



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY „CAROL I”
SECURITY AND DEFENSE FACULTY DOCTORAL SCHOOL

PROCEEDINGS

THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE
“STRATEGIES XXI”

STRATEGIC CHANGES IN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Volume 1

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Lieutenant Colonel Associate Professor Daniel GHIBA, PhD

April 2 - 3, 2015
Bucharest, Romania

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE STRATEGIES XXI
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ISSN 2285-8318

ISSN-L 2285-8318



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


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THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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RELIGION, CHURCH AND GEO-POLITICS

Carol-Teodor PETERFI,

PhD. Candidate, University of Tartu, Estonia
carolpeterfi@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The religion has often been criticized for having been a source of war and conflict rather than a vehicle of peace. For more than 1500 years the Church was a major influence on the state and to its politics. Now a day the most of the modern and democratic countries claim a separation between State and Church. Also they consider as being very difficult to go back to an era when the Church treated the state as its instrument. But, in spite of those claims, one can observe that often enough, religion and church hold the media's headline. My essay explores the impact of religion towards the contemporary politics and church's influence on national and international arena.*

Key words: *churches, Catholicism, Islamism, religion.*

Religion and its geo-political role

A commonly cited example of the centrality of religion as political factors is the artificial set up of Pakistan. In 1947, after one century of British rule, the Indian Viceroyalty, 'Britain's Crown Gem', was divided on confessional lines into two distinct states: the Indian union (Hindu) and Pakistan (Islamic). The latter consisted of two territories 2000 km from each other: West Pakistan, on the axis of Indus river and located between the Himalaya Mountains and Indian Ocean shore and East Pakistan, on the Gange-Brahmaputra river and the nearby plain.

In the same category of religion's role in politics falls the transformation of Iran, from the Empire of Iran into the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 1979, Iran's monarchy (Pahlavi dynasty) under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was overthrown and replaced with an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution. In the name of the Revolution Ayatollah Khomeini established the Islamic Revolutionary Council that proclaimed on 1st April 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran.¹ The new constitution approved by referendum in December 1979, transformed Iran into an Islamic Religious State. This state is led by the Islamic clergy at all levels of society following traditional precepts of Islam and rejects all other values outside the Koran, especially American and Western European values. Today, in accordance with the provision of the 1989 Constitution which was approved by referendum, Iran is a Shiite Muslim State and the supreme authority is the supreme religious leader. In this case there are many problems regarding the human rights and their interpretation, particularly in how they are understood by Iranian authorities and by the United Nations. In the end, in both cases the religious factor prevailed and thus it can be considered as a decisive political aspect that influenced and led security decisions.

On the other hand, it is useful to remember that the religious unity of some countries did not stop the outbreak or recurrence of bloody wars. For example Iraqi-Iranian (1980-1988) and Iraqi-Kuwait (1990-1991) conflicts were wars waged between Muslim nations for power-political reasons. The 1990 Iraqi-Kuwait conflict requested the United Nation Security Council resolution for a multinational military intervention against the aggressor (Iraq) that

¹ See for details Imam Khomeini, 'Governance of the Jurist' ('*Velayat-e Faqeeh*'), (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works), accessed August 6, 2013, http://www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/books/velayat_faqqeh.pdf.

ended up with the forced withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the restoration of the initial border. This conflict had an economic cause which was control of the oil fields of Kuwait. Control of these assets was seen as a politico-economic tool necessary for Iraq to gain the regional hegemony in the Middle East and to control oil exports, and subsequently, oil stocks. Thus, a legitimate question arises: can we still talk today about 'religious wars'? Or do religions only pursue some specific political objectives that directly influence the dynamics of wars and violent conflicts?

Today we cannot speak solely about 'religious wars', although one can consider under this concept the Israeli-Palestinian and Former Yugoslavia conflicts. To explain this position, I will offer three examples: Political Islam Catholicism and Orthodoxy.

Iranian Shi'ism can be considered as an eloquent example of political aims pursued by religion. After the victory of Islamic Revolution the Shiite Iranian clergy aspired for 'Islam Shi'ism for Islamization of the world'² according to some analysts. This ambition of Iranian State goes well beyond the power of Iran as a state that currently has a prudent external policy with a certain religious power, but for now it is doing so without great success. Two opinions about Islam as a political force are common among Western academics and politicians. The first considers that 'radical Islam reached the maximum of its development and it is already into a descending trend'.³ The terrorist attacks on 9/11 contradict these perceptions. Some analysts⁴ consider that Political Islam will remain an important factor of social, cultural and political dynamic that conducts internal evolution of Islamic countries. It will equally affect regional politics and the international connections of the Islamic countries, but will not be the only factor of evolution or even the most determinant one. Above all, Political Islam will not vanish but will also not likely be the sole factor that will regulate the future of the Islamic world.⁵ A similar opinion can be found in the writings of Jean Carlo, an Italian geo-politician who underlines that, 'in reality, Islam is far from being monolithic; moreover, it is profoundly divided. To speak about Islamic danger is as to speak about Christian danger'.⁶

Islam remains a complex phenomenon, hard to control and with some aspects that contributed to the violence in Afghanistan today or to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. But these are also emergent hot spots such as former Asian Soviet republics and Middle Eastern and North African countries. Less known than 9/11, but important to illustrate religion as a political factor, is the situation in the former Soviet Asian states where the Islamic feelings were sharpened by the political openness process initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev. This awakening was predominantly religious and cultural, but it embodied a political dimension as well. In this respect, in Central Asia and the Caucasus there appeared parties that have

² Chauprade Aymeric and Thual Francois, *Dictionnaire de Geopolitique (Dictionary of geopolitics)*, (Paris: Eclipses, 1998), 564.

³ Adrian Pop, 'Foreword' in '*Puteri și Influențe: Anuar de geopolitică și geostrategie 2000-2001*' ('*Powers and Influences: Yearbook of geopolitics and geo-strategy 2000-2001*'), ed. Adrian Pop, Arnaud Blin, Gerard Chaliand, Francois Gere, and Narcisa Șerbănescu (București: Corint, 2001), 5.

⁴ See Laura Sitaru, *Gândirea politică arabă (Arab Political Thinking)*, (București: Polirom, 2009); Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Dale F. Eikelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics)*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁵ Thomson S. Hunter, 'Ce va deveni Islamul Politic' ('What Political Islam Will Become') in '*Puteri și Influențe: Anuar de geopolitică și geostrategie 2000-2001 (Powers and Influences: Yearbook of geopolitics and geo-strategy 2000-2001)*', ed. Adrian Pop, Arnaud Blin, Gerard Chaliand, Francois Gere, Narcisa Șerbănescu. (București: Corint, 2001), 117.

⁶ Jean Carlo, 'Geopolitică și religie. Insurecții religioase în secolul XX. Insurecția euxiniană.' ('Geopolitics and Religion. Religious insurrections in 20th Century. Euxinian Insurrection'), *Revista Euxin (Euxin Magazine)*, Issue 1-2, (1997), 218.

declared themselves as Islamic.⁷ Some conflicts in the region have occurred, as the civil war from Tajikistan (1992 – 1997), the Chechen war (1994 – 1996, resumed after 1998), and conflicts from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

In the framework of ‘political Islam’, one can include ‘Islamic terrorism’. Now a day and probably the most notorious example of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is represented by the Islamic State (IS). The increasing instability of the Middle East and the incapacity of some Arabic states to offer a steady development of their nations created a heaven for jihadi militancy. The socio-political vacuum produced by the intense turmoil in Arabic Peninsula, particularly in Iraq and Syria, was heavily exploited by jihadi groups in order to emerge, expand, and consolidate their operations. On those political and social backgrounds the Islamic State⁸ was able to rise to prominence. In less than 15 years,⁹ Islamic States was able to transform from a small and unstructured body with broad international ambitions into a vast and well structured organization that governs a transnational ‘caliphate’.¹⁰ The Islamic State declared by the Islamist group is the first and so far the sole attempt to resurrect a governmental system used by early Muslims after the abolishment of the last caliphate ruled by Ottoman Empire.¹¹ The ideology of the Islamic State is of Salafist-jihadism. In this political system there is no distinction between religion and state. As a system of government, the caliphate is considered as divinely sanctioned religious monarchy that invests the ruling power in the hands of the caliph, who has the supreme religious and political jurisdiction over the entire Muslim (*Ummah*) nation. The caliph decisions are based on the hard-line interpretation of sharia law (Islamic law) that also suppresses any other laic juridical systems.

The Islamic State has, as any other well structured states, short, medium and long terms objectives. If on the short term its objective is to consolidate the state in all conquered and controlled areas, the ultimate aim is nothing but the total domination of the world. As such, the nascent caliphate has no plans to resume the expansions. There are speculations regarding the Islamic States new targets as Saudi Arabia and Jordan.¹²

While the Islamic State it is considered a terrorist organization at its most basic level, there are no doubts that by establishing a transnational state across Syria and Iraq has demonstrated the scale of his political goals and capabilities. Exploiting the regional instability of the Middle East and the controversial geopolitical interest in the area, the Islamic State gained military power, international membership and unprecedented financial resources.

Although the Islamic State evolution keeps the attention of the entire world, the most eloquent example of Islamic terrorism remains the 9/11 attack against New York (*World Trade Center*) and the Pentagon against symbols of the largest power of the world. This terrorist attack took place in a period when the United States had an absolute superior position which conferred upon it a real degree of security. ‘And yet, in America as an analyst wrote one year before World Trade Center attack, there is the impression that the national security is under the threats of some attacks coming from abroad.’¹³ That is exactly what happened.

⁷ Thomson S. Hunter, ‘Ce va deveni Islamul Politic’ (‘What Political Islam Will Become’) in *Puteri și Influențe: Anuar de geopolitică și geostrategie 2000-2001 (Powers and Influences: Yearbook of geopolitics and geo-strategy 2000-2001)*, ed. Adrian Pop, Arnaud Blin, Gerard Chaliand, Francois Gere, Narcisa Șerbănescu. (București: Corint, 2001), 116.

⁸ previously known as Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)

⁹ What is now the Islamic State began as a group called *Jamaat al-Tahwid wa-i-Jihad* (JTWJ), founded in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

¹⁰ The Caliphate was established on June 29, 2014. See the entire declaration of the establishment of the Caliphate by the Islamic State at <http://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/06/29/the-islamic-state-restores-the-caliphate/>

¹¹ The last caliphate was abolished by the secular Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk in 1924.

¹² <http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/isis-next-targets-jordan-and-saudi-arabia>

¹³ Arnaud Blin, ‘Amenințări virtuale’ (‘Virtual Threats’), *Puteri și Influențe: Anuar de geopolitică și geostrategie 2000-2001 (Powers and Influences: Yearbook of geopolitics and geo-strategy 2000-2001)*, (București: Corint, 2001), 86.

Churches as political factor

In respect with the political objectives pursued by religions, an even more conclusive example than Islamism is Catholicism.¹⁴ This latter religion never gave up its original mission of reaching the unity of the world through evangelization. Today it carries out a peaceful policy, but this does not exclude in specific cases support for participant sides in conflict: Croatia against Serbia¹⁵ during the Yugoslavia war, or support of the Polish population against the Communist Party in the 1980s. It is notable to mention the role of religious elites in politics and a good example is Pope John Paul II. Karol Wojtyla was the supreme pontiff of the Universal Church between 1978 and 2005. In his capacity as Pope he used the extensive resources of his office to focus the attention of the world towards his homeland Poland. He invested considerable personal energy to radically change and reformulate the Polish policy and government. Using the Polish example he aimed to systematically change the political and social life of the European continent.¹⁶ Involvement in political life is nothing new for Roman Catholic Church. There are many examples from history.¹⁷ But, with regard to the involvement of the Catholic Church in political life it is useful to mention its transformed vision that happened after the 'Second Vatican Council' (1962-1965). This forum reshaped the Catholic Church way of thinking regarding church-state relationships, religious liberty, and the issues of political participation in the modern world.¹⁸

The new changes introduced by the Vatican II energized a long series of social actions designed to serve humankind. Since then Catholics have been thought that to care about the world and its inhabitants is a norm of discipleship.¹⁹ This citizenship consciousness to be followed by believers in their pastoral vocation will be one of the most important factors that shape the support of the Catholic Church towards or against different political actions and serves as a powerful mobilizing factor.

In international realm the Vatican acts as transnational actor. A good example is the United Nation Third International Conference and Population Development in 1994. In that conference President Clinton strongly supported by the industrialized countries, wanted a final resolution with a clear pro-choice language on abortion that links the population control with development. Because the United States was supported by many industrialized countries the Clinton administration was confident if would achieve its political objectives. Although the draft document granted 90% of what the United States and its allies wanted, the remaining 10% proved lethal for United States interests. The Holy See, leading a group of Latin America states and some Muslim allies, succeeded in derailing negotiations on abortion and family planning. The final document produced by conference did not include the pro-choice language

¹⁴ Catholicism is not a religion *per se*. It is part of the Christianity but for the purpose of the sub-chapter it can be consider as religion.

¹⁵ Alex J. Bellamy, 'The Catholic Church and Croatia's Two Transitions', *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2002), 46.

¹⁶ Timothy A. Byrnes, 'The Polish Church: Hierarchy and Polish Politics,' in *The Catholic Church and the Nation-state: Comparative Perspectives*, eds. Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence Christopher Reardon, Clyde Wilcox (Washington: George Washington University Press, 2006), 103.

¹⁷ Eric O. Hanson, *The Catholic Church in World Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Marvin L. Krier Mich, *Catholic Social Teaching and Movements*, (Mystic CT, Twenty-Third Publication, 2000, 2nd edition).

¹⁸ For more details see Phillip Wogaman, *Christianity and Politics, reviewed and expanded edition* (Louisville: Westminster: John Knox Press, 2000), 46.

¹⁹ Kennet R. Himes, 'Vatican II and Contemporary Politics', in *The Catholic Church and the Nation-state: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence Christopher Reardon, Clyde Wilcox, (Washington: George Washington University Press, 2006), 29.

desired by most of the industrialized West. This shows the considerable influence wielded by Catholic Church, yet it is a force without any military power.²⁰

In the international system the Catholic Church has a unique identity being a state, an Intergovernmental Organisation (IGO) and Non Governmental Organisation (NGO). This specific identity allows it to act and influence international relations in a distinctive way. Being an NGO, Catholic Church like other churches, cannot rely on economic or military strength to influence the international dynamic of suzerain states. Therefore, the Holy See has to rely on its soft power that comes from its worldwide membership. Its largely diffuse body shapes the attention of the states and guarantees that the Church's voice is heard even, if is not headed. And being heard is not a small victory in international relation arena.

On the other hand, the Holy See is directly linked with a suzerain actor (state), the Vatican City. Because of this, it can relate with other states as any other states though its diplomatic and legal representatives. In this way, the Catholic Church has channels for actions with direct access to the heads of states and governments that are not available to an NGO. These channels are critical in international relations and indispensable for political lobbying. In the same way its affiliation with an independent state (Vatican City) enhances its ability to act in the international system. Due to its unique identity, size and geographical distribution of the adherents, the Holy See has leverage in interacting with states and to commands an array of powerful symbols in the global political discourse.²¹ Today the Catholic Church is a unique representative of a religion with a coherent international policy and a global strategy, being the only exclusively religious founded state in the world, the Vatican, and its numerous diplomatic embassies and worldwide resources.

Less discussed, but also important in the political role of religion is the Orthodox Church. Orthodoxy is not a religion per se, but a denomination of Christianity. Unlike Catholic Church the Orthodox Churches are autocephalous and autonomous. This means that they are churches that are self-governed. In spite of their independence they recognize one another and are in full communion each other. Together they constitute so-called 'the Orthodox Church', but may also be referred to as the 'mainstream Orthodox Church or World Orthodoxy'. Because of its influence on other churches, this study discusses further about religion and politics in Russian Orthodox Church.

The government of Russian Federation and Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)²² recently underwent back-to-back changes in each institution's leadership how did the changes occur in their political relationship and how are these reflected abroad.

The Moscow Patriarchate, like the Russian government, is involved and concerned about the developments outside Russian Federation territory and how these developments may influence their domestic affairs and interests. This interest is not a theoretic one and goes beyond the limits of the former Soviet Block states (Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Estonia) and extends to other states where the Russian Orthodox Christians may be living, provided they 'voluntarily' join the Moscow Patriarchate's jurisdiction.²³ In Patriarch Kirill's view, the Russian Orthodox Church has a genuine global purview and virtually covers every country and as many major governmental institutions. Patriarch Kirill notes, 'the universal nature of the Christian teaching make us interested in various spheres of the life society. The

²⁰ Lissa L. Ferrari, 'The Vatican as a Transnational Actor', in *The Catholic Church and the Nation-state: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence Christopher Reardon, Clyde Wilcox, (Washington: George Washington University Press, 2006). 33.

²¹ *Ibid*, pp. 48

²² The term also defines the Moscow Patriarchate.

²³ 'The Statute of Russian Orthodox Church', *Department for External Church Relation of the Moscow Patriarchate*, point I, § 3, accessed November 19, 2011, <http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/3/15.aspx>.

Church acts on equal footing as a subject of relations with different states and with international public and political organizations. We defend our values and promote the rights and interest of our congregations.’²⁴

The diplomatic relations, and most of the work carried out abroad by the Russian Orthodox Church, is managed through its Department of External Church Relations (DECR). Its main task is to ‘maintain the Church’s relation with Local Orthodox Churches, non-Orthodox Churches, Christian organizations and non-Christian religious communities, as well as governmental, parliamentary, inter-governmental, religious and public bodies abroad and public international organizations.’²⁵ In practice, this department acts as a de facto foreign ministry that hosts ambassadors, organizes visits and interacts with the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international organizations.²⁶

The objectives of the Russian Orthodox Church in terms of foreign policy are diverse and multi-pronged, resembling the Russian government foreign policy priorities. This is reflected in a letter addressed by Patriarch Kirill to Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on the occasion of his 60th birthday, ‘during your service as foreign minister, the cooperation between the Russian foreign policy department and the Moscow Patriarchate has considerably broadened.’²⁷

In order to strengthen and coordinate the efforts of foreign policy, in 2003, following the visit paid by Patriarch Alexei to Russia’s Foreign Minister, a decision was made to establish a common working group – the Russian Orthodox Church – Ministry of Foreign Affairs Working Group. The aim of this working group is to develop policies related to protecting and expanding Russia’s ‘spiritual’ values and the Russian Orthodox Church relations abroad. In the eyes of Foreign Minister Lavrov the group would enable both institutions to work ‘together realizing a whole array of foreign policy and international activity thrusts.’²⁸ In general this working group meets regularly to discuss various issues including the protection and maintenance of cultural and spiritual links with Russians abroad. The official purpose is to preserve ‘the cultural and historic legacy of [the] Fatherland and of the Russian language.’²⁹ In promoting this purpose Mr. Lavrov portrays the Russian Orthodox Church as nothing less than ‘a huge mainstay of government actions in this sector.’³⁰ In more specific terms this forum serves as a strategy session that addresses the planning of the Patriarch’s international travels and evaluates the Russian Orthodox Church performance and actions in international organizations, as well as its developments in inter-religious relations, including those with Vatican. It is obvious that Russian Orthodox Church and Minister of Foreign Affairs works in tandem to promote and achieve the state’s foreign policy goals granting the Church and ‘traditional’ religious values greater prominence within the international system.

²⁴ ‘Church Diplomacy Is Not Just a Matter of Inter-Church Relations’, *Diplomat* (September 2008), pp. 12-13

²⁵ Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate (DECR), Department for External Church Relations of Russian Orthodox Church, accessed November 19, 2011, <http://www.mospat.ru/en/departament/today/>.

²⁶ See for details The DECR Secretariat for the Far Abroad, Department for External Church Relations of Russian Orthodox Church, accessed November 19, 2011, <http://www.mospat.ru/en/departament/secretary-2/>.

²⁷ ‘Patriarch Kirill’s Congratulatory Message to Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov’, *Department for External Church Relations of Russian Orthodox Church* (22 March 2010), accessed November 19, 2011, <http://www.mospat.ru/en/2010/03/22/news14871/>.

²⁸ Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Remarks at orthodox Ester Reception, Moscow,’ last modified April 30, 2008, (describing the foreign policy collaboration of the ROC and MOFA) http://www.in.mid.ro/BRP_4.NSF/f68cd37b84711611c3256f6d00541094/061ff2b937bf6b62c3257440002637f9?OpenDocument.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid*

On the other hand, this working partnership is another proof of the Russian Orthodox Church's special treatment and privileges compared to other churches, denominations or religions. One can study the activities of the same working group regarding cooperation with Muslim organizations. The Advisory Council on Cooperation with Muslim Organizations established at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs level has met only couple of times since its establishment in June 2007. The discussions were limited to the status and prospect of Islamic education and problems encountered by Russian Muslims during hajj³¹ to Saudi Arabia.³²

At the international level the joint efforts of Russia's government and the Russian Orthodox Church is to facilitate a special podium for Orthodoxy at the United Nations. In this respect the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks a permanent role for the Moscow Patriarchate within a variety of United Nations forums. An example of this is the exhibition sponsored by Russia's Permanent Mission to the United Nations entitled 'Russian Orthodox Church and Interreligious Dialogue: Spiritual Revival of Russia'.³³ Although the theme is the interreligious dialogue, the content of the exhibition reflects an effort of Russian Orthodox Church to undermine the so-called 'non-traditional' religions in Russia. This effort was also evident in the discourse of the Patriarch Alexy at the opening ceremony who excluded thousands of Russian citizens who are of other religions than those accepted by Moscow Patriarchate by stating that: '... we, Russians Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Jews, and Buddhists, live in peace. And at the heart of this peace is our respect for each other's traditions, ways of life and social models.'³⁴

Conclusions

Religion indeed plays an important role in the world politics and the religion's force can not be underestimated or simply ignored. But, in considering the political role of religion one should bear in mind the difference between Church and religion. In a broad sense religion is defined as an organized system of beliefs that relates man with divinity. Religion embodies a moral code and values that apply to those who share the same faith and regulate their daily behaviour. Unlike the term religion, the word church has different meanings. A church can be either a building or a social structure. As a social structure, it consists of the community of people who share the same faith and willingly accept and follow the same norms and rules in practicing their faith.

From the definitions above the reader should understand that, although religion can influence politics due to the commitment of its followers towards some certain values, the church is more influential because it is a social structure and as such a church has its own agenda and interests that must be defended, protected or extended. The church in the biblical understanding is the community of people and not a building. Being a human community it has human interests that can differ from another community, even if the latter group belongs to the same religion or to a different one. Therefore, from the examples presented, the reader can acknowledge two ways in which religion affects politics. First, religion is used as an ideology and as a system of control. For example, the promotion of political Islam is now referred to as Islamism to distinguish it from the religion. Fundamentalist beliefs look like

³¹ Hajji is an honorific title given to a Muslim person who has successfully completed the Hajj to Mecca and is often used to refer to an elder, since it can take time to accumulate the wealth to fund the travel.

³² For more details see in Russian language: 'Press Release on the Meeting of the Advisory Council for Cooperation with the Russian Foreign Ministry and Russian Muslim Organizations', *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation* (27 March 2008).

³³ Press Release, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, On the opening at the United Nations Headquarters of the photo exhibition 'Russian Orthodox Church and Interreligious Dialogue: Spiritual Revival of Russia' (8 October 2007), accessed February 12, 2013, <http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/press/071008eprel.htm>

³⁴ *Ibid.*

ideologies because that they claim absolute authority and do not allow for competing ideas or power sharing. In some cases the emphasis on gaining political power is so great that the movement becomes more ideological than religious.³⁵ The second example refers to the church as a community and from here the church's political role becomes more complicated. The political role of church as community is dictated by its parishioners. In simple terms, the church will support the community policy protecting, defending or extending the interests of the group. This happens because churches provide an interpretation of the reality which intersects with other social interpretations. Since those religious interpretations crisscross the political, social and ethical ones the church has the obligation to take concrete actions, be they of advocacy or criticism. Such stances of criticism or advocacy cannot be seen solely as theological. They are often based on rational and ethical grounds that are intersected or emphasised by church's religious vision and community interests.³⁶

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³⁵ Jeffrey Key, 'Ideology, Religion and Politics: The History of a Changing Concept', accessed February 18, 2013, <http://www.daniellazar.com/wp-content/uploads/ideology-religion-and-politics-briefing-paper-4p.doc>.

³⁶ See the judicious comments of George G. Higgins, 'The Problems in Preaching: Politics/What Place in the Church?' *Origins* 2, Vol. 13 (Sept. 21, 1972), 207, 212-214, and Walter J. Burghardt, 'Preaching the Just Word,' in *Liturgy and Social Justice*, ed. Mark Searle (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1980), 36-52.

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SWOT ANALYSIS REGARDING THE PUBLIC ORDER ON NATIONAL TERRITORY

Ciprian Vasile MAFTEI,

PhD. Candidate, Doctoral School for „Public Order and National Security”/
„Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Police Academy of Bucharest
“CAROL I” National Defense University, Bucharest
mafteimvc@yahoo.com

Dănuț MAFTEI,

PhD. Candidate, Doctoral School for „Public Order and National Security”/
„Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Police Academy of Bucharest
“CAROL I” National Defense University, Bucharest
dn.maftei@gmail.com

Abstract: *By using the SWOT analysis principles, this paperwork aims to identify and highlight the strong and the weak points, the threats and the opportunities of the public order national system, as well as to put forward some proposals meant to improve the deficiencies noted. In order to accurately assess the positive and negative aspects of the public order national system, the following vectors are being taken into consideration: human resources, the managerial factor, logistic and administrative resources, practical aspects and public impact. It is a research compiled by studying the current Romanian legal framework related to the subject and by interviewing several experienced employees of the national law agencies.*
Key'words: *opportunities, public order national system, strengths, threats, weaknesses.*

Introduction

Public Order is defined as a constituent part of the national security and European public order and represents the state of legality, stability and peace through which a state can ensure public peace, health and moral values, as well as personal, collective and goods' security, the maintaining of which is realized through specific preventive and constrictive measures.¹

The Public Order National System is an ensemble consisting of legislation, public administration, institutions, forces and resources especially created and trained, who act as a guarantee for the citizens rights and liberties, protection of private and public property and the normal and legal state functioning. A national Public Order system usually comprises specialized, complementary and exceptional forces.²

Strengths/ Weaknesses (Vulnerabilities)

In order to accurately assess the positive and negative aspects of the public order national system, the following vectors are being taken into consideration: human resources,

¹ Damian Miclea, Iulian Maxim, Ștefan Dogaru, "Politici și strategii în ordine publică și siguranță națională", pag. 12, București 2012 (op. cit. Stancu Șerb, Constantin Drăghici, Andrei Ignat, Adrian Iacob, Drept polițienesc și contravențional, Editura Tritonic, București 2003, p. 11)

² Damian Miclea, Iulian Maxim, Ștefan Dogaru, "Politici și strategii în ordine publică și siguranță națională", pag. 6, București 2012

the managerial factor, logistic and administrative resources, practical aspects and public impact (including media impact).

Strengths

1. From a human resources perspective.

- a. An existing efficient system for personnel initial training poses a major advantage (herein taking, as well, into consideration the specialized, complementary and exceptional forces acting in the national public order system). The complete successful formation process, starting with admission, continuing with regular training and finishing with graduation, represents a major guarantee of the abilities and skills of the future operator.
As well as this, the existence of a good continuous educational system must be underlined, as well as the facilities offered for the improvement of personnel skills (e.g. the continuous education offers issued by the national public order institutions: the Police Academy, the Institute for Public Order Studies, etc.).
- b. The recruitment of skilled specialists from relevant external sources in exceptional areas of activity (e.g. information technology, public communication, psychology), which has brought an increase of professional value to the Public Order System.
- c. The high work capacity and performance specific to the majority of the public order system personnel (military or special public servants). To support this, we mention that, despite the imbalance between workload and personnel deficit, the work tasks, in most of the cases, are completed under normal parameters. Moreover, to further support the aforementioned idea, we give as example the great performances achieved by the Romanian seconded experts within the international and cooperation missions, based on the experience and training received within the national Public Order educational system.

2. From a managerial standpoint concerning the coordination of activities performed for ensuring, maintaining and reestablishing public order.

- a. A good coordination between the institutions of the Public Order system.³
- b. International cooperation in the field of public order and tackling criminality has been strengthened as a consequence of the internationalization of threats and the need to jointly counter them.⁴

3. From an administrative and logistic point of view.

The ability of the personnel within the Public Order sector to optimize their performances despite the limited access to logistic resources.

4. The results of the actions carried out by the institutions within the National Public Order System.

The institution within the Public Order System manage to respond to complex challenges, maintaining a climate of order and public safety characterized by stability and legal normality, while facing a complex system of factors and circumstances.

³ An illustrative example is the good cooperation between the Romanian Police, the Romanian Gendarmerie and other institutions in the field of Public Order, including through regular activities such as joint patrols (<http://www.voceatransilvaniei.ro/din-septembrie-patrule-mixte-de-politie-jandarmi-si-politie-locala-zonele-probleme-ale-baii-mari/>).

⁴ For example, the international cooperation developed through INTERPOL, EUROPOL or EUGENDFOR (the European Gendarmerie Force, <http://www.eurogendfor.org/>).

Weaknesses

1. From the perspective of the human resources management.

- a. The increase of anxiety among personnel, as a result of several factors:
 - realizing that job security no longer represents a sole result of one's own behavior⁵;
 - the lack of legal possibilities for supplementing the income, by performing other professional activities⁶;
 - the self endangering of personnel living standards, due to poor decisions taken during a period of visible economic growth (until 2009) ⁷;
 - the slight chances of a viable alternative for a work-place in case of leaving the public system, not only because of economical disadvantages, but also because the Public Order System is quite exclusivist⁸;
 - some issues which sometimes occur within the career promotion system, as for example: derogations, subjective external influences, etc;
- b. The cases related to the recruitment of specialists from external sources for exceptional domains within the Public Order system, who end up working in different fields of activity, in opposition to the initial goal for which they were hired, or without the experience and educational prerequisites imposed by the respective position;⁹
- c. Staff members often migrate from one department to another in search of a better job satisfaction, thus disrupting the accumulation of solid experience in well-defined areas and possibly leading to de-professionalization;¹⁰
- d. The shortage of efficient motivational strategies, pecuniary or work related satisfaction.

2. From a managerial standpoint concerning the coordination of activities performed for ensuring, maintaining and reestablishing public order.

- a. Some managers still use outdated principles and wrong ideas regarding the managerial act, often based upon: the clear distinction and the gaps within the hierarchical system; the centralization of decisions; the existence of an *abusive* or *abrasive* conduct¹¹ on behalf of the superiors; ignoring the benefits stemming from the creation of a transparent and proactive environment.
- b. Cases of unjust and unequal treatment of the subordinates, without respecting the meritocracy principles.

1. From an administrative and logistic point of view.

Work performance could be affected in many cases by limited logistic resources, sometimes forcing personnel to make contributions out of their own earnings for ensuring proper working conditions.

2. From the perspective of results and impact of the actions undertaken by institutions pertaining to the National Public Order System.

⁵ For example, the decision, taken in the period of severe economic crisis, to cut a number of staff positions within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

⁶ There are very limited exceptions provided by law.

⁷ For example, nonperforming bank loans.

⁸ There are limited fields of activity within which a sacked or retired policeman could performed in accordance to his/her Police skills (for example, as security guard or private investigator).

⁹ For example, a staff member recruited from an external source for an IT position, after a while might be promoted as the head of an department specialized in criminal investigations.

¹¹ Eugen Avram și Cary Cooper, *Cultura organizațional managerial. Tendințe actuale*, Editura Collegium, 2008, p. 128.

Both direct and indirect public communication between the Public Order System institutions and the citizens sometimes are not always as efficient as required.¹²

Opportunities / Threats

Opportunities

1. Specific aspects of the national environment

- a. The innate characteristic of the Romanian people to express its dissatisfactions and to enact its reactions in an acceptable social framework.¹³
- b. Despite globalization, Romania has yet to become a destination of immigration, being primarily used as a transit space.
- c. Romania has yet to become a major target of the terrorist phenomena.
- d. Despite the existing economic climate (both global and national) and the current demographic situation, unemployment is at a reasonable position compared to other member states, such as Spain or Portugal.

2. From a human resources perspective.

The opportunity of engaging personnel who acquired experience within international institutions (or cooperation mechanisms), where they had the opportunity of gaining skills and best practices from colleagues within other states, as well as enriching their own knowledge by attending courses and programs during their assignments.¹⁴

3. From a managerial standpoint concerning the coordination of activities performed for ensuring, maintaining and reestablishing public order.

The possibility of improving the organizational culture of the National Public Order System through the adoption and adaptation of ideas generated by globalization trends and geopolitical reforms.

4. From an administrative and logistic resources point of view.

The opportunity of accessing structural funds available for new EU member states, as well as the possibility of decentralizing the public order components towards local authorities, while increasing responsibility for other components.¹⁵

5. From the perspective of external factors.

The opportunity of institutional cooperation and intelligence exchange with institutions from other public order systems, with the aim to prevent the risks and threats related to public order, which spread beyond the national spectrum or have been internationalized.¹⁶

Threats

1. Internal threats:

- the tendency of a part of mass-media to reflect reality in a spectacular, mostly negativistic manner, which can lead to a decrease of institutional trust and respect in the eyes of the general public;
- the damage sustained by some components of organizational culture, such as the emergence of conceptual differences between personal and institutional identity;

¹² We consider that the dissolution of the "sectorist's" department within the Public Order Police created an disadvantage in the relation with the community which could not been fully replaced by the establishment of the Police of Proximity

¹³ Comparing with other states, as for example: Greece or Middle East countries.

¹⁴ There are EU states, which, alongside with accomplishing their commitment to the CSDP missions, aims that their seconded staff to get available specialized training (unavailable or very expensive in their countries).

¹⁵ For example, the transfer of certain responsibilities related to Public Order from the National Police to Gendarmerie and, in some cases, to the Local Police.

¹⁶ For example: S.E.C.I. Center, INTERPOL, EUROPOL, FRONTEX.

- cases of corruption and inadequate behavior inconsistent with the institutions responsible for carrying out public policy;
- the risk of declining the public confidence in state institutions and justice;
- in opposition to the traditional national Romanian people's approach on public manifestations, some modern historical experience proves that at times there might be a higher risks of unpredictable social unrest which could make difficult to control the crowd's energy;¹⁷
- issues related to some state-owned companies that in the current economic and political context present an increased risk of insolvency and bankruptcy, thus leading to the loss of a significant number of jobs, which can generate social tensions and even violent reactions.

2. External threats¹⁸:

- "the development, consolidation and specialization of organized crime groups, their internationalization and attractiveness for national criminal elements;
- the inclusion of national territory in the transnational circuit of illegal migration, trafficking in drugs, human beings, weapons, explosives, toxic and radioactive substances, as well as monetary counterfeit;
- the increasing terrorist threats, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trafficking in technologies and materials prohibited from holding without authorization;
- the increased interest of some foreign investors to obtain, through illegal financial transactions, the majority of shares in companies that produce and use chemicals, materials and strategic national technology, with intent to export, directly or through an intermediary, to conflict or embargoed zones;
- the diversification of the modus operandi used for money laundering;
- the proliferation of illicit small arms trafficking and increased possibility of losing control of the management and operation of weapons of mass destruction;
- the manifestation of autonomy trends in certain regions, based on ethnic or religious criteria;
- natural or technological accidents with trans-border effects;
- the reduction of the access to strategic resources, information technology and advanced equipment technologies;
- the increasing phenomenon of illegal migration";
- the increasing influence of foreign extremist ideologies, acting in the background of the economic crisis, will generate specific anti-globalization trends, such as those that have already occurred in various European cities.

Proposals for reforming the public order national system

In order to prevent the results and conclusions of a SWOT analysis not to lay dormant at a theoretical stage, they ought to be practically used so as to create strategies and procedures that will improve and optimize the analysis subject.¹⁹

In this respect, we submit the following proposals meant to improve the quality and the robustness of the National Public Order System:

- ❖ the amendment of the legislation concerning the following aspects:

¹⁷ For example, the violent demonstrations involving the miners from Jiu Valley which occurred in the 90's.

¹⁸ Damian Miclea, Iulian Maxim, Ștefan Dogaru, *"Politici și strategii în ordine public și siguranță națională"*, pag. 46-47, București 2012 (cit. The Strategy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for realizing Public Order and Security).

¹⁹ Some say that, if there are no practical utilities, the SWOT analysis is a: Significant **W**aste **O**f **T**ime.

- granting the possibility for the personnel within the public order system to engage in additional income generating activities which do not affect in any way their main job;
- the enhancement of the social protection measures and creation of viable job alternatives for the retired or dismissed staff members;
- establishing clear and strict criteria and methods for regulating employment and promotion from executive and management positions, meant to limit the possibility of granting exemptions.
- ❖ implementation of quality standards in the field of public order management, meant to promote a proactive attitude of the managers towards the employees and the decentralization of the decision making based on expertise and accountability;
- ❖ the optimal use of knowledge and skills acquired by personnel that have performed in international organizations and cooperation mechanisms;
- ❖ adoption of the best European and international standards, especially those which proved their effectiveness in other states, with respect to national particularities;
- ❖ conducting studies that capture a true picture of organizational climate and reflect particularities, typology and the organizational culture of institutions in the field of public order, with the aim to correct the negative elements and effects;
- ❖ increasing the effectiveness of the public relations departments, by recruiting experienced and skilled personnel from external sources;
- ❖ improving the logistic resources by decentralizing some components of the public order system and through initiation of robust projects financed from European funds.

This paper has been financially supported within the project entitled „*Horizon 2020 - Doctoral and Postdoctoral Studies: Promoting the National Interest through Excellence, Competitiveness and Responsibility in the Field of Romanian Fundamental and Applied Scientific Research*”, contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/140106. This project is co-financed by European Social Fund through Sectorial Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013. **Investing in people!**

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CIVIL-MILITARY COLLABORATION IN JORDAN - SYRIAN REFUGEES CASE STUDY

Raluca ZAMFIRESCU,

MSc in Crisis and Security Management candidate, Leiden University, Netherlands
raluca.zam@gmail.com

Abstract: *Identifying and looking from different angles at the humanitarian and security aspects when trying to deal with refugees, this network management plan is describing and analyzing the operating system of multi-agencies collaboration, integrating smart practices on how agencies can improve their collaboration in order to obtain better and faster results. Describing information on the problematic of Syrian refugees in Jordan, this policy is intended to be a comprehensive tool, addressed to people working in this field, especially to the ones that want to get an insight in this matter of global interest, namely social workers, psychologists, medical staff and so on.*

Key'words: *aid, risk, network, methodology, assessment, collaboration.*

“Interagency collaboration is defined as activities by agencies intended to increase public value by having the agencies working together rather than separately. Although I cannot prove--and do not attempt to--that unexploited opportunities to create value in this way are abundant, many institutional features of our policymaking system suggest this is the case”¹ (Bardach, 1998).

Case Description

As a result of a common meeting between the legislative bodies from Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Jordan Mission, the US Ambassador in Jordan accepted to incorporate a four-man Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) within the embassy. The CMSE-Jordan would then become a follow-up of the Civil-Military Engagement (CME) program. This program is part of the US Special Operations Command that “facilitates the US interagency, host nation indigenous interagency authorities, select intergovernmental and nongovernmental partners, and the private sector to build, replace, repair, and sustain civil capabilities and capacities that eliminate, reduce, or mitigate civil vulnerabilities to local and regional populations”. The core purpose of the CME program is “to eliminate the underlying conditions and core motivations for local and regional population support to violent extremist organizations and their networks” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011).

In March 2012, after CMSE-Jordan members arrived to Amman, they immediately started to guide and coordinate the US team members already in place, in order to find the civil vulnerabilities located in high-priority areas where the US inter-agencies programs and activities weren't developed yet. After a consulting session, CMSE-Jordan took into consideration a USAID recommendation and decided to create a close collaboration with the Regional Refugee Coordinator (RefCoord) from the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). After multiple meetings between these organizations, PRM asked CMSE-Jordan to plan and access as many resources as possible in order to reduce the gaps and obstacles between the US and international assistance and the Jordanian assistance to the Syrian refugees (Hackenbracht, 2013).

¹ Eugene Bardach, *Getting Agencies to Work Together*

Being one of the most important US government agency coordinating refugee response in the area, PRM works closely with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other smaller NGOs. PRM main job is to effectively coordinate those organizations, contribute to their actions and plans and monitor their success and compatibility with the US policies on refugees. Before the current conflict in Syria, PRM's RefCoord was located at the US Embassy in Damascus and was monitoring and helping US support to Iraqi and Palestinian refugees. But after the conflict escalated in Syria and the US Embassy in Damascus got closed in February 2012, RefCoord changed the location to Amman. Immediately after, the agency started working with UNHCR in order to coordinate the growing number of refugees coming from Syria (US Department of State).

In spring 2012, UNHCR estimated the number of Syrian citizens in Jordan at around 140,000, including the ones able to sustain themselves through jobs or donations. Nonetheless, after April 2012, the Syrian refugees that requested daily assistance increased drastically. Taking this into consideration, together with a possible increase in the number of refugees, the US ambassador to Jordan guided the US governmental agencies present in the area to collaborate on this developing issue of the Syrian refugees. Working under this mission, PRM and CMSE-Jordan started to operate together. They created Syrian refugees plans and infrastructure, building Zaatari Refugee Camp for 100,000 persons located near Mafraq City (Hackenbracht, 2013).

One of the obstacles that both CMSE-Jordan and PRM had when working with UNHCR and other international organizations present in the area was their unwillingness to directly involve some Department of Defense (DoD) elements within the refugee plan of response. The UNHCR response to this issue was that including the US military in the refugee response was a risk in creating a distortional perception that the response effort was not a humanitarian one, but a militarized one (Hackenbracht, 2013).

In order to tone down this issue, PRM organized multiple discussions with the stakeholders involved in this issue. By restricting the DoD involvement as much as possible in creating infrastructure, helping the Jordanian government and assisting the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) Border Guard in charge with receiving the Syrian refugees, CMSE-Jordan finally received an informal approval and support of their humanitarian projects in the area. But another obstacle met in this situation was that the CMSE programs were only getting approved and applied in the circumstance of the response effort becoming overwhelmed, concluding that the US military still remains the extremely last option in taking action in the area. Taking all those limitation into consideration, CMSE-Jordan decided to begin using the civil affairs methodology in order to create and develop a realistic and effective course of action that encompasses a integrated US government plan of action to the Syrian refugees in Jordan (Hackenbracht, 2013).

Civil Affairs Methodology (Smart Practices)

United States Army policy coordinates civil affairs soldiers to work under specific planning process when it comes to conducting civil operations, the process being called 'civil affairs methodology'. This methodology is formed out of six major steps: assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, evaluate and transition (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011). Presenting this action planning process, CMSE-Jordan started working directly with the major governmental and nongovernmental organizations in the area such as PRM, UNHCR and the Jordanian officials, in order to create the best program in responding to the massive wave of Syrian refugees in Jordan and to identify the gaps in the organizational and logistical processes involved in this issue. Those six stages mentioned can also be called the smart practices of a forming system of action involving the inter-agencies collaboration in Jordan regarding the crisis of the Syrian refugees. The smart practices will be described in

detail, exposing the best way on how the collaboration within the present organizations can handle the issue, but also the development of the situation in Jordan.

Assess

After CMSE-Jordan in collaboration with PRM made an initial assessment over the Syrian refugees' situation in Jordan in spring 2012, the organization concluded multiple meetings with the Jordanian authorities, UNHCR and other international organizations present in the area. During the assessment period (April-May 2012), the Jordanian authorities together with UNHCR used a 'bail-out' system which allowed Syrian refugees to get on Jordanian territory only after a security screening and after a guarantee from a Jordanian friend or relative. This 'bail-out' system was predominately used in the Ramtha District, across the border from the Syrian city of Da'ra. Immediately after the massive increase of the number of Syrians crossing the border to Jordan, this system had failed, blocking the access to Jordanian territory. As a consequence, the refugees were blocked at the border control points till the UNHCR would transport them to temporary overcrowded housing. Taking all this issues into consideration and introducing the first smart practice, the Jordanian government was still circumspect in authorizing the construction of the most rapid and efficient method in solving this pressuring issue in handling the massive number of refugees. The motive of concern in authorizing the refugee camp construction was the possible reaction of the Assad regime (Associated Press, 2012). The conclusion of the assessment conducted by the CMSE-Jordan and PRM was that if the number of Syrian refugees will still increase that fast, the result will be seen in the critical lack of food, sanitation and water amongst refugees. Furthermore, if the refugee camp would not be given the resources necessities to stabilize the situation, the large number of refugees can overwhelm the ability of the UNHCR and the other humanitarian agencies present to carry out their air actions.

Decide

As mentioned above, CMSE-Jordan consulted with the other agencies involved in the area in order to pick the most effective, inexpensive and rapid projects in order to stabilize the issue in the area. But under the US ambassador's instructions to use a whole-of-government response to this problem, CMSE-Jordan began creating projects that can be synced with the needs and facilities of the Jordanian government, UNHCR and other US government priorities in the area. A second smart practice is introduced here, targeting the smart use of funding and grants accessed in order to be as cost efficient as they can be in this situation. In order to do so, CMSE-Jordan decided to use the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program, which is coordinated and administrated by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). As a first phase, DSCA approved the amount of 10,000\$ as a minimal-cost for Jordan, from where CMSE-Jordan divided the amount, based on PRM and UNHCR requests, for water tanks, electrical generators, kitchen equipment and other essentials which would be held for contingency purposes. In the same time, SOCCENT and CENTCOM² which were supervising the CME efforts in the region, have started a successful negotiation with DSCA in increasing the minimal-cost amount in Jordan to 75,000\$. This increased amount would give CME-Jordan more resources and an easiest patch in helping the Syrian refugees (Bardach, 1998).

Develop and Detect

While creating a sense of reliability and constantly reporting with other organizations and individuals involved in the response of the influx of Syrian refugees, CMSE-Jordan was

² SOCCENT - Special Operations Command Central; CENTCOM - United States Central Command

also the eyes and ears of the Department of State and DoD bodies, coordinating strategic-level planning with Jordanian authorities but also with the international community. Being part of the weekly meeting of US Syrian Working Group, organized by the US Ambassador in Jordan, CMSE-Jordan was able to give periodical situation reports and ground-truth reports on the Syrian refugee situation directly to US senior leaders. This tactical-level approach applied by the US government in this situation can be considered a smart practice because US governmental entities in the areas were the first ones informed about the massive number of Syrian refugees during the evening of July 22, 2012 (Bardach, 1998). The next days after this, the temporary housing facilities for refugees near the Ramtha boarder point would be at eighth times its maximum capacity and would push Jordanian government to ask UNHCR assistance and resources in building the Zaatari refugee camp as soon as possible (the refugee camp was opened a week later) (Hackenbracht, 2013).

Deliver

During the month before the 22nd of July 2012, the regular number of refugees crossing the border into Jordan was at approximately 400 per night, putting a great pressure on the 'bail-out' system in place at that moment. In the following weeks, when the average number of refugees entering Jordan raised to 1,100 per night, the 'bail-out' system was terminated and was announced that the refugees will be moved to a near camp that will be put in place by UNHCR at Zaatari. Having such a short notice and a lot of duties to take into account, UNHCR asked CMSE-Jordan for their assistance in ensuring that the Jordanian officials had the much needed infrastructure near the border in order to properly respond to the massive influx of Syrian refugees. In the same time CMSE-Jordan got the CENTCOM approval to use the contingency projects supplies and they started to distribute the water tanks, the electric generators, kitchen equipment and other essential goods to the refugee camp.

Evaluate

The CMSE-Jordan analyzed the efficiency and effectiveness of the delivered projects and they also identified some follow-up collaboration between the agencies in the area. At the same time, during the whole process of delivering the humanitarian assistance to the Zaatari Refugee Camp and along the border with Syria and during the evaluation process on the effectiveness and successful rate of the program, CMSE-Jordan did not stop its collaborations with PRM and USAID in order to evaluate all the running projects and situations at all the locations in Jordan (Hackenbracht, 2013).

One of the most important factors and smart practice that can be concluded in determining the effectiveness of the CMSE-Jordan programs within the refugees' context was to look into its success in supporting the US external policies and its strategic objectives (Bardach, 1998). During one of the weekly meetings for the Syrian Working Group, the US Ambassador in Jordan articulated his disappointment in the difficulty US government has publicly expressed regarding its strategic commitment to the Syrian refugees and Jordan. In order to support the Ambassador's strategic intent, CMSE-Jordan wanted to ensure that the next CMSE programs will support the strategic objectives and will show the US commitment to the mission in Jordan. To accomplish this, CMSE-Jordan involved the embassy's public diplomacy office with the public affairs officers from SOCCENT, so that the next completed projects involving the Zaatari Refugee Camp will include public press releases (Hackenbracht, 2013).

Transition

As mentioned above, CMSE-Jordan prepared follow-on projects to be transferred to the next civil affairs units, international organizations, NGOs, Jordanian officials, UN organizations and other appropriate agencies that want to get involved in this issue. Before completing the first CMSE-Jordan deployment rotation in October 2012, CMSE-Jordan was made a permanent agency in Jordan. Prior to the second deployment, the team had to make sure that the projects involving the Zaatari Refugee Camp and the Jordanian community along the Syrian border were transferred to the main CMSE agency or to the Jordanian officials, UN agencies or other US military bodies in the area (Hackenbracht, 2013).

Recommendations

The collaboration between USAID, PRM and CME was a total success in the US civil-military collective effort regarding the Syrian refugees in Jordan. Some parallel programs should be encouraged to start in other countries close to the Syrian borders that face refugee problems. CMSE Lebanon, being part of the Operations Command Forward Lebanon, has already shaped a connection with USAID Lebanon Mission and would be an excellent international collaboration with PRM in Jordan. For other countries that are close to the Syrian conflict and are affected by it, but they don't have a CMSE (Civil-Military Support Element) like Turkey or Iraq, a solution would be to introduce CME elements into the US team already present in those countries. Being such a success and becoming such a develop network in the region, CMSE-Jordan can advise and even become the link between the PRM RefCoord and CME in the countries around Syrian borders, in order to easily create unity among all the US partners in the area.

Conclusion

As established and confirmed by the CMSE-Jordan, the CME program facilitates the interagency collaboration between the civil and the military sector within a crisis situation, with limited amount of time and funding. The Civil Military Support provides the platform for an interagency collaboration with the aims of offering unity within the civil-military programs and of avoiding the necessity to deploy a large number of military personnel in a fragile, fast-developing and resource-contained location. Making sure that the CME programs are fully and complexly integrated within the network of agencies at the location, this provides a huge benefit for both US ambassadors in the region and the military commanders, through providing important information about the situation on the field, with the ending point in facilitating the whole-of-government approaches of humanitarian assistance and conflict prevention or management.

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STRATEGIC CHANGES IN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Daniel Liviu ROTARU,

Graduant, "CAROL I" National Defense University
liviuroth@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The article proposed for this scientific session has as subject the strategic change in security and international relations in the new world order.*

Global security correlates with States security. An active and dynamic national security policy makes a proper involvement in the international security. In the recent years, the defense policies of the national territory and of the Member preventive diplomacy is combined with the policies that promote their own interests, meant to support global stability in different regions of the world. All small or big states have their own strategies of security and defense.

States are directly engaged in the restructuring the global security system, economic cooperation and adapting the norms and principles of international law to the developments caused by the globalization process, into the work of the UN, OSCE, EU, WTO. In NATO and EU systems, the national military and security structures must be interoperable, agile, mobile, flexible, etc. They must be able to perform network operations, logistics fully supported by an integrated system. Including Romania has security strategy and military defense.

Key'words: *security, global, military, political, economic, efficiency*

National and state security implications on global security

General view to the national security

Nowadays, it's becoming more current the idea that the global security is closely related to the security of states.

The national interest requires the State to develop and to maintain an optimum capacity to promote his own "good public"; the society is seen as a public good, essential. The national interest is presented as the principle regulator of foreign and security policy, that considers the common good of the society the ultimate goal of diplomatic, economic and military actions. In this sense, foreign and security policy are obliged to promote the particular interests of each state (peace or war, national welfare, economic and national prosperity, etc.). Usually, are taken into account: the vital interests, the important interests, the primary and fundamental interests, ordinary interests etc. To achieve performances in the security sphere means, with priority, linking national interests with those regional and global.

Therefore, the national security must be seen as a combination between state and the class interests, without necessarily completely dominated by any of them. J. Galtung appreciate that while the class structures divides the states internally, they also correlate significantly with the general pattern of relations between states. As so, the class division between "center" and "periphery" (elite versus the masses) within states is reproduced globally in relations "center" versus "periphery" of the industrialized countries and the Third World. The elites of peripheral countries share many interests with the central elites. But while both elite groups are struggling with their internal peripheries, those from the Third World do more than those from the center, because they have fewer resources to distribute (being on the periphery of the overall system). There is no clear harmony of interests between the central periphery and peripheral periphery, as the relative advantage of the former depends

on maintaining a system that exploits the latter.¹

Undoubtedly, there are conflicts between the elites from North and South, which are as diverse as, for example, the territorial issue of Falkland Islands. The internal structure of class, the extent and the intensity of the hostility between the elite and the masses, reached an obvious factor in determining the strength or weakness of a state. The states deeply divided on both coordinates classes, and especially on those of nationalities, are reaching vulnerable to nationalist political attacks and to those leftist or fundamentalist. States divided on one dimension, can use the strong side to mask or mitigate the weak one.

The military security

The military threats range on a central position in national and foreign security. Military intervention endangers all state components: physical basis (the territory) can be employed (partial or total) or impaired as an ecosystem, the institutional structure can be severely hit, the idea of state can be undermined. Moreover, the threats emphasize the relevance of the use of force in international relations.

When the threat is an external nature, the military security relies on the military capacity of the state to deal with bullying, including the establishment of alliance systems. Therefore, the definition and building the military capacity should be guided according to vulnerabilities and threats.

The political security. The undermining of the authority

The political security must be combined with organizational stability of the social order. In the Cold War era, the security has materialized as a delicate balance of military arsenals of the two superpowers. After 1990, the natural state of the international system (in the terms of analysis) is not a security state, but of insecurity. In realistic / neorealistic vision, the international relations are primarily about power and security approaches. An optimal control of insecurity can ensure relative stability of the international system and a specific balance of power stability ("balance of power").

The political security is intertwined with the military and economic one. The states are getting together in organizations of cooperation and alliance; states decide to align. The alignment is necessary when: the states can align with other threatening states or coalitions, hoping to be able to divert an attack on their address (defensive alignment); the states can align with the dominant part into a war to participate in sharing the benefits of the victory (the offensive alignment). The "balancing" is recorded for minor power / small states, their union being to counter a strong state, a threatening point, to discourage it.

It shall also apply the theories of the balance of power, the balance of interests and the balance of threats (see the contributions of K. Waltz, S. Walt and R. Schweller). The most important factor in deciding the alliance is the compatibility of policy goals or the interests and not the imbalance of power or threat. Considering the anarchic international system feature, alliances are on a daily basis. Alliances are distinguished from collective security organizations.

As I pointed out above, the essential element in achieving the security state is the social-political cohesion. NATO is the classic example of an alliance.

The economic security

The social and economic performance depends on achieving the economic security. On the other hand, it is good to emphasize that passionate discussions have also aroused the approaches concerning the definition of the concept of economic security. S.R. Rouis from

¹ B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, Cartier, Bucharest, 2014, p. 246.

National Defense University (US), highlighted that the USSR was disintegrated due to the lack of economic security or a viable market-based economy. It quickly disintegrated, widespread and precipitated. This disintegration has created a new world order in which the concerns on the regional challenges to national security, have replaced the global threats and offset the Cold War.

Clearly, low tensions of this new world, have favored, partially, new democracies. Traditional democracies like the US also benefited after this. Those developed countries had an economic security due to their market-based economies and now they can devote more resources than during the Cold War, to some issues such as the environment, overpopulation, technology transfer and infrastructure development. They also have resources for cooperation in peacekeeping operations around the world, for creating new alliances like Partnerships for Peace and wider alliances such as NATO and the UN.²

However, two problems do not cease to preoccupy the economic and national security planners, despite reducing the tensions, the progresses on human rights and the stability of many economies in the world. Why almost nobody in the West has not foresee the disintegration of the Soviet Union and could such a chaos to come upon the United States by the 2020s? It should discuss this issue to highlight that the type of chaos registered in the Soviet Union was due to its economic viability collapse. West could be in danger of suffering such a collapse? Insufficient study of such problems could subject the West to a risk of a present unforeseen danger, that could hit the Western economy. If those problems are understood, it may be reduced the risk?

"What could cause the appearance of such danger? On the one hand, a strong military force, with a global presence is required of US companies in business development in their overall and there is a lack of understanding between the military and civilian population of the United States. The armed forces, consisting of volunteers, are no more longer the large American company and that company, as represented in Congress, is called to serve in the army, although to a lesser extent. Therefore, the Congress has very poor knowledge or experience of the military domain, and so the US population has less. "³

Even worse for the economy is that both the government and the industry do not cooperate as how they could in crucial areas, to the development of national security, like creating a network of national laboratories and ensuring the environment to encourage in-depth research and development on many fronts. The industry does not really understand the government bureaucracy. The industry is frustrated by the lack of appreciation of the important role that Wall Street plays in her life. In the face of rapid penetration and irrevocable industry on markets and on global agreements - which should lead to a strong economic development and so to a national security – the government feels corseted because it's losing the control. On the other hand, the industry ignores legitimate regulatory efforts of the government.

"The relationship between the industry and the army - in particular between the long-term planners from both sides - suffers from a lack of increasingly greater understanding. There is a mutual ignorance on both sides, due to the lack of communication and a true 'partnership'. If this ignorance continues, the country could lose its leading role in the world. It could be overcome by european or asian consortia, in which the army and the governments, in general, are working with industry on a long term".⁴

It should be understood that the economic security means national security in the broadest sense. US Government and industry have lost the opportunity to consolidate the gains they have accumulated following the victory in the Cold War. They actually did not

² C. Harbulot, page 34; Sheila R. Ronis, *The University Group Inc.*, October 1997.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

cooperate and in fact, they continue to develop a sense of adversity. The separation between government and industry is caused by mutual misunderstandings, in circumstances where building bridges of dialogue to overcome this gap is critical to US national security. Understanding the nature of "national security systems is the essence of the problem: why is crucial for the government and the industry to work together to maintain US leadership in the XXI century. In a system, each element is interconnected with each of the other elements and all elements are interdependent. Therefore, the systems are only as powerful as how strong are their weakest connections".⁵

The anarchic international system highlights the parts in the detriment of the whole. On the other hand, the economic activity generates more fragmentation - in classes, companies or national economies - "The international economy as a whole is mummified by the trade, production, finance, communications and transport patterns. Interest rates in the United States marks the Latin American debt burdens. Technological innovations, themselves generate sensitive pressures within the meaning emulation elsewhere, both through their impact on production costs and the effect on consumer preferences. If the trade is practiced as a way to increase efficiency and welfare, there are intricate patterns of dependence, in which the economic activity from a place depends of a complex on external conditions, and the market pressures cross the entire system. The international economy is the main component in kind, and in another, the main consequence of the increased density and interdependence in the international system".⁶

The economy expanded progressively (the local or the base). It remains in question whether the world economy is subordinated or not to the international political system. National economies are truly a critical level of analysis. Very important are the increased economic role and the governments power in national determining of the economic and states priorities as economic units with numerous links between state power and economic activity. The class structure is more important inside the states than above them. Economic activity is forcing the states to interact and materialize the international political system. The international political system can not be understood in the absence of analyzing the economic system. International economy is so seriously penetrated by the state structures and by the dynamics of power and security, like the state is crossed by the patterns of production, consumption and classes, but also by the market dynamics. Only the relative freedom from central political control, by the allowed anarchic structure, represented the guarantee given to market behavior to become a dominant economic and social practice.

The international anarchy and market relations are so interrelated, that are representing a phenomena mutually constitutive. Competition in anarchy is inherently twofold. The political fragmentation stimulates the competition on the market, in which manufacturers are forced to compete with one another on innovations, quality and price, to achieve their welfare. The political structure of the anarchy creates more freedom for economic actors. The competition for power and international influence is supplemented by market competition for wealth. Both competitions stimulate the technological innovation, which continually redefines the needs of an economic and strategical successful (or not) behavior. Thus, the economic security emerges as a major component of international security issues.

On the other hand, the analysts believe that the economic security is not an absolute value of wide application. In fact, the economic security is a major relativity combined with a particularly intense report of contradictions and adversity. The market economy is working only if the market competition is allowed to shape its behavior. Individuals and businesses thrive only if it can compete, and the specter of bankruptcy is just as important as the profit promise, in stimulating an effective behavior. The overall productivity and the prosperity of

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, Cartier, Bucharest, 2014, p. 235.

the system are subject to removal from business of the units less efficient and less innovative than the working ones⁷. So, the competitive capitalism is founded on a considerable degree of permanent insecurity of all individual units of it (individuals, companies, states) making the idea of an economic security in capitalism to seem a contradiction in terms. Without a substantial level of insecurity, the system does not work. Despite its shortcomings, the capitalism argues that is in practice, the most effective generator of wealth and innovation, the most reliable guarantor of political pluralism (both domestic and international).

At the individual level, the economic security means access to the means to satisfy basic human needs (food, water, shelter, education). Individual economic security should be restricted to basic conditions of survival or to be defined in terms of maintaining a certain standard of living? The question is whether the right to work or the right to a minimum income are considered necessary conditions of the economic security. The individual is both consumer and producer. As consumers, the individuals favor the market, because it guarantees the best choice of the product and price. As producers, employees would oppose the market if its action would threaten their job or income. Only relative economic success provides a related security, by allowing individuals to avoid the extremes. It is not very clear whether the governments can control the economic performances; however, sometimes trying to do so undermines their ability to remain economically competitive.

As the individuals are trying to reduce their economic vulnerability, as greater will be the risk that collectively will deteriorate the overall efficiency of the economy that supports them. But if given too little attention to their economic security, they are risking or veing the exploitation by those best placed, or to wake up in the street, as an accident of the market efficiency. Trying to maintain these macro and micro insecurities in some balance is a constant issue for both individuals and governments. The relative success makes the balancing to act easier and the relative failure makes it more difficult.⁸

In other news, the companies are the purest economic actors and therefore the least ables to avoid the fundamental contradictions of economic security. Firms can follow maintaining security in the forefront of the market by the superior adaptability and innovativeness with monopoly practices Consistently, companies as entities directed to profit, are seeking the monopoly. The firms do not display creations of function convenience, a deep-rooted sense of performance or an imperative mandatory of a survival. Conditions in constantly changing of market competition require organizational flexibility to time. The major exception to this rule consists the sufficiently large firms that / or occupying key positions in the economy (like banks). Their collapse would follow on a massive and worldwide scale. Choosing security can take here the form of an adjustment range, on short-term, of costs to sustained economic inefficiency.

Often when companies are seeking their own security by monopoly or protection, it appears the contradiction between their security interests and the interests of consumer welfare. The monopoly and the protection are raising prices for consumers. Protection can also advertise the grants resulted from taxation. The companies claim that their own survival is a matter of national security, otherwise, productive areas of significant strategic capabilities (such as steel, shipbuilding, food, aircraft, energy) would be removed from the economy. Simultaneously, the idea of the relative autonomy of the state has become already common even among Marxist thinkers. Therefore, the national security must be seen as a combination of state interests and the class ones, without necessarily completely dominated by any of them. J. Galtung appreciated that while the structures of class internally divide the states, they also correlate significantly with the general pattern of relations between states. The class division between "center" and "periphery" (elite versus the masses) within states is

⁷ C. Harbulot, *Techniques offensives et guerre économique*, Bardenney, 1989.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 243.

reproduced globally in relations "center" versus "periphery" of the industrialized countries and the Third World. The elites of peripheral countries share many interests with the central elites. But while both elite groups are struggling with their internal peripheries, those from the Third World are doing this more than those from the center, because they have fewer resources to distribute (being on the periphery of the overall system). There is not a clear harmony of interests between the central periphery and the peripheral periphery, because the relative advantage of the former depends on maintaining the system that exploits the latter.⁹

Undoubtedly, there are conflicts between elites in the North and South, which are as diverse as, for example, the territorial issue of Falkland Islands. The internal structure of class, extent and hostility intensity of the elite and the masses, reached an obvious factor in determining the strength or the weakness of a state. States deeply divided on both coordinates classes, and especially those of nationalities are reaching vulnerable to the nationalist political attacks and to the leftist or fundamentalist. States divided on one dimension, can be used to mask the strong side or mitigate the weak.

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ROMANIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF FISCAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Mihaela-Nicoleta BĂCANU,

M.A. Graduate, Bucharest University of Economic Studies,
bacanu_mihaela90@yahoo.com

Sergiu-Bogdan CONSTANTIN,

Assistant Professor PhD., Bucharest University of Economic Studies,
c.sergiu.b@gmail.com

Abstract: *In the context of globalization, the international tax evasion increased dramatically in the past few years, reducing the states revenues. This is why, a significant number of countries harness their resources in pursuing the fight against this phenomenon. Very important tools in combating tax evasion are international relations and international exchange of information. Romania has joined the international fight against tax evasion and is cooperating with most of the countries and with international institutions. The aim of this research is to describe Romania's international cooperation in exchanging information in the fight against tax evasion. Romania will take part in the automatic exchange of information through FATCA agreement issued by USA and the implementation of Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters issued by OECD. To implement these agreements, the information has to be comparable, so Romania must modify its legislation to bring it at international standards.*

Key'words: *exchange of information, agreement, international cooperation, tax evasion, OECD, FATCA*

Introduction

The globalization is a complex phenomenon that reached in all areas: economic, social, cultural or political.

Based on the definition of globalization given by Anthony Giddens according to which the globalization is the *intensification of worldwide social relations which connect cities, distances, therefore local occurrences are shaped by events which are taking place many miles away and vice versa*¹ we can say that this phenomenon influenced the fight against tax evasion so the organizations all over the world cooperate by performing information exchange in order to combat tax evasion. In other words, performing information exchange is a tool for fighting against the phenomenon 'tax evasion'.

Authorities all over the world are trying to fight against tax evasion and against the illegalities committed by the natural or juridical persons. They are trying to increase the efficiency of their activity regarding the collection of the budgetary receivables, increasing, in this way, the budgetary revenues for a better management of the money necessary to the society.

Institutions fighting against international tax evasion by exchanging information

In order to prevent and combat the tax evasion, United States of America issued in 2010 a law named Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). According to this law the U.S. taxpayers must report certain foreign financial accounts and offshore assets and foreign

¹Gorgan Catalina, *Convergenta contabila internationala. Implicatii asupra raportarii financiare*, ASE, Bucharest, 2013, p. 16.

financial institutions must report financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers or foreign entities in which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest.²

United States of America signed intergovernmental agreements with some other states in order to apply FATCA and perform exchange of information and with some other states the negotiations are still performing.

At the international level there is an organization that is specialized in the fight against tax evasion named The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This organization has members from all over the world. European Commission takes part of the OECD work, too. Their representatives participate in the discussions regarding the strategies that the Organization applies and are involved in OECD's work.

Regarding the automatic exchange of information, the EU has drawn on its own experience and expertise in this area to actively contribute to the development of the new global standard³.

Having FATCA as model, the international organization specialized in the fight against tax evasion issued the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters.

On the 29 October 2014 the Global Forum, by OECD, on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes has collected 80 engagements of implementing the Standard from 80 jurisdictions, members of the Global Forum⁴.

Romanian cooperation regarding the international exchange of information

Romania cooperates with the international institutions, making exchange of information with these, in order to combat tax evasion phenomenon but also for the good functioning of the economy. Thus, there are several institutions in Romania that perform exchange of fiscal or financial information with similar international institutions.

One of that institutions mentioned above is the National Agency for Fiscal Administration that performs exchange of information through its organization, General Direction of Tax Information.

The National Office for Prevention and Control of Money Laundering (NOPCML) is the Romanian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of administrative type, with leadership role on drafting, coordination and implementation of the national system of combating money laundering and terrorism financing.

NOPCML cooperates with several national institutions like: The National Bank of Romania, The Financial Supervisory Authority, The National Agency for Fiscal Administration, The Romanian Intelligence Service, and international institutions like: Financial Action Task Force, The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in order to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

The National Bank of Romania has sign an agreement of cooperation with central banks and ministries of finance from the European Union regarding the cross-border financial stability. It cooperates with other similar institutions from European Union (for example: European Central Bank, Bank of England, Banque de France, Banca d'Italia, Deutsche

² "Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act" accessed January, 21, 2015, on <http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA>

³ "Fighting Tax Evasion and Avoidance: A year of progress" accessed January, 21, 2015, on http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1096_en.htm

⁴ "The Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters" accessed January, 21, 2015, on http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-tax-matters_9789264216525-en

Bundesbank, etc.) to manage and solve the financial crisis performing proper procedures of exchanging information and efficiently assessing the information received.

Romanian cooperation with FATCA

Regarding the automatic exchange of information, Romania had two rounds of negotiations with United States of America regarding the FATCA agreement. The first one was in April 2014 and the second one was in October 2014. The major parts of the agreement were discussed by the two countries, but they still must discuss the provisions proposed by Romania in the Annex II, regarding the exemptions of reporting.

Starting with 2nd of April 2014, Romania appears in the list of *jurisdictions that have reached agreements in substance*, published by U.S. Treasury.⁵

Even though Romania did not sign the agreement with United States of America, starting with 1st of July 2014 some provisions like collecting information about American residences, foreign entities with substantial US ownership and customers classified as recalcitrant, must be applied.

Romanian financial institutions that will apply the FATCA agreement are Custodial Institutions, Depository Institutions, an Investment Entities, or a Specified Insurance Companies.

Romanian implication in the multilateral agreement regarding the Automatic Exchange of Information

Another international agreement signed by Romania is the multilateral competent authority agreement regarding the automatic exchange of information. Romania participated at the Global Forum Meeting held on 29 October 2014 with other 50 jurisdictions.

Signing this agreement, Romania is committed to start the automatic exchange of information in 2017, in order to identify the persons who transfer money from Romania to other countries using offshore companies, or other ways of tax evasion.

The automatic exchange of information will be made under the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters issued by OECD.

As other signatory countries, Romania must follow four steps for the implementation of the Standard. Thus, Romania must translate the reporting and due diligence requirements into domestic law, must select a legal basis for the exchange of information, must update the administrative and IT infrastructure based on the provisions of the Standard and the information transferred must be protected in order to maintain the confidentiality and data safeguards. According to OECD, it is not mandatory for a country to maintain an order in following these steps⁶.

Discussions and conclusions

As we could see above, Romania participates in the international attempts to combat tax evasion. Our country cooperates with other international jurisdictions in the exchange of information.

There are three types of exchanging information: exchange of information on request, automatic exchange of information and spontaneous exchange of information. In Romania the meaning of these concepts is described in the Fiscal Procedure Code. The most used type of exchange of information in Romania is the exchange of information on request. Through its institutions, Romania has sent requests and has received requests from foreign institutions to

⁵“FATCA – Archive” accessed January, 21, 2015, on <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA-Archive.aspx>

⁶ Exchange of information portal accessed January, 21, 2015 on <http://www.eoi-tax.org/articles#default>

exchange information with them. The spontaneous exchange of information can be applied in Romania starting with first of January 2015.

Regarding the type “automatic exchange of information”, in the last year, Romania has negotiated or signed agreements for automatic exchange of information. Thus, there were the negotiations with United States of America regarding the signing of the FATCA agreement, but also it was the signing of the multilateral competent authority agreement regarding the automatic exchange of information.

Romanian legislation provides information regarding the automatic exchange of information. Thus, the Fiscal Procedure Code describes the information to be transmitted through this category of exchange. So, Romania must communicate, by automatic exchange, information related to the period following first of January 2014, regarding the residences of other member state, the labor income, remuneration paid to directors and other persons related to them, life insurance products not covered by other legal instruments of the European Union for the exchange of information and other similar measures, pensions, ownership of real assets and income from real assets.

During the year 2014, Romania was preparing for the automatic exchange of information, especially in the last part of the year. For a good implementation of the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, Romania has to work on the legislation and to improve it. In the last month of 2014, Romanian authorities published various ordinances, which modify various laws.

One of the ordinances mentioned above was published on 12th December 2014, which modifies Law no. 571/2003 establishing the Fiscal Code. The aim of this Ordinance is to bring the Romanian legislation at the level of the European rules whereas Romania cooperates with other states to combat tax evasion. Thus, starting with 1st of January 2015, Romania, as a Member State of registration, will retain a certain percentage of the amounts transferred to each Member State of consumption for the electronic services, telecommunications, broadcasting provided to non-taxable persons, for which it is applied the special scheme.

On 30th December 2014, The Official Journal of Romania has published the Emergency Ordinance number 91/2014, which modifies and complete Emergency Ordinance number 28/1999 regarding the obligation of economic agents to utilize the fiscal electronic cash register.

Economic agents who make retail trade with goods directly to the final consumer, or provide services directly to the population by receiving cash or cash substitutes in exchange of their equivalent value, are forced to use fiscal electronic cash register.

According to the Emergency Ordinance number 91/2014, the new fiscal electronic cash registers differ from those classical by the fact that they are equipped with a storage device of the electronic journal, which includes structural fiscal module through which it controls the fiscal memory, printing device, memory device, customer display, external rescue device and external communication device that allows integration into a system.

Thus, the authorities will have a more extended control over those who use this type of cash registers.

That is why, starting with first of October 2015, it will be authorized only those who deliver the new cash registers, and starting with first of January 2016 it is prohibited to commercialize the classical cash registers. Regarding the economic agents who utilize the cash registers, the big taxpayers cannot utilize the classical ones starting with the first of April 2016, the medium taxpayers must utilize the new cash registers starting with the first of July 2016 and the small taxpayers must utilize them starting with the first of November 2016. Thus, in the year 2017, when Romania will apply the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, all the taxpayers who are required to utilize cash

registers will use only the new fiscal electronic cash registers, so the authorities can monitor all the transactions of the taxpayers.

Because the taxpayers are inventive finding various ways to defraud the state, the new law establishes sanctions, not only for the taxpayers, but for the consumers too. It is about the consumers who do not require the tax receipts when the sellers do not provide it.

At the end of 2014, on 30th of December, it was published the OMFP 1802/2014 - Accounting Regulations on the annual individual and consolidated financial statements which repeals the OMFP 3055/2009 applied until 2014 in accounting. It is necessary to make the information comparable between the states that sign the agreements of exchanging information, thus OMFP 1802/2014 brings some changes related to the financial information features and introduces new criteria for establishing the size of the entities.

From all presented above, we can see that Romania makes changes in the legislation in order to prepare for the application of the Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters, to reduce the tax evasion and to cooperate with other states for discovering better methods to combat this phenomenon.

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PROPOSALS REGARDING CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY FOR 2030

Maria POPESCU,

PhD., ULIM
blondin42003@yahoo.com

Alexandru GRIBINCEA,

Professor, ULIM
agribincea@mail.ru

Abstract: *Climate policies are fundamental for the future of our planet, while a truly European energy policy is a key factor for our competitiveness. It's mandatory a new European energy policy which must accept the real energetic motivations regarding sustainability and greenhouse gas, security of supply and dependence on imports, competitiveness and efficient functioning of the internal energy market. An ambitious target of 40% reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases for 2030 is the cornerstone of the most efficient in terms of cost on our path towards a low-carbon dioxide. And at least 27% target for renewable energy is an important signal to investors to provide stability, boost green jobs and support security of supply. Using renewable energy sources (wind, solar and photovoltaic, biomass and biofuels, geothermal and heat pumps) undeniably contributes to limiting climate change. In addition, it helps to secure energy supplies and to create and increase employment in Europe, thanks to increasing local energy production and consumption.*

Key words: *security, energy, European Union, strategy, economics, climate.*

Introduction

Energy security is a very complex concept that has evolved throughout history from the point of view of the subject - initially the concept was attached oil, gradually extending to other resources, and the area of meanings, from physical supply related to all stages of the energy chain. For most professionals, energy security is to be provided in terms of resources, control and distribution routes and alternatives. In a broad sense, the concept is defined as "secure resources at a reasonable price", in other words encompasses a much broader issue than the triangle security of supply - sustainability - competitiveness.¹

In the current economic climate, in a globalized space, domestic energy strategy in the context of changing trends and changes taking place in the context of development in Europe and worldwide. Known oil proven reserves can sustain current levels of consumption only until 2040, and the gas until 2070, while world reserves of coal provides for more than 200 years to an increase in the level of operation.²

The economic growth, we believe that will follow, will have a higher consumption of energy resources. In terms of the structure of primary energy consumption worldwide, evolution and prognosis of the reference made by the International Energy Agency (IEA) for the next decade shows a significant increase in the share of renewables.

¹ Kamila PRONINSKA, *Energy and security: regional and global dimensions*, SIPRI Yearbook in 2007 - Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 216 and Daniel Yergin, *Ensuring Energy Security*, *Foreign Affairs*, March / April 2006, Vol. 86, No. 2.

² www.minind.ro/energie/STRATEGIA_energetica

The above elements underlying the reorientation energy policies of the countries that are net importers of energy, to increase attention to renewable energy and improving energy efficiency.

In Europe and worldwide there is a wide range of fuels and biofuels that with other types of ways of producing "green energy" (solar energy, thermal energy, wind energy, voltaic etc.) can provide viable solutions for the energy future the world.³

Increasing energy security and tackling climate change are two of the concerns and challenges of contemporary society. Both are linked intrinsically to the way we produce and consume energy. And both energy security and climate change have implications for foreign and security policies. One of the major challenges for the European Commission, and generally for the EU is how it can provide competitive energy and "clean" for Europe, taking account of climate change, escalating global energy demand and uncertain future resources.⁴

In terms of specific methodological approach elaborations of this paper, the first part will be referred to the theoretical concept of sustainable development, from identifying real conceptual origins and evolution based on its treatment methods in the literature and in the economic, social and Policies that will be drawn and specified some wide criticism expressed by renowned authors, that will punctuate the main controversies of the concept of sustainable development is now part.

As specific methodological analysis elaborations paper we started from a basic set of questions and answers identifying relevant research topics are constiue the concept of climate change and energy, including for the following period.

The objectives of the research analysis: general global energy policy, ways of achieving energy security, energy security - part of economic security, energy security in the EU's vision.

Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger said: "The 2030 EU expressed willingness to promote progress towards a competitive low carbon dioxide, the investment stability and the security of energy supply. My goal is to ensure that energy remains affordable for households and businesses. The 2030 sets a high level of ambition in terms of climate change, but recognizes also that this objective must be achieved at lower cost. Internal energy market provides the basis to achieve this goal and will continue to strive towards its conclusion to use its full potential. This includes the "Europeanization" of renewable energy policies."⁵

Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action, said: "We managed to contradict the statements of those who claimed that today the Commission will not present any ambitious proposal. A 40% reduction in emissions is the goal of most efficient in terms of costs for the EU, which takes into account our responsibility globally. And of course, Europe must continue a strong focus on renewable energy sources. Therefore, it is important to today's Commission proposal for a binding EU target. They have now agreed the details of the framework, but the direction is heading towards Europe was established. If all other regions would be equally ambitious on climate change, our world would look much better."⁶

The need for a new European energy policy need to accept the actual energy motivations regarding sustainability and emissions of greenhouse gases, security of supply and dependence on imports, competitiveness and efficient functioning of the internal energy market. The importance of knowing a new European energy policy is necessary to have a more effective response to these challenges, regarded as a common objective in all Member States. It requires a new industrial revolution that will create an economy with high energy efficiency and low CO2 emissions.

³ www.cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii

⁴ www.beta.ier.ro/documente/...ro/Studiul_2_-_Securitatea_energetica_RO

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
The establishment of the EU to achieve common goals major energy; achievement of the internal energy market, achieving a competitive market, an integrated and interconnected market, a public energy security, guarantee of security energy supply, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, energy technology development, implementation of an international common energy policy.

Climate and energy targets for 2030 for the EU economy competitive, secure and low-carbon

European Parliament calls for further adoption by the EU new targets on climate change to be achieved by 2050: reducing emissions by 80 greenhouse gas emissions, 60% share of renewable energies in total energy consumption and improve energy efficiency by 35%. MEPs believe that the most effective way to improve energy security, including in terms of cost, is energy saving, requiring Member States and the Commission to adopt a binding target of improving energy efficiency by at least 20% by 2020.

The European Commission launched on 10 January 2007 a set of measures to redefine the European Union's energy policy towards energy security, global warming process management and boost competitiveness. Solution Commission strategy has three main objectives, namely finalization of the single energy market, accelerate the transition to alternative energy (as little carbon based) and energy efficiency. Scientific research profile would be allocated to funds supplemented with 50% during the current financial year (2007-2013).⁷

Table 1. Global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions



European energy policy is threefold: combating climate change, limiting the EU's vulnerability to imported hydrocarbons, promoting employment and growth, thereby providing secure and affordable energy to consumers.

Currently, 23.5% of the electricity produced in the Union and 14% of final energy consumption in all sectors comes from a renewable energy source. Therefore, the EU is on track to achieve the target that 20% of our energy is from renewable sources by 2020,

⁷ www.cadranpolitic.ro

although further efforts will be needed to achieve this goal. Also, this provides a solid foundation to continue efforts and to achieve a more ambitious target on renewable energy sources by 2030.⁸

The Commission proposed the establishment of such an objective in the EU at least 27%.⁹

A reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) emissions by 40% below 1990 levels, a binding target of at least 27% across the EU for renewable energy, renewed ambitions for energy efficiency policies, a new system of governance and a set of new indicators to ensure a competitive and secure energy system. These are the pillars of the new EU framework on climate change and energy for 2030, presented on 22 January 2014 by the European Commission. Energy accounts for 80% of emissions of greenhouse gases in the EU.

Being committed to fighting climate change, the EU is committed to reducing domestic emissions by at least 20% by 2020. In addition, it calls upon the signing of an international agreement whereby developed countries to commit to reducing greenhouse gas emissions emissions by 30% by 2020.

Under this agreement, the EU would set the new target of reducing its emissions by 30% compared to 1990. These goals form a central part of the EU strategy for mitigating climate change.¹⁰

Or, reducing emissions of greenhouse gases requires the use of more low energy and greater use of clean energy.

Energy Efficiency

Reducing energy consumption by 20% by 2020 is the objective of the EU and established the Energy Efficiency Action Plan (2007-2012).¹¹

To this end, efforts should be made concrete, especially in terms of energy saving in the transport sector, setting minimum efficiency requirements for energy-using equipment, energy consumer awareness about rational behavior and economy, improving production efficiency, transportation and supply of heat and electricity, and the development of energy technologies and energy performance of buildings.

In addition, the EU understands the need for realization of a common approach on a global scale, energy saving through an international agreement on energy efficiency.

Renewable Energy

Using renewable energy sources (wind, solar and photovoltaic, biomass and biofuels, geothermal and heat pumps) undeniably contributes to limiting climate change. In addition, it helps to secure energy supplies and to create and increase employment in Europe, thanks to increasing local energy production and consumption.


⁸ www.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/

⁹ *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030*

¹⁰ www.europa.eu> ...> Energy> European energy policy

¹¹ www.europa.eu> ...> Summaries of EU legislation> Energy> Energy Efficiency

Table 2. Global energy consumption 2013



Renewable energy sources have remained, however, a marginal position in the European energy mix, the cost of maintaining the higher than traditional energy sources.

For renewables to better enforce EU has set the roadmap for renewable energy binding minimum target for renewable energy 20% of all energy sources by 2020.¹²

This objective requires progress in three main areas covered by renewable energy: electricity (increasing the production of electricity from renewable energy sources and ensuring sustainable electricity production from fossil fuels, particularly through the development and capture systems CO₂ storage), biofuels by 2020, will be the 10% of transport fuels and finally heating and cooling systems.¹³

In October 2014, the European Union (EU) has set ambitious climate and energy targets for 2030, confirming global leadership on climate change.

But while the objectives are formulated and adopted the legal framework for their implementation is still far from being achieved. Energy Policies of IEA Countries: European Union - 2014, provides guidance on how to how to get in a cost-effective, integrated, while promoting competitiveness and energy security of the European Union. The recommendations are based on experience from the first in-depth evaluation of EU Alliance in 2008.¹⁴

Since then, EU policy has led to energy market integration, cross-border trade and implementation of energy and climate objectives by 2020. The European Union is a global leader in the transition to a low carbon economy: the unprecedented boom European renewable energy, energy efficiency action and economic recession have contributed to a decrease in emissions of greenhouse gases.

However, energy security issues have increased. Making the most of its diversity, the European Union should strengthen the internal energy market to enhance both energy security and competitiveness of its industry. However, the interconnections are missing, and despite opening the wholesale market and falling prices, focusing on retail markets, regulated, do not benefit consumers.

¹² www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/

¹³ www.europa.eu> ...> Summaries of EU legislation> Energy> Renewable energy

¹⁴ www.europarl.europa.eu/.../2014

As Member States to adopt more decarbonisation pathways and new options for energy policy, rules are needed and policies that support the development of low carbon technologies in new energy and climate policy framework for 2030 with a market energy efficiency.

The European Parliament has always argued in favor of renewable energy sources and stressed the importance of setting binding targets for 2020¹⁵ and, more recently, for 2030. In February 2014 the Parliament adopted a Resolution¹⁶ criticizing the Commission's proposals on the climate and energy for 2030 as limited and lacking in ambition. He asked obligation 30% of EU energy consumption to come from renewable energies, to be achieved by individual binding national targets and objectives extend beyond 2020 on transport fuels.

In addition, Parliament called in the past long-term establishment of a system of incentives for renewables EU-wide¹⁷, advocating also to support smart grids.¹⁸

The Parliament also repeatedly invited the Commission to propose a legal framework for renewable energy for heating and cooling, in order to increase their share in energy production.

By adopting the Directive on renewable energy, the European Parliament strengthened and clarified several mechanisms, establishing also a system to ensure a more thorough environmental sustainability of the whole policy.

On 24 October 2014 the European Council approved a framework 2030 energy and climate objectives proposed by the European Commission, to be achieved by 2030: EU mandatory to reduce by at least 40% of emissions of greenhouse gases by in 2030 compared to 1990; at least 27% of energy from renewable sources to be used at EU level; increase energy efficiency by at least 27% by 2020 to be reviewed in view of the EU 30% for 2030; completion of the internal energy market by reaching a target for electricity interconnection between member States 15% and implementing in the future of certain major infrastructure projects.

Such a policy framework agreed by U.E. Emissions of greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energies and energy efficiency should provide stability and predictability for economic operators and confirm EU leadership globally. The European Council also reiterated the goal of building a Union of Energy aimed at energy affordable, safe and durable.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The experience of recent years, especially the recent crisis that swept the global financial and economic system as a whole, shows that there can be no prosperity and social peace without ensuring safety at all levels, including economic security. Now more than ever reaching a certain level of economic security depends on the state's ability to aggregate resources internally and gain or maintain access to external economic resources. Energy security, like special side of economic security, is closely related to any action or inaction of any owner-operator chain actor-producer-distributor-consumer carrier, directly or indirectly related to energy resources, with the goal of influencing or control other actors. The risk of

¹⁵ *European Parliament resolutions* of 29 September 2005 on the share of renewable energy in the EU and proposals for concrete actions (OJ C 277 E, 21.9.2006, p. 599), of 14 February 2006 on the use of renewable energy for heating and cooling (OJ C 290 E, 29.11.2006, p. 115), 14 December 2006 on a strategy for biomass and biofuels (OJ C 317 E, 23.12.2006, p. 890) and of 25 September 2007 on a roadmap for renewable energy in Europe (OJ C 219 E, 28.8.2008, p. 82).

¹⁶ *European Parliament resolution* of 5 February 2014 on the 2030 framework for climate policy and energy

¹⁷ *European Parliament resolution* of 25 November 2010 entitled "Towards a new Energy Strategy for Europe 2011-2020" (OJ C 99 E, 3.4.2012, p. 64).

¹⁸ *European Parliament resolution* of 5 July 2011 on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond (OJ C 33 E, 5.2.2013, p. 46).

such energy continues to be a constant facing any economy dependent on external energy resources, regardless of its degree of development. Interdependence continues to be the vector of achieving energy security. Energy security of an actor can mean energy security other actors interconnected with it.

European energy policy in recent years has always adapted to new geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-strategic and sought to ensure, in a much more integrated, affordable energy supplies, respecting market mechanisms, promoting energy efficiency and environmental protection. However, we believe that we need a comprehensive energy strategy that clearly identify vulnerabilities and major risks to pinpoint strategic objectives achievable and ways to attain them, and, especially, the course of action in the medium and long to ensure a higher level of energy security.

Any discussion about Romania's energy security should start from a simple reality, namely national energy resource reserves are reduced continuously, and Russia is the main energy source to cover the deficit of our country. In these circumstances, governments have set ambitious targets in the national energy strategy, which if it could be made to maximize the energy potential of our country has particularly and would fail to satisfy their energy needs at a price as low, in terms of quality and food safety.

Although the state remains the owner of relatively high energy, Romania can not meet the conditions of the financial crisis, globalization and increased competition on regional and international markets, domestic consumption needs. Therefore, we believe that our country's energy security can be achieved mainly in European energy interdependence, but in a mutually beneficial partnership of the European Union with Russia. Romania's energy security can mean greater energy security at European level and increase energy security community means greater energy security for our country.

In conclusion, we can say that working hypothesis established at the beginning of this paper, namely oil demand which increases at a much faster rate than supply, and major hydrocarbon reserves are located in areas characterized by profound political and economic imbalances and instability, facts that have become competition for energy resources in the contemporary world in a significant source of crises and conflicts, has been confirmed. Competition for oil seems to dominate the beginning of the millennium, with focus on the polarization states of the Gulf, Caspian, Eastern and Western Siberia, Southeast Asia etc. Interesting is that even the disputes and conflicts are focusing in the same spaces. Moreover, the close link between energy and conflict derives from their essential characteristics: the vital importance for economic and military power of nations and unequal geographical distribution.

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THE ROLE OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AFTER THE COLD WAR

Elena Iuliana LACHE,

Lecturer PhD., Faculty of International Relations, History and Philosophy,
Spiru Haret University
elenaiulianalache@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The paper presents, through a holistic approach, the role of the sovereign state as the main subject of international relations in the post-Cold War era. It analyses the central position occupied by the sovereign state in the international arena, alongside other subjects/actors, such as intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, transnational corporations, individuals. It examines the areas in which state's authority is diminished by its competitors. At the same time, the distinction between international relations and international law is made. The states are the countries, the nations; also they engage countries as entities, provided that in the international life such an engagement is ultimately judicial; finally, states are the only creators of legal norms at the level of the countries and on their behalf. State's quality as subject of international law arises from its intrinsic attributes, expressing the country's sovereignty understood in general terms as power of decision in domestic and external problems.*

Key'words: *international relations, post-Cold War era, sovereign state, sovereign state's competitors, nation-state, subject / actor in the international arena*

Preliminaries

International relations are established and conducted between subjects, often called actors. Therefore, the subjects represent the key in international relations and a central concept in the International Relations Theory and History of International Relations. According to a widely accepted point of view, there are four categories of subjects of international relations: *the states, the groups (unions of states), the nonstate organizations (NGOs), the individuals (natural persons).*

Currently, there are 196 states/countries – more specifically nation-states and states that make up a federal system – forming, since the eighteenth century, Europe, then in the following centuries, on other continents as well. After 1990, meaning in the post-Cold War era, 31 sovereign states came into being, particularly as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. It is estimated that in the future the number of sovereign states will increase. Also, a tendency toward the multiplication of the group states with the most diverse goals and objectives manifests. Thus, if the multiplication of universal organizations such as the United Nations (UN), or with universal vocation, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) is not expected, the regional and subregional plans offer in this respect a picture of a slow slope increase. To illustrate, we mention: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the Euro-Atlantic area; European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) for Europe; Black Sea Economic Cooperation Forum for Europe-Asia; Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the area designated by the same name; Organisation of African Union (OAU) for Africa; Organization of American States (OAS), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for North America. All these organizations are unions of states that become through their very grouping subjects of international relations. Of course, some international governmental organizations can be considered actors of the international system

only under certain conditions, i.e. if they have the resources to influence other actors: expertise, finances, decision-making capacity, support and popular legitimacy, capacity to impose decisions and diplomatic skills – UN and EU clearly satisfy these requirements, which does not happen with all international governmental organizations.¹

An impressive multiplication is highlighted by the developments that take place in the sphere of non-state actors, ranging from NGOs such as Amnesty International, Freedom House, Green Peace, Médecins sans Frontières, Reporters sans Frontières or Transparency International, to political parties, companies, employers' organizations etc., in all cases, national or transnational, through scope, nature, object of activity. The number of international non-governmental organizations grew, according to the statistics of the Union of International Associations, reaching in 2001 to 47,000.²

An upward evolution, especially after the Cold War, is known by the direct presence of individuals in international relations as subjects of these relations. Such a presence is the conjugated result of a convergent action of a multitude of factors, including: the process of globalization, with its inherent components of integration and interdependences increase, expanding the scope of democratic regimes, with their respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and, on the other hand, intensification of international concern for the protection of these rights and freedoms.

In the contemporary international arena, alongside *legitimate* actors, act the so called *illegitimate* actors such as transnational terrorist movements with a more and more obvious presence in today's world, and other transnational organized crime groups. There is also a category of false NGOs, funded by states with totalitarian regimes, or by groups having minority interests, constituted as elements of logistics support, membership recruitment, fundraising for terrorist organizations or of the organized crime.³

The adoption of legitimate-illegitimate dichotomy is questionable, since makes it impossible to theoretically fit actors such as guerrilla movements or the militias, whose activities, in various parts of the globe, are transnational in nature. The picture becomes even more complex if one abandons the radical separation of the international politics from the domestic one. Following the older liberal-pluralist strategy, the state can be seen as a network of agencies (ministries, departments) that can each enter transnational networks; the same can be said of municipalities or other local and regional bodies. In the nongovernmental sector, the organizations from a certain state may establish relations with international organizations or even governments of other countries, the government of the state of origine lacking the possibility to compel or shape, in any way, the interactions.⁴ In analyzing the role of the state and other subjects of international relations we take into account the influence exercised by the illegitimate factors in all these relationships. This does not mean that all of these entities should be considered actors in the international relations.⁵

¹ Andrei Miroiu, Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu (coordinators), Daniel Biró, Lucian-Dumitru Dîrdală, Olivia Todorean, Ionuț Apahideanu, Simona Soare, Stanislav Secieru, *Handbook of International Relations*, Polirom Publishing, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 59-60.

² Ph.D. Teodor Frunzeti, *Global Dynamics and Non-state Actors*, in Ph.D. Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D. Vladimir Zodian (coordinators), *World 2005. Political and Military Encyclopaedia (Strategic and Security Studies)*, Publishing house of the Editorial Technical Center of the Army, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 149-152.

³ Ph.D. Teodor Frunzeti, *Global Dynamics and Non-state Actors*, in Ph.D. Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D. Vladimir Zodian (coordinators), *World 2005. Political and Military Encyclopaedia (Strategic and Security Studies)*, Publishing house of the Editorial Technical Center of the Army, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 149-152.

⁴ Andrei Miroiu, Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu (coordinators), Daniel Biró, Lucian-Dumitru Dîrdală, Olivia Todorean, Ionuț Apahideanu, Simona Soare, Stanislav Secieru, *Handbook of International Relations*, Polirom Publishing, Bucharest, 2006, p. 44.

⁵ Andrei Miroiu, Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu (coordinators), Daniel Biró, Lucian-Dumitru Dîrdală, Olivia Todorean, Ionuț Apahideanu, Simona Soare, Stanislav Secieru, *Handbook of International Relations*, Polirom Publishing, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 44-45.

The sovereign state, the main subject of international relations

The modern state is not only a territorial entity limited by borders, associated with a particular community of people (nation/country), but it incorporates the sovereignty with its two dimensions: the first refers to the presence of a central, supreme power with full authority, which takes precedence over any other forms of exercising the power within the state. A second dimension of the modern sovereignty state regards the external environment, i.e. the international arena, where it has independence from a direct external control. Given the interactions with governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the state remains the tool of reaffirming the sovereignty and national identity. It acts according to the sovereignty criterion through foreign policy on the international circumstances, on its own foreign relations, but also the foreign relations of aliens, respecting the general principles of international law: the sovereign equality of states, fulfillment in good faith of the assumed obligations (*pacta sunt servanda*), solving international disputes by peaceful means, refraining from threat of force and its utilization.⁶ There is no higher authority than that of individual states forming the international system of states and no state has a sovereignty superior to another state. Therefore, in formal terms, all states are equally sovereign in the international sphere and are thus equal in the international law. However, from any other perspective, it cannot be argued that states are equal. There is a wide variation between modern states in terms of size, power, social structure, organization of domestic policy, military potential, economic, geographical, environmental factors. Also, there are various forms of states, which can be parliamentary republic, presidential republic, semipresidential republic, constitutional monarchy, absolute monarchy.⁷

Eloquent examples of nation-state or state-nation are: Albania, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania, Sweden etc. There are also states that have two nations such as Belgium and Canada, but also nations without states, for example the Kurds. The states that make up a federal system are: Australia, Brazil, Russian Federation, United States of America, Venezuela, etc. There are still dependent territories with special status and erroneously called countries or nation-states, such as the regions: Bermuda, Greenland, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Western Sahara, etc. and even for components that are part of the UK, such as England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

The modern sovereign state has a special role in the manifestation of the political on the international level, as the international arena consists of an overlapping of interests and actions of the national communities or of some communities born on national soil; and internationally, the essence of nationality is expressed through the state, in the presence of states, in a circumstance and a conditionality created by the states, which is also available in the case of the supranational structures, in terms and in a national-international dynamics. At the same time, it can be seen the preference of the political to appear in the international life in tandem with other components, of which foreground as importance seem the political-diplomatic relations, the politico-military ones and those referring to the human rights.⁸

Despite recent developments on a global scale, the sovereign state maintains its role as the main subject of international relations as a whole. This role is manifested in an integrated context from which it results its central position in the international arena, highlighting, on the one hand, the decrease of some of the state authority's components and, on the other hand, the amplification of the influence of other subjects in the respective arena. Such an integrative

⁶ Dan Năstase, *Diplomatic and Consular Law*, Publishing house of Romania of Tomorrow Foundation, Bucharest, 2006, p. 29.

⁷ Stephanie Lawson, *International Relations. A Brief Introduction*, CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, pp. 36-37.

⁸ Constantin Vlad, *International Relations in Modern History*, Publishing house of Romania of Tomorrow Foundation, Bucharest, 2001, p. 20.

approach permits the achievement of the distinction between international relations and international law, in the case of different categories of subjects of the interstate relations.

Thus, primarily, states are countries, nations. A political party, even when in government, represents a segment of the population: its members, supporters, voters, etc., but not the country as such. Likewise, a non-governmental organization is the exponent of an or some different, narrower or wider categories of people, which makes the organization concerned to represent only those human groups. With respect to the individuals (natural persons), they represent only themselves in any international contact, when they manifest as subjects of the international relations.

Secondly, only sovereign states can engage countries/nations as entities, provided that, in the international life, such an engagement is, ultimately, of necessity a legal commitment. Finally, in the third place, sovereign states are the only creators of legal norms at the level of the countries and on their behalf. Consequently, states are the only subjects of international law if and on behalf of the countries/nations.

Such a quality arises from the intrinsic attributes of the state, because it expresses the people's sovereignty, embodies the country's sovereignty, sovereignty understood in general terms as power of decision in internal and external problems. Establishing the diplomatic relations, always a reciprocal act, means that the states in question recognize each other as bearers of sovereignty, therefore as subject of international law. This legal form may be worn by any type of relations in which the state enters at the international level, relations of the most diverse by their nature – political, economic, military, cultural, etc. A statement of the representatives of two or more states on matters of mutual interest, no matter the field to which it refers to, is a political act that commits the parties. An agreement, whether bilateral or multilateral, again regardless of the field covered, signed and entered into force in accordance with the existing constitutional system of the states parties, engages the countries concerned from the legal point of view. In the first case, states act directly as subjects of international relations; their understanding engages them politically. In the second case, states act as subjects of international law; their agreement is reflected in the legal norms – part of the international law also grown into parts of the domestic law of the states concerned – recognized and endorsed as such, with the rights and obligations involved by the respective norms. Precisely this is an exclusive quality of the state: he is the only one able to legally engage the country, because he is the only bearer of sovereignty from and on the behalf of the respective country.⁹

The sovereign state is present in the international arena through its structures, at different levels, its actions complying with the constitutional provisions of each country in general, and the principle of separation of powers, in particular. *The parliament*, as a legislative body, establishes a variety of relations, becoming an increasingly active subject of the international relations. It has contacts with similar institutions in other countries, takes part through its representatives in the international bodies such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, NATO's Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) –, obviously, in the case of the Member States or participante to such structures. In all such cases, the Parliament is representing itself of course, in its capacity as supreme (national) body of the legislative power, with the authority and responsibility this quality brings in international relations. In all circumstances when the parliament of a country enters into international contacts, it acts as a subject of international relations, but not as subject of international law. It represents itself or engages the country within the limits of the empowerments it disposes of, its acts entering in the political sphere. Of course, the attributions of the parliament in external policy of the state are not confined to

⁹ Constantin Vlad, *International Relations in Modern History*, Publishing house of Romania of Tomorrow Foundation, Bucharest, 2001, pp. 30-32.

its own parliamentary action. Depending on the constitutional regime of the respective state, the Parliament shall decide on various foreign policy acts, which become legal commitments of the country, only after approval by Parliament or by virtue of its proxies.

The branch of the state power, which engages on the legal level is the executive power, *the Government* and, in certain circumstances, its structures. The conclusion of some legal acts in other states – or other subjects of international relations or international law – is initiated by the executive, capable to negotiate and sign such acts on the behalf of the state. There are situations in which the Government engages the state on the basis of the general mandate obtained from the Parliament regarding the foreign policy of the respective state.

Particular aspects present the international attributions of *the head of state*. In the different constitutional systems the head of state has the role to represent the country internationally. However, in the contemporary world, this role is often prominent, which makes us speak about a *high-level diplomacy*, involving not only the heads of state, but heads of government as well. The position of the head of state in international relations is individualized according to each country's constitutional system. Thus, in the case of monarchical forms of government, the monarch, as the head of the state, usually meets restricted functions, especially of representation, with their protocol and diplomatic etiquette constituents. The parliamentary republic typically provides an image of the presidential institution with mainly representative functions. Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary are such parliamentary republics. To the extent that the presidential institution engages on the external level, its actions concern the political relations of the concerned state with other states. The full commitment of the respective states is given at high level by the head of the Government, the prime minister (chancellor in the case of Germany and Austria) being the main personality of the state power in external relations. In presidential republics/regimes, in which the head of the state is either simultaneously the chief of the executive, for example US, or has larger executive powers, for example the Russian Federation, in these cases, the head of the state engage that state, including from the legal point of view, therefore as subject of international law. An intermediate condition is known by the semi-presidential republics/regimes – such as France, Romania – cases in which the head of the state, without also being the chief of the executive, or directly fulfilling executive functions, is vested with attributions which enables him to internationally engage the state, both politically and legally.¹⁰

Thus, the sovereign state remains the main subject of international relations. This reality is present along with the position and role of other such subjects. Thus, the whole issue of the international relations and the actors that are present in these relations is placed in a principled framework that enables the coherent understanding of the international life with its specific logic.

Competition in the contemporary international arena

In the current international environment, frequented by non-state actors more and more influential, the nation state is under pressures not experienced before. Challenges are more easily noticeable if the sovereignty is seen as a social construct that involves, in addition to identity and territory, also acceptance by other states of the final authority claims in a number of *issue areas*¹¹. There is a variation – in time and from one issue area to another – of the sphere in which final authority is claimed by the state and/or is recognized as legitimate by other states. In this respect, three types of challenges are defined.

¹⁰ Constantin Vlad, *Political and Diplomatic Contemporary International Relations*, Publishing house of Romania of Tomorrow Foundation, Bucharest, 2001, pp. 35-39.

¹¹ Thomas J. Biersteker, *State, Sovereignty and Territory*, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth A. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, Sage Publications, London, 2002, p. 167.

First of all, in certain issue areas, states tend to mitigate some of the claims regarding the final authority. Although it does not manifest equally in all the regions or in all the issue areas of the international life, the phenomenon is obvious. Thus, EU Member States have attenuated the claims from the field of economic and monetary policy in favor of the EU structures. The interference and mutual surveillance into the domestic sphere (food safety, state subsidies, budget deficits) are normal in the *post-Cold War* world. In the EU, mergers and state subsidies are governed by common rules. In most of the EU Member States, the decisions of the European Court of Justice concerning most of the internal problems of the states (if allowed or not to apply punitive sanctions to your own children) are accepted as final. Resorting to military force is rejected in disputes resolution. The borders between countries are increasingly irrelevant. Rockets, cars and satellites, the disappearance of the border concept are realities of the 21st century. Within most of the EU Member States, the traces of the borders began to disappear, and the only way to know that you have crossed from one country to another is the changing colors of road signs.¹² Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg lies with the institutions of the contemporary world because it interferes directly with the domestic jurisdiction of states. No less striking is the case of the Convention on Torture, which allows the inspection of the national penitentiary systems, inspections often conducted without notice and without visas.

Secondly, there is a significant change in the rules of foreign recognition, of some of the claims of authority issued by the state. The intensification of the normative efforts at universal and regional level in the sphere of human rights is a factor that calls into question the traditional view on state autonomy in internal affairs. For example, a Member State of the Council of Europe must recognize the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which takes precedence over the internal one. Similar efforts are visible as well in areas such as democracy and market economy.

Finally, the state, as an actor of the international system, is more and more faced with the competing claims of authority from some non-state actors. Thus, the integrated international market has become a place of the authority that states must take into account under the threat of some targeted sanctions. On the other hand, in some areas of impact for the international public opinion, such as the environment, transnational *issue networks* have acquired influence and prestige, becoming exponents of a global civil society. States cannot ignore those limitations, both as regards the internal politics as well as their behaviour in the international arena.¹³

The nongovernmental organizations operate both nationally and internationally, aiming to indirectly influence the decisions of the state actors or the international organizations through manifestations, media, attracting some political leaders, opinion makers and decision makers to their own cause. Moreover, they are involved in a series of processes and policies that take place on the international stage, interacting with states or various international organizations: collect information on human rights violations, provide expertise and data in the negotiation processes of the environmental treaties, support various humanitarian processes in cases of conflicts/natural disasters or participate in the processes of promoting and strengthening the democratic principles and values.

In the international arena, an increased number of terrorist organizations operate that are turning their attention from the governmental, diplomatic and military targets, to the so-called „soft targets” (trains, subways, hotels, banks, synagogues) important through the

¹² Robert Cooper, *The Collapse of Nations. Order and Chaos in the 21st Century*, Translation by Sebastian Huluban, Introductory study: Ambassador George Maior, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 56-57.

¹³ Andrei Miroiu, Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu (coordinators), Daniel Biró, Lucian-Dumitru Dîrdală, Olivia Todorean, Ionuț Apahideanu, Simona Soare, Stanislav Secieru, *Handbook of International Relations*, Polirom Publishing, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 45-46.

symbolic charge and the challenge of a significant number of victims. Such actions aim to determine the pressure of the public opinion on policy makers in the sense of accepting the requests coming from the terrorist organizations. A present phenomenon is that of the global message of terrorism given the technological evolution through which the messages of the terrorist organizations are transmitted over long distances and have a wide audience. At the same time, at state and international organizations level, tendencies to address the causes of the proliferation and its supporting elements – illegal trafficking, organized crime, *safe heavens* manifest. On this dimension, however, the prevention of terrorist actions remains a wish, without state remedies being adapted as fast as the terrorist strategies.¹⁴

In the context of an unfavorable economic environment and of the proliferation of transnational and cross-border criminality, among the determinants of conflicts are often found: the existence of mutual territorial claims, both from the states and from the non-state actors; ethnic/religious cleavages; specific local balances of power and the possibility to exert pressure from the outside on the parties; the goals and the ambitions of the leaders; the access of state and non-state actors to military equipment.¹⁵

Alongside the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and organized crime, the international terrorism, constantly rising after 2001, has become a complex aggressive phenomenon which takes unpredictable manifestation forms and difficult to counteract, using to reach the goals both traditional means and the latest achievements of science and technology. Specialized military bodies of the democratic states, engaged in the campaign against terrorism, although adapted to the new conditions posed by the new form of combat and take great efforts in this respect, are not yet sufficiently prepared to fight and counteract all terrorist actions.¹⁶

Currently in the international arena there is a fierce competition among states for obtaining raw material and financial resources for the markets, for the access to science, technology, information and others, for winning a favorable position at the level of knowing the intentions of other competitors, of specific confidentiality, of maximum safe keeping of the scientific theories, of the new technologies in the military field in particular. At the same time, states, the responsible factors within, pregnantly manifest the desire to be safe, to solve the internal and external crises by establishing normative acts that should allow the organization of their own systems, of their own national security strategies.¹⁷

The competition between non-state actors – particularly the transnational ones – and nation states should not be viewed solely in conflicting terms. This perspective is rather characteristic to some theories that, analyzing the cases of conflict, invariably conclude that the influence of the non-state actors is limited. Questions like „Who wins the duels between states and transnational actors?“ are insufficient. In an analysis that takes into account the „transnational policy“ as a dimension of the contemporary international relations, it is more relevant to study the negotiations, the coalitions and the alliances formed between

¹⁴ Ph.D. Teodor Frunzeti, *Global Dynamics and Non-state Actors*, in Ph.D. Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D. Vladimir Zodian (coordinators), *World 2005. Political and Military Encyclopaedia (Strategic and Security Studies)*, Publishing house of the Editorial Technical Center of the Army, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 144-145.

¹⁵ Ph.D. Teodor Frunzeti, *Global Dynamics and Non-state Actors*, in Ph.D. Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D. Vladimir Zodian (coordinators), *World 2005. Political and Military Encyclopaedia (Strategic and Security Studies)*, Publishing house of the Editorial Technical Center of the Army, Bucharest, 2005, p. 152.

¹⁶ Ph.D. Visarion Neagoe, Adrian Crăciunescu, *Military Force in the War against International Terrorism*, in Ph.D. Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D. Vladimir Zodian (coordonators), *World 2005. Political and Military Encyclopaedia (Strategic and Security Studies)*, Publishing house of the Editorial Technical Center of the Army, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 197, 200-201.

¹⁷ Dorel Bușe, *Crisis Management and Regional Conflicts*, Publishing house of Romania of Tomorrow Foundation, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 328-329.

transnational actors as well as between them and parts of governments and international intergovernmental organizations.¹⁸

In connection with groups of countries, the following clarifications are necessary from the point of view of their competence: whether or not they have the right to representation, the right to engage member and participating states, whether or not they can adopt decisions through their own structures or whether or not they can act on the behalf of the component states. In relation to this, the groups of states suggest or not the transfer of sovereignty from the member or participating states to the structures in which these groups of countries are considered.¹⁹

The transfer of sovereignty also takes place in the case of security and security-defense bodies, such as the UN and NATO. According to the United Nations Charter (1945), the Security Council bears the main responsibility for international peace and security. Article 24 of the Charter states: „In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”²⁰ This way, the transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to UN goes so far as the Member States which are not members of the Security Council waive their right to vote which is inherent to their quality. In the case of NATO, decisions are taken by consensus. Also, in a number of issues regarding the NATO actions, the Member States may choose an action or another. This does not apply in the cases provided for in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on the establishment of NATO (1949), which applies automatically and compulsorily through the structures of the Alliance, including through its military mechanisms. By evoking this article, we reach the guarantees of security, an institution with numerous and complex applications regarding the position of the states as subjects of international relations. The history of these relations records many cases when one or more States have given, or have granted mutual security guarantees. In this regard, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty states: „The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”²¹

In postmodernity, for Romania are identified the following national priorities:

1. Learning and applying the principles of sustainable development as a conceptual basis of the strategic planning and public policy. The gradual transition from the growth model based on excessive and unreasonable consumption of resources to achieving a dynamic balance between economic development and maintaining a natural clean and healthy environment that can be understood and accepted in the society.

2. Setting a specific country profile and the capitalization of Romania's real competitive advantages, particularly by supporting the training and development of the national capital in forms compatible with EU and NATO regulations.

¹⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, *Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion*, International Organization, 25 (3), 1971, p. 723.

¹⁹ Constantin Vlad, *International Relations in Modern History*, Publishing house of Romania of Tomorrow Foundation, Bucharest, 2001, pp. 34-35.

²⁰ Constantin Bușe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, *International Relations in the Acts and Documents*, Vol. II (1939-1945), Didactic and Pedagogic Publishing house, Bucharest, 1976, p. 215.

²¹ Constantin Bușe, Zorin Zamfir, Alexandru Vianu, Gheorghe Bădescu, *International Relations in the Acts and Documents*, Vol. III (1945-1982), Didactic and Pedagogic Publishing house, Bucharest, 1983, p. 58.

3. Modernization of state structures, predominantly by strengthening the democratic institutions and procedures, by strengthening the rule of the single law for all, the depoliticization and professionalization of the executive functions at all levels, ensuring transparency and accountability, actually guaranteeing the rights and freedoms.

4. Emphasizing the importance of human capital for the development of Romania in the 21st century, by foreground allocation of resources, regardless of the constraints that may arise in other areas, for education and training, the healthcare system, assistance and social inclusion, scientific research, technological development and innovation, as well as demographic recovery measures.

5. The initiation of some national debates – with the participation of the political factors, the academic community, the business environment, social partners and civil society – which must have as a result the adoption of legislative measures and public policies aimed at implementing the concept of sustainable development, the identification of new resources, including through public-private partnerships, attracting investments and stimulating some associative formulas for creating stable, well-paid jobs, and for improving the quality of people's lives.

6. Promoting an active external policy, consistent and dignified within EU and NATO, as well as in relations to other countries, especially the neighboring ones, pursuing Romania's interests and the fulfillment of its dialogue and conciliation vocation, regionally and internationally. Strengthening the national security and the defense capacity of the country.²²

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²² *Romania after the Crisis. Re-professionalisation*, Coordonators: Mircea Malița, Călin Georgescu, Institute for Innovation and Development Projects, Bucharest, Company 2010, pp. 129-130, passim.

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GENERAL ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST ACTIONS NEW FORMS OF TERRORISM, TENDENCIES AND PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACT

Marius NEGRESCU,

PhD., General Directorate of Bucharest Police,
mariusnegrescu@gmail.com

Abstract: *The article presents briefly a few characteristics of contemporary terrorism which became a global, international problem and it analyzes new types of terrorism (cyber, bioterrorism, eco-terrorism) each of them presenting itself distinctly as a form of attack, as a tool but also having psychological, economic and medical consequences. The measures of prevention and countering depend on each type of attack. It is certain that combining the attack forms would have a devastating effect on the target population.*

Key words: *contemporary terrorism, critical infrastructures, cyberterrorism, bioterrorist attack, eco-terrorism, psychosocial impact.*

Criminality and the number of violent and terrorist actions have largely increased nowadays being in the public attention since September 9-11 attacks, which had as a result over 3000 victims. These terrorist actions in the USA represented practically a cornerstone, the related studies being divided in two main periods: up to and after 9-11. Before the attacks the topic was tackled in a singular manner, specific to each state but after 9-11, terrorism turned into a global, international problem.

Terrorist organizations or those of organised crime have access at present at increasing funds, a situation that constitutes a “gate” to getting ammunition and more dangerous new technologies.

In exchange, as long as the reaction of the authorities has tended in the 90’s to be limited to non-lethal guns, the terrorists and the out-laws from all over the world have been discovering the “charm” of Teflon bullets which can penetrate whatever anti bullet vest.

Paradoxically, the terrorist phenomenon can be treated as well as a reason for military and political actions in order to fulfil economic and strategic goals of some states. By exaggerating the terrorist peril, leaders, governments or political parties can obtain increased political powers, funds, all justified by the necessity state (exceptional situations request exceptional measures).

At the same time with the developing of science, of technology and communication means, the instant access to information in various domains allowed the exponents of terrorist and organised crime organizations to diversify their means and to grow their action areas.

Terrorism adapted itself to the new conditions and possibilities; in the 20th century the target of the terrorist actions was represented by common persons. These attacks have been as a main objective the producing of anxiety of the population by the existence of a threat to the individual security, his/her family (a threat to his/her health or life). The panic or intimidation state put a pressure on the leading echelon (of the state, organizations and social categories), the terrorists trying to achieve political objectives (by having solutions to or changing political problems, having a sensitive public opinion on a certain ideology or subject; having a certain degree of disorganization related to military objectives, etc.) objectives very difficult to be achieved by democratic or conventional methods.

Nowadays new forms of terrorism are in focus such as the cyber one, bioterrorism, nuclear or atomic one or eco-terrorism.

In the context of an increased interest on the potential risks related to different activities in Romania, the Romanian Institute for Evaluation and Strategy in cooperation with the Romanian Association for Evaluation and Strategy made a study about the public perception on the risks factors related to the Romanian state and the society and the individual risks in December 2013. Approximately a half of the respondents (43%) appreciated the national security as being quite good; a third (29%) consider it poor, 13% very poor and 9% very good. Terrorism is perceived as a present risk for Romania by 35% of the respondents; beyond earthquake (78% consider this risk a present one) these being followed by inflation and social disorders (77%, respectively 75%), kidnapping (52%), pandemics (43%) and country bankruptcy (41%). Specifically, the energetic security of Romania, largely discussed in the public sphere especially those subjects related to the exploitation of natural resources, is bivalent appreciated by the respondents: 46% think it is very or quite good and 49% consider it quite or very poor (according to the research rapport “*Perception of some security risks and the activity of some institutional actors*”¹).

Cyberterrorism

Nowadays, because of the developing of informatics and computerized calculation systems, the risk of committing terrorist attacks which can affect the critical infrastructures of a society has increased largely.

According to the Directive no. 114/2008/CE of the European Council, on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection (December 8, 2008), “critical infrastructure” means “an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions”.

The consequences of an attack which would target the control systems of the infrastructure in various critical domains of a society would be disastrous. The specialists estimate that a cyber attack of a terrorist intent, with or without victims, would interrupt for a long period of time the activity and consequently the good functioning of some vital infrastructures such as chemical installations, electrical networks or gas transport.

At the same time, the breaking down of a system belonging to the infrastructure could affect the functioning of other systems, and the effect could spread in accordance with the degree of developing of a certain society.

When electrical breakdowns occurred in the USA and Canada this was a sign of vulnerability for the electrical systems. A terrorist cyber attack combined with a physical terrorist attack could affect the target population at a large scale. Such systems are to be found out in various economic branches, in finance and banking domain as well as in transportation, energetic, communication and administrative one.

This is the reason to impose different measures with a view on the elaboration of intervention plans for each objective in case of a terrorist attack, for each objective separately, that include controls and regular exercises on its security and establishing efficient communication ways in between the authorities.

As well in Romania, in 2013, cyber attacks have been confirmed on national companies that are based on critical infrastructures in terms of handling and administration, such as Romgaz and Transgaz (according to the declarations made by a senior officer of Romanian Intelligence Service from Sibiu, in a media conference held to announce the International Conference “Cybersecurity-Central European Conference” – October, 2013).

¹ available at http://www.ires.com.ro/uploads/articole/ires_percep%C8%9Bia-unor-riscuri-de-securitate-2013_raport-de-cercetare.pdf

According to a mass media communiqué², since the beginning of 2014 the Romanian Intelligence Service/RIS has been supported (in its quality of national authority in this regard - cyber intelligence) “specific activities related to the cyber attack Wipbot/Epic (suspected as being a part of the campaign Snake/Turla/Uroburos) in cooperation with institutions represented in the Operative Council on Cyber Security constituted at the national level and foreign partners. This attack had as an objective the cyber systems belonging to core institutions in various states or country being included.

At the same time, during the NATO Workshop on cyber threats (Bucharest, June, 2014), in the presence of over 100 participants (according to a RIS communiqué³) RIS Director, George Cristian Maior, emphasized that taking into account the new risks and threats that the allied states are confronted with, a special place is dedicated to those related to the cyber space in this sense being necessary a solid legal framework which would assure the necessary conditions to proper investigations through the cooperation with public and national affected entities and a proper understanding of the cyber attacks (with a higher degree of complexity) which could severely damage the national security of Romania and its allied/partner states, by direct actions.

Bioterrorist attack

Even the idea of using the biological agents as weapons is quite old, the recent progress of biotechnology offers the opportunity of creating some biological weapons with an impressive potential. Some authors consider that a new era has begun, one of the post-nuclear threats during which the biological threat replaces the nuclear one (Chambon et. al., 2000).

The threat represented by the acquisition of chemicals, biological, radiological and nuclear/CBRN materials by a terrorist group determined governments and international organizations to pass/enforce regulations and major impact programmes in order to defend the populations against the risks associated to this threat. In 2004, United Nations Security Council adopted unanimously the Resolution no. 1540, which imposes obligations for all member states to develop and enforce laws/regulatory measures in order to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the appropriate internal measures of these materials to prevent their illicit traffic.

Even though this kind of attacks have been reduced as a number in comparison with other forms, the psychological, economical and medical consequences on the population could be so large that it is seriously considered the step towards the prevention and the combating of an attack, no matter its scale.

The bioterrorist attack represents a deliberate release of viruses, bacteria and other germs with the objective of causing illness or death in the human or animal population. The biological agents are difficult to be detected and most of the times the effect appears in due time for the terrorists to leave away the scene of attack. The clinical effects are various from high morbidity (measles, plague, pneumonia) to prolonged incapacity (for instance Venezuelan equine encephalitis).

An act of bioterrorism could be easily fulfilled with few means, starting with the contamination of a restaurant or a public institution to the contamination of a crop or the transmission of a virus through aerosol, the dispersion of the pathological agent in the water or at the soil surface. Some studies⁴ give as a prognosis that we can face in the future new possible developments of the terrorist actions in this domain – the contamination of the air-

² <https://www.sri.ro/comunicat-de-presa-11-08-2014-15-33.html>

³ <https://www.sri.ro/serviciul-roman-de-informatii-a-organizat-a-cincisprezecea-editie-a-atelierului-de-lucru-nato-privind-amenintarile-cibernetice.html>

⁴ See National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases – “NIAID Strategic Plan for Biodefense Research 2007 Update”, <http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/topics/BiodefenseRelated/Biodefense/PDF/biosp2007.pdf>

conditioner in business buildings or the spray of the pathological agents from airplanes and these are only few examples.

The biological weapons are characterized by: the difficulty of knowing certainly the authors, relatively low costs of producing and quickness of dissemination of the pathological agents, extended effects on the targets, no effects on the buildings and other material assets and the negative psychological effect on the attacked population.

The threat (but not the materialization of a bioterrorist attack) could be self-sufficient to create a strong psychological impact. Even though the attack is not going to have shape the effects are to be seen on long term, being amplified by the existence of rumors. Moreover, the protection measures taken by the authorities – by using detection monitors in the underground stations for example or the use of total protection outfit (nuclear, biological, and chemical) may induce fear and the feeling of an imminent danger. The authorities may take measures for better informing the public by having an official statement, knowing that rumors appear when official information is missing, it lacks the important aspects, it is thin in content or it is not transmitted to the public.

Unfortunately the present uncertainties related to the chronic effects on health as a result of the exposure at toxic agents at low levels will increase the anxiety of the population in the affected communities. The health system representatives cannot ensure the population that the exposure even for a limited time or quantity is without consequences. As a result, frustration appears and an increasing lack of confidence in the medical experts and the governmental institutions situation that leads to a degree of difficulty in the rehabilitation.

According to Lemyre (2010) the psychosocial impact of these agents is larger than the physical one. A biological attack in a civil environment may lead to logistic and economic damages and prolonged psychological effects on population in general, which can excel the direct medical effects of deliberate release as it is exemplified by the terrorist attacks with anthrax in the United States in 2001.

Even though at the final point 5 deceased and 21 infected persons have been registered, the peril of simply opening an envelope has had a large impact on million individuals and created serious dysfunctions. The psychological reaction was generalized panic amplified by several elements: temporal proximity to 9-11 attacks, the uncertainty regarding the sender of the contaminated letters and the waiting – the incapacity of knowing who the next target is. The involvement of the press as a target of the letters generated an overwhelming media exposure which supported the panic. The means of informing constitute real networks of transmitting the information but of the rumors too when the information is incomplete. The accelerating effect is a physical one – thousands of persons acknowledge the rumor and a psychological one by overtaking it and making it credible.

A decade ago the specialists complained about the lack of studies (Hall et al. 2002) regarding the psychological consequences of bioterrorism and of modalities of protection. Recently published (Gouweloos et al. 2014) 39 studies made on psychosocial responses after the terrorist attacks with CBRN agents include specialized recommendations with a view on psychological care about:

- firstly - crisis and risk communication, the institutions involved should give clear messages (without contradictory elements) on the risks of exposure, the symptoms should be described in an objective manner, because some of them could be overlapped with those of physical expressed anxiety, ways of protection, details about quarantine, decontamination, vaccination and medicine distribution;
- secondly – there are important recommendations on the personnel's education and training as the most important danger is for the health care systems to be overcrowded immediately after the attack and the patients could have problems related to the fear of exposure not physical ones, having in mind the sarin gas attack in Tokyo, 2005; the wearing of equipments

which saved lives (gas masks, airtight costumes) created problems, consequently exercises are necessary to avoid claustrophobia or anxiety;

- thirdly – an important issue is the given practical support to the patients in need of expressing themselves on past experiences; recommendations should be given, taking into account that beyond priorities is placed the family reunion, the parents should be preoccupied by the security of their own families when the mobile communication is interrupted and followed by anxiety and resistance; a practical support should be given to return to a state of normality with respect to appropriate permanent housing, schooling and community service in order to reduce significantly the risk of the long term psychological impact on children and families (Lemyre et al., 2010);

- fourthly - professional care and counseling are important, beyond the common actions related to monitoring, the identification of vulnerable groups, recommendations on professional care specific only to CBRN, reassurance given to anxious but not contaminated persons, giving flyers with the possible emotional reactions in non-exposure situations.

Eco-terrorism and the activists for animal rights

The terrorism related to a particular cause may have as an objective activities supported by individuals, extremist ecologist organizations who militate for animal rights or against the abortion politics. They protest, threaten or develop actions in a violent manner against companies, clinics, research institutes or against any measure or no measure taken by state institutions.

During the past two years, the ecologist extremist organizations increased their violent forms of manifestation most of the times their members making threatening statements, organizing street demonstrations and making violent actions to fulfil their objectives.

Presently, the violent actions having as pretext ecological causes (compared frequently with Islamic terrorism⁵) are on the agenda of American and European security agencies/institutions. The eco-terrorism is manifesting through violent acts and threatening the persons and their owning, vandalism, propriety destroying all made in the name of the protection of the environment. The eco-terrorists are taking actions in order to stop deforestation, they put on fire housing areas and the headquarters of some companies sometimes even cares to protest against the excessive use of fossil fuel, they attack the fishing ships for whales, they cut the fishing nets and use as extreme tactics the explosives.

These threats “are neither artificial nor distant, but the theories and dangerous groups are not simply related to the third world, they come closer to the civilized world, in the heart of the large cities or in their suburbs, waiting for the proper time to act”⁶.

Eco-terrorists commit violent acts with a political motivation to put a pressure on the governmental institutions and large parts of the society to change the attitude towards the environment.

“Animal Liberation Front”/ALF⁷ is the best known international organization for its fight for the animal rights, against any type of abuse and other forms of animal exploitation. In its publications, a large part of them websites, they make publicly instructions regarding the methods of sabotage and destruction of the objectives and information on the doctors and researchers’ addresses or those of the research labs⁸.

⁵ see *The Threat of Eco-Terrorism* at <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm>

⁶ Tihan E., Ciuchiță, L., Toma D., *Scurtă analiză asupra terorismului contemporan. Orientări, strategii de combatere* (Bucharest: I.E.S.P.U. Focus Press, 2016), p. 71.

⁷ see <http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/Philosophy-index.htm>

⁸ See <http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/Activist%20Tips/activist-index.htm>

Generally, the tactic adopted by this organization is non-violent direct action. Nonetheless, ALF produces important economic damages to the animals' owners who take a profit from their death.

FBI considers the eco-terrorist organizations and those affiliated as being one of the most important terrorist internal threats in the USA because of the large number of the violent actions, (over 600 from 1996), of the economic impact (losses of more than 43 million dollars), of the large category of victims (corporation staff, timber companies, labs for animal testing, research centers for genetic research, etc.) and of increasing violence in actions⁹.

During 2006 the American Congress enforced the law "Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act" ¹⁰ which protects the companies which use animals in any way from the actions of the activists on animal rights. It stipulates penalties with imprisonment for 1 to 20 years or life imprisonment for producing damages to these companies.

In Romania eco-terrorist acts are not stipulated in the Penal Code. We assume that in our country as well the public information may be taken from the internet as long as the ecologist and defending animal rights organizations have on their sites methods of destroying objectives and information on preparing explosives. The potential adherents communicate with these organizations by using closed internet platforms; they can send messages and reclaim the attacks being undercover published by the international mass media trusts.

The actions may begin with graffiti inscriptions then followed by windows breaking of some institutions and gradually turned to threatening the companies, the contamination of products, sending letter bombs, using infected needles and blades, making threatening calls up to destroying targets and putting cars on fire.

Evolution tendencies of contemporary terrorism

In the last centuries terrorism was evolving around some revolutionary ideas, part of them of national liberation, at present terrorism is centered upon ethnical, religious causes or those related to the protection of the environment.

Contemporary terrorism is characterized by an increasing number of terrorist acts, made with cynicism and cruelty – as being more efficient this way and having a larger impact and an increased number of victims.

Present terrorist organizations use superior technique methods, special, performing equipment, they have been transformed themselves in special organizations with their own funds, performing operative actions, having training camps, shelters, labs, weapons, best means of transport and communication. Terrorist actions are focused on attracting mass media representatives to support their actions and make them popular.

No matter its forms the efficacy of a terrorist attack depends on the terrorist's capacity to transmit the messages for three types of audiences. The attack transmits a message for the terrorist organization and its supporters, another for the target community and a third one for the international public opinion.

One of the main tendencies in the modern evolution of terrorism is the use of modern handy methods – airplanes, cars, fertilizers, cyber networks, social networks, internet communication, bank transfers, encrypted e-mails, credit cards etc.

Some security studies¹¹ identified a series of present tendencies of the terrorist phenomenon:

- attacks with explosives on large urban crowding;

⁹ See <http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco-terrorism>

¹⁰ Public Law 109-374 *Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act* available at <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=476361>

¹¹ *The National Counterterrorism Center –USA (NCTC)* at http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2009_report_on_terrorism.pdf

- attacks with pathological agents;
- attacks on objectives that could affect national economy;
- increasing number of actions based on taking hostages to obtain funds from families, companies, governments;
- intensive collaboration from terrorist groups and organized crime groups;
- increasing number of the victims of religious, fundamentalist terrorism.

The particular trait of contemporary terrorism is represented by its gradual increase - in terms of attacks and the degree of affecting more states. Contemporary terrorism has a transnational character derived from the process of globalization and free movement.

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THE USE OF ARMED FORCE IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Nicolae David UNGUREANU,

Assistant Lecturer, Police Academy "Alexandru Ioan Cuza",
davidungureanu2008@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The issue of the use of armed force in the international relations is an old one, ever since the advent of organized state societies and of the international system of states based upon cooperation and confrontation among the states as its elements. Because in antiquity war was the most visible form of the relationship between the states, the law regulating these relations was called the law of war, but being distinguished the subjective right of the states to make war from the rules and customs of warfare. Even today when the subjective right of the states to resort to the armed force turned into jus ad pacem, the law of peace based upon the prohibition of the use of force as an instrument of national policy and the Security Council's monopoly over the use of the armed force, armed conflicts continue to manifest themselves, in order to limit their destructive effects being established the international humanitarian law which represents the protection of the human rights in exceptional situations of war, in fact, jus in bello of the ancient Romans.*

Key words: *international relations, international law, armed force, legitimacy*

The legitimacy of using military force in international relations of the beginning of the third millennium

In organized societies the use of force is generally repudiated but it is acknowledged that the prevention and repression of illegal violence is only possible through the use of the coercive force of the state against criminals, so that the law must penalize any infringement; somewhat similar, although with notable differences the question arises also in the international system of states, in which, depending on the new developments of the supranational governance, it also existed the concept of "just war" that allowed the state to use force in promoting the survival interests of the community, for that today we find the fundamental principle of non-resort to force by establishing the monopoly of the Security Council, as the authority of global governance on the international use of force.

The legitimacy of the use of force in the state legal order

That violence is intrinsic to human personality is a fact that should not be demonstrated, people being a synthesis of good and evil in different proportions. Being a natural given, nor can we say that violence is "bad" in itself, certain aggressiveness is needed for efficacy and evolution. Accordingly, the term "inhuman violence" appears to be slightly pleonastic, which does not mean we should accept without reservation that "the end justifies the means"; anyway, next to the peaceful fraternal cooperation, the violence often proved to be one of the effective methods of achieving objectives. So it is that man as a social being, always committed not only friendly acts in the relationships with his peers but also acts of physical and armed violence, individual or collective, in all types of human community, from the family type to the international type. Although there is also "political violence", it is believed that the first goal of politics is to avoid violence; this is true in the sense that politics should prohibit the use of violence by the individuals. So it is that, by law, the states have monopolized the use of armed force, violence being outlawed whether it be individual or collective and the organization of military or paramilitary activities outside a State authority was prohibited. The only possibility that an individual has in the state legal order to use means

of armed violence is self-defense, a justifying cause under the criminal law by which violent acts committed under certain conditions do not constitute an offense and are exempt from legal liability; moreover, those who resort to armed force, regardless of their motivation, are legally punished, this being the way through which state organized communities seek to limit the use of violence in society, the state being the only one legitimate to do so. The State monopoly over the use of armed force means that it alone can use legitimate coercion, both against offenders and in cases of serious disturbances of the legal order.

The legitimacy of the use of force in the international community

In the international community, violence is usually associated with international war, that is, the with the physical violence, with the confrontation of the armed forces of states and solely in the relatively recent times, it was realized that there are other violent means than war itself, which means that war is only one of the forms of international violence, the most extreme and deadly, resulting from international anarchy; so it is that global strategic research institutes have expanded the field of study and analysis from the problems of war to those of violence in all its forms because, along with the apparent violence, there is also a structural one, inherent to the social and international structure. At the root of violence there is always a will of constraint in order to exercise an effect of domination (or vice versa, in order to counter this effect) even if the constraint is not apparent and even if it is not direct. The use of military force in international relations was never instinctive and passionate (even in totalitarian or terrorist regimes) but, there is always a rational layout in it, to the extent that those who resort to violence aim at a specific result, weighing the risks and costs on the one hand and the benefits on the other, each state having a personal assessment on this in that relationship. For this reason it is said that war is the continuation of politics by other means the use of armed force between States having as fundamentals many political, military and legal considerations.

From a legal perspective, from ancient times to the twentieth century, war was considered a lawful activity of the sovereign state, the use of armed force being a voluntary act of states, based on their discretionary power to preserve their existence and to promote their interests; the freedom to make war was an essential prerogative of sovereignty, just as natural as the ability of States to conclude treaties of peace, the only recourse to armed force limitations being ethical ones, as demonstrated by the just war theory. The entry into war created a state of belligerency, characterized by interrupting the normal rules of international law in the relations between the belligerents and the application of a particular international law, the law of war. The use of armed force without boundaries in time and space was not a crime, but only an "international fact" likely to be subject to legal qualifications. We have already seen that national legal systems monopolized since their appearance the use of force in favor of government institutions in the sense that people yielded their right to use force (except in self-defense) in exchange for the guarantee provided by the public authorities that they will protect the persons and property. The lack in the international society of a higher political authority superior to that of sovereign states has led to the inexistence in international relations of the monopoly on the use of force and the full freedom of states to resort to armed violence in defense of their vital interests made the international law to be considered as a weak right, imperfect and primitive.

The increase of interdependencies between states has led in the twentieth century, sovereign states to consent to limiting and regulating the use of force in order to ensure the peaceful, harmonious and mutually beneficial coexistence of nations in the international society of nations. The first steps were taken in the second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 when they codified customary rules of legitimacy of opening military hostilities and of armed neutrality. The globalization of the armed violence of the First World War demonstrated the

risks of the freedom of states to make war so that by the Covenant of the League of Nations, the first attempt of institutionalization of the international society, it was agreed that the war is illegal in case of aggression (Article 10) when required to resolve a difference that was not previously subject to a peaceful procedure (art.12.1) when deployed to challenge a judicial or arbitral international decision (art.13.4) and when it is contrary to a recommendation adopted unanimously by the Council of the League of Nations. The effectiveness of this limitation of the right of states to use force was strengthened by a procedure of "moratorium on war" (Article 12) prohibiting hostilities from beginning within three months of the adoption of Council recommendations or the pronouncing of an international sentence. The main flaw was that the League of Nations Covenant guaranteed the legitimacy of all wars that were not expressly prohibited; trying to correct this, the Briand- Kellogg Pact of 1928 established a general prohibition of resorting to war as an instrument of national policy of states setting outside the law the use of armed force in international relations, based on the rule that what is not expressly authorized is prohibited. Even if between the two international treaties there was not enough coherence to stop the illegitimate use of force, they have demonstrated that the international legal system is moving in the same direction as national legal systems, that of the prohibition of armed violence.

Indeed, the disadvantages of the interwar regulations on the use of force could be eliminated in the circumstances of the end of the Second World War. Overcoming the renunciation of war formulated by the Pact of 1928 (which is recognized as having a customary value), the United Nations Charter within paragraph 4 of Article 2 imposes a more general ban targeting any use of force in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of this Treaty, leaving as legitimate only the use of "peaceful" force, if not contrary to the principles of the UN. It is not therefore wrong when to say that this made the most important and certainly more ambitious change to the international law outlawing the use of force and is the cornerstone of the community interstate system still based on the sovereignty and autonomy of states but declaring the international peace and security as the supreme value of the global legal system. In this way increased the international solidarity in the sense that making illegal any recourse to armed force is not a simple contractual obligation and it means that each state must understand that its essential interests are infringed by its violation; therefore, not only the victim of the illegitimate use of force but also any other State is entitled to pursue their claims of liability, as the prohibition includes the international community as a whole. However, unlike the national legal systems, the prohibition of the use of force in international relations cannot be substantiated as much on the law enforcement, but in other ways, such as the good faith of states, their consent and the reciprocity of treatment. And political preferences as well as the vital interests of states make it so that the interpretation of the paragraph 4 of Article 2 is not yet unambiguous. They had to reach different situations and international issues and countless international sentences be given or be faced with various doctrinal opinions in order to understand that the term "force" is limited to military force (not including political, economic or psychological coercion) or that the "threat of force" can result in terms of the use of weapons (showing the same characteristics as undue pressure and use of force); also heated debates were held on the significance of prohibiting the use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations", justifying the numerous "humanitarian" and "pro-democracy" interventions or other "altruistic " uses of armed violence, forgetting that, by the UN Charter, States are protected against any illegitimate use of force, the Security Council must ensure that armed force shall not be used by any state in its selfish interests, but in the collective interest of all humanity.

Many problematic aspects have created the exceptions to the prohibition of the use and threat of use of force in international relations. Like any fundamental legal principle in this

area there are two exceptions stated even by the Charter. The first is found in Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter and refers to the monopoly of the Security Council to decide on the international use of force. Given the negative experience of the League of Nations, the UN Charter established a system of collective security more effective and advanced in order to ensure international peace and security, but also to punish those who use the illegitimate force in violation of the prohibition of armed violence. In the philosophy of the Charter, the Security Council appears as political institution that has the right to take the necessary decisions based not only on legal arguments but on the basis of political and military reasons, however its resolutions having binding effect on the UN members; holding total supremacy in terms of international peace and security, the Security Council determines, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter the situations when there is a threat or violation of the peace, or act of aggression and authorizes the use of force by mandating collective military action. Beyond the fact that the rules of Chapter VII were not fully put into effect (the inexistence General Staff Committee) and the repeated blocking of its decisions because of the permanent members right of veto (which necessarily requires its reform to reflect the realities of the XXI century), political and military intervention is not arbitrary but is done on behalf of the world community, even if it cannot compel a state to participate in military operations because today the mandate that it offers is more a recommendation or a justification of use force than an order; therefore, excluding peacekeeping operations organized by the UN Secretary, usually after the resolution to use military forces is adopted, the participating States form a coalition of goodwill, which is under the control of the coalition leader and not the UN. On the other hand, the Aggressor State cannot invoke the international law even in this situation. Also, the Chapter VIII of the Charter states that in its actions, the Security Council may use agreements and regional bodies for the enforcement action under its authority, but their actions must be endorsed by the Security Council. Its monopoly on the international use of force is complete if we consider that any inherent right of individual or collective self-defense of states may be exercised only until the Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain world peace.

The second exception to the fundamental principle of non-resort to force or threat of force in international relations is in 51 of the Charter (the last article of Chapter VII) which provides the legitimate individual and collective self-defense of the states. Following the model of the state legal systems on the legitimacy of the coercive use of force by individuals to defend themselves from attack, also the UN Charter has taken over the customary principle of recognition of legitimate defense against an aggression committed by other member states; if the domestic criminal law doctrines shows that, in reality, the act committed in self-defense is committed without guilt, admitting the possibility of exercising the defensive action also in cases of imminent attack, in the international law the problem is different because of the quality the recipients of the norm have - Member States - that are at the same time its creators. For this reason, the absence of supranational judicial bodies, the law analogy, although attractive at first glance, is reduced mainly to the similarity of features regarding the symmetry of this institution (the attack-defense ratio, the conditions of attack, of the defensive action, etc.); which means that the right of individual and collective self-defense of states is to be appreciated and understood in light of the principles applicable in the international legal system of relations between sovereign and equal states, that usually cannot be "guilty" of anything.

It is beyond doubt that not to recognize the right of self-defense of States would transform the international legal order in a suicidal one for the attacked Member States, which is why all the instruments that have limited or prohibited use of force recognized it explicitly or implicitly. However, in the view of the UN Charter, the right to self-defense may be exercised from the start of an armed attack up to the intervention of the Security Council, the Member States having the obligation to inform him about the use of armed force; that right

does not disappear if the Council does not act as only the effective interventionist measures would make inappropriate and unnecessary the use of an armed response of the victim of aggression. Most states and experts believe that the right to self-defense must be strictly construed so as to correspond to the actual armed attack and the reaction of the victim, in order to be legitimate, must be proportionate to the seriousness of the attack and confined to restoring the situation before the assault.

Legal Considerations on self-defense

When an organized society is fighting back against attack, it is responding, in fact, to an aggression with aggression, thus being committed a criminal offense under national or international law which prohibit the acts of revenge and individual use of force. However, according to the legal requirements, this act is committed without guilt because the perpetrator, be it individual or state, has not acted in free will, but constrained by the need to protect social values protected by the legal order and seriously threatened with illegal aggression. For this reason, in the case self-defense, the law provides that guilt and the criminal nature of the act are removed both for individuals as well as the states which use force against aggression.

Between the self-defense¹ provided for by the national public law and the one governed by the international relations there are significant similarities and differences. The criminal doctrine justified by different theories, removing the criminal nature of the act committed in self-defense, some of them being subjective (the conservation instinct theory and the theory of moral constraint) and others being objective (the theory of unjust negation, the response to evil by evil, the collision rights and obligations the theory of the public subsidiary defense, the social unity theory, the exercise of public functions of a public subjective right). For the military and the police officers, as public authorities with responsibilities essential for safeguarding the public order and the national existence, self-defense has specific connotations both in domestic law and in the international one, with distinct features in the case of individual defense, collective security or in peace support operations.

Self-defense in the international law

In the international law, self-defense concerns the subjects of the global legal order and is a legal principle which postulates the right of a state to react immediately and spontaneously with the armed forces in the event of an aggression, being enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain world peace and security ". It is noted that, as in the national law, self-defense removes the international responsibility of the State reacting to an armed aggression with the use of armed force, being a useful and necessary action, an exception to the fundamental principle of public contemporary international law of the renunciation of force or threat of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations; The specific of the international law to create a horizontal legal order, without the existence of a global supranational authority superior to the sovereign states, makes it so that the war waged in self-defense always be legitimate and legal under the following conditions and limitations objectively determined: 1) the existence of an act of aggression with the use of armed force; 2) the anteriority of the act

¹ Self-defense is generally considered as a riposte which a person or a state gives against an attack that would seriously endanger the individual, the state, their rights or the public interest, retaliation determined by the necessity to safeguard endangered social values.

of aggression in relation to the defense; 3) the seriousness of the assault (it does not constitute aggression mere border incidents and they may involve, eventually, only proportional countermeasures); 4) The exercise of self-defense, from the moment when the act of aggression is triggered until the moment when the Security Council intervenes with measures to end the aggression; 5) The proportionality of defense compared to the intensity of the attack.

Unfortunately, despite repeated attempts to define aggression, even today it was not possible to adopt an international treaty accepted by states in order to determine which situations of use of force in the global relations give the right to self-defense; even the Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in Rome in 1998 and entered into force in 2002, although it included in its jurisdiction the crime of aggression, lives its definition in the task of further conferences. However, we can get directions in this area from the UN General Assembly Resolution no. 3314/1974 by which are regarded as acts of armed aggression the following: 1) bombing, invading or attacking the territory of a State; 2) blockade of ports or coast; 3) providing of land for another state to commit such an act; 4) attacking of the armed forces, naval and air vessels and civil aircraft of a state (even outside its territory); 5) use of armed forces from military bases abroad, contrary to the residence arrangements; 6) sending armed gangs and mercenaries against another State. This typology excludes the possibility of self-defense by the use of armed force in the case of economic, psychological or informational "aggression". It does not contain expressly neither the qualification of terrorism as armed aggression, but the Security Council resolution that followed the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, has qualified it as such, legitimizing the war on terrorism. The Conference of States Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Kampala of 2010 decided that the definition of the crime of aggression to be made at the next meeting in 2017, inspired by Resolution 3314/1974; until then, the situations in which they may have committed an act of aggression could be referred to the Court by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter by a State Party or a State not involved, the ICC prosecutor being authorized to investigate ex officio or at the request of a State Party, conditional to authorization by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber; however, according to the Declaration of the 2010 Review Conference, the ICC will not have jurisdiction in this area in case of aggression committed in states which have not accepted the Statute of 1998 or those States Parties which have expressly stated that they do not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court on the crime of aggression. Particular problems in the current changing legal order poses the problem of the preventive self-defense, included in the US security strategy. The complexity of self-defense in the international law requires analyzing it under three aspects: individual self-defense, collective self-defense and self-defense in the security system of the UN.

Individual Self-defense

The imperfection of the international law in relation to the national law has made that the reaction of a state to breaches of his rights to manifest as retort, retaliation and war, actions included in the so-called self-help, self-defense and self-protection. The retort contains no illegal measures taken by the state for another state's coercion to end its unfriendly acts contrary to the international usage, such as, for example, increasing customs duties or the expulsion of diplomats. Retaliations, however, are acts of coercion adopted by a State notwithstanding the rules of international law (ie illegal) against another State in order to force him to re-enter legality and to repair the damage. You might say, in this respect, that war is the extreme form of retaliation that may use a state in individual self-defense in case of an armed attack. Self-support is, in the international law, the situation of a State against whom there is an illicit action from outside its territory to carry out combat missions for military,

economic or otherwise to defend itself; if the illicit action against which the State concerned defends itself is a military aggression, self-support is called individual self-defense and falls within the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, Member States having sovereignty inherent right to organize national defense system as they see fit. Finally, the self-protection, specific to the classic international law, was, in the past, the natural right of states to use force to protect its interests with repression, provided there is a risk to its vital interests, even in the absence of any violation of the international law.

Having a customary origin, but being consecrated conventionally in the UN Charter, self-defense is considered individual, if the state which resorts to it is the direct victim of armed aggression. Even if two or more States are assaulted by a state or coalition of states, acting simultaneously or successively, the States that defend themselves exercise always their individual right at self-defense, although they could support each other. The appeal to legitimate self-defense is only proper to deal with a certain and imminent danger represented by an armed aggression, for which the doctrine of preventive self-defense through which you might take simple measures to anticipate a potential danger is doomed. However it is to be discussed if terrorism today, globally organized, is simply a potential hazard, and the war against it is fully justified. The International Court of Justice referred, on several occasions, at natural right of States, stating, for example, that one cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or the illicit in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, it would be the very survival of the State concerned. The essence of that legal institution is that the state progressing to individual self-defense is merely exercising its legal rights, it does not commit international crimes and therefore its international liability will not be engaged. In response to an aggression, the legitimate self-defense raises special problems regarding the anteriority of the act of aggression (often belligerents blaming each other), indirect aggression (including terrorism) and proportionality between attack and defense, as can be seen in the Middle East, which requires an examination of the international community to invoke the right of legitimate individual self-defense. Thus the establishment of the collective security did not suppress the state's right to defend its survival and territorial integrity with the use of force, but Article 51 of the Charter provides that the measures taken by states to exercise their right to self-defense shall be immediately brought to the attention of the Security Council and shall not affect in any way, its power and duty to take action whenever it deems necessary to maintain or restore world peace and security.

Collective self-defense

A corollary of the fundamental principle of non-resort to force or threat of force, the collective self-defense is provided for all in the UN Charter Article 51 - based on the idea of international solidarity and mutual support in punishing the perpetrator of the victim of armed aggression acts - but has deep historical roots in ad hoc military coalitions established the onset of an attack or in military alliances with a permanent character. In this case, it is the principle of "one for all and all for one" in the sense that although not being a direct victim of the attack, the states which partnered with the State victim of this aggression will participate, together, in the fight against the aggressor, the legitimacy of it coming not only from a spirit of international solidarity, but from a treaty of alliance. The institutional conservation of the regionally collective self-defense is covered in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which in Article 52 provides that "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of agreements or regional bodies designed to deal with issues maintaining world peace and security which are likely actions of a regional nature, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN." As with the individual self-defense, it is reiterated the obligation to fully inform the allies and all Security Council on actions taken or envisaged under regional arrangements or by regional organisms (Article 54),

but also the possibility of the Security Council to use such arrangements or agencies or regional organizations for the enforcement actions under its authority, but it cannot do so without the UN authorization (Article 53).

Even though it has a common legal foundation and individual features close to the self-defense, the emergence of a third state in the equation, rather complicated, between the aggressor and the defender, further complicates the situation. Much of the international legal doctrine believes that self-defense (self-help) can be collective only if more countries are attacked or if there is a relationship between the states in sufficient proximity (which in the past was an ideological one). The reality and the persistence of military alliances, but also the possibility of ad hoc coalitions such theories were refuted, and the International Court of Justice confirmed that there is a right to the collective armed retaliation against acts of aggression by the following two additional conditions to individual self-defense: the state's victim of armed aggression request and its declaration proclaiming itself assaulted. It is not so incidental that mutual assistance pacts resume the terms of Article 51 of the Charter referring in particular to the collective self-defense. As is the case with the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which in Article 5 states: "The parties agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them occurring in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack directed against all parties and consequently they agree that, if such an attack occurred, each of them, in exercise of the right at self-defense, individual or collective, recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or such parties soon attacked and undertake, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action that they deem necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and ensure security in the North Atlantic. " In the same article it is reiterated the obligation to bring to the attention of the Security Council immediately any armed attack of this nature and the measures taken in consequence, the measures ending when the Security Council will take the necessary measures to restore and maintain peace and security. Of course those provisions are in force in the context of NATO's New Strategic Concept, noting that, due to the globalization of threats to Member States, the organization will act not only in the space originally established, but anywhere in the world where security risks will produce, with this purpose, a NATO response Force, interoperable, flexible and technologically advanced being established. In the context of Romania's integration into NATO there was a discussion on the relation of the national defense and the collective defense. What we have previously demonstrated that the collective self-defense does not abolish individual self-defense, so that both systems coexist in the NATO joint forces and the national self-defense forces.

The use of force in the international law science

In most Western countries the scientific literature of public² international law contains chapters on the use of force in international relations. Thus, in a French academic work, the general rules of the use of force, containing both the consecration of the prohibition the use of force and the field of application, including the exceptions for the lawful self-defense and the intervention of the UN Security Council, is in section called "the international law material "in the "right to world peace and security ", among other topics, such as diplomatic and consular relations, law of armed conflict, collective security and disarmament³. In the Romanian literature, classical authors of public⁴ international law treated the use of force in a manner similar to the Western ones; following the prohibition of the use of force and threat of force through the UN Charter in 1945, some modern authors have never given a special

² See also Nguyen Quoc Dinh, *Droit international publique*, 5ème Edition, L.G.D.J., Paris, 1994, p. 889 and R.M.M. Wallace, *International law*, 3rd Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1997, p. 397.

³ D. Alland, *Droit international publique*, PUF, Paris 2000.

⁴ For example G. Plastara, G. Meitani, M. Antonescu, G. Sofronie și N. Dașcovici.

chapter to the use of force, probably under the influence of the idea that imposed a reserved attitude towards the *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* immediately after the adoption of the constitution of global governance after the second World War, preferring, as did the Gregory Geamănu to present this material only in the context of the fundamental principle of public international law of non-resort to force and partly in the section on constraint means to resolve disputes or of the one dedicated to the UN⁵, idea which was sustained until today⁶. However, there were also scientific works which analyzed in depth the theory of the use of force in the current system of international security such as those developed by D. Mazilu in 1983 (with separate chapters on the right of war, prohibition of it as a means of dispute resolution international law and peace building, liability actions against peace⁷) or Bolintineanu A. and A. Năstase in 1995 (the chapter on international organizations and the use of force⁸), and DL While in 2008 (with separate analyzes on *jus ad bellum* and on the separation of *jus in bello*, aggression crimes and war crimes, such as the international the crime of aggression and also the international criminal courts, the democratic intervention, etc.)⁹. Both in the Western literature and in the Romanian one, complex studies have been published on the use of force in international relations, examples being J. Zourek that and start analyzing the origin of the prohibition the use of force for the end it with the possibility of using force to end human rights violations¹⁰, or new, I. Motoc, cited above, investigating the use of force in self-defense, as collective redress and the right to self-determination or in the humanitarian interventions. Related items on a smaller scale have been published in law magazines (IM Anghel), Public Law Review (D. Smith), Bulletin of the National Defence University "Carol I" (I. John, A. Bodescu) Scientific Book of the ISA "Paul Negulescu" (S. Scaunas, M. Andreescu, E. Bețian) Geopolitics (M. Cornel, I. Dragoman, G. Nicolescu, D. Codita), Romanian Journal of International Affairs (M. Costache) and the Romanian Journal of Humanitarian Law (C. Sillion, N. Neagu, V. Badescu, I. Suceavă, C. Voicu). The specific literature on international humanitarian law was concerned not only with *jus in bello*'s analysis but also with *jus ad bellum*. Thus, in the Manual of 1992 and the Treaty of 2000 the professors I. Cloșcă and I. Suceavă allocate an entire part of their ample study to the use of force in the international security system, analyzing the sequence and depth of the banning of the use of force in the international law, the situations in which it can be used legally at force and limitations of force exerting means¹¹. In a somewhat similar way proceed IM Anghel and V.I. Anghel, focusing attention on the use of force in the international relations, in the relations between states, international organizations and in terms of arms control and disarmament¹². In turn Palsoiu I¹³. and N. Purdă¹⁴ focus on the issue of the use of force in international peace and security system, analyzing the right of defense and the law of war from the perspective of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*. Analysis just as laborious and important are found in the published volumes to ARDU such as *Probleme umanitare la sfârșitul secolului și mileniului* (1998), *Lumea în care trăim* (volumul I din 1998 și II din

⁵ G. Geamănu, *Drept Internațional Public*, Ed. Didactică și Pedagogică, vol. I, 1981, vol. II, 1983, București.

⁶ See de L. Takacs în 1976, I. Diaconu în 1993, M.I. Niciu în 1997, R. Miga Beșteliu în 1997, D. Popescu și A. Năstase în 1997, C. Grigore, I. Suceavă și I. Cloșcă în 2001, A. Năstase, B. Aurescu și C. Jura în 2002, S. Scăunaș in 2002 etc.

⁷ D. Mazilu, *Dreptul păcii*, Ed. Academiei, București, 1983.

⁸ A. Bolintineanu, A. Năstase, *Drept internațional contemporan*, Regia Autonomă Monitorul Oficial, București, 1995.

⁹ D.L. Căndea, *Curtea Penală Internațională – o analiză interdisciplinară*, Ed. Militară, București, 2008.

¹⁰ J. Zourek, *L'interdiction de l'emploi de la force en droit international*, Institute Henry Dunant, Genève, 1974.

¹¹ I. Cloșcă, I. Suceavă, *Tratat de drept internațional umanitar*, București, 2000, p.601-676.

¹² I.M. Anghel, V.I. Anghel, *Regulile războiului și dreptul umanitar*, Ed. Lumina Lex, București, 2003, pp. 5-44.

¹³ I. Pălșoiu, *Dreptul păcii și al războiului*, Ed. Universitaria, Craiova, 2007, pp. 81-103.

¹⁴ N. Purdă, *Drept internațional umanitar – curs universitar*, Ed. Lumina Lex, București, 2004, pp. 57-99.

1999), *Dreptul Internațional Umanitar la începutul secolului XXI* (2003) și *Mari probleme umanitare în dezbaterile oamenilor de știință* (2006).

The issue of the use of force is not the preserve of the science of public international law. Thus, the science of criminal law, both national and international, as well as the one of police law, is a good platform for understanding the use of force in self-defense in particular¹⁵. Also, a classic example of international relations theory is Hans J. Morgenthau who's main opera¹⁶ is subtitled the "power struggle and the struggle for peace", examining interdisciplinary the international law limitations to the national and international appeal to armed force. Among recent studies we mention *The UN system in the context of globalization*, Paul Dumitriu¹⁷, which refers legitimacy as a source of authority (p. 111) and *The UN's role in global good governance system* (p. 343), *Dictionary of International Security*, Paul Robinson¹⁸ explaining the theory of just war x (p. 225) and of the democratic peace (p. 223) and Mary Kaldor's¹⁹ *Human security*, which in the chapter entitled *War and peace as right* (pp. 183-213) believes that in era of globalization, instead of the theory of just war, it requires a new approach to ethics based on the notion that individual rights and the state rights are a priority, therefore, the international law that applies to individuals is above the laws of war; in other words, jus in pace may not be suspended during the war in favor of jus ad bellum or *jus in bello*. The author, a professor of global governance at London School of Economics and Political Science, rightly believes that "legitimate military force still has a role but how it is used has more to do with domestic law enforcement than war; Of course, some of the principles of just war theory are relevant for the police force, as is the majority of humanitarian law. Just war theory provides a framework to reflect the justified use of force but this is different from just war." That's why we believe ultimately that humanity does not need a new international humanitarian law but to a new jus in pace.

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822 with the title **“Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.**”

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¹⁵ See C. Voicu, *Conflictele și tensiunile interne*, București, 2007 și B. Onica-Jarca, *Jurisdicția penală internațională*, Ed. CH. Beck, București, 2008.

¹⁶Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni*, Ed. Polirom, 2007.

¹⁷ Paul Dumitriu, *Sistemul ONU în contextul globalizării*, Ed. Curtea Veche, București, 2008.

¹⁸ Paul Robinson, *Dicționarul de Securitate Internațională*, Ed. CA Publishing, 2010.

¹⁹ Mary Kaldor, *Securitatea umană*, Ed. CA Publishing, 2011.

THE STATES, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION AS BEARERS OF THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH AND ENFORCE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

Andreea Rurela CÎRCIUMARU,

Lecturer, PhD., Police Academy „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”,
rurela@yahoo.com

Nicolae David UNGUREANU,

Assistant lecturer, PhD., Police Academy „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”,
davidungureanu2008@yahoo.com

Abstract: *In the contemporary criminal law, with the obvious exception of the forms of radical abolitionist theories, no one discusses that the holder of the right to punish is the state, as the bearer of sovereignty. And if in the past the "society" we were talking about was circumscribed to the territorial limits of a state, today the inter-conditioning and the influence the international community exerts on criminal policy of the Member States, depending of course on their degree of involvement in the life this community, cannot be ignored. Slightly less well configured is the position of the European Union, a sui generis international body of which Romania is now a member.*

Key words: *criminal sanctions, the right to punish, the international community, the European Union*

For the first peoples of the ancient Near East, the Sumerians, the Akkadians, the Babylonians and the Assyrians, the state and the laws were considered of divine origin, and the king, the classic oriental despot, was the sole holder of the right to enact binding normative precepts and administer all sanctions for their violation, on the basis of said divine investiture. The Criminal Justice is administered only by officials in the name and by the authority of the king, but the penalties were applied differentiated according to classes and social groups, and the righteousness, as a law of nature established by the gods, does not protect the same the slave and the free man, although all the old Mesopotamian law codes reclaim their foundation and purpose from the divine justice.

A different stand as the sovereign's position is found in the ancient Hittite legal texts which, although stated that the king is the one who serves justice and establishes penalties, punitive limited its punitive powers in the sense that for the sacrilege committed by a nobleman, the penalty is set by the "paukuş" (the noblemen assembly), and for the act committed by a member of the royal family the sanction was established by a Council consisting of the relatives of the king, that the Council could even put to death the monarch for serious violations of the religious and moral laws.

More original is the conception of the ancient Hebrews, as it results from the Genesis. Here the holder of the right to punish and the one who directly applies the penalty is the creator himself¹. In Genesis, the myth of Adam appears as an illustration of the first sentence ever imposed. By breaking the taboo, the first people will receive the first penalty – the expulsion from paradise - out of the state of grace by the condemnation to humanity, the loss of the individual immortality to gain the immortality of the species. The second sentence of the creator, the flood, affects not only the humans, but all creation: "I will cut off from the

¹ Genesis, Chapter 6, verse 7.

earth all the people I have created, I will cut off everything from man to cattle and creeping thing, and to the flocks of sparrows flying in the sky, I will cut off because I regret that I created them." ² And it is also the creator himself the one who administers the punishment as a sanction for the violation of the rule (the divine command) in the Babel Tower myth or that of Cain and Abel. Looking at the Bible through its social vocation and analyzing The 10 Commandments outside of their religious and Hebrew context, we can reveal their secular character, their originality among the moral and legal conceptions of the ancient world and their undeniable universality.

A little more modern is the conception of the ancient Chinese, who, developing administrative structures remarkably elaborated for that time, postulate the supreme authority of the law over all, introduce the principle of the public knowledge of the rules and the mechanism of punishments and rewards as an indispensable guarantee of the rule of law which, although it is appreciated as originating in the laws of heaven, is applied by state officials whose action finds its legitimation in the rule of law and the obligation for all to obey it.

Based on the Brahmanic conception of the relationship of the being with the universe, the Indian antiquity, however, is distinguished by a deep morally- religious feature - less legalistic, its first laws, the Laws of Manu placing the burden of administering punishment on the divinity and the transcendental plan, real penalty for ill deeds committed in life being not the one applied by human authority, which is quite secondary, but the negative change, accordingly and in direct proportion to the offense committed, of the offender's reincarnation cycle³.

In ancient Greece, Democritus, the ancient defender of democracy, is the first to be concerned with the study of the problem of the society and the state whose interests should be put, in his view, above all else. Socrates, in turn, equals obedience to the law to the practical realization of the ideal of justice, and Aristotle, regarding the state and the society in an evolutionary perspective, considers that the state is, in relation to the individual, a primary institution governed by the hierarchy principle, the respect for the law and the public order. Somewhat more interesting is Plato's conception who, agreeing that the state is the one who keeps the law through punishment, however, says that the latter, being fixed, is inferior to the magistrate which must be given the role to enforce the laws in concrete cases in a way suited to their purpose: educating the citizens in the spirit and practice of the moral virtue. In his view, justice begins with the election of magistrates and then follows the settlement of laws to determine their power. In his work "The Laws" Plato conceives a real judicial power within the state expressed by three courts: the Court of arbitrators appointed by the parties, a civil court to judge private business and a tribunal to judge public cases that interest the society or the state. Emphasizing the positive aspects of Plato's conception about the state, we must not lose sight of the fact that he speaks of a police state ruled by a morals police, having a religious foundation, an agrarian state with a fixed number of members (five thousand forty) that has no purpose other than the consecration of itself, a state consisting of hermits, where the individual freedom does not matter when coming against the State governed by a general dogma accepted by all after a specific education.

² See also Vlăduțescu G., *Introducere in istoria filosofiei Orientului Antic*, Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, Bucuresti, 1980, p. 183.

³ *Idem*, p. 182.

In the medieval European philosophy, Avicenna identifies the legislator as the holder of the right to punish, although its vision is more radical and more utilitarian than we would expect from a Christian philosopher ⁴.

The position of the state, supported by the ancients or that of the monarch, built by the medieval feudalism, as the undisputed holders of the absolute right to punish begins to be questioned under the influence of the Renaissance humanism which, although limited to the desire of freedom of thought and action of man, had however a strong positive leaven on the culture and the ideological struggle of the epoch.

Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Leonardo da Vinci, Nicolaus Cusani, Thomas More, Thomas Campanella, Giordano Bruno, Picco della Mirandola are those who, animated by the spirit of civic humanism, taught the people not to conceive life without freedom, exerting a proven influence on the society of their time. Florence, for instance, is cited in the literature as an example of a society where laws were established to ensure the freedom and access "of all worthy citizens to all the public honors; (...) In this way people get courage and rise to a higher plane"⁵. In the vision of the Renaissance thinkers the monarch is still the holder of the right to punish, but this power is based on sovereignty as a fundamental attribute of the state, being exercised only in compliance with the laws of nature, the freedom of man being such a law ⁶.

In the contemporary criminal law, with the obvious exception of the forms of radical abolitionist theories, no one discusses that the holder of the right to punish is the state, as the bearer of sovereignty. It is now generally recognized and accepted the right of the state to impose sanctions for the noncompliance with the laws which allows the normal functioning of the social life and the system of criminal sanctions is now, as in any historical period used as the main means of repression and preservation of the legal order.

The right of the State to establish and impose penalties cannot however be unlimited and, as regards the application of criminal sanctions, the action of the state is limited, as pointed out by prof. Dongoroz, by the current law, in the matter of establishing rules whose breach is punishable by criminal penalties, the power to punish of the state can no longer be accepted to manifest unrestricted. According to modern concepts, the power to punish is divided among the three branches of activity of a state of law determined according to the classic principle of separation of powers⁷.

The legitimacy of the right to punish of the state derives not only from the democratic representativeness of the legislature, but also from the way that such a legislator understands the need to limit the power to punish by instituting legislative safeguards of the individual freedom, using the means of the criminal law for the protection and not for the suppression of citizens.

The limits that configure the action space reserved to the power to punish are precisely the principles that should govern the establishment and application of the criminal sanction as they are accepted at a determined time by the society in which the punishment should operate.

And if in the past "the society" we were talking about was circumscribed to the territorial limits of a state, today it cannot be ignored the inter- conditioning and influence the international community exerts on the criminal policy of the Member States, depending of course on their degree of involvement in the life this community.

⁴ "The legislator must remove from the earth and destroy the people who do not have a well-defined purpose." See also Ley, H., „*Studii de filosofie medievală*”, Ed. Științifică, București, 1973, p. 104.

⁵ Guicciardini, Fr., „*Storia fiorentina*” in „*Opere inedite*”, Editura Canestrini, Florența, 1959, p. 7.

⁶ Jean Bodin in „*Les six livres de la Republique*”, cited by Pantazi, R. in „*Istoria filozofiei moderne și contemporane*”, editura Academiei RSR, București, 1984, p. 191.

⁷ Fernandes Munoz E. D., „*La pena de prision*”, Barcelona, 2001, p. 36.

The contemporary doctrine knows even the appearance of a new branch of law, the international criminal law defined as that branch of international law the standards of which criminalize and punish crimes affecting the highest values of the community of states as a whole⁸, offenses punishable under this framework currently being the crime of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide.

It was considered that the first ideas relating to the criminal liability of the individual before an international authority superior to that of the state can be found in an embryonic⁹ form in the work of Hugo Grotius who argued essentially that there is an obligation of the state to punish those who commit crimes against *ius gentium*. The first attempts of legal consecration of such liability occurred in the draft Convention for the establishment of an International Criminal Court to repress offenses under the Geneva Convention of 1864, initiative which remained at the design stage. The first legal rules relating to international responsibility of individuals for war crimes are summarized in the Treaty of Versailles and provide for the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute the former Kaiser of Germany¹⁰. In the years 1937-1938 the international conference in Geneva of the League of Nations endorsed the proposals of the Romanian jurist Vespasian Pella adopting a convention for the prevention of terrorist acts and discussed a draft statute of the international criminal court elaborated in 1935 by the same famous jurist. The period after the Second World War is characterized by the creation of ad hoc international criminal courts, being well known the activity of the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo or the Hague and Arusha established following the conflict that took place in 90s in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

Although concerns for the creation of a permanent international criminal court occurred since the 20s, and official talks at the United Nations were wearing from 1950, it was not until 1998 that succeeded the adoption and opening for signature of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, a permanent legal institution with global jurisdiction in punishing individuals responsible for serious violations of international law. This document is currently the legal base for the consecration of a new bearer of the right to punish - "the entire international community."

The right to punish of the international community is based, according to the document mentioned, on the need to protect the "common heritage" of peace, security and welfare of the world and sustainably guarantee the achievement of an "international justice".

The Court sanctioning activity is governed by the principles of legality of the incrimination and punishment, of the individual criminal responsibility and non-retroactivity *ratione personae*, excluding any immunities or special procedural rules based on official capacity of the active subject.

The Court may impose as primary penalty the deprivation of liberty, perpetual or temporary, to which it may be added the penalty of fine and the confiscation of profits, of goods and property arising directly or indirectly from crimes.

The general criteria for deciding the punishment are the seriousness of the crime and the personal circumstances of the convicted, and in case concurrence of offenses The Court will pronounce a sentence for each crime and a single sentence, indicating the total length of detention. This period cannot be lower than the heaviest individual penalty and cannot be greater than 30 years heavier than the penalty of life imprisonment.

⁸ See G. Geamănu, „*Drept internațional public*”, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1983, p. 534.

⁹ See also Purdă N., „*Justiția penală internațională la începutul secolului XXI*”, Editura Universul Juridic, București, 2005, p. 8.

¹⁰ See also Purdă N., „*Justiția penală internațională la începutul secolului XXI*”, Editura Universul Juridic, București, 2005, p. 8.

The custodial sentence is executed in a State designated by the Court from the list of states that have made it known that they are willing to receive the condemned, but that State has not in any way the right to modify the sentence.

Interesting and somewhat less well configured is the position of the European Union, an international sui generis body of which Romania is now part of. Identify the EU as one of the subjects that have the right to punish, at this time, would be, however, wrong in our opinion.

Certain aspects of cross-border crime (trafficking of drugs and persons, terrorism) led to new ways of cooperation within the European Communities since 1972¹¹, but it was art. K1 of Title VI of the Treaty of Maastricht, which mentioned not only the criminal judicial activity as an area of cooperation, but also as an additional area of competence of the European Communities. Art. K3 paragraph 1 of the same Treaty states that, to achieve cooperation, Member States are to coordinate their actions and bodies created in this area, while paragraph 2 of the same article establishes the competence of the Council to determine the extent of common actions if they cannot be achieved through isolated actions of states, and to recommend the adoption of conventions by the Member States.

The tools developed at EU level and used in the areas of cooperation were the joint action, the common position and the agreement. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced a new tool, more efficient, ie, the decisions that are used for the harmonization of the position of the Member States and are binding on Member States as to the result expected to be achieved, but leave the latter choice of form and methods to achieve the indicated result.

The notion of "justice and home affairs" used by the Treaty of Maastricht was replaced at Amsterdam with the "Policy of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters" done by creating an area of freedom, security and justice. Also, the same Treaty of Amsterdam allows any area of cooperation referred to in Title VI of the Treaty of Maastricht to be transferred under the new Title IV of the Treaty on the European Community. This transfer procedure allows any related field of justice and home affairs to be transferred to the Community competence, which would mean that the application of EU law is to prevail over the national law of the Member States.

An extremely bold step towards establishing the European Union as one of the bearers of the right to enforce criminal sanctions was attempted with the failed adoption of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. In this area of jurisdiction the treaty stipulated that the European framework laws may, inter alia, establish measures to promote and support the efforts of Member States in the field of crime prevention and, very importantly, to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offenses and sanctions in areas with particularly serious crime having cross-border dimension. There were mentioned as part of this category terrorism, human trafficking, sexual exploitation of women and children, drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organized crime, but the Council could adopt, with the approval of the Parliament, a European decision, depending on the evolution of the criminality, to identify other areas that meet those criteria.

The intended EU Constitution created therefore very solid premises so that, in the future, this international body would have been able to intervene with binding rules in areas which, from the beginning of the Communities until now, remained the reserved competence of the Member States, namely the criminalization and the imposition of

¹¹ 1972 is year of the establishment of the Pompidou Group on drugs, in 1975 the European Council created the Trevi Group to coordinate anti-terrorist activities and the Schengen Agreement of 1995 and its implementing Convention are considered the most significant developments in the field. See also Diaconu, N., "European Union law. Special Part - Community policies." Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2007, p. 62.

sanctions to combat acts that affect the most important social values. And, although the draft constitution currently has no chance of ever being adopted, on the framework set by it, and self-consciously an only partially assumed by the Treaty of Lisbon, unquestionably we can talk about the establishment of common values whose defense is to be made by rules of criminal law whose violation is to be punished uniformly throughout the Union. And what is ability to establish rules whose transgression is punishable by criminal penalties, if not the core of the power to punish and enforce criminal sanctions.

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THE ARMS TRADE TREATY – THE CONTROL OF FIREARMS IN PRESENT CONTEXT

Alexandru DENA,

Firearms forensic expert, co-founder and president
Center for Criminal Justice and Security Studies,
alexandrudena@gmail.com

Emiliea-Elena GAVADIA,

Prosecutor head of bureau, Criminal Investigation and Forensic Department, Prosecutor's
Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice

Abstract: *The recent rise in terrorist activity internationally showed that, besides the new threats like cyber-attacks, the existence of uncontrolled and illegally owned small arms or even military assault rifles (as in the case of the Paris attacks), constitutes a high threat to the safety of civilians but also to military or law enforcement agencies. The article looks at the status quo in small arms control in Europe and internationally, as well as at the future of the Arms Trade Treaty and International Arms Control Standards (ISACS).*

Key words: *firearms control, public safety, international small arms standards*

The Arms Trade Treaty is the first international instrument that sets forth minimum global standards with the purpose of creating national control systems for external trade operations with conventional arms.¹

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) entered into force on 24th December 2014. But what does this mean to the European and international community in today's context, when on one side we acknowledge a rise in terrorist attacks where assault rifles and grenade launchers are used, and on the other the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine where all the conventional arms set forth in the scope of the Arms Treaty (*battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, small arms and light weapons*)² are being used by the Ukrainian army, the pro-Russian rebels and, why not, the Russian army.

The story of the first Arms Trade Treaty goes back to 2006, when the premises of an *internationally binding instrument establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms*, were established by the UN resolution 61/89 introduced by the UK, Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, France, Japan and Kenya.³

In December 2006, 153 Member States voted in favor of the resolution, numbered 61/89. Twenty-four countries abstained: Bahrain, Belarus, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Laos, Libya, Marshall Islands, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, UAE, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The United States voted against the resolution.⁴

¹ <http://www.mae.ro/node/29977>, 13.02.2015.

² <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>, last visited on 14.02.2015

³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_Trade_Treaty, 13.02.2015

⁴ United Nations General Assembly Session 61 *Verbatim Report 67. A/61/PV.67* page 31. 6 December 2006. Retrieved 2012-11-05.

In December 2009, the UN General Assembly voted to start negotiations for an international Arms Trade Treaty by 2012⁵. The Treaty was adopted on 2nd April 2013 with 154 votes for, 3 against and 23 abstained. The signing of the Treaty was launched on 3rd June 2013 and was supposed to enter into force, according to article 22 of the Treaty, ninety days following the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification.

Romania has signed the Treaty on the first day when it was launched and deposited the instrument of ratification on 2nd April 2014, along with Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, UK, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Hungary.⁶

During these years, the initiative of having a multilateral treaty that will set forth the principles of trading arms between states was received with a lot of enthusiasm from states, NGOs and individuals but also with a lot of criticism.

Beside the 3 states that voted against the Treaty – Syria, North Korea and Iran, two large arms exporters abstained: Russia and China.⁷

Large criticism came also from different associations in the United States: The National Rifle Association, The National Association for Gun Rights, the National Shooting Sports Foundation, etc. All these associations feared that the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty would interfere with the individual rights of possessing a firearm and the right to self-defense. In article 3 of the Treaty it is stated clearly that the scope of the Treaty is to establish the possibilities and limits of arms trade between states, with no intention to interfere in national laws on trading, owning firearms within the borders of the state.

The United States of America signed the Treaty on 25 September 2013 but didn't deposit the instrument of ratification up to now.

Other critical opinions refer to the fact that in the Treaty only the principle of state self-defense is stated, "*the inherent right of all States to individual or collective self-defense as recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations*"⁸. In the paper "The Human right to self-defense", the authors bring their criticism to the principle of not allowing arms trade with non-state actors, recollecting the case of the Kurds in Irak during the Saddam Hussein period, but also Nazi guerillas during World War II or anti-communists during the Cold War⁹.

Of course there was also a great support to the idea of a higher control of arms. In 2003 emerged the Control Arms initiative from Nobel Peace laureates and civil society organizations like Oxfam, Amnesty International and others. In 2006 the Control Arms initiative handed to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan a petition called "Million Faces"¹⁰.

A lot of debates emerged also after the Paris Attacks in January 2015 and the recent attacks in Denmark, on 14th February 2015. A first side to the problem concerns, of course, the origins of the AK type assault rifles and grenade launchers that the attackers could procure, not in Syria or Afghanistan but in the center of Paris? The other side of the problem is whether civilians should have access to firearms in order to defend themselves, or, in other words, bringing the American model to Europe. There are voices which support the idea that if the victims of the attacks had been bearing arms and thus have had the possibility to fight back, then the number of casualties had been smaller.

⁵ http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/English_PATT_summary_web_11.pdf, 14.02.2015

⁶ <http://www.mae.ro/node/25803>, 14.02.2015

⁷ <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-14543075-onu-adoptat-primul-tratat-privind-comertul-arme-conventionale.htm>, last visited on 14.02.2015

⁸ <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/English7.pdf>, page 2, 13.02.2015

⁹ David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, and Joanne D. Eisen, *The Human Right of Self-Defense*, 22 BYU J. Pub. L. 43 (2007), p.8. Available at: <http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol22/iss1/3>.

¹⁰ <http://controlarms.org/en/about-controlarms/>

In relation to this issue, as mentioned earlier, the new treaty only regards international movement of conventional arms and does not have implications on national regulations concerning individual's right to own firearms.

As such, the main provisions of the treaty refer to:

1. Prohibitions imposed to state parties regarding any transfer of conventional arms that would violate arms embargoes, international obligations or any transfer of arms that would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected (Article 6 of the treaty). Under this article the trade of the Mistral warships from France to Russia would be in question, if Russia's transfer of arms to the pro-Russian rebels would be admitted by Russia or it would be demonstrated by the international community. Of course, the transfer of arms to the pro-Russian rebels by Russia also falls under the provisions of this article, if it were to be confirmed officially. Russia abstained from voting the adoption of the Treaty on 2nd April 2013, but according to article 21, the Treaty is opened to accession by any State following its entry into force.
2. Record keeping by the state parties of transferred conventional arms, related to quantity, value, model, details of exporting state and end users. The Treaty introduced a bold provision stating that the records shall be kept for a minimum of ten years.
3. Enforcement and Reporting mechanisms, including the designation of national authorities, national contact points and national control lists. Each State Party will have to provide a report, after one year of the entry into force, consisting of the measures taken at national level to implement the Arms Trade Treaty. These measures refer to the elaboration of national laws and national control lists in order to apply the provisions of the Treaty.
4. Rules for international cooperation and assistance to the effective implementation of the Treaty. A great emphasis is stated on the international cooperation. States, by their own, cannot counter trafficking of arms and only through international mechanisms the whole picture of the phenomena can be revealed.

In the matter of small arms, UN through the UN – CASA initiative (Coordinating Action on Small Arms) introduced several standards – International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS), with the aim to prevent the illicit trade and misuse of small arms and light weapons¹¹. Up to now 11 standards are available:

- *National controls over the manufacture of small arms and light weapons,*
- *National controls over the international transfer of small arms and light weapons,*
- *National controls over the end-user and end-use of internationally transferred small arms and light weapons,*
- *National coordinating mechanisms on small arms and light weapons control,*
- *Conducting small arms and light weapons surveys,*
- *Stockpile management: Weapons,*
- *Marking and recordkeeping,*
- *Tracing illicit small arms and light weapons,*
- *Collection of illicit and unwanted small arms and light weapons,*
- *Destruction: Weapons,*
- *Border controls and law enforcement cooperation*¹².

¹¹ <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/about-isacs.html>, 14.02.2015.

¹² <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/>, 14.02.2015

Many others standards are in progress and on debate within the Expert Reference Group, consisting of experts from governments, European and international organizations, sporting associations, NGO's, etc.

In the area of international cooperation concerning arms, INTERPOL has made great steps in the last years with the launching of the “iARMS”. The INTERPOL Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS) is a web-based system that help law enforcement agencies cooperate and exchange information in case of lost, stolen, trafficked and smuggled firearms. The tracing of firearms means that the “journey” of a firearm from manufacturer to importers, to local vendors, to the buyer or to the last known point of legal possession can be reconstructed. After that point, in the dark area of illegal possession and commission of crime the cases when a certain firearm has been used can be linked together. That means that a suspect can be linked to a firearm in a criminal investigation, the firearms traffickers can be identified and possible firearm crime trends can be revealed.¹³

The Arms Trade Treaty and the International Small Arms Control Standards can help transform the way arms are traded, with strong influence in fighting poverty caused by armed conflict and corruption in the security and defense sector. Poorly regulated arms trade influences economic development. It is estimated that violence costs Africa \$18 billion per year.¹⁴ Moreover, it can help regain control over a part of nearly one million of the 7–8 million firearms produced every year that are lost or stolen, aiming to reduce the likelihood of tragic events such as the Paris or Copenhagen attacks.

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THE IMAGOLOGIC EFFECT OF TERRORIST ATTACK IN PARIS

JANUARY 2015

Daniel PÎSLARIU,

First lieutenant PhD. Candidate in National Security and Intelligence research,
“CAROL I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania
pislariu.daniel@myunap.net

Abstract: *The beginning of the XXI century was one full of new attempts and threats directed to the international security and defense. After fourteen years those new attempts and threats continue to show us that the defense and security environment is not fully capable to counter such events.*

Maybe this is why the attention directed to the terrorism phenomenon has experienced continuous growth in the recent years, even if terrorism is not a new issue in terms of security risks.

Although the issue of the terrorism phenomenon is not a new one, why is this form of international instability constantly gathering more of the public attention? Is this possible only because of the failures to prevent and counter such dreadful organized attack by terrorist group leaders? Or is there something more, beyond our logical explanation, such as the evolutions of modern technologies, thus the way that mass-media represents reality.

Our main target in this article is to seek a new way to observe the problem, from a new perspective, and that is from an imagological perspective.

Key words: *terrorism, media, imagology, public opinion.*

A new way of communication

The beginning of the year two thousand and fifteen debuted with at tragic event. The 7th of January will remain in the modern history as a date on which terror stroked again and succeeded to destabilize the security environment. Since the 9/11 in two thousand and one, which stills remains one most important and well known terrorist event in human history, many terrorist attacks were recorded through the world. Even the event who took place in France, Paris, did not recorded a large number a victims, who were killed, there are a much larger number of indirect victims who have been touched, especially on a mental level, by the wave of terror after viewing the images and videos mediated live, directly from the center of the actions.

The terrorist attacks on the 7th of January has succeeded to restore the terrorist phenomenon the „well deserved” attention. Still, did this attention over this phenomenon grow because of the number of the victims, or maybe because of the media coverage of the event, coverage that is based on direct and rapid information which is transmitted over the public which introduce the receptors into the tragic scenes of the event.

So, what is the main characteristic between a terrorist attack, that does not enjoy of a mediatized support, and one that after the attack more and more media submit information about the event? The first one has a smaller number of victims and the other the opposite, but more than this the first event does not accomplish its goal, while the other does fulfill it.

In search of shocking news, media seeks to attract attention through any kind of event, to offer information about it as fast as possible to the public, but in the same time, they offer terrorists the exact thing that they want: attention, a way through which they can be present in every person live through fear, panic and hopelessness to a safe and able security which is capable to protect and defend its own citizens. And off course, that is exactly what terrorist

want, to spread the wave of terror and panic over the area that took place the attack. The only problem is, both media and terrorism want to send something fast over the same target, and that something is making the difference.

Still, what kind of effect makes a media coverage terrorist attack easy to remember or shall we say, more hard to forget?

Every day we are the witnesses of a continuous process of devouring the information. In present, we have developed a necessity that is as important as the necessity to eat. We are bound by the desire to be informed, aware of what is happening around us. Most of the information that we absorb occurs at the level of the visual field, through our eyes. And because the nonverbal communication represents 93% of the communication process between individuals¹ the impact of the images is a strong one, which has profound implication at the mental level.

Due to the possibility of being easier to remember, images represent nowadays a form of information which is easier to absorb, store and play back when needed on the level of human mentality.

Therefore, even if a terrorist attack that has a lesser number of direct victims, such as the persons who were killed or injured during the bombing or the shooting, after the media coverage of the tragic event the number of victims will continue to grow even if the new victims did not took part directly as victims in the terrorist attack. These victims represent the indirect ones, victims on which the wave of terror, fear and the uncertainty of present are being installed.

The effect through which the mediated images of a terrorist attack are imprinted on the individual mental level is referred as the imagologic effect.

Before we may start to discuss about the imagologic effect of a terrorist attack after the media coverage of the event we must stop, look over the topic, then study and focus upon the term of imagology. We must step forward, over the border and understand that even simple words force us to create images into our individual mind. More than this, these images that we perceive we took them as bringer of reality, although in some cases this thing is not available. Only then we might come to an approval that we understand the true effect of an imagology event, in our case, a terrorist attack.

In general, imagology represents a new branch science arising from sociology, history, psychology and anthropology. This new born science started as a response to the need of people, social groups and ethnic communities to understand their relations between them and much more than this, to help them differentiate from others. These differences are not based on just simple representative aspects, such as clothing. They consist in culture, different mentalities, socials phenomenon, as the same.²

These differences between ethnic communities may be called social images, which are formed in a long period of time, due to the cohabitation in the same geographical and historical place, to the economic, political, military and cultural relations, which represent the direct perception. Besides these, social images are being formed with the help of the indirect perception, or as it is known, through mass-media.³ In other words, to simplify the meaning of these social images is that they work as a social tag.

There is one issue that must be underlined about direct and indirect ways of perception of social images. If the indirect perception helps social groups to form an much more optimistic or pessimistic view over the other communities, the direct perception creates an image that is much closer to the real world thus determinate the perceptive group to act

¹ <http://www.businessballs.com/mehrabiancommunications.htm>, accessed at 14:41, 20.01.2015.

² Alexandru Duțu, *Literatura comparată și Istoria mentalităților*, București, editura Univers, 1982, p. 37.

³ Ion Chiciudean, Bogdan-Alexandru Halic, *Imagologie. Imagologie Istorică*, Școala Națională de Studii Politice și Administrative, Facultatea de Comunicare și Relații Publice, București, 2008, p. 6.

different than in case of the indirect perception. The optimistic or pessimistic view is formed due to the indirect contact with a culture, which leads to a diffused image. Therefore, in most of the time, the indirect perception of the social image is the result of the mass media actions over the public.⁴

Therefore as it is evidenced by the previous ideas, the concerns in terms of imagology are rather old. Still, only in near present the subject of study over the image in general has showed strong interest.

In September 1985 at Stuttgart, imagology has become a science at the XVI International Congress of Historical Sciences where, at one of the debates the main topic was the image of others, which consists the study object of imagology.

After all this we can sum up and underline the fact that imagology studies the communication through images and the ways that these images are being crystallizes on the mental level of individuals or collectively, depending on the horizons of interpretation and the perception of each individual or group.⁵

At first, imagology seems an ordinary science which is cough at an intersection between other scientific fields, with a much longer existence. Still, even if we don't realize, every day we are witnesses, generating different emotional states only by seeing some few images. Most of the times, we are generating emotions more powerful even if we had live the even itself. The problem is that we are not aware of this phenomenon which we are imbued with daily.

Mass-media and reality

In the first chapter we familiarize ourselves with the term imagology. We understand that even if we are not aware of it, the daily information, materialized in images and sounds that surround us creates in our minds through the media mechanisms a new way to see and understand the events that are present in our life.

Due to the extreme growth of the modern technology, the alert flow of the social life and our desire to be permanently in touch with the latest news, to be continuous connected to fresh information our social images are created through indirect perception over the reality. In other words mass-media represents the main source that shapes the perception of life in general.

Because of the technologies and the desire of people to be permanently connected to the new and amazing news, mass-media had become the promoter of image and social images. Even though the reality may show not encouraging as someone expectation, media may modify it through its mechanisms and means and insert into peoples mind a new image of the real world and the events that took place.

If mass-media consists in the totality of the means and modern technical procedures that inform and influence the masses through its specific means⁶, imagology studies the way that communication through images is being realized from the emitter to the receiver therefor the link between mass-media and imagology is a strong one, simply because these two spheres intersect each other. While mass-media spreads information, most amount of it in the shape of images or videos to the public, iamgology studies how these images are perceived by the public and how social images are being changed, moving the receivers away from reality.

Like I mentioned in the last paragraph, nowadays most of the information is realized through images and videos. Why? The best and simple way to provide information that affects the memory is through images and videos which are „elements” that offer different moods to the person or persons that receive this information. Due to the fact that this kind of

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p.11.

⁶ Dorin Popa, *Mass-media, astăzi*, Institutul European, Iași, 2002, p. 5.

information offered in this state of image or video, they are emotionally charged events that can modify the mood and of course they can be easier to remember.⁷

For example, if a person is watching the five o'clock news and sees a traffic accident which involves a red car, for a period of time the person will rebroadcast the images of the accident that he saw in his mind every time he will see a red car. Because of the emotionally charged event, the images will be easier to find in the memory of the person and redisplay in more rapid way.

Because a great amount of information we receive is through mass-media, our perception of reality is not a real one, but a blurred one. This is because of the indirect perception of the reality which the public often construct using information from mass-media.

In search to attract more and more audience, which leads to a substantial economic growth, mass-media provides the public events which are emotionally charged. This is the reason why most of the afternoon news consists of tragic and violent events.

Another mechanism through which media is gathering the attention of the public is the rapidity display images of an event so that the certainty that the event cannot be put under doubt.

A set of experiments had been done in this case and the results showed that in the moment when a great amount of information is being provided by a fast process, the human brain has the trend to consider it all true, without even questioning the certainty of it⁸. So, it is easy to see why mass-media tends to overcharging the public mental level, so that the step which consist in raising question marks of the accuracy of the information that has been distribute is to miss.

Besides these aspects that help to change the shape of reality, is the amount of time that a regular person spends each day in the face of the T.V. In the latest years there has been done a set of studies to see how much time does a regular person spends each day looking at T.V. Today, a person spends about 3 hours looking at T.V. More than this, he or she hear the latest news at the radio during work, while eating reads the newspapers or magazines, and on the way home is browsing the internet using his smartphone.⁹

In the attempt to remain permanently connected to new information, most of the population, or should I say, the public, is supersaturated of information. And because of the great amount of information, the credibility of it over the public is certain.

Consequently, as can be seen, at the base of the pyramid of human needs there can be inserted a new one, the need to stay permanently informed. But this need to devour more and more information comes with a price. The perception over the reality becomes a diffused one. The perception of reality is an indirect one. This process is the result of the mass media action over the population, idea that I had mentioned before when we were describing imagology.

The reality, the social image and even our behavior is being changed or affected¹⁰ because of this massive assimilation of information. This is why media spreads information which is basically emotionally charged events, just to attract the public attention over them.

This is the main reason that most of the journal news is flooded with titles like: stock market crash, tragic car accident, natural disasters or terrorist attacks. These kinds of events have effects on human behavior they could change the mood a viewer has during and after the process of assimilating the information which has been publicized.

Still, what is the main aspect that gives information the power to change the status of the public that absorbs it?

⁷ <http://www.memory-key.com/memory/emotion>, accessed at 22:37, 19.01.2015.

⁸ Sebastien Bohler, *150 de experimente pentru a înțelege manipularea mediatică – Psihologia consumatorului de mass-media*, Iași, editura Polirom, 2009, p. 20.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

The key feature which gives this power to influence public status can be described as follows: imagologic impact. Few we know about it, and even if we are not aware of it this impact takes action in our lives indirectly.

To study this phenomenon we will focus on a recent event that has managed through a process of excessive media to capture the attention of the world and managed to amaze and to change perceptions and state of public, and besides these aspects, gave birth to a new slogan: Je suis Charlie¹¹.

Terror over Paris

The beginning of the year 2015 had to be one represented by a tragic event. Most of the public were shocked when they heard that on the morning of 7th of January, at approximately 11:30 local time, in one of the most popular capitals of the world, Paris, a terrorist attack took place.

Two Islamist terrorist that were armed with assault rifles got into the office of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo.¹² The result of this terrorist attack was a number of 12 deaths and 11 non-fatal injuries.¹³

Before we shall continue to describe main steps of the tragic event we must focus upon one characteristic: the number of the victims and the effect that the terrorist attack has been made. The number of victim of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack are insignificant compared with the victims recorded from other terrorist attacks, but to observe the functioning of the imagologic impact following to the media coverage of the images related to this event we must compare the direct result of the attack with the indirect one.

After about two days of continuous searches, the two Islamic terrorists were found. They were located in a northern region of Paris, Thursday. After their position was certain, the in the area was established maximum alert status.¹⁴ In the end, the two terrorist were shot and killed.

If we look at the event itself, aside the tragic aspect and the emotional level which is charged, the event indeed consist of a shocking information, mostly because the way that the security of a NATO member country was taken by surprise. The fact that were recorded victims, few matter of fact, cannot reject the fact that this event cannot be consisted a planned terrorist attack. Nevertheless, is quite difficult to compare this event with the 9/11 in 2001¹⁵ where were registered 2996 victims and over 6000 non-fatal injuries.¹⁶

Despite the number of direct victims, these two tragic events could be similar in terms of the number of the indirect victims. By this I'm trying to focus upon the picture that media generated after the images about the terrorist attack were shown around the earth.

Even if the result of the terrorist attack consisted of 12 deaths and 11 non-fatal injuries, the media coverage of the event had showed the world a different perspective of the tragic event.

Due to the media coverage of the terrorist attack, the terrorists goal was fulfill. It is known that the terrorist attacks have the main aim to capture the worldwide attention, to make themselves heard, and through them to induce the sentiment of fear.

¹¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Je_suis_Charlie, accessed at 21:32, 15.02.2015.

¹² http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Hebdo_shooting, accessed at 22:54, 15.02.2015.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ <http://www.ziare.com/international/atentat-paris/atentat-terorist-la-paris-1341882>, accessed at 22:41, 15.02.2015.

¹⁵ <http://www.digi24.ro/Stiri/Digi24/Extern/Stiri/ATAC+TERORIST+PARIS+Imaginile+care+nu+le+fac+cinste+politistilor>, accessed at 23:01, 15.02.2015.

¹⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks, accessed at 23:13, 15.02.2015.

If the terrorist attack from the 7th of January did not have enjoyed of the media „support” concerning the coverage of the actions, the terrorist attack would not have fulfilled its main goal, to punish those who published in newspapers or magazines a series of satirical cartoons of Muhammad, including nude caricatures, or other caricatures, depiction that are forbidden in some interpretations of Islam.¹⁷

Because of the images that continued to appear on screen of the T.V. news, on internet websites, even simply words that described the tragic event on the radio news, creates and implements the image that Parris is being put under the pressure of terrorist action. All over the world information in form of images or videos were mediated to show and to keep the public informed over the actions that were developed in Paris. But by this, like I mentioned before, terrorist did fulfill their main goal, to attract the attention of the world.

So, as we can see, no matter the number the victims a terrorist attack register, the media, by giving information to the public creates a number of victims much larger than the terrorist attack itself. The difference is that the terrorist attack generates direct victims, deaths or injuries, and media after spreading images of the terrorist action generates indirect victims that will carry the wave of fear forward.

To give an example of the power that media has, to modify and offer an indirect aspect of the reality, between the 3th and the 7th of January another terrorist attack was registered in Baga, Nigeria. Even if the result of this event were obviously greater than the one in Paris, approximately 2000 deaths¹⁸, the fact that media did not mediatize the event as much as it did with the Charlie Hebdo shootings did not create and spread the wave of terror worldwide and of course did not engage in helping the terrorists to offer their message to the public.

Still, what is it called this impact over the public, due to the media coverage of the terrorist attack? Because of the large amount of information which is showed to the public in forms of mostly images and videos, the impact that is created, by which the wave of terror is propagated is called the *imagologic impact*.

This *imagologic impact* has effect over the public even if the public does not feel it, but indirectly, the images that are showed are inserted and crystallized at the mental level of each individual that absorbs the information. Of course, the perception of these images and the way that they are solidified on mental scale differs depending on the beliefs and experience gained of each individual.

Interesting thing about the *imagologic impact* is that, the images that the individual or public did consume during the media coverage of the event will be remembered, even if they will be covered with other information. For example, most of the people that saw the event linked to the Paris shooting, instantly remembered the events from 9/11. This is because these two events had the same protagonists: terrorists. So, what I am trying to bring to light is that, images will continue to appear over time whenever the indirect victim will hear the word terrorist or bombing or other words that are related to the lexical field of these words.

If we can imagine the human mind in a simple and materialistic form, it can be seen like a shelf full of different files. The files can be perceived as images of different persons, images of a football match, or even images of a terrorist attack. If a person that has seen images from the terrorist attack from 9/11, it is possible that those images may be lost and covered by others. But, if the person did see news in the form of images that represented the terrorist attack from Paris, it is likely that the images of 9/11 of the terrorist attack were brought to the foreground of the individual mind within moments.

¹⁷ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Hebdo_shooting, accessed at 23:22, 15.02.2015.

¹⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Baga_massacre, accessed at 23:48, 15.02.2015.

This mechanism is based on images because most of the time it is much easier to draw a circle than to describe one.¹⁹ And because the mediated images that show the exact aspects of the terrorist attack are in the major role, the effect is an imagologic one.

The imagologic effect has consequences on the indirect victim of the event, in our case a terrorist attack. Even if the terrorist action did not harm the victims directly, because of the intense coverage that media cause, the images of the victims that suffer, security forces on alert and sometimes even panic, people that are crying for their lost, demolished building and other similar visual images related after a terrorist action, are being seen by people all over the world. In addition to these, modern technology offers the possibility to access all this amount of information from even a smartphone, gadget that is beginning to gain ground from other ones and that is beginning to be indispensable, due to its possibilities that offers in terms of accessing the information found on the Internet.

As we mentioned above, the imagologic impact of a terrorist attack is inevitable. The only thing that matters is the level of the media coverage of the event. The process of remembering things through images is more facile than doing the same thing by using words. In the end the person will realize that at the level of his mental he had generated an image which helped him to remember. As a matter of fact, I did the same thing in the paragraph above when I described the result of a terrorist attack.

Still there is one question to be answered. Is a terrorist attack more successful which has the results of a greater number of direct victims, deaths and injuries, or an attack that has the number of indirect victims at a global scale, affected by the imagologic effect?

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¹⁹ Mike Parkinson, *Do-It-Yourself Billion Dollar Graphics: 3 Fast and Easy Steps to Turn Your Text and Ideas Into Persuasive Graphics*, PepperLip Press, 2012, p. 2.

CHANGING THE SECURITY PARADIGMS IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC THINKING AFTER THE COLD WAR

Oana Mihaela VLADU,

Research Associate, OBGMS-Paris,
oanavladu20@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The major changes occurring in society lead to changes in the paradigm of security.*

If by the end of the Cold War, security was a concept less studied, being considered by the realists a substitute for power and by the idealists a substitute for peace, after the end of the Cold War the traditionalists and the liberals tried to diminish the central role of the state, and to restrict and to extend in the same time, the security agenda also to other areas, as the economical, the environmental the and social one.

Nowadays, researchers consider security as an open concept which can be enriched with new theories according to the evolution of human society as a whole.

Security cannot be defined globally. Security is a component of peace, and not its guarantee. Methodologies for studying the risk were designed, appearing thus a new science, risk management.

The concept of security in recent years has drawn the attention of the researchers, through its complexity, being studied at an international level.

Security is the primary role of the politics of the national and sovereign states.

Key words: *security, security paradigm, the Euro-Atlantic thinking, peace.*

Changing the security paradigms

Major changes occurring in society at the turn of the century and the millennium lead to changes in the political-military field, thus affecting the international security system.

If by the end of the Cold War, security was a concept less studied, being considered a substitute for the power by the realists and a substitute for peace by the idealists, after its end, traditionalists and liberals attempt to diminish the central role of the state and to restrict, respectively, extend the security agenda in other areas, as the economic, environmental, social.

In the last decade of the twentieth century, events occurred in accelerated rhythm as the fall of the Soviet Union, the United Nations victory in the Persian Gulf, starting rebuilding the peace process in the Middle East, etc., events which are not yet able to provide the relative stability that characterized the East-West confrontation recently.

Policies developed for national security are updating, or rather, they try to update them by creating the ratio between the political and military segment, taking into account the multipolar and interdependent world in which we live.

The aim of our research is to highlight the security paradigm shift after the Cold War and identify principles underlying the building security concepts in the XXI century.

Because in the work of international relations appear different connotations to notions of security, threat, security risk, are useful conceptual delimitations.

Currently, researchers consider security as an open concept, which can be enriched with new theories, as the evolution of human society as a whole, a result of events occurring on the plan objectively and correlated with the possibility of being protected from any danger, and on a subjective level, which refers to the general feeling of lack of threat perception.¹

In another sense, the one of Ilie Gh., national security is both a state and a process that

¹C., Codi.a, *The arms race. Social-political determinations and implications*, Bucharest, Military Publishing house, 1989.

has an internal and an external component.²

According to analyst Simon Boncu vision, security is understood as "the set of actions and as a result thereof, for maintaining the functionality of a national entity within limits which do not jeopardize any state or position in relation to other structures"³ "state of dynamic equilibrium macrostructure infra and inter-social organization of the same level (state-state, super-structure - super-structure) and different areas of coverage (state - supranational structures - troposphere - biosphere), carried out in conjunction organized and unorganized processes and change management in a such a way so as not to be affected goals (values) of their fundamental generally accepted their existence as entities and reproductive possibilities."⁴

Security cannot be defined globally. It is a component of peace, and not a guarantee of it.

The risk of insecurity implies the presence of active or potential factors that could affect national security. The threat requires both risk factors and detection of political will to put into action means to damage the security.⁵

There were designed methodologies of studying the risk, thus appearing as a new science, the risk management.

In the last years, in its complexity, the concept of security has attracted the attention of researchers, being studied internationally.

If until recently, security was defined in purely military terms, now we consider the components of economical-financial, diplomatic, informational, cultural or psychological becoming, in the words of Conf. Univ. Neculai Stoina "of support or alternative power or military actions and complementary elements of interference generating security".⁶ Strategy expert Bernard Brodie said: "compared to the changes they consider now, those of the past, measured from a war on the other, were almost trivial. And almost always no time in the past, for understanding and evaluating technological change, even after the cessation of hostilities. This time will not exist anymore in any form of limited war of the future."⁷

Traditional security paradigm

Since antiquity to modern society, security was based on the military's ability to resist war. "If someone wants peace, then you must prepare for war". The issue of war has changed with the emergence of other wars. On July 16, 1945 begins the first nuclear weapons test in the New Mexico desert. Even if nuclear weapons were not commonly used, they represent a real threat to all humanity and can change course and purpose of the war.

Beginning of the Cold War brought about the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear explosion had immediate effects and delayed effects. "The shock wave, thermal radiation, prompts ionizing radiation cause great damage in seconds or minutes after detonation. Delayed effects such as dropping radioactive act over long periods of time from hours to years."⁸ Although they were not widely used, have caused major damage in a very short time.

The solution found to reduce the potential for mass destruction of a nuclear attack has been creating strategic defense unilateral. Thus, in 1970, entered into force "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" which is currently signed by 190 countries including the 5 states

² Ilie, Gh., *Military systems security*, Bucharest, Military Publishing house, 1995

³ Simion Boncu, *European security changing. Challenges and solutions*. Amco Press Publishing house, Bucharest, 1995, p. 13.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 33.

⁶ Neculai Stoina, *Security paradigm evolution from tradition to present*.

⁷ Brodie, B., *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959, p. 409.

⁸ «*The Effects of Nuclear War*», May 1979 p. 10

possessing nuclear weapons officially.

In 1996, at the request of the UN, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on "the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons". Court held that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would violate various articles of international law, including The Geneva Convention, The Hague Convention, The UN Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights⁹, leading to the idea that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be generated." Thus, it was concluded that the theoretical foundations of paradigm was limited and the company had to overcome.

Security paradigm shift in euro-atlantic thinking

In the Euro-Atlantic area were created major discrepancies between the world states due to the traditional paradigm uncontrolled characteristics.

With the end of bipolarity which "is often regarded as the most stable configuration of the international system, implying the existence of two major powers opposing each dominating a particular part of the system; ideological and military can relate to each other, leading to an arms race; typical bipolar Cold War situation"¹⁰ "major changes occur in the concept of security because modern warfare is no longer a means of ensuring security.

"The new Strategic Concept should confirm the strong relationship between security and development and draw the necessary conclusions regarding the planning and deployment of the armed forces of the Alliance. This link calls for the closest possible cooperation between political and military authorities for planning and execution of missions carried great distances. It also includes encouraging closer contacts and involvement of non-governmental organizations"¹¹ and its basic principle of mutual security, joint promotion of peace against new risks emerged after the end of the Cold War terrorism, ethnic conflicts, political instability, fragility economic, human rights abuses, the spread of nuclear, biological, chemical, etc.

"The new paradigm of security configuration in the restructuring of the international system directs behavioral states of the world to the following matrix:

a) Resizing spaces (areas) with a high level of economic, political and military establishment of new types of relations based on cooperation and partnership with unintegrated areas;

We can say that they try to achieve an international community that their members will not be fighting each other, but will try to create a stable European space.

b) Generalization of the Euro-Atlantic area of open societies, plural political and market economy;

We highlight the paradigm so that there is a new feature, the multidimensionality. Thus, states can support each other in order to reduce vulnerability and risk prevention occurred during this period.

c) Reducing the possibilities of direct use of military force in interstate relations; such attempts to stabilize the military situation and the risk of confrontation with measures aimed at arms control and arms control and exchange of information, consultation and cooperation for a better discipleship;

d) Conflict prevention and crisis management have become an important component of security for NATO, the UN and OSCE, involving a mix of political, military, economic and not least, diplomatic, seeking to create anticipatory measures;

e) Developing and implementing strategies to promote non-military conflict of national interests;

⁹ <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=e1&p3=4&case=95>

¹⁰ Miroiu Andrei, Ungureanu Radu-Sebastian «*Manual of international relations*» Iași, 2006, p. 6.

¹¹ <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/0902/090203/RO/index.htm>, accesed on February, 2nd 2015.

f) Defending army in forms more or less traditional."¹²

The security environment is constantly changing thereby generating new risks and threats. In this context, security interests and objectives are achieved through international cooperation and global conflict prevention through diplomatic actions and crisis management capabilities.

Along with these objectives and interests of the security environment, we can mention the phenomenon of globalization which can generate increasing interdependence of economic, cultural, political and social.

Actions carried out worldwide, of countries with economic and military potential creates the world political scene, diversifying global actors. The opinions of experts from the US Institute for Foreign Policy Studies¹³ bring to the fore two components: global players in addition to US security and the Russian Federation, is likely to include Europe, Japan, China, India and Iran, and regional predictable crystallization of four strategic triangles (Europe, with actors EU, US and Russia, Middle East, actors Russia, Iran, US, Asia, actors USA, Japan and China, Eurasia, with Russia, China and India)¹⁴.

Other trends of evolution of the global security environment are: the increasing importance of non-state actors that may affect the interests of other actors domestically or internationally; technological development and information and their proliferation to develop the military; environmental issues, here we talk about military actions should be carried out without harming the environment; population growth and migration are also, problematic issues in the modern world, population growth can create new major global players, provided that they have or develop economic and social power.

In conclusion, we can say that the XXI century will be a constant struggle for progress and to win world power, a struggle between war and peace, which will influence the corner whatever will happen, because some ambitions to achieve economic or those relating to mineral resources, information and communication.

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822** with the title ***"Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - "SmartSPODAS".***"

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¹² Boncu, S., *op. cit.*

¹³ Jacquelyn, K. Davis, Michael, J., Sweeney, *Strategic Paradigms 2025*, Brassecy's Washington D.C. publishing house, 1999, p. 6.

¹⁴ Neculai Stoina, *Security paradigm evolution from tradition to present*

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PROCESSES AND PHENOMENA OF GLOBALIZATION

Chairs:

Colonel Professor Sorin PÎNZARIU, PhD

Associate Professor Mirela IONIȚĂ, PhD

INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND DISCOURAGING STRATEGIES

Andreea Emilia DUTA,

Student, University of Bucharest,
deea.emilia@ymail.com

Abstract: *There are five hypothetical scenarios for nuclear war. A crisis is a sum of measures and counter-measures to ensure a certain level of situation balance, based on "cascade" decisions, included in or corroborated to credibility, respectively to a certain consistency that could be shaped by "reaction types." It seems the political personalities leading nuclear states played the most important part in nuclear crises. An essential factor in the evolution of crises is the relation between the provisions of the international law and the "crises diplomacy". The provisions in treaties to prevent nuclear wars are the starting points for the democracy that has to exploit these according to national interests. The participants are never in complete control of the events during crises, especially the nuclear crises. The discouraging strategies are based on the enemy's warning about the next reaction to prevent any opening of an aggressive game, an escalation leading to increased losses.*

Keywords: *nuclear war, reaction types, discouraging strategies, aggressive game.*

Specialty literature defines concepts such as crises, conflict and war based on the criteria they are operated with, namely: state or non-state actors, number of states participating, the violent/non-violent nature, the intensity of violence, minor/serious crashes, victims, escalation-ending, trigger motif - its proper existence, the political regime, gaining influence, territorial advantages, military prejudices (big/small), etc. A non-debatable criterion when categorizing military theories is, definitely, the nuclear element.

A nuclear war might burst in five hypothetical scenarios: a surprise nuclear attack from a superpower, the continuation of the crises, a conventional war escalation, an accident or an open unauthorized use by a third party- be it a nuclear power or terrorist group. According to some American military analysts, the most probable scenario is that of the escalation of crises.¹ The superpowers noticed that in all these nuclear war scenarios the solution is the discouragement, if not as the universal solution, than to ensure stability, at least. As a reference opinion, any interference with the armament race turns one to become the eternal prisoner of the dilemma.² This perspective is based on the hypothesis that a nuclear war would burst "unintentionally" due to the escalation of mutual sanctions, a possibility that could be avoided by mutual discouraging strategies adapted to hostility levels correlated to the hostility levels in a specific gradual character specific to mathematically shaped games.³

The doctrine of guaranteed mutual destruction⁴ is build on the fact that both superpowers could resist to a first nuclear strike, so that a first strike during a crises does not cancel the victim's potential to a counter-offensive to destroy its aggressor. Thus, the nuclear

¹ See Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Hawks, doves and owls: a new perspective on avoiding nuclear war, in *International Affairs*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4(Autumn, 1985), pp. 581-589.

² See The continuous Prisoner's Dilemma in Jean-Pierre P. Langlois, "Modeling Deterrence and International Crises", *Journal of conflict resolution*, Vol. 33 No. 1, March 1989, pp. 67-83.

³ The game process: the player is busy with the present situation but also with the future consequences of their facts; later on, each player formulates personal intentions and awaits the opponent's reaction, establishing their final decision. See Jean-Pierre P. Langlois, *op.cit.*, p. 67.

⁴ Mutual assured destruction - MAD.

war becomes a suicidal act, being the most important argument to prevent the conflict between the superpowers during the Cold War.⁵

As for the crises concept, the above mentioned norms are valid for gender differences within the domain, implying in such a case the decisional factor in the case of international crises with a nuclear component. The most used definition in specialty works is centered on the probability for the situation to evolve towards military hostility, affecting the structure of the international system.⁶ Nuclear crises, as part of international crises, contain nuclear elements - that increase danger - with potentially paroxistical consequences.

A crisis is a sum of measures and counter-measures to ensure a certain level of situation balance, based on "cascade" decisions, included in or corroborated to credibility, respectively to a certain consistency that could be shaped by "reaction types." Nuclear crises are the subject to some very valuable theories and analysis models.

Behavioral patterns during crisis

The behavior of superpowers during a crisis is based on the balance between the dimension and the potential of own nuclear forces and those of the adversary, as well as on the evaluation of down's loss.⁷

Due to the fact that The USA was the nuclear, because of leader Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Moscow was prudent; even it expanded its influence in Central and East Europe.⁸

After the first nuclear test, Moscow developed an external policy in which international intervention was a constant and it pass from unipolarity to the binom The USA-Russia, followed by the risk of a war between the two.

During the Cold War, the behavior during crises balanced considerably. Some politicians tried to induce a preventive insecurity to their adversaries because they themselves were insecure, (Truman and Nixon). Some others used threat (Eisenhower and Kennedy). Anyway, no matter the case, politicians did not follow a pattern or disconsidered expert advice and there are few prove to certify that the lessons learned during crises played an important part in the development of nuclear doctrine. There are few references to lessons learned from crises situations in the books and important documents written by known American strategists on nuclear issues⁹ (Except for the Cuba missile crises).¹⁰ This is probably due to the fact that decisions taken during crises situations „don't make good permanent politics.”¹¹ Another cause might be, as well, the fact that the nuclear doctrine was established in a somehow abstract manner.

⁵ See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G., "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S.", *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring, 2006), pp. 7-44.

⁶ An international crisis is "(1) a change in the type and/or increase in the intensity of disruptive, that is, hostile verbal or physical, interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities, that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system - global, dominant or subsystem." See Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp. 4-5.

⁷ See Carolyn C. James, "Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries", *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), p. 725.

⁸ See the Prague events in 1948. Later, in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Afghanistan (1979) when the behavior was radically changed. See: U.S. Department of Defense, *Support for American Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century*, Washington, DC:, The Department of Defense, January 2012, www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (Accessed 3 December 2014).

⁹ See Herman Kahn, „*The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence*” in „The RAND corporation”, January 1960, p. 121.

¹⁰ See Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Controlling the Risks in Cuba*, in „Adelphi Paper” No. 17, London: Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1965.

¹¹ See John Foster Dulles, *Policy for Security and Peace* in „Foreign Affairs” vol. 32, nr. 3, 1954.

Still, all past crises contain valuable lessons. For example, once a situation ended, the following confrontation was influenced by the result of its leading crises; the Cuban missile crises, for example, relies directly to the previous Berlin crises in 1961, in an attempt made by Moscow to re-balance the two powers (Russians knew since then that Washington had discovered the fact that the missiles difference was in favor of The USA). Some crises situations proved how some events could be solved even if leaders agreed to refrain them (Black Saturday for example).

The political decision

The role of the nuclear factor in international crises situations started to be underestimated since 1946, by specialists. A review of the period started with The IIWW, fact possible due to the declassification of some documents, especially from The USA, shows for wrong this is. The first steps - sometimes deceiving, sometimes wrong, some other times subtle and later on strong - in translating nuclear capabilities into effective actions for the prevention of violent acts, of blackmail and coercion, are presented in fact in a variety of crises situations leading to some lessons concerning international security in the XXIst century.

The fundamental shaping factor of the crises - the political decision should match the military capability, a political deciding factor decreasing seriously the force access. It seems the political personalities leading nuclear states played the most important part in nuclear crises. But only the leadership alone cannot discourage - it is important; see the Sino-American balance when the Sino-Soviet crises;¹² another example is the Cuban missile crises.

A significant example of how important is the decisional factor in a nuclear crisis is the file of The North Iran. In 1945, in The North of Iran, occupied by Russians in 1941, after five months from the end of The IIWW, the new Azerbaijan Party (pro-soviet) formed govern in Tabriz generating fears in Teheran that Moscow might intend to separate this province from Iran and unite it with The Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. According to The Three party Treaty of Alliance from 1942; all foreign troops were to be retreated from Iran in six months time from the end of the IIWW. The USA's decision to force the retreat of soviet forces from Iran by threatening with the nuclear arm was crucial in these crises,¹³ even if the reason for the soviet final reread remains uncertain. The Iran - The USSR negotiations ended with the Russians leaving the country, the retreat of Iran's complain to The UN and also with an agreement for oil delivery.¹⁴

¹² The Chinese, for instance, have taken seriously the nuclear threat in 1953 but ignored the ambiguous signal made by Washington in 1950 when they learned from the Russians that Washington had no intention to endanger Beijing with a nuclear attack while in 1953, Eisenhower was credible enough to make them withdraw. See U.S. Department of Defense, *Support for American Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century*, Washington, DC.; The USA Department of Defense, January 2012, www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (Accessed 3 December 2014).

¹³ After his mandate, Harry Truman stated he threatened Moscow with an ultimatum on this situation. President Truman declared the way he determine The USSR to retreat its forces from Iran was to call The Russian ambassador to The White House and tell him that The Americans would use the atomic bomb if the Russians won't retreat their forces. Russians retreated in 24 hours. See Barry Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, *Afghanistan and the 1946 Iran Analogy*, in "Survival", Vol. 22, No. 6, November/December 1980.

¹⁴ At March 21st 1946, Truman declared the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko came at 11 o'clock that day but there are no proves of this. The UN Security Council used this but Moscow didn't consider this moral pressure too serious. The main reason was for Moscow to focus on East Europe despite the perriferical tensions. Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart said: "While Stalin focused on the most important issues for the Russian interests, he tried to calm The Occident and avoid their potential reaction by taking a step back from less important regions." See Barry Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, *op.cit.*, pp. 56-57.

In the period when The USA had nuclear monopoly, President Truman didn't refuse the use of nuclear threat towards Moscow.¹⁵ In April 1957, two years after The West Germany joined NATO - a fact that gave it conditioned access to American nuclear weapons - The USSR threatened to turn The West Germany into a „nuclear cemetery.”¹⁶ In 1958, after The USSR's announcement to sign a treaty with East Germany, The USA excludes any hope to restrain the war in Europe to a conventional one,¹⁷ a realistically and solid political decision in fact.¹⁸

In 1962, after a first meeting between Nikita Hruščiov and John F. Kennedy the weak points of the new American President in regard to his relations with Moscow showed on, determining Moscow to believe the possibility of some dangerous activities.¹⁹ While the crises escalated, the quality of the American team was validated by the Russians, but the initial lack of credibility from The President Kennedy remained a part of the Russian equation.

An expanded discouraging game is the file of Berlin, respectively the Soviet's demand to control the entire town,²⁰ based on their new nuclear vectors and on the vulnerability of the American posts stationed in Europe.²¹ Maintaining the transatlantic engagement, The USA shoves back massive retaliations and the execution of a demonstrative nuclear strike in an isolated area in Russia.²² There was a previous American attempt to compromise in the first half of 1962 (January-May),²³ for America wanted to risk a nuclear war for a town very

¹⁵ Doubting his affirmation about the nuclear threat during the crises in Azerbaijan in 1946 even if it was less important. See Barry Blechman and Douglas M. Hart, *op. cit.* p. 146.

¹⁶ See Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*, Brookings Institution Press 1987, p. 84.

¹⁷ On December 11, Eisenhower declared: „Hruščiov should know that when we will decide to attack, we will use all our capabilities.” See Günter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, eds., *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995, p. 220.

¹⁸ He said it was necessary to use discouragement and that Russians would try intimidation and would retreat when confronted with West's decision. Shortly before the crises ended, Averell Harriman met Nikita Hruščiov who threatened with actions against Berlin; Harriman laughed and Hruščiov asked „why are you laughing?” Harriman answered: „Well, mister President, this would mean nuclear war and you do not want that.” Hruščiov looked him and answered: „You are right.” The dead term passed and the problem remained unsolved. When the Russians tried again, with the next American president during 1961-1962, they lost again even the new democratically administration was ready to find a diplomatically compromise. See McGeorge Bundy, *Risk and Opportunity: Can We Tell Them Apart?*, in Catherine Kelleher, Frank Kerr, and George Quester, eds., *Nuclear Deterrence: New Risks, New Opportunities*, Washington, D.C.: Pergamon, 1986, p. 34.

¹⁹ They didn't imagine that President Kennedy could warn Moscow: „This will be the policy of this nation, to see any missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the West hemisphere as an attack from The USSR towards The USA, which implies a complete answer towards The USSR.” See Graham Allison, *Deterring Kim Jong Il*, in „Washington Post”, 27 October 2006, p. A23.

²⁰ In June 1961, during the Hruščiov-Kennedy meeting in Vienna, the Russian leader rediscussed Eisenhower's demands (1958) for a neuter Berlin in six months time. Kennedy considered the „perspectives of a nuclear war were imminent”; Hruščiov, on the other hand, didn't believe that „Kennedy would start a nuclear war against high-way traffic controllers”, that West's determination to fight for the freedom of the town of Berlin „is just a story; there are 2.000.000 people in West Berlin, but in case of a war many of them would die. Hat reasonable man would bring such an argument to convince the imperialists?” See Theodore C Sorensen, *Kennedy: The Classic Biography*, New York: Harper & Row, 1965, p. 549.

²¹ In July he added: „The best advice for those thinking of war would be not to count on the distance to save them,” which means that Moscow now had the means to reach the American soil (ICBM). Hruščiov underlined the threat represented by the Russians against nations in Western Europe and the force represented by the aircraft and the short and medium range missiles. See Theodore C Sorensen, *op. cit.* p. 552.

²² Kennedy wanted to „introduce the nuclear genie inside the magic lamp,” but it was not the right time for that and he didn't question America's commitment towards NATO allies. This also was the first operational exercise led by Paul Nitze. Civilian analysts thought that a strike would have been a possibility, but which would the objectives be? In August 1961, when the East Germans began the Berlin wall, Tomas Schelling proposed a nuclear strike as a warning over an isolated zone in The USSR. *Ibidem*, p. 587.

²³ In November 1961, John F. Kennedy gave his first Russian interview for Izvestia, and clearly stated his

difficult to defend in a conventional manner.²⁴ The nuclear crisis was serious, according to the archives opened after 1989, for The USA saw the crisis as a limited nuclear war, while The USSR wanted massive destructions of the enemy's population.²⁵ Due to the American force display, The USSR retreated and remained again to the Berlin's wall.²⁶

An essential factor in the evolution of crises is the relation between the provisions of the international law and the "crises diplomacy". The provisions in treaties, agreements and pacts to prevent nuclear wars are the starting points for the democracy that has to exploit these according to national interests. The 1973 agreement about the prevention of a nuclear war,²⁷ signed just months before the 1973 crisis, allowed The USA in October to remind The USSR that this risked the breaking of its provisions. The political personalities have an important part in the decisional process in nuclear crises.

The strategical relations between the adversaries include unpredictable moments, respectively the crises situations considered as a part of the strategical balance. The lack of training cannot be fixed by means of improvising when difficulties appear. A reputation based on firm principles, good judgment and seriousness are characteristics that discourage more than nuclear warheads and missiles. Once corroded by doubt, credibility is hard to restore. Thus, the following crises become more and more difficult to manage and at the same time, more harmful. Some leaders that consider themselves capable and ready might discover they are wrong and need further knowledge, imagination and balance. Compromises are acceptable, but their content and the way they are reached could avoid further challenges. A series of concessions, for example, could signal weakness and lead to military confrontations.²⁸

A misevaluation of the military alliance, together with the political option insufficiently fundamental can lead to a military and political catastrophe. The American and Russian interests were too different. Moscow wanted to maintain the issue unsolved and was not interested in a compromise. The USA were convinced with the possibility of a diplomatic solution, for there was a common interest to avoid a war in Berlin. The fact that the Russian government (Gromyko especially) was more preoccupied with the remains of the past war – like the American military presence in West Berlin – than with avoiding the next war was not understood by the American negotiators who were convinced that Russians were trying to intimidate them. But this was not the case and yet, fortunately, a war was successfully avoided.

objectives: "trying to find solution from the problems caused by the IIWW we don't want to start the IIIWW. All that we want to do is to maintain a limited number of troops - and they are very limited - for the three powers in West Berlin and to have, for example, an international high-way administrator so that the goods and the people could circulate freely. See John F. Kennedy, *Transcript of Interview with the President*, de Aleksei Adzhubei, *Izvestia*, November 25, 1961, on-line de Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. (Accessed 3 December 2014).

²⁴ In January 1962, the State Secretary Dean Rusk said that Washington was ready to defend Berlin „at any costs”. On January 2nd 1962, the American ambassador in Moscow, Llewellyn E. Tomson and Andrei Gromyko, the Russian foreign minister begin talks of about six months, with no results. See Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller și Stephen Van Evera, eds., *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990, p. 214.

²⁵ See Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G., "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S.", *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring, 2006), pp. 7-12.

²⁶ The data gathered by satellites determined the American intelligence experts to estimate the number of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles as being little, and this information was sent to the Russian ambassador. There was no strategic arrangement, and the difference in missiles number favored America. Kennedy was not forced to take a decision by the end of the day. See Petr Lunak, *The Berlin Crisis*, in "Cold War History", Vol. 3, No. 2, January 2003.

²⁷ The Treaty for the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABMT).

²⁸ See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, New York: Basic Books, 2012, p. 31.

In present crises, the political deciding factors paid attention to the probable scenarios for escalation-shaping-ending according to the probability theories and the patterns to shape crises.²⁹ The theory of games, the successive stages in crises escalation situations following conflicts - shaped on computer, with different programs – can offer perspectives to be applied by the political decisive factor.

Eisenhower and Kennedy were more efficient than Nixon. The lack of certainty can recommend prudence to the enemy and can lead him to balance decisions. The ostentatious threats, if calibrated and credible, force the adversary to take part in a risky game. Experience shows the retreat is possible. Still, it is debatable if this can be a possibility, especially in the XXI century. Threats can mad imprudent minds or inexperienced leaders. From the documents that are now declassified, we can see that the Soviet political and military leaders understood the devastating consequences of the nuclear war and considered avoiding the use of nuclear weapons.³⁰

The participants are never in complete control of the events during crises, especially the nuclear crises, for the difference in opinions is potentially catastrophic. Divergences can take different forms: nuclear weapons dislocated in places unknown to the enemy, a wise or a misunderstood reaction in the case of a blockage, ignored or delayed orders. Even small events (a message sent and lost, for example) can misguide the discouraging process during crises. Misunderstandings are always part of the equation, for humans tend to misunderstand the things they are told during times of extreme stress. They should try the limitation of frequency and its amplitude, while at the same time is ready for its occurrence.

Discouraging strategies: an aggressive game

The discouraging strategies are based on the enemy's warning about the next reaction to prevent any opening of an aggressive game, an escalation leading to increased losses. If a player chooses discouragement and his enemy will follow, both playing by common rules to adopt future strategies, building a dynamic system to cooperate, with a certain level of stability in threatening the enemy's counter-measures.

Nuclear crises prevention led to the development of complex scenarios mathematically shaped enriched with the deciding factors' behavioral patterns. Among these predictive and explicit patterns, the classical theory of discouragement-though not validated by the predictions regarding the end of the cold war- on which the British security doctrine was build remains a reference point even after the breaking of the Berlin wall.”³¹ This theory and that of "The Moves" - TOM³² inspired the mathematical patterns for the analysis of the international crises – like the game of the nuclear arsenals (NAG)³³ - and the procesuality of the crises – like the interactions during crises.

²⁹ President Kennedy declared he thought the chances for a war during the Cuban missiles crises were at least three, a believe that valued victory too much, according to Robert Jervis (any rational mind would think the same). But the most important point is not if the president was aware of the theory of probabilities. What matters is he won. Sees Robert Jervis, *Deterrence Theory Revisited*, in „World Politics”, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1979, pp. 289–294.

³⁰ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, New York: Basic Books. 2012, p.121.

³¹ Classical, or Rational, Deterrence Theory. The most influential perspective on the study of international relations during the cold war is based on the fact that a state that has and displays enough power influences a potential adversary in the sense of not acting aggressively. See Frank P. Harvey, *The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability After the Cold War*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, pp. 6-17.

³² Theory of Moves – TOM. See Carolyn C. James, *op.cit.*, pp. 728.

³³ Nuclear Arsenal Game – NAG. See Carolyn C. James, "Nuclear Arsenal Games: Coping with Proliferation in a World of Changing Rivalries", *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 723-746.

In 1950, Beijing entered the Korea war, practically a war against The USA, though it had no nuclear capabilities³⁴ the bloody war lasting about three years, despite its regional interests.

During 1953-1962, The USA involved in more crises: Korea (with the truce in 1953); Quemoy and Matsu (1954 and 1958); Berlin (1958-1959 and 1961) and Cuba (1962). The post-war period represents a model of negligence from Washington with unjustified nuclear threats (Greece in 1946), for it was absurd to threat and blackmail in the absence of extreme circumstances. Nuclear crises from 1970 and 1973 may seem rather than a misusing of nuclear weapons from Washington, a reckless manipulation of the risks by President Richard Nixon. Referring to the 70s, knowing that Jordan could develop a problem with Moscow, Nixon opened a second front line without hesitation, a fact that not even the CIA sources didn't understand.³⁵

Starting 1970, the shaping factor for the international crises - the quantitative superiority - stopped being an element in the nuclear balance, the military theory beginning to elaborate new concepts based on the limited character of the crises and later on of the conflicts— low intensity, peripheral, minor, management, etc.³⁶ The quantitative superiority is no longer a credible discouragement factor, but this doesn't mean it no longer matters. Moscow strives to gain nuclear superiority,³⁷ its doctrine being based on the quantity as well.

Discouragement by means of nuclear threat is an irrational option though some nuclear states adopted dull nuclear doctrines.³⁸ Albert Wohlstetter said “The less I know, the more I hoped.”³⁹ To know is often to be unjustifiably pessimistic, but also to be indispensably careful, especially when dealing with ambiguous intelligence. Learning from the past means we'll be better protected against vanity. Russians rejected the idea that nuclear weapons served as discouragement before the end of the 1960s, and their studies on discouragement insisted less on this aspect than the American ones. For The USA, the discouragement was a part of the nuclear doctrine, long before The Russians introduced it into their doctrine, but practice shows that politicians didn't follow a discouragement pattern during crises.⁴⁰

³⁴ The controverted discourse of Dean Acheson on 12th of January 1950 was many times interpreted as a signal that Washington didn't consider The South Korea to be of interest. See Dean Acheson, *Speech on the Far East*, Washington, DC, 12th of January 1950, p. 9.

³⁵ See Barry Blechman and Douglas Hart, *The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis* in „International Security”, Vol. 7, No. 1, Summer 1982, pp. 34-38.

³⁶ See Frederik Rosen, *Civil-military relations in the third generation: Beyond link security and development*, Prism, Vol. 2, Nr. 1, December 2010, pp. 33-36.

³⁷ URSS didn't feel safe not even when Moscow had more intercontinental ballistic missiles than Washington. See Frederik Rosen, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

³⁸ An example is the null and irresponsible Russian - Belarusian military exercises in September 2009 simulating the use of nuclear war against Poland. They should have been denounced by Washington, European Capitals and NATO. But this didn't happen, even if Poland specifically demands it. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G., “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S.”, *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring, 2006), pp. 39-44.

³⁹ The judgment of one of the most brilliant strategists of the Cold War, whose ideas influenced the nuclear strategy during the 1960s. If he was right, then this is one of the most important lessons to remember, for without this info many leaders from the present would face difficulties if there should be the case to name more than two crises from the past. (Probably Berlin and Cuba). They wouldn't know the relation between the two crises and their challenges. See Albert Wohlstetter, *The Delicate Balance of Terror*, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation-1472, 6 November 1958.

⁴⁰ „The doctrine control people's minds only during the periods there are no emergencies. They don't necessarily control people's minds even when emergencies occur. At the moment of truth, when the possibility of a major devastation appears, sudden changes can occur in the doctrine.” See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S., *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy Hearings*, Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 160.

Nuclear discouragement should be used not only during times of crises. It consolidates precaution and moderation even in times of peace. The interest in crises comes from the fact they test discouragement in times of tension, since they cannot be described as obscure passages between times of peace and times of war, having too much at stake in order to allow mistakes. At a press conference on 4th March 1959, president Eisenhower said: „We are not at war, we don't kill each other, we don't go towards the final horror ... We don't live what we would like to call a normal life, paying more attention to our own situations, the education of our children, and other such things that should be in our minds.”⁴¹

The objective during a crises situation is preventing not only the war but also important political losses. Both are considered failures of the discouraging process, but while the first is „an unconceivable action”, to be prevented at (almost) any costs, the second one can modify the strategical balance being able to cause crises in the future, a far more dangerous situation given the loss of credibility.

The continuous development and adjustment of the discouraging nuclear strategies led a major part in defining the policy of the nuclear states, in a complex intellectual effort to understand the new world rose in the nuclear era.

The most dangerous nuclear crises seems to be the Cuban missiles one; The USSR began it, in response to the American placing missiles in West Germany, it was intended to be the background of the Russian discouragement strategy. The Russians played the surprise factor⁴² to negotiate Cuba against Berlin⁴³ for they misestimated the American arsenal.⁴⁴ Washington's prompt deployment of the navy amongst the Cubanese and Russian ships heading to Cuba decided the final result. Both unexpected events caused the Russian scheme to fail since the beginning. The Americans feared no nuclear war,⁴⁵ though both nations were really close to it, as could be seen by the military archives opened later on; Fidel Castro took serious risks surpassing the Russian intentions.⁴⁶

There were two moments that endangered the course of action: The Cubanese blockage (de facto), and the unexpected events on Black Saturday. Any escalation could have caused unimaginable consequences.⁴⁷ The success of the American strategy⁴⁸ forced The USSR to promote a policy of relaxation,⁴⁹ on a cautious background promoted by both countries in regard to nuclear issues.

⁴¹ See Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Press conference of the President- March 4, 1959*, in „Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower”, 1959; Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1959, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, 1960, p. 236.

⁴² See Arnold Horelick, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RM-3779-PR, September 1963, p. vii.

⁴³ Dean Rusk said „some Soviet officials said: we give you Cuba for Berlin.” See Timothy P. Maga, *The 1960s*, New York: Facts on File, 2003, p. 98.

⁴⁴ Exposing the myth of "the missiles' breach", in the second half of 1961 ended a period of four years in which the West believed that Russia was gaining rapidly an immense force, overwhelming The USA. The American credibility was restored. See Arnold Horelick, *op.cit.*, p. v.

⁴⁵ See James G. Blight, *The Shattered Crystal Ball: Fear and Learning in the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992, p. 131.

⁴⁶ Castro's position matches that described but the analyst Brodie in 1958: “In order to accept mass destruction only to cause an even bigger destruction upon the enemy...displays some sort of despair that excludes reason when taking such a decision.” See Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Controlling the Risks in Cuba*, in „Adelphi Paper” No. 17, London: Institute for Strategic Studies, April 1965, p. 18.

⁴⁷ See, John F. Kennedy, *After two years - A conversation with The President*, radio and TV interview, 17 December 1962, on-line de Gerhard Peters și John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

⁴⁸ See Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds., *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990, p. 260.

⁴⁹ After 1962, Hrușciov, who's „negligence to place missiles in Cuba brought the world closer than ever to a nuclear war” engaged into a detention politic. Still, a coalition formed of his colleagues from The Political

Some estimative studies presented an important element that reduced the danger of a nuclear war. Without detailed annalists regarding the missiles' precision, their output, the strategical and guiding bases, there was no possibility to bring an important contribution to the defense policy. To survive an attack and to strike back, the two elements of the discouraging strategy are reshaped and adapted according to the development of the nuclear strategy. The best example is China's discouraging strategy: it protects its forces and builds a credible capability for a second strike.⁵⁰

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Bureau released him from his duty in 1964, allowing The Army to start developing. See Strobe Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers; the Last Testament*, Little Brown, 1970, p. 238.

⁵⁰ Liselotte Odgaard, *China and Coexistence: Beijing's National Security Strategy for the XXI century*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012, p. 47.

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THE NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL MIX

Andreea Emilia DUTA,

Student, University of Bucharest,
deea.emilia@ymail.com

Abstract: *The danger of using the nuclear weapons in Europe is now at a reasonable level, the nuclear leverage continuing to be considered the fundament of the European security shaped mainly by the binom Russia - US, but also by the European nuclear powers: The UK, France. The reduction agenda, depending on the movement of the mass centre to the Asia-Pacific zone introduces in the "smallest number" equation of nuclear weapons some new potential large nuclear players. The "reconstitution strategy" implies that the American nuclear weapons' withdrawal from Europe would be followed by the creation of a storage net for the American war heads; the planes and the personnel would be prepared for two destinations - conventional and nuclear. Withdrawing the American nuclear weapons from Europe might lead to misunderstandings in the case of their reintroduction that might be interpreted as a step towards the escalation of the respective crisis.*

Key words: *nuclear weapons, reconstitution strategy, conventional weapons, outer space.*

The bilateral treaties of the two superpowers

Right after the end of the IInd WW, the international power games were started into a race for the nuclear armament by the two major powers, followed by other players, fact that led to serious worries considering the danger of the nuclear weapons. On the international agenda, as well as on the one of the bilateral Russian - American relations there appeared the issue of arsenals control, mainly of the nuclear one. Negotiations resulted in a series of treaties naming certain limits, transparency measures meant to stop an irrational arming race, as well as the control of nuclear crises and the global stability. The danger of using the nuclear weapons in Europe is now at a reasonable level, the nuclear leverage continuing to be considered the fundament of the European security shaped mainly by the binom Russia - US, but also by the European nuclear powers: The UK, France. Paradoxally, the European powers reduce their nuclear arsenals and retain themselves from developing their programs, while in the South-West Asia the nuclear pentagon turns into a hexagon; on the one hand, the risk for the first strike depends on the discouraging level; on the other hand, a limited discouragement invites to a new arming race. Starting 1972 till the end of the IInd WW, the two superpowers signed a series of bilateral treaties. (Table 1).

Table 1. U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Agreements, 1972-1991¹

Treaty/Agreement	Year	Format	Status
ABM Treaty	1972	Treaty	Entered into force in 1972; lapsed after U.S. withdrawal in 2002
SALT I Interim Agreement	1972	Executive Agreement	Entered into force in 1972, due to remain in force for 5 years
SALT II	1979	Treaty	Did not enter into force
INF	1987	Treaty	Entered into force in 1988; reductions complete in 1991; remains in force
START	1991		Treaty Entered into force in 1994; reductions complete in 2001; lapsed in December 2009

¹ See Amy F. Woolf, *Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia*, R43037, January 6, 2014, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, www.crs.gov, p.4. (Accessed 12 December 2014).

In 1993, it is considered that by a limit of 3.500 nuclear war heads, containing both ICBM (considered by US to destabilize) and SLBM (considered by Russia as fit for the first strike) the frame of a general strategical stability is established; although the START III negotiations established a limit of 2.500 war heads, there were voices to say that US needed no more limitations, for Russia would decrease its arsenal

In 2001, The USA announces its intentions to reduce the arsenal unilaterally, without other agreements with Russia which didn't salute the decision, being in favor of an officially controlled reduction process.²

In 2002, the new treaty doesn't offer enough data nor did to identify the weapons subject to the reduction process, neither to the verification procedures.

In 2011 there comes a treaty in favor of the strategic stability, limiting the war heads to 1.550 and some verification procedures.³

In 2013, The USA is in favor of a reduction by a third of nuclear war heads deployed strategically by both Russia and US. No treaty is signed this time.⁴

Table 2. U.S.-Russian Arms Control Treaties, 1992-2013⁵

Treaty/Agreement			Year	Format	Status
START II			1993	Treaty	Did not enter into force
Moscow Treaty (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty - SORT)			2002	Treaty	Entered into force in 2003; would have lapsed in 2012, but lapsed on EIF of New START
New START			2010		Treaty Entered into force in 2011

According to public data, there are nine states that own and develop nuclear weapons—The USA (1.550), Russia (1.550), France (300), China (240), The UK (160), India, Pakistan, Israel⁶ and North Korea.⁷ Most opinions stipulate the strategical stability orbits around the Russia - The USA binom; no other nuclear aspirers being wanted.⁸

The three nuclear powers – The USA, France and The UK - have a global perspective upon the security challenges and the potential adversaries from outside The Euro-Atlantic space – from Africa, Middle East and Asia.⁹

The reduction agenda, depending on the movement of the mass centre to the Asia-Pacific zone introduces in the "smallest number" equation of nuclear weapons some new potential large nuclear players.

² White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Press Conference. *President Bush and President Putin Discuss New Relationship*. November 13, 2001.

³ President Obama, *Remarks at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul*, South Korean, March 26, 2012. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201200215/pdf/DCPD-201200215.pdf>. (Accessed 1 November 2014).

⁴ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Undersecretary of State, *Priorities for Arms Control Negotiations Post-New START*, Remarks at the Exchange Monitor's Fifth Annual Nuclear Deterrence Summit, Arlington, VA. February 21, 2013. <http://www.state.gov/t/us/205051.htm>. (Accessed 1 December 2014).

⁵ See Amy F. Woolf, *Next Steps in Nuclear Arms Control with Russia*, R43037, January 6, 2014, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, www.crs.gov, p.4. (Accessed 12 December 2014).

⁶ Though there is official and non-official ambiguity, it is considered as gaining nuclear weapons. See Jonathan Medalia, Coordinator, *Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations*, May 1, 2013, R40439, Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, www.crs.gov. (Accessed 12 December 2014).

⁷ There are clues for nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009 and February 2013. See *Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on North Korea's Declared Nuclear Test on February 12, 2013*, February 12, 2013.

⁸ See Imants Liegis, Linas Linkevicius, and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Why Europe Still Needs Nuclear Deterrence," *Moscow Times*, May 23, 2012, www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/why-europe-still-needs-nuclear-deterrence/459069.html. (Accessed 10 December 2014).

⁹ See North Atlantic Council, "Deterrence and Defence Posture Review," May 20, 2012, para. 26 and 27.

Though there are not enough arguments for the multipolarity of the nuclear stage, the "unacceptable costs" of developing a national nuclear triade, the possibility to measure the discouragement (depending on the war heads or the movement vectors), the strategy of the "prompt global strike", the anti-missile defence, the mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, the Russian-American binom is determinant for the present and for some part of the future.

The limits of the strategical nuclear weapons

With Russia and America, the issue of mutual discouragement orbits around the limit of the strategic nuclear weapons (SNW) determined by the political and strategical approach.

The Schlesinger¹⁰ doctrine promoted a an extended discouragement based on the threat to destroy the populated enemy centers, taking under considerations the European responsibilities, resulting a need for about 2000-3000 nuclear war heads.¹¹ A limit of 1000 nuclear war heads turns this doctrine frail.¹²

Specialty literature mentions extended discouragement (protection of the allies and the troops deployed abroad, as well as of foreign possessions) stabile (ensured by about 300 nuclear war heads), direct (in reference only to military aspects) or limited (reported only to the adversary, allowing the burst of regional conflicts).¹³

The extended discouragement is based on The USA's threat to use the nuclear weapons in response to an attack from Russia or from somebody else against NATO allies.¹⁴ Such thing demands for the American presence in Europe and the development of both nuclear and conventional military capability without The USA.¹⁵ Some European countries wish the retreat of the nuclear weapons from Europe.¹⁶

Extended regional discouragement depends on the "regional security architectures" on the background of reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons while increasing missile defense and the capacity to project the integrated conventional forces based on a strong political involvement.¹⁷

In the issue of nuclear security, an important part is played by the states hosting American nuclear weapons and systems.¹⁸

¹⁰ Also known as "anti-cities strategy"/"counter-cities strategy" or "countervalue strategy". "We had to persuade the Russians and our European allies that extended deterrence still worked, even though the Soviet Union could now destroy our cities," James Schlesinger, who served as secretary of defense in 1973-75. See Gordon S. Barrass, *The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2009), p.181.

¹¹ Walter Slocombe, "The Continued Need for Extended Deterrence," *Washington Quarterly* 14 (Autumn 1991), pp. 168-69.

¹² Regulated via SALT agreements and treaties (1970), START (1990), the Moscow Treaty (2002), New START (2010).

¹³ See James Wood Forsyth, Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub, Jr., "Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 4 (Spring 2010), p. 82, 87.

¹⁴ See Clark A. Murdock and Jessica M. Yeats, *Exploring the Nuclear Posture Implications of Extended Deterrence and Assurance*, CSIS, Workshop Proceeding and Key Takeaways, Washington, DC, November 2009, <http://csis.org/publication/exploring-nuclear-posture-implications-extendeddeterrence-and-assurance>. (Accessed 22 December 2014).

¹⁵ See Taylor Bolz (ed.), *In the Eyes of the Experts: Analysis and Comments on America's Strategic Posture*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009).

¹⁶ Germany, Belgium and Holland. See Julian Borger, "Germans Press for Removal of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe," *The Guardian*, November 7, 2009.

¹⁷ See U.S. Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review*, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 34, <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, p.32. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

¹⁸ NSNW, 7000 (1970), 6000 (1980), 1000 (1990). See Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberg, editors. *Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Obstacles and Opportunities*, United States Air Force, Institute for

Starting 1991, The USA begins reducing the nuclear war heads for artillery and missiles, maintaining enough still. It is considered that The American arsenal stops potential threats all over the world, as well as the increase of the nuclear arsenal on the globe.¹⁹

The change of the discouragement policy by retreating some of the weapons from some regional security architectures is supported by the credibility of the answer to a large scale threat.²⁰ The USA continues to improve nuclear capabilities in Europe, replacing the planes F-16 with F-35 "Joint Strike Fighter" and bombs B61 with the improved version B61-12.²¹

France announced the reduction to half of its nuclear arsenal, under 300 war heads²² and The UK reduced it under 225 war heads, to come under 180 in 2020.²³ Both states continue to modernize the nuclear transport systems. The UK and France continue to maintain their nuclear capabilities in order to discourage, even after the end of the Cold War, in case there might appear some enemies from out Europe.²⁴ Nuclear submarines - both British and French - as a display of the force are time and resource consuming, that could only be justified by some independent interventions, in case NATO wouldn't be able to respond, which would question the American nuclear umbrella.²⁵

The reduction of the nuclear arsenal takes a well organized mechanism to be applied to all nuclear players, for the breaking of the nuclear umbrella would require for more conventional means able to take charge against potential future aggressions.

National Security Studies, July 2001, pp. 265-266. States hosting NSNW - Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. *Vezi Enhancing Alliance Collective Security: Shared Roles, Risks and Responsibilities in the Alliance*, A Report by NATO's Defence Planning Committee, December 1988, para. 36.

¹⁹ See Paul Ingram, "Extended Deterrence and Assurance: Current Challenges and Future Prospects", *Nuclear Deterrence Summit*, on February 12, 2014, London-Washington, www.basicint.org. (Accessed 4 December 2014).

²⁰ According to Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher, "Deterrence depends on the credibility of response. A massive and potential conventional response to nonnuclear aggression is highly credible." Statement of Ellen O. Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services, *The Nuclear Posture Review*, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 22, 2010.

²¹ See Hans M. Kristensen, *Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons*, Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, Washington, D.C., May 2012, p. 24, http://www.fas.org/docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

²² In March 2008, then-President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that, "*With respect to the airborne component, the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft will be reduced by one-third. . . . After this reduction . . . our arsenal will include fewer than 300 nuclear warheads. That is half of the maximum number of warheads we had during the Cold War.*" See Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, speech at Cherbourg, March 21, 2008, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Speech_by_Nicolas_Sarkozy__presentation_of_Le_Terrible_submarine.pdf. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

²³ In October 2010, the UK government indicated that by reducing the number of SLBMs per operational SSBN to "no more than eight," the UK government added, it will be able "to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid 2020s." See *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defense and Security Review*, Cm 7948, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty (London: The Stationery Office, October 2010), para. 3.11, pp. 38-39.

²⁴ In March 2008, then-President Sarkozy said that: *Today we must all be mindful of the fact that the nuclear missiles of even distant powers can reach Europe in less than half an hour. Currently only the great powers have such means. But other countries, in Asia and the Middle East, are vigorously developing ballistic capabilities. I am thinking in particular of Iran. Iran is increasing the range of its missiles, while grave suspicions surround its nuclear program. It is indeed Europe's security that is at stake.* See Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, speech at Cherbourg, March 21, 2008. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

²⁵ "The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies." See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), *Active Engagement, Modern Defense, Strategic Concept For the Defense and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Lisbon, Portugal, November 29, 2010, pp. 4-5, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

Non-strategical nuclear weapons systems

The generally accepted criteria concern the distance and the affected targets (NSNW)²⁶; the non-strategic ones have a shorter range and are used against the troops or certain facilities in the operation theatres.²⁷

According to the strategy of the "flexible answer," NSNW were meant to discourage a potential attack or to stop the enemy's conventional forces. It is considered that NSNW multiply substantial the fighting power of conventional troops during missions with clear and limited goals. The strategical missions are executed with very destructive strikes against military, industrial or leading objectives on the enemy terrain. If the status of the launching facilities located on friendly terrain is clear, there is a different situation regarding the ballistical missiles launched from Russian submarines with medium length range²⁸ close to The USA, as well as with the medium length American missiles²⁹ deployed in Europe that can hit strategically - that is they become strategical missiles – NSNW.

The guiding line of the Russian strategy during the Cold War was not to strike first, underlining that NSNW were destined for a potential surprise-attack, or a preemptive enemy strike, to support the friendly conventional forces in the theater.³⁰ Russian nuclear strategy, underlining the threats derived from the measures taken by NATO and The USA allows the use of NSNW during a local or regional conflict at its outskirts.³¹ The alterations made by Russia to its post cold War strategy give NSNW a defensive role, including against a conventional aggression that might threaten the state.³²

Defining the weapon's nature does not depend on its capacity to destroy - but on the importance of the target acquired.³³

In 1987, the treaty regarding the medium length missiles (INF)³⁴ stopped NATO's nuclear strategy regarding the cruise missiles deployment³⁵ and the medium length ballistic missiles.³⁶ Moreover, four years later the two super powers agreed to reduce some of their NSNW, by either stocking or destroying them.

The American-Russian NSNW balance is rather uncertain regarding the real number,³⁷ significant especially to the European space and less important to the Euro-Atlantic

²⁶ NSNW – Non strategic Nuclear Weapons.

²⁷ The non-strategically nuclear weapons: artillery projectiles, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, bombs.

²⁸ sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)

²⁹ intermediate-range missiles

³⁰ See Ivan Safranchuk, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World: A Russian Perspective," in Alexander, Brian and Alistair Millar, editors, *Tactical Nuclear Weapons* (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc., 2003), p. 52-54.

³¹ "The deployment of troop contingents of foreign states (groups of states) on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its allies and also in adjacent waters," U.S. missile defense assets that may be deployed on land in Poland and Romania and at sea near Russian territory as a part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2011," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 67, no. 3 (May/June 2011), p. 71.

³² Russian Military Doctrine stipulates: "the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc." See Pavel Podvig, "New Russian Doctrine and Preventive Nuclear Strikes," *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces*, October 14, 2009, http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/10/new_russian_doctrine_and_preve.shtml. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

³³ See Amy F. Woolf, *Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons*, RL32572, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, January 3, 2014, www.crs.gov, p.7. (Accessed 14 December 2014).

³⁴ INF - Treaty Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces.

³⁵ Cruise missiles

³⁶ intermediate-range ballistic missiles

³⁷ The approximated number of NSNW, SUA - 760 (200 deployed in Europe), Russia - up to 6000. Amy F. Woolf, *Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons*, RL32572, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, January 3, 2014, www.crs.gov, p.1. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

one, especially that their regime depends on Russia's condition that the 200 American NSNWs should be removed from Europe, a condition that is unacceptable, for NATO remains a nuclear alliance.³⁸ In order to discourage and to protect, NATO uses also the nuclear arsenal, not only the conventional forces.³⁹

By the end of, The USA retreats 2150 war heads with terrestrial transport systems, of which 500 on ships and submarines and 700 of the aviation.⁴⁰ Russia retreats NSNW from the Baltic States and the Republics in Central Asia (1991), from The Ukraine and Belarus (1992).

Nuclear war heads withdrawn by America: 14.000 (1992), 11.000 (1994), 10.600 (2000), 5.113 (2009 deployed; inactive, in stores), 4.650 (2014).⁴¹ The withdrawn were unilateral.

The NSNW deployed by Russia are somewhere between 4000-10000, but more important are the missions of the operational units.⁴² As for the NSNW in the Russia-USA binom, the fact that Russia still has thousands of weapons in stores favors it; it is a stop to the extension of NATO and its weapons and anti-missile shield deployment close to Russia's borders.⁴³

The withdrawal of short and medium transportation systems for NSNW lives place for the one with long range oriented against strategical and non-strategical targets, underlining not the destructive power, but the accuracy of the strike.⁴⁴

In 1997, an agreement is signed to place NSNW as the object of the next START III⁴⁵ treaty, for many countries demanded their elimination.⁴⁶ Still, Russia maintains them for the conflicts at its borders and The USA wants them to discourage its potential enemies; any alteration of the present situation depends on a checkable reciprocity. The American perspective pays less attention to nuclear weapons (except for the aviation, with the improved

³⁸ "... as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance." NATO would "maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces." North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Active Engagement, Modern Defense, Strategic Concept For the Defense and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lisbon, Portugal, November 29, 2010, pp. 4-5, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

³⁹ "Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defense." See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), *Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, Press Release*, Chicago, IL, May 20, 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

⁴⁰ Pershing II (intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles); Lance (short range ballistic missile); Tomahawk (sea launched cruise missile). See Joshua Handler, "The 1991-1992 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage and Security of Tactical Nuclear Weapons," in Alexander, Brian and Alistair Millar, editors, *Tactical Nuclear Weapons* (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc., 2003), p. 32.

⁴¹ From 2009 to 2014, there were withdrawn cruise missiles from the navy (sea-launched cruise missiles SLCM). See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 70, no. 1 (January 2014). <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/1/85.full.pdf+html>. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

⁴² Russia may retain up to 210 warheads for its ground forces, up to 166 warheads for its air and missile defense forces, 334 warheads for its air force, and 330 warheads for its naval forces. See Igor Sutyagin, Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia's Non-strategic Nuclear Forces, Royal United Services Institute, Occasional Paper, London, November 2012, p. 3, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/1211_OP_Atomic_Accounting_Web_updated.pdf, p.73. (Accessed 22 December 2014).

⁴³ See Robert Joseph, "Nuclear Weapons and Regional Deterrence," in Larson, Jeffrey A. and Kurt J. Klingenberg, editors, *Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities*, United States Air Force, Institute for National Security Studies, July 2001. pp. 90-92.

⁴⁴ See Amy F. Woolf, *Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons*, RL32572, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, January 3, 2014, www.crs.gov, p.5. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

⁴⁵ START III Treaty. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 2011. <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/1/64.full>. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

⁴⁶ See George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," *Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 2008, p. A13.

B-61) and focuses on the anti-missile shield and precision conventional weapons, even for the regional strategies.⁴⁷

The NSNW issue in regional conflicts will stretch beyond the bilateral Russian-American frame, the new actors being probably in possession of nuclear weapons, even if they might have different perspectives on the strategic or non strategic role, based on their own criteria-range, missions.⁴⁸

Both France and The UK are for the unilateral limitation of weapons, avoiding international negotiations, as well as the pressure and the rigors of a checking mechanism set by some treaty, averting the possibility to relaunch the armaments race.

A mechanism to limit the instability risks is based on the deployment of American NSNW in Europe - around 1.000 to 300 according to some opinions, in reciprocity with Russia.⁴⁹

The "reconstitution strategy" implies that the American nuclear weapons' withdrawal from Europe would be followed by the creation of a storage net for the American war heads; the planes and the personnel would be prepared for two destinations - conventional and nuclear. Withdrawing the American nuclear weapons from Europe might lead to misunderstandings in the case of their reintroduction that might be interpreted as a step towards the escalation of the respective crisis. On the one hand, the political support is doubtful, that is the break of the nuclear cooperation arrangements within the alliance. On the other hand, the benefits of reconstruction strategies are doubted by most of the European experts, especially due to the nuclear weapons reduction. Maintaining a strategic stability while reducing the number of nuclear war heads demands for an infrastructure for the reconstruction of the forces, adapted to the new strategic environment.⁵⁰

Acronime

ABMT	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty	Tratatul privind Rachetele Anti-Ballistic
DV	Delivery Vehicles	Vectorii de transport
GZ	Global Zero	Conceptul Nuclear Zero
HB	Heavy Bomber	Bombardier greu
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile	Rachete cu rază medie de acțiune
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile	Rachetă Balistică Intercontinentală
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty	Tratatul privind Forțele Nucleare de Rază Medie
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction	Distrugerea Reciprocă Asigurată
MRBM	Medium Range Balistic Missiles -	rachete cu rază medie de acțiune
MIRVs	Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles	Rachete Purtătoare de Multiple Focoase Nucleare Independente
NSNW	Non Strategic Nuclear Weapon	Armamentul nuclear non-strategic
SALT I	Arms Limitation Talks	Discuțiile privind Limitarea Armamentelor
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic	Rachete balistice lansate de submarine

⁴⁷ See Amy F. Woolf, *Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons*, RL32572, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, January 3, 2014, www.crs.gov, p.14. (Accessed 2 December 2014).

⁴⁸ India, Pakistan, China are nuclear states. See Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds. *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), p.13.

⁴⁹ See North Atlantic Council, *Deterrence and Defense Posture Review*, May 20, 2012, para. 26 and 27.

⁵⁰ Christopher A. Ford, "Nuclear Weapons and the Future of US Policy," *Nuclear Deterrence: Who Needs Nuclear Weapons and Why?* The Hudson Institute, May 8, 2012 www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPTestsite/?p=1276. (Accessed 10 December 2014). "Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis, any war could become a nuclear war. The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world." Thomas C. Schelling, "A World Without Nuclear Weapons?" *Daedalus* 138 (Fall 2009), p. 127.

	Missiles		
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty	Tratatul de Reducere a Capabilităților Ofensive	
START I	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	Tratatul de Reducere a Armelor Strategice	
New START	The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	Noul Tratat de Reducere a Armelor Strategice	

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OSCE AND THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

Paul DUTA,

Scientific researcher, PhD., Romanian Diplomatic Institute,
ppduta@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis might represent a new opportunity for OSCE to play a neutral role within the tensioned relations between the West and Russia. The Minsk Agreement contains necessary regulations for a cease-fire action but it does not contain the capability to stop its violations by imposing measures. The importance of the organization in the field of the regional security should be related to the performance of other regional actors – EU, NATO. Any discussion about the architecture of the pan-European security cannot disregard Russia and cannot be built by accepting lines of division in this space, and at this point OSCE became the most important security and stability structure. The OSCE gained experience and the position of neutrality in the use of peaceful means for conflict resolution can be especially valuable in "hot peace" between Russia and the West.*

Key words: OSCE, regional security, Ukrainian crisis, conflict resolution.

Considered to be a product of the Cold War, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe¹ is the biggest intergovernmental organization on regional security in the world build to increase trust and cooperation at a time when the ideological gap between the two superpowers and their allies did not allow the building of an organization on the basis of a statute. Because the design of lodging the conference/the organization did not allow to be more than a forum for discussion between NATO and the Soviet Union, the OSCE is not competent to sanction or to implement decisions by force.

Even before processing the term Conference into *sui generis* Organization with an autonomous institutional structure (Budapest 1996), is driven along with other international organizations – United Nations, NATO, EC/EU, CoE – in crisis management of the European space – the Balkans and the western former Soviet region – a promising role in the beginning but it faded in time. OSCE is focused on problematic conflicts, arms control, human rights and elections.²

The Forum for security cooperation³ represents the framework for discussions between the Member States concerning the security in Europe. Carried out in 17 countries in Europe and Asia, the offices and the OSCE missions consist of a range of activities that go from promoting democracy up to monitoring missions.⁴


¹ The Conference on Security and co-operation in Europe (CSCE), has 57 Member States and an observer status in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Can be regarded as a predecessor of the CSCE "The Bucharest Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe" to declare a desire to organize a Conference of the European States to confirm the borders and to promote cooperation. See Giovanni Barberini, *Sicuraga e cooperatone da Vancouver a Vladivostok* (Torino: Giappichelli, 2004), p. 4.

² OSCE has approximately 580 staff based at its headquarters and 2,000 field staff. Its annual budget for 2014 was EUR142.3 million (USD180 million), slightly down on 2013's EUR144.8 million (USD184 million). See Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 132.

³ The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC).

⁴ The Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk și the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. The long-term missions have their basis in the Helsinki II meeting regarding peacekeeping operations, as a special form of latter. They represent a mixture between the information and reporting missions and small peacekeeping operations. The OSCE missions do not have a military component, being focused on cooperation and solving conflicts in a peaceful manner. See Emmanouil Athanasiou, "Les mission de longue durée et les

Table 1. OSCE presence in Eurasia



Long-term OSCE missions represent special measures for providing security in a given geographical area, other than the classic peacekeeping operations, being operations aimed at informing and reporting, and for conflict prevention.⁵ Long-term missions derive from the short-term missions aimed at reporting and informing on candidate states, which have evolved and have become an instrument for the evaluation of conflict situations. In addition to the missions⁶, there are other OSCE activities in the field of conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction. For various reasons, the countries on the territory of which they will be carried out avoided to adopt the name "missions".⁷

The Balkans

In the South-East of Europe, OSCE plays an important role in the fields of democratization, human rights, the creation and development of the institutions of media by: The presence of OSCE in Albania; The OSCE mission in Bosnia Herzegovina⁸; The OSCE

activités sur le terrain," in *L'OSCE trente ans après l'Acte final de Helsinki: Sécurité coopérative et dimension humaine*, éd. Emmanuel Decaux and Serge Sur (Paris: Pedone, 2008), pp. 102-110.

⁵ It is similar to operations developed in Kosovo, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Macedonia and Ukraine. See OSCE Ministerial Council, *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century*, 2003, par. 3, www.osce.org/mc/40533 (accessed December 29, 2014).

⁶ The OSCE missions are located in Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. The OSCE missions are one of the OSCE tools for conflict prevention and crisis management. See OSCE Ministerial Council, *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century*, 2003, par. 3, www.osce.org/mc/40533 (accessed December 29, 2014).

⁷ The OSCE presence in Albania, the OSCE Office in Belarus, the OSCE project coordinator in Ukraine, the OSCE Office in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office and his team of legal assistance in the Nagorno Karabakh issue etc. Although the OSCE's achievements and successes are not sufficiently given to publicity and known, the mechanisms of the organization have been involved in more management of inter-states conflict situations than any other European institution and have played a significant role in the security of the continent. See J. Galbreath, *The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 26.

⁸ See Giuseppe Nesi, "La cooperazione fra OSCE e Nazioni Unite," in *Le Organizzazioni regionali e il mantenimento della pace nella prassi di fine XX secolo*, ed. Flavia Lattanzi and Marina Spinedi (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2004), pp. 131-140.

mission in Montenegro; The OSCE mission to Serbia; The OSCE Mission in Kosovo⁹; The OSCE Monitoring Mission in Skopje.

In 1997, an OSCE presence in Albania¹⁰ is established with a mandate¹¹ to promote democratization, the introduction of law and human rights in accordance with the OSCE principles and the assistance of the electoral reform.¹²

In 1995, the mandate of another OSCE mission complies with the "General Rules of Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina", drawn up in Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris, that put an end to nearly four years of conflict in the country.¹³ The mission carries out with EUFOR, UNDP inspections of the military facilities and the military weaponry destroying at the same time the redundant weapons and ammunition. OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is focused on working on thematic areas on democratization, education, human rights, security and cooperation, the education sector, housing refugee children with special rights and needs. In 2005, the War Crimes Chamber within the Court in Bosnia and Herzegovina took over certain cases transferred from the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in accordance with the adjective law 11bis.

The OSCE mission in Croatia participates in consolidating the internal peace and supported the political anneal, the monitoring and supporting of the return refugees and displaced persons, the allotment and the local administration activity.¹⁴ The mission monitors the return and reintegration¹⁵ of about 300,000 Serb and Croatian refugees during the armed conflict in Croatia.

On the 11th of March 1998, the Permanent Council requested from R. F. of Yugoslavia to unconditionally accept the immediate return of the long-term OSCE missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. In 2001, the Permanent Council established an OSCE mission in R. F. of Yugoslavia and the long-term OSCE missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina are officially closed.

On the 16th of October 1998, an agreement between OSCE and R. F. of Yugoslavia is signed, in which there were laid down the cornerstones of the Verification Mission in Kosovo – KVM.¹⁶ The Verification Mission in Kosovo (KVM) and the NATO operation "Eagle Eye" shall be carried out concurrently, being the first common work experience for OSCE and NATO, both organizations having completely different tasks. Although their mission planning was carried out in a hurry and under a huge pressure, in terms of different leadership control, the political actions were carried out in a complete harmony, due to skillfully orientated

⁹ See Victor Y. Ghebali, "The OSCE between Crisis and Reform: Towards a New Lease on Life," *Policy Paper No.10* (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), p. 3.

¹⁰ See also: Cristian Țecu, "Activitățile OSCE în Albania, Erevan și Baku", in Paul Duță and Grațian Lupu, *Legitimitate și eficiență în domeniul securității internaționale*, Tehnomedia Publishing House, Sibiu, 2006, pp.132-140.

¹¹ See Emmanuel Decaux, "Two Cheers for Diplomacy, the Challenges of Survival and Efficiency for the OSCE," *Security and Human Rights* 21, no. 1 (2010): p. 22.

¹² See "The Future of the OSCE," Report of the Colloquium organized jointly by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Swiss Institute for World Affairs (Washington: 5-6 June 2005); Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), "Managing Change in Europe. Evaluating the OSCE and Its Future Role: Competencies, Capabilities, and Missions", Working Paper no. 13. Hamburg, (2005); see also "Voices for reform", *Helsinki Monitor* 16, no. 3, special issue (2005), in which experts from various countries present their ideas about what measures should be taken to make the organization more effective in its functioning.

¹³ See OSCE, *Common Purpose*, 22, par. 36; Victor Y. Ghebali, "Is the OSCE Chairmanship Still a Relevant Institution?" *Helsinki Monitor* 7, no. 3 (2002).

¹⁴ See OSCE, *Common Purpose: Towards a More Effective OSCE*, Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE, 27 June 2005.

¹⁵ See Victor Y. Ghebali, "Debating Election and Election Monitoring Standards at the OSCE: Between Technical Needs and Politicization," in ed. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), *OSCE Yearbook* (2005), p. 217.

¹⁶ The Kosovo Verifications Missions – KVM.

partners' efforts. The KVM deployment in Kosovo is represented by 1,400 members with 400 vehicles and technical equipment, the largest operation carried out by OSCE.¹⁷

On the 20th of March 1999, KVM withdrew its troops from Kosovo.

On the 24th of March 1999, NATO began the campaign of 78 days of firing upon the objectives in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo has been the third mission which took place on the territory of the former Yugoslavia¹⁸, in close relationship with forerunner NATO operation, *Kosovo Stabilisation Force* (KFOR). The OSCE vision for the future of the region demanded the removal of the "independence" theme from the Kosovo election platforms of the political Albanian parties.

The Caucasus

The future of the Caucasus remains dependent on the interactions between the external players – the great nations - which have special interests in the Caucasus. The scenario of the skeptic, the foreign pressures should be incompatible with the survival of the independence of these nations.¹⁹ The scenario of the optimistic, involves a constructive solution resulting from some compromise to be reached after mediated negotiations from the outside on the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh.²⁰ Taking into account the fact that both Russia and the USA are, undoubtedly, key players in the region, it is difficult to predict which of these two scenarios would have the chance of turning into real facts.

Chechnya is located in the Northern Caucasus Mountains and the southern Federal District. In 1991, during the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the government of the Republic proclaims its country independence under the name of the Republic of Chechen Icikeria. Having Moscow's agreement, OSCE opens the "OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya" (1995-1998 and 2001-2003), but Moscow, dissatisfied with OSCE "mission" in Chechnya, demands the evacuation of the mission in Chechnya.²¹

¹⁷ See Frank Evers, Martin Kahl, and Wolfgang Zellner, *The Culture of Dialogue: The OSCE Acquis 30 Years after Helsinki*, (Hamburg: Centre for OSCE Research, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, 2005), p. 3.

¹⁸ See also Frank Evers, Martin Kahl, and Wolfgang Zellner, *op. cit.*, p.14.

¹⁹ For example, if Russia and Iran will act jointly to coerce Azerbaijan, then the independence of that state will be severely threatened. Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan is vulnerable to such threats. Or if Russia tries to exploit the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, then not only the viability of Azerbaijan will be affected but also the existence of the true independence of Armenia will be limited. As a result, Armenia will also be much more vulnerable. If the problem of Abkhazia will not be solved in a constructive manner, Georgia will also be vulnerable to external pressures, which can have adverse effects on its true independence and, in time, it will make it unable to remain in the race to achieve their own national aspirations. Also, if Turkey will go towards an Islamic extremist direction, it will be more difficult for the West to reach in the area in a constructive way. See Jean-Christophe Romer, "De l'URSS et la CSCE à la Russie et l'OSCE," in *Conflits, sécurité et coopération, Liber Amicorum* Victor-Yves Ghebali, ed. Vincent Chetali (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007), pp. 459-461.

²⁰ This solution will also facilitate the access in the region through a variety of means, useful for several countries; means that we will be unite for economic cooperation. Moreover, it will allow improvement in the relations between the neighboring countries, especially between Turkey and Iran, aimed at opening the borders for economic exchanges. Last but not the least, the best variant of the negotiations will result in a greater involvement of Iran in the international economic community, particularly in economic links with Turkey. These links will prevent Iran from external pressures and, under this circumstance; Russia will become a constructive partner and will no longer represent the most influential authority in the area. The mobilization of the American troops in the area, however, gives new valences to such interpretations. See Jean-Christophe Romer, "De l'URSS et la CSCE à la Russie et l'OSCE," in *Conflits, sécurité et coopération, Liber Amicorum* Victor-Yves Ghebali, ed. Vincent Chetali (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007), pp. 465-475.

²¹ The head of OSCE, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, expressed his regret that he could not reach an agreement regarding the extension of the OSCE Assistance Group mandate for Chechnya. This is due to the Russian proposals to introduce major changes in the mandate of the mission. As a result of the lack of an agreement, the OSCE Mission in Chechnya was closed at the beginning of 2003. "It is important that OSCE

The OSCE office in Baku promoted the implementation of the OSCE principles and commitments in cooperation with the Government of Azerbaijan. The OSCE office in Baku should not be identified with the office of the "Minsk Group".²²

In 1999, the OSCE operation of monitoring the borders in Georgia²³ carried out observation and reporting border crossings between Georgia and the Republic of the Chechen within the Russian Federation.²⁴

In December 2001, the action area is extended up to the border with the Ingush Republic, and starting from January 2003 with the border with Dagestan.²⁵ The program ended in 2005.

The OSCE office in Yerevan worked independently from the so-called "Minsk Group"²⁶ to develop democratic institutions in Armenia, and promoting the OSCE standards and principles.

The trial in Minsk assumed the responsibility to find a political solution for the Kosovo conflict in Nagorno Karabakh²⁷ within OSCE.

The Ukrainian crisis

The outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis might represent a new opportunity for OSCE to play a neutral role within the tensioned relations between the West and Russia.

The OSCE missions in Kosovo, Georgia and Moldova brought a specific contribution to assess the situations of these states. Other OSCE missions were preoccupied with the status of certain ethnic groups, the Russians in the Baltic states and the Tartar's electoral representation from Crimea.

Because of its status with serious political and military limitations, OSCE signed several agreements on territorial disputes (the regime of Nagorno-Karabakh region by means of an Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement), the status of the ethnic minorities (the regime of the Serbs in Kosovo) and the consolidation of democracy (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo).

Eloquent but disputed examples²⁸ – the conflict between Moldova-Transnistria and the mission in Chechnya (1995-2003).

The status of Crimea and the civil war in Eastern Ukraine are hot issues on the international agenda which OSCE can activate itself to, and carry out specific activities to its role. The arrival of a new frozen conflict in Ukraine will bring costs²⁹ which will be reckoned

should have an active presence in Chechnya, with a quite permissive mandate," said Scheffer. He planned to discuss these issues, as well as others which were also and very pressing, with his Russian counterpart, the Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. "In recent years, the OSCE mission has done useful things in Chechnya, often in very difficult conditions," said the head of the OSCE. "If OSCE may continue to carry on their activities in Chechnya, in such a manner as to be accepted by both parties, it would clearly contribute to reducing instability, insecurity and delinquency in this country." http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/osce_minsk.shtml.

²² Which represents the central office of OSCE in issues related to Nagorno-Karabakh.

²³ to the political request of the Russian Federation.

²⁴ The monitors must be unarmed and they do not have power to strengthen border security and defense. The Georgian government engaged to provide them with protection and freedom of movement.

²⁵ http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/osce_minsk.shtml. (accessed December 21, 2014).

²⁶ Which deals with the peace treaties of armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in charge of peace treaties of armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/osce_minsk.shtml.

²⁷ http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/osce_minsk.shtml. (accessed December 21, 2014).

²⁸ At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Russian president Vladimir Putin asserted, "[Western countries were] trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries. And this task is also being accomplished by the OSCE's bureaucratic apparatus, which is absolutely not connected with the state founders in any way." http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/osce_minsk.shtml. (accessed December 21, 2014).

²⁹ pseudo-state 'Novorossiya' (New Russia). http://www.nkrusa.org/nk_conflict/osce_minsk.shtml. (accessed December 21, 2014).

only through the de-escalation of the crisis and a compromise by the acceptance of de facto control of Russia over Crimea in exchange for the reintegration of the East in Ukraine.

In the first place, by it will be establishing a formal framework for discussion between the struggling sides in the process from Minsk.

“The Normandy format” – Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine – can supervise the compliance and the implementation of the Memorandum on the 20th of September 2014 by the special monitoring mission in Ukraine.³⁰

The OSCE Mission in Ukraine deployed observers in the buffer zone between the government and the rebel forces.

The Minsk Agreement contains necessary regulations for a cease-fire action but it does not contain the capability to stop its violations by imposing measures, and the infringement of a cease-fire action can be imputed without the implication of a mechanism to impose compliance with the regulations of the agreement.

The cease-fire action provides a period of time for diplomatic negotiations, but also possible certain tactical advantages which doesn't mean the extinction of the crisis. On the other hand, the OSCE members deployed in Eastern Ukraine can have a valuable contribution regarding data collection and information on the parties involved in the current crisis.

The initial unique Forum of dialog between the West and socialist block proves to be a catalyst for some substantial transformations for a new peace and security status in Europe. Within the military field of study, it is considered that the OSCE structure is different from that of a "standard" organization as it is acknowledged that the principles and the obligations of the Final Act in Helsinki contain a political significance but do not have a legal status by not having the legal force of the obligations of an international treaty.³¹

While the mission in Kosovo covered the prevention stage of the conflict, those of Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh dealt with the stages of management and resolution of the crisis situations. Nevertheless, the last step in conflict management was carried out in 1999 in Kosovo, Albania and Croatia, together with implementation of Dayton Agreement regulations, thus attaining the management of post-conflict reconstruction.

The Finnish Government did not submit the document for recording at the United Nations Secretary desk in accordance with the article 102 of the UN Charter, namely the violation of the document cannot be relied upon by the United Nations. According to some opinions, the organizational and institutional mechanism are characterized as being ambivalent defining the OSCE as "a soft organization" unable to cope with the security challenges at the regional level.³²

Among its weaknesses there are listed, *inter alia*, the lack of legal force, the dependency on the agreement of the participating states, the absence of a hierarchy among its institutions, the decisions of the institutional framework – decision-making structures³³ and the structures with certain competences³⁴ – it's complicated and thick.

³⁰ The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. The Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko said, "[This is] one of the few occasions when the OSCE has played exactly the role for which it was created, and has made a concrete contribution to regional peace and security." See also Edwin Bakker and Hinke Pietersma, "The OSCE in Search of a Meaningful Reform Agenda", *Atlantisch Perspectief* 29, no. 78 (2005), p. 2.

³¹ See David J. Galbreath, *The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europa*, New-York, Routledge, 2007, pp. 21-35.

³² See Jan I. Klabbers, "Institutional Ambivalence by Design: Soft Organization in International Law," *Nordic Journal of International Law* 70, no.3, 2011, pp.403-421.

³³ The Summits of the Ministerial Councils, The Permanent Council

³⁴ The Forum for Security Cooperation – FSC. The FSC has also negotiated different political agreements on arms control, disarmament and confidence and security-building, and upon request, provides assistance to participating States in implementing the agreed measures. Key documents negotiated by the FSC are the

Being emphasized several times the need of legal personality (legal capacity/personality) the OSCE represents a serious barrier for the role of a regional actor, even just linked to the establishment of the Mission's status within the territory of a state.³⁵

The decision making within OSCE is made by consensus, its effectiveness being seriously limited due to the large number of participating states.³⁶

The assessment of the role of an international organization requires the analysis of the mandate, membership, functions, operational structure, and institutional cooperation between the states in the region in which they perform. The importance of the organization in the field of the regional security should be related to the performance of other regional actors – EU, NATO – regarding the military security, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

The different positions of the US and Russia regarding the strengthening role of OSCE – the legal status and institutional framework, the differences in interpretation of the competence area related to the concept of "security" gradually made it possible for the EU to take over the attributes of the OSCE skills in extinguishing regional crises.³⁷ The OSCE weaknesses consist in: integration inequalities, economic growth and democratic development of the participating states, the vagueness and the limitations of the statute (legal personality, the rules of procedure), the erosion of political role in favor of the EU and NATO. The proposals to strengthen the OSCE peacekeeping capacities in Russia are a counterweight to an extension of the NATO responsibilities.

The reformation of the international organizations are natural processes which are more or less successful; in the case of the OSCE, after the end of the Cold War, the transformation of the concept organization into conference (1996), the portrayal of a crossroads³⁸ between a United Europe or the emergence of new division lines due to the double standards imposed on dimensions – human dimension over sizing and the focus on the problems of the states in the Eastern Vienna (2007)³⁹ is followed by the "European Security Treaty" draft (2008)⁴⁰ for a new balance of the European security architecture. A possible regional organization procedure according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter could be a solution.⁴¹

The OSCE reforms depend on the political will of the participating states; Russia and the former Soviet States' discontents towards the activities that had been carried out can block the cooperation. A consensus on cooperative security through the OSCE will set up its position within the European institutions.

Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000) and the *Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition* (2003).

³⁵ Suzanne Jacobi, "The OSCE Court: An Overview," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 10, no.2/1997, pp. 281-294.

³⁶ Rules of Procedures of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, para. II (A) 2, document MC.DOC/1/16, November 1, 2006.

³⁷ See *A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy*, adopted by the European Council on December 12, 2003.

³⁸ *Declaration and then Astana Appeal to OSCE*

³⁹ *OSCE Handbook*, Vienna, OSCE Press and Public Information, 2007, p.11.

⁴⁰ The initiative of the Russian President Medvedev, *The Initiative of a European Security Treaty*, 2008. European Security Treaty, November 29, 2009, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml>. (accessed December 15, 2014). See also Pal Dunay, "Revisiting and Eventually Adjusting, though Certainly not Revising the European Security Architecture," *Security and Human Rights* 21, no. 1 (2010): pp. 23-29.

⁴¹ OSCE, *Common Purpose: Toward a More Effective, Final Report and Recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE*, 27 June 2005.

In recent years, there are debates on identity crisis, and several proposals have been made for strengthening its role supported by historical antecedents to eliminate the marginalization in the international organizations system in the pan-European security area.⁴²

The United Nations cannot be accepted as a regulatory forum, NATO and EU are subjective, leaving OSCE involved in the very conclusion of the Minsk Agreement.

Any discussion about the architecture of the pan-European security cannot disregard Russia and cannot be built by accepting lines of division in this space, and at this point OSCE became the most important security and stability structure. The nature of its missions configured with regard to the current threats and risks – the ethnic groups' issue, human beings trafficking, border control, the weapons proliferation – encompasses the interests of all member states of the organization.

In the long run, in a new era of international disputes having as a background the cooling relations between NATO and Russia, of the ambiguity of the European foreign policy,⁴³ the Organization will be able to become the main negotiating forum for security and stability. Heading towards increasing confidence-building and security measures is getting interesting as the USA, NATO and the EU imposed on Russia for the situation in Eastern Ukraine while Moscow considers that its security interests are being damaged, by reducing its global and regional authority. In such a context, it is necessary a defusing tension through dialogue and enhancing trust between divergent positions – Russia, NATO and EU – the OSCE format, even though it is far from being ideal, it represents an opportunity with a history in the Cold War.⁴⁴

The OSCE gained experience and the position of neutrality in the use of peaceful means for conflict resolution and confidence-building measures can be especially valuable in "hot peace" between Russia and the West.

At European level, the relations between OSCE, NATO and the EU, strongly influenced by the changes in Russia, were shaped through certain boundaries through harmonious cooperation and skills; subsequently, by blocking some mechanisms and by the development of other management procedures, OSCE is becoming more focused on the former Soviet space, a drive that Russia disapproves with.

Conclusions

The future role of the OSCE depends on the relations between the U.S., Russia and the EU. On the one hand, the U.S. and the EU have at their disposal alternatives of cooperation, with attempts of assuming greater roles for NATO; on the other hand, Russia has also at its disposal an Asian alternative of cooperation and the support of other member states of the OSCE⁴⁵ and it has decided to strengthen the OSCE role and declined assuming the responsibilities of this organization by other international organizations, drives that lead in some uncertainties regarding the future.

⁴² The political dispute settlement mechanisms under CSCE/OSCE comprise: *the 1991 Valletta mechanism* which was the first attempt to establish a mandatory third-party procedure with the purpose of providing procedural advice to the parties; and *the 1992 Stockholm Provisions for a CSCE Conciliation Commission* leading to a non-binding settlement proposal which include also the Provisions for Directed Conciliation, on the basis of which the Ministerial Council may direct the parties of the dispute to undergo either the political conciliation procedure before the Conciliation Commission, or the legal conciliation procedure under the *Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration* (CSCE Ministerial Council 1992: Annex 4). See also Suzanne Jacobi, "The OSCE Court: An Overview," *Leiden Journal of International Law* 10, no. 2 (1997): pp. 281-294.

⁴³ The European External Action Service (EEAS).

⁴⁴ See Patricia Schneider and Tim J. Aristide Müller-Wolf, 'The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration Within the OSCE: Working Methods, Procedures and Composition,' *Working Paper 16*, Hamburg, Centre for OSCE Research (2007), p. 27.

⁴⁵ Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.

Under the conditions that impose or require coercive measures, the OSCE is dependent on the support of other international bodies that have these tools, or the "co-operation" of influential states with interests in the region, which are rarely objective and disinterested. Hoping that OSCE would survive, the transitional presidency of the Organization tested two alternatives. In the first case, when trying to comply with the stated objectives, the organization showed its inability. In the second one, when trying to participate at any rate to any kind of "collaboration", the organization lost its face, dignity and reason for its existence. In both cases, the OSCE's relevance has been questioned.

Secondly, another major drawback of the organization is the lack of structures and the coercive powers of the OSCE, the lack of those levers of coercion of the participant states and parties in the conflict.⁴⁶ Both shortcomings are difficult to surmount because they reflect the very nature of the organization, based on cooperation and dialogue.

The future developments in the crisis in Ukraine can provide a framework in which the model of the Kosovo mission should be reproduced in a creative way for the de-escalating phase because talking about the preventive phase is already too late. Anyway, with all the statutory limitations and organizational boundaries, the OSCE can play a fundamental role in the extinction of the Ukrainian crisis.

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⁴⁶ Thus, even if the parties give their consent that OSCE could intervene in a conflict, there is no guarantee that it will have access to, and freedom of action with regard to the dispute or conflict, or, even in this situation, it is possible that the organization may not have enough influence on the parties to call it forth at dialog and compromise.

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THE LIMITS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS

Paul DUTA,

Scientific researcher, PhD., Romanian Diplomatic Institute,
ppduta@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The process of mediation can take place under the aegis of the United Nations, as part of a "complex security" or under the aegis of a regional organization. The success within intrastate conflicts with an ethnic component, in addition to the participation of international organizations, relevant major powers must also include, as a rule, the neighboring countries with their own significant ethnic minority in order to avoid possible future grounds of dissatisfaction and a strong regional stability. Like the case of Transnistria and the East of Ukraine, the neighboring states with substantial ties to ethnic minority communities in the two areas have been asked to get involved in finding a good solution. From the perspective of the international mediation of conflicts with an ethnic component, the involvement of the neighboring states with ethnic interests in a conflict mediation process raises questions about the future status of the minorities in these areas.*

Key words: *mediation, complex security, regional organization, Transnistria, the East of Ukraine*

We will use the phrase of "violation of international peace (VIP)" to synthesize the "phenomenon" in which mediation is referring to a political-diplomatic algorithm with a variable intensity military support.

An overall assessment of VIP

The VIP assessment lies in the definition of the fundamental interests and relationships reported in a context in which they are expressed as a means of achieving the strategies - if any - of the main actors. The history and historical dimension play an important role for shaping the nature of the situation - crisis/conflict, intra/interstate, regional climate, the potential for escalation. In setting the strategy for VIP, the mediator assesses the institutions and the processes in the affected companies which can be engaged for a possible non-violent variant, the possibilities for the establishment of new structures and relationships being analyzed.

In the case of Libya, creating a parallel system of banking¹ and petroleum² is an expression of the struggle for power in a state where mediation processes are seriously threatened. The loss of political stability, through episodes like the proclamation of an "Islamic Caliphate of Derna" may escalate the asymmetrical risks against the petroleum infrastructure. The polarization of the Libyan Government increases the risk of the disorders of militias payments and that of the violence around the oil terminals and pipelines.³

Historical landmarks corroborate with the cause (historical) and the substance (real or artificial) of the dispute/crisis/conflict (the territory, sovereignty, local autonomy, control of natural resources, religious or ethnic controversies) which may be a single reason or a

¹ Central Bank of Libya

² The National Oil Corporation (NOC)

³ The failure to comply with the neutrality of the National Oil Company and of the Central Bank of Libya by the internationally recognized Government of the Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, namely the cessation of payments attract penalties provided for by the Security Council Resolution 2146 prohibiting other vectors besides the Libyan Government to export or sell petroleum products. Richard Cochrane is a MENA country analyst in the IHS Country Risk Analysis and Forecasting Team (CRAFT). Libya's political rivals compete for oil revenues, Jane's Intelligence Review 27.1 (Jan 1, 2015).

combination of several disagreement motifs. Moreover, the territorial amplitude is of interest (local, national, regional, international), also the potential for its own integral current supply (a disagreement motif is worked out, but another reason of dispute appears).

In 1976, the pro-Polisario Sahrawi National Council⁴ proclaimed the establishment of an independent state, "The Democratic Arab Republic of Sahara" announcing that it will trigger the armed struggle for the realization of the right of self-determination of the people of this territory. In 1988, the United Nations established MINURSO in accordance with "proposals for understanding"⁵, as they have been accepted by Morocco and Front Frente for the liberation of Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro,⁶ but due to the divergence of opinions of the parties regarding the key issues of the agreement, especially those regarding the participation of voters in the referendum, it was not possible to implement the plan in accordance with repeated planning.

The negotiation of agreements

Studying the political developments of governmental structures and of power - being interested in the stability, the efficiency and legitimacy - on a VIP threatened territory a deceleration of reports and the space to affirm the opposition and that of the possibilities of supporting specific reconciliation changes. On a higher plane, it is necessary to assess at the international community level, the potential for the involvement of international institutions in the VIP-the conflict ceasing mechanisms, "contact groups" and "support", the international criminal tribunals.⁷

The various perspectives on concepts/paradigms of crisis and conflict, each with an extra touch of truth contained a more or less acceptance and applicability, and that one that will be instrumentalized will be chosen by the mediator.

Intrastate conflict-the most representative form of VPI-has deep historical roots, as a rule, the actors being regular forces, militias/insurgents, but also armed civilians with a low degree of discipline and hierarchy and a much disorganized control act. It is often characterized by guerrilla fighting, without a well-defined front line. Civilians are the main victims and often the main targets. There is a new approach with regard to this kind of crises/conflicts, an exceeding of the traditional rules of definition "international peace and security" (examples of intervention in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti) that can turn international security organizations in an "interventionist" in the internal affairs of States.⁸

The reelection of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as President of Algeria, strengthens the regional power status for the safety of his country, including the responsibility to engage the military against insurgency operations extremely limited to the principle of non-intervention

⁴ Pro-Polisario Provizional Sahrawi National Council. The Frente Polisario fighting against Moroccan and Mauritanian troops. A part of the population leaves the territory following the Frente Polisario who withdraws to a place situated in the area of Tindouf in the Southwest of Algeria. See Paul-Dănuț Duță, Mihai Chiriță, Ion Panait, *Globalization and the African continent: security issues*, Techno Media, Sibiu, 2008, pp. 25 et seq.

⁵ Mandate: monitoring the ceasefire, verifying the cessation of the Moroccan troops in the area, monitoring the measures to increase trust between Moroccan and the Frente Polisario troops, monitoring the detention of prisoners, the exchange of political and war prisoners, the implementation of repatriations, the identification and registration of persons entitled to vote, the organizing and ensuring of a free referendum and the proclamation of the results. See Paul-Dănuț Duță, Mihai Chiriță, Ion Panait, *op. cit.* p.32.

⁶ Frente Polisario.

⁷ "The Arrusha agreements" regulate the Organization and the conduct of elections under the aegis of the UN Electoral Observation Mission to Burundi (MENUB) the continuing of the Mission to Burundi (BNUB), after the end of the civil war in Burundi. See Jen Psaki, *U.S. Welcomes Robust UN Electoral Observation Mission to Burundi*, African Press Organization (APO)/ -- Press Statement, Washington, DC, January 7, 2015.

⁸ David Bentley and Robert Oakley, „Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti”, in *Strategic Forum*, nr.30, June, 1995, National Defence University, Institute National for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C.

although the Sahel region as of 2011 is characterized by strong turbulence. In addition, the political crisis in 2012 from Mali which led to a de facto division of Mali, and a severe instability in Libya made France, the United States and ECOWAS⁹ to request Algeria to assume the responsibilities of a coned power in terms of regional security and out of the inertia and ambiguity, at least with respect to the situation in the Sahel and out of inertia and ambiguity at least with regard to the situation in this area.

However, taking into consideration the policy of "wait-and-see", the Algerian diplomacy raises the dialogue with Maghreb moderate parties.¹⁰ The Algerian diplomacy is involved in defending the rights and the status of the minority of Mali since 1990, with opportunities to contribute to the inter-Mali negotiation process with certain armed groups¹¹ on the northern part of the state. Mali urged Algeria to host talks on the crisis in Mali, especially since the escalation of the crisis may be transmitted and southern Algeria, where many Tuareg people having both a refugee status, and also a naturalized Algerian citizens one.¹²

Prior to the commencement of mediation the following are required – the necessity to establish the parties (including attitudes, exposing the correct ones out of the wrong ones), the developments of the VIP, obtaining the agreement to negotiate.¹³ The antagonistic positions of the VIP actors go round a control aspect over an essential value-the territory, natural resources, the armed forces, the legitimacy and support of the population, the political and diplomatic support. The mediation strategy points and exploits the antagonisms that refer to key resources, the humanitarian aid, and the support of the diasporas.

The knowledge of the parties' negotiators seeks – the differences between the official positions and interests of the key actors, the VIP extinction effects on the interests of the VIP key actors (the possibility that these interests burden the VIP).¹⁴ The International mediation is a challenge because there will be some changes at the end of it, which affects a previous state of things causing reactions of resistance, external manipulation, fear to account for the abuses of the past, blocking security mechanisms, the gain of influence of the previous missed mediations. The strategic analysis of the VIP developments that are to be given to the VIP actors focus on highlighting the costs and alternatives to violent methods, in connection with the substance causes of the conflict.

The mediation customizes depending on the attitude of the parties - they take place at the negotiating table or require only an observer status - supports public or private negotiation sessions, focusing on the participation of all VIP actors. Basically, the VIP actors identify the representatives in negotiations, and their assessment knowledge being necessary for customizing the mediation strategy. A useful tool during the pursuit of the negotiations is the resource-flow control - protection or blocking – through non-violent means for the benefit of one or more VIP actors, but also through redeployment.¹⁵

⁹ ECOWAS - the Economic Community of West African States.

¹⁰ Muslim Brotherhood figures including Abdelhakim Belhadj, the former commander of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and former chairman of the Military Council in Tripoli; and Rached Ghannouchi, the leader of the Tunisian Al-Nahda Party.

¹¹ Run by Harakat Ansar al-Din, suspected of having links to the Algerian secret services. See Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst 14.10, *Militant menace - Algeria responds to turbulence in the Sahel*, December 1, 2014.

¹² The second and third sessions of the Algeria-Mali bilateral strategic committee in April and May 2014.

¹³ Establishing issues, attitudes and interests - invoking secession for security reasons, can hide a strategy for gaining control over the state.

¹⁴ Alternatively, the culture of negotiators and the possible so-called risks – the fear that it will be killed or that it is an act of weakness if the negotiation process is accepted.

¹⁵ If there is not a hierarchy of command, the identification of other influential people such as the mayor or the priest could be crucial in solving the problem. Identifying the source of the incident and the most appropriate level entitled to act underlying the prevention of future incidents. See Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson,

In East Asia there are three major conflicts whose features can be based on a system of mediation¹⁶ and a hybrid system.¹⁷ The three conflicts - Korea peninsula, Taiwan and the South China Sea - with roots in the cold war, linked to the existence of the Alliance, the allies that are part of a security complex determined by the relations between several actors.¹⁸

The mediation process must meet certain standards on conflict management - to prevent contradictions that lead to escalating violence, the incompatibilities need to be adapted to integration and coexistence, and the economic measures may be used as part of the mediation, the existence of instruments of crisis management.¹⁹ In the conduct of negotiations or mediation, the terrain must be secure and neutral. In controlling an incident, those important people in defusing the problem must be identified and persuaded to conduct negotiations away from those involved in the incident.

In the study of the actors involved in the VPI - the way they evaluate themselves, there are political and military structures outlined in the social, political and popular support, representatively and legitimacy. On the next level there are the cohesion-hierarchy, discipline, the degree of participation from the domestic political decision, and divergent national positions.

In 1991, the Security Council examines for the first time the situation in Liberia,²⁰ saying that "the Yamoussoukro IV Accord" provides the best framework for the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Liberia. After two years, "the peace agreement at Cotonou"²¹ is signed. Under this agreement, the Security Council has authorized the General-Secretary to carry out an advanced detachment of military observers.²²

Bringing the head and his power into service - a military authority, political quality, popularity, and post-mediation political perspectives - has an important significance within the group and population, the significance of who is crucial in the conflict and mediation, the advantages/disadvantages of the change in the process of mediation. During negotiations, he assesses the actors' representatives assessment - observance of the limits of the mandate given to the head of the group, in the course of the Group and the general public, engaging in good faith, received support from within the group.

and Pamela Aall, *Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 94-95.

¹⁶ According to Krasner, an international regime can be defined as a set of "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area". Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables", in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), *International regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 1.

¹⁷ One system may change into another system, and a transition form is referred to as hybrid system due to the fact that elements of both systems are present in it. See Oishi, Mikio, "In Search of an East Asian Way of Conflict Management: Three Regional Cases," *the International Conference on "China, ASEAN and the Changing Context of East Asian Regionalism*, 5-6 December 2012 at the Institute of Graduate Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

¹⁸ See Barry Buzan, *People, states and fear: The national security problem in international relations*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983, pp. 105-115.

¹⁹ Selecting individuals or groups that are supported by stakeholders, is essential to success negotiations. Chung-in Moon, "The six-party talks and building a nuclear-free Northeast Asia", East Asia Forum, 20th May 2012, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/20/thesixpartytalksandimplicationsforanortheastasianuclearweaponsfreezone/> (accessed 4th November 2012).

²⁰ The United Nations support the efforts of ECOWAS member states. Furthermore they provide humanitarian assistance in the most affected areas by UNDP, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO. See UN documents S / 22133.

²¹ Cotonou Peace Agreement, Cotonou, Benin, under the chairmanship of the special representative, the President of the OAU and ECOWAS Executive Secretary and Interim Government of National Unity and (IGNU), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). See UN documents S / 26272.

²² The field mission led by the special representative of the General Secretary. *Security Council resolution no.856* (1993) of 10 August 1993.

The administrative organization should include measures relating to the arrival and departure, parking provision, communication, meals and rest. Usually the meeting has a program, a distribution of seats and observers plan, and also an interpreter and adviser supplement regarding certain issues. There are likely to be imposed separate rooms as to allow each of the parties to hold private sessions.

During negotiations there is an ongoing assessment of the necessary resource flow for the protagonists involved in the VIP - for continuing both the VIP and negotiations - as a basis for sizing the influences of the involved groups. Active mediation is based on the knowledge of the operative situation - dynamic or stabilized, the military strength of each VIP actor, the ratio of forces, the correct or distorted information on their potential and of their opponent, the degree of manipulation through misinformation, and option variants for the VIP extinction based on real data on the ratio of forces.²³

The auxiliary elements with a meaning in the strategy of negotiation that can be taken into consideration are - the popular support, fear, cohesion of communities, media control, and support of religious leaders.

The evaluation and determination of active vectors of the civil society - policies, professional, union, religious - with a significance for negotiations, and the potential of the transformation into political structures. On the other hand, it is important to determine the degree of involvement and representatively of the population in the VIP actors' schedules and the responsibility of their leaders to the population. On the same side as the mediator, according to the international community's attention to the overall VIP and global or regional significance, other participants with a recognized prestige in the position of guarantors and supporters of the peace process, can be also trained.²⁴ This contribution must be at an equal level and according to the situation. The offense may be caused if a party's senior officials should meet low-level representatives.

Thus, the neighboring states, the powers that directly or indirectly support the VIP actors, the regional organizations and the United Nations, can be taken into consideration by establishing prior favorable or unfavorable intentions to the success of the approach, the level of representation, the estimating positions of adversity or cooperation in order to complete the negotiations.²⁵

With a secondary role, the following must be taken into consideration – the diaspora, international non-governmental organizations, the media and the internet - due to the impact of the peace process. Practice has shown that in the diaspora shadow governments can be formed, political leaders for the post-conflict period, as well as resources to power the VIP. The participation of non-governmental international organizations - humanitarian aid or the

²³ According to U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee the Ukrainian crisis is “Is in violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances, in which it pledged to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine and to refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.” See U.S. House of Representatives, *Foreign Affairs Committee Passes Ukraine Resolution - Calls for Russian Sanctions*, Congressional Documents and Publications. (Mar 6, 2014). <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/markup/markup-h-res-499-condemning-violation-ukrainian-sovereignty-independence-and-territorial>. (Accessed in 16 December 2014).

²⁴ After a brief and intense civil war, including a division of the state during a post-conflict period, Alassane Ouattara, the President of Côte d'Ivoire and his administration supported by ECOWAS, of the African Union, US, EU and UN have successfully conducted a policy of reconciliation supported by the impunity of past actions. The success of the policies, recommended him to be involved in the mediation process in Mali, Ivory Coast starting with 2012. See *Ivory Coast Oxford Analytic Country Profiles*. (Nov 11, 2014).

²⁵ In this regard, see the mediation process of Burkina Faso. Le Secrétaire général applaudit les efforts de la médiation conjointe des Nations Unies, de l'Union africaine, de la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, des Présidents du Ghana, du Nigéria et du Sénégal, ainsi que le soutien des partenaires internationaux, pour assurer une transition pacifique au Burkina Faso. See African Press Organisation. Database of Press Releases *Related to Africa*, Lausanne, 07 November 2014.

development of local projects - may be particularly significant the relationships with the locals, the local prestige, local contacts with all VIP actors - to complete the peace process. The local media must be analyzed in terms of its quality, coverage, impact, control, technology, involvement in VIP.

Implementing negotiated agreements

It aims limitation, moderation and/or end of hostilities between states or within them through the intervention of a third party, objective, organized and conducted at international level, which uses military force and civilians as an augment of the political process and of solving the conflict.²⁶ Military operations follow diplomatic negotiations which establish the mandate of military force.

Through negotiation and mediation positive relations between the parties and peacekeeping force can be formed, by facilitating agreements and promoting the process of reconciliation.²⁷ Objective and effective negotiations will develop a climate of mutual respect and cooperation.²⁸

Negotiation means the direct dialogue between the two parties. The negotiation is everywhere, and we are involved all the time in the processes of negotiation.²⁹

The mediation refers to activities that bring the parties to a dispute. Negotiation and mediation can take place independently, although they are usually ancillary to other conflict resolution activities. Negotiation and mediation can be deployed as part of a deliberate process.

First, the team of mediators must be carefully chosen, must have at its disposal the necessary resources and the necessary support to succeed. After a careful and substantial evaluation of VIP, the team of mediators develops a forward-looking perspective on VIP, devoid of vanity, prejudice and undue confidence in their capacity to demonstrate a possible real and substantial contribution, confirming later on the terrain.³⁰

The mediation strategies can be acquainted with many ways of expression; coordinated by the security international organizations and their agencies, carried out by governments and intergovernmental structures, undertaken by private organizations and public figures. Practice shows that the mediators can facilitate and also manipulate, can appeal to his own political authority and to any use of the institutions' structures at its disposal, to point out and emphasize the weaknesses and adverse effects.

A few interesting aspects can be found in the two strategies of mediation and negotiation carried out in Moldova and Ukraine.

In August 25, 1991, just two days before Chisinau proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Moldova, including Transnistria, it declared its independence. In 1997, "the Primakov memorandum" introduces the concept of the "common State" differently perceived in Chişinău - as a unitary state and in Tiraspol - a confederation of the two players with an equal status (including different subjects of international law); in 2002, the OSCE provides a federated organization plan; in 2003, Dmitri Kozak proposed a draft constitution for the future

²⁶ See Paul Dănuţ Duţă, *Instituţii de securitate. Partea generală*. Sibiu 2006, Ed. Tehno Media.

²⁷ The Art. 33 of the Chapter VI of the UN Charter stresses the importance of negotiation, investigation, mediation and conciliation, which are the most effective means of resolving the conflict in which peacekeeping forces intervene. See Paul Dănuţ Duţă, Mihai Purcărea, Ovidiu Cordoneanu, *Organizaţiile internaţionale şi mediul de securitate*, Tehno Media, Sibiu, 2008.

²⁸ Wallander, Celeste A. and Robert O. Keohane (2002). "Risk, threat and security institutions." In: Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Power and governance in a partially globalized world*. New York: Routledge, pp. 88-113.

²⁹ The negotiation process appears generally as an issue of social science (it belongs to social psychology and diplomacy) but in recent years the negotiation has become an indispensable element in resolving conflicts that take place in the international community. See Wallander, Celeste A. and Robert O. Keohane, *op.cit.*, p.92.

³⁰ See Paul Dănuţ Duţă, Mihai Purcărea, Ovidiu Cordoneanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-259.

Moldovan Federation and has been proposed directly to Moldova without the OSCE agreement.³¹ In 2004, Stanislav Belkovsky proposes that, in exchange for the recognition of independence of Transnistria, Russia has to accept the reunion with Romania.³² In 2005, Petro Poroshenko, takes and adapts Yevgeny Primakov's plan in his own interest by proposing a status of equality between Moldova and Transnistria as part of an agreement with Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, the last three players were to be the guaranteeing powers of the implementation of the agreement, which would have led to excluding Romania from the conflict resolution format.³³

In 2005, "Vladimir Voronin's initiative" claims the OSCE to arrive at a stability and security pact for Moldova, which to be granted together with the actors of the negotiating process and the EU, the US and Romania.³⁴

In 2010, the German chancellor Angela Merkel proposes "the Meseberg Initiative" (also known as the "the Meseberg Memorandum" or "Meseberg Agreement") and the possible establishment of a consulting mechanism on security issues for the European Union-The Russian Federation (the so-called Political and Security Committee).

In 2014, Crimea and the Donbas region status issues have led to a series of reactions at the level of international organizations.

The events at the beginning of 2014 bring into power an interim government which is trying to promote a policy of limiting the rights of ethnic minorities, including the Romanian intention to block the intervention of the international community. An extremist current that takes advantage of the turmoil in the East, has made its faith heard for some time in the Ukrainian press.³⁵

The Security Council has many meetings, but fails to take a position over Ukraine's situation.³⁶

The UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution entitled "Territorial integrity of Ukraine" that does not recognize the referendum for independence of Crimea and Sevastopol nor Crimea and the Russian Federation reunion.³⁷

³¹ "The Basic Principles of the State of the Unified State Structure". See, Paul Dănuț Duță, Teodor Frunzeti, Ion Panait, *Operațiuni și misiuni OSCE. Studiu de caz: Moldova*, Tehno Media, Sibiu, 2008, pp.234 and the next.

³² See, Paul Dănuț Duță, Teodor Frunzeti, Ion Panait, *op.cit.*, pp.236.

³³ ASee, Paul Dănuț Duță, Teodor Frunzeti, Ion Panait, *op.cit.*, p.245.

³⁴ The Moldovan experts have called for a new format of negotiations that would alter the current framework of "2 plus 3"; the architecture of the proposed format is "3 plus 3", which precludes the Transnistrian authorities and includes the EU, the USA and Romania. See, Paul Dănuț Duță, Teodor Frunzeti, Ion Panait, *op.cit.*, p.246.

³⁵ Romania does not give up to its claims over a portion of the territory which is now in Ukraine, says a report of the Center for civil society issues in Kiev, quoted by Novyi Rezhion. "The normal development of interstate relations is hindered by the tendentious exploiting of some historical problems made by the officials in Bucharest, primarily talking about the national-territorial membership of Northern Bukovina, Hertza and Hotin territories and the Ismail region in Basarabia. See Cornelia Roșoga, *Ucraina fears România while Russia is working on disruption*, Evenimentul Zilei, 30-10-2008. The Ukrainians in Romania have automatic representation in the Parliament of Bucharest and Tymoshenko does not even recognize the existence of Romanians in Ukraine. See *Romania represents a greater danger for Ukraine than it does for Russia*, 22-10-2008.

³⁶ The Russian Federation's representative reiterated that his country had not implemented the use of force, but the Ukraine's takeover by radical extremists was breeding serious risks, and his country was concerned about the rights of minorities. See also *Meeting this afternoon to consider the situation in Ukraine*, Security Council members had before them a letter from that country's delegation addressed to the Secretary-General (document S/2014/136). See also the Security Council on the situation in Ukraine, 3 March 2014 SC/11305.

³⁷ By a vote of 100 in favor to 11 against, with 58 abstentions, the Assembly adopted the resolution entitled "Territorial integrity of Ukraine" (document A/68/L.39). Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region, Sixty-eighth General Assembly, 80th Meeting (AM), GA/11493.

NATO's relations with Russia after a beneficial dialogue, cooperation and development (1991-2008),³⁸ are suspended due to events in Georgia (2008-2009) resumed and suspended due to events in Ukraine in 2014.³⁹

The EU relations with Ukraine are subordinated to a political association and a gradual and economic integration.⁴⁰ EU-taking into consideration the deterioration of the situation in Ukraine has adopted a series of sanctions and restrictions, sending a civilian mission to strengthen the operative rule of law⁴¹ on 1 December 2014, and supports the OSCE activities in this country.

The EU gets involved for the de-escalation of the crisis in Ukraine through a multilateral mechanism, but also by a series of penalties. A series of sanctions has been adopted including: the suspension of bilateral negotiations: a New EU-Russia Agreement, for the G8 Summit preparations in Sochi preparations, the accession to the OECD and the International Energy Agency, the granting of visas.⁴² A couple of cooperating programs are revalued, and a number of restrictions are established.

In the case of the civil war in Ukraine, the efforts of mediation sanctions and negotiation have made certain steps, on the initiative of Germany and France, complemented by the OSCE.

The start of OSCE mission in Ukraine⁴³ was at Ukraine's request followed by the deployment of two checkpoints at the Ukrainian-Russian border,⁴⁴ in accordance with the previous agreements.⁴⁵

Thus, the Protocol in Minsk⁴⁶ negotiated in a trilateral format, "The Trilateral Contact Group" - the President Poroshenko, President Putin, the Swiss Foreign Minister and the OSCE Representative Didier Burkhalter⁴⁷ based on "the plan for peace" of President Poroshenko and President Putin "initiatives" refers, *inter alia*, to some very important issues: ceasefire; the verification of ceasefire by the OSCE Monitoring Mission; decentralization of power; monitoring of the border between Ukraine and Russia and the creation of a security zone along the border; the release of the war prisoners and those detained; the amnesty for the persons involved in the separatist incidents of Donetsk and Luhansk; promoting national dialogue; improving the humanitarian situation; anticipated poll elections in Donetsk and Lugansk; the withdrawal of illegal armed groups, heavy weapons and mercenaries in Eastern Ukraine; economic recovery in Donbas; ensuring the safety of the individuals participating in the negotiations.

³⁸ A framework for development is created by: The North Atlantic Cooperation Council/The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (1991), the NATO-Russia Act on Mutual Relations (1997), Cooperation and Security, the Rome Declaration (2002) on "NATO-Russia relations: A New Quality", which established the NATO-Russia Council.

³⁹ The suspension of the practical cooperation between NATO-Russia within the NATO Council but also under the aegis of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the continuation of the political dialogue only within the embassies and higher, as needed.

⁴⁰ See the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership (EaP), the political provisions of the Association Agreement.

⁴¹ The EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM).

⁴² First suspended bilateral talks with the Russian Federation on visa matters and discussions on the New (EU-Russia) Agreement.

⁴³ The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Decision No. 1117 of 21 March 2014.

⁴⁴ Decision no. 1130 deployment of OSCE observers to two Russian checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border.

⁴⁵ The Joint Declaration made in Berlin on 2 July 2014.

⁴⁶ *Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group*, signed in Minsk, 5 September 2014 implementation of President Poroshenko's Peace Plan and of President Putin's initiatives. See also *Memorandum of September 19 2014 outlining the parameters for the implementation of commitments of the Minsk Protocol of 5 September 2014*.

⁴⁷ OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Swiss Foreign Minister.

It is pointed out that it is an important step for de-escalation of the crisis and to promote national dialogue if requested by the Ukrainian authorities.⁴⁸

A possible development of the negotiations in addition to OSCE monitoring is about to develop in the future through "The so-called Normandy Format."⁴⁹ In December 2014, Normandy Format agreed to carry out two meetings of the "Trilateral Group of Contact" with representatives of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk concerning – ceasefire, implementation of the disengagement plan, the release of prisoners and detained persons, granting humanitarian aid.⁵⁰

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⁴⁸ See Chairperson-in-Office welcomes Minsk agreement, assures President Poroshenko of OSCE support, BERN, 5 September 2014, <http://www.osce.org/cio/123245>

⁴⁹ The leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France.

⁵⁰ *Minsk talks must resume to rapidly advance peace efforts, Swiss Chair says*, Bern, December 26, 2014, <http://www.osce.org/search/pages/Minsk%20Protocol>

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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Ion PANAIT,

Lecturer, PhD., "Lucian Blaga" University, Sibiu
nelutu.panait@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Different versions of the world order regarding the United States and China give rise to an international system without clear rules of the game because of a lack of a coherent set of conduct principles in the international community. In this environment, the security threats are addressed through ad hoc methods of conflict management. If during the Cold War the Korean peninsula represented the greatest strategic value in the triangle the USSR-Japan-China, after the end of the East-West confrontation on the European continent, the center of gravity started moving to the West of the Asian continent. There is potential for conflict between the U.S. and China. China could not afford to engage in battle against the U.S. because its inferior military and economic capacity. Russia is watching more closely toward East than toward Europe in order to get to integration in the East Asian economic field.*

Key words: *security threats, conflict management, the Korean peninsula, Asian security environment*

The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, although one which could be possible in a far away future, translates into a sustained effort for nuclear safety, doubled by strategies where either diminished or not, the role of nuclear weapons is definite. The means used by the US to reinforce this global world order will expand the role of the liberal world order as the grounds for interaction in Asia. This strategy calls for free-trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership with Asian countries, strengthening economic and military cooperation with Asian democracies and restructuring American defensive alignment to place the American Command Center for Pacific in the centre and to involve Asian states in peace operations where there are gaps in the pursuit of democracy and in the observing of civil rights, which disrupt the peace and international stability.¹ Although China is rising, the values and ideals of the U.S. remain prominent in the global landscape, through innovation and ability to solve the problems shown by the American economy and society.²

There are numerous and contradictory opinions about redrawing the Asian security environment; thus, a new "draft order" for nuclear weapons is proposed - a project intended to lessen the enmity and enhance friendship - but solutions to numerous challenges which nuclear agenda is now facing are unconvincing.³

¹ The American international order is called integrationist because it is based on values. The drawback of this order is the rigidity regarding the definition of what is and what is not considered legitimate, and it excludes a number of states from becoming member states, because of the military, economic and political structures which are the grounds for the state-society relations. The strong point is that it clearly defines the limits of acceptable behavior. Only democracies which subscribe to the principles of the market economy can be part of the core of the liberal world order. It is also clear that the agenda of this world order is extensive in the sense that the integration into a community of states that operate on the basis of shared values is a long-term goal. See, Ian Clark, "China and the United States: A Succession of Hegemonies?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1, 2011, pp. 13-28.

² See Fareed Zakaria, "The Future of US politics: How can US survive other states' ascension," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3, May/June 2008, pp. 18-43.

³ See, William Walker, *A perpetual menace: nuclear weapons and international order* (Londra: Routledge, 2012). At the present time the gap between the agreements of the Cold War and post-Cold war realities has deepened. See, Therese Delpech, *Nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: lessons from the Cold War for a new*

The situation of military forces ratio in the Asia-Pacific area must also be combined with nuclear power which will continue to play a fundamental role, especially since there seems to be an increasing desire for them among Asian states. Different versions of the world order regarding the United States and China give rise to an international system without clear rules of the game because of a lack of a coherent set of conduct principles in the international community. In this environment, the security threats are addressed through ad hoc methods of conflict management. The members and the rules are laid down on the basis of attempt-error analysis. Also, less powerful states have more power, because the United States and China are concerned with the struggle for the most influential position, therefore the other states may choose one or the other of the principal competitors.⁴




Figure no.1. The main military forces in the Asia-Pacific region⁵

era of strategic piracy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012).

⁴ In the interventions in Libya European leadership requires the support of the Western countries for the security regionalization- the same as that of the China program for the world order. The U.S. is unlikely to assume a leadership role in this type of operations, outside their area of interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Germany's disagreement with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, due to its disapproval of using force in Libya shows increasingly blurred differences between those supporting the integrationist order and those supporting a sort of global order based on coexistence. That doesn't mean that China and the United States share the same vision, but rather indicates the need for regionalization in the absence of a coherent set of principles defining the limits of what is right and what is wrong in terms of international behavior. See, Liselotte Odgaard, "National Security Strategy of China and Chinese Policies in Libya" AMS-ISDP Joint Conference.

⁵ Source: "The Military Balance 2014" published by the U.S. Department of Defense, and others. Figures for

The Second Nuclear Era in the Asia-Pacific Region

The second nuclear era, through its character and its consequences, is particularly dangerous especially in the Asian area, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia requiring taking into account the discouragement as the dominant of national military doctrines and at the same time of the arms race.⁶

Military superiority combined with global alignment system determines the position of the U.S. as the supreme leader. At the same time, the U.S. is a superpower in decline, with a gross domestic product estimated at only two-thirds of that of China in the year 2050, if it continues with the current rate of economic growth.⁷ Perhaps Washington will lose its status as a global power; however, the U.S. is seriously concerned, especially with keeping its decision-making influence in international affairs more than with keeping their position as a dominant power.⁸

U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region




Figure no. 2. The deployment of U.S. forces on December 31, 2013⁹

In Asia, nuclear weapons affect the strategic environment, accelerating the pace of strategic

Japan, as of the end of 2013, indicate the strength of each SDF; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only); Figures of U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are those of Army and Marine Corps personnel combined; Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft; Figures in parentheses show the total number of central units, such as divisions and brigades. Only divisions are included in North Korea; The number of U.S. 7th Fleet vessels and aircraft indicates those which are forward-deployed in Japan and Guam. See, *Defence of Japan Digest 2014*, p. 9.

⁶ Paul Bracken, *The second nuclear age: strategy, danger and the new power politics* (New York: Times Books, 2012); Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, eds., *Strategy in the second nuclear age: power, ambition and the ultimate weapon* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012). See also, Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *The long shadow: nuclear weapons and security in 21st century Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ The approach of a free integration also appears in G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and in The World Reconstruction after Great Wars*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 3-79.

⁹ See *Defence of Japan Digest 2014*, p. 32.

changes. Several Asian countries also develop nuclear programs for nuclear weapons delivery vectors, which can become very dangerous in case of geopolitical shocks. The strategic center of gravity is shifting in Asia. If during the Cold War the Korean peninsula represented the greatest strategic value in the triangle the USSR-Japan-China, after the end of the East-West confrontation on the European continent, the center of gravity started moving to the West of the Asian continent.

China participates in defining the political and international game rules and determines the foreign policy decisions open to international participants. The advantages of the Chinese version of world order lies in its flexibility, in the fact that it does not require any economic, political or military changes, but it allows the existence of a plurality of political systems and rapid adjustments to the changes in the international environment. Therefore, China doesn't have to clearly define its long-term objectives, although China reinforces its status as a growing world power.

Table no. 1. The situation of armed forces of China and Taiwan¹⁰

		China	Taiwan (Reference)
Total military forces		Approx. 2.3 million troops	Approx. 290,000 troops
Ground forces	Group troops	Approx. 1.6 million troops	Approx. 200,000 troops
	Tanks	Type-99/A, Type-98/A, Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 7,600 vehicles	M-60, M-48A/H and others Approx. 1,200 vehicles
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 890 vessels / 1,423 thousand tons	Approx. 410 vessels / 201,000 tons
	Destroyers & frigates	Approx. 70 vessels	Approx. 30 vessels
	Submarines	Approx. 60 vessels	4 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 10,000 troops	Approx. 15,000 troops
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 2,580 aircraft	Approx. 500 aircraft
	Modern fighters aircraft	J-10 x 264 Su-27/J-11 x 328 Su-30 x 97 (Fourth-generation fighters x 689)	Mirage 2000 x 56 F-16 x 145 F-CK-1 (IDF) x 128 (Fourth-generation fighters x 329)
Reference	Population	Approx. 1.360 billion	Approx. 23 million
	Term of service	2 years	1 year

Source: The Military Balance (2014) and others.

China is considered as a principle power whose behavior matches the international principles that it promotes and as an oriented and pragmatic power that listens to the grievances of smaller powers. This set of principles is a mix between a conservative form of defensive diplomacy based on the former principles of the United Nations and a form of offensive diplomacy, which involves the revision of the former UN system. The Chinese version of world order is widely accepted in non-Western regions of the world and thus justifies China's trendsetter status in the world order.¹¹

¹⁰ See *Defence of Japan Digest 2014*, p. 38.

¹¹ For example, in the case of Myanmar, China has expressed concern over the development of the developing countries with regard to violations of civil and political rights and the unsolicited use of force. The influence of China is due to its relations with the countries of the second echelon of power such as Russia and Indonesia and its participation in international bodies for regional security worldwide: AU, the Association of the Southeastern Asia Nations (ASEAN), the Organization for Shanghai Cooperation (SCO). These are used for the exercising political and strategic influence. This network of commitments in the framework of regional security institutions constitutes the Chinese alternative to the system of U.S. global alignment. See, U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012, www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. (accessed at 7 December 2014).

The strategic importance of China¹² and of the countries that lie in the South and West of China outlines a region with more and more substantial geopolitical value, where the issue of nuclear weapons, of new capabilities and weapons systems, ranging from the ultimate drones to cyberspace and outer space, will set up an area with particularly significant developments.¹³

The peaceful coexistence at a more practical level of implementation involves several types of practices. One would be the compromise in cases where there is potential for conflict between the U.S. and China. China could not afford to engage in battle against the U.S. because its inferior military and economic capacity. In addition, China is subject to approval by the host governments in order to support peace operations. Thirdly, China promotes fairness and mutual benefit as the cornerstone principle, which implies treating states as equals and promoting social and economic development. Also, China supports the efforts of regional and functional organizations of the United Nations in crisis management and in determining the point at which the intervention is needed in order to restore peace and stability in conflict areas. At the moment of the UN Security Council vote to establish a joint U.N.-African force (Darfur, July 2007), China's special envoy to Darfur, Liu Guijin, commented: "it is not China's Darfur. It is Sudan's Darfur first and then Africa's Darfur." In Guijin's opinion, peace talks must take precedence over peacekeeping efforts in order to achieve a lasting peace.¹⁴ China's becoming a great power will take several decades and it is subscribed to the Sino-centric national interests to re-do the borders that China considers as being original territory. The socio-political transition, combined with the Sino-centric interests, shows that most of the countries of the second power echelon will not become loyal to China, up to a level that would allow Beijing to replace Washington as world power within the international system.¹⁵

Since 2000, Russia, in order to avoid marginalization in the East Asian region, develops economic relations, supported by ambitious goals to become "a Euro-Pacific power," respectively, to regain the role of great power in the region.¹⁶

¹² As to the economic and military capability, China has become the first in the group of second most important world powers. Beijing has not yet reached the status of world power. In political terms, China already exercises a great international influence. After the implosion of the Soviet Union, China seemed the most likely successor, and it did so in taking up that position, even in the absence of the necessary infrastructure for a global leader. Beijing has done this by gradually developing a certain type of world order already in existence, which appeared as an alternative to the American one. It is an exercise of coexistence in the sense that it targets a limited cooperation to avoid major conflicts which would jeopardize international order. This type of order is useful for China not to lose the current status of world power and not to fall into the position of secondary power rather than to rise continuously and to strengthen his position. Although it is facing many domestic and political challenges, Beijing considers extremely important to consume resources in this direction. See, Liselotte Odgaard, *China and Coexistence: Beijing's National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012, pp. 23-26.

¹³ Drones offer the advantage of a war without casualties blue force casualties, cyber war offers the advantage of a war without attribution, the space offers the advantage of achieving global effects on an orderly border. See, Christopher Chyba and J.D. Crouch, 'Understanding the US nuclear weapons policy debate', *Washington Quarterly* 32: 3, July 2009, pp. 21-36.

¹⁴ For example, in the case of Taiwan, China reserves the right to use force to counter what it considers to be a province of its own. However, Beijing has not implemented this threat; Instead, in the post-Cold War era it has adopted a pragmatic approach to political coordination and negotiations on the use of force against a state entity which was unlikely to be defended by US. China has supported the operations of Chapter VII in the case of Sudan, the UN and other international bodies have presented strong evidence of endangerment of international peace and security. At the same time, China has been able to limit the number and purpose of some punitive actions approved by the United Nations, consistently insisting to the government in Khartoum. China's involvement in activities in Sudan (building schools and a new presidential palace), as well as on the issue of import duty reductions contrasts with the U.S. preference for punitive measures and the desire to remove the Khartoum regime from the field of international relations. See, Su Qiang, "The Confrontation for Darfur 'Will lead us nowhere,'" *China Daily*, July 27, 2007, website www.chinadaily.com.cn/2008/2007-07/27/content_5445062.htm. (accessed at 3 December 2014).

¹⁵ See, Liselotte Odgaard, *China and Coexistence: Beijing's National Security Strategy for the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012, pp.29.

¹⁶ See Margarete Klein, "Russia: A Euro-Pacific Power? Goals, Strategies and Perspectives of Moscow's East

From a military point of view, the modernization of Eastern forces calls for equipping airplanes and opening new bases would be a solution to the limited capabilities of power projection of and to act as a stabilizing force.

Politically, Russia promotes a dual strategy, initially a strategic partnership with China which has altered the bilateral balance of power at the expense of Russia; China does not support Russia as an equal partner in East Asia. This position requires Russia to diversify its political relations.

Table no. 2. The situation of Russia's armed forces¹⁷

		Russia
Total military forces		Approx. 850,000 troops
Ground forces	Ground troops	Approx. 290,000 troops
	Tanks	T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 2,550 (Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 20,550 including mothballed tanks)
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 980 vessels Approx. 2,070,000 tons
	Aircraft carriers	1 vessel
	Cruisers	5 vessels
	Destroyers	15 vessels
	Frigates	29 vessels
	Submarines	63 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 20,000 troops
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 1,560 troops
	Modern Fighter aircraft	224 MiG-29 aircraft 10 Su-30 aircraft 160 MiG-31 aircraft 18 Su-33 aircraft 220 Su-25 aircraft 28 Su-34 aircraft 289 Su-27 aircraft 12 Su-35 aircraft (4th generation fighter aircraft: Total 961)
	Bombers	16 Tu-160 aircraft 62 Tu-95 aircraft 63 Tu-22M aircraft
Reference	Population	Approx. 142.50 million
	Term of service	1year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)

Notes: Source: The Military Balance 2014 and others.

The crisis in Ukraine has led to greater importance of East Asia for Russia, thus good relations with China, South Korea and Japan being crucial to counter the international isolation; the area is considered a "powerhouse of growth"¹⁸ but also a "vital center" of the world economy.¹⁹

Russia is watching more closely toward East than toward Europe in order to get to integration in the East Asian economic field, a strategy which provides both opportunities and risks.²⁰

Asia Policy," 8 September 2014 German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

¹⁷ See *Defence of Japan Digest 2014*, p. 39.

¹⁸ See Dmitry Medvedev, "Excerpts from Transcript on Meeting of the Far East's Socioeconomic Development and Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Region Countries", President of Russia, official website, July 2, 2010, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/547> (accessed at 9 December 2014).

¹⁹ See Sergey Lavrov, "Towards Peace, Stability and Sustainable Economic Development in the Asia Pacific Region", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, official website October 5, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/D19A0531B380362544257BFB00259BE. (accessed at 9 December 2014).

²⁰ See Natasha Kuhrt, "The Russian Far East in Russia's Asia Policy: Dual Integration or Double Periphery?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 64, no. 3 (2012) pp. 471–93.

Russia's regional ambitions in East Asia are not supported by the existence of a sphere of influence in the past and at the same time by the actual pressing interests; however, an independent position in the multipolar system of this space, on par with other positions of major powers, can be a sustainable objective especially in organizing international structures. Such a status would allow Russia to retain the status of superpower and also that of a major player which seems to become the most important in the 21st century.²¹

The security environment is dependent upon the relative equation between the power balances on different levels and upon the system of alliances and military coalitions, strategic stability being a dynamic process in the light of developments in the superpower arsenals that control such spaces.

Extended nuclear deterrence is based on nuclear capabilities, perceived by an opponent as being of such value that they are convinced that victory in a confrontation will not be on their side. It may be reported to certain limits of nuclear warheads through which the destruction of its military, civil and economic objectives are ensured by the power of destruction of the adversary and the qualities of the displacement ballistic vectors, as carriers of nuclear warheads exceed its countermeasure capabilities.




Figure no. 3. The radius of the impact of North Korea's ballistic missile²²

During the Cold War, the main emphasis was on deterrence as a way of de-escalation of crisis; during the second nuclear age, the strategic stability has a new approach through a combination of nuclear weapons and conventional long-range action weapons of great precision.²³

²¹ See Detlef Nolte, "How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics", *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 4 (2010) pp. 881–901.

²² See *Defence of Japan Digest 2014*, p. 7.

²³ It is not to be stated that deterrence does not play a role in the modern world. We need to think carefully about what this role is and what it can and cannot do for us, but we need to carefully think of the guarantee. Guarantee,




Figure no. 4. The geopolitical value of Okinawa Island²⁴

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²⁴ See *Defence of Japan Digest* 2014, p. 7.

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FROM GLOBAL AND TO REGIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Ion PANAIT,

Lecturer, PhD., "Lucian Blaga" University, Sibiu
nelutu.panait@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Economic conflicts and resource related - not always violent - though often with this potential, but directly threatening the prosperity of great power - looms on the horizon. It is considered that it takes several solutions regarding conflicting statements - that is, a mixture of at least two of the three dimensions - military, diplomatic and progress. Updating the concerns about the dangers of taking up new schools/ movements as natural and the possibility of the overestimation of accidental/non-essential events as having disproportionate consequences, requires both diplomats and the military to devote an important role to flexibility. It should also widen the palette of specific measures since threats and challenges will be many and all the elements of the national power are to be in close contact with the near future. "Do more with less" is a subtle phrase, but as a guide to policy it is too often used as a pretext to avoid prioritization.*

Key words: *United Nations, peace operations, "Offshore" Strategy*

The conflict is not going to go away, concerns to stop the conflicts so that they do not escalate in violence will be increasingly higher, particularly between and within states. There is a list of the sources of conflict including problems considered solved or even forgotten, which could increase in the years to come.¹ Interstate cooperation in the 20th and 21st centuries is marked by a proliferation in the number of organizations and international regimes, which adhere to both the rules and multilateral principles which are both similar and different as well. There are no two regions with the same culture of security or regional security system, and there are important differences in the way in which the threats to security are seen. Some regions of the world- Europe, for example, have developed a network of unbalanced regional organizations. In other regions, states have consciously avoided formal multilateralism. The lack of formal, regional and multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region has both a normative political explanation and an internal one.²

The role of the UN in crisis management

A growing number of supporters have wanted the UN to have a stronger role in directing and supporting the international community's humanitarian efforts; few of them have appreciated how complex and competitive will become the benevolent system within which UN should work. However, many have recognised that there could be an increase on the scale of the disaster and emergency situations, and they also said that more and more actors appear on the stage of humanitarian operations.

Indeed, this awareness has led to a situation in which the General Assembly has granted the U.N. in December 1991 an unprecedented leadership role to respond and coordinate humanitarian crises.³ The role of the UN in humanitarian action became known as

¹ The conflicts that raise certain concerns - the tension between Israel and Iran, generated by nuclear proliferation, the fighting between India and Pakistan, the rise of Beijing's power in the waters of South China, the war of secession in Ukraine.

² See, Christopher Hemmer, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism", *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002): pp. 575-607.

³ GA Resolution 46/182, "Strengthening the Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations".

the "fourth pillar" within the basic activities of the organization, a status that his sidelined predecessor has never touched.⁴

The United Nations was now seen as having a central and unique role in providing leadership and coordination of the international community's efforts to assist the countries affected by disaster, and was designated to ensure prompt and consistent delivery of assistance in ways consistent with humanitarian principles.

The initiative is supported by a separate department within the Secretariat of the United Nations - Humanitarian Services Department - led by an Undersecretary of State, who also holds the title of Coordinator of Emergency Support. The function of coordination was to be assisted by the Committee of the Inter-Agency Representative (IASC) comprising representatives of the International Red Cross movement, the major consortia of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and, of course, humanitarian organizations of the United Nations. The UN's humanitarian responsibility has been extended to crisis prevention, readiness and readiness of response and an Emergency Fund (CERF) was created in order to facilitate operations, which, in other circumstances, would have been shelved for lack of funds.

Conflict prevention at all levels - primarily in international security organizations - through an active and engaged diplomacy may avoid unnecessary slaughter of people and the inconsiderate defuse of precious resource, used for conflict rather than for economic and social development.⁵ Crisis and conflict prevention can take many forms at the same time. It is a long-term action; and nor does it simply start when they do not show the first signs of conflict, nor does it diminish after an interventionist reaction.

Intense diplomatic activity should be a constant and continuous approach of the international community for those countries at risk of being affected by crises and conflicts.

Conflict and crisis prevention requires the strengthening of the capacity of states to properly manage crises and conflicts within international standards of accountability, good governance, respect for human rights, and promoting economic development. It is easy for despot leaders to choose the easy way, reducing to silence the opposition, either by throwing in jail its members or by killing them, and on the contrary it is more difficult for them to give up the governance or make changes that do not lead to crimes against civilians. The ways of preventing crises and conflicts can have a wide range, "from the roots of the causes of conflict at the level of their political and economic dimensions to the directing of prevention efforts, including diplomatic, mediation and arbitration ways and in some cases in the form of sanctions."⁶

Reinventing the construction of peace operations

Large-scale operations for the construction of peace missions and peace-support operations must go through a fundamental reorganization. Part of this requires the acceptance

⁴ GA Resolution 2816 has created the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) - after two years of deliberations - in December 1971. United Nations agencies and programmes have described UNDRO coordination as being hard to accept and no matter how ambiguous they have designed the mandate so as it should meet the agency and the program issues, it lacked the ability to provide sufficient coordination and encouragement of leadership.

⁵ Plato observed that "only the dead have seen the end of the war". So we have to accept that the nature of the human condition is that, for the foreseeable future, we do not mention the aggressive impulses of humanity anymore. However, the inevitability of human conflict does not mean that we should abandon efforts to avoid it. Every successful situation refers to saving lives and future situation which are to be remembered. Even where violence cannot be avoided, the improvement and limitation efforts are worthwhile because they encourage minimizing human suffering and help to create a space so that the liberal democracy and the free initiative should take root and prosper. See, ICISS, p. 27.

⁶ During the last period, the world has experimented such a thing in the Arab world in countries such as Lybia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. See, Ian Clark, *China and the U.S.: a succession of hegemonies?*, in "International Affairs", vol. 87, no. 1, 2011, p. 96.

although somewhat unwelcome of certain harsh political realities that include the fact that public support for expanded wars is in collapse.⁷ The costs of an American soldier in Afghanistan for a period of one year have reached the impressive figures of 1.2 million dollars, the amount which is in strong contradiction with the substantial cutbacks regarding expenditures for defense.⁸ Furthermore, it is cheaper to deploy civilians in order to meet many of the requirements of building the nations, task that is currently carried out by the military; the use of the military is counterproductive⁹ and the leading of such missions seems a little disorganized.¹⁰ The involvement of a large number of experts (approx. 2000) is unjustified.¹¹

A coherent strategic vision deeply anchored in reality with genuine prospects of achieving it can be drawn up in an environment free of conflicts. From a historic point of view, the essential purpose of the state is to create the environment. The reasons to do this so frequently were - and it seems that they still are - to organize the means of violence on behalf of the state or of a group of states and to apply it whenever peace has been violated or threatened. In a perfect world, the individuals and the states that have the tendency to destroy peace will be prevented from doing this, because of the image they have in their mind of the conflict which, as a reason of logic, it would be an inefficient and costly means to settle disputes. But the security environment offers no warranties for such an environment.

The asymmetry of security is further exploited by certain states for their benefit, by promoting a variety of religious, ideological and cultural identity reasons and others in order to escalate a situation to crisis and subsequently to conflict because those prone to possess the power want to forcefully achieve their goals.

For various reasons, within the stabilisation scenarios of the most recent international crises, the arrangements for peace were voted but nothing was obtained except achieving some objectives for brief periods of stabilization.¹²

Formulating strategic objectives following the conclusion of crisis/conflict is impossible. The agreements are just moments of rest or a door to more favourable conditions for conflict resolution and reconciliation. We can hardly delienate realistic political vision and a way to follow when we have to face a destroyed economy, humanitarian catastrophes, socio-psychological aftermath of the conflict and an agreement within which the armed

⁷ See, ABC News/*Washington Post* Poll, April 5-8 2012, www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm. (accessed 10 December 2014).

⁸ See, R. Jeffrey Smith, *To Trim the Deficit, Americans Favor Much Deeper Reductions at the Pentagon than Their Leaders Do*, iWatch News, Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity, May 10, 2012, www.iwatchnews.org/2012/05/10/8856/pub-lic-overwhelmingly-supports-large-defense-spending-cuts. (accessed 11 December 2014).

⁹ See, Yochi Dreazen, *Afghanistan's Civilian Surge Comes with Enormous Price Tag and Uncertain Results*, in „The National Journal”, September 8, 2011, available on the website www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/afghanistan-s-civilian-surge-comes-with-enormous-price-tag-and-uncertain-results-20110908. (accessed 10 December 2014).

¹⁰ See, Nina M. Serafino, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towells, *Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2012, fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/183725.pdf. (accessed 10 December 2014).

¹¹ Cg. Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 12, 2012, www.fas.org/spp/crs/natsec/RL32862.pdf. (accessed 10 December 2014).

¹² For example, the Dayton Agreement could not have been signed if the issue about the status of Kosovo had not been excluded. The same applies to the Pretoria Agreement, which could not be fulfilled because none of the warring Congolese parties did not sincerely desire the establishment of a centralized state. In the case of the Petersburg Agreement the major conflict parties were excluded from the minute of the agreement and of the international reconstruction efforts. See R. Jeffrey Smith, *To Trim the Deficit, Americans Favor Much Deeper Reductions at the Pentagon than Their Leaders Do*, iWatch News, Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity, May 10, 2012, www.iwatchnews.org/2012/05/10/8856/pub-lic-overwhelmingly-supports-large-defense-spending-cuts. (accessed 12 December 2014).

factions are ready to regroup and are waiting for a spark to rekindle the fire.

For external actors is risky as they are exposed to long-term commitments, without clear terms of output, having difficulties in acting proactively and with the likelihood of political contractions. Building a vision without the political support of local actors becomes a task of major risks, difficult to assess within medium term. Continuous systemic assessment of the risk in order to bring corrections needed to ensure stabilization and reconstruction strategies if they don't have the political support on the part of local populations becomes arid and in term of strategy it does not provide the expected success.¹³

They seek to adapt the stabilization strategies without giving due consideration to the local population support, particularly with regard to the cultural and religious specificity, to identify the effects that could highlight the good results obtained, or which would increase the risks and vulnerabilities within the peace process. In this context, the use of simulation systems in order to anticipate the effects and the results could be useful. It is necessary the strategic guidance for civilian actors that encompasses a wide range of governmental and non-governmental, local and international organizations, civic groups and private businesses. All of them are employed in various sectors of activity such as humanitarian assistance, economic recovery, institutional construction, education, child protection, reconciliation.

The experiences of multinational operations within the past two decades showed the difficulties of peace-building operations in open-conflict-torn societies, in which the decision was taken not to use force only because it has proved to be successful in past situations, even if it could be applied to situations which are found to be legal and moral. The decision to use force in terms of its nature becomes particularly delicate, avoiding as far as possible the introduction of troops. Models for the future will probably be the intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s and in Libya in 2011, in which air strikes led to the avoidance of losses of the intervention forces.

The operations of peace-building describe the efforts to prevent, limit, control or resolve conflicts, especially the violent ones. It is based on the concept that conflicts are a normal part of human interaction and that they are rarely resolved or removed entirely, but they can be controlled.¹⁴ This concept can be applied not only to conflicts within states and accordingly to subunits, but also to conflicts among states or within them and therefore to alliances. The situation in Libya showed that leaders of middle scale power can be removed at distance, without even putting foot on the ground, using weapons launched from the sea or from the air with the heaviest load carried by partner nations- in the case of Libya, European allies and even some Arab states.¹⁵

The new developments of military art which can be applied to several possible conflicting scenarios seek to avoid the use of a large number of troops. Such types of operations are recommended to be used in counterterrorism operations directed towards key

¹³ As long as the conflicting parties cannot or will not make political visions for outsiders it is even harder, especially since they show no intention of assuming full responsibility. All these contradictions eventually lead to outline short-term objectives and the policy of the strategy has an upside-down approach, from the bottom to the top, with open ends. Because the structural conditions of international policy, this is understandable and up to a certain point is inevitable. See, Thomas X. Hammes, *Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy*, "Infinity Magazine", 2012, p.9, www.in-finityjournal.com/article/53/Offshore_Control_A_Proposed_Strategy. (accessed 10 December 2014).

¹⁴ Regarding Afghanistan, 78% of Americans are in favor of the withdrawal the troops, 66% believe that the war was not worth it to be waged. See, Snodderly, Dan, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Management and Peacebuilding Conflict*, Washington, DC: Academy for International Management and Peacebuilding Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, 2011, p. 15.

¹⁵ See, Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, *Seeing Limits to 'New' Kind of War in Libya*, in „New York Times”, October 21, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/africa/nato-war-in-libya-shows-united-states-was-vital-to-toppling-qaddafi.html. (accessed 15 December 2014).

enemy leaders through the use of drones and special operation forces.¹⁶ In Afghanistan, "the goal is not to build a state similar to U.S. "but rather" to destroy Al-Qaeda."¹⁷

With all these innovations we cannot give up using ground forces, but with few exceptions, the above-mentioned type of operation should be carried out by indigenous personnel. A well articulated strategy involves building of indigenous ground troops through intake of instructors and mentors from external intervenionists.¹⁸

"Offshore" Strategy

Another proposal, "External Control" (offshore) is meant to improve the benefits of the U.S. technique as a means of addressing to the challenge of security, with regard to China, without necessarily sending a large mass of U.S. troops on the territory of China.¹⁹

Humanitarian crises are caused not only by tyrants or regimes in autocratic states but also, to some extent, by the petty interests of the rest of the world.²⁰ "We have a responsibility to mitigate human rights violations produced by the schemes of existing international institutions [which include] the duty to redistribute the wealth to those who do not live too well because of the current arrangements."²¹ Some of the main causes of many conflicts refer to the control of natural resources: diamonds and other resources of Sierra Leone; gold, timber and minerals from Congo, coffee and cocoa from the Ivory Coast, and oil from Nigeria and Sudan.

Humanitarian crises can initially be divided into two types: those caused by a "systematic abuse of the most basic human rights by a cruel and repressive regime" and those caused by "the collapse of the central governmental authority which leads to a situation of anarchy which itself threatens those rights."²² Unfortunately, many of the humanitarian crises within recent years have been the direct result of an intentional misconduct committed by repressive governments.

We can notice that the United Nations - together with other actors belonging to humanitarian communities - are not sufficiently prepared to cope with disasters and

¹⁶ The involvement of drones in the attacks against Al-Qaeda leaders enjoy a high support from 85 percent of the general public. Not all situations relating to conflict management can be solved using drones or even with the help of special forces operative networks, like those that have eliminated Osama bin Laden. See, Scott Wilson and Jon Cohen, *Poll Finds Broad Support for Obama's Counterterrorism Policies*, in „Washington Post“, February 8, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-finds-broad-support-for-obamas-counterterrorism-policies/2012/02/07/gIQAfrSEyQ_story.html. (accessed 10 December 2014).

¹⁷ The transcript of President Barack Obama's speech from Bagram air base, Afghanistan, May 2, 2012, world-news.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/01/11492424-transcript-of-pres-ident-barack-obamas-speech-from-bagram-air-base-may-2?lite. (accessed 20 December 2014).

¹⁸ As it was done in Iraq and Afghanistan. See, Al-jazeera, *NATO Soldier Killed in Afghan Shooting*, May 6, 2012, www.aljazeera.com/news/sia/2012/05/201256131119330234.html. (accessed 20 December 2014).

¹⁹ See, Thomas X. Hammes, *Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy*, "Infinity Magazine", 2012, p.10, available on the website www.in-finityjournal.com/article/53/Offshore_Control_A_Proposed_Strategy. (accessed 10 December 2014).

²⁰ This is because "we are partly involved in the imposition of a global institutional scheme that leads to serious humanitarian crises through, for example, encouraging the system of privileges regarding resources which can lead to significant bloodied conflicts over selling natural resources." See, Michael Newman, "Revisiting the 'Responsibility to Protect,'" *Political Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (2009), p. 269.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

²² In these cases, it could be easier to generate public support for a humanitarian intervention, if the offensive government can be easily discredited- the Clinton Administration's attempt to associate Slobodan Milosevic's atrocities with Hitler atrocities was somewhat effective in generating public support for U.S. policy regarding Kosovo. The ability to clearly identify a guilty villain, without a doubt, will increase the likelihood of public support, but it can also create a post-intervention situation which would be more difficult if the villain were in power. Of course, even in anarchic situations, we will publicly try to identify the persons responsible for worsening the situation. (e.g. Farrah Aidid in Somalia). See, Garrett, S. A. 1999. *Doing good and doing well: An examination of humanitarian intervention*. Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 25-32.

emergency situations that occurred. Concerned by the criticism about existing rivalries within the inter-agency of its own system, the United Nations has become involved rather in the provision of internal harmony than in the development of the managerial and coordination role proposed by the General Assembly. For understandable but regrettable reasons, the UN was involved in a collision in which humanitarian response was confused with institutional survival - all of this in order to live another day.²³

When the intervention troops enter a country and interpose between the helpless civil population and a rebel group decided to commit robbery, to recognize a successful intervention becomes a simple task. But when conflict occurs or is averted because of preventative measures such as those already mentioned, it is not that clear.²⁴ However, exactly those measures against the current are extremely important to help prevent those four crimes within the issue of "responsibility to protect" (R2P): genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.

A variant would be that some states, societies and peoples should internalize the principles of "responsibility to protect" (R2P) within their own conceptions regarding the nature of the state and its obligations towards the population so that these crimes do not materialize.²⁵

The states would like to see that their money and their time are usefully spent and the results are worth the investment. While they worry about money and forces they are obliged to spend money on peacekeeping missions and are the least capable to observe where these expenses go. This is usually more difficult to achieve in terms of measures of prevention. This might not be so attractive to political theorists who would prefer to establish cause and effect as accurately as possible.²⁶ Regardless of what the army will try to do in order to have a good result, the host nation has its own objectives and its own ideas, and over time, as the military force's influence fades local imperatives predominate. Property rights of the host country are an essential principle in the doctrine of the United Nations and the military need to understand this concept. What builds the army will evolve over time into something else.²⁷

Primum non nocere is a Latin phrase that means "First of all, do no harm". This is one of the key principles of physicians and it should be taken into account when working with the military's contribution for the consolidation of peace. There is no standard approach, nor are there any formulas that can be applied in each and every situation. The military must try not only to understand the local conditions, but also their own institution and the effects produced

²³ These key organizations that could have predicted patterns of vulnerability and could have provided the appropriate answers in cases of disaster and emergency situations, have never seemed to be involved in a coherent and systematic strategic thinking. Those few humanitarian organisations which dared to make speculations about the future have been institutionally isolated. The advocacy needed to ensure equality among beneficiaries has often seemed to be subordinated to the operational need to respond to the problems of donors. The voices of the United Nations and of the Coordinator of Emergency Assistance were rarely heard during the donor community to provide humanitarian assistance in a more equitable, more consistently and more predictable manner. See, Garrett, S. A. 1999. *Doing good and doing well: An examination of humanitarian intervention*, Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 40.

²⁴ "As we move forward in terms of structural prevention, the more difficult is to demonstrate the impact of R2P." See, Snodderly, Dan, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding*, Washington, DC: Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace, 2011, p. 352.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ Everyone, including the states and their governments, should realize that "our first goal must be to prevent such appalling crimes, and not to prove the profitability of R2P, as frustrating as this would be." *Ibidem*.

²⁷ The UN doctrine states in the section "Peacemaking Activities" that conducting a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation under the United Nations can help to stop the violence on the short term; it is unlikely to lead to a lasting peace without being accompanied by programs designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict. See, DPKO, *Peacekeeping operations of the United Nations: Principles and Guidelines*, New York: United Nations, Department of Field Support, 2008, p. 25.

for the environment. Much attention should be paid to the consequences of undesirable actions that can affect power relations, social dynamics and even the devising of policies in capitals. This concept should be taken into account when referring to doctrine, planning and training of military forces and they will require an adjustment. This approach "do not do harm" should be also in collaboration with the host nation, so that, in the end, the host nation will have the right of ownership, with the ability to deal with the factors of instability.²⁸

Learned lessons

We consider that the selective involvement of force, which involves light ground foreign capabilities for conflict management, may gain time in order to make the nonmilitary process operate only if a major effort is made so that a new generation of economic, military and political leaders with sophisticated views about the damaging effects of corruption should arise.²⁹

Although there were sustained and consistent efforts to promote the universality of the principles and values of humanitarian assistance, they are perceived as uncertain and ambiguous. 'The client' affected by disaster and emergency situations is too often sacrificed at the expense of the other 'customer', the donor. The voice of the good Samaritan remains humble and uncertain about the consequences of granting aid. The evolution of humanitarianism is now marked by a sense of malaise. While much work has continuously been carried out under its aegis, humanitarianism is becoming increasingly adrift.

In an era in which the complexity and the rapid change create the need for greater transparency and for a more important responsibility, the future of effective humanitarian action will also require greater transparency and responsibility. To that extent, humanitarianism needs a "classification of standards" of principles, norms and standards that can guide the efforts of a wider humanitarian community for the long-term strategy, as well as for the immediate response.

There are some organizations in the humanitarian community seen as being well placed to take on the role of a humanitarian system dependant on the United Nations. In order to fulfil this role they have the prestige and the ability to provide relief worldwide; the key issue is the extent to which the United Nations would be willing to make the difficult transition that they will be required to take on.

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²⁸ In American specialized literature, the importance is given to the U.N. peacekeeping operations and to other operations; they argue that they would have a greater success if they were better funded and supported. The way of how the world will evaluate this, considering that US military power is perceived as compromised, gets to the dangerous likelihood that opportunistic nations should destabilize the world if they begin to have the impression that US military power is weakened. Some powers from around the globe might enjoy this situation, but unfortunately, many of them are not necessarily fond of peace. See, Micha Zenko and Michael A. Cohen, *A Clear and Present Safety*, in „Foreign Affairs”, March/April 2012, p. 79.

²⁹ See, John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, *The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy*, Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, April 30, 2012, www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-ethics-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy. (accessed 10 December 2014).

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NEW MILITARY SPATIAL PLANNING TRENDS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND GLOBALIZATION

Sorina-Georgiana RUSU,

Urban planner PhD., Teaching Assistant, “ION MINCU” University of Architecture and Urban Planning; Military Science PhD. Student, “CAROL I”, National Defense University, rususorina2004@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Smart cities are facing increased spatial complexity and functional fuzziness of their institutional and managerial systems. Additional to technologies emergence, civil and military challenges occurred in knowledge use of urban environment transformation. We are living in a both tangible and intangible global space where we can create different types of networks and events that can happen simultaneously or with various speed. Military operations on urbanized terrain imply rapid building of command-control elements and immediate adequate answer to crisis-situations through the implication of different force categories in complex actions. An intelligent planning system should focus both on reliable data required and on know-how, using them in forecasting scenarios for a real-time effective spatial exploitation to defeat an enemy mixed in within civilians. This paper invites reflecting on spatial planning system, ensuring the citizen and community security and underpinning respond to both civil and military cities demands of resilience and sustainable development.*

Key words: smart city, military planning, urban security, military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT), resilience, fuzzy responsibilities

Primary Assumptions

Within urban area, the military spatial planning system should concentrate on the quantity and quality of the necessary and available information, as well as on the knowledge and ability of using them, for elaborating the scenarios for real time forecast, for defeating the enemy hidden within a civil community. Concerning what was already mentioned, the continuous civil-military cooperation is essential within the cities' operating and sustainable development and for being able to respond to the present and future security problems.

How did the globalization and revolution military affairs influence the spatial planning system? What is the relationship between the civil spatial planning and the military one within the urban area?

By the present article, I intend to emphasize some trends within the military spatial planning of the *smart city*¹, in the context where our relationship with the spatial, time and knowing related principles have substantially changed in the last decades.

Developments in spatial planning

Defending the cities was a continuous concern within time, the planning² of spatial resources gaining substance along with generating and formalizing the system of knowledge of that age. If within the Renaissance, the presence of fortified walls and citadel's strongholds represented a pledge for providing the security, with the existing fire arms, today, considering

¹ “The concept of [smart city] is not a static one: there is no consensus or a general accepted definition of the intelligent city, which rather expresses a process or a series of phases, through which the cities become more “livable” and resilience, and consequently, capable to a faster respond to new challenges.” (British Government: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013)

² „Planning is a formalized procedure for producing an articulated result, as an integrated system of decisions.”, Mintzberg, Henry, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, Prentice Hall International, UK, 1994, p.12

the globalization³ and revolution of military (RMA)⁴ effects, as well as the ones of these factors' influence on cities' evolution, such a physical boundary becomes irrelevant.

Globalization generated significantly changes within the relationship systems, within the flows, the connections, the interdependences between communities and the individual, through their enhancement of interaction capacities. At the same time, by changing the military doctrine, implementing the big scientific discoveries, along with using of new weapons and technologies in the fight area, RMA substantially influenced the way of carrying wars and led to dissemination of the new technologies in military, as well as in the civil area.

Spatial planning is being realized today, in the context of rapid urbanization and a global competition for natural and artificial resources. Getting to know certain events made us think that a constant perception upon present could allow us to rebuild the past and forecast the future. But the comparative analysis and intuition are not able to answer to the necessity to grasp a pattern for extremely various categories of problems, where the subject could be confounded with the object of the analysis and the cause-effect relationships could convert from unidirectional to circular relationships. In response to those mentioned, the alternative scenarios⁵ concerning the representation of cities' evolution and the capacity of providing the security, we find that, unconcerned by the followed way, within the sequence of stages, in the planning phases, the time self-reference becomes inevitable.

Transformation of human relationship with space and time

The consequence of this mechanism reflects upon elaborating the decisions and their transposal in space. Taking the decision inevitable influences the real event which is going to happen, as well as the forecast result for possible future events. Therefore, "we cannot ask relative time questions on time, but within time itself"⁶

Speeding up the interconnections, by way of virtual space, eases and increases the speed for exchanging the knowledge between individuals. But, to be able to get an image as accurate as it could be, it is necessary that our relationship with the real physical space to be modified by new technologies.⁷

³ "A process which includes the causes, the course and the consequences of the transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities" Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan and Gerard Stoudmann, *Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition*, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2006, p. 5, accessed 08.01.2015 on <http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/Globalisation/index.htm>

⁴ "[...] the essence of a revolution of military affairs (there were many such revolutions along human history) consists in the impact of one or many revolutionary technologies and of some adequate doctrines to highlight these technologies within their optimum parameters, upon the fight field and upon the war's physiognomy on the whole, when these new scientific discoveries are used in war.", Frunzeti, Teodor, *Solutionarea crizelor ingernationale*, Ed. Institutul European, Iași, 2006, p. 90.

⁵ "The classic Newton-Gallileo science was defined by its predictable capacity. The successes got in mechanic, astronomy and in some other chapters of nature science, where the investigated phenomena were expressed by differential simple equations, lead the impression that science can unlimitedly expand its classic route observation-hypothesis-experiment-generalisation-theory-laws and, basing on the latter ones, can forecast the phenomenon evolution. [...] Slowly, the traditional science route got into crisis. Observation and experiment could not anymore be able to develop, the difference subject-object didn't work any longer, nor the cause-effect relationship, and the induction processes rather became circular than unidirectional. [...] Instead of laws and theories, here there are elaborated the cognitive patterns which have the statute of hypothesis and which deepen the investigated phenomenon, but sometimes, this phenomenon is generated even by the proposed pattern.", Marcus, Solomon, *Paradigme Universale*, Ed. Paralela 45, Pitești, 2011, p. 344.

⁶ Marcus, Solomon, *Paradigme Universale*, Ed. Paralela 45, Pitești, 2011, p. 345.

⁷ "Sensorial wireless networks (or *sensornets*) represent a new computing platform which combines the calculation, detection and communication with a physical environment, like birds' habitat, bridges or electrical network. This new network incorporated class of computers requires new software patterns, theories and management instruments. They change the way we ruminate the calculation and it represents a challenge in designing the last generation Internet, which not only connects people within, but also connects people with the

Returning to the issue of space, we consider that the two-way influence real-virtual space generated new types of relationships with global repercussions and interdependencies. The interest in spatial planning started to manifest itself in an increasingly prominent way, once with the need to establish priorities regarding the process in which occurs “the change of the activities distribution in space and of the links between them by converting the usage forms of lands and properties.”⁸

The quantitative problems of cities, are doubled by the qualitative ones. Paradoxically, the more information we get that contributes to the representation of increasingly comprehensive urban space, the more important becomes the issue of accuracy, quality and processing of the data obtained. These things can cause discontinuities in planning, with effects on the possibilities of foreseeing the evolution of the city. In practice, the systems integration, to achieve a synergistic effect, is very difficult to achieve if there is no perfect integrated information network.

Expanding the knowledge space

The increasingly detailed knowledge of real space through new technological tools, led to the creation of databases that store information gathered from the physical environment. Opening the databases to the public use involves, besides the possibility of knowledge and depth of reality as it has not been done so far, risks and vulnerabilities related to the use of data for purposes that could create new types of conflicts. The increasingly precise knowledge of the physical space reality generated, paradoxically, measures that contributed to the worsening of quantitative and qualitative problems in urban development. The systemic balance and stability are more and more difficult to achieve, due to interdependencies increasingly higher between physical and virtual space and the trends affecting both spheres of knowledge.

Individual and community

In the context of armed conflict, they may have at the same time effects both in terms of virtual space and consequences in real space, and vice versa, we consider necessary the referral distinction between individual psychology and the psychology of crowds. The appearance of specific sets of characteristics is determined by various causes⁹, conditioning the crowd to be lower in terms of intellectual aspect to the isolated individual. But, in terms of feelings and the way it is suggested, it may be better or worse. In this regard, “the concept of crowd is quantitative and visually.”¹⁰ Today, urbanization and the congestion phenomenon generate the “plenitude” of the real physical space, simultaneously with an overflow and an increased ability to interact in cyberspace. At the same time, the conflict gets various forms and “tends to be dysfunctional in a social structure where tolerance and institutionalization of conflict does not exist or it is not sufficient.”¹¹ Basically, referring to the social structure in the virtual environment, there is no institutionalization of conflict, a normalization, by

physical environment.”, Zhao, Feng, *Technical perspective. The physical side of computing*, Communications of A.C.M., vol.51, No.7, p. 98.

⁸ EC, *The Eu Compendium of spatial planning systems and policies*, 1997, p. 24.

⁹ „The first is that the individual from a crowd gets simply due to the number, the feeling of *invincible power* which allows him to give up some instincts which, being isolated, would have to restrain them. [...] A second cause which also determines the crowds’ manifestation of some specific characteristics and determines also their orientation is the *mental contagion*. [...] A third cause, and by far the most important, causes in the individuals in a crowd, characteristics, often completely opposed to the single individual. It’s the *suggestibility*, whose effect is, moreover, the contagion mentioned above.”, Gustave, Le Bone, *Psihologia mulțimilor*, trad. O. Vlad; Ghițoc M. Ed. Anima, Bucharest, 1937 pp. 15,16.

¹⁰ José Ortega y Gasset, *Revolta maselor*, trad. L. Coman, Ed. Humanitas, București, 1994, p. 43.

¹¹ Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, The Free Press, New York, 1956, p. 157.

connecting at a national and international law, in order to ensure functionality and produce beneficial effects in these systems. May this one be one of the challenges of *smart cities*?

Smart City Concept

“Evoking the concept of intelligence attributed to a common understanding just to the human being can confuse, and therefore requires a clarification of terms.”¹² Because there are many types of intelligence, we believe that in order to make sense, the concept of *smart city* should be reported to the capability of detection, understanding and solving the problems, for the three levels of organization: material, of the living structures (non-verbalized) and the one of socio-human (verbalized). Thus, the dependence of real physical space - virtual space creates the ability to see the connection between the elements of some situations (inter-leger), and to locate and communicate the solution correlated with these ratios through IT technologies. Although difficult to be done, this manifestation in the physical plan, of the real- virtual space connection, can give consistency to the *smart city* concept (*Figure No.1*) and can produce operationalization, getting it out from the paradigm of ideal or utopian city of the Renaissance.




Figure no. 1. Conceptualization¹³ of urbanized confrontation environment in smart city¹⁴.

In this regard, we expect that not only the way of exploration and understanding of the urban space reality should be changed, but also the cooperation within the decision makers of civil and military environment. On the one hand, to ensure a synergistic cooperation, it takes a clusterization¹⁵ of interested groups on urban security issues, together with the use of fuzzy logic¹⁶ in control systems implementation, in the absence of some total information of reality.

¹² D.C. Dulcan, *Inteligența materiei*, Ediția a III-a, Ed. Eikon, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, pp. 191, 192

¹³ dividing real physical space: the intelligence classification on levels – Acc.to D.C. Dulcan, „*Intelligence Material*”

¹⁴ Source: the author

¹⁵ „Clusters are geographic concentrations of institutions and companies in a particular field, linked. The clusters contain a group of related industries and other entities important in terms of competition. These include, for example, suppliers of specialized inputs such as components, machinery and services, and providers of specialized infrastructure. Often, clusters extend downstream to various distribution channels and customers and

Therefore, going into operational and tactical level, military intervention in urban areas is becoming more present by the two relevant factors: RMA and actual trends of globalization. In this context, military spatial planning in such areas will have to take account of the determinant factors in influencing the conduct operations in urban areas. The trend of the military operations to take place in cities is increasing because of the pressure exercised by the urbanization and environmental degradation consequences.

The urban environment confrontation dynamic

*“The present environment confrontation and the one of the future are characterized, among others, by: frequent and often sudden changes of the situation; rapidly conducting events; unprecedented increase in the number of factors influencing the military actions; increase the number of direct and especially indirect “actors”, participating in the preparation and conduct of military actions; extraordinary expansion of the confrontational environment etc.”*¹⁷ In this context, planning plays a key role in balancing the interests of civil and military confrontations with reference to the confrontations in all spatial dimensions of the confrontation environment.

There are both similarities and differences in the problem of the spatial coordination and integration of civil and military interests, in an increasingly urbanized environment¹⁸ (UN, World Urbanization Prospects, 2014). Civilian and military planners analyze in a different way the urban areas. The military think that cities are needed to develop decisive operations, while the civilian population hates fighting in cities because of the destruction and loss of life.

Contemporary and future outbreaks of violence come from within major cities. Recent armed conflicts¹⁹ feed the cyberspace, creating chain reactions and increasing the tension and uncertainty of the communities worldwide. Moreover, while the Ukrainian conflict is difficult to stop²⁰, the terrorist attacks in urban areas generate patterns of attack, with the religious beliefs mobile. In this context, the moving threats lead to increasingly difficult decisions to be made. The trajectories of the moving enemies, generate a growing interest for mobility and continuous surveillance of urban space.

laterally to manufacturers of complementary products and related industries through qualifications, technologies or common inputs. Finally, some clusters include governmental and of other type institutions - such as universities, standards agencies, think tanks, professional training providers and employers - that provides specialized training, education, information, research and technical support. "(M. Porter, 1998)

¹⁶ Lotfi A. Zadeh, *Fuzzy logic and its application to approximate reasoning*, In: *Information Processing 74*, Proc. IFIP Congr. 1974 (3), pp. 591–594.

¹⁷ Mihail Orzeacă, *Războiul continuu*, Ed. Militară, București, 2011, p. 59.

¹⁸ The world population living in urban areas has grown rapidly, from 746 million in 1950 to 3.9 billion in 2014. [...] Continuing the trends of population growth and urbanization, it is expected that by 2050, 2.5 billion people will be added to the current population living in urban areas, accessed 01.07.2015 on <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf>

¹⁹ 1) The war in Ukraine, accessed 15.02.2015 on <http://www.evz.ro/criza-din-ucraina-forte-guvernamentale-si-civili-ucisi-in-lupta-presedintele-porosenko-anunta-ca-acordul-de-pace-este-in-pericol.html>

2) The terrorist attacks in Paris, Charlie Hebdo, accessed 15.02.2015 on http://www.realitatea.net/filmul-complet-al-atentatelor-teroriste-din-franta-incepand-cu-momentul-atacului-la-charlie-hebdo_1606599.html

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²⁰ As foreseen by the Minsk Agreement, the peace truce for Ukraine was violated, the military operations continuing to be conducted in Ukrainian cities, accessed 15.02.2015 on <http://www.ziuanews.ro/revista-presei/iluzia-procesului-de-pace-din-estul-ucrainei-a-inut-pu-in-pre-edintele-poro-enko-denun-a-continuarea-ac-iunilor-militare-proruse-157921>

Military operations on urban terrain

Military operations on urban terrain (MOUT)²¹ are difficult and consumer of multiple resource. The report of the quantitative and qualitative elements of cities (relief, geography, population, economy, power, databases, etc.) influenced the manner of carrying the fight in urban areas. For the purposes of the above, the constraints can be, depending on the tier to which we refer: internal and international regulations, political and military goals set according to the dynamics of conflicts, various missions of civilian and military entities, real space dynamics in relation to cyberspace, pressures and attitudes of civil society etc.

If at the strategic level, it tends to promote the *smart power*²², which indicates a reinterpretation and a trying to applicate some old known principles,²³ the reality at tactic level has changed a lot, predicting that in the near future it will be unlikely to respect the recommendation „attack the cities only when you have no other choice.”²⁴ So, the call to the solution of military operation in urban areas will require rethinking the urban spatial planning, the location of military objectives and critical infrastructure within cities and also increasing the possibilities of extending the research and monitoring means for obtaining continuous visibility of the battlefield and control the actions space.

Future challenges

In a paradoxical way, the *vicious effects of globalization*²⁵ lead us periodically to take similar measures²⁶ to counter the security challenges,²⁷ but with other technical means made available by RMA contribution. We believe that future challenges will focus on several directions such as:

- new ways and opportunities for concealment / masking military targets in the civilian environment;
- trying to institutionalize the virtual space ;
- appearance of mobile threats arising from the dissemination of information and the open access of civilians to the different types of databases;
- trying sustainable development of cities in relation to resilience to natural and anthropic hazards;

²¹ „The acronym MOUT (Military Operation on Urbanized Terrain – Military operations in urban terrain) describes those military actions planned and conducted in a complex field where artificial constructions (man-made) have a great impact on the reach tactical command options.”, FM 90-10. *MOUT*, p. 1.

²² „We must use what has been referred to as *smart power* - the full range of tools at our disposal - diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural – from which to choose the right tool or combination of tools appropriate to each situation. „ (Clinton, H., 2009), accessed 10.02.2015 on <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/clintons-confirmation-opening-statement/>

²³ See some principles of war developed by Sun Tzu in the VI century BC

²⁴ Sun Tzu, *Artă Războiului*, Ed. Antet, București, 1996, p.23

²⁵ Teodor Frunzeti, *Globalizarea securității*, Ed. Militară, București, 2006, p. 27.

²⁶ “The exercise of discipline entails a device to coerce by the simple game of sight; an apparatus, in which the techniques that make it possible, induce effects of power and on the other hand the coercive means make them perfectly visible on those to which they apply. During the classical era we are witnessing the slow building of these „observatories” of the human multiplicity to whom the history of science gave too little attention. Along with the great technology of telescopes, lenses and light beams, which coincided with the founding of the new physics and the new cosmology, there were also small techniques of multiple and cross surveillance forms, of the glances that must see without being seen; an obscure art of light and visible prepared in an undertone a new human knowledge, through some subjugation techniques and their methods of use. These „observatories” have an almost ideal model: the military camp.”, Michel Foucault, *A supraveghea și a pedepsi*, trans. Bogdan Ghiu, Ed. Paralela 45, Pitești, 2005, p. 220.

²⁷ The concept of *panopticon* proposed by Jeremy Bentham Panopticon in the eighteenth century played a very important role in the way of thinking of observation and surveillance. According to it, the panopticon represented „a new way of obtaining the power of mind over mind, in an amount that up to now is unprecedented.”

- problems of differences between individual and collective intelligence;
- emphasizing the migration of virtual population and economic capital;
- conflicts between spatial planning and decision-making processes and self-organization processes existing in the natural environment;
- emphasis on security dilemma of the spatial physical resource in relation to the projected information in virtual databases and their management issues through IT;
- proliferation with amazing speed and use in the civil environment, of some discoveries such as 3D printer²⁸, that allows fast prototyping of some objects or even machines²⁹ available to a plurality of users;
- miniaturization of new weapons, with the help of nanotechnologies and their highly refined disguising;
- spatial extent of clashes in urban areas by enhancing the dispersion of frontline in depth and height of the actions in the detriment of continuous battle front, specifically to the classical wars.

Conclusions

After studying the phenomena reported, we believe that military spatial planning will undergo substantial changes in terms of the need to meet the challenges that changing the concept of violence and the masked violence, are assumed in an urban environment. The development of double use technologies (civilian and military) leads to a dangerous simultaneity of using the tools and means of warfare by civilian and military.³⁰

Moreover, the globalization of information and RMA provided an opportunity for individuals and communities that are in various stages of development to be able to use the tools characteristic of the third wave³¹ depending on ideological, religious beliefs, and on the educational level and the characteristics of crowds - *invincible power, mental contagion and suggestibility* - virtual communities ability to use new tools and their actual use may create a threat to the cybersecurity, and to the security of real physical environment.

Thus, under these conditions, the spatial military planning system becomes dependent on quantitative and qualitative knowledge of the information from urban environment, necessary to defeat the concealed enemy in civil environment. The civil-military cooperation of specialists in the field of spatial planning is inevitable in view of avoiding duplication of processes common interest in ensuring the security of citizens and the community in *smart cities*.

²⁸ A simple question may be related to the possibility of creating non-lethal or even fatal weapons, with this new technology. Comment: author, accessed 10.02.2015 on <http://www.descopera.ro/lumea-digitala/9208385-imprimanta-3d-tehnologia-ce-va-aduce-cea-de-a-doua-revolutie-industriala>

²⁹ The scenario of creating a fighting machine in a very short time, it is far from becoming true. Given the short time of achievement (44 hours) which is intended to be reduced to 24 hours, remains to be seen what kind of materials allows the possibility to generate some safe and efficient fighting machines. Comment: author, Also, accessed 02.10.2015 <http://www.capital.ro/prima-masina-realizata-la-imprimanta-3d-prezentata-la-detroit.html>

³⁰ "There is a theory which argues that information technology allows the war not to be worn only by soldiers, and also by hundreds of millions of citizens who join them, perhaps many sympathizers from other countries. Together they could use laptops - sharing the neutralized capacity to create supercomputers - to assault the enemy vital infrastructure, including financial networks and other civilian targets. [...] As some authors have written, it would be a new shocking version of "popular war" in Mao's vision.", Alvin Toffler, Heidi Toffler, *Avuția în mișcare*, trad. A. Nastase; N. Nastase, Ed. Header, 2006, p. 294.

³¹ „Looking at the today staggering changes from a historical perspective, I called the agricultural revolution that began ten thousand years ago, "the first wave" of historical change. The Industrial Revolution that forced the factory chimneys civilization around the world, I named it „the second wave”. Today rapid and massive changes are perceived as „the third wave” which creates a whole new civilization based on high technology, information and new ways of organizing economic activities.”, Alvin Toffler, *Corporația adaptabilă*, trad. Robert Adam, Ed. Header, p. 25.

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THE RESECURITIZATION OF ETHNIC RELATIONS? NEOLIBERALISM AND THE RETREAT OF MULTICULTURALISM

Lucian-Stefan DUMITRESCU,

Post-doctoral researcher, “CAROL I”, National Defense University,
Researcher, Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations,
The Romanian Academy
dulust@gmail.com

Abstract: *Whereas in most Western states ethnic relations were subjected to desecuritization at the end of the Cold War era, in the former communist countries relations between states and national minorities continued to be a matter of national security due to some structural factors, such as low-capacity states, social memory, neighbouring kin-states etc. I argue that once neoliberalism started thinning down the usual politics of recognition, the integration or assimilation process of minorities began to be less and less effective. Under such circumstances, ethnic relations have been once again subject to resecuritization. My contribution forays into multiculturalist policies employed by Germany and Netherlands in an attempt to find out if the resecuritization of ethnic relation really happened in the abovementioned countries. I also bring to the fore the case of Romania in order to find out which are the limits of the desecuritization of ethnic relations in a country endowed with a low-capacity state.*

Key words: *neoliberalism, welfare state, politics of redistribution, politics of recognition, multiculturalism, resecuritization*

Geopolitics of multiculturalism

By using this specific trope, namely the “geopolitics of multiculturalism,” Will Kymlicka explores the ideological turn of the liberal discourse from orthodox liberalism to pluralist liberalism in the early ’70s. According to Kymlicka, the propaganda apparatus of the USSR successfully projected a terrifying image of the United States both in the socialist and capitalis states by drawing massively on the political mistreatment of the African-Americans. Kymlicka claims that Allies had agreed to build the post-war international order on the principal of racial equality before the Holocaust was widely know. “And one important reason why the Allies agreed to this principle was precisely to help ensure that they would win the war”¹. Nevertheless, Kymlicka adds, there was no mention about racial equality in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, a document signed by the British and Americans. One year later, when the Singapore fell to the Japonese, the British were shocked for the locals refused to fight for the Great Britain. And they were shocked precisely becaue at the basis of their mind frame lay the principle of racial inequality. Moreover, the Japonese, that were impelled by the same principle of racial superiority as the British were, promised the local population more autonomy and self-government. According to Kymlicka, the United States pressed both the Great Britain and France to make promises to India, China and Vietnam in order to obtain the cooperation (or neutrality in the worst case scenario) of the local population at a time when the Axis powers tried to politically outbid the Allies. Once WWII came to an end, the American government failed to keep the promise of racial equality towards its African American citizens, many of whom had relatives who fell in the war fighting for a more democratic United States. As I’ve stated earlier, the Soviet propaganda drew massively on the

¹ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odyseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 113.

political mistreatment of African Americans. According to the reports made by several American embassies, Asian people were particularly sensitive on the issue of racial discrimination. But whilst people who found themselves at the basis of social ladder experienced rather indirectly the mistreatment of African Americans, thanks to the Soviet propaganda, political elites from different Asian or African states witnessed it directly. African or Asian delegates to the United Nations were compelled to use restaurants and washrooms organized in a segregated manner. After such a humiliating experience, there is no need to say more about the image these Asian and African diplomats kept in their mind with respect to the United States when they returned home. Under such circumstances, in the face of a relentless Soviet propaganda, the issue of human rights and racial equality seemed to be the key that the United States needed to win the Cold War. Consequently, the main drive for solving the question of human rights and racial inequality was rather a geopolitical one than a humanitarian one. “But it’s worth noting that the initial push within the federal government for desegregation came from the Executive branch, and the State Department in particular, rather from either the judiciary or the legislature. (...) Without this foreign policy-inspired push from the Executive, it’s not clear whether, or when, the moral logic of desegregation would have been accepted by either the white majority among the public at large or the courts”².

Securitization and Desecuritization of Ethnic Relations

Kymlicka believes that national minorities continue to be a question of national security in those states that are insecure in geopolitical terms. To be insecure in geopolitical terms has many different meanings, but the one that Kymlicka brings to the fore is fear of “neighbouring enemies”. To be more precise, “neighbouring enemies” refers to kin-states that have ethno-cultural groups of their own on the national territory of other states due to geopolitical reasons, such as Peace Treaties that concluded a major war. In most cases, these ethno-cultural groups have been subjected to a citizenization process driven by the language, myths, symbols and rituals of the dominant ethnicity. As a consequence of such a nation-building process, negative feelings or even cultural traumas towards the *nationalizing state* might have occurred among members of the ethno-cultural group that happens to have a kin-state or a *homeland nation* nearby³. To make matters even worse, political elites of the nationalizing states share feeling of distrust towards national minorities that have kin-states nearby, and consider that these national minorities could act as a “fifth column” for a neighbouring state. Under such circumstances, national minorities continue to be a issue of national security. Whereas in Eastern and Central European States national minorities are still securitized, in Western democracies it is inconceivable to think of a national minority as a potential collaborator of a neighbouring enemy. “Quebec nationalists may want to secede from Canada, but an independent Quebec would be an ally of Canada, not an enemy and would cooperate together with Canada in NATO and other Western defence and security arrangements. Similarly, an independent Scotland would be an ally, not an enemy of England; an independent Catalonia would be an ally of Spain, and so on”⁴. But Kymlicka’s characterization of some consolidated Western democracies doesn’t suit many different cases in the ex-Soviet space. I turn later on to this debate, but for the moment it is worth noting the Armenian minority in Georgia asks for Russian support. The Russian minority in Ukraine also

² Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 117.

³ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

⁴ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 119.

seeks Russian support, not to mention the Abkhaz who, backed by Russian military assistance, managed to detach from Georgia an important territory. The “false consciousness” of Kymlicka is pretty obvious. There is little doubt that the national minorities in the ex-Soviet space would have preferred to be endowed with Kymlicka’s mind frame, but it takes certain structural conditions and a high-capacity state in order to forge a democratic doxa, something that Kymlicka fails to take into consideration.

Kymlicka argues that ethnic politics have been almost desecuritized in Western countries. Obviously, there are some structural conditions that allowed the high-capacity states of Western Europe to desecuritize ethnic politics. Unlike their Eastern counterparts, Western states have had a long institutional tradition. Whereas most of Central and Eastern European states emerged in the 19th century, most Western states have had a long imperial tradition which created a consistent bureaucratic experience. On the contrary, being dominated by imperial power centers, most of the East European States lacked such a bureaucratic experience and did not have the opportunity to develop a strong infrastructural capacity, which was of pivotal importance for forging a national consciousness, and, consequently, for stabilizing political identities in modern times. Barry Buzan claims that strong states are the ones that have been able to create a general consensus among their citizens⁵. He stresses the capacity of states to legitimize themselves as the most important ingredient of political security. Thus, a state is politically legitimate when it has already created a general consensus among its citizens. A strong polity emerges, contends Dominique Schnapper, when nationality becomes an almost transcendental reality that unites citizens irrespective of their religious, ethnic and social backgrounds⁶. Most Eastern European states have never been able to forge a strong polity mainly because they lacked a strong infrastructural capacity as the most important instrument for forging a nation-state. And this is where it lies the most important difference between high-capacity states and low-capacity ones, namely in their ability to create consensus and stabilize identities. In other words, in their ability to forge political security.

Urszula Doroszewska tackles Kymlicka’s argument about Central and East European states. The Canadian political philosopher argued that lack of political will is what these states don’t have in order to implement a more democratic political frame for their national minorities. Doroszewska backs my argument that Eastern states, as low-capacity states endowed with weak infrastructural capacity and as producer of low levels of trust towards public institutions, have always had problem when it comes to stabilizing identities. But whilst my concern is especially with Eastern European states, the ones that are now EU and NATO members, Doroszewska examines those states that emerged in the ex-Soviet republics after the collapse of the USSR. Her assesment of the political contour of these states is pretty harsh and it runs contrary to Kymlicka’s perspective. “One does not have to be a learned Sovietologist to see that most post-Soviet states are controlled by organized crime groups who have succeeded in privatizing national economies and whose direct interest in governance rarely goes beyond the taxation system and foreign trade. (...) Ruling elites show little interest in other aspects of social life such as education, health care, and minority issues unless minorities are seen as a security threat”⁷. It is pretty obvious that under such

⁵ Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, statele și frica. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după Războiul Rece*, Chișinău: Cartier, 2005.

⁶ Dominique Schnapper, *Community of Citizens. On the Modern Idea of Nationality*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1998.

⁷ Urszula Doroszewska, “Rethinking the State, Minority, and National Security,” in *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe*, ed. Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

circumstances, the issue of national minority's desecuritization has not made it yet onto the political agenda.

Unlike the low-capacity states that emerged from the ruins of USSR, the consolidated Western democracies succeeded in implementing multicultural policies due to five structural conditions, namely increasing rights-consciousness, demographic changes, multiple access points for political mobilization, consensus on human rights, and the desecuritization of ethnic relations. On a closer examination, it is pretty obvious that many of the structural conditions that transformed Western states from multicultural into multiculturalist ones don't apply to former communist states. Increasing rights-consciousness, for instance, needs a certain type of political culture to become a *doxa*, usually a civic one, whereas most former communist states are still characterized by a submissive political culture, which is conducive to powerful leaders and weak civil societies. Former communist countries have not been so far countries of immigration, but countries of emigration. Last, but not least, due to a weak civil society, political mobilization has been rather low so far, and when national minorities got involved in political movements most members of the dominant ethnicities experienced negative emotions, which is hardly surprising considering that at the heart of the societal security in the Eastern parts of Europe lies mostly the centralized state and its public culture. Paradoxically, although former communist states are rather weak states, meaning that they don't provide high quality public services and dignity for their citizens, the most widespread form of nationalism is not an ethnic one, as some Western pundits tend to believe, but a public nationalism, which is characterized by strong attachments to the state as a potential and a miraculous saviour from the actual political conundrum. Arguably, religious residues have not been erased by an incomplete modernity.

But in Western Europe the desecuritization of ethnic relations is not a *fait accompli*. When Kymlicka refers to *ethnic minorities* three different ethnic categories fall under this description, namely indigenous people, national minorities and immigrants. Especially after 9/11 one could notice a re-securitization of immigrants in Western Europe, a process that had a particular salience in the Netherlands and Germany. For Kymlicka, the re-securitization of immigration means a retreat from immigrant multiculturalism. But this retreat from immigrant multiculturalism is not tantamount with the failure of multiculturalism. The Netherlands, for instance, continues to respect the rights of its Frisian minority, whilst Germany strengthens the political status of its Danish minority. The Great Britain has also retreated from immigrant multiculturalism, but it still respects the political autonomy of Scotland and Wales. So is the case of Australia, which has retreated from immigrant multiculturalism too, but it continues to endorse the rights of its Aboriginal population. The conclusion that Kymlicka draws is that the rhetoric of pluralist liberalism is still in force, and that the retreat from immigrant multiculturalism of many consolidated democracies is not tantamount to a ideological return to the discourse of orthodox liberalism and its "undifferentiated multiculturalism and neutral public spheres"⁸.

The distrust towards Muslim immigrants, who are allegedly potential collaborators of terrorist networks, strikingly resembles the perception of some Eastern European states with regard to their national minorities, seen also as potential collaborators of an enemy neighbouring state. The conclusion of this section is that the de-securitization of ethnic relation in consolidated democracies is not yet complete. "The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent Madrid and London bombings, have also led to the resecuritization of state-Muslim relations, as fears have arisen that locally settled Muslims might collaborate with external enemies of the West, serving as a fifth column"⁹.

⁸ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Odysseys. Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 113.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

The Case of Germany. Integration or Assimilation?

To be more precise, I stress from the very beginning the meaning of multicultural policies. According to Kymlicka, multicultural policies aim at protecting more than the basic civil and political rights of all individuals. Multicultural policies, that is politics of recognition and politics of redistribution, strive to amass social and cultural resources so that ethno-cultural groups have the chance of expressing their particular identities, that is their specific language, symbols, rituals and other traditional cultural practices¹⁰. Obviously, the following question can be posed: “What is the relationship between multicultural policies and the securitization/desecuritization of minorities?”. The relationship is a simple one. When a democratic state successfully implements multicultural policies – in the abovementioned way that Kymlicka defines multicultural policies - it means that the premises it has worked from is that ethnic minorities are desecuritized. For a state that considers ethnic minorities to be an issue of national security will not get involved in political activities that are meant to strengthen the so-called societal security of a specific ethnic group. To sum it up, there is a strong chance to find de-securitized ethnic relations in a state that has forged successful multicultural policies.

The focus of inquiry of this section is the German case. In the early '60s, Germany (FRG) became a country of immigration, a cultural status that has never been fully acknowledged by the German political elites. There is a common place in multicultural studies that intellectuals have played an important cultural and political role in promoting multiculturalism in their countries and also at an international level. German intellectuals have been rather reluctant towards multicultural policies, because the latter one needed a *völkisch*-type discourse in order to make the general public espousing multiculturalism. Given the particular historical circumstances of Germany, especially the left-wing intellectuals were not willing to make any concessions to such a discourse that would have placed emphasis on social separations on cultural grounds. And therefore cultural arguments were superseded by social ones from the very beginning. Under such circumstances, the approach to diversity in Kymlicka's terms has never occurred in Germany. In other words, politics of redistribution have always been more salient than the politics of recognition, the latter ones being less crystallized. It should be noted that the propensity for politics of redistribution has never been related to the dwindling process of the welfare state in Germany, but rather with a political discourse that has always laid emphasis on integration or even assimilation. One constantly resurrecting theme in the political discourses of left-wing parties is that of “parallel society”. It refers to ethno-cultural collectivities with a high degree of homogeneity and a separate informal institutional infrastructure. These collectivities are usually spatially segregated and well developed in marginal urban areas of Cologne, Hamburg and Berlin. Left-wing politicians in Germany tend to think that furthering cultural differences through specific multicultural policies would result in consolidating these “parallel societies” with dire consequences regarding social, political and economic integration. The fact that most of the immigrants fare badly in the employment system is explained through their insufficient cultural and social integration. Thus, in Germany the most effective way to deal with immigrant multiculturalism appears to be integration. There is hardly surprising, under such circumstances, that multicultural education has barely emerged in Germany. According to a government website, learning German is a desirable cultural conduct of the immigrants who desire to remain in Germany. A public discourse that stresses the growing disaffection of the German public with immigrants who make claims on welfare state provisions has become more and more salient. An observer of multicultural policies in Germany could notice at least

¹⁰ Will Kymlicka, “Introduction: Multiculturalism and the welfare state: Setting the Context,” in *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*, ed. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

three arguments against the adoption of more cultural rights for immigrants. “First of all such policies usually require an acceptance of the minority groups as longer-term parts of a given society. Second, the retention of national or ethnic group solidarity is often seen as backward-looking (...). Thirdly, stronger, more visible, and vocal ethnic communities are seen as a danger to the overall cohesion of modern societies and as parallel societies”¹¹.

This impetus towards assimilation of immigrants is rather a constant feature of the German political culture. Populism could also be an important drive towards the integration or assimilation of immigrants. But in Germany, far-right or far-left populism has fared badly after 1990, the year of German reunification. But even if populism would have been a salient political discourse in Germany, it hadn't changed too much regarding multicultural policies, considering that, traditionally, political parties don't control the political arena in Germany, due to institutional counterweights such as federalism, Constitutional Court, ministerial bureaucracy, media etc. To sum it up, immigrant multiculturalism continues to be securitized in Germany. This public approach towards immigrants is not related to the downsizing of the welfare state in a neoliberal context, but rather to the specific German political culture.

The Case of Netherlands. Depillarization and Populism

Unlike Germany, the Netherlands has had a more friendly approach on multiculturalism. Whereas in Germany the political culture seems to be the main drive of an assimilationist-prone multicultural policies, in the case of Netherlands the event that triggered a political turn with respect to immigrants seems to be the occurrence of populism at the beginning of the 21st century. In the early '60s, when guest workers from Mediterranean countries as well as from Surinam started pouring into the country, the Netherlands became an immigration country. Starting from the premise that immigrants would return to their homeland some day, multicultural policies that were adopted in the early '70s furthered mother-tongue teaching for immigrants' children. For the Dutch society a multicultural approach towards different ethnic and religious groups had already been a tradition. Under the pillarization system, ethno-religious groups in the Netherlands benefitted from own institutional arrangements with respect to schools, hospitals, political parties, newspapers, trade unions and so on. Clearly, the state-backed funds were used to support such a system. And the elites of every ethno-religious group were considered to be the roof of the pillarization system. Although it had partly been applied to immigrants, starting in the late '60s the pillarization system stopped working for the local population. The immigrants were heavily struck by the restructuration of industrial sector in the early 1980s, and subsequently more than one third of the Turks and Morrocans in the Netherlands were unemployed. In the early '90s, the mainstream political discourse veered from a multicultural approach to an integration one. Cultural issues were evacuated from the public space and transformed into private matters. Or, as Kymlicka would put it, the Netherlands abandoned pluralist liberalism in favour of orthodox liberalism. Consequently, mother tongue teaching was eliminated from public schools' curriculum. Moreover, every immigrant arrived from outside of the European Union was compelled to attend a Dutch language course and a civic integration course. This courses were mandatory.

But the event that triggered the cultural turn from integration policies to assimilationist ones seems to be the death of Pim Fortuyn. A relatively marginal sociologist in the academic realm, Pim Fortuyn represented right-wing parties in the political debate and stood for the rights of the local population. His anti-immigrant discourse became more salient in the post-9/11 political atmosphere, and consequently, in May 2002, at the parliamentary elections his

¹¹ Peter A. Kraus and Karen Schönwälder, “Multiculturalism in Germany: Rhetoric, scattered experiments, and future chances,” in *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*, ed. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 220.

party, List Pim Fortuyn, obtained an unexpected score, namely 26 out of 150 seats in parliament. In Fortuyn's political programme, the main discursive line regarded immigrants. Fortuyn was concerned that being unfamiliar with modern values, Muslim immigrants will represent a strong challenge for democracy in the Netherlands. Employing a classical neoliberal argument, Fortuyn stated that immigrants should be forced to take more responsibility for their own lives, and stop drawing upon the benefits offered by the welfare state. Fortuyn's approach furthered the public perception that immigrants were to blame for their lack of integration. On May 6th, 2002, one week before the parliamentary elections, Fortuyn was murdered by an activist for animal rights.

After Fortuyn's death, Christian Democrats ascended to power. Paradoxically, the Christian Democrats which supported pillarization and thus multiculturalism, veered towards a nationalist approach after eight years in opposition and asked for the assimilation of immigrants. In 2003, the Dutch government introduced a very demanding naturalization process for immigrants in which a very good knowledge of Dutch society was required, along with proficiency in Dutch language. As soon as this quite demanding requirements were introduced the naturalization process was severely slowed down, with only 25 per cent of the applicants being able to successfully meet the new conditions.

For some authors, the harsher naturalization conditions imposed upon immigrants in the Netherlands could be the legacy of Pim Fortuyn in the field of multiculturalism. "Nonetheless, directly or indirectly, it contributed to a tougher immigration policy in the Netherlands and a greater emphasis on integration of immigrants through language courses, naturalization ceremonies and civic exams for marriage partners"¹². Other authors claim that the political turn from multiculturalism to assimilation in the Netherlands is rather related to the downsizing of the welfare state. But only apparently. For the main argument used by different political parties was preventing the marginalization of immigrants and fostering unity. But solidarity, which means an additional emphasis on politics of redistribution instead on politics of recognition, strongly requires the support of the welfare state. What matters for our discussion is that, exactly as in the German case, policy of redistribution received more political attention in the case of Netherlands, whereas cultural arguments were evacuated from the public space and sent to the private sphere. In other words, pluralist liberalism stopped applying to immigrants in the Netherlands in 2003. And thus one can draw the conclusion that immigrants are still subject to securitization policies in the Netherlands.

The Case of Romania

The Hungarian minority is usually examined when it comes to assessing the multicultural policies of the Romanian state. The reason is quite simple. Apart from being concentrated in only one historical province of Romania, it is the only large ethno-cultural group that has a homeland state next to Romania. In Ceaușescu's time the multicultural policies employed by the Romanian state towards its Hungarian minority were not as liberal as Kymlicka would want them to be, but still they weren't as bad as in other ex-communist states. Although some Western pundits claimed that the Hungarian minority was subjected to a "cultural genocide" under Ceaușescu, things were different. "The claims of cultural genocide made by some Hungarians abroad during the 1970s and 1980s were grotesquely exaggerated"¹³. Undoubtedly, the communist state was striving to assimilate its national minorities with an emphasis on the Hungarian one. Therefore, the public culture of the

¹² Paul Lucardie, "The Netherlands: Populism versus Pillarization," in *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*, ed. Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 163.

¹³ Rogers Brubaker and Margit Feischmidt, John Fox, Liana Grancea, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008, 88.

Romanian state under Ceaușescu, which was propelled by a grotesque national-communist ideology, revolved around a thick conception of the nation, which rejected the language, symbols, rituals and history of the Hungarian minority. Moreover, public institutions were heavily “ethnicized” and consequently Romanian Hungarians didn’t have access to top public positions. And yet some liberal accents were manifest. For instance, Calvinist churches in Transylvania were full on Sundays. “The representative of Great Britain states that Churches are more free in Romania than in Hungary and cites the Calvinist bishop from Transylvania, who allegedly argued that ‘we enjoy freedom as much as it is’. The press attaché of the embassy had noticed twice in the last 12 months that Hungarian speaking churches from Transylvania were packed with people”¹⁴. Besides, the communist Romanian state allowed for mother-tongue teaching in primary schools, and for some Hungarian pupils education in their native language was protracted until high-school period. It is also worth mentioning that the communist regime didn’t close all Hungarian publishing houses or newspapers. Obviously, what was published was under a severe political control. But a comparison between the “multicultural policies” of Germany (FRG) towards its Turk immigrants and the way the communist state treated Romanian Hungarians, it will make the Romanian state look more liberal. “It is an irony of history that ethnicity was one of the few bases of association that this notoriously nationalist regime did *not* destroy”¹⁵.

Undoubtedly, after the 1989 Revolution most Romanian citizens experienced the institutional uncertainty and lack of predictability brought by rapid political and social change. As it usually happens, in a social climate dominated by the culture of distrust populism flourishes. And Romania made no exception in this regard. Among the four parties that ascended to power after the October 1992 elections, two of them were nationalist parties. I refer to the Party for National Unity in Romania and the Great Romania Party. For the leaders of these two parties, the Hungarian and the Roma minorities were the perfect scapegoats for everything that didn’t work well in Romania back then. That was the period when the Romanian Hungarians were characterized as a fifth column and as a potential collaborators of the Hungarian state. After the 1996 elections, when the DAHR was invited to join the government along with the Democratic Convention and the Democratic Party, Romania signed international documents that granted political rights to national minorities, the political rights of the Hungarian minority were acknowledged. Consequently, the DAHR accepted to put on hold political requests regarding self-government and territorial autonomy that were contrary with provisos of the Romanian Constitution. Moreover, nationalist parties were marginalized by the Romanian citizens.

And yet a thorny issue remains on the political agenda of the DAHR, namely a Hungarian state university. The Romanian-Hungarian politicians argued that one can find state universities for national minorities in Finland, Sweden, Italy and many other democratic countries. Moreover, setting up a Hungarian state university in Transylvania would be in line with the multicultural tradition of the province. The argument the Romanian politicians offered against a Hungarian state university in Transylvania was that the state didn’t have the financial resources to support such an institutional project. True, transforming a multicultural historical province into a multiculturalist one needs money. But money apart, multicultural policies need “an acceptance of the minority groups as longer-term parts of a given society”¹⁶. According to Paul Roe, leaders of the NSF and other political parties that had to

¹⁴ Larry Watts, *Cei dintâi vor fi cei din urmă. România și sfârșitul Războiului Rece*, București: Rao, 2013, 89.

¹⁵ Rogers Brubaker and Margit Feischmidt, John Fox, Liana Grancea, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008, 88.

¹⁶ Peter A. Kraus and Karen Schönwälder, “Multiculturalism in Germany: Rhetoric, scattered experiments, and future chances,” in *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*, ed. Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 220.

cope with the issue of a Hungarian state university were reluctant to use public funds in order to forge a Romanian Hungarian elite in Transylvania. But what is the source of this distrust? “Romanian societal security requirements – the maintenance of a highly centralised state – instead suggested that any provisions culminating in Hungarian autonomy, be that cultural or ethnic, were potentially contrary to this end”¹⁷. In other words, setting up a Hungarian state university is seen by some Romanian politicians as an important step towards cultural autonomy of the Hungarian minority and, therefore, as a threat to societal security of Romanians. Under such circumstances, one could draw the conclusion that ethnic relations continues to be partly securitized in Romania.

In lieu of conclusion

The conclusion that one can come up with after reading this article is that the most important propeller of multicultural policies is not the welfare state, but the political culture of a particular state. Therefore, although neoliberalism has thinned down the welfare state, there is no direct connection between neoliberalism and the retreat of multiculturalism understood as the resecuritization of immigrants. Rather the political climate that emerged after 9/11 is the variable that adequately explains the resecuritization of immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands. With respect to the Romanian case, political culture is also the variable that explains the partly securitization of the Hungarian minority. The difference between the Western states that I brought under scrutiny and Romania lies in the fact that in the former only immigrant groups have been subjected to resecuritization, whilst indigenous people and national minorities seem to be completely desecuritized.

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/ 159/1.5/S/138822 with the title **“Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”**.

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¹⁷Paul Roe, *Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma*, London: Routledge, 2005, 148.

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THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON ILEGAL MIGRATION

Ana Irina IRIMIA,

PhD. Candidate, “Al. I. Cuza” Police Academy,
“O.P.S.N. - Public Order and National Security” PhD School
irimia_ana_irina@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Globalization has been the defining feature of the late twentieth century, exemplified by sharply increased trade in goods, inter-connected financial markets and large-scale international migration. Globalization is defined by cross-border connectivity, including porous borders, which serve to expedite flows of goods while at the same time increase the level of immigration – both legal and illegal. Every country in the world is affected in some way by this global phenomenon. Illegal migration is a natural result of the movement of labor caused by globalization. Since its causes and problems are rooted deeply in the principles of economics, any serious attempt at a workable solution to the conflicts caused by illegal immigration has no choice but to follow and be guided by the economic logic that relates to globalization. Illegal migration, as a phenomenon, is watched closely for purposes of control and surveillance by national law enforcement agencies, including Romanian Intelligence Service*

Key words: *globalization, migration, illegal, Romanian Intelligence Service, international, economics*

1. Illegal Migration Concept and Globalization Concept

Migration is a phenomenon where many people move from one territorial area to another, and then change their domicile and/or are included in a form of activity at the arrival area¹. From a social and demographic point of view, “migrations means the movement of a person – individually or in a group – outside his/her community of residence during a given reference period, in order to change his/her stable domicile and/or job. A lot of events of this type represent a migration phenomenon”².

Seen only as a demographic phenomenon, migration is the main form of geographical mobility, as it means a definitive change in stable domicile between two separate localities, with a distinction between migration and nomadism, trips, tourism, seasonal travels, commuting, or oscillating movement³.

Migration, as a phenomenon, is determined by a series of social and economic factors existing in the states originating migrants, especially by a low standard of living of the population, political persecutions, religious or other persecutions the population is subjected to, the existence of religious conflicts, and the overpopulation of certain regions or the occurrence of natural disasters⁴.

The migration phenomenon has two main types of causes, objective and subjective. The objective causes include the ensemble of social, economic and political phenomena, acting globally; the subjective causes include the psychological mechanisms which determine a person to emigrate under the pressure of objective factors.

As it is widely known, many people leave their native places for economic reasons. They leave to search for better paid jobs or simply to get away from poverty. Obviously,

¹ Zamfir Cătălin and Vlăsceanu Lazăr, *Dicționar de sociologie*, Editura Babel, Bucharest, 1998.

² Dumitru Sandu, *Fluxurile de migrație în România*, Editura Academiei R.S.R., Bucharest, 1984, p. 20.

³ Vladimir Trebici, *Mica Enciclopedie de Demografie*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1975.

⁴ Emil Hedesiu, Gheorghe Toma, *Contracurarea Crimei Organizate Transfrontaliere*, Editura Universității Naționale de apărare, Bucharest 2005.

many others move to new geographical areas pursuant to cultural or religious persecutions or because of adverse political conditions. Anyhow, out of all the factors influencing the migration flows, the economic factors remain the dominant ones: hunger, unemployment, lack of agricultural lands. It is understood that the migration flows determined by such factors are voluntary, by their nature. However, there are many other involuntary causes: forced transfer of certain populations from one continent to another, wars, expulsion, huge natural disasters, etc., with numerous examples of such events in the history of humankind.

Lately, one of the most important processes who have been exercising a huge influence on the perspectives of the development of the entire humankind is the globalization. This phenomenon has reached all the areas of social life, including economy, politics, international relations, culture, ecology, security, with huge changes in the evolution of the entire human community. The occurrence of this phenomenon was possible because of the development of the global economy, which has led by default to the development of transports and communications, with the obvious contribution of science and technology. "In fact, globalization is a paradox: it is extremely advantageous for a few people, but it marginalizes or excludes two thirds of the world population"⁵.

Globalization has opened the borders wider for goods than for people, and this unequal treatment cannot last for much longer considering that the movements of goods and people are intrinsically linked. The illegal migration phenomenon, and especially its cross-border component, joins one of the most commented and present processes of international life: globalization. Globalization has involuntarily opened new opportunities for organized crime, as it is thought that the organized crime phenomenon is the adverse effect of globalization. Globalization is displayed in the most characteristic forms and it is rapidly extending to the areas of economically developed democratic countries and governments which joined convergent systems with similar values. The contemporary migrants travel in a world where international law has begun to affect the internal legislation and where international organizations monitor and intervene in migration processes.

The extent to which both infrastructures and regulations reach interregional or cross-continental levels, shall affect and model the migration globalization. Many of the European states have reached the conclusion that controlled migration has a positive effect on the negative status of certain internal demographic indicators. In a context of multiculturalism and globalization, in many of the world states a certain kind of migration has proven to be an important factor of economic growth. On the other hand, uncontrolled illegal migration may represent a real danger to public order and democracy. The lack of a policy in this field can generate negative long-term effects, one of the most significant negative effects being the change in population structure.

The illegal entry and stay of a large number of foreigners in Romania is a danger to national security and public order, firstly because many of these people are not registered by the authorities and thus they cannot be controlled⁶. The lack of a functional system for fighting illegal migration represents, more often than not, an element of attraction for criminals chased through the Interpol, for people who have committed crimes against humanity or against the Charter of the United Nations, or for the people who are a danger to the national security, or to the people who are part of terrorist groups or cross-border criminal organizations.

⁵ Graham Balls and Milly Jentinkis, *Too much for them, not enough for us*, Independent Sunday, July 21, 1996, apud Zigmunt Bauman, *Globalizarea și efectele ei sociale*, p. 77.

⁶ Emil Hedesiu, Gheorghe Toma, *Contracurarea Crimei Organizate Transfrontaliere*, Editura Universității Naționale de apărare, Bucharest 2005; Zlotea Marian, *Migrația ilegală, factori de risc la adresa securității naționale, stabilității democratice și a ordinii publice*, Bucharest 2006; John Salt, *Migration and Population Change in Europe*, United Nation Publication; New York, 1998.

2. International and Regional Status

The fall of the iron curtain opened up new profit opportunities for criminal organizations, with their involvement in human and migrant trafficking, phenomena which have recorded an increase due to the economic decline generated by the conflicts in the Balkans and by the changes in the countries under transition. Studies indicate that in the entire Europe cross-border organized crime groups are getting more and more involved in human trafficking, thus eliminating the 'local competition', with the inevitable consequence of violent conflicts between the competing criminal organizations. The occurrence of new political, ethical and religious conflicts, has led to the movement of people to other countries because of the aggravated social and economic status in their countries of 'origin'.

At a national level, the exodus of Chinese and Pakistani immigrants is such a phenomenon which has got out of hand, with serious economic consequences because of an increase in tax evasion, as the illegal trade is about four times the legal trade in volume.

Illegal migration is an important asymmetrical threat as international terrorism flourishes. Legal and illegal migration give terrorist organizations the opportunity to place their members in strategic points for terrorist attacks, as well as the opportunity to create logistic sites in the transit countries close to the target countries, such activities being monitored by specialized institutions⁷.

Most of the international experts on migration believe that one of the important factors influencing migration is the demographic growth. If we also consider the other important factors influencing migration, like: economic status of the main states generating migrants, internal or international armed conflicts, which more often than not generate humanitarian crises, massive flows of people in need of international protection, but also an important number of economic and political migrants, etc., the conclusion is the same: the migration phenomenon is continuously increasing.

As such, most of the states in the region are crossed by migration paths from East to West and from South to North. This flow is not a constant one, as it is permanently changing according to the actual status in each country. Therefore, the concrete and efficient measures for fighting migration in one country lead to the increase of the migration flow on other paths and, implicitly, lead to an increase in migration in the other states in the region.

The system of readmission agreements for third-country nationals, concluded especially with the Western states when expanding the Schengen area and the applicability area for the Dublin convention, generated the return of a large number of foreigners from the Western states, who have transited Romania legally or have had the right to stay in Romania, and our country had to return these people to their countries of origin. This is the current status of those Member States of the European Union with a migration policy less developed than the policies of the others (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, etc.).

Due to the lack of national programmes for returning illegal foreigners and of readmission agreements with the main states generating migrants, and to the difficulties in identifying certain people and in obtaining travel documents for them for their return, it can be said that the illegal migration phenomenon in Romania, especially the illegal migration, will record an important increase. Many foreigners transiting Romania or leaving Romania in order to enter and stay illegally in their countries of destination shall be returned to Romania in the future and Romania shall have to undertake the responsibility for their illegal crossing through our country.

⁷ Emil Hedesiu, Gheorghe Toma, *Contracurarea Crimei Organizate Transfrontaliere*, Editura Universității Naționale de apărare, Bucharest 2005; Constantin Creangă, *Crima organizată și terorismul- riscurile securității mondiale*, Editura Polirom, Bucharest 2002.

3. Current Status in Romania

In terms of refugees, Romania has its historical role as a gate to the West. For the refugees who arrive in our country, their target is obviously Western Europe. They come mainly from Asia and Africa, most of them being of Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist religion, but also of Christian religion, their religious freedom being guaranteed in the Constitution.

Pursuant to the analysis of the border events occurred, it can be seen that Romania knows six areas where the migration phenomenon is most present, each of these areas showing, in addition to the general valid principles for such activities, also particular characteristics, determined by the specifics of each area, the means and methods used, the destination, and the purpose (source country, target country, transit area/country).

Thus, in the Eastern area, at the border with the Republic of Moldova, it can be seen a tendency to cross the border illegally in Romania, especially by African and Asian citizens, guided by members of certain criminal organizations from the former states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially Russians, Ukrainians, and Moldavians, as well as by local elements.

The Western area, at the border with Hungary, is known for the tendency of African and Asian citizens to cross the border illegally, after having entered the country through the East or South of Romania, as well as for local elements with the tendency to cross the border with the declared purpose of reaching Western Europe.

The third area where illegal people trafficking activities have increased is the Southern area of the country, at the border with Bulgaria, is used for illegal entry in Romania by people from Africa and Asia or by Kurds who want to transit our country and get to a Western country, and also for the illegal exit of foreign people who want to get to Greece. Another area is the border with Ukraine, in the South-East, and the area of the Romanian seashore, where people from the former Soviet Union or from Africa or Asia are present.

In the South-West area, the border with the former Yugoslavia, there are fraudulent state border crossings coordinated by very well organized international criminal groups. The purpose of the channels in this area is for immigrants to transit the former Yugoslavian area or the local area.

The North area, the border with Ukraine, is of special importance for the analysis of this criminal phenomenon due to the people trafficking in the area, and also to the large number of African and Asian citizens in Ukraine.

4. Typology

The methods used to enter, stay, or exit illegally into or from Romania are: the use of false documents; destruction of identity documents followed by the submission of an application for requesting asylum, in order to prevent expulsion; obtaining a transit or collective entry visa, for tourism purposes; legal entry in the country and obtaining a visa for staying for people who come from states with a high risk of migration, motivated by trading activities, the actions of the people involved being illegal and being carried out through shell companies which could be involved in illegal migration activities; the use of false or counterfeit visas; hiding in road, railroad, or naval transport means; fraudulent crossing of the 'green' border with the help of guides who are usually part of specialized human trafficking and illegal migration networks⁸.

⁸ Emil Hedesiu, Gheorghe Toma, *Contracararea Crimei Organizate Transfrontaliere*, Editura Universității Naționale de apărare, Bucharest 2005.

This paper had financial support through the project entitled ‘PhD and post-PhD Studies *Orizont 2020: promoting national interest through excellence, competitiveness, and responsibility in the fundamental and applied Romanian scientific research*’; contract identification number: **POSDRU /159 1.5/S/ 140106. The project is co-financed from the European Social Fund through the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013. Invest in People!**

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STRATEGY OF INTER – AGENCY COOPERATION TO PREVENT CHILD TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

Viorica Ștefania MOLDOVAN,

Lecturer, Police Academy “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”,
viorica.moldovan@academiadepolitie.ro
viorik.mo@gmail.com

Abstract: *International police cooperation to prevent child trafficking is high on the agenda of law enforcement authorities. In the context of globalization prevention of child trafficking and exploitation is a challenge for police and civil society.*

Key words: *Inter - agency police cooperation, police, child trafficking, exploitation, law, human right, prevention*

Globalization. Globalization of Crime

Multidimensional phenomenon, closely related with the development of mass communication technologies, the development of trade and broadening capital markets, globalization, focus, at least in theory, the interest of researchers.

Globalization can be defined as "economic interdependence among states that manifest as a result of growth factor dependence on the global economy. On the other hand, globalization can be seen as the reduction of customs duties, customs and Cancellation of restrictions on the movement of goods, services, technology and capital, with the development of economic exchanges. The globalization process taking place for some time, greatly influence the security issue. It is obvious that all efforts directed towards ensuring the security of an object taken part - state, society, firm, person, etc., have their contribution to global security, human security ie, the entire planet. It follows that the security of the state, society, people can not be fully ensured without planetary security ".

Regarded as "... a double resonance process, on the one hand covering what scholars call the phenomenon of shrinking world - a process that aim to reduce distances, increase social density and density relational world, progressive globalization processes of cultural, economic, political, military, etc.- On the other hand, cumulating individual perception relative to the phenomenon whose actor is - that reflect the subject's consciousness transformation "globalization decisively influence the crime as a social phenomenon.

At present, amid the persistent global economic crisis "witnessing an unprecedented upsurge of crime phenomenon is amplified by drug trafficking, terrorism and organized crime, committed in order to inspire fear and insecurity among the population, and a series of offenses and crimes that violate fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, characterized by murders, robberies, kidnappings, robberies and other military arm unsafe acts civic and individual ".

Contemporary society points out that despite the intensification of activities and interventions bodies responsible for the prevention and combating of crime in general, there is "an amplification of criminal acts against persons and public or private property, and an extension of corruption and fraud in various sectors of economic life - social. In this climate crime, organized crime is the most dangerous form, with a direct impact on the state of normality and public safety. The most dangerous and virulent form of organized crime

Organized Crime border, a real scourge that threatens all countries, because all can be exploited for the benefit of crime bosses where borders are nonexistent. "

Human trafficking - a serious form of organized crime

Human trafficking is a serious violation of fundamental rights expressly prohibited by Article 5 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It is also a serious form of organized crime, driven by high profits and high demand for the services of his victims. It affects women and men, girls and boys, in the EU and third countries, injury often profound and lifelong. To address this phenomenon, the European Commission adopted the EU Strategy to eradicate human trafficking 2012-2016.

Highlights on trends in the dynamics of victims of human trafficking in Romania

The data provided by the National Agency against Trafficking in Persons, showing changes in the dynamics of victims of trafficking. Thus, in 2013 there was a tendency maintenance to reduce the number of victims trafficked and identified, indicating that, for the reference year, in the category "victims identified" are included trafficking victims identified in previous years and in 2013, and identified trafficking victims in 2013 and that same year.

Trends comparative dynamics victims identified during 2008- 2013:

- 2008: 1240 victims identified (trend decline over the previous year -30%)
- 2009: 780 victims identified (trend decline over the previous year -37%): 322 trafficking victims (increasing trend with + 0.4%)
- 2010: 1154 identified victims (increasing trend with + 32.5%) 626 trafficking victims (increasing trend with + 94.5%)
- 2011: 1048 victims identified (trend down -9%) 606 trafficking victims (trend down -3%)
- 2012: 1041 victims identified (trend down 1%) 554 trafficking victims (trend down -9%)
- 2013: 896 victims identified (trend down -14%) -24% 419 trafficking victims.

As regards the method of recruitment, mentioned statistics show that 54% of victims were recruited through people close by, belonging to the circle of relationships - friends, acquaintances; in 94% recruitment was directly, without intermediaries, most victims were attracted by promises of offering the use of a job abroad, under a high level of unemployment and poverty, generated,, among others by the economic - financial began in 2009.

Also, the total number of victims trafficked in the year 2013, 77% are female, 33% were male, 52% of victims were major entry into the trafficking situation. Most victims were trafficked for sexual exploitation, 66% and 8% more than in 2012, 24% were exploited for labor. Exploited victims forced into begging, forced to commit theft or pornographic, were recorded in 6%. Age category highly victimization is represented by minors between the ages of 14 and 17. They are vulnerable and at risk of trafficking for example, over 90% of minors identified in 2011 were in the age group mentioned

Nationally, counties had the highest values of provenance child victims in 2011 were Braşov, Iaşi and Argeş, 22, and 20 minor victims. In 2012 trafficked minors can identify a causal link between gender membership and form of exploitation, sexual exploitation 11 (75%). Although reduced by case law, minors trafficked in 2012 were exploited and forced labor, particularly in agriculture, order in pornographic, thefts or begging. The main destination of trafficking known among this category of victims was Romania, accounting for 82% of all child victims. The main foreign destinations were Italy (30 victims), Germany (9 victims) and Greece (8 victims).

Victims aged 14-17 years and 18-25 years are predominantly women sexually exploited. Victims aged 25-60 are predominantly men exploited for labor. Minors and this

period is a vulnerable road users, especially in recruiting for sexual exploitation. Thus, out of 160 minors identified in this period, 98% are girls, respectively 157 and only three victims are boys

Strategic approach to preventing and combating trafficking in human beings

In the European Union, the issue of human trafficking has received increased attention. Studies show that in the period 2010 - 2012, there were 30,146 victims in 28 member states of the European Union (according to gender-in period, 80% of fatalities were women). Of the victims recorded in the states under study, gender and age disaggregated data show that 67% of victims are women, 17% men, girls victim - 13% and boys - 3%. Regarding the age of the victims, 45% of victims were recorded at the entrance to traffic more than 25 years, 36% were aged 18-24 years, 17% between 12-17, and 2% were aged between 0 -11 years.

Data on registered victims were broken down by various forms of exploitation for the reference period, as follows: 69% of registered victims were trafficked for sexual exploitation, child labor 19% to 12% for other forms of exploitation, such as removal of organs, thefts, the sale of children. Children are considered a high risk traffic category in the European Union framework. Taking into account the "best interests of the child" strategy sets out a series of measures that States must take into account, given the specific needs of child victims of trafficking, children neglected, deprived of parental care as and the need to work in integrated, multidisciplinary, focused on the implementation of EU policies on prevention of trafficking and the harmonization of legislative instruments reference.

Romania attach great importance to preventing and combating trafficking in persons, both in terms of legislation, and as regards the institutional framework, in the law enforcement authorities. Trafficking Prevention segment, the overall objective of the National Strategy is "Speed up prevention activities and civil society participation in their implementation" subsumed specific objectives are:

- Raising awareness and awareness, risk groups on the implications of trafficking;
- Reduce the risk factors that lead to victimization;
- Monitoring the work of economic operators in the professional fields with high turnover of labor (construction, agriculture, logging, tourism etc.)

In our opinion, inter – agency cooperation to prevent child trafficking should addressing victims increased risk categories (children from poor families, marginalized social, economic, Roma children, children whose parents work abroad, children who have safe internet access), reducing traffic demand. From our point of view, the Agency's efforts to Prevent Trafficking in Persons to prevent child trafficking can and should be supported at a high level, political level, in the Romanian state.

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822** with the title **“Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.**”

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STRATEGIC CHANGES IN SECURITY CAUSED BY WEATHER WARFARE

Ion CHIUȚĂ,

Professor "Universitatea Politehnica București" and president of Technical Sciences AOȘR,
inchiuta@gmail.com

Cătălina Cristina PETICĂ,


PhD. engineer "Universitatea Politehnica București",
catalinapetica@yahoo.com

Abstract: *This paper aims to analyses and list the imbalance factors climatic and to make suggestions in order to reduce their effects. To this is added, and not at all insignificantly, mankind's action which uses outdated technology, destroys the natural balance, as well as through highly conscious activities, yet destructive to the planet and its stability. Global warming, the experiences regarding climate changes (the seeding of clouds, the use of electromagnetic waves, and artificially produced earthquakes, etc.) will lead in the future to the occurrence of extremely difficult to control weather phenomena, to changes in the architecture of air and ocean currents, with both short and long term catastrophic effects. Governments all over the world are called to identify risk factors but also to resolutely forbid climate changing experiences (utmost and immediate emergency), otherwise the equilibrium of life on the planet Earth will be strongly called into question.*


Key words: *destruction of the natural balance, climate change, catastrophe.*

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a UN group who regularly presents information on the climate change, draws a serious warning signal on devastating effects that the planet's climate will face in the coming years. According to the official report published by this group, the ice cap at the North Pole is starting to melt increasingly faster, the drinking water supplies are becoming smaller, there are heat waves, heavy rains and extreme events in more and more areas of the world, the fishes and other aquatic creatures die or migrate to the poles, the ocean levels is constantly increasing, threatening the coastal communities. Ocean water is more acidic and hotter, killing many species of fish or of coral, there are physiology mutations that occur in various plant species, there are massive extinctions in many species of plants, animals, fish and insects. Among the greatest dangers the humankind is facing on top is hunger and climate change. "Nobody on this planet will not escape without being affected by climate change," says Rajendra Pachauri, the chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Making a synthesis of the various phenomena that the humanity has faced and is still facing in recent years, the specialists have found abundant evidence that can support hypotheses about the relationship between the natural factors and climate changes. Thus, we find links between the volcanism and the climate change, between the intensity and the frequency of seismic phenomena and the changes in climate and many other correlations.



The Man's responsibility in raising the level of global warming is more obvious. The Earth's average temperature will rise by 0.3 up to 4.8 degrees Celsius by 2100, estimate the experts with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that have still upwards revised also the estimates on rising of the sea levels, which would be between 26 and 82 centimeters by 2100, according to the new report⁷.



According to the IPCC, by now it is "highly likely" that the human influence is the main cause of the warming observed since the mid-twentieth century, which equates to a 95% confidence. In its latest report, in 2007 this certainty was of 90%. Regarding the possible extent of global warming are detained four possible scenarios where global warming will be between an optimistic 0.3 ° C and a pessimistic 4.8 ° C by the end of this century, the average temperature values reported during 1986 - 2005.⁸

The uncertainties depend obviously quantities of greenhouse gases to be emitted into the atmosphere in the coming years. Earth has already warmed by about 0.8 degrees Celsius compared to the pre-industrial era and only the scenario based on 0.3 degrees would maintain the temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius compared to the same era. With respect to sea level rise, one of the major consequences of global warming, the scientists expect to increase between 26 and 82 centimeters by 2100, compared to 18-59 cm in the 2007 report so that climatologists take into account the acceleration of melting glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica, a phenomenon less studied so far.^{7 8}

Ocean water temperature increases with that of the air on a globally level. As ocean water is heated, the water level rises. According to the IPCC, water level on the global level rose by 3.1 millimeters each year between 1993 and 2003, the growth rate being much faster than that recorded between 1961 and 2003 by 1.8 mm per year. (10) The factor responsible for 50% of the increase in the level of oceans is the water warming, which determines its increase in volume. The melting of the glaciers and of the ice caps is responsible in a proportion of 25%.


In total, in the last hundred years, the the level of the planet's ocean rose by 20 centimeters, and by 2100 it is estimated that it could increase by 1-2 meters above the current level, or even more if the ice cap melting from Greenland continues to accelerate.¹⁰ The global warming as a phenomenon in itself is not fully understood, a fact that feeds the positions pros and cons. It can be said with certainty that the global warming is the result of the interaction of cosmic nature factors, factors resulting from the celestial mechanics,

⁷ *** climate.nasa.gov/newsletter_signup/

⁸ *** Natural Resources Defense Council

anthropogenic factors and factors also due to human interferences into atmospheric mechanics due to their desire to control and manipulate the meteorological factors.¹

We present further some elements to support the theory according to which the greenhouse gases are on the basis of the global warming^{6 7 8}



Increasing of the water level of the seas and the oceans

The States are in the greatest danger are the Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu in the Pacific Ocean and the Maldives and Seychelles, located in the Indian Ocean.⁶ The residents and leaders of these states recognize that their existence on their current territory is now scheduled to end in the next century, due to rising ocean levels. All these countries are slightly above sea level. Of the 1,200 islands of the Maldives, of which 200 are inhabited, 80% are less than one meter above sea level. Many years before a island to sink, this will become uninhabitable as the waves penetrate increasingly above, destroying the crops the inhabitants rely on and the drinking water supplies being affected by the ocean. These effects are already being felt in Kiribati. A country with 100,000 inhabitants, it spans over 32 atolls and one island, spread over a surface of the Pacific Ocean twice larger than the US state of Alaska. It should be emphasized the fact that the increase due to climate change crisis are deepen and sharpen as a result of the existence of collateral factors such as: the large number of the inhabitants of the planet 7 billion in 2011-9 billion in 2050-10 billion in 2085.

These are the estimated figures provided by the UN, which used different models of prediction but the rate of population growth has declined much over the last 50 years and, in all probability, will continue to fall. In other words, the growth will be much slower. The

¹ Boțoagă Daniel, *Solar flares, climate risk factor*, sesiunea științifică toamna AOSR, Constanța, 19-20 septembrie 2014.

⁶ *** Global Climate CHANGE

most populated countries were in 2010: China (1,341 million inhabitants), India (1,225 million), USA (310 million).

How will look the top in 2100 after the official estimations?

I st Place: India (estimated population: 1,551 million inhabitants).

II nd Place: China (941 million – a remarkable decrease, but how good or bad will be the decreasing of the population of China, that only the future will show us).

And on the **III rd place** - surprise! - could reach Nigeria, a country which today ranks on the 7th place but with a high rate of fertility, will come, it is expected, at a population of 730 million - as the entire current population of Europe!

- We will be older

Some countries – the developed ones - have already aging population, as a result of low fertility (fertility is, in this demographic sense, an index calculated on the basis of the number of children born alive and on the number of women in the respective population), coupled with a higher life expectancy; instead, the underdeveloped countries, where usually, fertility is high, they have young populations, but with a lower life expectancy, the tendency being to increase the life expectancy and of aging of the population of the planet.

In 2010, 7.6% of the world population will be over 65 years. In 2100, the percentage of the third age will reach 22%.

- We will be poorer

At the moment, 48 of the states of the world are included by the UN included among "the least developed countries" (Least Developed Countries - LDCs) - in other words, the poorest countries with the lowest standard of living, ie a income less than \$ 1.25 per day, per person. These countries suffer from extreme poverty, armed conflicts (civil wars, frequent inter-ethnic clashes), corruption and political and social instability. Epidemics are rampant and people are extremely vulnerable to natural disasters. The number of people living in extreme poverty (less than \$ 1.25 a day) decreased between 1990 and 2005, from 1.8 to 1.4 billion.

- Hunger will be increasingly accentuated, it will include masses increasingly large, making vulnerable more and more people

- Obesity will be increasingly present, it will primarily affect the degree of mobility of the people.

- The emergence of new diseases due to increased antibiotic resistance of existing ones.

1. The coral reefs

The coral reefs around the world could be on the verge of extinction by the end of the century because of the the fact that the oceans are becoming more acidic. The decrease in pH below 7.8 could have catastrophic effects on corals. The studies conducted have shown that the reducing of the diversity and of the complexity of the reefs is due to changing of water pH.¹⁰

2. The melting of the permafrost

A related survey relating with the speed with which melts the permafrost suggests that billions of frozen leaves and roots that have remained frozen in the soil for thousands of years will thaw in the next 10-20 years, releasing huge amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. This will lead to major climate changes and accelerate the global warming by turning the Arctic region into a carbon source. It was also found that by the year 2200 about two thirds of permafrost on Earth will melt, bringing into surface about 190 billion tons of carbon dioxide and methane - about half of all emissions of greenhouse gases from fossil fuels since the beginning of the industrial revolution until the present.

¹⁰ ***World Ocean Observatory

3. The modification of the gravity

The melting of largest icecap on Earth will lead to damage the planet's gravitational field. Even the Earth's rotation (the reduction of rotation speed inevitably leading to greater warming of the earth surface) will be affected in so much that ocean levels will rise more than anticipated the researchers at the University of Bristol. If western ice cap "white continent" disappears, the loss of such water masses in the Southern Hemisphere will lead to increasing of gravity in the Northern Hemisphere, leading to a sharp increase of sea levels in that hemisphere.

4. The climate refugees

In 2050, the number of "climate refugees" will reach 200 million. As will depend on hurricanes, storms, silt or drought, or it will be a consequence of wars for control of water resources, in 2050, the Earth could be put in a position to cope with the trauma represented by 200 million of "climate refugees". Already in 1990 - says the IOM report - the number of so-called "climate refugees" those who are suffering because of pollution, drought and natural disasters, will amount to 25 million. According to the report of the Migration Agency, at the present moment there are 192 million people, a figure equal to 3% of the world population, who were forced to leave their native place.⁹ According to the specialists, the fundamental steps for the release of these "prisoners" of the climate" are four in number: the recognition of the problem from the part of the international community, policies against the vulnerability, maintaining a high level of research in the field and helping the developing countries.

5. The hole in the ozone layer

If until two decades ago, the holes in the ozone layer was seen as a major threat to the planet, the researchers from the UK, US and Sweden have found that the ices of Antarctica better resist against the global warming than that of the North Pole. In fact, with the exception of the Antarctic Peninsula, near South America, Antarctica has not undergone major changes in temperature. The thin ozone layer over the South Pole glaciers causing storms that maintain a stable level, and as long as the situation continues, the ice will not melt, scientists announced. However, the ozone layer is recovering, on the one hand protecting the planet from solar radiation but emphasizing, on the other hand, the effects of global warming. The latest calculations show that the Antarctic ice would start to melt rapidly in the period 2050-2070, during which the ozone layer will recover completely, while the North Pole glaciers could melt completely in the next two or three years.⁹

The diminishing of the precipitations

The decrease of rainfall in some parts of the world will produce catastrophic effects. A sediment core from a lake in the Andes suggests that once the temperatures rise, summer monsoons will decrease, causing a severe decrease in the amount of water in tropical regions. Equatorial regions of South America already receive much less rainfall than the last millennium, according to a new study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. Like these phenomena and droughts in the Amazon causes panic.⁶ The two severe droughts that hit in recent years raises the Amazon region future carbon filter. Climate change caused by global warming will adversely affect natural freshwater supplies of traditional communities living in the Arctic, some fallen snow in the winter months, rare rains in the summer months temperatures combined with steadily increasing from year to year, and with strong winds that increase the natural rate of evaporation, all these issues have caused concern about the future of natural reserves of freshwater in the Arctic.

⁹ ***Iceland Naturally

6. The changing of the shape of the planet

The melting of glaciers led to changing in the shape of the Earth, making it more bulging at the Equator. The measurements made using the satellites, made between 1975 and 2009 show a change that began with the mid 90s. Solid ice near the poles turned into water, which was distributed over the entire surface of the planet. Earth is already bulging at the Equator with 42 kilometers, compared to north-south axis, the difference being largely caused by the rotation of the planet. The water produced by melting of the glaciers emphasize this difference. Drawing a conclusion to the above, it can be said with certainty that at this moment we can say that the global warming is very close of becoming irreversible. We previously mentioned about the factors other than those natural of modification of the climatic parameters. They are based on human intervention in order to control and modify the climatic elements for both civil and military nature. Let's see how it is produced the interaction between the Sun and Earth's climate in the case when strong solar flares occur.¹²³ When a solar flare of class M occurs, it is developing the next set of phenomena: through the explosion, a significant amount of protons are expelled into outer space at speeds that can reach 800 and even 1000 km/s. This eruption of particles is called solar wind.⁷

The movement of these particles in outer space facilitates the appearance of a magnetic field of the order of 17 to 30 nT, field that is interacting with the geomagnetic field producing in a first phase of its values increased to 250-350 nT, then the value of this field can drop to values of 30-50 nT. Another effect of solar flare protons expelled produces is particularly strong warming of the outer layers of the atmosphere and ionosphere (due to collisions that occur between protons and atoms or subatomic particles existing in these layers), thousands of degrees. If gas heating is similar to increase its volume, which correlated with decreased pressure increase at the soil surface foam was determined atmosphere. When these conditions occur in the soil surface defining elements of air currents change, so changing climatic parameters (temperature, humidity, pressure) and hence the weather changes.^{2 3} This scenario can be achieved also on earth through various types of antennas, antennas that emit into frequency range of the radio waves. The difference is that in the case of the solar flares, the meteorological parameters changes occur on extensive areas while in the case of the human activities the changing of weather parameters is done on regional areas and even punctual ones. If we add to these activities those of the cloud seeding, all possibilities of change and climate control becomes more than possible (ie. At the beginning of the last period when the sun was covered with clouds about 30 consecutive days from 11.11. to 11.12. 2014 the precipitations pH at the beginning of the period was 4.1 and at the end was of 8, if the situation in which the pH average is of 6.5-6.7)

Another aspect is the production of earthquakes "on demand" by using the same types of radiation but structured otherwise.⁴

Environmental Modification Techniques/ *Environmental Modification Convention* (ENMOD) for military use in the present context is the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. A fact which is not spoken in the debates on the global climate change is that of the change in weather conditions by appealing to a new generation of sophisticated electromagnetic weapons. Both Russia and the US have developed capabilities to manipulate the climate for military purposes. Changing of the weather conditions, according to the AF 2025 document of the United States Air Force "offers to a war fighter a wide range of possible options to defeat or coerce an adversary capabilities, sometime undergoing the beginning of floods,

² Boțoagă Daniel, *Sun-Earth interaction, factor of climate instability*, sesiunea științifică primăvara AOSR, București, 9 aprilie 2014.

³ Boțoagă Daniel, *Global warming, intrinsic factor of the evolution of the Earth in Outer space and Orbital parameters*, sesiunea științifică primăvara AOSR, București, 9 aprilie 2014.

⁴ Jerry E. Smith, *Weather Warfare*, Editura Daksha, 2011.

hurricanes, droughts and earthquakes.⁴ During the Vietnam War, the techniques of clouds creating have been used since 1967 under the name of the Popeye Project, whose goal was to prolong the monsoon season and to block enemy supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh road. The US and Russia armies have developed advanced capabilities that when activated selectively alter the weather patterns. The technology, which is prepared in the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP), which is a weapon of mass destruction, acting in the high atmosphere, being capable of destabilizing agricultural and ecological systems around the world. The term "environmental modification techniques" refers to any other technique for changing, through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes, of the dynamics, of the composition or of the structure of the Earth, including of the bios or of the lithosphere, of the hydrosphere and of the atmosphere, or of the outer space". "The weather weapons" is the ultimate weapon of mass destruction, with the potential to destabilize the ecosystem of the enemy, destroying its agriculture, disabling its communication networks. In other words, ENMOD techniques can affect an entire national economy, may impoverish millions of people and can "kill a nation" without the help of troops and military weapons. There are several main explanations on weather and climate change, but none of them fully explains very unusual and completely chaotic events of the weather, without mentioning the "human costs" and the produced devastations that led to the destabilization of a agricultural and ecological system. These explanations were never referred to the issue of climate manipulation for military use. The HAARP program was established in 1992. It is part of a new generation of sophisticated weaponry. HAARP constitutes a system of powerful antennas capable of creating "controlled local modifications of the ionosphere" (the layer of upper atmosphere). The HAARP program represents a super-strong technology with radio waves affecting areas of the ionosphere by focusing of a beam and by warming of those areas. The electromagnetic waves arrive back on Earth affecting absolutely all form of life". The HAARP program has the ability to trigger blackouts and of disrupting the electricity system of entire regions. Unusual weather events in the US, Western Europe and Asia have been extensively documented. However, that was not emphasized is that number of unusual and dramatic climate changes that have occurred in recent years in countries that are identified as possible targets. For example, weather patterns in North Korea were marked since the mid-90s by a succession of droughts, followed by floods. The result was the destruction of an entire agricultural system. In Cuba, the pattern is similar to that observed in North Korea. In Iraq, Iran and Syria, a devastating drought occurred in 1999. In Afghanistan, a four-year drought in the previous period the US invasion of 2001 caused the destruction of an economy based on agricultural producers, which has led to widespread famine.¹¹

The weather manipulation is par excellence a preventive weapon. It can be directed against enemy countries or even "friendly nations", without them realizing this fact. Weather war is a hidden form of a preventive war⁴

The climate manipulation can be used to destabilize the economy, the agriculture and the ecosystem of an enemy (eg North Korea or Cuba). It should be stressed the fact that these techniques can cause havoc on financial and commodity markets also can be used as an of tool 'domestic trade' in view of financial gains. Weather manipulation has the ability to destabilize a country's institutions. Meanwhile, the unrest in agriculture creates a greater reliance on food aid and on grain imports from other more "luckier" countries. Was Romania the victim of such an attack in 2004? year in which Romania was hit by a series of heavy rains that could not be called torrential rains, but really heavy rains, causing huge damages due to flooding. The phenomenon in its whole presented a whole of features never seen

¹¹ Jerry E. Smith, *Haarp: The Ultimate Weapon of the Conspiracy*, Ed. Daksa, 2011.

before in our country then, as there not being an equivalent of them mentioned in the national meteorological archives, namely:

- They started extremely fast, their duration was not very high, but the intensity of the phenomenon and the pattern of manifestation had nothing in common with those of normal rain: while the latter is made up of water droplets or even large size and volumetric density and frequency of falls extremely high, in the case of the year 2004 the phenomenon seemed to be directed by someone in the sky that would open a high flow valve so that on the Earth was falling a continuous water column, the phenomenon stopping suddenly at a time, as the same valve was closed by order;
- were manifested by reduced surface areas they occurred on areas reduced surface areas and with traceable geometric shape: the areas in question was prey to flood and within the 5 meters from the boundary surface was hit by the sun, without a drop of raining;
- in many cases they were accompanied by weather phenomena not found in Romania until then, primarily high-intensity tornadoes and iridescent phenomena of the atmosphere.

There is also the danger that the existing installations, primarily those of the US and of the Russian Federation, to be used to generate extremely low frequencies waves (ELF) with pulsed emission that would be directed to the inside of the Earth, in the depth, producing the dislocation of the delicate tectonic plates suspended by fragile links in the Earth's solid core. Before trying to explain what actually happened in Romania, it should be stressed that weather war is only one aspect of the less famous "War of the Waves" - which includes:

- blocking by the interruption of all radio communications;
- influencing of the human behavior;
- weather modifications, including the generating of local weather phenomena cataclysm;
- causing earthquakes;
- generating of explosions in the atmosphere with powers and effects similar to those of atomic bomb.

Guided by using the same energy beam whose position can be controlled very simple pulsed beam is positioned in the cloud formations in the area, regardless of their type - cumulus, cirrus, Cirrocumulus, nimbus, stratus, etc. It really does not matter than the density of water vapor that forms them. Imagine about what happens when a pulse with a duration in the range from a few milliseconds to a few microseconds of the high energy beam in contact with a charged cloud of water vapor. Kelvin temperature thousands of radio pulse generator produces instant and simultaneous transformation of the entire volume of water vapor in the cloud liquid water, which practically collapses to the ground as if poured out of a huge bucket suddenly turned upside down! After that, if the area is no longer there are other clouds, it gets rid of other spills launched from heaven, and the beam is moved to a new formation cloudy operators positioned above another and receives areas that flood water and it rolled from high altitude and so on.

The cloud seeding

It is very simple achieved by using aircraft and are known under the form of condensation trails: Contrails or Chemtrails ⁵

Contrails are those normal trails that are forming due to condensation of water from the exhaust gases of jet engines. They appear only at heights above 9,000 meters where the outside temperature is very low. In order to form the contrails it is necessary for the temperature of the gas exhausted of aircraft engine to drop, so they occur at a certain distance from the airplane body and are quickly dispersed. (5)

⁵ Amitie Nenki, *Chemtrails*, Ed. Vidia, 2013

Chemtrails are those trails left by aircraft that look like condensation trails (contrails) but unlike them are very persistent (they may last for several hours if not windy) so we can see them crossing the sky from one side to side to another and usually cover the sky along and across the lattice work, as if someone wanted to cover each piece of the sky.

Chemtrails represent condensation trails of chemical nature left by military or civilian aircraft containing chemical or biological agents deliberately sprayed at high altitudes. There are enough differences between condensation trails (contrails), with which we are used to and that they are fading fast, covering the entire sky, transforming it an white, milky appearance, or the trails can turn into pink or dark gray towards the evening . These delayed chemical weapons, represent bioterrorist attacks taking place across the globe. Within the patent of Bernard Eastlung is mentioned that it is possible to disperse barium in the upper atmosphere and it is specified that it is likely to greatly increase the conductivity, thereby favoring the onset of certain resonance phenomena that allow the use of The HAARP-type systems. (the earthquakes in the Izvoarele Locality /Galati County)

It goes without saying that the elderly or ill and young children are most vulnerable. Here are the symptoms that have been observed:

1. Bleedings of the nose and lungs. They appear in several reports of shelters for elderly persons. These symptoms can be directly attributed to atmospheric aerosol sprayed through the chemtrails);
2. Asthma and allergies: the growing number of young people using inhalers is unsettling;
3. Many presents various irritations due to all these toxic agents;
4. Allergic bronchopulmonary aspergillosis (ABPA) (microscopic fungi on the level of the lungs in young children);
5. Flu, bronchitis, and pneumonia (they have epidemic proportions, the doctors found that their patients need several weeks to recover and they are complaining about the ineffectiveness of antibiotics);
6. Upper respiratory symptoms, including pulmonary syndrome lock (PDS) in neonates, children and in even adults, sudden infant death (SIDS)
7. Fever or nocturnal perspirations;
8. Deaths due to black fungus, black or red mold on agricultural crops (many people reporting significant changes in soil and water pH, the last snow, happened in the night of 07 February 2015 had the pH of 7.9), in buildings (including schools) and ventilation systems;
9. Arthritis- and muscle pains-like symptoms
10. Gastrointestinal disorders;
11. Bladder infections (including enuresis, not only in infants but also in adults);
12. Sudden hearing loss; tinnitus (ringing in the form of auditory sensations and whistlings in the ears, without any external stimulus), dizziness (feeling felt by people becoming more and more numerous, immediately before or after a storm or after a rapid change of temperature);
13. Blurred vision, nervous tics after exposure to the outside air;
14. Dry skin and chapped lips, rash, wounds and fungal infections, aging of skin;
15. In women: a painful and prolonged menstrual bleeding;
16. Confusion and hindering of the mental processes; thoughts or feelings seem to be blurred;
17. Immunity problems (lupus, thyroid, Crohn's disease and Addison's disease, fibromyalgia, Lyme borreliosis, arthritis and rheumatism).

We can obtain ourselves samples of substances that are part of chemtrails such as barium or other specified elements, procuring ourselves a HEPA filter that we will expose into the ambient air for several days. The HEPA filters are high efficiency filters, filters made

in a filtration medium of glass microfiber paper, repellent, fungicide and bactericide treated, not containing cellulose. They are used for filtering of the extremely fine submicron particles, found suspended in the air, fog, viruses, radioactive aerosols etc., for environments that require a very high purity of the air. Of course all these symptoms can occur in various other diseases as associated factors. We are discussing however of the effects produced in very special conditions in apparently healthy people. The last decade (2002-2011) was the warmest in history in Europe, with the temperature at ground level in Europe by 1.3° C above the pre-industrial average. Various projections show that in Europe could be 2.5-4° C warmer in the last part of the XXI century compared with the 1961-1990 average.²

The heat waves have increased in frequency and duration, causing ten of thousands of deaths in the last decade. The expected multiplying of the heat waves could increase the related deaths in the coming decades, unless the societies will adapt, says the report. However, the cold related deaths is expected to decline in many countries. While the amount of precipitations is decreasing in southern regions, it is growing in Northern Europe, says the report. It is expected that these trends will continue. Climate change is expected to increase the number of floods, especially in northern Europe, since high temperatures intensify the water cycle. However, it is difficult to dissociate the influence of climate change on flood data kept until now. The decreases in river flows seem to have become more severe and more frequent in Southern Europe. It is expected that minimum flows of the rivers will decrease significantly during the summer in Southern Europe, but also in many other parts of Europe differently. To Arctic Region is warming faster than other regions. In the Arctic has been observed a negative record on floating ice in 2007, 2011 and 2012, representing about half of the minimum observed in the 1980s. The melting of the Greenland icecap doubled compared with 1990s, losing in weight in average 250 billion tons every year between the 2005 and 2009. The glaciers in the Alps have lost about two thirds of their volume since 1850, and these trends are expected to continue. The seas level is rising, increasing the risk of coastal flooding during the storms. The average global sea level rose 1.7 mm per year in the twentieth century and 3 mm per year in the last decades. The projections for the future vary widely, but it is likely that in the XXIth century, the rising of the sea level to be higher than in the XXth century. However, the rising of the sea level along European coasts vary, for example, due to local land movements. Besides the health effects related to heating, another effects on human health are also important, says the report. The climate change contributes to the transmission of certain diseases. For example, they allow the species of ticks *Ixodes ricinus* to multiply to the north, while the continuing warming may cause some parts of Europe are more favorable to mosquitoes and flies carrying diseases. Pollination season is longer and starts 10 days earlier than 50 years ago, which also affects human health. Many studies have measured changes on a large scale in plant and animal characteristics. For example, the plants bloom earlier in the year, while the phytoplankton and the freshwater zooplankton also appear earlier. Other animals and plants migrate to north or to the highlands as their habitats are heated. Because the rate of migration of many species is insufficient to keep pace with the rate of climate change, they could be pushed to extinction in the future.

Although the amount of water available for agriculture could fall in southern Europe, the conditions for crop production could improve in another areas. The growing season for many crops in Europe has been extended and this thing is expected to continue in the future, along with the extending of the warm season crops to more northern latitudes. However, it is planned the decrease in yield for some crops due to heat waves and drought in Central and Southern Europe.

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THE ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF GLOBALIZATION

Cristian NICULESCU,

Military priest, PhD. Candidate “CAROL I” National Defense University,
cristianniculescu70@yahoo.com

Abstract: *In modern society one can notice that this complex phenomenon – globalization – may lead to the transformation of peoples into masses of individuals, leveling cultures and mixing religions, as well as to the homogenization of people’s outer appearance and behaviour, to the Americanization of their way of life. The real reason for approaching globalization by themes (usually this is done in a negative sense) is that, among its many positive and negative aspects, it engenders man’s dramatic annihilation as a person, from the religious, spiritual and anthropological points of view. Consequently, religions are promoted and understood as “means of psychological regulation”, an outlook totally opposed to the approach of Christianity as knowledge of the revealed truth about God as a Person and His communion with creation. Globalization brings about a certain image of the world, seen as homogenizing material, while ignoring its principles, values and particularities, and instituting the reign of money and power.*

Key words: *globalization, Orthodoxy, spirituality, truth, freedom, democracy*

In modern society one can notice that this complex phenomenon – globalization – may lead to the transformation of peoples into masses of individuals, leveling cultures and mixing religions, as well as to the homogenization of people’s outer appearance and behaviour, to the Americanization of their way of life. The real reason for approaching globalization by themes (usually this is done in a negative sense) is that, among its many positive and negative aspects, it engenders man’s dramatic annihilation as a person, from the religious, spiritual and anthropological points of view. Consequently, religions are promoted and understood as “means of psychological regulation”, an outlook totally opposed to the approach of Christianity as knowledge of the revealed truth about God as a Person and His communion with creation. Globalization brings about a certain image of the world, seen as homogenizing material, while ignoring its principles, values and particularities, and instituting the reign of money and power.

The Orthodox outlook opposes to globalization Christian universality, based on giving up selfishness; it is achieved inside the world, at the level of persons, inside man and history, by endless strive and self-sacrifice, according to Christ’s model. Foreseeing that, unless humans take attitude against the negative effects of globalization, this complex non-personal phenomenon will worsen personal and community life, thus annulling real and concrete human communion. World civilization is not built on people’s homogeneity but on their elevation to personal dignity, inspired by the universal spirit.

An objective analysis allows us to notice that globalization does not mean relativism and has to be perceived as dialogue. As to Orthodoxy, it has to overcome the prejudices and tensions linked to modernity and the logic of the old symphony, while facing dialogue. Beyond these general principles, it results that the phenomenon of globalization is an expression of secularization, which neglects or undermines religion, dealing with other topics. Nevertheless, despite the conditions imposed by secularization, it is recommended to be “within the scope of these new unity forces of humanity, without superiority or inferiority complexes”, and the “non-religious factors” such as the socialist movement or other

movements whose ideals were initially religious but later on became lay (equality, individual freedom, justice) must be treated as partners in fulfilling the universal ideals. Even so, in a relationship of collaboration, religion will not be able to ignore its criticizing role, the necessity of a daring expression and prophetic vision, as well as the identification of the dangers and risks engendered by the degradation of contemporary culture and spirituality.

The Orthodox Church is prevalent in three E.U. countries, so the question may arise if it can and does succeed to take part in the process of European integration and in the consolidation of the European institutions. In our country, the Romanian Orthodox Church, by its synodal (college) organization and its experience in keeping a balanced ratio between particularity and alterity, lives unity in diversity, recommends subsidiarity and co-responsibility, principles underlying the European construction. The principle of subsidiarity, so often mentioned and underlined in the debates related to the European institutions and to the ratio between national sovereignty and the political identity of the European Union, is a basic principle for the organization of our ancient Church.

Even if for the time being the leaders of the European states do not succeed to reach an agreement on the formal and unanimous assertion of Europe's Christian roots, for us, Orthodox Romanians, it is important to offer Europe everything that our Christian identity may bring. Christianity brings about the capacity to accept differences and develop love and respect for our like, overcoming selfishness and living in humility, unconditionally, without expecting anything in exchange. Christ forever marked the identity of the old continent. To this effect, the European spiritual and cultural patrimony is an indisputable testimony. Even if, for many people, the economic relations are more important than the assertion of ideals and identity, each of us has the obligation to compensate the absence of official acknowledgement for the Christian church by hard personal and community endeavour to do that which, for various reasons, is overshadowed and left aside.

It is natural that Romania's integration into the European family should be carefully analyzed from various angles; on the one hand, integration is a great spiritual challenge and on the other hand, our national Church may contribute to re-settling the European Union on natural spiritual basis, by preserving the cultural and spiritual Christian Orthodox identity of the Romanian people and by developing the inter-cultural dialogue with other European peoples. Europe will have a grim future if we take into account that by 2040 it is estimated that 60% of the old continent's population will be Moslim and 80% of Christians will be retired. This is a genuine geopolitical challenge to which the European institutions must find a quick solution, so that the European community will be and stay a common space of security, freedom and justice.

It is necessary to take immediate decisions for a new strategy of the European Community, meant to ensure in the near future not only short-term economic security, as shown by the (still) ongoing economic crisis, but also long-term religious security, built on the universal principles of mutual love and respect. Thus, we can hope that we will never experience a clash of civilizations, as Huntington said, but stability based on interculturalism and ecumenism.

The theologian and academician Dumitru Popescu stated that "if economy, politics, culture and law are dimensions universally acknowledged by a transforming Europe, things are different when it comes to the specific religious dimension".¹ European culture has become more and more secular, eliminating God from the objective reality and replacing Him with man. That is why Feuerbach said that it was not God that created Man, but Man created God. The French Revolution and the Enlightenment played a decisive role in this outlook, excluding religion from the public domain. Within the European space we can speak about a

¹ Priest Dumitru Popescu, Professor, PhD, *Biserica ortodoxă Română și Integrarea Europeană*, Editura IBMBOR, Buc. 2005 p. 764.

separation between science and religion and it is precisely because of this separation that lay school tends to eliminate religious education and Christian symbols from the public space. This process happened in the Romanian space during the 1848 Revolution, when Romanian culture was divided into two trends: a folk one, deeply influenced by Orthodoxy and an intellectual one, influenced by the ideals of Western culture.²

The Romanian Orthodox Church has the vocation and inner power to overcome these challenges of the new world order and offer universal theology and the world an invaluable and badly needed treasury, especially in a world like the contemporary one, which faces so many anxieties, imbalances and vulnerabilities. In its essence, Orthodoxy is therapeutic, because it offers a way of healing; the difference between Orthodoxy and other Christian rites and religions lies precisely in this capacity to heal. "Orthodoxy has a consummate therapeutic system. It knows the meaning of health, looks frankly upon man's traumas and recommends a perfect therapeutic model of behaviour. We can say that, when faith is distorted, Man's healing is also distorted".³ "This is precisely the great danger of our times: presenting lie as truth and falseness as reality. Unfortunately, today we are witnessing the ideologization of Orthodoxy. The great truths related to life have become mere ideas. Nowadays people have become self-sufficient, presenting their personal truths as general ones. I believe that the greatest danger of our times is autarchy, which means despise for your like, separation from the divine inspiration and God. What Man needs most today is the divine inspiration, but the latter does not work unless man freely and consciously accepts it. We are witnessing a suppression of human liberty at its twilight. A vicious man cannot be free, therefore healthy. This is precisely what Orthodoxy promotes: freedom and self-determination. It makes the difference between sacred and profane and lays the foundation of a "homo religiosus". The contemporary world promotes God's death and the fact that Christian symbols and rituals are useless, in the attempt of laying the foundation of a new religion where the profane becomes sacred".⁴

The non-religious man of our times has reached a state of recklessness that no longer offers him solutions to his own problems, while in his innermost self Man lives that "misterum tremendum", since he was created after God's appearance, with the command of rising to likeness with God. Thanks to religious apriorism, ontologically speaking Man still deeply believes in the idea of God, but this idea must be brought to realization, discovered and implemented, otherwise it will die. That is why modern Man becomes prey to despair, hatred, dismay, violence and extremism. When speaking about the new security environment of the contemporary world, we cannot ignore spiritual security. Will the triumph of democracy and liberalism mean "the end of history", according to Francisc Fukuyama?⁵ Will the westernization of the world mean a new world order, characterized by ethnic and civilization clashes, as anticipated by Huntington?⁶

Huntington postulates a geopolitical conflict potential, for the following reasons:

- 1) there are differences of identity, specificity and inter-civilization
- 2) technology made difficult the coexistence of different civilizations
- 3) the cultural and religious differences are deeper in the human nature than the political and economic ones and the religious identity is stronger than the ethnic one.

Huntington deemed that there are seven civilizations: western, Confucian, Japanese, Moslim, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox and Latin-American, and the Confucian-Moslim

² Priest Dumitru Gh. Popescu, Professor, PhD, *Teologie și cultură*, Ed. IBMBOR, Buc. 1993, p. 46.

³ Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos, *Psihoterapia Ortodoxă*, translated from Greek by Prof. I. Diaconescu, Ed. Sofia, Bucharest, 2003, p. 13

⁴ Mircea Eliade, *Sacral si profanul*, Ed. Humanitas, Buc., 2000, p. 7.

⁵ Fukuyama Francisc, *La fine della storia e l'ultimo uomo*, Rizzoli, Milano, 1992.

⁶ Huntington Samuel, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor*, Ed. Antent, Buc., 1997, pp. 20 – 60.

one will be a danger for the Western world. “Within the current context we can speak about dis-nationalization, since the state can no longer manage the disintegration tendencies, so that the states’ fate will depend on their capacity to prepare and wage, not a military war, but a world economic one. Globalization can be used both in a positive and negative way; it is not by stopping globalization but by implementing it in an ethical way that man will reach positive effects, by solving the equation with three unknown variables: free trade, knowledge and democracy. Globalization by suppression of the borders may degenerate into selfishness without borders”.⁷ The concept of globalization is understood from three different perspectives:

- the perspective of uniformization, generalization and non-differentiation
- the perspective of destroying entities and abolishing all frontiers and barriers
- the perspective of interconnecting entities⁸

The Treaty of Lisbon stipulates for the following objectives: promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion, solidarity among the member states, while respecting the rich cultural and linguistic diversity and watching over the development and protection of the European cultural patrimony. There is no mention of the European spiritual patrimony and heritage. Europe has developed horizontally in a spectacular way, while ignoring the vertical spiritual line. To this effect, Andrei Pleșu said: “Europe from the *center* does not know about the countries it includes more than it needs in order to align them. It does not search for its past in their past and does not take interest in the latently existing Christian spiritual unity among its members and candidates, based on some common religious and cultural experiences. The in-depth look only searches for failure and guilt (Balkan cruelty and nationalisms), while the upward look is only after effective metaphors. ”Institutional” Europe is a Europe which for the time being prefers to ignore its initial Christian bases.”⁹

European man has lost contact with sacrality, the divine inspiration link with God, falling into individualism, consumerism and the irresponsible exploitation of creation. The phenomenon of globalization is ”before anything else, a macro-economic, industrial, financial, technological and military phenomenon, in which many people see a triumph of capitalism on a world scale”¹⁰, that is “a political, economic and social transformation, by abolishing cultural and national differences”.¹¹ Although the EU Treaty asserts the principle of “unity in diversity”, this unity can only be given by Christianity, which must be considered the fourth pillar of the EU, besides the three established by the Maastricht Treaty.

The east-European religious context has two main poles: the Church and the State, two institutions that work complementarily in most countries, the religious structure being an important factor in the formation of state structures. Initially unitary, lately the religious structure has undergone a significant diversification, always tolerated by the historic Churches. The social situation has gone through a dramatic change with the coming to power in several east-European countries of the totalitarian communist regime where the State tried to suppress, ban and eradicate any type of public religious expression. Nonetheless, the secularization imposed by the new system had the opposite effect, in many cases making the Church the most powerful and credible opposition institution. The fall of the totalitarian regimes from the ex-communist gulag was also engendered by an obvious religious component. Starting with the early 90’s we can speak about an era marked by concern for

⁷ Gheorghe Nicolaescu, *Gestionarea crizelor politico-militare*, Ed. Top Form, Buc. 2003, p. 73.

⁸ Lt. col. Doina Mureșan, Assistant Professor, PhD, *Dimensiunea economică a securității în epoca parteneriatelor și a alianțelor (PhD thesis)*, Ed. Amanda, București, 2009, p. 7.

⁹ www.infoeuropa.ro/ieweb/imgupload/Andrei_Plesu_verticala_europeana_00001.pdf

¹⁰ Priest Bruno Cescos, Professor, PhD, *Globalizarea-perspective spirituale și teologice*, Editura Reîntregirea, Alba-Iulia 2003, p. 71.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 531.

building up democracy and respect for human dignity. This period of post-communist transition brought out the fact that the type of democracy that all the east-European countries were building was determined by actors from the public scene, among whom only a few were political. The main institution meant to achieve the change is of course the State, which can benefit from the support of education institutions, creators of opinion, among which the Church, and the process is a lengthy one. In many social contexts the Orthodox Church has tried to outline in a coherent and practical discourse, the Christian view upon democracy, without any political commitment, given its vocation of serving all the faithful. Within the context of the changes occurred in all these years, the evolution of the relationships between State and Church, having as a common aim the Romanian people's material prosperity and spiritual health, has imposed a series of actions meant to prove that the Church has an important role in defining the emerging democracy, while having an important contribution to the State's efforts to build it.

Globalization imposes the re-adjustment of the relations among religions, brought about either by the emergence of new religious constructions (type New Age) or by a self-preserving attitude. It is obvious that the discussion about "world religion" is more topical than ever, given its similarities with the globalization phenomenon. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of religious communication and dialogue, both for mutual knowledge and understanding and for respecting the other's liberty, alterity, peaceful coexistence and collaboration for common issues such as social justice and conflict resolution. The perspective of globalization is today more and more remote from the image where a center and a culture impose themselves to the detriment of the other societies. To this effect, religious communities become specific, national "centers of resistance" and "fortresses of identity"; as a reaction to abusive globalization, religions have become the only islands of identity security and comfort people rally around.

In relation to globalization, Orthodoxy is not facing a stalemate. Universality (ecumenism, synodicity in the theological language) is the fundamental component of the bi-millenary Orthodox tradition and the Christian teachings have a universal and eschatological (redeeming) dimension. Culturally speaking, the holistic view emerged during the synthesis between Greek culture and the revealed content of the Christian faith. This approach is also present in the public Orthodox divine cult, which promotes a global perspective, a pan-cosmic view: prayers are for the world's peace and the Orthodox Church is called to guide Man's spiritual rebirth and the redemption through Christ, and assign a meaning to life.

At the core of its concerns, the Orthodox Church places Man (characterized by tenacity and selfless love, opposing justice and harmony to individual egocentrism, xenophobia and racism) and heralds world communion in brotherly love, in parallel with its role of prophecy and criticism against any form of human decadence. The force and sanctifying work of Orthodoxy has neither identified itself with nor relied on the exercise of worldly power. Instead of globalization, which turns people and nations into an entity useful only to the economic purposes of some anonymous oligarchies, the Orthodox life and outlook propose and call people to strive for a communion of brotherly love and respect. This lesson proves the faith in Orthodoxy for the centuries to come: open to evolution, by no means at the outskirts of history but in its vanguard, striving to secure freedom, reassessing man as a person and the integrity of God's creation.

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THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE MISSION OF THE ROMANIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Cristian NICULESCU,

Military priest, PhD. Candidate “CAROL I” National Defense University,
cristianniculescu70@yahoo.com

Abstract: *For almost two millennia the one sacred, synodal and apostolic Orthodox Church has been promoting faith in God, the One glorified in the Holy Trinity, the evangelical message brought by Him and the divine commands according to the godly Revelation (Discovery). That is why the Church cannot change its teachings, irrespective of the laws imposed by state authorities. The Church respects the observance of secular power, but God’s command to perform the work of Man’s redemption in any conditions and circumstances is above the exigencies of this loyalty. In this respect, the Church is completely independent of the state and in certain circumstances may recommend the faithful to adopt a stand towards some decisions taken by the state powers.*

Key words: *ethics, morals, social mission, philanthropic, missionary, pastoral*

For almost two millennia the one sacred, synodal and apostolic Orthodox Church has been promoting faith in God, the One glorified in the Holy Trinity, the evangelical message brought by Him and the divine commands according to the godly Revelation (Discovery). That is why the Church cannot change its teachings, irrespective of the laws imposed by state authorities. The Church respects the observance of secular power, but God’s command to perform the work of Man’s redemption in any conditions and circumstances is above the exigencies of this loyalty. In this respect, the Church is completely independent of the state and in certain circumstances may recommend the faithful to adopt a stand towards some decisions taken by the state powers.

When facing differences, contradictions and political strife, the Orthodox Church proclaims peace and collaboration among people with similar or different opinions. It also allows the existence of different political creeds among its bishops, clerics and lay persons, unless those creeds clearly engender deeds that run against faith and the moral precepts of the Church Tradition. The participation of the Church high leadership and clergy in the activities of certain political organizations and in the electoral process or their public support for political organizations involved in the elections, independent candidates, electoral campaigns and so on, are not allowed. The clergy is forbidden to actively candidate in elections for any body of the representative power, at any level. On the other hand, nothing must prevent the participation of hierarchs, clergymen and lay persons in expressing people’s will in elections, besides and together with the other citizens.

In the history of the Orthodox Church there have been few cases when it supported certain doctrines, opinions, organizations and political leaders. In some of these cases, this support was related to the Church’s need to protect its fundamental interests in the extreme conditions of anti-religious persecutions and the destructive or restrictive actions of a non-Orthodox and faithless power. In certain circumstances, sometimes such participation generated confusion and discord. This happened mostly when the clergy was allowed to candidate in elections without the Church’s blessing. On the whole, the practice of this participation of the clergy in the activity of the power bodies has shown that it is impossible to get involved without assuming responsibility for certain decisions favourable only to a part of the population, to the detriment of the others’ interests, which gravely complicates the

clergy's pastoral and missionary work. From a canonical point of view, the answer to the question whether a priest that holds a state position may concomitantly exert his priestly mission is undoubtedly negative.

The non-participation of the clergy in political disputes, in the parties' activity and in the electoral process does not mean that the Orthodox Church refuses to publicly express its stand in socially significant issues and to publicly present this stand to the power bodies from any country at any level. This position is expressed only by the Synods, by the Church leaders and by persons empowered by the latter. However, nothing prevents the Orthodox faithful to participate in the activities of the legislative, executive or judicial power bodies and in political organizations. Actually, such involvement – in agreement with the faith teachings of the Church, its moral norms and its official position as to the social problems – is one of the forms of the Church's mission in society. Lay persons may and are called to fulfill their civic duty, to take part in processes related to elections at any level and to collaborate in the morally justified actions of the state.

The history of the Orthodox Church mentions a great number of examples of lay persons actively involved in the state's actions, in the activity of certain political and civic associations. This involvement occurred in the conditions of various political systems: autocracy, constitutional monarchy and various forms of republic. The participation of Orthodox lay persons in civic and political processes was very difficult in the conditions of an atheistic or non-Christian regime which supported a policy of state atheism. By taking part in state government and in political processes, Orthodox lay persons are called to base their actions on the norms of evangelical morals, on the link between justice and mercy, on the concern for the people's material and spiritual good, on love for the country and on the wish to transfigure the surrounding world in keeping with Christ's teachings.

At the same time, as a politician or a statesman, the Orthodox Christian must be aware that, in the conditions of the historical reality - moreover, in the context of today's divided and antagonistic society - most of the adopted political decisions and actions tend to favour only a part of society, while restricting or encroaching upon the others' interests and wishes. Many such decisions and actions bear the stamp of sin or complicity to sin. That is why the Orthodox politician or statesman needs extreme spiritual and moral sensitivity.¹

The existence of Christian political organizations and their union in larger Christian Orthodox political associations is perceived by world churches as a positive phenomenon to the extent to which it helps lay persons to get involved in a common state and political action, based on the principles of Christian spiritual-moral principles. Free to perform their activities, these organizations are called to consult the church leadership and co-ordinate their actions to assert the Church's position as to the social problems. Christian Orthodox organizations must not have the character of secret societies, asking exclusive submission to the leaders and consciously refusing to reveal their nature in consultations with the church leadership or even during confession. The Church cannot agree with the participation of lay persons - moreover, of the clergy - in the activity of some non-Orthodox societies of this kind, which, by their very nature, lead man away from his total commitment to God's Church and its canonical order.

The Romanian Orthodox Church, which has a national character, may rely on state support in achieving its social, charitable, cultural, philanthropic, educational projects and other social initiatives. Yet, in its relations with the state, it claims that it is unacceptable for the latter to promote ideas or tendencies leading to total control of personal life, convictions and relations with other people, to degradation of personal, family and public morality, to offense against the religious feelings and the cultural-spiritual identity of the faithful, posing a threat to the sacred gift of life. Thus, the Church does not want to start initiating any form of

¹ Daniel, Metropolitan of Moldavia and Bukovina, *Dăruire și Dănuire*, Iași, 2005, p. 327.

government, but a spiritual rebirth of society and its members' moral and bodily change for the better.

For all that, at the European level, a right balance between religious symbols and religious propaganda, between religious freedom and non-discrimination has not been reached yet. Romania has not been spared weird opinions (both from the inside and the outside), suggesting the elimination from society of any form of religious manifestations. Obviously, the institution that was the most important stake in debates on secularization was school. Maintaining or abolishing the religious symbols from court rooms, hospitals, classrooms or public institutions, as well as swearing on the Bible become the topic of almost amusing debates, even more so that these are institutions whose origins are often the result of the Church's missionary-philanthropic activity, such as hospitals or, in certain situations, schools. Therefore, there cannot be a state without religion or a society without profession of faith; on the other hand, according to some post-Marxist-Leninist hot-headed atheists, "the Church's monopolization of society is an attempt to suppress freedom of conscience" and clearly opposes the aspirations of the civil and political society. Nevertheless, it is known that the ancient Orthodox Church does not in the least wish to "monopolize"; instead, it is present where allowed to and where called. Christ the Redeemer says: "Behold, I am standing at the door and knocking; if anyone hears My voice and opens the door, I will enter and dine with him and he with Me." (Apocalipsis 3, 20).

The real stake in the useless dispute around religious symbols in predominantly Orthodox Romania is related to the presence of the Church in the public space. Wavering between laicism and relativism, the modern state does not cease to consider the common space as an exclusive territory of its laws. Radu Preda remarked that "for over two centuries we have been witnessing this abusive type of laicism, which has led to a situation where, instead of being the guarantee of social peace and common norms, the state also proclaims itself a source of the public conscience. Consistent with this ideology, the state ends by setting a monopoly on the public space and negotiates with the other social actors the share assigned to each of them on the stage."² We may say that modern society is quite reserved as to the public manifestation of the predominant Church. Actually, the lay state is inconvenienced by a strong prevalent Church that censors the moral deviations and the legislative departures sometimes promoted by state institutions. On the other hand, anyone may notice that the Romanian Orthodox Church is a reliable partner of the state when the latter promotes projects meant to bring welfare, stability, coherence and sane moral advance in society. For all that, clerical or lay theologians have not given up their public stand in defending the interests of the faithful, who are also citizens of the state.³ Gradually, unjustly and abusively removed from the public space of the Romanian society in the communist period, the Church was directing its efforts towards organizing and supporting some religious, confessional associations. This happened with hospitals, with social assistance and education institutions, set up, maintained and supported by the Church for centuries on end.

Regarding the institutions of the Orthodox Church and the Romanian Armed Forces, one may say that they represent fundamental bodies for the identity, unity and integrity of the Romanian people. The Armed Forces are a state institution but also an institution of the Romanian nation, made up of our citizens, mostly Orthodox. The Armed Forces have the duty to ensure the national integrity and sovereignty and the Orthodox Church has an essential role in the preservation and spiritual development of the integrity and national identity of our people. The Orthodox Church and the Romanian Armed Forces are fundamental institutions

² Radu Preda, „Amnezia unui continent. Raportul dintre Biserică și Stat între laicism și relativism” in *Teologie și politică, de la Sfinții Părinți la Europa Unită*, p. 315.

³ Rene Remond, *Religie și societate în Europa. Secularizarea în secolele al XIX-lea și al XX-lea (1780- 2000)*, Editura Polirom, București, 2003. See chapter: „E nevoie ca statul să aibă o religie?”, pp. 67-72.

for the sovereignty, identity, national unity and integrity of the Romanian people; they rely on values and principles such as: hierarchical organization, patriotism, innovating tradition, faith and belief, devotion, constancy and self-sacrifice till death, in defense of their ideals and creeds.

What distinguishes them is their different relation with the state but also their specific way of action. While the Church is an institution independent of but not separated from the state, the Armed Forces are a state institution like the other institutions with a political, administrative or juridical character.⁴ They stand out by their specific role in society, by the legal use of force in accomplishing their missions. Thus, according to the Romanian Constitution, the Romanian Armed Forces' mission is to contribute to Romania's security in time of peace and war, to defend Romania and its allies, to promote regional and global stability, to defend state authority in case of civil emergency. We can thus infer that the main role of the military is to fight and its basic purpose the legal use of force. The mission of the Romanian Orthodox Church is the preservation and spiritual development of the national integrity and identity, and its means are different.⁵ The Church's "struggle" consists of the effort to build strong characters, outstanding patriotic, moral and Christian virtues in the faithful, some of them wearing military uniforms while being state citizens. Its "weapons" are the Gospel of the Redeemer Jesus Christ, the accomplishment of the Holy Sacraments, the social-philanthropic and pastoral-missionary involvement.

The above mentioned facts represent favourable conditions for the institutional collaboration between the two institutions. The resumption of permanent religious assistance in the military environment is only one of the proofs of the collaboration between the Armed Forces and the Romanian Orthodox Church. It is certain that right after reintroducing permanent religious assistance in the Romanian Armed Forces, the military clergy played an important role in fulfilling some objectives of the military institutions. Likewise, starting with the professionalization of the Armed Forces and their participation in multinational humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, the status of the military priest is reassessed in harmony with the new priorities, exigencies and objectives of the military institution.

⁴ His Eminence Bartolomeu Anania, *Biserica și Armata*, in „Gândirea Militară Românească”, no. 3, 2005; Archpriest Valentin Bețiu, *Preotul militar slujitor al lui Dumnezeu și al oștirii creștine*, in „Anuarul Academiei Forțelor Terestre” no. 2, 2003.

⁵ Gl. Mircea Mureșan, university professor, PhD, „Interacțiunea axiologică credință-datorie-valoare în configurarea unității europene”, in *Biserica Ortodoxă în Uniunea Europeană. Contribuții necesare la securitatea și stabilitatea europeană*, Coordonatori: Priest Adrian Gabor, university professor, PhD and Radu Petre Mureșan, university assistant, PhD, Editura Universității București, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 6-13.

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GEOPOLITICS, GEOSTRATEGY AND DEFENSE STUDIES

Chairs:

Colonel Associate Professor Constantin POPESCU, PhD

Lecturer Ecaterina HLIHOR, PhD

POLITICAL DETERMINATIONS OF THE WARFARE

Constantin POPESCU,

Colonel, Associate Professor, PhD., Vice dean, Security and Defense Faculty,
“CAROL I” National Defense University
popescu.constantin@myunap.net

Titel IOVA,

Major, PhD., Course Director, Crises Management and Multinational Operations Regional
Department, “CAROL I” National Defense University
iovatitel@yahoo.com

Abstract: *One of the dimensions of political determinations over the war is given by the essential ambivalence characteristics of the political status. Military systems, armed forces act only on behalf and on the political authority request. On this situation, the political level establishes if the war will be waged. Another parameter shows a causality link between politics and warfare, identifiable by the thesis according to which “war is not a necessary event, but a possibility”. On the other hand, national interests are seen as a vague and with multiple meanings concept, according to the identified context. It always launched debates, stressing different positions of the authors, tributary to the international system status in time, the streams of the opinions towards the theories of international relations embraced, and tributary to the relevance of the concept for the analyzed and disputed subject.*

Key words: war, politics, national interest, security, international relations, soft power

Introduction

It is more than obvious the fact that the war means more than what Clausewitz identified as “a continuation of politics with other means¹”. This is tributary to the current context of international relations, tagged by the diversification of the actors in the international system and by the multiplication and globalization of the threats and risks towards state security. We sustain this statement by accepting the fact that divergence is a permanent stage of social system, and it is expressing through various profiles, both within the states, as at international and interstate levels, where the concept of politics may be identified with the concept of conflict.

Therefore, the state, as on behalf of human communities with different dimensions, with political- juridical organization, is the one who must mitigate the divergence, as to harmonize various interests, to temper the differences, and to remove oppositions on various dimensions: social, economical, cultural and so. These processes are conducted through the use of political power’s rights to organize and to rule the social system in its whole through governance. This state function is applied on inner plan, on intrastate level, and on external environment – interstate dimension.

Political influences over the warfare

To conduct a proper, scientifically accurate investigation on the political influences over the warfare, it is required a multilevel analysis, with the starting point the preeminence of the politics on the use of force or applying of constraints monopoly. Domenico Fisichella

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 67.

identifies at least two important implications of this preeminence: *politics are managing the community activities, and politics has no limits within all of community life sectors*².

The first implication refers to the fundamental role of the politics in society rules establishment, as stressed by Aristotel in *Politéia* – constitution, the fundamental law. From this perspective, politics is the one who establishes the conditions over the use of war, in order to reach the established objectives. The complexity of this role assumed by politics towards the decision of using (or not using) the force in relation with other actors in the international system is emphasized by the diversity of the threats and risks array towards the individual security and state security, specifics to the current security environment.

On the other hand, the first dimension of political determinations over the war is given by the “essential ambivalence characteristics of the political status”³. According to this consideration, a political construction has an inherent part of opponent’s exclusion, and a part of friendly, allies’ inclusion. Politics identifies the opponents, and, on the same time, establishes the future strategic partnerships. Different said, as stated by Domenico Fisichella, “Politics sums up, for sure, the possibility of hostilities and the possibility of alliances”⁴. Following this logics, the connection between politics and war is given by the fact that the first on is nominating who are the enemies and who are the allies, in case of any confrontation. This is founded on rigorous criteria based on the shared values system and on the direction of state interests: convergent or divergent. Most of the time, the political level identifies partners firstly and later on it commence its’ hostilities with the adversary. On those situations, politics is the one who establishes *with whom* the war will be waged. The main challenge of contemporary political systems is to identify the best operational and institutional ways to “confront and manage the conflicts”⁵, considering firstly the necessity to avoid the escalation of crises and to prevent military confrontation, and at last to solve the problems through warfare.

The following parameter which shows a causality link between politics and warfare is identifiable following the thesis according to “war is not a necessary event, but a possible one”⁶. The argument that support the necessity of military confrontation starting from the conflict solving examples that reached a stalemate from which only by the use of force could find a solution, and therefore changing the war into a decisive factor, is opposed by the simple and evident consideration that not all the wars that could occur during history actually emerged. The Cuban missiles crisis is one of those examples from the recent history, but it were, many more cases when politics found solutions to crises, avoiding armed confrontation. That happened because the political system invented and imposed a legitimate monopole on force. Military systems, regular armed forces act only on behalf and on the political authority request. On this situation, the political level establishes *if* the war will be waged.

The legitimate monopole of the public authority, represented by the government, over the force means, has reduced the possibility of discretionary use of those by the subjects opened to this manner of problem solving. The government is the only public authority accredited and recognized with the right to organize, maintain and use of the armed forces for defending citizen’s security and states’ stability. There is another important consideration reflecting the politics influence over the war. Rushing to get more and more destructive means of combat, as strategists desire to increase the chances of success, in military armories appeared means that have produced too much suffering and too much destruction to be justified from their necessity to attain victory with all costs. It is about mass destruction

² Domenico Fisichella, *Știința politică: probleme, concepte, teorii*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, p. 71.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 50.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 52.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 54.

weaponry, antipersonnel mines, fragmentation ammunition and so on. As a direct result, states decided to limit or to prohibit those means, through international protocols and agreements. Those arrangements once ratified at national level, become mandatory to follow. Therefore, on this scenario, the political level decides *with what means* the war will be waged. On the same page, we must highlight the fact that the governments of the current democratic states possess a large array of different means to define their behavior on international arena. So, the non – military power vectors define a series of capabilities that can be used by states in political confrontation, and named by some authors as *soft- power*⁷.

There are different opinions according to warfare will not be a continuation of politics anymore, but the end of politics. Different said, the stage of war might be seen as a failure of politics. This is the *last and extreme ratio* of politics; therefore we can debate about a “*continuum politics- war*”⁸, while the confrontation last on the invisible background in the globalised human society. State and supra- state political structures are responsible for the states’ behavior in international system, no matter if we are talking from the realism, liberal perspective, or from the ascendance of constructivism paradigm point of view. Kenneth N. Waltz stated that the “actors (*states*) and the intermediary entities (*international organizations*), as components of the international system are sided by forces and competition, more likely, than authority and law”⁹. Thus, it is required to have responsible political structures to assume the first part of the continuum – the public order. But, the dominant feature of an anarchic global system, as seen by Aron Raymond, is defined by “the absence of a tribunal or a police force, the rights to use force, plurality of the autonomous decision centers, alternatives and the continuous interdependence between peace and war”¹⁰. We can stress that politics is assuming the conflict management in international arena using preferentially power instruments of non – military and non – violent nature. Unfortunately, the international relations practice is abundant with examples of diplomatic, economic or informational instruments proved to be inefficient and useless to solve contradictory situations. On those situations, human society moved to the other side of the continuum, named warfare. As a direct consequence, politics is the one which is dictating *when* to use the warfare as a tool.

The second meaning of the politics – war relation, as stressed by Fisichella, starts from the recognition of the interventionist character of the politics in society¹¹. This ideological thesis is showing the political power as the one that establishes political objectives for each domain, including security. When formulating the security politics for internal or international environments, politicians start from the identification of the *national interests* to establish the paths to follow concurrently with other state and non – state actors, in order to achieve the security objective. Different said, the interests are determining the *modus operandi* of an actor, not directly, but through the mediation of a project, usually of a political nature. Therefore, the politics transform, change and transpose the interests into action. This action can be of a violent or non – violent nature and can use all the power instruments, including military

The international system structure, as seen by Waltz and Raymond, oblige the international actors to an interaction based competition. As direct consequence towards the main characteristics identified by the quoted authors, “*The international political structure*

⁷ For more details concerning the concept of *softpower* , to be consulted Robert Nye Jr, *Puterea blândă*, Editura Institutul European, Iași, 2009.

⁸ Domenico Fisichella, *Op.cit.*, p. 55.

⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Teoria politicii internaționale* , Editura Polirom, Iași, 2006, p. 165.

¹⁰ Raymond Aron, *What is a theory of international relations?*, in Journal of International Affairs, vol 21, p. 192, apud Kenneth N. Waltz, *Op.cit.*, p. 99.

¹¹ Domenico Fisichella, *Op.cit.*, pp. 71 -72.

*becomes powerful, with weighty effects*¹². This reality is transposed into practice through polarity (the increasing number of the great powers on international arena is activating the power equation) and through the apparition of regional security complexes (the identification of regional common security problems).

State and non – state actors behavior through the international system relations is marked simultaneously by diversity and increased complexity, no matter if they belong to regional or global security complexes or if they act alone. The common element that explains and determines the attitude and the intensity of actors involvement in regional or international problems solving, is to be found as *national interest* concept. The problems get complicated when considering the increased presence in international arena of the non- state actors (ONGs, multinational corporations, religious movements, ethnic groups, trans - frontier criminal organizations, terrorist organizations and so on). All those non –state actors are different as “goals, objectives, structure, power levels, [...] with increased influence over international relations”¹³. Due to those conditions and according to the security specialists, we ascertain “the presence in political address or in geopolitical analysis of some derivatives, as *specific interest, global interest, regional interest, security interest, economic interest, political interest, ideology interest*, along with the concept of *national interest*”¹⁴. On the other hand, some of the authors delimitate very clear the national interest that dictate the objectives and the purpose of the actors external relations, from the public interest, manifested within the analyzed actors limits¹⁵.

No matter of their nature, the state and non-state actors are in interdependence relations of cooperation or compulsion nature and they are using power instruments in order to promote or defend their interests, thus influencing the evolution of the international system at local, regional or global level. Nevertheless, the states position themselves in the core of the international system paradigm analysis (as a nation- state, according to the realism and constructivism theories, or as part of international bodies, according to the liberal theories)¹⁶. As a result, we consider the *national interest* to be found, more or less obvious, as integral part of the collocations enounced above.

We will analyze the determinations of the politics over the war, from national interests’ claims and sustaining perspective, as seen in the political practice, starting from the fact that national interests “*are essential to establish the objectives or purposes as direct goals for politics and strategies*”¹⁷.

National interests are seen as a pretty vague and with multiple meanings concept, according to the identified context, the identification and defining way and it always launched debates, stressing different positions of the authors, tributary to the international system status in time, the streams of the opinions towards the theories of international relations embraced, and tributary to the relevance of the concept for the analyzed and disputed subject. For example, Henry Kissinger saw in national interests the engine of the main political and strategic coordination for a state. The author considers as crucial importance the identification and delimitation of the national interests, suggesting the possibility of change in accordance

¹² Barry Buzan, Richard Little, *Istoria sistemelor politice internaționale*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2009, p. 345.

¹³ Teodor Frunzeti, *Geostrategie*, Editura CTEA, București, 2009, p. 57.

¹⁴ Constantin Hlihor, *Geopolitica de la clasic la postmodern*, Editura Karta Gragic, Ploiești, 2012, p. 144.

¹⁵ Alan G. Stolberg, *Crafting National Interests in the 21st Century*, in J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., (editor), *National Security Policy and Strategy*, The US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II, 2001, p. 3, available online at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1005.pdf>, accessed at 06.11.2004.

¹⁶ For more details to be consulted Teodor Frunzeti, *Op.cit.*, pp. 57 -97, Constantin Hlihor, *Op.cit.*, pp. 67 -80, Barry Buzan, Richard Little, *Op.cit.*, pp. 259 -289, Radu –Sebastian Ungureanu, *Securitatea, suveranitatea și instituțiile internaționale*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2010, pp. 69 -99.

¹⁷ Constantin Hlihor, *Op.cit.*, pp. 145 -146.

with the evolution of the international system¹⁸. Hans Morgenthau considers the national interests as “the very essence of the politics and it is not affected by time or space circumstances”¹⁹. This means the existence of a series of central interests, unchangeable from the importance perspective for the international system²⁰.

Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham consider the national interests as a “divers and multiple meaning set of subjective preferences, that change on periodical basis, as response to the evolution of the inner political process and as an answer to the international system changes. Therefore, the national interest seems to be more likely what the politicians said, as been”²¹. No matter of the adopted attitude, we must stress that a national interest must be assessed as “supported objective from the whole social groups of a state”²², in order to be properly identified and defined.

In a broad definition, national interest can be “*what is considered by a certain state (actor) to be [...] a desirable goal*”²³, but, through of whom accomplishment the economical, political social, ecological situation is maintained or improved. On the same page the accomplishment is influencing the actor’s behavior on the inner or outer environment. Starting from the assertion according to whom “*national interests are reflecting the nation’s identity – geography, culture, political sympathies and social consent, and the economical prosperity and demographic amelioration*”²⁴, P.H. Liotta saw the concept more than a set of abstract guidance or concepts, but he is considering the “*answer to the essential and fundamental question: << For what are we willing to die?>>*”²⁵. According to him, the essence of the fundamental interest for a state is the meaning of the nation will and for what “*the citizen are willing to wage wars*”²⁶.

Joseph Nye, as constant promoter of the employment of the soft power in the international relations science, considers that “a democratic definition of the national does not accept the difference between moral based external politics and interest based politics”²⁷. The followers of defining the national interests with the morals, as main pillar, are setting the inclusion of common values into the concept (peaceful relations among states, peace keeping, conflict prevention, democracy promotion, equality of chances), different from the realism stream which considers the national interest as seen through actor’s advantage in relation with others.

The dichotomy’s elimination referring to the national interest specific ways of approach resulted from the contrast between the pragmatic and the moral point of view, represent a basic requirement for all the relevant actors, considering the current international

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 143 -145.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 147.

²⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Fourth Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, p. 8, apud. Alan G. Stolberg, *Op.cit.*, p. 5.

²¹ Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, London, UK: Penguin Books, 1998, p. 345, apud. Alan G. Stolberg, *Op.cit.*, p. 5.

²² Petre Duțu, Cristina Bogzeanu, *Interesele naționale și utilizarea instrumentelor de putere pentru apărarea lor, cazul României*, Editura Universității Naționale „Carol I”, București, 2010, p. 12.

²³ G. R. Berridge and Alan James, *A Dictionary of Diplomacy*, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, Second Edition, 2003, p. 181, apud. Alan G. Stolberg, *Op.cit.*, p. 4.

²⁴ P.H. Liotta, *Still Worth Dying for National Interests and the Nature of Strategy*, Naval War College Review, Vol. LVI, No. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 129 -130, available online at <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/73ae174a-4d7c-45c0-8180-3e9c5964af33/Still-Worth-Dying-For--National-Interests-and-the-.aspx>, accessed at 06.11.2014

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 130.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 128.

²⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, 78 (July-August 1999), pp. 23 -24, apud. P.H. Liotta, *To Die For: National Interests and Strategic Uncertainties*, in *The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters*, Vol XXX, available online at <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/00summer/liotta.htm>, accessed at 06.11.2014

system configuration. Practice has demonstrated that only by adopting a position that express a compromise between the mentioned currents, it is possible to define the interests required to achieve the goal of security, without excluding the other actors and avoiding isolation on international arena.

One of the essential characteristics linked to the political influence over the war, from the politics interventionist side, is revealed from the national interests' prioritization on the importance order, seen as objectives of the external and internal policies. The establishment of different categories from the national interests is done in report to different criteria, from who most used are: their importance for the national security; the intensity of their defense or pursue; their stability in time²⁸. The classification of the national interests into different categories leads to "different intensity outlines or prioritization for each interest, separately"²⁹

In order to highlight the connection between politics and warfare through the national interests, we can use as a proper example the thesis proposed by Hans Morgenthau, who identified two levels of national interests, in accordance with the intensity and importance: *vital and secondary*³⁰. The superior level is that one of the *vital interests*. It has direct influence over the states' security, independence and sovereignty. They are non- negotiable and for their defense the states are willing to use all their power instruments, up to military confrontation. The lower level of the secondary interests is important, but no crucial. Those interests are the most difficult to identify, negotiable and it can be the subject of compromise in international relations.

Conclusions

One important factor of the politics influences over the war is the necessity of power resources identification, based on the prioritization of the international interests. The political leadership can decide if the military force must be employed to achieve one of the national interests, which is immediate and vital for the national security, along with the other strategic engagement lines (diplomatic, economic and informational areas). In other words, political leadership is deciding which one form the national interests is linked directly to the national security and must be enforced with power- from realism perspective, and which ones are based on moral principles, their accomplishment not being essential for the state's security.

The political determination of the war is essential and they are stressing a complex process. Otherwise, the political conditioning principle of the war and the principle of active determination between those two social areas are considered by some authors as essential for strategic situation analysis and for an actor's behavior on the international arena³¹. The institutions tasked with political leadership's support to reach decisions on national policies and strategies are focused on the importance of strategic economy areas, as well.

²⁸ Constantin Hlihor, *Op.cit.*, p. 149.

²⁹ Alan G. Stolberg, *Op.cit.*, p. 8.

³⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Impasse of American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 191, apud P.H. Liotta, *Still Worth Dying for National Interests and the Nature of Strategy*, Naval War College Review, Spring 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 2, p. 130.

³¹ Mircea Mureșan, Gheorghe Văduva, *Războiul viitorului, viitorul războiului*, Editura Universității Naționale „Carol I”, București, 2004, p. 88.

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TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION: FORMULATING A SECURE FUTURE

Roxana CHIRITA,

Master student, “CAROL I” National Defense University, Faculty of Security and Defense
rchirita9@gmail.com

Scott TINNEY,

Bachelor student, The Hague University of Applied Sciences,
Faculty of Safety and Security Management Studies
tinneysa@gmail.com

Abstract: *The transatlantic cooperation involves generally two parts: NATO (with the USA as its major military force provider) and the EU. As in any type of partnership, there are different challenges that test the cooperation between the partners. Some of the most prominent threats are imposed by the current state of affairs of our world which is defined by a rise of intra- and inter-state conflicts, terrorist groups (ISIS, Al-Qaeda), the Ukrainian crisis and the tensions between Russia and the West being some of the relevant examples. The next step the two entities would have to take differs depending on their capabilities. The EU should invest in common military capabilities which will enable the block to act autonomously in future conflicts, whereas NATO would have to better coordinate budget spending in order to close the gap regarding the pooling and sharing of capabilities.*

Key words: *transatlanticism, security, asymmetry, conflict stabilization, policy*

Introduction

Hans Morgenthau argued that the laws of politics and society derive from human nature, defined by three basic principles: survival, reproduction and domination. The international system comprises states fighting to assure their survival. The universality of the realist paradigm derives from national concern with the protection of their interests in an anarchic system where cooperation can be limited by the structure of the system itself because states are worried that “a division of possible gains [...] may favor others more than itself¹”, hence states become individual actors driven by military force. Analyzing the modern international arena, one observes, on one hand, improved collaboration between states; world actors have developed better relations – the strongest example being the UN, considered to be the “missing” higher power which can oversee international relations. On the other hand, the economic crisis, the changing global power and the significant rise of conflicts, indicate a relapse of world affairs.

This paper intends to bring a contribution to the analysis of the transatlantic cooperation and progress, focusing on the European perspective of providing international security and peace through different instruments, as well as on the NATO (with an emphasis on the US) – EU partnership. Security and defense on both sides will play a central part, whereas the examination of current world affairs will bring clarification on the relevance of the next steps to be followed by the two entities in order to maintain their present roles and advance customized strategies to future challenges of a multi-polar international system.

Elman, C. & Jensen M. 2014. *The Realism Reader*. Routledge, p. 114.

Security challenges abound for both the US and the EU. Geo-political moves indicate that a new world order will emerge: there is a shift of power from West to East, marked by the US pivot towards Asia - Pacific. Therefore, the EU risks to become a geo-political buffer zone trapped between two rival blocks, indicating it is high time the EU should establish a common European military corpus in order to be able to cope with future challenges and multiple crises.

While so far the NATO alliance, the bulk of whose military might is provided by the US, has provided for much of the security of Europe this trend is diminishing. This is due partly to the strategic “pivot” of US foreign policy towards Asia, which will see a decrease in US military presence in Europe. However, the principal reason for which NATO will not be able to fully guarantee European security rests on the shoulders of its member states which, with four exceptions, do not meet the 2% of GDP defense spending target². While 2% may be an unrealistic target, or one abstracting reality³, European military might is minimal, as the recent economic crisis saw defense budgets slashed, and equipment sold without co-ordination, leaving severe gaps in European military capabilities⁴.

Going up against these diminished capabilities are an expanding plethora of challenges. The emergence of an aggressive Russia in its neighborhood, an arms race building up among non-NATO members, an increasingly tense maritime environment on the grand strategic side of affairs are all threats to the transatlantic partnership between the US and Europe. Challenges inherent to technological development, specifically in the arenas of cyber and robotics technology, must also be assessed and planned for in a systematic manner.

Also worrisome is the method of warfare arguably pioneered by Putin’s Russia in Ukraine, which takes advantage of the same gaps in international legal frameworks that terrorist and criminal entities do, as they cannot be labelled as combatants, yet fulfil that role. Moreover, the military operations conducted by Russia are features of asymmetric warfare and can be categorized as “guerilla strategies”. Such strategies might be more successful than those employed by technologically advanced parties that focus on the theory of speed in their approach to war, because the “long war of endurance” – or the guerilla warfare as defined by Mao-Tse-tung – is less (or not at all in the case of a domestic insurgency) reliant on long supply chains, deployment orders and the management of an “invader’s” image. Because it implies long-time sustained actions that imperil the success of short actions taken by more advanced parties, it succeeds not by military dominance as much as drawing out the conflict to a point where the superior party, for reasons political, economic or military, can or will not continue the conflict.

Furthermore, while the US’s military force is well structured and prepared for symmetrical inter-state conflict, and is virtually unchallengeable in that arena, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted major deficiencies that this force has in the arena of Stability Security Transition Reconstruction, or SSTR. Strategically, inability in SSTR leaves open the probability of conflict-displaced populations becoming involved in insurgent, terrorist, or, criminal organizations, as evidenced by Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan, as well as arguably the rise of ISIS from Iraq’s former military⁵. The prevalence of complex

² Fidler, S. 2014. *NATO Leaders to Vow to Lift Military Spending*, published on Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from <http://online.wsj.com/articles/nato-leaders-to-vow-to-lift-military-spending-1409832341>. par. 2.

³ Hasik, J. 2014. *Is NATO's 2% of GDP a relevant target?*, published on <http://www.atlantic-council.org/en/blogs/defense-industrialist/is-nato-s-2-of-gdp-a-relevant-target> par. 5.

⁴ Rajendran, G. 2014. *Giri Rajendran: What now for European defence spending?* | IISS. published on <http://www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2014-3bea/april-7347/what-now-for-european-defence-spending-e70e>

⁵ Hubbard, N., & Schmitt, E. 2014. *Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS*, published on <http://nyti.ms/1tEDcVI>

intra-state conflicts challenges international peace and stability, especially considering the current inability to intervene effectively by the international community.

The necessity of a European military emerges not only from uncertain future, but also from the bulk of issues at home which led to a loss of common purpose and shared ambition, feelings emphasized by the economic crisis. While Europeans may consider their current position adequate, this will not persist without serious moves towards European defense and security.

EU:

The EU is a soft power driven world actor acknowledging principles of solidarity, liberty and diversity, striving to achieve international security and a ruled-based international order. For a successful accomplishment of these goals, soft power must be backed by a hard dimension, thus a strategy based on smart power should be the cornerstone of the Common Security and Defense Policy. The development of a shared strategic culture where the already-established institutions – European Defense Agency, the Political and Security Committee, EU Military Staff EU Military Committee, EUFOR, European External Action Service, etc. – work together in a common, comprehensive manner is imperative. To establish a functioning CSDP, the European nations should be mutually accountable, give up part of their sovereignty and further develop and implement integrative projects. The moves in this regards, such as the European “defense semester” or the Smarter Defense: A Public-Private Partnership for CSDP document co-authored by the European External Action Service and the European Commission, prove that the European leadership is now deliberating on how to improve and advance the union’s military capabilities. What is interesting is that private entities are keener to work on the European security than the national governments. The reason behind Europe’s consortium of capitalists involvement is the worrisome feeling “that [the] EU political structures are unable to locate and defend the continent’s business interests around the world”⁶. Ergo, if a strategy based on smart power ought to be developed, the key to a successful development is partnership (that supposes a certain level of trust regarding the availability of common capabilities) which will imply a shared part in the application of hard power tools that will foster a more active implication of member states in achieving the common goals and interests.

In addition, the US “have made it particularly clear that the superpower [NATO] is no longer willing to carry the burden of Europe’s defense”⁷. This should be another point of concern for the Europeans who had increasingly contracted their defense budgets and risk to downsize their military capabilities. As expressed earlier, the EU is now facing defining times for its role on the international arena. If the union intends to maintain its status as a pillar of world affairs it is impetuous to finally put the bases of an autonomous European military which should be ready to defend the block’s interests, values, maintain and bring a contribution to international peace and security (especially in its proximity), but also consolidate common NATO-EU efforts. In furtherance of this idea, it will need full-spectrum capabilities ready to quickly engage all 5 environments: land, air, sea, space and cyber.

Establishing a common army, the European block will achieve political unification overcoming, thus, the haunting label of “an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm,” observation made by Mark Eyksens, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1991. In addition, it will be beneficial in terms of economy, industry, job market, state-of-the-art

⁶ Techau, J. 2014. *EU Defense Finally Means Business*, published on [carnegieeurope.eu](http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=55189): <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=55189> (accessed November 22, 2014)

⁷ Csernaton, R. 2014. *Why does the EU need an autonomous military muscle when it already has NATO?*, published on isiseurope.wordpress.com. Retrieved from: <http://isiseurope.wordpress.com/2014/05/19/why-does-the-eu-need-an-autonomous-military-muscle-when-it-already-has-nato/>

technology and academia. Members should envision this step as a great opportunity their economy which will prosper since new business will emerge. Already established companies such as Mercedes-Benz, Siemens, Boeing, Telefonica, ENI, to name a few, will be ready to become involved and put at the EU's disposal the necessary know-how and instruments. Additionally, Nexter (based in Paris, specialised in land armaments) and KMW (Krauss-Maffei Wegmann from Bonn, German defense technology company) have already signed a joint venture earlier this summer forming an alliance that "will create a European defense technology group with combined annual sales nearing €2 billion [...], a combined order book worth €6.5 billion and more than 6,000 staff⁸" according to *defensenews.com*. This is a just one example of what could be achieved in terms of the defense industry, and is supported by Nissen⁹ where she argues that the European defense market needs to defragment.

The EU will become an attractive space for foreign, as well as internal investors which will focus on new industrial, technological and manufacturing branches. Human resources will play an important part since co-operation with strategy consulting firms, think-tanks and agencies is vital, creating job opportunities for millions of European across the continent.

The developing partnership:

The major concern among EU member states' governments regarding the creation of these positions is understandably, the assumption it would overstretch national budgets. For those states which are also NATO members, the need to increase defense budgets is apparent, however across the multiple spectra that a realistic European common security effort will be undertaken, it is likely that a significant portion of these positions would be open in the private sector, which will be open to taxation. This course of action is made more plausible when considering the surplus in capacity and knowledge which the European private sector has gathered in the security and defense sectors, especially in the NGO nexus, and a proven track record under the CSDP's 29 civilian crisis management missions undertaken to date¹⁰.

Moreover, the criticality of deeper private – public co-operation in security matters cannot be understated. Particularly interesting is capability development in the cyber domain, where private entities are much ahead of the curve, as exemplified by Estonian response to cyber-attacks in 2008¹¹. Especially when dealing with an issue as nuanced as developing a common defense and security agenda for a union of sovereign states, the crux of the issue is legitimacy among the citizenries of these states. These societies are currently under significant strain, due to population migrations and subsequent integration issues. Within the confines of the EU, however, bolstering and promoting a united military corpus could serve to assuage some of these issues, as well as contribute to the effort of establishing a European identity to serve not only the political goals of Brussels' leadership, but also of individuals it protects.

Considering the identities of the individuals it serves, and the enduring transatlantic partnership, there is a unique opportunity to open up a dialogue which would take advantage of the public – private entities which operate under the normative western values of democracy spanning transatlanticism. Considering NATO's unmatched capabilities in symmetrical conflicts, the development of a purely hard-power oriented EU military would be foolish. This would create overlap in equipment, command and control, and capabilities. Furthermore, the EU's goals are not purely hard-power based, but focused on the promotion

⁸ Tran, P. & Muller, A. 2014. *Nexter, KMW Announce Joint Venture With 'Intended Unification*. Published on *defensenews.com*: <http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014307010024>

⁹ Nissen, C. 2014. *Prioritising European Defence Cooperation*. Published by the Danish Institute for International Studies website: http://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer_2014/diis_pb_defence_2014_print.pdf

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Moffet, S. 2014. *Overhauling transatlantic security thinking (Summer 2014)*. Security and Defence Agenda

of soft-power means¹², furthering the argument for smart power. What NATO has truly failed at so far are SSTR operations, due mainly to assigning both warfighting and reconstruction tasks, which run counter to each other, to the same soldiers, most recently under David Petraus' counter-insurgency doctrine.

Thomas Barnett, perhaps the most prolific advocate of SSTR, proposes a force which starts in the military, but evolves into a predominantly civilian force, whose focus is the non-threatening export of security. This force is designed to “win the peace” after the battle space, NATO’s playground, has been crossed in an intervention, and would own the transition to peace space. Essentially, this force would excel at the second phase of 4th generation warfare, where the object is local capacity rebuilding. Where the initial hard military intervention is to be conducted swiftly and brutally, on its heels comes a force to maintain law and order and assist reconciliation and reconstruction. In essence, combining these approaches would accomplish, to paraphrase, “planning for war with intention to win the peace.”¹³

Some argue for the establishment of this force within the US, but such an approach will not be feasible in the near future; one thing made clear by is that it would ideally have a separate command, similar to USSOCOM¹⁴. However, Europe’s need for a bulking up on hard power capabilities, and its great capacity to deploy soft power make it the perfect environment to develop a military styled along the lines of smart power: one that is capable of effective warfighting and willing to engage in SSTR afterwards, with separate assets. Furthermore, European citizens and organizations would be much better suited for SSTR as American actors tend to be much more susceptible to mirror-imaging in foreign contexts, offset by Europe’s long history of cultural and linguistic diversity.

Finally, the nature of partnership must be considered. While mutual commitment to defense between US and Europe must be addressed, both through NATO and the EU, a partnership also implies a certain complementarity: as the US has the most potent war-winning force in the world, and has and will continue to (even if more limitedly) commit it towards some of Europe’s defense, what Europe can do is pick up the missing slack in the peace-winning process following a successful military campaign, under a certain amount of situational decided force protection.

Recommendations:

- NATO must conduct a frank and deep-cutting assessment of current capability gaps and overlaps, and, wasted resources. Following this, an action plan for scaled and coordinated defense budget increases, as well as streamlined expenses, can be formed among members.
- The EU needs the ability to intervene militarily without the US. To this end the Battlegroup exercise must either be committed to seriously, or scrapped and begun anew.
- European and American experts from military and civilian security sectors need a platform to utilize the lessons learned from SSTR experiences in order to develop a functioning concept for SSTR. A potential example is The Hague Security Delta.
- EU leaders must admit to Europe’s urgent security situation and engage in realistic action on the CSDP. Following a capacity assessment, immediate hard-power gaps can be covered and plans for investment in the largely civilian SSTR force can be crafted.
- Private entities have a very real interest in European security and should be included, and, where possible, co-opted in its development.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Barnett, T. P. 2005. *Thomas Barnett: Let's rethink America's military strategy* | Talk Video | TED.com [Video file]. Retrieved from http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barnett_draws_a_new_map_for_peace

¹⁴ Ellsworth, James B. 2006. SysAdmin: Toward Barnett's stabilization and reconstruction force. Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army.

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THE UNITED KINGDOM'S MILITARY IMPORTANCE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

Marius PRICOPI,

PhD., Platoon Commander, „Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy,
pricopimarius@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The Euro-scepticism of the United Kingdom is notorious, and it is often displayed in all areas of European integration, including defence. Taking into account a possible British exit from the European Union, upon which a decision will be taken through the national referendum of 2017, this paper subjects to analysis the military importance of the United Kingdom for the Union. The analysis is conducted using, as its main methodological instrument, the European Index of Military Integration.*

Key words: *United Kingdom, European Index of Military Integration, British military power, British exit*

Introduction

The possibility of a British exit from the European Union (EU) has always existed, as the British society maintained, ever since the founding of the European Communities, a certain dose of Euro-scepticism. And the announcement of the current Prime Minister David Cameron on an eventual „in/out” referendum has sparked new debates both within the United Kingdom (UK), and across Europe.

However, this referendum would not be a first. A previous one, on the same issue, was organised in 1975, and resulted in over two thirds of the British citizens voting to remain in the (then) European Economic Community. But, as the saying goes, this time is different. The UK now faces totally different challenges, as are the considerable waves of migration from new member states or a high unemployment rate, to mention just a few. This time, the outcome of the 2017 announced referendum may not extend UK's membership in the EU.

Of course, no one wants a British exit, but its consequences would definitely impact on all areas of European integration, including the defence one. This is why a thorough understanding of UK's military importance in the EU is necessary; by realizing what the UK has to offer in terms of military integration, one can better fill the gaps if a British exit eventually happens. Because, as another saying goes, we should all hope for the best and plan for the worst.

Landmarks in the involvement of the United Kingdom in European defence

Along time, UK's military stance in the EU has alternated between Euro-scepticism and a positive involvement that led to significant progresses.

For example, at the beginning of the 1950' an extremely popular project for the European military integration was the European Defence Community. Within the Community there were intentions to create, among other things, a unified European army, subject to democratic control and in full agreement with the United States and Canada. Yet, the British Foreign Minister (and the Dutch one also) saw in this Community another platform for France's political hegemony.

And so, the British policy was to officially support the European Defence Community, in order to avoid any accusations of misappropriating the project; but at the same time, UK waited

for its failure, in order to conserve the existing Euro-Atlantic solution to military integration¹ that also included the United States (*recte* the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO).

An example from the opposite spectrum is the Saint-Malo Declaration – a major success in integrating the different European defences along time. Signed between UK and France on December 4, 1998, the declaration represented the political incentive that permitted, one year latter, the adoption of the European and Security Defence Policy. Of course, this political *pirouette* was not missed by researchers and historians, who tend to agree on the fact that the pivot was determined by the British politicians' realization that UK cannot modernize its armed forces or prepare for new missions and security tasks on its own².

Probably for the same reasons UK, alongside Germany and France, forwarded in February 2004 the idea of Battlegroups – multinational military structures of battalion size, highly operative and capable of conducting independent operations. The idea was rapidly adopted and transformed in an official project of the EU, and since 2007 Battlegroups became fully operative.

The United Kingdom in the European Index of Military Integration

A fresh perspective on the military importance of the UK for the EU can be obtained with the help of a scientific instrument that I developed as part of my doctoral studies: the *European Index of Military Integration*. The Index classifies the countries of the EU according to their level of military integration. In this Index states appear in descending order, the first positions being held by the most militarily integrated countries in the EU, while the last places belong to the least thus integrated states.

The Index is compiled based on the values obtained for 6 different coefficients, grouped in 2 general dimensions:

1) *Openness to the European Defence Space*, with the following coefficients:

- c_{1.1} – Military expenditures as % of Gross Domestic Product;
- c_{1.2} – Flow of conventional weapons;
- c_{1.3} – Military facilities shared for common training.

2) *Participation to EU military operations*, with the following coefficients:

- c_{2.1} – Deployable (land) forces as % of total military personnel forces;
- c_{2.2} – Troops involved in on-going EU military operations;
- c_{2.3} – Contribution to EU Battlegroups³.

And in this Index the UK holds the 9th position. Analysing in more detail this grading will definitely be of use in understanding UK's military importance for the EU.

To be more specific, the data for the coefficients of the first dimension are the following:

Coefficient	Value	Score	Rank*
c _{1.1} Military expenditures as % of Gross Domestic Product	2,5	5	1-2
c _{1.2} Flow of conventional weapons	1,5	3	8-12
c _{1.3} Military facilities shared for common training	3	3	10-12

Table no. 1. Data for the first dimension – „Openness to the European Defence Space”

¹ Cf. Martin Dedman, *The Origins and Development of the European Union*, Routledge, 2010, p 65 și pp. 69-70.

² Cf. Martin Trybus, *European Union Law and Defense Integration*, Hart Publishing, 2005, p. 95.

³ The complete, detailed methodology and calculus algorithms are described in: Marius Pricopi, *Integrarea militară europeană*, Sibiu, Techno Media, 2014.

* All EU member states are taken into account, except Croatia.

One can thus observe that UK allocates 2,5% of its Gross Domestic Product to military expenditures, one of the highest percentages in the EU, equalled only by France⁴. On the other side, UK has a medium score of 3 for the coefficient „Flow of conventional weapons”, most probably due to the fact that imports and exports of conventional weapons are almost at par for this country⁵. As for the third coefficient, „Military facilities shared for common training”, one can notice that UK shares with the member states only 3 training facilities⁶, a rather low contribution if one takes into consideration its size of armed forces and its defence budget.

Further on, the data for the coefficients of the second dimension are the following:

Coefficient	Value	Score	Rank*
c2.1 Deployable (land) forces as % of total military personnel forces	34,2	4	4
c2.2 Troops involved in on-going EU military operations	7	2	17-18
c2.3 Contribution to EU Battlegroups	2	3	8-20

Table no. 2. Data for the second dimension – “Participation to EU military operations”

According to coefficient c2.1, of the total British armed forces, 34.2% are currently (land) deployable forces⁷, placing UK on the fourth position in this matter among EU member states. Many British troops are located in areas of operation or military bases in over 80 countries around the world, from Afghanistan and Africa to Gibraltar and the South Atlantic Islands⁸.

But to on-going EU military operations (c2.2), the UK contributes with only 7 soldiers: 4 in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) and 3 in Somalia (EUTM Somalia)⁹. This contribution is among the lowest within the EU, and in deep contrast with UK’s contribution to the military operations conducted by NATO.

Also, UK’s contribution to the EU Battlegroups (c2.3) is, again, rather small. Between the years 2009-2013, UK subscribed troops for only two Battlegroups, in semesters January – June 2010 and July – December 2013¹⁰.

Maybe a more clear picture of UK’s military stance in the EU becomes possible thanks to the following figure, comparing a hypothetical perfect score for all the 6 coefficients to the real score obtained by UK for the same coefficients:

⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2013*, Oxford University Press, 2013.

⁵ Institute for Economics and Peace, *2013 Global Peace Index*, accessed December 12, 2013, on <http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index>.

⁶ European Union External Action Service, *Sharing training facilities in the EU in the military field*, accessed January 23, 2015, on http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/trainings/sharing-training-facilities/index_en.htm.

⁷ European Defence Agency, *Defence Data: EDA participating Member States in 2010*, Bruxelles, 2012, p. 38; European Defence Agency, *National Defence Data 2011*, Bruxelles, 2013, p. 42.

⁸ *Overseas Deployments*, accessed January 23, 2015, on <http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22753.aspx>.

⁹ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 2013*, Routledge, 2013.

¹⁰ *EU Battlegroups*, accessed January 24, 2015, on <http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2009-06-16c.279966.h>.




Figure no. 1. Comparison between a hypothetical perfect score and UK's score

This figure clearly portrays *the rather unbalanced score of the UK* for the 6 coefficients subjected to analysis. And, associating all these different values and scores, it becomes quite obvious why UK holds only the 9th position in the European Index of Military Integration.

Although not taken directly into account when compiling the Index, *three other associated coefficients offer valuable insights* for analysing the military power of UK inside the EU. The associated coefficients are:

- Arms-producing and military services companies;
- Leadership in European military structures;
- EU Operational Headquarters.

Regarding the first associated coefficient ("Arms-producing and military services companies"), no less than 9 British companies (Table no. 3) are present in the ranking prepared by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and known as "SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in the world (excluding China)". UK's performance is the second highest among the member states, after France, with 10 companies in the same top.

No.	Rank in Top 100 SIPRI	Company	Arms sales (US \$, mil.)	Total employment
1	3	<i>BAE Systems</i>	26 820	84 600
2	14	<i>Rolls-Royce</i>	5 550	55 200
3	26	<i>Babcock International Group</i>	3 270	10 260
4	39	<i>Serco</i>	2 560	120 540
5	55	<i>Cobham</i>	1 820	10 090

6	63	<i>QinetiQ</i>	1 190	6 220
7	76	<i>Meggitt</i>	960	10 720
8	79	<i>GKN</i>	950	49 700
9	80	<i>Chemring Group</i>	920	3 690

Table no. 3. British companies in SIPRI Top 100¹¹

When referring to the second associated coefficient (“Leadership in European military structures”), between the years 2004 – 2014 no less than 4 high-ranking British officials held top leading positions in structures regulating EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy, as follows:

Institution	Leading position	Leader	Period
<i>European Defence Agency</i>	Head of Agency	Catherine Ashton	2009 – 2014
	Chief Executive	Nick Witney	2004 – 2007
<i>EU Military Staff</i>	Director General	Lt Gen David Leakey	2007 – 2010
	Deputy Director General	Rear Admiral Bruce Williams	2011 – 2014

Table no. 4. British officials in top leading positions¹²

Finally, regarding the third associated coefficient (“EU Operational Headquarters”), the British Army hosts such an Operational Headquarters in Northwood. There are only 4 other states in the EU that also host on their territories headquarters like this: France (Paris), Germany (Ulm), Greece (Larissa) and Italy (Rome)¹³. Currently, the Northwood Headquarters is used to successfully conduct the EU operation NAVFOR Atalanta; launched in 2008, the operation aims at enhancing maritime security on the northern coast of Somalia.

As can be observed, *the British state enlists favourable values for all these three associated coefficients.*

Conclusions

The United Kingdom remains a major player in the European military integration process. In time, when UK acted in this area with Euro-scepticism, advances were still possible, be it with a certain degree of delay; but when UK got positively involved in European defence issues, remarkable progresses got achieved.

¹¹ *SIPRI Fact Sheet*, accessed January 25, 2015, on <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/recent-trends-in-arms-industry/Fact%20Sheet%20Top100%202013.pdf>.

¹² European Defence Agency, accessed January 25, 2015, on <http://www.eda.europa.eu/>; *Statul Major Militar al Uniunii Europene*, accessed January 25, 2015, on http://www.eas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-military-staff/index_en.htm.

¹³ *Factsheet. The Activation of the EU Operations Centre*, accessed January 26, 2015, on http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/factsheet_opscentre_22_may_12_en.pdf.

Currently, the United Kingdom allocates to military expenditures a high percentage of its Gross Domestic Product, benefits from efficient arms-producing and military services companies, has a good leadership record in European military structures and even hosts on its territory an EU Operational Headquarters. On the other side, the British army doesn't share many military facilities for common training, has few troops involved in on-going EU military operations and has only occasional contributions to the EU Battlegroups.

Accordingly, in the European Index of Military Integration UK holds the 9th position, well behind states like Spain, Sweden or Greece. Its stance in European defence issues is a more political than military one, as UK prefers the format of NATO for enhanced military cooperation. If a British exit would eventually take place, it is highly probable that the most important negative consequences would be not on the part of the European Union or its member states, but on the part of the United Kingdom itself.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE IN RELATION TO ROMANIA'S GEOPOLITICAL IMPERATIVE OF SECURING THE MOUTH OF THE DANUBE FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN EASTERN UKRAINE

Mihai ARDELEAN,

Student (master level), Babeş-Bolyai University, Faculty of Security Management
mihai.ardelean@hotmail.com

Abstract: *Given the recent changes in international security due to the events in the Eastern region of Ukraine and its potential for attracting major world stage players, Europe again seems to be at the heart of worldwide attention. In Romania's particular case, a country whose geostrategic value has been the reason why many empires to date expressed their desire to control it or at least tried to, there is plenty of reason for concern. In this paper I shall argue for a revival of Strategic Intelligence as a whole and in particular case to Romania's need of securing the mouth of the Danube, as modus operandi following the developments in the East of the Dnepr River. Strategic Intelligence or SRATINT is a system of gathering of intelligence in order to enhance the ability to foresee events and enforce the capacity to conceptualize methods for action so that far reaching objectives are met.*

Key words: *Strategic thinking, Strategic Intelligence (STRATINT), Romania, geopolitical imperatives, Danube, Ukraine crisis.*

The importance of strategic thinking in 21st century international relations and the growing need for Strategic Intelligence (STRATINT)

Strategic thinking is a cognitive process that involves the alignment of a set of questions whose answers must lead to the accomplishment of a task/mission/endeavor. The ultimate goal of strategic thinking is the production of strategic foresight, which in turn can formulate the action plan in order to achieve the preset goals.

In the ever-changing spectrum of 21st century international relations, one might argue that strategic thinking is not to be prioritized. This has become a popular belief; however it does not seem to produce viable results in terms of preserving stability throughout the world. In such cases, when the premises do not confirm the conclusions it is recommended to appeal to authority on the matters. One of the greatest military minds in history was the Chinese general, Sun Tzu. In his most important work 'The Art of War' he expresses his views concerning the achievement of victory regardless of the available resources. Sun Tzu's Art of War is seen by many as a cornerstone in the development of the thinking process which assures victory in many fields of life such as business, sports and of course military operations. Sun Tzu's key concept in 'The Art of War' is the need for foreknowledge which he best expresses in the following: 'If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles'. This inevitably leads to another axiom expressed by the Chinese general: 'Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat'. Of course, international affairs 500 B.C. were way different than they are now, mainly to the fact that the flow of information didn't extend across seas and continents as it does nowadays, in the sense that news didn't travel as far as it does today (due to the technological developments in world communication). Yet, the communication revolution does not imply that strategic thinking should disappear in favor of the more practical tactical approach. On the contrary, it enforces the need to gather information in order to meet far reaching goals. In a world economy where profit seems to be

one of the only motives for mobilization and concentration of energies, strategic thinking offers what a business analyst would call a business plan; otherwise said ‘the big picture’. This big picture is not a rigid structure of data and executions as someone might think; the only constants in it are the input (the what, the why and the how) and the output which is generally referred to as the goal or the result of all these actions. Everything which constitutes the body of the big picture should be as flexible as water (tactics level). The key element in strategic thinking is expertise of the highest order; sine qua non the entire process is unthinkable.



In the respect of international relations, If we take for example the sudden birth of ISIS or Russia’s response (the annexation of Crimea) to the Ukrainian protests, we come to the conclusion that these constitute strategic surprises; this of course given the premise that strategic thinking was employed in the first place. Sun Tzu states that ‘the wise general before doing battle, in the temple he calculates’. This thinking process naturally involves a number of hypothesis and alternatives to the given situation. It is a lengthy and consuming

process but in the long term it does much to lessen the probability of the event that everyone is trying to avoid regardless of profession or field of work, that event which is surprise. Surprise, in international relations, is a very powerful factor of change. The Netherlands for example, changed its security policy following the events in Eastern Ukraine and started to allocate more funds to the Defense Department and that after a long period of austerity in military spending. NATO, as an international body, started to consider Russia, particularly its intentions as a prime threat. All these changes in perspective happened due to the surprise element.

So where does Strategic Intelligence come into play? First of all we have to clarify what this collocation actually stands for. Strategic Intelligence or STRATINT employs the collection, analysis and corroboration of intelligence that is needed for the formulation of policy (foreign and domestic) and for military operations. STRATINT involves a series of abilities of the personnel involved that are needed to ensure the successfulness of the whole process. These are the following:

- ✚ Foresight: the faculty of thought which provides the ability to spot trends and opportunities;
- ✚ System thinking: the capacity to analyze, synthesize and coagulate various elements into a whole;
- ✚ Visioning: the ability to figure out the optimal set of choices in the order, in order to achieve the goals set forth

The term was created by Sherman Kent, a history professor which pioneered many of the methods of intelligence analysis. On his work called ‘Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy’ he argues in favor of STRATINT as an everlasting thinking process used for coping with the challenges ahead, in the sense presented by Kent, America’s challenge on dealing with its post-World War 2 super-power status and the responsibilities involved.

As we can see, STRATINT is a process where a precise sort of information is needed, namely one which helps formulate a set of actions in order to achieve/accomplish a set of goals. STRATINT isn’t tied to governmental institutions alone. It can be seen as a national

endeavor where private actors come into play. Agencies like Stratfor and or Jane's for sure contribute to America's national security, even though these agencies offer their services to the worldwide consumer. Every country in turn should follow America's example of liberalizing the intelligence gathering and analysis field so that more actors step can contribute to national and world security.

Romania's Geopolitical Imperative: the mouth of the Danube and the role of STRATINT in relation to its security following the developments in Eastern Ukraine

Romania's geographical setting in the right flank of the European peninsula is a region where stability was always the delicate factor. From its historical point of view, it is a region situated at the crossroad of 3 civilizations: The Russian Empire in the East, The Western Civilization on the western border and the Crescent civilization on the South. Romania's geostrategic value has often caused it to be the competing ground of many interests. Its riches in natural resources, access to the Black Sea as well and the host of the mouth of the Danube represented a prize which few empires could resist.

The 21st century setting does not differ much from the previous eras. Albeit, one thing is certain, that Romania now has set its sights clear on consolidating its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as in the European Union. However, given Russia's resurrection as a major world player in international affairs under President Vladimir Putin, particularly after the annexation of Crimea, Romania's challenges to its national security and territorial integrity don't cease to exist. From the political realism perspective, Russia and the West will always be competing with each other for spheres of influences worldwide, particularly in Europe. Romania's leaning (as far as alliances are concerned) is now obvious; but the heavy breathing of the Russian bear is still felt in its back of the neck. Russia refuses to be treated as a second rate player and is ready to endure sacrifices in order to maintain its power status. The developments in Eastern Ukraine following the popular uprisings, seems to have resuscitated the Cold War. Whether Russia is directly or indirectly involved in the Eastern Ukraine theater of operations matters little as long as it is involved in a way or another. Russia cannot give up Ukraine and this fact has been underestimated by the Western powers across the previous decades.

From Romania's perspective, the developments in Ukraine, regardless of the February 15th of 2015 seize fire are reasons for concern. Many voices in the Romanian press speculated that Russia's ambitions might be to go as far West as possible, with the sights on the mouth of the Danube. These voices are not without foundation.



The mouth of the Danube is situated in the South-East side of Romania. It borders Ukraine on the north and the Black sea on the East. The Danube is regarded by many as Europe's longest highway, due to the width and length of it as well as its capacity for accommodating sea trade. It is therefore vital to Romania's economy. On the other hand, there are European projects which plan to link the Rhine with the Danube; this would mean that Rotterdam would have a direct link to Constanta and the Black Sea through the heart of Europe. This in turn would reduce Romania's geopolitical dependency on Turkey's Hellespont¹. In other words it would create another navigable

¹ The Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits

trade route in Europe which will revolutionize commerce within the continent. In this entire scheme the control of the mouth of the Danube is essential to controlling trade. This offers the controller a true gold mine which it can exploit to its full potential. Russia, given its present economic crisis has to 'diversify its bonds', meaning that it has to look for alternatives to salvage its decline. After the annexation of Crimea which pretty much turned the Black Sea into a Russian lake, the control of the mouth of the Danube might be another target. Romania has to be fully aware of the situation and counter it as well as it can.

Strategic Intelligence in this scenario comes well into play. The capacity to evaluate the situation in Ukraine as well as the troop's movements on land and the Black Seaboard can prove vital. HUMINT and OSINT as active parts of STRATINT are therefore prerequisites in the evaluation the situation. Foreknowledge is the only weapon available at hand in Romania's arsenal in coping with the global players' moves, a weapon which it must use to its full potential.

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THE BLACK SEA REGION – DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION

Laura-Lucia RĂȘINAR,

Lucicut13@yahoo.com

Abstract: *In military terms, NATO is, very probable, the world's strongest and most successful military defence organisation. By a closer glance, everyone must to admit that NATO is much more than just a military organisation. It is not just a purely defensive Alliance, as started to be more than 60 years ago, while now is a strong call around the world for its capabilities and its responsiveness. Beside its military capacity, there is a strong political consultation forum for the entire North-Atlantic Community, allowing its members and their neighbors to make the best decisions, in accordance with their principles and values, so their interests are well protected at home and all over the world, too. But, such an organisation, being an alive organism, a community of countries that share basic political principles and values, including respect for human rights, requires strong and intensive attention so it can work properly.*

Key words: *reform, transformation, Command Structure, Forces Structure, capabilities, operational*

Introduction

The Black Sea is a Continental Sea of medium dimension (422.000 km²) and it is situated between two main continents: Asia and Europe. There are six states near The Black Sea: Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia. From the ethnical point of view, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and a part of Georgia are Slavic Christian nations, while Romania is a Latin Christian nation and Turkey is an Islamic state. For four of these countries (Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia) the Black Sea represents the only sea border they have.¹

This area is described by the ideological diversity and strategic opportunities. It could be characterized by prosperity, stability and security, but the region is associated with words as incertitude, turbulence and crisis. This dual description has been explained in the White Charta of National Security and Defense in Romania (2004). According to this document, the Black Sea region represents „An opportunity and a risk source because it is situated in the conjunction of two main axes:

1) Black Sea – Mediterranean Sea, the south side of NATO: it is a very important strategic area for NATO, known for its dynamic risks.

2) Black Sea – Caucasus – Caspian Sea, a transit area for energetic resources from central Asia, influenced by sub regional instability from central Asia”.²

According to the Romania National Security Strategy, „the Black Sea area has one of the biggest numbers of separatist conflicts, fights and conflicts on Earth. Also, it generates serious threats against security in region and creates the danger of violent conflicts”³. All these documents show that conflicts in strategic Eastern area of NATO and EU represent threats against European and Euro Atlantic security.⁴

¹ Corneliu Dinco - Evaluarea mediului de securitate în zona Mării Negre, Universitatea Națională de Apărare ”Carol I”, Securitate și Apărare în Uniunea Europeană, Strategii XXI, Secțiunea Securitate și Apărare, București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare ”Carol I”, 2008.

² Carta Albă a Securității și Apărării Naționale a României (2004)

³ Strategia de Securitate Națională a României

⁴ Revista INFOSFERA, numărul 4 din anul 2009, p. 38.

Ideological differences of conception – threats generator

The Black Region in an important area from the conflicts and cooperation point of view and it influences not only the countries near Black Sea, but a wide area of seven states: the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbian, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Greece, but also three Caucasian states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. These two groups of countries are connected by Turkey and have interests not only in the entire area, but worldwide.

Russia and Ukraine can hardly be qualified countries from Black Sea area, but there are very important in the region we talk about because they are regional powers because of their size, interests and strategic possibilities. Also, Russia is indisputable the main actor in the Pontic geopolitical field and has the greatest political, social and economical influence.

The neo-imperial conception of Russia about the Black Sea has its origin hundreds of centuries ago because of other entities like USA who wanted to expand. About this subject, the president Vladimir Putin showed a permanent attention in his fleet, which represents an important element in the area, although it is old and obsolete.

Interested in this subject, Octavian Sergentu wrote in 2007 in Historical and Political culture magazine about the geopolitical situation of the Black Sea, sustaining that Russia wants hegemony, not cooperation. Moreover, he wrote that Russia has many communication and trust problems involving the states around Black Sea.⁵

All these problems and conflicts exist because of the economical importance of the area and multiple interests that USA and EU have. Of course, the stability has a great impact on the security environment for entities around the area, far or close. The phenomena of transnational migration and the ethnic communities without spatial delimitations and based on tribes and clans are affecting the stability in the area for long time. Sometimes, the minorities from one state are the same as the majority from the other state near it and this fact generates tensions and conflict. As an example, Georgia has an important Armenian community in the south area of the country. These Armenian people always complain about discrimination and poor economical and social conditions. As a result, there are many violent manifestations.⁶

The dynamism of the area and the fast evolution of international relationships lead to new threats. The main problem results from the interaction between three main problems, which are specific for the Black Sea area.⁷

The political and military fields evolution in the states near the area

It is important to reveal the unstable and fragile political environment because this is a problem for the state authority and the proliferation of organized crime phenomena by involving political and military figures in illegal activities. In the same category, we can mention latent tensions determined by separatists or territorial disputes as Transnistria, Georgia and Armenia with regional effects as the incapacity of efficient surveillance of the borders. Moreover, these facts develop threats as illegal traffic. According to these problems, the main aspects about the countries near Black Sea can be described:

The Republic of Moldova – has the Transnistrian problem and is the area of a great conflict based on disparate governance principles and political culture between main entities.

Ukraine – has lots of social and political problems. Also, it is part of a great conflict against Russia for the Crimean Peninsula, while the leaders try to enestablish special relationships with NATO and EU.

⁵ www.rostonline.org/rost/ian-feb2007/marea-neagra.shtml, consultat la data de 23.01.2015

⁶ Revista INFOSFERA, numărul 4 din anul 2009, pagina 40

⁷ Ibidem.

Georgia – is still affected by the war against Russia in August 2008 because of the need of reconstruction and stability. On the other side, this country has lots of territorial integrity and sovereignty problems. The Georgian authorities keep a strong attitude in sustaining the territorial integrity and search for solutions in eliminating the consequences of war. For that to be made, they are looking for help from SUA and EU.

Armenia – is interested in rebuilding the good relationship with Turkey and in finding a solution for the conflict with Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan – faces two main problems. The first one the democratic reforms in improving human rights field and for the development of economy area by being part of the World Trade Organization which is an important part in the cooperation with EU. The other problem is the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh region taken away by Armenia.

Crossing in the area of different interests of the main entities from the region or from the entire world

This subject can be analyzed from many perspectives.

The European Union confronts with an identity problem with great impact on its area of influence and political actions in the Black Sea area. Most of the region's countries are transit states for energetic resources and this makes them important entities of the European Union and its political field. Considering this, the European Union promoted a series of initiatives to offer a new alternative to the nearby states: the newest is the Eastern Partnership Initiative. This project involves Belarus, The Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia. These states have many benefits from the partnership as good according in trade, complex programs financially sustained by EU, canceling of the travel restriction, cultural exchange and assistance projects. To obtain these advantages, the states involved must improve the national political and economical field.

Russia confronts simultaneously with the economical and financial crisis effects and with a crisis involving its own international statement. Moscow is using politics, economy and other fields to maintain its position as a regional leader in order to create an economical, political and military power as strong as the old Soviet Union.

During the summits, **NATO** has always been recognized as the main power entity in the Black Sea Region. Also, it cooperates with the partners and allies in the area to maintain stability and peace. As a transatlantic security organization, NATO has to deal with many security threats in this area and this is the reason why it needs a proper strategy of cooperation with EU.

Political instability and economical depression in the region

This instability is characterized by differences between states, as a result of many crises in the economy field, many reforms, differences of prices, involvement of politicians in economy, lower life standard, high rate of emigration and internal or external conflicts.

Some countries adopted a new political view, the liberalist one, but without involving projects that may lead to social or economy development. Others adopted the Russian alternative of democracy, the sovereign democracy. At the same time, the Black Sea is situated in the middle of three influence centers: Euro-Atlantic, soviet and the Middle East. In this context, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova are influenced by both Russia and Euro-Atlantic community and the Caucasus region is situated between Russia and the Middle East, but it also has Euro-Atlantic influences. Of course, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are dependent economically on Moscow and confront with separatists. Turkey is a well situated country because this is the place of trades between the two continents and it has many benefits.

Taking into consideration all these aspects about security environment in the region, there can be described some of the main threats against security in the Black Sea area:

- internal instability in many states and areas of interest as a result of the division of the Soviet Union;
- accentuation or maintenance of separatist conflicts;
- measures taken to disintegrate entities and build new independent states as Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia;
- instability caused by the encouragement of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic states interests in the south part of Europe. All these are made by some compact ethnical groups in important areas;
- competition in the economical field, caused by exploitation and transport of oil in the Caspian Sea;
- expansion of both terrorist organizations and activities and transnational organized crime (that affects economy and the financial field, trade of drugs, people, radioactive materials, weapons and ammunition).

Until present, the cooperation in the security field reveals lots of ways to maintain peace in the area:⁸

- building a new transnational entity to manage all aspects about organized crime and illegal trade in the Black Sea region;
- signing of a new agreement between states in the area to minimize the number of military activity and training. These activities must take place twice in an year and must be supervised by observers from nearby states;
- forbidding any maneuvers or actions in the narrows areas;
- proper and opportune notification of the reason of actions, patrols and any other activities made by three or more ships in the Sea;
- agreeing on a memorandum in which it is shown that CEMN state members will develop military activities in the Black Sea with their partners;
- informing the states in the area about the existence of ships in their territorial Sea.

The security of the area implies an important task for the main organizations in cooperation and security (BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, SEEBRIG, GUAM). In this context, there are some very important projects and cooperation actions on international level, but also for Romania.

In the international area the development of cooperation in new fields of interest has been made in different states in the Black Sea region. For this, many agreements, documents and protocols have been signed for cooperation, state borders, common assistance, intelligence exchange, and fight against organized crime. After 2007 when Romania and Bulgaria became members of the EU, the Black Sea area gained more importance because it became the new border of the EU. As a result, cooperation is the most important part in assuring a security environment.

Also, more and more organizations as FRONTEX, AQUAPOL and EUROPOL are interested in supporting the regional cooperation in the Black Sea area. Moreover, in 15-17 October 2003 the Coordination and Informing Center of the Black Sea has been founded in order to facilitate the cooperation between border police structures. For the same reason, one year earlier a document was signed in Giurgiu, Romania between the border police structures from Romania and Bulgaria. An important aspect is the proposal made by Ukraine to the

⁸ Corneliu Dinco - Evaluarea mediului de securitate în zona Mării Negre, Universitatea Națională de Apărare "Carol I", Securitate și Apărare în Uniunea Europeană, Strategii XXI, Secțiunea Securitate și Apărare, București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", 2008.

Government from Romania to sign a cooperation agreement for the Black Sea area between Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Romania and Turkey.

As an addition to this according, the military cooperation in this area is represented by BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony.

The Naval Cooperation Group in Black Sea (BLACKSEAFOR) is made of all states around the sea and it has been created in 2001. In august 2001, BLACKSEAFOR decided to have maritime activities two times per year under the command of different members in order to make every country a commander from time to time during these exercises for better cooperation and development. The idea of cooperation of naval forces in the area is based on many agreed laws with diplomatic character. All fulfilled missions during these initiatives have the same purpose: strengthening the trust and facilitating the communication between partners. BLACKSEAFOR mission include: sea rescue operations, assistance operations, actions against marine mines and environment protection. The main objectives are: to promote cooperation and interoperability between naval forces from different countries, evaluation experimenting of naval procedures in peace supporting operations.

In addition, the Black Sea Harmony has many tasks as: naval operations of surveillance, reconnaissance operation, identification of unknown ships and assisting the commercial activities.

Romania – an outpost for NATO and EU in the Black Sea Region

The Black Sea Region is an area of interest for the national security of Romania. It is very important for economy and integration in high standards. Taking these into consideration, it is necessary for our country to get involved in many projects developed for better cooperation in the area. Also, the Black Sea border is a beneficial thing and Romania is interested in: keeping its own territorial integrity, economy and trade in the area, being able to travel and transport materials, but also in keeping the natural environment safe.

Also, the interests of Romania are determined by the fact that our country is dependent on the natural resources from this area and the transport facilities on Black Sea because 60% of commercial activities for Romania are developed on Sea or rivers. This is why our flag must be seen on seas and oceans.

As a NATO member country we must fulfill our duties. This is why there must be developed new forces and measures to sustain ships and other naval forces to get involved in operation against surface ships, land objectives, forces in the area of interest or missions other than the ones from article 5 of NATO.⁹

Talking about OCEMN, the most important subject for Romania is the Romania Police who sustained some proposals based on Action Plan EAAT from 2006:¹⁰

- assistance in collecting and exploitation of data in regional operations about organized crime;
- exchange of intelligence, experience and regulations about migration, organized crime and illegal activities;
- develop the regional cooperation in the fight against weapons of mass destruction and organized crime;
- strengthen the security in the area based on EU Coast Guard methods and standards;

⁹ Simona-Valentina Maleşcu - Interesele naţionale privind securitatea maritimă la Marea Neagră, Universitatea Naţională de Apărare "Carol I", Securitate şi Apărare în Uniunea Europeană, Strategii XXI, Secţiunea Securitate şi Apărare, Bucureşti, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare "Carol I", 2008.

¹⁰ Alexandru Cătălin Văleanu - Iniţiative şi forme de cooperare regională la Marea Neagră, Universitatea Naţională de Apărare "Carol I", tactică şi Artă operativă – Forţe Terestre, Strategii XXI, Secţiunea Securitate şi Apărare, Bucureşti, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare "Carol I", 2008.

- building a secure environment in ports from Romania especially Constanța. Another important task is the establishment of a partnership between institutions to control the commercial activity and fight against illegal and terrorist acts;
- develop of regional cooperation to sustain the „Proliferation Security Initiative” (PSI).

The crisis generated by the aggression against Ukraine

The international crisis generated by the aggression against Ukraine was made by Russia who took Crimean away from Ukraine and developed violent actions in the east side of Ukraine. Moreover, this conflict blocked the international institutions that could stop the aggression. Most of the time, the events were a challenge not only for the Government from Ukraine, but also for the international principles developed after the Second World War. Moscow changed ONU principles, despised OSCE, revealed witnesses of EU and USA and minimized the efficiency of the article 5.

Considering all these, Romania is an outpost for NATO and EU in the Black Sea Region, so it can have a great influence on the security of other states from the Black Sea area. Today, taking into consideration the priorities of international cooperation for a long last security environment and stability in the political and economical field, it is necessary to accomplish some tasks:

(1) elaboration and implementation of some measures by OCEMN, GUAM, EU and NATO:

- fighting against neo-imperialist politic view of Russia and its influence in the area;
- fighting against the development of military activity in the area, at least on short term to establish peace and solve the conflict;

2) concentrate all attention on the development of investment projects and eliminate obstacles to sustain commercial activities. Also, the conflicts between states create many problems as affecting partnerships. To solve all these, there is a great need of communication and honesty in dialog between countries to reach a compromise for cooperation.

The most important thing is the involvement of EU and NATO in strategic decisions for the security of the Black Sea Region. The cooperation in all these tasks leads to regional security, building of democracy and establishing trust and cooperation between Kiev and Bucharest.¹¹

Conclusion

The changes of the security environment of the Black Sea, especially in the international waters, is a direct consequence of the fall of the communist bloc which includes the dissolution of former Soviet Union and also a result of the liberalization of fossil resources exploitation in the Caspian Sea. Being known that economical security is an essential component of national security, the international waters of the Black Sea don't only represent a source of risks and threats to its security for Romania, but also represent a lot of economical and other types of opportunities, which used efficiently, can contribute to the achieving of Romania's interests in this area of influence. The global economical, political, scientific, technological and informational processes, such as confrontation and on the other hand cooperation for further access to resources, markets and modern technologies, have a growing impact upon Romania's security.

In the Black Sea region with connection to the Caucasus, the following security objectives must be consolidated:

¹¹<http://www.revista22.ro/abordari-viabile-ale-cooperarii-la-marea-neagra-2837.html>, consultat la data de 23.01.2015.

- building of a strategic coalition between the states in this area in order to counter any threats from any other state or terrorist organization;
- the development of a regional system of protection for communication lines and also the protection of strategic energy transit routes;
- consolidation of the information exchange and sharing with NATO partners and also intelligence cooperation for common defense;
- identifying regional solutions for the annihilation of organized crime, uncontrolled paramilitary actions and potential sources of terrorist activities;
- encouragement of the security dialogue between governmental institutions and nongovernmental actors from the Black Sea region countries;
- intensified cooperation for any type of crisis management and environment protection.

Terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration and corruption are phenomena which can hardly be approached and which, in this region, especially because of the scale of their manifestation and their effects on society, represent major sources of instability.

The predictable potential of the multilateral collaboration in the Danube drainage area as a navigable trans-european route can substantially contribute to the value of maritime and fluvial transport routes in the entire area of the Black Sea, including the Caspian Sea through Volga-Ural geographical system.

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COOPERATION ACTIONS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE MILITARY DEFENSE SYSTEM REGARDING THE PROTECTION, EVACUATION OF THE POPULATION

Constantin COȘOFREȚ,

PhD. Student, “CAROL I” National Defense University,
cosofrco@yahoo.com

Lucian Ștefan COZMA,

PhD. Student, “CAROL I” National Defense University,
lucian.stefan@yahoo.fr

Abstract: *Critical infrastructures of permanent military system of defense (work underground) requires a thorough documentation of the existence and needs of adapting them to the requirements fight. Use underground work for military purposes requires a sustained planning and organization and determined by their importance, their participation by cooperation with the defense forces (protection) measures to civil protection, evacuation of the population. It is therefore for the purposes of cooperation critical infrastructures with military groups of defense (protection) civil it is absolutely necessary to establish common pathways: the assessment variants and measures adopted to defend urban centers and how to integrate it into they work underground; information on record-keeping and physical condition of existing underground works in urban center, its scale, the degree of utilare and their training in combat; additional measures for repair, adaptation and completion of underground works in urban center, to defend the values and objectives of the programme.*

Key words: *critical infrastructures, underground facilities, urban combat*

General aspects regarding the cooperation actions

Romanian National Defense Strategy states that one of the main action is to maintain and develop fitness for humanitarian intervention in support of public authorities in cases of civil emergencies¹.

To act effectively on the whole spectrum of crisis, crisis prevention measures to collective defense, Romania envisages implementation of integrated national crisis management. This aims to harmonize laws and procedures with civil emergency and crisis management in N.A.T.O. and the U.E., N.A.T.O. policy implementation and instruments in the field and through participation in U.E. operations crisis management; improving the national crisis management; preparing the population for crises and civil emergencies.

Supporting sustainable economic development and the strategic goals of defense requires the development of a network of physical infrastructure support, specialized and efficient compatible with European infrastructure, which entails increased capabilities. Hierarchy and staging infrastructure projects are based on the requirements of the priority objectives in the field and the possibilities of covering the financial effort required to achieve them.

The main actions to modernize the infrastructure are to maintain the operating parameters and enhancement of existing capacity by rehabilitating and modernizing military and civilian infrastructures; achievement of modern communication infrastructure, sustainable

¹ President of Romania, *National Defence Strategy of Romania*, Romanian Presidency, Bucharest, 2007.

and safe, able to be integrated into European communications; training, modernization and development of infrastructure facilities offered by N.A.T.O. for H.N.S.¹.

Critical infrastructures permanent military defense system (work/underground constructions) requires a thorough documentation of the existence and needs to adapt to the requirements of the fight. Underground works for military use requires a sustained and determined by planning and organizing special importance of their participation in cooperative defense formations (protection) civil measures of protection, evacuation of the population.

Therefore military cooperation with formations of critical infrastructure protection (protection) is imperative civil divisions establishment of joint action: evaluation of alternatives and measures to defend urban centers and how they integrate into the underground workings; records and information on the physical condition of the existing underground workings urban center, their extent, degree of equipment and prepare them for battle; implementation of additional measures for the repair, adaptation and completion of underground works to defend the urban center, values and objectives within it. Insurance of immediate possibilities materials, machinery, specialized and effective means for planning and adapting existing underground workings and supplementing them with new works required².



Figure no. 1. The Limanu Cave, an example of very large galleries created in chalk due to natural factors. Similar phenomena occurred in the internal structure of the limestone hills of the Capital Region

Formations defense (protection) can participate civil adaptation (planning) work underground in case of military actions are subunits of ensuring civil defense actions with the following specialties: research, communications, housing and pyrotechnics; subunits of intervention: health, veterinary, release and rescue, facilities, roads and bridges, N.B.C. and so on. To participate effectively in cooperation actions with defense formations (protection) civil necessary, during the period of non-combat, adapting existing underground works, building new underground workings orientation and immediate application of the following general principles: adaptation (arrangement) existing underground works as defense works; arranging the existing underground works shelters (caves, caverns, tunnels and other natural excavations); execution of underground works new underground shelters for control points, rest and campaign hospitals, shelter galleries subunits, combat equipment and stores etc.

Civil protection is an essential component of national defense, intended to provide peacetime, against the consequences of calamities, natural disasters or armed conflicts protecting citizens' cultural values and material goods. Necessary conditions of battles in urban areas is determined by the number and the possibility of housing and the timely evacuation of the population from the conflict. Housing measures are studied in peacetime, are summarized in civil protection plans and apply to the entire national territory, in different ways, depending on the importance of civil protection localities. Housing measures must take

² Octavian Pușchilă, Constantin Nitica, Peter Grecu, *Underground works and warfare*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest 2005.

into account: the use of all existing possibilities; differential protection to the population in every situation; economic and social development of urban centers and other places; constructions that may occur and the foregone.




Figure no. 2. The Bucharest Metro underground network: an adaptation and modernization of an old circuit of canals and underground facilities inherited from ancient times

By location, shelters, including ground (like) their employment should allow time between giving the alarm and enemy attack. Also housing measures must be implemented quickly and with technical inputs, materials and low labor. Accommodation capacity must ensure, including by integrating underground works constructed, adapted and/or arranged for this purpose: protecting the public spaces and staff; control points for leading civil protection and economic and social activities: housing and health research teams and observation posts; spaces for the storage of valuable cultural, apparatus, equipment etc .

Differential protection by housing takes into account the importance of urban centers and obtain the degree of protection both construction and the location of shelters, the highly durable being made in areas where the possibility of enemy attack are higher.

Protection is provided by: structure design of shelters, to be sized and constructed to withstand the shock wave data overload, those of conventional munitions blast; equipped with metal doors or reinforced concrete elements like walls and floor resistant closure inputs and outputs (including spare) with protective devices; cover layer of soil, which enables reduction of from 10 to 100 times the incident flux of radiation in the case of nuclear explosion or when employed in neutron ammunition; filter-ventilation facilities for protection against radioactive contamination with substances and biological warfare. In order to assure the stop of a long time buried and underground shelters, they are equipped with lighting wiring for fan operation Power systems, sanitary installations and assemblies and wire broadcasting local telephone network³.

Civil protection, including special purpose built underground or adapted later, no changes their functionality. During non-combat, civil protection can also be used as storage or used for other functions, with compliance to be maintained in working order and be revitalized in maximum 24 hours. Periodically, the exercises and applications, employment training may come into effect simultaneously, where necessary, evacuation of the materials inside.

A brief history of the romanian special objectives of critical infrastructure

The lack of concrete scientific data and information makes such a subject to be very labile, readily available to every lover of sensational. Precisely for this reason it is necessary to find the scientific explanations for the formation of natural underground galleries and how

³ Octavian Pușchilă, Constantin Nitica, Peter Grecu, *Underground works and warfare*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest 2005.

they can be adapted by humans. In terms of natural conditions, the region of Bucharest for instance, was a region with ancient woods and swamps alternating with chalk hills and a rich branch of rivers. From the Călugăreni region to the geographical position of Bucharest stretched a series of small chalk mountains, which have their underground carved by water into numerous canals some of which flooded. This chalk mountain chain had a range of nearly several hundred kilometers, starting from the near Danube region of Orsova, then going on an irregular line more or less distant from the Danube river, climbing to a point a little to the north and passing near Călugăreni to the region of Bucharest, then turning south again and going nearly parallel to the Danube. The region of forest, swamps and blunt chalk mountains is the region where it was placed later the Bucharest, and it drew the attention of its inhabitants because of its many large natural underground canals, cavities and other karst formations. All these karst formations which can be easily arranged and adapted to different purposes like hideouts, deposit rooms etc. From what it seems, at first, the Dacians used these natural caves and galleries to store their strategic reserves of food, leather and fur etc. Over time, the area was later used since ancient times as barn for domestic animals, in the Middle Ages this shelter became later a human settlement.




Figure no. 3. Some examples of surface and underground ancient constructions involving the realization of a vast circuit of tunnels: the Swan Palace (left) and the fortifications belt of Bucharest (right)

The first that notified the strategic potential of Bucharest was the Prince Vlad Tepes, who did design the first “modern” underground tunnels. Later, over the underground buildings of Tepes other princes and military commanders made several extensions, exterior buildings which try to conceal the access or other arrangements of the underground constructions. For instance, the Tepes Royal Court is an underground canal that passes under the Manuc's Inn and then branch out in three different directions : one goes toward the University Square turning to the position of Cismigiu Park (a former chalk hill surrounded by swamps) a region where later (since the times of King Carol I of Hohenzollern) were arranged some strategic objectives contemporary with the "fortified belt" of Bucharest (in the early Twentieth Century) and others; another underground canal starts from the Tepes Royal Court going toward what today we call the "House of Parliament" but the most important and longest canal leads to the largest chalk hill of today Bucharest and whose remains can still be seen today inside the Tineretului Park (the former “swamp of Cocioac”). In the era in which Tepes lived, that hill was a chalk mountain of a larger size, partially wooded and surrounded by the largest swamp in the region, so an impregnable natural fortress. There, on top of the mountain and inside the woods, it was the exit of the Tepes tunnel. Today, this exit is masked by the “Cenusa” Crematorium building.

Subsequently, such underground constructions continued during the Middle Eve but especially during the Phanariot Eve. All monasteries in the city or near Bucharest are actually located on the acces gates of important underground galleries, and these the ecclesiastical and sacred building, mask the strategic underground buildings. For instance, the former TB Sanatorium which is the current Swan Palace (and Restaurant) and a lot of objectives which

are located on major underground galleries: Cotroceni Palace (founded by Prince Serban Cantacuzino, and subsequently extended and arranged by King Ferdinand I of Hohenzollern, when the underground canal was been extended to Clinceni, via Fort Domnesti); the Mogosoaia Palace (at 14 km from Bucharest, it was built in 1702 by Constantin Brancoveanu); the Ghica Palace (built by Prince Grigore Dimitrie Ghica in 1822); the Stirbei Palace (built in 1835); the Sutu Palace (belonged to the great seneschal Costache Grigore Sutu, it was made in 1834, today it is the Museum of Art and History of Bucharest after it was been the museum of Romanian Communist Party, it is the nodal point above the ancient underground galleries, near the region where the communists built some very large strategic underground facilities, situated today in the area of Intercontinental Hotel/Bucharest National Theater); the University Palace (1857-1869) built by architect Al. Orascu and K. Storck, it is today the University of Bucharest and with the adjacent buildings of Sutu Palace it was located on one of the largest natural underground cavities which was successively adapted and used since ancient times beginning with Dacians, whose traces can be found almost everywhere in Bucharest and next to it (for example important archaeological sites are in Pantelimon, near the Swan Palace); the Palace of Justice (1890-1895) and the Cantacuzino Palace. All of these are located into a large scheme of underground galleries, for instance, from Saint Pantelimon Island, where Grigore Ghica built in 1735 the Pantelimon Monastery and hospital (partially demolished by Ceausescu) and where it is now the Swan Palace, starts an underground canal of large dimensions (virtually, a paved road) which links the palace with the Ghica Palace and Plumbuita Monastery etc.

Interesting to note that all these monasteries and palaces were built even in large intervals of time, at great distance one to another, but they were not placed randomly, but in a common scheme of large underground galleries: the Palace of Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies (the old building), the palaces and monasteries that some of which we mentioned above, the regions in which were relatively large chalk hills and swamps (Cismigiu and Youth Park today, and former blunt mountain on which is located the current Palace of Parliament etc), all these were from the beginning placed on strategic underground objectives and masks the acces/exit gates into them. Regarding the underground constructions of Bucharest, since Antiquity and the Middle Ages, there were several large tunnels that had a number of ramifications and on their schedule were later made adaptations and extensions, both inside and on the surface. In some areas where the chalk layer was strongly eroded it were formed larger cavities, often such cases occurred in the region of Bucharest in which there were once massive chalk hills. These were worn over time and even were more or less leveled by the artificial interventions.

The workers led by Vlad Tepes or much more later (XVIII-XIXth Century) by the princes Ghica and Cantacuzino, did not need to make excavations, but just some improvements of natural karst formations: the strengthening of the vault in certain places, paving, leveling etc. As Dacians from ancient times, they took some natural karst formations and made several improvements. The Bucharest underground situation (point of view of natural conditions) is very close to that of Budapest City, which is just sitting on a crust crossed by many natural galleries, that some of which are flooded. There are certain areas in Bucharest where underground facilities which have an high volume (ie underground cavity) and which according to the Defense Plan of "Patriotic War of the whole People" (the strategy of Socialist Republic of Romania) should have become important objectives of the civil protection facilities, with high capacity for housing people and supplies of all kinds; in 1989 some of these facilities were still under construction, being made only the structural strength, but mostly... until today have not been completed, because there were not allocated the necessary funds. It is therefore the case to draw attention to the need to pay attention and funds to preserve (at least) this important segment of the strategic infrastructure

modernization. Much of underground objectives are now left in disrepair for many years and there are in an advanced state of decay.



Figure no. 4. Examples of the former swampy regions of Bucharest region, in which area it could arrange large underground construction: the A.I. Cuza Park and the Park of Circus

The Dobrogea region is a former mountainous area, now a chalk hills plateau where there are a multitude of natural underground galleries. For example the sedimentary layers of chalk of Braila, that their origin was natural, not dug by any man, but the underground buildings were made, strengthened and used over time by the Dacians and muchmore later, by the Turks. Originally neither Braila nor Galati were not surface human settlements (even Drobeta Turnu-Severin, in southern Romania, has a similar underground structure) but over times were also made the construction on the surface. There was a long chalk mountain that starts from Orsova and was placed almost parallel to the Danube. The remains of this chalk mountain eroded by time and natural factors, can still be seen today. The region of today Bucharest has attracted the attention of humans since ancient times because there were several bigger hills surrounded by swamps and deep forests, the dry or flooded underground galleries were formed between these chalk hills and that underground cavities could be improved and used even by the Dacians, thousands years ago. The fact that the mountains (or hills) were hollowed inside amd surrounded by swamps and forests, did to have a very good defense against eventual aggressors.

The swamps and forests that existed in the region of Bucharest otherwise preserved over millennia, and Vlad Tepes seen them almost in their original form, the last remnants have been "deleted" relatively recently: Dambovita have once numerous affluents that in the meantime disappeared, as in fact the real Dambovita itself disappeared, Ceausescu making it to run solely on a subterranean canal; the Coccioc large swamp began to be drained only by 1968 that proved to be almost impossible, so they turned it in the current Tineretului Lake (which still is today a dangerous lake, with mofette and a very thick layer of mud in which that may still exist access slots in a circuit of underground phreatic rivers) and later to continue the improvements of the underground objectives, in the region was built (1928) the Cenua Crematorium (which masks the exist of the former main gallery from the Tepes Royal Court) but also the Polyvalent Hall (built in 1974), an objective which apparently is placed in a inappropriate place (due to the large volume of underground excavations the built of this Polyvalent Hall masked other large-scale works) and others. In the swamp where it is the today Cismigiu Park, where the second port of ventilation/output of galleries that started from the Tepes Royal Court; here, since the period of monarchical regime (between 1866 and 1947) but especially during the communist regime, were built important military objectives. Both the Coccioc swamp and the former swamp where is now the Cismigiu Park, were dominated by one or more fairly large sized hills. Today there can be spotted only little remains of them. The so-called People's House (now, The Palace of Parliament) was located on what was originally a hill. Its underground construction is higher and wider than what can be seen on the surface, being an underground miniature town; from this objective start the

connection tunnels to the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee and the Royal Palace, to the Otopeni Airport via Primaverii District, to the Clinceni paratroops unit via Cotroceni Palace, to Scrovistea Palace, to the planned Bucharest-Danube-Black Sea canal and in other directions.

Nicolae Ceausescu had the desire to be able to move almost only through the underground facilities in the entire range of the Ilfov Agricultural Sector. For this he had in mind to build a huge building that should be connected by underground metro lines, roads and waterways, with the objectives that are in almost all sides of Bucharest and even outside it, in the Ilfov Agricultural Sector. All these buildings were partially executed, some of them remaining just started and others, unfinished. The case of the Parliament Palace, with great difficulty were finished (and those partial ...) some of the surface buildings, even this did not work over yet.

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LANGUAGE POLICY AND STATE CONSTRUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE

Ecaterina HLIHOR,

Lecturer, "CAROL I" National Defense University,
katihlihor@yahoo.com

Abstract *The people of Ukraine are divided by politics, culture and language. The Dnipro river, which cuts through the country, not only separates east from west, but also a region with a Russian-speaking majority from one with a Ukrainian-speaking majority. The paper analyses the linguistic policy and its role in building the national identity and looks for an answer for the question: is the separatist sentiment a result of an inefficient language policy?*

Key words: *language policy, language rights, official language, regional language, identity blockage*

The Ukrainian crisis, already reflected in a civil war, brings to public attention, but also to the academic one a series of problems that have not been solved despite the efforts of political leaders in Kiev to strengthen the state and do it a viable player on the geopolitical map of Europe. The developments over the last 200 years, the historical and geopolitical ones, prevented its crystallization in classical forms of its national identity. The Ukrainian statehood has a long history, but with high temporal interruptions and great questions. For a long time large parts of the current territory of Ukraine were ruled by Poland, Russian and Austrian empires / Austro -Hungarian Empire, which had an impact on the process of forging a national matrix.

The very name of the state has not had enough time to coagulate in the collective mind in classical form (one followed by most European nations) to be focused on the ethnic majority. The name "Ukraine" was used in different historical periods to indicate a geographical location. The word is derived from "*u Kraia*" or "*okraina*" in Russian language and it means "periphery", "at periphery", "on edge". The root of this word is "krai" - "edge"¹. In the period in which they had not their own statehood, Ukrainians were perceived and known as *rusini* or *Malorussians* (small Russians). The Empire census conducted by the tsarist authorities in 1887, identified three "kinds" of Russians: Russians, Malorussians (Ukrainians) and Belarusian. The three names are closely related to the way Russia itself was perceived as a political actor.

For the others, Europeans or Asians, Russia was and remains not only a political and geographical reality but also a cultural one, whose borders are always moving. It can not be otherwise, since the state border disputes are an intrinsic part of its definition. Gogol, the famous writer claimed both by Russians and Ukrainians perceived this dynamic reality in his famous "poem", "Dead Souls" (1852). For him Russia is "*a country that does not know the joke, which has lasted half a world, while others pull themselves aside and make room for it to pass*"². This is a possible explanation for the fact that a lot of words have been used to

¹ See also Irina Manea, *Ukraine, national identity and War historiography*, in Historia.ro online, http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/ucraina-identitate-nationala-razboi-istoriografic

² Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol, *Dead Souls. Poem*, translation and notes by Emil Iordache, Holding Truth Publishing, Bucharest, 2011, pp. 260-261.

designate the political geography of Russia. The concepts *Россия* (Russia) and *Русь* (Rutenia) do not overlap totally but partially. In the Russian language the term *Русь* refers in a historical, cultural and geographical sense to the entire eastern Slavic space. For this reason in the Russian language there are two terms that do not overlap with strong meanings rooted in the collective mind: *Киевская Русь* (Kievan Rus) and *Россия*³. Instead, for the communities in the Roman-Germanic linguistic area the notion of Ruthenia represented the Eastern Slavs, but not Great Russians. These realities have influenced the collective consciousness of the peoples around the Russian neighborhood who perceived not only a single state reality, but a few Russians (Ruthenians): *Великороссия* or United Russia, as the Byzantines called the fourteenth century territories of the Oka River, located under the dominion of the great prince of Moscow; *Малороссия* or Little Russia, covering in the XIV century the western Ukraine today (Halicz and Volânia principalities), and later extended to the eastern Ukraine and *Новороссия* (New Russia) - the northern Black Sea territories annexed by Russia in the XVIII century, previously mastered by Crimea (inhabited by the majority of Tatars and Greeks). The Civil War between 1917-1922 transformed Novorossia into an object of dispute between Ukrainian nationalist government led by Petliura and Russians, be they communist or social-revolutionary albigardists. The one who would settle down the matter was Lenin, by his decision to assign Novorossia and eastern Crimea to the Russian SFSR and the central and western part to Ukraine⁴.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has rekindled the analysts interest for what Novorussia meant both for the Ukrainian nationalists, and for the Russians ones. The Proclamation in 2014 by the Russian separatists of a "confederal state" called Novorussia in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions brings to the attention of the international community a "Novorussia file" that can not be resolved without knowing the political history know and also without knowing how the identity matrices were built for the peoples within the Slavic space in general and Ukrainians in particular. The current crisis can not be understood without considering that Ukraine can be seen both as a very old country and as a very new one. Very old because it can be considered the cradle of the East Slavic world, but also very new because it appeared as a state, for a very short period of time after the end of World War I, on the ruins of the Russian Empire and Austro-Hungarian⁵.

Demographic and ethno-linguistic realities in contemporary Ukraine

The collapse of the Soviet empire reconnected the history of the state building and the national identities in Europe at a historic time abruptly stopped in this region by Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution which sat the statehood in the Marxist matrix of the social solidarity, of a state of "*proletarians*". Ukraine proclaimed its independence on the 24th of August, 1991, as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and it became one of the founding members of an ephemeral state building, the Community of the Independent States, although legally it has not ceased to exist⁶. The Ukrainian citizens overwhelmingly approved

³ Serebrian, Oleg, *Russia at crossroads. Geohistory, geo-culture, geopolitics*, Ed Cartier, Chisinau, 2014, pp. 12-15.

⁴ See broadly, Martin Malia, *Russia under Western Eyes : From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*, Belknap Press, 2000; Russell Bova, *Russia and Western Civilization: The crop and Historical Encounters*, Routledg, Annotated edition edition, 2003; Paul R. MágoCs, *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*, University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2010.

⁵ Mike Shuster, *Ukraine and the First World War*, online <http://greatwarproject.org/2014/03/26/ukraine-and-the-first-world-war/> accessed January 10, 2015.

⁶ See Jerry F. Hough, *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997; Steven Solnick, *Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998; Stephen Kotkin, *averted Armageddon: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

a referendum on independence from the Soviet Union and Ukraine's independence was internationally recognized. Since then, the young state has begun a difficult road of building its national identity. Among other methods and tools, language policy has played, as in fact for many of the former Soviet republics, a particularly important role. Some experts did not hesitate to say that in the former Soviet Union a real "*linguistic revolution began*"⁷. For Ukraine and other countries emerging from this revolution it did not mean only the reinstatement of the national language, but its return to its traditional alphabet and sometimes to another alphabet. This revolution has been driven by the linguistic question of national identity, for "*National identity is not just joining a language which is that of the nation, but also features a traditional alphabet linking it to a broader cultural group to which it belongs*"⁸.

Everyone who lived in Ukraine received citizenship in 1991. This did not mean automatically that all "had access" to the consciousness of one and the same national identity due to the heterogeneous ethnic, religious and cultural composition⁹. From this point of view, the new leadership in Kiev that assumed the political transition of the Ukrainian society has entered a state of dilemma: to establish a state based on one nation, with one official language, the Ukrainian one and ignore the multilingualism issues raised or make a series of concessions to minorities and to most Russian speakers and build a state based on a civic nation¹⁰. This dilemma was notified and Juliane Besters-Dilger which noted that Ukraine should consider the challenge of multiculturalism in the formation of national identity, which in the long run will have a much greater impact than a few decades ago. Ukraine should abandon the idea that the state is composed of a pure ethnic nation defined by a common, homogeneous language and culture. The demographic and ethno-linguistic realities seem to confirm these assertions.

Although Ukraine is a multiethnic country, with at least 25 different ethnic communities, it can be considered a relatively homogeneous country ethnolinguistics perspective because 78% of the population declared of Ukrainian origin, a much higher proportion compared to the most of the countries. Specifically, 77.8% of Ukrainians and 17.3% Russians represent 95.1% of the population¹¹.

This defines the ruin of a relative balance of social and ideological guidance in the process of the language for communication choice in the post-Soviet period¹². It is an interesting situation in Ukraine, which can also be unlikely to be found in any other European countries, namely that the ethnic map does not overlap the linguistic map. Many people who claim to be ethnic Ukrainians use actually the Russian language in the family. Abel Polese noted that visitors traveling for the first time in Kiev change very easily from the Ukrainian language to the Russian one. The announcements and street posters are formulated in Ukrainian, while the informal small ads and posters are in Russian. The announcements at bus stops, subway or airport are in the Ukrainian language, but it is a common thing to hear the request to speak in Russian to provide information. In varying degrees, the same situation is throughout the country. Officially each city speaks Ukrainian, but in reality, its geographical position encourages the use of a specific language.

⁷Elena Olteanu, *Language policy and state-building in Moldova* on line

<http://ro.scribd.com/doc/99535908/politica-lingvistica-si-constructia-statala-in-Republica-Moldova#scribd>

⁸ Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *La Gloire des nations*, Paris, 1988, p. 244.

⁹ Zbigniew Truchlewski, L' Ukraine postsoviétique : à l' autre d'une transition ? in Les Etudes de la Nouvelle Europe, Juin 2007 online http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/images/stories/ene_transition_ukraine.pdf

¹⁰ Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine. State and nation building*, Taylor & Francis e- Library, 2002, p. 2.

¹¹ Irina Pribytkova, *À la recherche of nouvelles identités. L' Ukraine dance to dimension ethnique et régionale (1991-2003)*, Matériaux pour l' histoire in the notre temps, Année 2004 Volume 76, Numéro 76, p. 41.

¹² Valeriy Chemes Fedorovych, *Ethnolinguistics identity of persons of Ukrainian origin / Romanian-speaking Russian in the multiethnic regions of Ukraine* in Linguistic Study. Випуск, 6/2012, p. 384.

In Odessa, for example, to ask for some information on the street you should firstly address in Russian, rather than Ukrainian; in Lvov, on the contrary, it is better to talk to people in Ukrainian and then go to Russian if the caller prefers that¹³. The surveys conducted in 2013 show that Russophones often identify themselves as Ukrainians. Thus, 35% of them declared themselves Russians according to their native language, for half of the Ukrainians respondents being easier to communicate in Russian and 13% communicate as easily in Russian as in Ukrainian¹⁴.

Although the population of Ukraine is seen to be composed of two major language groups, we must show that there is a distinct community, that of the speakers who use a hybrid dialect that Ukrainians call *suržyk*¹⁵. The term refers to a mixture of cereals (with a negative connotation) and took the metaphorical meaning of "*mixed blood*" and "*mixed language*". *Suržyk* has come to mean a mixture of words from Russian and Ukrainian. Patrick Seriot thinks the *suržyk* dialect may be designated primarily as a Russified Ukrainian and finally as a separate language¹⁶. From this point of view it is difficult to know who speaks "genuine Russian language" and who "pure Ukrainian". There are mixed words and meanings that give lexical, phonetic and morphosyntactic interferences between two similar languages, but not identical ones. As it can be seen from the map shown below the speakers of this dialect are up to 21.7%.

Linguistic Policies and state-building

There are authors who believe that Ukraine is formally engaged in a process of building its national identity, based on a civic conception of the nation and not on ethnic criteria, defining the national interests acceptable to all citizens in order to unite all in the effort to build the Ukrainian nation¹⁷. The reality shows that the ethnic factor played an important role. The political elites, in the period immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, strongly encouraged the use and development of the Ukrainian language both in the new fundamental act – **the Constitution** of the country - and through a series of laws aimed to official language and the status of minority languages in everyday practice. In *Article 10, The Constitution* provides that the Ukrainian language is the "*national language*" (*derjama Mova*)¹⁸, which has a different status from the "*official language*" (*ofitziyna Mova*). This difference is similar to the distinction drawn in the German law between "*Amtsprach*" (administrative language) and "*Sprach offiziell*"¹⁹. For the Ukrainian nationalists, however, the official bilingualism is unacceptable. A compromise can be reached in Ukraine if it remains one "state" language and two or more "official" languages. They can recognize a form of bilingualism, but without an official recognition of it. Currently, there is a

¹³ Abel Polese, *In theory and in practice: language policy in Ukraine after 1991*, in *Revue Regard sur L'est* online http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=ro&sl=fr&u=http://www.regard-est.com/home/breve_contenu.php%3Fid%3D944&prev=search

¹⁴ *Idem*.

¹⁵ See LAAD Bilaniuk, *Speaking of Surzhyk : Mixed Language Ideologies and the Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. XXI, no. 1-2, June 1997; Niklas Bernsand, *Surzhyk and National Identity in Ukrainian Nationalist Ideology in the Forum*. *Berliner Osteuropa Info*, no. 17/2001, pp. 38-47; Patrick Seriot, *La linguistique spontaneity of frontières des traceurs* in Sériot P. (Ed.), *Langue et en Europe Central et Eastern nation, du 18ème siècle à nos jours*, Cahiers de l'ILSL (Univ. Of Lausanne), no. 8, 1996, pp. 277- 304 ; *Idem*, *Diglossia, egg mélange des langues bilinguisme: le cas du suržyk en Ukraine*, in *LaLinguistique* 41, FASC. 2 (2005), pp. 37-52.

¹⁶ Patrick Seriot, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

¹⁷ Jacques Leclerc, *Ukraine: politique à la langue relative ukrainienne*, in *L' aménagement linguistique dans le monde*, Quebec, TLFQ, Université Laval, 24 march 2007 online <http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/europe/ukraine.htm> accessed January 13, 2010.

¹⁸ State Language - fixed idiom in law, whose use is mandatory in state government bodies and acts, in institutions and organizations, enterprises, educational institutions, scientific, cultural, in communications and computing, cf. to the variant translated into Romanian lb LAW OF UKRAINE ON LANGUAGE POLICY PRINCIPLES OF STATE, online, <https://cubreacov.wordpress.com/2012/12/22/legea-ucrainei-despre-principiile-politicii-lingvistice-de-stat-versiune-romaneasca-in-premiera-absoluta/> accessed January 13, 2015.

¹⁹ Jacques Leclerc, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

large gap between the official rhetoric and the observable situation. The only state language is Ukrainian, of the "titular nation" that is, the one that gave its name to the state. But most of the people, especially in urban areas, in the western part of Ukraine speak Ukrainian, and the rest speaks Russian or the dialect called suržyk. The paradox of today's Ukraine is that the state language is spoken by a minority and there is thus the danger to territorially restrict its area of use.

After the independence of Ukraine in August 1991, the political parties, "driven" mostly by external factors frequently resorted to ace in the hole: the linguistic argument, especially during the election campaigns. Right immediately after the collapse of the regime of Viktor Yanukovich, under the pressure from the nationalists in the west, the Superior Rada took the decision to cancel the famous and controversial law on languages, finally adopted with a fight and scandal²⁰, on the 3rd of July, 2012, that reserved the language Russian and several other languages of national minorities the status of official languages in the regions where they are spoken by most residents, not less than 10% of the population²¹. Rada decision, however, was blocked by ad interim president Oleksandr Turchynov and therefore did not get to take effect. This incident was one of the factors of mass discontent in the southeastern part of the country and a high ball at the net for the Russian Federation to accuse Kiev of non political rights of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. That was one of the pretexts²² for Russian military incursion (be it the Kremlin officially unresolved) in Crimea and its annexation under the older name of Novorossia. As shown, both political power in Kiev and Moscow chose not to make the language a means of understanding, but a weapon of hatred, through which to turn both Russians and Ukrainians one against the other.

Most often, the position of these political parties and movements stands, unfortunately, through aggression and lack of compromise. They consider the Russian language as the only "civilized" one. Maybe. However, pro-Russians make no concession to the Ukrainian language. It will be much reserved the role of a provincial dialect, intentionally corrupted by the interference of the Polish lexical items, an "Esperanto" invented by the Austrian propaganda before the First World War. Among the arguments mentioned by the pro-Russian part there are invariably mentioned the Austrian attempts to politically - and not philologically – reform the Rusyns language through a series of measures: the replacement (a total fail) of the Cyrillic alphabet with the Latin one, the removal of letters ы, э, ъ, and the inclusion of some foreign to the Russian language, as *е* and *і*, innovations being motivated by the Austrian emperor's belief that *"It is better and safer for Ruthenians not to use the spelling used in Russia"*²³. After alphabet, vocabulary turn came to be cleaned by many words used in the Russian literature, considered to be "Moscow" ones, so harmful. The gaps were filled with loans from Polish, German or simply invented words. Thus, *direction* (направление) - "Moscow" word was replaced with "напря́м", contemporary (современный) – also "Moscow" word was replaced with "сучасний", only (исключительно) - replaced with "виключно", "Enlightenment (просветительный) with "просивітний", "society (общество)" - with "товариство" or "суспільство" etc.

In this "reformed" language were written manuals, books, dictionaries hardly accepted, with opposition from the people, until they were accustomed to change. The works published in

²⁰ Оппозиция готова к физическому противостоянию при принятии языкового закона, zn.ua.html : // opposition - gotova -k - fizicescomu - protivostoianiu - pri - priniatii- /, accessed January 3, 2015.

²¹ The law applies to 18 languages, including Russian, Belarrussian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Tatar, Moldovan, Romanian, German, Polish etc.

²² *"We could not abandon the Crimea and its people in trouble. It would have been a betrayal of us"*, said Vladimir Putin to the State Duma in Moscow In March 18, 2014, accessed <http://segodnjashnie-novosti.ru/politika/rech-putina-18-marta-video/> January 3, 2015.

²³ *Українці. Виртуальна нація і її язык. Антируське движение сепаратистів в Малоросії 1847-2009*, <http://monarchy.ucaz.net/> accessed November 12, 2014, <https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0>, accessed November 29, 2014 .

the Ukrainian language, of Ivan Franco, the writer, for instance, who joined the Ukrainian movement "corrected" the texts for each new edition "look" (взгляд), "air" (воздух), "army (войско),"yesterday (вчера) "with "погляд", "повітря", "військо","вчора" led to an acute shortage of readers²⁴. Ten, fifteen years passed until they could sell, while books like *"Taras Bulba"* by Gogol, the famous Ukrainian writer *who wrote in Russian*, quickly spread to villages in Galicia in huge circulations in the nineteenth century.

In part due to this social background Russia is somewhat handy to have an appreciable impact on the political life of Ukraine – it is well known Moscow's policy on the rights of Russian minorities abroad, which covers not only the ethnic Russians, but all the Russian-speaking population. As it can be seen in the case of the Crimean Peninsula, Moscow may use this approach as a pretext for military aggression against some sovereign states. The fears of the Baltic States in this respect, are not unfounded²⁵.

The Russian Church by its Patriarch, could not stay out of the ideological and linguistic war in the neighboring state, spreading through a hard propaganda the concept of Russian World (Русский мир) according to which the Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and - attention! - Moldovans together form a unique civilization around the Russian language and culture. The attempt to revive, in this view, the unity of the three nations, if possible, even more, invoking the period of the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union, aims to artificially oppose the Russian world to the Western civilization. Trying to justify the Kremlin's intervention in Ukraine, the official representative of the Russian Orthodox Church said that the Russian people is a nation divided on its historic territory entitled to unite in a single state body²⁶. The Russian patriarch's position is not a new one and it is supported by many Russians historians, linguists, geopoliticians, according to which the Ukrainian and Belorussian languages are sub-dialects of the Russian language.

On the opposite side of the political spectrum of Ukraine lies the other group, for which the "free", legally "unregulated" movement of the Russian language has the effect of eliminating the use of Ukrainian. This orientation is present in the west, where the national traditions are very strong in Kiev, where the most recent ideology is elaborated, the national ideology. The leaders of this guidance can not accept Russian as a second official language, convinced that its official status brakes the strengthening of the Ukrainian nation based on a single language, the Ukrainian language. According to these, language is the foundation of building a nation. *"The Ukrainian language should remain the only official language in Ukraine,"* said Chairman Petro Poroshenko, at the first meeting of the new parliament (Verkhovna Rada), elected on the 26th of October 2014. *"The Ukrainian language as the only state language is an extremely important factor in strengthening the society and the state"*²⁷. The belief of many supporters of the president's position is that the Ukrainian language actually does not benefit from the status established by law and its possibilities in the state. The official use in all fields of activity of the Russian language can only lead to the marginalization of the Ukrainian language, to its use only in the domestic sphere and only in certain regions. Therefore, it must be smoothed, "clean" the way of the Ukrainian language.

²⁴ <https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0>, accessed November 29, 2014

²⁵ G. Friedman, *In the hands of Russia*, Moldova threatens http://activenews.ro/stratfor-dupa-ucraina-alianta-din-estonia-pana-azerbaijan_1827826.html Bucharest, accessed December 29, 2014.

²⁶ Патриарх Кирилл: суверенитет Украины не должен разрушать "Русского мира" www.religion.in.ua/.../25195-patriarx-kirill-suverenitet-ukrainy-ne-dolzhen-razrushat-russkij-mir.html, accessed on 27 December 2014, Патриарх Кирилл настаивает на «русском мире» для Украины, http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/26831-patriarx-kirill-nastaivaet-na-russkom-mire-dlya-ukrainy.html, accessed December 27, 2014.

²⁷ Petro Poroshenko claims that Ukrainian should be the only official language, [Realitatea_Net.html](http://Realitatea.Net.html), accessed January 3, 2015.

As if to further thicken the dividing line between pro ucrainofon western and pro Russia southeastern, Poroschenko proposed in a speech at the University of Lviv on the 3rd of October, 2014, as English to become the second language in the Ukrainian schools. *"We do not have to talk about the status of the Russian language but that of English"*, he said, arguing that *"there is a link between the living standards and the level of mastery of English by the people of a country"*²⁸. The example elected by the president was Singapore, whose government decided in the 50s as English becomes the second official language. What is the rapprochement between Ukraine and Singapore the president did not say, but knowingly ignoring even denying - *"it's not necessary"* – the needs to study the mother tongue of nearly half of the population has poured fuel on the painful language problems.

The real possibility of restricting the use of Russian in Ukraine is, however, hard to imagine. It's an idea both unproductive and unrealistic. Basically, the language issue is used by the political forces in Ukraine, but also by the external actors with one goal – to block the interregional dialogue and the national integration of the country.

One of the most common clichés is that the Russian language brings people closer, politically speaking, her Russian speakers to Russia. The polls disprove this theory, however. According to recent research undertaken in 2013 in the most Russian-speaking Ukrainian city of Donetsk, between 60% and 75% of respondents aged between 18 and 45 identified themselves as Ukrainians and 99% of them preferred to fill forms in Russian²⁹. Our question, naturally: why in Russian? Is it possible bilingualism in Ukraine? In the current tense think it is difficult to give a firm answer. As an example, in the Russian social network "VKontakte" (ВКонтакте) the *"Russian-speaking Ukrainian nationalists"* is a very active group who talks in Russian and support the Ukrainian language as the sole state language. However, according to the members of the group, switching to Ukrainian must be *"very gradual and conscious, given that none of the languages will be oppressed"*³⁰. And, we would add, given the fact that the Ukrainian language will come to occupy such a strong position in society, such a prestige and real social status - and not designed - that to be known and spoken by all citizens, including politicians.

The linguistic problem, as it turns out, is not exactly easy to be "sliced" in Ukraine. In any case, not by inflammatory speeches of the political leaders, by placing on very categorical positions, very intransigent ones. Much less with heavy armament, unmarked troops, tanks sent to "defend" against each other. And in this matter, despite the intense propaganda war conducted by means of Russian international services - from Russia Today TV channel³¹, much of the Russian intelligentsia did not only hastened to join the Kremlin propaganda of the Presidency, but also celebrity voices were firmly defined by the demonstrations of force that Moscow is committed and condemned the aggression – not even assumed, not even recognized by Kremlin!!! – against Ukraine. *"I'm Russian, I miss my homeland* - says director Andrei Konchalovsky, author of *"Siberiada"* but also of an interesting documentary in two parts *"Battle for Ukraine"* - *but I do not see the land which I want to be proud of. I just see crowds of unhappy people and foreigners who are afraid of*

²⁸ UKRAINE \ Petro Poroshenko wants English to become the second language of instruction in schools in Ukraine, instead of Russian - International - HotNews_ro.htm, accessed January 10, 2015.

²⁹ Опрос: 75% молодежи Донецка считают себя украинцами
<http://podrobnosti.ua/society/2013/08/08/922522.html>, accessed December 28, 2014.

³⁰ Украинский язык для лентяев, <http://vk.com/lazyukraine>, accessed January 3, 2015, <http://www.paginaderusia.ro/la-prima-sedinta-a-noului-guvern-de-la-kiev-sa-vorbit-in-limba-rusa/>, accessed January 5, 2014.

³¹ "Telepropaganda prepared the Russians to defend their homeland << >> in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine by the Ukrainian fascist occupants," said Russian writer Mikhail Siskin. *"Putin's television moderators have done everything to create in their propaganda news the image of a Hill defender as a fascist and a hohol who appeared like a joke : cunning, greedy, obtuse, ready to sell everything even to the West, being fat or not. The country which has such a state television should die of shame"* in Шишкин, Михаил, Украинское будущее России, <http://rus.postimeesee/2746962/mihail-shishkin-ukrainskoe-buduwee-rossii>, accessed December 21, 2014.

each other! I want them to be proud, not ashamed of their homeland! When was I last proud of it? I do not remember"³².

But, after all, who are these and who are the others? Who is Russian, who is Ukrainian? The dilemma is not a new one. "The secret Ucrainofil of the Russian culture ", as it is called Gogol who was concerned about the nature of his soul two centuries ago. He confessed to friends that he felt equally Russian and Malorussians (hohol)³³. Russians and malorussians seemed to be, in his view, branches of the same ethnos, united by the Orthodox faith. His desire, as it is shown by a scrap of that period of 1846-1851, was "*to encompass both halves of the Russian people, the north and south, the treasure of a single soul*"³⁴. We believe that in solving the problem of identity one can not ignore the emotions, the feelings of people, the system of values to which they relate and they believe in and they are not required by any law of language or, worse, with tanks.

The overcoming of the identity deadlock, of the pro western or pro Russia fanaticism currently is not in the power of the government in Kiev, much less in the Kremlin. An approach to include all of them is given by Andrey Kurkov (born in 1961), writer from Kiev, known worldwide for his novels *Death of the penguin*, *Dear friend*, *companion of the dead one*. He writes in Russian, but he considers himself an Ukrainian writer as the Russian literature that is written in Ukraine and about Ukraine belong to the Ukrainian national literature and it should not be monopolies according to criteria of language. Immediately after the invasion of Ukraine by Russian military forces, Kurkov said: "*I am Russian and I do not need any protection. I demand the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. My ancestors settled down in Crimea in 1785. Raised in Crimea, I was fed up with Russian culture. I think, I speak and I write in Russian... and I mean it with every fiber of my being. I demand immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine*"³⁵.

We believe that the process of national integration substantially accelerated after the Russian intervention, which generated a serious threat to the Ukrainian state. Currently only a small part of the Ukrainian population sees itself living in Russia. According to surveys conducted by the Institute of Sociology in Kiev in southeastern only 8.4% of the population see Ukraine and Russia in the composition of one state and 15.4% support their annexation to Russia region³⁶. Most of the active, educated Russian-speaking population in Ukraine proves an absolute solidity with the ucrainofons compatriots, uniting against the Russian invasion and the attempt to slash the country and divide the society.

Conclusions

As a result of some language policies that have been imposed for reasons of changing the balance of power between those who want a coming closer to the Western values and those seeking greater proximity to Russia, the linguistic situation in Ukraine is one of paradox. The national language, the Ukrainian language, is not preferred (and sometimes not sufficiently known) by a significant segment of the population in everyday communication, and one of the minority languages - Russian - is dominant in the Ukrainian society. The establishment of a model that appeared and consolidated in Europe in the nations

³² Андрей Кончаловский, *Битва за Украину*, www.obretenie.info/art/.../bitva_za_ukrainu.htm, accessed December 19, 2014.

³³ Гоголь и русско-украинский вопрос, online, [www.Гоголь и русско - украинский вопрос. htm](http://www.Гоголь_и_русско_-_украинский_вопрос_.htm) ., accessed December 21, 2014.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Андрей Курков: "*Мы находимся в состоянии войны с Россией. И это надолго, если не навсегда*", fakty.ua/178640-andrej-kurkov-my-nahodimsy, accessed December 27, 2014

³⁶ <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3379502-otnoshenye-ukrayntsev-k-rossyy-luchshe-chem-rossyian-k-ukrayne-opros>, accessed December 28, 2014.

century, without taking into account these realities, may lead to crises and increase tensions between certain segments of society. On the occasion of Day of unity, the President of Ukraine said that his country "*is a unitary member states that speaks a single language*". Can this statement be one meant to bring peace in regions struggling today with all the means for political and linguistic rights? Russians and Russophones are also unable to understand such commands and they think their ethnic identity, language, culture, traditions are threatened.

The linguistic policies adopted lately by the power of Kiev lead the state-building in a state of dilemma. The intellectuals and pro-European political elite want a classic European state, where the population has secure borders, with one official language, one flag and national anthem. On the other hand, a significant part of the Ukrainian society would like a federal state with a state language, but also with broad rights in the language and culture policy and historical traditions. The clash between these two visions seems unsolvable at this time. Two or three generations will be necessary to clear things within the linguistic area after the cease of the ethnic conflicts and the intolerable behavior disappear from the relations between the nationalists and pro-Russians in Ukraine.

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PRINCIPLES AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPECIFIC FUNCTION CONSISTING BY CATEGORY IMPORTANT AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PERMANENT

Constantin COȘOFREȚ,

Lieutenant colonel, Engineer, PhD. Student, National Defense University “CAROL I”,
cosofrco@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The work of preparing the ground made operative, chiefly command posts, storage technique and other military equipment, and where there is permanent fortification systems, integrated underground them. Work underground civil defense system composition include shelters and facilities for protection of the population, food warehouses and other logistics, command posts; underground works for health activities; underground spaces for housing industrial installations of particular importance to the continuation of the national economy. The main types of construction (housing) underground are subways, which are used by special arrangements for hospitals, warehouses, command posts and telecommunications; specially built underground storage spaces; ground control points equipped with filtro-ventilation plants, transmission systems, sources of water, energy, food, medicine, rest areas, exits in case of emergency rescue; underground spaces made for defense industrial facilities; grottos, caves, salt mines specially designed for various purposes; rock shelters, for certain types of ships, aircraft, command posts, warehouses, etc .;*

Keywords: *critical infrastructure permanent underground work, protection of the population;*

An important element of the defense system to protect livestock, people, goods, values, heritage and environmental factors is the ongoing critical infrastructure - similar to work underground - with the engineer works for battle, those that are executed on the surface or buried in the ground. Critical infrastructures equivalent permanent military fortifications are building permanent military ground, stone or concrete or other durable material designed to protect the lifeblood and the means of their struggle against the enemy means of destruction and to facilitate action combat troops.

Integrating critical infrastructure appropriate to the needs of the fight standing, using forces, technical means for the execution of various materials and their arrangement determines the action to streamline and harmonize the planning system works engineers, especially during non-combat, to have the expected outcome later and the materialization of home court advantage¹.

The concept of critical infrastructure protection and it had several forms of approach, diversity is on technical and economic specification, parts of the study, coordinates risk developments².

The issue of design, implementation and execution of critical infrastructure for permanent command and control system remains an ongoing evolutionary principle technologization diversified and the emergence of new types and categories of weapons. Currently specialized in military literature, there are few works devoted exclusively to deal with, the issue of permanent fortifications, corresponding to the current conditions of modern warfare. Direct participation in the design, execution, completion and commissioning, with

¹ “Critical infrastructure permanent military vulnerability to different types / categories of weapons and ammunition” - Florentina IUGAN, Constantin Cosofret, Lucian Stefan COZMA - Communication session National Defense University “CAROL I” - november 2013.

² “National Defence Strategy of Romania”.

direct participation in analyzing the results, checks technically demonstrated such critical infrastructure for command and control system, where the function tests, such types targets without regard to outstanding technical performance, leads me to say that the application is extended and includes a special attention to all military specialists in development issues above.

Due to the many problems of life insurance personnel and military equipment can create various scenarios on vulnerabilities in various military actions using different types and categories of weapons. Once again, we can not accurately predict the behavior of all of the components of such critical infrastructures permanent because the design theme when launching, drawing, can not be measured, estimated, the concept of technology and appearance time types, and different types of weapons.

The emergence and development of critical infrastructure works have analyzed military, dialectically, in line with developments armies and means of warfare throughout history Romanian society. Thus, we can mention the main forms of critical infrastructure works such military fortification, in the order they appeared and evolved in history: the wave of earth, guard towers, walls of towns and cities, border lines, construction big walls with outer ditches and towers, fortified medieval castles, fortifications with bastions.

In Romania fortification works are known generally the same stages and forms of development. The progress of the work of fortification there are the following periods: stabbing cities, cities firearms during period of high caliber weapons, aviation bombs and chemical weapons during arms classic high caliber and widespread destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical and biological) weapons during intelligent³.

To combat the destruction or removal of defense staff works it serves can be used several categories of means of destruction. Means used to destroy critical infrastructure work can be classified:

- conventional means (artillery shells, bombs aviation ammunition load reactive classic rocket bombs, bullets infantry weapons);
- modern methods (ordinary and cumulative loads of explosives, incendiary means, chemical and bacteriological means, means 'blindness' nuclear and thermonuclear ammunition pull launched or transported in the form of missiles, bombs, projectiles, action type H.P.M. weapons (high power microwave);

Among current concerns for defense in case of aggression and warfare distinguish early realization of various types of underground works. Underground works made in the preparation of operational chiefly command posts, storage technique and other military equipment, and where there is permanent fortification systems, underground works are integrated them. Military experts consider that the existing underground workings can not be considered sufficient. It is considered necessary to extend the concept of protection of the majority population, military equipment and material goods in towns and urban centers. Given the complexity and difficulty of ongoing critical infrastructure, a strong emphasis is placed on activities such as adaptation of underground appurtenances; developing evacuation plans of the majority population and material goods in urban centers; exercise civilian population by applications from non-combat time for timely evacuation⁴.

From extensive research of the literature it can be concluded that the loss of personnel, combat equipment, materials while the physical protection system is designed permanent critical infrastructure based on a powerful concept, is the essential guarantee of success in military which is determined by destructive means of striking features and fire protection capability natural fortification works and statistical data resulting from previous conflicts.

³ Lt. col. ing. Miron JOSAN, "*Permanent fortifications*", Military Academy, 1977.

⁴ Col. Octavian PUȘCHILĂ, col. (r) ing. Constantin NIȚICĂ, col. Petre GRECU. "*Underground works and warfare*", Military Publishing, 1994.

Masking works include: planting of trees and vegetation specific area, civil, industrial false, sand dunes, which works adapted to environmental conditions. In order to increase the value as an obstacle to urban centers and socio-economic objectives mention some of the measures that need to be planning engineers presented and analyzed: fortified support points on roadways, defense organization of districts; execution of dams explosive and non-explosive networks using improvised means and local preparation of buildings, enhancing their achievement hidden pathways, including groundwater discharges to supply and safe; construction planning for the provision of viewing conditions, enforcement and fire protection personnel; execution of shelters with ventilation and more effective inputs, preferably in basements and / or underground workings; arrangement of control points; preparation of dams and counter alignments; arrangement artillery firing positions; enforcement measures to protect existing infrastructure.

Underground works composing defense and civil protection system include: shelters and facilities for protection of the population, food warehouses and other logistics, command posts; underground works for health activities; underground spaces for housing industrial installations of particular importance to the continuation of the national economy. In large urban public purpose objectives are built (subways, rail and road tunnels etc.) that the arrangement can be turned into underground shelters. The main types of construction (housing) underground are subways, which are used by special arrangements for hospitals, warehouses, command posts and telecommunications, etc .; specially built underground storage spaces; ground control points equipped with filtro-ventilation plants, transmission systems, sources of water, energy, food, medicine, rest areas, exits in case of emergency rescue; underground spaces made for defense industrial facilities; grottos, caves, salt mines specially designed for various purposes; rock shelters, for certain types of ships, aircraft, command posts, warehouses etc.

For planning, adapting premises, interior equipment underground works needed some immediate actions:

- **complete sealing of the lens assembly against chemical warfare, radioactive substances and pathogens**; This is executed by installing watertight protection doors at the main entrance, located behind and at a distance of 2.00 m - 4.00 m from the outer door (resistance) made of metal. Protective doors will be of resistance-tight and airtight (second), so at least two airlocks; a limitation of overpressure inside the lens to prevent foul air penetration for possible leaks exterior insulation system.

- **providing minimum filtro-ventilation works**; filtro-ventilation system of underground works are done in three modes: free ventilation, ventilation filtering indoor air regeneration; for free ventilation air brought in from outside, ventilation is achieved by maintaining the doors open. The ventilation system with filtration, the atmosphere of the main room must provide minimum conditions of microclimate, dynamic pressure, urniditate, concentration of carbon dioxide, air purification toxic and radioactive substances, etc .. Ventilation filtration system consists of rule of: air intake, valve antisuflu filtration, dust retention, fan, pipes and ducts for introducing purified air to discharge polluted air. Regeneration indoor air ventilation is used when the outside air quality does not meet the objective. Completion of oxygen consumed in underground work can be done from oxygen cylinders under pressure or using oxygen regenerative substance.

- **vertical and horizontal waterproofing work underground structure**; protection against infiltration of underground or surface water depth are important during periods of rainfall or storm water freezing and thawing, including climate areas where the ground water table level is ascending vertically. Given the use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological, the presence of water is a real source of contamination with toxic, radioactive or pathogenic agents. Water infiltration and the high humidity, with permanent or seasonal.

Permanent water seepage sails are fed from groundwater, which acts throughout the year; they maintain a humid, sometimes impossible or unbearable for human activity and degrade, rock or weakening resistance subterranean space. Fighting seepage is a complex operation and requires more resources and effective for a period of time. Procedures to combat seepage underground space are determined by the way (natural or executed), the abundance seepage, to a destination gave underground space. Fighting seepage into underground voids (unlined) with open areas subject to natural agents and degradation, sealing is achieved by using the process of injection pressure rocks of different suspensions emulsions, which also helps increase resilience (lift) rocks. Fluids are used are usually the type suspensions and solutions clay cement, chemicals, hydrocarbon binders mixed injectable substances. Basic materials are injectable suspensions of cement in water, cement-clay-water clay-sand-cement-water, chemical solutions of sodium silicate, organic resins. Sealing is achieved by cementing rocks, argillic alteration, or silicatisation. Fighting infiltrate the underground excavations lined typically consists in: waterproofing liner by grouting (in masonry) and plastering; capture water and sewer drainage executed them using support body or its upper surface; achieving intermediate waterproofing layer using prefabricated waterproof materials; use waterproof concrete; use ventilation and indoor lighting; using injection processes (cementation, silicatisation) above; restoration waterproofing screed⁵.

- **ensuring that the work / rest**; equipment underground space with indoor plants is based on the destination and usually includes: filtro-ventilation installations; materials to ensure working conditions and rest (suspended or fixed working boards on tables, racks, folding furniture Staff furniture made onsite beds); installations for heating and lighting (electric lanterns or based batteries); connections and driving means; installation preparation (heated) food. Installation of partitioning functions endowments and insurance are extremely diverse: sas sites, hallways, offices, bedrooms, kitchen, meeting rooms, medical, operating room, dentist, ambient sound and arrangement, functions technical areas etc .;

- **ensuring sanitary and hygienic conditions, including decontamination, N.B.C. protection**; ensuring sanitary and hygienic conditions concern: the underground disposal of all outbreaks, insects and rodents; intended for human activities sector isolation from the rest of underground space when it is larger; establishment and proper use of drinking water supply; sewage disposal; understand composition analysis and permanent (parameters) of underground air; treatment (when possible) walls with disinfectant materials; arrangement of the spaces, insulated and ventilated the campaign toilets; ventilation and illumination of corresponding underground space⁶.

Conclusions

It is distinguished, some main directions for defining, configuring and compiling permanent constructive critical infrastructure:

- the means / methods of destruction and factors related to these computing tasks that immediate action means / methods of destruction;
- establishing metdodelor on protection against means / methods of destruction, to completely eliminate their vulnerability;
- establishing measures for determining the positions occupied by troops in combat and operation control command system;
- planning engineers by masking and protection measures;

⁵ - Col. Octavian PUȘCHILĂ, col. (r) ing. Constantin NIȚICĂ, col. Petre GRECU, *"Underground works and warfare"* Military Publishing, 1994.

⁶ - Col. Octavian PUȘCHILĂ, col. (r) ing. Constantin NIȚICĂ, col. Petre GRECU, *"Underground works and warfare"* Military Publishing, 1994.

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SOCIETAL SECURITY A UNION SECURITY FOR A MULTICULTURAL EUROPEAN SOCIETY

Anghel ANDREESCU,

Gl. (r) Prof. PhD., "CAROL I", National Defense University

Dorin RÂNCEANU,

Assistant Researcher, "CAROL I" National Defense University,
ranceanu.dorin@gmail.com.

Abstract: *The national concern is the sum of the citizens' interests that converges in creating a relaxed and peaceful environment within a secure framework. The interests of the people, that bear a number of common attributes (race, ethnicity, language, history, geography) and give form and substance to mere feelings (identity, symbols, values) are elements of the national interest based on the right of association (groups, constituent parties).*

European integration has eroded the borders of traditional societies and this process led to shifting one's attention from national to European concerns. For an European society the security of the state is no longer sufficient, that is why the EU's support is now in foreground. The pure European is currently at risk of being exposed to non-EU multiculturalism, as European citizens have the tendency to become "stateless" in their own country.

Key words: *Societal Security, economy, cooperation security, terrorist groups, identity, multiculturalism, ethnic conflicts.*

Redefining the concepts of vulnerability, risk, threat to European security

The concepts of (in) security (vulnerability, risk, threat) and European interest had been perceived differently over the years in the old continent. Currently in terms of psychosociology (individual, group, state / nation) are noticed trends of smoothing in European society.

The European interest is the amount citizens' interests which converges to create a well-being environment within a framework of security. Individual interests are componente parts of European interest based on the right of association (groups, constituent parties). In this case, it is interesting the way in which the concept of European interest takes shape from the psychosociology and way it can be achieved and maintained on long run. Security policies of the EU should aim to create an European interest at the expense of protecting certain states. Creating and integrating the Eastern European EU established both opportunities and threats. In this respect, the rights and opportunities of individuals can provide risks and threats to others.

Security is the prerequisite for the operation of any formal or informal social group of any social, economic, political, organization and is the result of the action of some external disruptive factors and internal strength of social protection and responsiveness.

The vulnerability is the weak side of an individual or a system that can be exploited by external actions, and is characterized by a reduced ability to withstand threats.

The risk can be defined as "the likelihood of damaging consequences determined by an action conducted by an entity for purposes of exploitation a vulnerability." Risk is

the possibility of reaching in a condition of insecurity and is the result of the sum of items of hazard - vulnerability.

At the psychologic level of an individual, the risk increases gradually, according to the stakeholders (state, nation, group, individual), proximal (by its proximity - local, state, planetary) and promptness (by how quickly triggering). The risk can be military, political, economical or social. At the individual level the risk is assessed from the outside to inside being permanently exposed to threats and from inside to other individuals as a threat trigger.

The outside threat is a dangerous action, which is linked to a circumstance or conjuncture (hazard). External danger has an anticipatory and a preventively character. The threat is "declaration of intention to punish or injure a person, especially if it does not want a sign or a warning of a potential danger"¹.

The risks and psychological threats to the individual

The risks and threats to the individual's psychological aims to change mentalities, ideas, aspirations, behaviours:

- Inoculation and developing the spirit of selfishness and individualistic at the expense of team spirit (this has led to the emergency of extreme nationalist groups and right-wing parties, emergency of the current European anti Eastern European citizens' rights to freedom of movement and be employable, and equalize them to the psychologic of non-EU citizens);
- Deviation of individual attention and interest from their current problems, by irrelevant ways (implemented daily events at national and European level despite some real military and economic threats such as those coming from Russian space, terrorist threats exported from the Middle East, or the internal because of organized crime);
- introduction and application in the individuals consciousness of false spiritual values, in order to replace traditional true values (accession of citizens to extreme, separatist, fundamentalist, religious values).

The psychosocial European security representation

The concept of psychosocial representation of security concerns the way people perceive the problems (in) security and it is created on the basis of life experience, needs, values, interests, personal and collective beliefs.

The representation, fundamental concept in psychology and sociology, are linked by social processes and collective language. Basis of this concept has made the Frenchman Emile Durkheim, who said that "collective life, like individual psychologic life is a continuous course of representations; we do not know exactly where it begins and where it ends"².

The persons' activities represent psychosocial outcomes of internal and external environment. The emergency of individual level, at vulnerabilities during human existence and risks through their awareness, which shall be shared between other individuals, leads to the creation of social opinions. Interlocking design vulnerabilities and risks of personal statement and professional, environmental, social, geopolitical, go to changes at the psychological level of European society on the state of security and by extension to the state and to the European Union.

The perception and awareness of vulnerabilities physical-geographic, socio-economic and politico-military, contributed to creating a dangerous internal landscape. The growth

¹ OXFORD Dictionary of Current English, Oxford University Press, 1988, Second Edition by Christina Ruse

² Durkheim, E. *Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives*, Publié dans la Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, VI, mai 1898. Link: http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Durkheim-emile/Socio_et_philo/ch.pdf, F. Barlett (1932/1995), J.T. Jost (1992), S. Moscovici (1961/1997), K. Jung.

dormant state volatility and the existence of threats have characterized European society today.

The terrorist attacks have hit Europe from North (Norway³) to South (Spain⁴) and from East (Turkey⁵) to West (UK⁶). The threats are not addressed to a single country or to a single nation. In the attacks from Bulgaria in 2012 and France 2015, people of different nationalities, various religions and cultures, died. This created in the European perception the existence of a common and permanent threat – the terrorism.

An European Union of non Europeans

The events of Kosovo, Ukraine are completed by those in Scotland, Spain, Italy, France, Romania. These are examples of present and future of the power conversion of vulnerability in the threats.

To this end, today's Europe is identified with the risk of new groups of people that can have a local historical identity and a need of differentiation from other nations.

So, the social diferentions will lead to identity revendications and ethno-teritorial separatism. As a result of globalized conflicts in certans areas most European countries face with a great number of Muslim imigrants as well as with imigrants of different religious and cultures. Those, above mentioned, get the citizenship of a state and become officelly European citizens. This fact, as well as mediatic threats derived from illegal activities made by the „new European citizens”, create a social-identity frustration of the European psihic. Din dorința de conservare identitară și culturală europenii tind să se refugieze în mici națiuni ceea ce duce la un separatism european. In this respect, stopping or diminishing a threat can bring the threats domino to an end.

The act of migration is a catalyst of regionalism and identity claim, as well as the pillar of some terrorist threats, especially organized crime.

The trends of the last decades sketched an European future scraped identity. The high number of non-European, who arrived on the old continent, and the growing trend of immigrants in counterweight with lowering birth rate of Europeans, present a future Europe of some non Europeans.

The success of the secessionist states is followed by other communities in their struggle for self-determination and the preservation of identity will resort to terrorism. From the law point of view the integrating of new states is not regulated in the EU, it must follow the accession's steps, not having arrangements to safeguard security and the possible refusal from the country of which broke away. In this respect, would appear non-EU states of pure European nationals with a low level of security on the map of Europe, led by former revolutionaries, who used separatist terrorist elements to reach the state leading positions and EU states led by the "new Europeans" .

Conclusions and other opinion

Depending on the geostrategic proximity, both vulnerabilities and the threats get a personal importance, which, together with the human perception, as far as risk concerned, creates a cognitive-affective image of security. The events "is denationalize and become increasingly global, while the population renaționalizează and becoming increasingly local."⁷

³ <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/norway-terrorist-attacks/>

⁴ <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/terrorists-bomb-trains-in-madrid>

⁵ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30701483> and <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/19/world/meast/turkey-attack/>

⁶ <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/jul/08/terrorism.july74>

⁷ Huntington, P. Simon, Who Are We: The Challenges to Americas National Identity, Simon and Schuster, New York.

That is why, these events "are loosing their national characteristics and become increasingly global, while the population tries to gain its national form and becomes more local".

"As a source of instability and insecurity, the culture globalization, generates a localization of traditional culture, which reprezents a revival of old regional identities"⁸ – and thus, the powerful states become security exporters, while the weak states, generate insecurity.

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⁸ Sava, I.N., *Studii de securitate*, p.195, Centrul român de studii regionale, 2005, pp. 100 – 142.

PUBLIC AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION
AND SOCIAL SECURITY

Chairs:

Colonel Professor Ioan DEAC, PhD

Associate Professor Margareta BOACĂ, PhD

THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH AND ITS SELF-SUPPRESSION

Ioan DEAC,

Professor, PhD., “CAROL I” National Defense University,
deac.ioan@myunap.net

Abstract: *The present article aims to show how public debate in defense of the right to free speech activates the forces specific to the “spiral of silence” that risks to suppress its own content and to weaken the true goals of the human rights.*

Key words: *the right to free speech, “spiral of silence”, universal rights*

A strong movement of reconsideration and reevaluation of the right to free speech has become manifest as a result of the terrorist attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* editorial headquarters. As it is a more than well-known event, we will not go into the particulars of the attack here. Our goal is to reflect upon the mechanism of instilling a dominant public idea to the detriment of other public ideas and to analyze the backing, grounding and consequences of the dispute between the dominant idea and the peripheral ones.

A short while after the terrorist attack took place, on-line campaigns were launched to show support for the editors of *Charlie Hebdo* and for the principle of free speech, large marches were organized, including one, organized in Paris one week after the events in question, which was attended by several heads of state and government who thus wanted to show their solidarity with the victims and with France. However, by far, the greatest support came from mass media institutions which manifested solidarity both with the victims as well as with the principle of free speech. The reason for this solidarity is given by the fact that there were victims of the terrorist attack and by the diffuse threat that it generated against the right to free speech. Under the scope of an already manifest threat, public voices have found a slogan and a signal of group recognition, of belonging to the great family of universal values and liberties. The slogan “*Je suis Charlie*” was the binder of these manifestations in which journalists, free people, women, Christians, Jews, Muslims have found themselves and have perceived themselves in a unique identity.

The public wave of support for the cause of freedom of speech and identification with the values that it presupposes is a didactic illustration of the theory of the “spiral of silence”¹. Its mechanism, manifested in the present case as well, is the following: (1) a motivated group publicly and forcefully supports an idea; (2) contrary or complementary ideas which are less strongly expressed are suppressed; (3) the dominant idea is taken over by more and more subjects, as it is seen to express “the truth” that the subjects identify with social reality; (4) due to the need of not being socially isolated, but also out of the desire to be associated with the dominant idea, most of the subjects will assume and identify themselves with the dominant idea; (5) thus, the support group becomes larger and larger, and the supported idea becomes the dominant public opinion. The force that fuels the dominant idea is given by the centripetal component of “the spiral of silence” which emphasizes, which highlights, which places in a dominant position the idea that is at the center of this spiral.

¹Noelle-Neuman, Elisabeth – *Spirala tăcerii. Opinia publică – învelișul nostru social*, trad. Vlad, Cucu-Oancea, ed. comunicare.ro, București, 2004.

Being conditioned by the strong emotions awakened by the terrorist attack, the placement of the idea of defending the right to free speech as the dominant idea was done very swiftly. The support group for this idea was made up of the media institutions which used their entire media force to dominate public discourse so that, in a very short span of time, a few days in fact, the need to support and call for the right to free speech was shared by millions of people. People who would not have otherwise thought of such an idea suddenly became its fervent supporters. Furthermore, people who are not longtime advocates of this idea were present at the heads' of state and government march. The editorials of large and small publications, the news shows and the current events shows on media channels were imbued by this idea and its advocates. Thus, suddenly, with extreme force, the idea of upholding freedom of speech turned into an image and diffusion vector seldom seen before. It contaminated any other public idea and any other public value in those days. The dominant idea, that of safeguarding the right to free speech under any circumstances, was enhanced by its association with the damnatory terrorist attack which resulted in twelve people's death. Condemning this terrorist attack and the threat it poses contaminated the media representation of the events according to which freedom of speech could itself become a victim of terrorists. The media went as far as to formulate the idea that terrorists would attack freedom of speech not the authors of cartoons. Freedom of speech thus became the sacrosanct foundation of contemporary society and it seemed to be in danger of being lost, and nothing seemed too dear to be used in its defense. Furthermore, cartoon journalists defined themselves as "the white knights of the freedom of the press"². The irrefutable evidence that this idea is dominant is provided not solely by the huge number of proponents and the vast area of support that it gained but also by the circulation figures for the magazine *Charlie Hebdo* on its first issue after the attack: 5,000,000 copies!, taking into account the fact that the normal circulation figure is 50,000 copies.

Despite this obvious domination, a series of complementary opinions have been formulated during the general debate. We present here just a few of them: (1) the right to free speech should be balanced with the right to public safety; (2) the right to free speech should be associated with public responsibility; (3) the right to free speech coexists with other rights which are just as important and fundamental.

These ideas did not enjoy the same attention because they did not have the same backing. The mechanism that maintained them in the area of relative ignorance is the aforementioned one, of "the spiral of silence" which annihilates the ideas which lack a support group and the ideas that do not have the chance to occupy the public space, only in this case, the marginalization of complementary ideas is due to the centrifuge force of the spiral, which pushes them to the area of ignorance of public debate. Most of the time, complementary ideas are perceived as contrary to the ones that are on trend, not as competing with it, and the fact is that they do not have a vocal, motivated, strong support group or because a strong enough social catalyst does not ensure their success. In the present case, the most powerful public emotion has been attached to the dominant idea: suppressing the journalists from the satirical weekly was the concrete evidence of the grave threat that hovers over the freedom of expression because in their cartoons, the journalists did nothing more than express their right to free speech. Contrary ideas would have needed a much stronger emotional catalyst than this, which is practically impossible to find.

Even so, the backing of these ideas must be analyzed beyond the mechanism of media public communication which propels some to dominant positions and condemns others to oblivion. Both the dominant as well as the complementary ideas unquestionably appeal to the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*³. As it is well-known, the premises of the

²<http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-magazin.htm>

³<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>

Declaration lie in the recognition and promotion “of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family” which constitute “the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”; the end goal of the *Declaration* is to create a world in which human beings “shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want (...) as the highest aspiration of the common people.” To meet this goal, the preamble of the *Declaration* suggests the avenues to follow: the common ideal of such a world can be attained through „teaching and education” the only means that could ensure „by progressive measures (...) their universal and effective recognition and observance.”

The supporters of the dominant idea invoke the *Declaration* only with respect to Article 19 which refers to the right to free speech, which they claim to be sacrosanct, ignoring the other rights mentioned in the *Declaration*. The supporters of complementary ideas resort to the same document in a more refined and nuanced manner. Thus, they invoke the right to dignity and freedom of religious beliefs⁴ of those who have a different representation of dignity and religious belief. Rightly, they argue that satire and defamation directed against the faith of some human communities⁵ does not contribute to attaining the goal of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, in fact, on the contrary, they may create a disservice to its objectives, even if it is all done in the name of freedom of speech. Moreover, the advocates of the dominant idea occupy the whole horizon of invoking the *Declaration* to the extent to which they seem not to notice that only one paragraph above, in Article 18 of the same document, it is stated that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion” which presupposes the freedom to “manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” This, in an interpretation that some interested parties might make, could become the backing for manifestations of religion or belief – which happened in this case – that might lead to acts of terrorism.

Moreover, when looking for the profound causes, be they social or of a different nature, that have led to this situation, one of the causes is the fact that European states have accepted over the years the settling on their territories of communities which are ethnically and religiously different from the values and the history of European peoples and communities. An idea has made itself heard according to which European authorities have proven too generous in allowing admittance to the European space to persons who, in confrontation with cultural otherness, end up committing violent acts against the host nation. This is the reason for which the proponents of freedom of speech suggest a stronger control of foreign nationals’ movement in Europe⁶. This is precisely where the problem lies: such a proposal contradicts another fundamental right inscribed in the same *Declaration*, in Article 13, the right to freedom of movement which ensures every person’s right to leave their country and to choose another country to settle in.

Advocates of the dominant idea also commit a sophism of the type *post hoc ergo propter hoc* in the justification of their position. Considering that the right to free speech is universally unconditional and placed in the dominant position which they assign to it, advocates of the freedom of speech ignore the fact that its universality is relative and still limited to a small part of humanity (fewer than 40% of the world states are assessed as being societies in which freedom of expression is guaranteed⁷, according to *Freedom House*), and the fact that it is still just an aspiration not a constant reality. The error is consolidated by the advocates’ subjectivism. They do not notice that, if for the group they represent the respective right is dominant, it is not necessary that other groups be dominated by the same rights, even

⁴http://activenews.ro/de-ce-nu-sunt-cu-charlie_1879912.html

⁵http://adevarul.ro/news/societate/5-motive-nu-charlie-1_54b38577448e03c0fd858676/index.html

⁶<http://www.contributors.ro/editorial/eu-sunt-charlie-si-ahmed-%E2%80%93-cateva-lectii-si-o-concluzie/>

⁷<https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/discarding-democracy-return-iron-fist#.VNxZZvmsWT8>

if these groups do not support their ideas with the same strength and do not have the same opportunities in the public discourse arena.

This particularity is apprehended by the advocates of contrary ideas who thus justify their position, referring to the right to dignity (Article 1), the right to religion and conscience (Article 18), the right to a social and international order (Article 28), also inscribed in the *Declaration*, rights that, to some extent, the publication in question completely ignored when it satirized certain aspects that pertain to the identity and conscience of other human communities. Unfortunately, lacking exercise and the practice of public debates, lacking its benefits, but feeling aggressed in their identity and dignity, the members of the satirized community, by exercising their right to free speech, became terrorists and resorted to the only silencing method that they felt could bring them satisfaction: suppressing the sources of satirical expression.

Supporters of complementary ideas, non-dominant in this debate, commit errors of backing, of justification for their ideas. Thus, when they try to balance freedom of speech with the right to security, the supporters of this latter idea obviously alter the content of the right to security inscribed in Articles 3 and 22 of the *Declaration*, which refer to “individual security” and “social security” respectively, understood as an expression of satisfying “economic, social and cultural” rights, not as “societal security”/ “public security”, concept which in security studies has a different content and reference – political, military, cyber and informational, administrative, as well as related to governance and international relations.

More often than not, dominant ideas are not supported critically, but emotionally, they come to oppose, as if in a mirror image, the reality they reflect, which means that they lend it a series of characteristics. We are warned against this perverse consequence by a reputed organization which defends the right to free speech – *Reporters sans frontières* – whose slogan for their support campaign for *Charlie Hebdo* contains the following warning: “Freedom of speech is not a religion!”⁸

As it amply and forcefully takes up the space of public debate, the dominant idea suffocates and annihilates the relevance of other rights, emptying of content and significance even the right that it makes dominant. It is not less true that the supporters of the complimentary ideas, peripheral to the debate, do not manage to serve well the right to free speech. Even though they relate to it critically and responsibly, they do so at a moment of utter inconvenience so that their ideas are pushed to the periphery by the centrifugal force of the debate and, unfortunately, the ideas assume the characteristics that are imposed upon them: peripherality and lack of importance.

It is obvious that the advocates of the dominant idea suppress the relevance of any other fundamental rights, which corresponds to the sense that is enforced by the centripetal force of the “spiral of silence”, but they do not notice that the same force also works against the very principle and right to free speech that they advocate. The supporters of the dominant idea of freedom of speech belong to the culture and society in which this right is a given, an already-earned right. The problem is that the way they relate to this right is not critical and in consonance with the intention of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Its spirit and intention is that by means of the universal rights, human life should become better. The rights, once attained, must not be exercised against those who do not have them yet, or in ignorance of the consequences of exercising them. If the communities from which terrorists come knew and adhered to the value system of the advocates’ dominant community, there would certainly be few chances that the events which led to the idea of safeguarding freedom of speech becoming dominant would have taken place. Not unwarrantedly, the preamble to the *Declaration* qualifies the rights as aspirations which can be attained through education. The

⁸<http://en.rsfs.org/>

universal rights are not given realities, but continuous aspirations, with an educative value, which cannot be instantiated other than simultaneously as a group.

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In conclusion, the appeal to universal rights is practiced differently by the two groups. The advocates of the dominant idea superficially and incompletely invoke the backing, but very firmly and vocally, while the supporters of complementary ideas invoke the same backing critically but not strongly enough and without having on their side the convenience of support. Unexpectedly, the main loser of the debate is the right to free speech itself since the advocates of the dominant idea turn freedom of speech into a fetish, into a goal in and of itself: freedom of speech regardless of the consequences, without any responsibility. Thus the supporters ignore the goal and the cultivation of these rights as they are specified in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, rights which make humanity responsible for creating a better world for all, not a hedonistic world for some.

The public debate undertaken with respect to defending and safeguarding the right to free speech, verifies once more the validity of the theory of “the spiral of silence” and the force that makes its mechanisms function through its centrifugal and centripetal components which propel some dominant ideas to the fore and push to the periphery other ideas which do not find an opening to become manifest.

Moreover, by relating to the different degree of internalization of the rights in the *Declaration* by the members of various communities, it becomes obvious that only those who share common cultural, spiritual, material, civilizational values can claim a system of rights considered fundamental, but not universal for certain.

The analysis we have undertaken has given us the chance to show how important it still is that, with respect to the universal human rights, one must be aware of their aspirational and responsible character, that one bear in mind the relativity of their universality and the equal importance of all the rights. Moreover, the analysis has given us the opportunity to show that the fact that freedom of speech has attained the dominant position and silenced other ideas in a public debate is not necessarily a gain for freedom of speech as much as the expression of its self-suppression.

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WHERE TO LOOK FOR THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE CONGO A SAMPLE

Valeria MICU,

Junior Lecturer, “CAROL I” National Defense University,
micu.valeria@myunap.net

Abstract: *Many researchers speak today about a general incapacity to unravel the motivations behind the acts of unequalled brutality still taking place all over the world with samples of unbelievable cruelty manifested in an incessant chain of conflicts arising in some countries. The same researchers admit that in spite of being a very important issue, it has not been sufficiently studied so far. Consequently, specialists from different domains are still questioning and hypothesizing upon, in a clear, international attempt to find the right answer, which could help decrease the amount of violent behaviour and its psychological, social, economic, political effects supposed to be responsible not only for the situation in some states, but on the whole globe. I chose Congo as a sample, to prove that the unspeakable atrocities taking place there for decades have very deep roots going back to the first contacts the Congolese had with Europeans.*

Key Words: *Congo, violence, colonialism, atrocities, psychological patterns*

Is violence everybody’s concern?

“Violence needs to be connected to modernity and to problems of identity formation and not only to personal or collective risk”¹

The word violence is on almost everybody’s lips, because the consequences of violent acts affect too many people of today’s world. Violence seems to have become a general state of being or a huge wave sweeping everything in its way. The international public have always been kept in touch with external events, but the impact and immediate reaction are not always of the same force in spite of the gravity of the approached topic. There is often a relationship between public reaction and the degree to which that public could be affected by a certain humanitarian concern. We can often speak about total indifference, which is one of the most dangerous manifestations of symbolic violence, that could be compared to the same distant attitude people generally had while crimes and genocides were perpetrated in different places of the world during well known regimes of oppression such as slavery, colonialism, imperialism, communism. In 2008 Slavoj Žižek was writing in the introduction to his book *Violence*, about the impact different pieces of information may have upon the audience, as a starting point for identifying certain types of violence. He chose the cover story of *Time* magazine of 5 June 2006, “The Deadliest War in the World”, which “offered detailed documentation on how around 4 million people died in the Democratic Republic of Congo as a result of political violence over the last decade” noticing that “[n]one of the usual humanitarian uproar followed, just a couple of readers’ letters – as if some kind of filtering mechanism blocked this news from achieving its full impact in our symbolic space.” His logical conclusion is that “*Time* picked the wrong victim in the struggle for hegemony in suffering” in spite of a cruel reality put in front of the readers: “The Congo today has effectively re-emerged as a Conradian ‘heart of darkness.’ No one dares to confront it head on”.²

¹ Michel Wieviorka, “Violence and the Subject”, SAGE Publications London, 2003: 42.

² Slavoj Žižek, *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*, London: Profile Books, 2009: 2-3.

There are many other African places where “the normal rules of human development and advancement simply don’t apply”.³ This is a general judgement related to a continent which keeps trying to make its way towards a normal life, but the results are still insignificant with too many spots of interethnic wars or permanent violent conflicts, where rape, killing, atrocities have become “normal” manifestations of everyday life inspiring visitors to make up in their minds questions similar to that suggested by Butcher: “Why are Africans so bad at running Africa?”⁴ and answers inferred by the same author: “They may be in some way inherently evil.”⁵

This is one of the reasons why, researchers from different domains are still questioning and hypothesizing upon, in a clear international attempt to find answers, but mainly solutions, which could help decrease the amount of violence and its psychological, social, economic, political effects supposed to be responsible not only for the situation in some states, but for the whole of Africa. There are some research works in progress analyzing the conflict related issues in Sub-Saharan Africa, which published reports concerning either certain countries or certain aspects of the main problem represented by an extremely violent behaviour of Africans towards Africans during war or armed conflicts affecting soldiers and civilians - mostly women and girls because of thousands of sexual assaults and gender-based violence. Newspaper articles and reports launch serious warnings related to the disastrous consequences that rape and other violent acts have upon the victims’ psychosocial, intellectual, and economic functioning, as well as upon the whole social group because of physical and psychological suffering.⁶

Among the voices claiming that the present social, economic and political situation of Africa, the permanent state of conflict and instability have deep roots in history, there are some analysts who push their assumptions further speaking about a shocking resemblance between colonial practices and some patterns to be noticed today in the violent behaviour of the ex-colonized, also suggesting comparisons between the colonial “style” and the present manifestation of different African peoples during conflicts towards their enemies, either soldiers or civilians. The mass killings from the past caused by specific colonisers resemble the mass killings which took place many years after the Africans became independent.

The saddest aspect of this international state of things may be inferred in what Shorter wrote about foreign implications nowadays: “Much of the violence in contemporary Africa serves the interest of foreign powers and is fomented by them.”⁷

Congo or The Democratic Republic of Congo, as it is called today, may serve as the best example for what represents today the worst situation in Africa, being categorised as one of the greatest humanitarian crisis of the 21st century, the place where we can speak about “endemic violence”⁸, “a totem for the failed continent of Africa”⁹. All kinds of organizations and people have got involved in this complex issue, some of them making genuine efforts to help. Congo is ranked as “the costliest conflict since the Second World War”¹⁰.

Butcher’s travelogue is meant to remake a long dangerous journey accomplished a century before by the journalist-explorer H.M. Stanley to Congo, this intriguing country, considered today “a lost cause” in spite of having “more potential than any other African nation, more diamonds, more gold, more navigable rivers, more fellable timber, more rich agricultural land. ... [I]t is exactly this sense of what might be that makes the Congo’s failure all the more

³ Tim Butcher, *Blood River*, London, 2008: 4.

⁴ *Ibidem*, 310.

⁵ *Ibidem*, 5.

⁶ Watts and Zimmerman, “Violence against women: global scope and magnitude” in *The Lancet*, 2002.

⁷ Aylward Shorter, *Social and Religious Concerns of East Africa: A Wajibu Anthology*, Wanjohi. 2005: 347.

⁸ Tim Butcher, *Blood River*, London, 2008: 344.

⁹ *Ibidem*, 7.

¹⁰ Tim Butcher, *Blood River*, London, 2008: 5.

acute”.¹¹ The country is crossed by the huge Congo River whose waters became the colour of blood, “the indisputable symbol of *violence*”¹² several times in its history, because hundreds of dead people were carried downstream in times of slavery, colonialism or interethnic wars, still making hundreds of victims.

Psychological mechanisms of violence

We need some theoretical information in order to get a better understanding of the psychological mechanisms of violence. The preoccupation for understanding the mechanisms of violence comes in the first place from the human basic instinct of preservation. Violence means conflict, conflict means danger, danger means fight (to defend and preserve one’s property, which in many cases is one’s own body or life). It has become more and more obvious that solutions are not to be found without appropriate research of the hidden elements causing such behaviour, which differs from culture to culture as direct consequence of specific experience. “Conflicts are mediated by a society’s cultural perception that gives specific meaning to the situation, evaluating it on the basis of the experience of past conflicts, stored as objectified knowledge in a group’s social memory.”¹³

The voices arguing that colonial practices influenced the colonised people to such extent that we can speak about induced *patterns of violent behaviour* with a clear bend towards cruelty and sadism, start from the theory that human beings do not have a genetic inclination toward *violence*. They reached the conclusion that violence is not a question of genes or hormones and there are some accounts published in books, reports, studies, or even anthologies by people working in different domains such as neurobiology, sociology, anthropology, psychology and psychiatry, philosophy, history and political science.

This mechanism can be better grasped by analysing some types of violence, which could be distinguished in the Congo case and generally in many other colonised countries. The main point is to bring more explanations, examples and arguments in the same vein with the large group of scientists who argue that humans have a nonviolent inborn nature (Locke; Rousseau; Giorgi; Kropotkin, Fromm, Montagu, Barash, Sponsel quoted in Giorgi). These scientists maintain that the cultural environment strongly influence the individuals’ behaviour.

The violent act — a link in a chain

Almost all these researchers agree that “no violent act can be fully understood without viewing it as one link in the chain of a long process of events each of which refers to a system of cultural and material structure that can be compared to similar structural conditions anywhere else”¹⁴. The same authors insist that violence never limits itself to just one instance arguing that “violence is never a totally isolated act, [but] related to a competitive relationship...that may extend far back in time...Violence is more than just instrumental behaviour...it is informed by material constraints and incentives as well as by historical structures and by the cultural representation of these two sets of conditions”¹⁵.

All studies are important, useful, but reliable only up to a certain point, consequently more vulnerable, especially after too long a period when researchers agreed upon the fact that congenital violence in humans is the real source of any conflict, opinion still shared by a great number of people in the world we live. That is why I reckon useful to present the scientific results obtained in neurobiology, which have provided material proofs more difficult to be contested. I relied on *Origins of Violence*, a book written by Piero Giorgi after a long period of

¹¹ *Ibidem*, 7.

¹² *Ibidem*, 342.

¹³ Schmidt and Schroder, *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*, Taylor & Francis e-Library 2003: 4.

¹⁴ Schmidt and Schroder, *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*, Taylor & Francis e-Library 2003: 7.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 3.

research in the field and also in some other fields in tight connection with the *violence* issue within an international group, Peace Studies, which have been focusing on the world peace matter for several years.

In an attempt to counteract some well known theories still accepted by a large number of scholars and average lay people Giorgi gives a very sensible argument to Freud's intuitive conclusion that humans were born violent and they feel constraint by the general social rules forcing them not to let free their wild subconscious drive. Giorgi suggests that "the cause of the malaise of civilization is more likely to be *the opposite of that suggested by Freud*: we feel uncomfortable in a violent society. A congenital predisposition toward living in a nonviolent community is still there in contemporary *Homo sapiens*"¹⁶.

Giorgi reformulates what Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau claimed related to human nature, which, in their theories is generally in search for social order and submission to sovereignty precisely for avoiding conflict and war. They created the basis for political science later challenged by scholars like Spencer and Freud, who approached the biological implications in political sociology. Thus, we can consider this last assumption as an urgent reason for all scientific, empirical, official, or private research and debate targeting the *violence* manifested at such a frightening scale in our society.

For the sake of a better general understanding not only of the origins of violence, but also of its psychological mechanisms Giorgi insists on a correct use of terminology bringing some necessary clarifications upon the concepts of *aggression*, *aggressiveness* and *violence*. First of all he clarifies that these words cannot be considered synonyms because *aggression* and *aggressiveness* are basic concepts, while *violence* should be approached as a complex concept. Besides, *aggression* and *violence* mean behaviour, while *aggressiveness* is an inborn predisposition, which may or may not develop in aggressive or violent behaviour. He gives some practical examples in order to prove that any predisposition is closely influenced by the post-natal development of an individual. At this point I would like to connect this assumption with the main interest of my paper, namely to prove that the striking level of *violence* still manifested in Congo today is directly connected to the Belgian colonial practices applied on all Congolese people for several decades. This statement is also meant to give an answer to all those specialists who still motivate the present African, and mostly Congolese chaos speaking about inborn *violence* demonstrated, they say, by aggressive pre-colonial behaviour meaning bloody inter-ethnic conflicts, cruel rituals and cannibalistic native practices. But neurobiological research states that a higher innate predisposition toward aggressiveness is always aggravated by the post-natal every day model.

Congenital information versus education

Giorgi uses generally accepted concepts familiar in the field and brings neurobiological and anthropological evidence in order "to support the purely cultural essence of violence"¹⁷. He refers to congenital factors and post-natal learning borrowing the terms nature/nurture from much older debates on the same topic. Helvetius was one of the first who insisted upon the stronger role of what a brain can gain by learning than what the brain is primarily endowed with.¹⁸ Writing in the same vein as Locke, the first who had spoken about the new born baby's brain as a *tabula rasa* element, where knowledge could be acquired only by means of personal experience derived from sense perception¹⁹, Helvetius issued his philosophical work, *De l'esprit (On Mind)* in 1758, arguing that he had noticed the great power nature and education

¹⁶ Piero Giorgi, *The Origins of Violence by Cultural Evolution*. Brisbane, Australia 2001: 198.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, 192.

¹⁸ Tvetan Todorov, *Noi si ceilalti*. Iasi: Institutul European, 1999: 223.

²⁰ Walter Kaufmann, *From Plato to Derrida*, 2008: 527–29.

have upon the human mind, consequently education being responsible for what we are. The atheistic, utilitarian and egalitarian doctrines were so daring for his time that the Church and the State declared his issued philosophical achievement heretical and decided upon burning the book as a public act of banning and rejection.²⁰

A century later, in 1894, Gustave Le Bon, a French social psychologist, sociologist, anthropologist, inventor and physicist came with some new conclusions concerning the nature/nurture issue in *Les lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples* (*The Psychology of Peoples*). In spite of the long lapse of time and multidisciplinary studies, his opinion is situated on the opposite side from the previously mentioned position: education is supposed to have little chance to change the inborn amount of information in humans and the changes are supposed to be only of a superficial nature. He chose to exemplify with representatives of different races arguing that it would be possible to teach a black person or a Japanese so as to make him become a high school graduate or a lawyer, but it would only be a superficial lustre with no effect upon their mental structure. Such a person could never reach the intellectual level of an ordinary European.²¹ He maintains that European education cannot have a positive influence on non-European peoples; on the contrary it would rather bring them corruption because it would destroy the old cultural background without replacing it with something valuable in accordance with their capacity of reception. It would only manage to disrupt their basic moral laws and their intelligence pushing them backwards even from the level they had already acquired on their own.²² I think that apart from the racist mentality, which was a general characteristic of the time, we can distinguish some valuable assessment of the situation, especially from the perspective of the twenty-first century when we can see the consequences of European colonialism upon some non-European peoples.

Intergenerational—transmitted traumas

Giorgi tries to prove that the qualitative factor is of extreme importance for the individual's future behaviour. He claims that almost any amount of inborn aggressiveness can be addressed in a favourable cultural environment especially when such nurture element is available from very early stages in somebody's life, the result being the same when the child is raised in a violent culture and the chances are as big for the mind to copy on the violent model irrespective of the degree of inborn aggressiveness. This becomes not only a matter of time, but also of quality, or as Giorgi puts it "the concept of *time factor* implies a *qualitative* and not just a quantitative difference in the relative contribution of congenital components and cultural components of our social behaviour: nature may well predispose, but nurture finally defines behavioural traits"²³ and that is why there is such a diversity in present and past human behaviours.

Another important aspect supporting the theory that in spite of their non-violent nature many people still behave in extremely violent manners, especially in the case of Congolese people who are the main concern of this paper, is the way in which behavioural traits are transmitted from one generation to the next. In this case it is necessary to clarify that this happens through cultural transfer which is "so effective and conservative (in a stable environment) as to be easily confused with the inheritance of congenital behaviour. Several analogies existing between the mechanisms of biological and cultural evolution make the confusion even more likely".²⁴ The fact that scholars have repeatedly made analogies between

²⁰ Tvetan Todorov, *Noi si ceilalti*. Iasi: Institutul European, 1999: 223.

²¹ *Ibidem*, 223.

²² *Ibidem*, 224.

²³ Piero Giorgi, *The Origins of Violence by Cultural Evolution*. Brisbane, Australia 2001: 132.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, 110.

the two “encourage[d] erroneous biological deterministic interpretation”.²⁵ What makes the great difference is that “the inheritance of acquired characters occurs only in cultural evolution, which explains the exceptional swiftness of this process as compared to biological evolution”²⁶. Giorgi specifies that this type of transformation was considered by some anthropologists to be of the Lamarckian type, as Lamarck had made the assumption that any need for a new organ could determine the necessary change in the body of an animal, giving the example of the giraffe growing a longer neck in order to reach the leaves on taller trees. That happened half a century before Darwin accepted the idea that acquired characters are inherited and adapted it to what he called the natural selection.

“[C]ultural evolution corresponds to a true inheritance of acquired characters.[...] If this cultural inheritance becomes transmitted faithfully from one generation to the next, the new behaviours become part of the characteristics of that population”.²⁷ Unfortunately sometimes the acquired characteristics are not meant to help a population really advance, because the new experiences are traumas caused by aggressions and other violent acts, which dictate specific response behaviour adopted in order to defend oneself, to protect one’s own body and/or one’s family and wealth.

“The effects of experiencing trauma are transmitted within and across generations, and whole communities can be affected by a single experience of trauma by a single member of community”.²⁸ This is the conclusion reached by another group of researchers who have closely worked with different groups of indigenous communities in an attempt to address the serious psychosocial problems they encounter because of violent behaviour. Their situation is similar to that of the Congolese in many respects. The main source of worry is that the members of these communities are inflicting violence causing extreme suffering and even death to their kin. They perpetrate violent personal assaults, which in Congo are almost always of a sexual nature, against men, women and children, kidnapping and keeping women hostage most of the times as sexual slaves, torturing, maiming, and too often killing them, sometimes with almost no clear reason. It is why most of these people are considered psychologically affected by what psychiatrists call Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) and why “the cycle of violence is repeated and compounded, as trauma begets violence, with trauma enacted through increasingly severe violence and increasing societal distress”²⁹. C. Atkinson (2008) had already focused on the obvious relationship between being a victim and becoming a perpetrator and upon the importance of an appropriate approach to the matter, when such dangerous men have to be incarcerated in order to break the vicious circle of violent and offending behaviour. She insisted on the direct connection between “the number of traumatic stressors or cumulative degree of traumatic exposure and the likelihood of displaying PTSD symptomatology” focusing on the present perpetrators who in almost all cases were victims of severe sexual abuse during their childhood, sometimes until maturity.³⁰

This vicious intergenerational chain of transmission of trauma was researched by Blanco who “developed a five-generation account of the effects of violence on subsequent generations in South America that can be mapped onto the history of Indigenous Australia”³¹ and that can also be compared to the Congo situation. It is clearly explained how the cruel treatment of killing, enslaving, beating, humiliating applied on conquered males of the first

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ Hinde 1974 quoted in Giorgi: 102.

²⁸ J. Atkinson, J. Nelson, and C. Atkinson, “Trauma, Transgenerational Transfer and Effects on Community Wellbeing”, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. 2010: 135-144.

²⁹ *Ibidem*.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

generation also affected the members of their families who shared their traumatic experiences by witnessing the horrors. The members of the second generation, especially men were then inclined toward alcohol and/or drugs overuse which could help them face inner feelings of lost identity and lack of self-esteem. Consequently their behaviour became violent in relationships with their own family and friends in the form of spousal abuse and domestic violence.³²

Types of violence

“Violence is a basic form of social action that occurs under concrete conditions, targets concrete victims, creates concrete settings and produces concrete results”.³³ The authors maintain, as we have already stated above, that the complexity of this behavioural act can only be understood in the context of a long process where each violent act is perpetrated in close connection with previous and future violent acts, or with parallel violent performance; whenever applied as a long-term strategy able to shape “a group’s psychological proneness to the use of force in the evolutionary process”³⁴, but also “limit[ing] the development of people’s potentials and deny[ing] people’s aspiration to be in control of their body, their behaviour and their social environment”³⁵.

This combined definition covers the main types of violence that have so far been depicted by anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, and which will be taken into account in my analysis of the Congo situation: structural (indirect) violence, cultural violence and personal (direct) violence. These types have been analysed by Galtung who reiterated that “the essence of structural violence was – and still is – represented by those values and institutions that enable a *minority of individuals to control the majority* of the members of the same community”³⁶. Giorgi’s further insight into the cultural evolution of *structural violence* could be of real use for us to understand why historical events had such a heavy and long-term impact upon the African communities which were actors in the cultural clash with members of totally different communities who eventually imposed *their* institutions and values enabling *their* minorities to control African majorities.

Giorgi argues that “material progress and violence evolved in parallel and so did the malaise of those *Homo sapiens* living in a social environment that was not in harmony with their hunter-gatherer neurologic imperatives, which did not change at the same time as the emergence of violent cultures”³⁷. He further explains that “people’s malaise in food-producing cultures finds its most interesting expression in religion; pre-agricultural and contemporary animism and shamanism are spiritual expressions of unity with nature”³⁸. In the case of polytheistic religions “the different gods represented role models for specific social aspects” and “instructions on how to behave were indirect and implicit”³⁹. Gradually the relationship established between people and their environment took dependency size, the main reason for the sedentary communities to find the best ways to appease the angry gods. They created rituals of sacrifice sometimes mild when incantations were used or plants and flowers were offered as gifts, sometimes cruel gestures of killing animals and even humans to satisfy the supposed divine anger. Such rituals could take strange dimensions, when the community had to find the appropriate “scapegoat” every time in order to stay in good relationship with the divinity and with themselves. This is what people have been hypothesizing ever since acts of *cultural*

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Schmidt and Schroder, *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*, Taylor & Francis e-Library 2003: 6.

³⁴ Abbink quoted in Schmidt and Schroder: 3.

³⁵ Galtung 1969 quoted in Giorgi: 126.

³⁶ Galtung quoted in Giorgi: 167.

³⁷ Giorgi: 169.

³⁸ Noss 1974 quoted in Giorgi: 172.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

violence provided enough hideous, bloody, odd examples of sacrifice, cannibalism still representing the scariest of ritualistic practices. Most of us are tempted to call them “barbarous” proceedings in spite of much more cruel manifestations of our so called civilized contemporaries. It may appear even stranger that ritual sacrifices represent what some famous scholars call *founding violence* or “good violence” (Girard, Noica).

Stefan Stanciugelu approaches the rational-irrational dimensions of the sacrificial ritual in contemporary interpretation. He spotlights the limits of the modern layperson who is not prepared to accept such a ritual as a piece of *collective founding violence* of a traditional community meant to structure, protect, and most important, put a temporary end to the collective violent behaviour. He admits that our violent world where the State has a monopoly on legitimate violence and the access to the sacred world is almost entirely denied offers tangible reasons for rejecting any type of violence, narrowing at the same time people’s capacity of comprehending cultural practices closely related to sacred archaic rituals. In the same vein Mircea Eliade saw ritual violence as meaningful social manifestations and Noica insisted that any violent act of the archaic people had its special significance and belonged to the sacred world, a good reason for the contemporaries to give more sensible interpretations to such specific cultural acts.⁴⁰ He adds that our contemporaries became too rational to be able to integrate collective violence and transform it into good or *founding violence*.⁴¹

The general curiosity which always pushed people to make researches in order to find the deepest possible roots of violence is well expressed by Jensen who approaches the issue from the position that human beings have a nonviolent nature. He argues that “man must have been subjected to some particular overwhelming experiences to have been led to introduce such cruel practices into his life”⁴².

French anthropologist René Girard comes with similar theories regarding the above questions and hypotheses, inspired by the common thread to be found in almost all old stories and myths about Creation, which almost invariably start with a violent event generally representing Primordial Birth.

Sociologists also came with specific classifications and rationalizations of violence in an attempt to unriddle complex and unspeakable acts of aggression taking place nowadays almost everywhere around. We can find the same label put to different types of violence or different labels for the same type of violent manifestations. In Michel Wieviorka’s study, one of the most remarkable sociological approaches to violence, the term of *founding violence* is used as “the factor that triggered off subjectivation” in the case of young people who engage in different social, cultural, political and religious activities, which sometimes become violent only because they want to change a monotonous, even absurd everyday life.⁴³ He spotlights the similarity with psychiatrist and philosopher Frantz Fanon (1964), who had urged the Algerian people to fight against the colonizers arguing that “it is in the violent rupture with the colonizer that the colonized cease to be mere things and become human beings”⁴⁴. In both cases violence represents the founding element which can help the subject regain dignity, recreate himself as a subject.

Apart from the above mentioned types of violence Wieviorka brings under analysis the concept of *instrumental violence*, which had already been delimited by English philosopher Thomas Hobbes and served as strong basis for discussions about trade union activities and different types of revolt, or severe violent acts of the Nazi type, which have forever wounded

⁴⁰ C. Noica quoted in Stanciugelu, *Violența, mit și revoluție*, 1998: 25-27.

⁴¹ Stanciugelu p. 53.

⁴² Jensen quoted in Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 1989: 91.

⁴³ Michel Wieviorka, “Violence and the Subject”, SAGE Publications London, 2003: 47.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 48.

humanity in the twentieth century.⁴⁵ Professor Radu Surdulescu also comes with some important specifications regarding this type of violence where classical sociology distinguished “the *instrumental* action (carried out in order to reach a certain goal) and the *expressive* action (whose aim is to convey a message that defines it): hence two types of violence”.⁴⁶ Surdulescu mentions some instances when these two types of violence “intermingle”, one of them the 1994 Rwanda genocide, which, I have to add, was in close relationship with the Congo genocide whose disastrous consequences are still in place today. Surdulescu explains that such atrocities were possible and may still happen when “hot feelings of rage or exasperation” specific for expressive violence interact with “cold” instrumental violence, generally “built around a doctrinal discourse”.⁴⁷

This article has provided complex theoretical background in order to clarify psychological mechanisms deeply influencing human relationships, cultural evolution or involution as may sometimes happen. It also displays some types of violence related to the colonial environment and analyses the tools violence uses in order to reach its goals, as it has been proved that violence generally has precise objectives.

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⁴⁵ Wieviorka quoted in Surdulescu, *The Raping of Identity*, 2006: 28

⁴⁶ Surdulescu, p. 28

⁴⁷ Ibidem: 29

SECURITY CULTURE. MEASURING IT FROM A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Darie CRISTEA,

Senior Lecturer, University of Bucharest,
Postdoctoral Researcher, “CAROL I” National Defense University,
darie.c.cristea@gmail.com

Abstract: *Security culture is a pivotal constituent for the sustainability of any policies and measures employed by the state both in the realm of national security and the international behavior of states or states alliances. Measuring security culture is seemingly an approachable sociological task considering that sociologists have been exploring the cultural dimensions (from an anthropological perspective) of human communities, and surveys about opinions and attitudes are just normal activities for sociologists and institutes of sociology. Does security culture have certain aspects that make it impossible to examine through standard sociological researches? How can one tackle the question of security culture and how come that for the moment there are no standard examinations, the so-called security culture barometers, considering that the topic has useful strategic utilities for the realm of national security in any democratic country?*

Key words: *security culture, security culture barometer, social research, methodology, insecurity culture*

Why measure security culture?

In theory, measuring security culture is not such a difficult undertaking. Approaches centered on the concept of security culture fill an entire chapter in security studies. However, work on security culture is relatively poor in empirical content.

The usefulness of such a concept would be better served by working with operational concepts, dimensions and indicators, rather than with theoretical speculation.

Of course, the main issue in measuring security culture for a specific context relates to its theoretical definition and its sociological operationalization for that particular context.

In security studies, as well as in other social academic disciplines, the more a concept has received attention from scholars, the less clear measuring it had become. It is “natural” for theoretical approaches to outnumber operational and empirical models.

The question is what do we do about the analytical utility of a sociological concept when there are too many theoretical debates (one might say they are speculative debates) and too little debate on methodological issues.

An evidence of scientific progress in the sociology of security culture would be establishing a set of empirical models in order to allow effective measurement of the phenomenon. Repetitive assessments of security culture would give us a real insight on how people see, feel and understand the security environment (domestic and foreign), security institutions, as well as the security agenda etc.

But before giving an answer to the question “how to measure security culture?”, we have to answer to “why measure security culture?”.

Of course, any answer that we would try to give to the second question embodies a sociological hypothesis related to what type of security culture are we trying to tackle.

There is a security culture of political, diplomatic and military elites. There is also an international security culture – norms and values in which consist informal international

relations. And there is, of course, the “popular” security culture – the security culture of the masses.

This popular security culture is actually “the most measurable” of them all from a sociological point of view. Less “noble” than the security culture of the elites, less interesting for international relations scholars than the security culture of the international security environment... But very interesting for sociologists and, lately, for policymakers.

The concept of security culture has become very popular after the collapse of communism, because it was part of the new geopolitical climate. Public perception of the architecture of the new international system became almost an international actor *per se*, or at least a political force not to be ignored.

Cynically speaking, as a political and military decision maker from a liberal-democratic country, you could “fool” or manipulate public opinion, but you could not ignore it any more.

September 11th 2001 changes somehow the way security studies specialists view security culture and their definition of the concept. The new definition focuses on the public awareness of the threat represented by international terrorism and also pays attention to the support that the public would be willing to give to the increasing states’ security requirements in the field.

Of course, the ongoing hybrid conflict in Ukraine can bring new dimension, new perspectives, and new analytical and conceptual developments on security culture.

Theoretical layers for approaching security culture empirical assessment

The aim of the following section is to present a theoretical basis that can substantiate an empirical model for measuring security culture. Addressing security culture as a sociological concept involves compliance with a few methodological requirements and social research stages.

The first challenge is to clearly define the concept that will become the center of our research. What kind of security culture are we interested in?

We have already established that we will study security culture as public (or “popular”) security culture. This will include public opinion, perception, social cognition, attitudes etc.

The next step is transforming an intellectual concept of security culture into a methodological concept that is capable of being measured. This implies defining dimensions and indicators as concrete manifestations of the security culture as a public opinion phenomenon.

That leads us to our next challenge: drawing the dimensions of the concept in question on a theoretical basis that would ease our efforts to create an adequate research tool (of course, the method we propose to be used in studying the subject is the questionnaire based sociological survey).

The key to making the concept measurable is what social scientists call operationalization – at the end of the operationalization process we should obtain a list of relevant social indicators that would allow approaching the studied phenomenon with a certain validity and fidelity.

Theoretical layers for measuring security culture are, from this point of view, not only the usual description of the state of art in the field, but the first step to how valid our security culture assessment through sociological surveys would be.

We will briefly review a few theoretical approaches which can substantiate the operationalization of the security culture research concept.

1. *The Civic Culture – Gabriel Almond & Sidney Verba*

Studying security culture cannot bypass established concepts, such as civic/political culture. Security culture can be seen after all as a particular case of civic/political culture. Unfortunately, many security studies and international relations scholars pay little or no attention to Almond and Verba's work¹ when writing about security culture.

Of course, extracting a concept of security culture directly from security studies or IR scientific literature is, after all, a research option as valid as any other. However, using a "methodological shortcut" by following Almond and Verba's view on civic/political culture and applying it to the field of national security may prove itself a fruitful approach.

A positive aspect of Almond & Verba's model of civic culture – an aspect which can be very useful to our approach on security culture – concerns the fact that we are looking at a social cognition based model.

The authors view civic culture as this particular type of political culture, constructed by people's perception, stereotypes, degree of information, opinions, attitudes, interactions etc. The operational model of civic culture, as Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba define it, is underlined by three subjective dimensions that tend to form the base for political participation: cognition (what do we know about the political system), affect (do we care about the political system or parts of it?), evaluation (people's assessment of the political system).

The targets for these three political orientations of the citizen can be the system as a whole, inputs related to the system, outputs of the political system, or the self in relation to the political system.

It is neither the time nor the place to proceed to a more detailed description of the civic culture empirical model. What is to be remembered from the discussion above is that a social cognition based model for defining dimensions and indicators of security culture is a working version which shouldn't be ignored.

2. *The Culture of National Security – Norms, Identities, Values – Peter J. Katzenstein*

The most famous book on security culture might as well be Peter J. Katzenstein (editor), *The Culture of National Security*², a collective book aimed probably at exhausting the topic announced in the title. Although a very comprehensive and instructive volume, it fails to cover all the issues raised by the topic in question: for example, it is rather centered on the security culture of the international environment perspective, and it does not bring much for the researchers studying the public (or "popular") security culture.

For bibliographical reasons we could not avoid mentioning Katzenstein's book. However, the way states, foreign policy, treaties and diplomatic world works can be decisive for power and security architecture of the international system but it does not teach us how to measure the way public shapes its security culture.

How public opinion relates to security culture depends on several mediations and "filters". There are multiple forms of security culture: an international system based security

¹ Almond, Gabriel; Verba, Sidney, *The Civic Culture – Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, New York: Sage Publications, 1963.

² Katzenstein, Peter J., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

culture, a regional security culture, international security cultures promoted at state-level, international institutions and organizations security culture and so on.

All of these are elements of the superstructure. They widely influence the security culture of the general public but they also represent a subject to opinions and attitudes which constitute “popular” security culture.

3. Hofstede's five dimensions

Another useful and interesting approach in configuring the relevant dimensions for the security culture concept is following a well known model of operationalization for the sociologic concept of culture.

Geert Hofstede's work³ on cultural dimensions has more in common with management and cross-cultural communication, and almost no stake intended in strategic studies or international relations. That does not mean that the way in which he constructed his model of the concept of culture cannot be of interest to our effort in defining the empirical approach of security culture.

Perfected over decades, Hofstede's model of cultural dimensions brings into focus six dimensions that can only be used for comparing cultural profiles from one country to another:

power distance

individualism vs. collectivism

masculinity vs. femininity

uncertainty avoidance

long-term orientation vs. short term orientation

indulgence vs restraint

If Almond and Verba proposed an operationalization model centered on social cognition, Hofstede's dimensions indicate us that there is a possibility to view culture rather in comparative manner. More, Hofstede's model is psychosociological grounded. Almond and Verba's model is sociological grounded. This raises the big question: what kind of security culture assessment do we want to perform?

One that starts from the way people perceive elements of the political system, or one that takes into account with priority tendencies, collective psychological dispositions, collective “geopolitical emotions” and so on?

4. A simple solution to the problem

An easier way to tackle the social measurement of security culture is trying to identify the main topics which are significant for describing the concept in a certain context (national, regional, geopolitical, historical etc.) and use them as dimensions in the operationalization procedure.

For such an approach the researcher can be guided by scientific literature on the subject, discussions with other experts and also, why not, by opinion polls (or other types of psychosociological research) which reveal vulnerabilities, fears, risks etc. perceived at the societal level.

This is a more comfortable approach, although it brings up a methodological risk: the question of validity and fidelity. How do we know that we are measuring what we are supposed to measure? And how are we assured that if were to repeat the research process in

³ www.geert-hofstede.com/national-culture

similar conditions we should obtain similar, or identical, results? The first step is writing the research instrument and let it face the reality.

An exploratory draft of dimensions to be taken into account for a social measurement of security culture

Our proposal sets six operational dimensions for measuring public security culture:

- 1st Dimension: Security and defense institutions/organizations (domestic)
- 2nd Dimension: International environment. Events, states and international organizations
- 3rd Dimension: Socioeconomic aspects of security. Daily and non-military security
- 4th Dimension: Public fears. Perceived threats and collective vulnerabilities
- 5th Dimension: Victim Indicators. Individual Threats and vulnerabilities
- 6th Dimension: Terrorism. Natural disasters. Nuclear security

How does this proposal work? Each dimension will be provided with empirical indicators assuring that the particular aspect of security culture which it refers to is covered. There will be four types of indicators (as the Almond&Verba model somehow suggested):

- a) *knowledge indicators*
- b) *agreement and approval indicators*
- c) *trust and reliance indicators*
- d) *sympathy indicators*

This paper's argumentation rests at this level. Detailing indicators for the above mentioned dimensions will be the aim of a further article which will also present the design of the research tool. All indicators will be delivered to the respondents through a sociological questionnaire (in a sociological survey, as already mentioned) as ordinal scales. This procedure will allow data collecting on public national security culture that will be able to fill a huge gap in studies regarding the field: setting a security culture barometer in order to obtain a grounded image of public security culture.

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822** with the title ***“Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.*”**

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STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS IN INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

Margareta BOACĂ,

Associate professor, PhD., “CAROL I” National Defense University,
m.boaca@gmail.com

Abstract: Globalization has determined the circulation of extensive information coming from the great variety of cultures that exist in the world. The pervasive impact that cultures exert on the lives of peoples and on the very configuration of the world today has become clearer than ever. Intercultural communication as a branch of the communication science is a field that has experienced accelerated growth – commensurate in fact with the increase in the scope and frequency of intercultural communication processes and phenomena that unfold in the world today. The present article examines some of the factors that can represent strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in the processes of intercultural communication, in an attempt to better understand some of the variables at individual level that can influence these complex processes. The article also points to the importance of personality traits that can favor intercultural communication, but also the great role of education that is the key factor in promoting intercultural communication.

Key words: linguistic competence, bilingualism, nonverbal communication, ethnocentrism, stereotypes, intercultural education

The cultural heritage of the world genuinely represents a reservoir of human creativity and ingenuity, whose diversity is undoubtedly one of the great riches of the planet. The manifestations of cultures exhibit endless variety and diversity. One such form of manifestation is the specifically cultural way in which the members of a certain culture communicate. If we agree with the vision of communication promoted by the Palo Alto School that the first and foremost characteristic of the communication process is that every behavior is a form of communication we realize that communication is an all-embracing process. This further points to the deep-going relation that exists between communication and culture: on the one hand, cultures obviously influence the patterns and processes of human communication, they determine the way in which certain communities communicate; on the other hand, communication makes possible the perpetuation, dissemination and influence exerted by cultures and the critical assimilation of cultural values in the social field.

Strengths and Opportunities: Linguistic Competence, Bilingualism, Awareness of Nonverbal Messages

The realization of the fact that we are decisively conditioned by the specificity of our own culture comes the moment we move to a new cultural environment. In the second half of the 20th century, when migrations started to gain momentum, these types of encounters were known to produce a culture shock, considered a socio-occupational disease, an inevitable pathological reaction that occurs when having to function in a new cultural environment. A definition of the phenomenon is given by Margalit Cohen-Emerique, who considers it is an emotional and intellectual experience that occurs in those in contact with the stranger, and she emphasizes the feelings of frustration, rejection, revolt and anxiety¹. As a socio-occupational

¹ Cohen-Emerique, Margalit, “Chocs culturels et relations interculturelles dans la pratique des travailleurs sociaux. Formation par la méthode des incidents critiques”, în *Dicționarul alterității și al relațiilor interculturale*, ed. Gilles Ferréol, Guy Jucquois, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2005, p. 369.

disease, the culture shock was treated according to the psychological models of adjustment to stressful situations².

Linguistic competence, bilingualism

The way out from the predicament of the culture shock is possible due to the knowledge of the language of the respective culture. We cannot talk about a successful intercultural encounter in the absence of the knowledge of the respective language or of any other language that could act as *lingua franca*. This makes the individual able to get information about the new cultural environment and to adjust to it, a process designated as acculturation. In addition to the language, in order to correctly understand the wide variety of messages, knowledge of the cultural context is useful. The context of the situation, connotation, even the intonation with which a certain message is uttered can change the meaning of the actual words. The cultural context is shaped by the hidden values which are characteristic of that culture. It is important to know not only what to say and how to say it, it is particularly important to know when to say it. The more advanced the level of language proficiency, the easier it is to learn about the new cultural environment and to adjust to it. Knowledge of the language is thus the main pre-requisite of success in intercultural communication, as it fosters awareness of the cultural values that lie underneath certain behaviors, and enables adjustment to the cultural environment by understanding the norms of the new culture and changing behaviors to accordingly. Knowing the language of the culture is definitely a strength. Linguistic competence also enables the individual to adopt the communication strategies specific to a certain cultural environment.

Proficiency in two languages represents a valuable asset in the processes of intercultural communication. The learning of a language means the assimilation of a cultural code, learning two languages means the assimilation of two different cultural codes and of the adequate norms of each of them. This characterizes the privileged position of a bilingual individual who has access to two different cultural codes and can make a bridge between them, for himself and for the others, acting as a mediator. Bilingualism is also the pre-requisite for the integration of the two cultures in one's own identity. When asked if he feels more "French" or more "Libanese", the French – Libanese writer Amin Maalouf confessed that what makes him be himself and not somebody else, is the very fact that he is situated at the border between two or three languages and between several cultural traditions and this is the very thing that defines his identity³. Just as intercultural communication presupposes the knowledge of the language of the new cultural environment, bilingualism fosters genuine interculturality.

Awareness of nonverbal messages

As it is generally considered that nonverbal communication represents between 60% - 90% of our messages⁴, the importance of nonverbal communication in intercultural communication clearly stands out. Nonverbal communication provides the relational framework for the interpretation of the verbal messages, and on the other it is a form of communication in its own right because nonverbal messages can confirm or deny, enrich or substitute verbal messages

The large share of messages that we communicate nonverbally is to a great extent culturally determined. We can include in this category proxemics or the range of distances that

² Ward, Collen, Bochner, Stephen, Furnham, Adrian, *The Psychology of Culture Shock*, London, Routledge, 2001, p. 74.

³ Maalouf, Amin, *Les Identités meurtrières*, Paris, Grasset et Fasquelle, 1998., quoted in Ferréol, Gilles, Jucquois, Guy (coord.), *Dictionarul alteritatii si al relatiilor interculturale*, Iasi, Polirom, 2005, p. 86.

⁴ Mehrabian, Albert, *Nonverbal Communication*, Aldine Atherton, Inc., 1972.

speakers feel comfortable to stand at⁵, eye contact, if any, and for how long, haptics or to the extent to which it is culturally acceptable for speakers to touch during interaction, even posture and the frequency, amplitude and significance of gestures, dress, artifacts and entire physical appearance, everything that is included into the category called paralanguage, that is intonation, rhythm, pauses, silence, pitch, turn taking, the management of time and the expectations related to that, the management of emotions, these are aspects that differ across cultures⁶.

Linguistic competence is important, but ignorance or unawareness of nonverbal communication can affect linguistic competence and intercultural communication in general. Ignorance or misinterpretation of nonverbal clues can become the source of misunderstandings, confusion or hostility. This is why it is important to develop awareness of the nonverbal aspects of communication, be they of the foreign culture, be they of the own culture but unknown to our foreign interlocutor. So, becoming aware of the fact that the gestures and behaviors of a foreign interlocutor definitely have a specific cultural significance, which sometimes may totally differ from the significance we attach to them in our own culture, and also realizing that some of our gestures and nonverbal messages could be perplexing or offensive to people in other cultures represent opportunities in intercultural communication⁷. To decode nonverbal messages is not an innate ability, but one that can be developed through observation and training, so it is better not to assume that we are competent in deciphering nonverbal messages. However, before acquiring training in this subject-matter, a useful attitude is not to judge a certain behavior in the light of its significance in our culture, but to postpone the judgment of a surprising or offensive behavior or gesture to the moment when we have enough information to correctly evaluate it.

Life time study and experiments on the way humans express their emotions have led reputed specialist Paul Ekman to the conclusion that people, as members of the same species, manifest themselves emotionally in the same ways everywhere in the world, irrespective of culture or education. His conclusions have been subsequently confirmed by a series of other specialists in this field. Even if people do not speak the language and even if the cultural and civilizational differences are great, emotions and feelings are expressed similarly, in ways that can be recognized as such, irrespective of culture. Culture only determines accepted intensity levels in the expression of emotions or the type of situations in which the emotional display is acceptable⁸. For instance, evidence suggests the people the world over use the same expression for grief in private, but their public display of grief by facial expression, tears, or crying may vary greatly because of cultural norms⁹. Cultural norms regulate the intensity of emotional displays, but the true nature of emotions and feelings is recognized as such everywhere in the world, no matter the culture or level of education of individuals.

In their study related to understanding cultures and the way they operate, Alfons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden -Turner¹⁰ identify a valid criterion of describing cultures in the way people express their feelings. They differentiate between neuter and affective cultures. Neuter cultures are characterized by the fact that they favor control over the expression of emotions, which is considered a sign of civilization. An intense display of emotions in a neuter culture is considered uncivilized and unprofessional in the work environment. Quite

⁵ For the way in which proximity determines social relations see Le Boulche, G., „Approche systemique de la proximite”, Comunicare.ro, 2001.

⁶ Chelcea, Septimiu, Ivan, Loredana, Chelcea, Adina, *Comunicarea nonverbală: gesturile și postura*, Editura Comunicare.ro, 2005, p. 81.

⁷ Collet, Peter, *Cartea gesturilor europene*, Editura Trei, 2006, p. 10.

⁸ Ekman, Paul, *Emotions Revealed. Understanding Faces and Feelings*, Phoenix, 2004.

⁹ Ekman, Paul, Friessen, Wallace, si Elsworth Phoebe, *Emotion in the Human Face*, New York, Pergamon Press, 1972.

¹⁰ Trompenaars, Fons and Hampden -Turner, Charles, *Riding the Waves of Culture. Understanding Diversity in Global Business*, second edition, McGraw Hill, 1998, pp. 69 -77.

opposite are the affective cultures, such as the Latin, Mediterranean or Arab ones, in which emotions run high and communication is pervaded by feelings and emotions – an indication that people believe in what they say and are honest, according to the suppositions in the respective cultures. Conversely, in affective cultures, people who control their emotions are considered cold and unsincere.

Weaknesses and Threats: Ethnocentrism and Stereotypes

The culture in which we were born creates patterns of behavior and interpretation that we take for granted without questioning: they are familiar to us and they represent the norm. In comparison with them, other behaviors may seem not only simply different, but also odd or inadequate, crazy and wrong. In all epochs and cultures we come across people that are attached to their familiar cultural and linguistic environment, focussing on their own cultural identity which they consider superior to other cultures¹¹.

Ethnocentrism

In *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, Ken Booth sets out from the premise that ethnocentrism is a universal socio-psychological phenomenon that results from the fact that societies place themselves in the center of their vision of the world, and this perception of the centrality of a particular cultural identity is augmented by considering other societies inferior. The phenomenon is wide in scope and has ramifications in most aspects of intergroup relations¹². Grigore Georgiu distinguishes between the „soft” ethnocentrism, namely a marked preference for one’s own cultural and linguistic environment, for one’s own way of life¹³, and the „hard” variant of ethnocentrism, which consists in the high regard for one’s own culture, accompanied by superior attitudes or even rejection of other cultures, in extreme cases intolerance, xenophobia, chauvinism. This is the negative ethnocentrism which exaggerates the value of the own culture and grossly underevaluates other cultures¹⁴. According to Joseph Shaules, ethnocentrism as an attitude towards another culture is an instinctive biological reaction to a symbolic threat – perceived as such through the lenses of a culturally determined outlook on the world¹⁵. The negative judgment of a culture can lead to avoiding it, while resistance towards the cultural differences can be, in the most fortunate of cases, a mere stage in cultural learning and adjustment. The negative attitude, the feelings of superiority are serious obstacles to intercultural communication. The first stage in overcoming this obstacle is to achieve de-centering, that is to no longer consider the standards of the own culture as having absolute value¹⁶. This is the first step towards understanding that people who belong to different cultures have to be judged according to different standards¹⁷. Integration can be achieved on the basis of knowledge and interaction, particularly in situations in which people interact on an equal footing. This kind of interaction allows people to learn about other cultures and to respect cultural values. Globalizations provides innumerable opportunities of this kind, in a wide variety of environments that provide favorable conditions for intercultural cooperation, in work organizations, universities, military missions, leisure activities, the internet, etc. Ethnocentrism is closely connected to stereotypes, also a serious obstacle in intercultural communication.

¹¹ Ferréol, Gilles, Jucquis, Guy (coord.), *Dictionarul alteritatii si al relatiilor interculturale*, Iași, Polirom, 2005, p. 285.

¹² Booth, Ken, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, London, Croom Helm, 1979, p. 13.

¹³ Georgiu, Grigore, *Comunicarea interculturala*, comunicare.ro, 2013, p. 142.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Joseph Shaules, *Deep Culture. The Hidden Challenges of Global Living*, Multilingual Matters Ltd, Clevedon, Buffalo, Toronto, 2007, p. 63.

¹⁶ Constantin Cucos, *Educația. Dimensiuni culturale și interculturale*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2003, p. 131.

¹⁷ Hofstede, Geert, Hofstede, Gert Ian, Michael, Minkov, *Culturi și organizații. Softul mental. Cooperarea interculturală și importanța ei pentru supraviețuire*, Humanitas, București, 2012, p. 370.

Walter Lippmann was among the first to examine the role of stereotypes in helping us „see” many areas of the world to which we do not have access directly¹⁸. Stereotypes function as pre-fabricated images that select and order the information coming from the social environment. From a wide range of information and events, people tend to select those that confirm the already existing image in their minds and to reject or ignore whatever information does not correspond to it. On the one hand, stereotypes play a positive role, because they efficiently synthesize information and allow for divisions into categories, an important mental ability that favors logical deductions¹⁹, but on the other, they are problematic since they are not the result of direct observation and consequently, they have no direct relation to reality, they are often in contradiction with it, or even worse, partially correspond to it, which makes them even more difficult to uproot. Another difficulty comes from the fact that they are based on strong - positive or negative beliefs, acceptance or rejection - and it is this subjective emotional quality that can lead to conflict²⁰.

In intercultural communication stereotypes play an important role when they refer to racial, ethnic or professional groups and attach to them certain, usually negative characteristics, suggesting that a certain category, different from us, has inherent universal traits that cannot be overcome. Thus, stereotypes define „what is different” from the social, symbolic or moral order, and exclude them from the normal order of things, in a process that involves the operation of power²¹. One widely spread stereotype refers to African Americans, who have often been represented as lazy and best fitted for subordination to white people. Many contemporary representations of race on US television continue to stereotypically associate black people, specifically young men, with crime and social problems²². M. Steele and Joshua Aronson have identified a phenomenon which they named „stereotype threat” – the impact of stereotypes on reality – in a research that involved the intellectual performance of black people. Beate Siebt and Jens Förster suggest the performance decreases when the black subjects are under the negative influence of the so-called „stereotype threat” which, according to their experiments, negatively affects their performances²³.

Stereotypes are perpetuated at cultural level, through tradition and historic experience. Due to their emotional overload they are durable and resistant to change and have the tendency to confirm and perpetuate, which explains the difficulty of changing them.

In order to uproot stereotypes, information, knowledge, awareness and the building of new skills are necessary. A vast amount of information that contradicts the stereotype is needed in order to bring about awareness of our own prejudices and stereotypes, whose influence is much more pervasive than we would imagine. The *expectancy violation theory* refers to what happens when we are faced with instances that contradict the stereotype. In such situations, we seem to exaggerate the importance of the characteristics that contradict the stereotype, a mechanism that is extremely useful in the attempt to change existing stereotypes²⁴.

The mass media can play a crucial role in intercultural communication in general and in uprooting stereotypes, in particular, since they create an image of reality which, for many, becomes the reality itself. Instead of perpetuating stereotypes and conflict, as they often do, the mass-media could simply correctly inform the audiences about cultural differences and thus prevent misunderstandings. The next step is to integrate the new information and to interpret

¹⁸ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, New York, Harcourt Brau, 1922, p. 181.

¹⁹ Paul Murphy Annie, „Where Bias Begins: The Truth about Stereotypes”, *Psychology Today*, 1998, May-June.

²⁰ Gavriluic, Alin, *De la relațiile interpersonale la comunicarea socială*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2006, pp. 234-265.

²¹ Baker, Chris, *The Sage Dictionary of Cultural Studies*, Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 2004, p. 188.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ Quoted in Duduciuc, Alina, Ivan, Loredana, Chelcea, Septimiu, *Psihologie sociala. Studiul interactiunilor umane*, comunicare.ro, 2013, p. 279.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 282.

our behavior from the viewpoint of the newly acquired knowledge about the contact culture, to see what cultural aspects from our own culture could be perceived in a negative light and third, to develop new interaction skills on this new basis with the members of the respective culture.

The role of personality traits and education in intercultural communication

Intercultural communication is undoubtedly a major experience, and it tells not so much about the culture that the individual is experiencing, but much more about the individual that undergoes the intercultural experience, about his/her ability to discover, understand and adjust to the new cultural environment. This requires certain emotional, cognitive and communicational skills, and also the willingness to make the considerable effort required for functioning in a different cultural environment. Of course, there are individuals that are naturally gifted to communicate interculturally, and in the range of multilateral intelligences there is even what authors have even identified as the intercultural intelligence²⁵. However, as intercultural communication expert Geert Hofstede notes, intercultural communication skills are difficult to be acquired by people who have an inflated sense of the self, a high degree of uncertainty avoidance and harbor racist, extreme right or extreme left sympathies. Likewise, people with adjustment problems are ill suited for living in foreign environments that require them to distance themselves from the familiar things that they cherish²⁶. However, the good news is that intercultural communication can be taught and learnt. Intercultural communication is closely linked to intercultural education, since the analysis and understanding of how to make people belonging to different cultures communicate efficiently and understand each other can best be capitalized upon in education. It represents valuable knowledge that should be translated into action and should be shared and handed down to the young generation. The courses of intercultural communication have evolved from the culture specific traditional ones that involved language learning, providing information and teaching about a certain culture and cultural environment, but did not go into the analysis of the own cultural values and characteristics, to courses that concentrate on developing awareness of cultural differences, in which equally important are the analysis of the own culture and of the differences that exist in regard to other cultures. Although culture specific, these types of courses provide knowledge and competences that apply to any foreign cultural environment. In this approach to intercultural learning, the stages are: awareness of cultural determination, knowledge about the target culture and the development of competences of intercultural communication. The starting point of any transformation process is represented by the stage of awareness. In the case of intercultural communication it is awareness of our own software of the mind, the fact the culture in which we are born shapes in a specific way the way in which we perceive and understand the world. The next stage involves knowledge about the target culture – its language and symbols and values and how they manifest themselves in their norms, traditions and heroes. Knowledge allows us to have an intellectual perception of the new culture and mentally analyse the differences in values and norms. The third level, that of intercultural competences, is the level in which awareness and knowledge are strengthened by practice: applying the symbols, taking part in the rituals and solving the problems involved in living in the new cultural environment.

Your Christ is a Jew. Your car is Japanese. Your pizza is Italian. Your democracy – Greek. Your coffee – Brazilian. Your holiday – Turkish. Your numbers – Arabic. Your letters – Latin. Only your neighbor is a foreigner”.

The world as it is today has been created through the joint contribution of countless cultures, as this poster on a street in Berlin also suggests. The poster also suggests that in spite

²⁵ Peterson, Brooks, *Cultural Intelligence*, Intercultural Press, 2004.

²⁶ Hofstede, Geert, Hofstede, Gert Ian, Michael, Minkov, *Culturi și organizații. Softul mental. Cooperarea interculturală și importanța ei pentru supraviețuire*, Humanitas, Bucuresti, 2012, p. 402.

of that, and in spite of the fact that we live side by side, we are increasingly reluctant to know more about our foreign neighbor. Many of the problems facing the world today spring from our ignorance about the Other and our unwillingness to know the Other. A great range of conflicts and serious problems related to demographic growth, the development of technology, environmental issues could be solved if we developed intercultural communication and cooperation. The world could look a lot more different than it is today if we paid more attention to intercultural communication.

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INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES. MISINFORMATION

Lenuța TRANDAFIR,

PhDs, Police Academy "Al.I. Cuza",
Doctoral School "O.P.S.N.- Public Order and National Security"
elena.trandafir@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Research in the field of social psychology has shown that we cannot always control our behavior and that every day we are unawares manipulated by apparently common factors. These influencing techniques have a positive side and a negative one; the two techniques may be used both ways, causing a wide behavioral range. Influencing techniques are in tight connection with the development of democratic societies, since all of them share a common view: the person upon whom one of these techniques is applied is entirely free to take the decision they want.*

Key words: *behavior, social, influence techniques, misinformation, manipulated, societies*

Conceptual delimitations

Manipulation of public opinion, or, as Kara-Murza says in a deeper way, of *conscience*, is not a new thing. Demosthenes, speaking to the Athenians, Cicero, uttering his Catilinarian speeches, Caesar cheering his legionaries before the assault, already guided consciences.

Interpersonal conflicts are practically never limited to the material forces confrontation. An intelligent analysis of the enemy's mentality combined with a bold imagination exceeds as a force the number of soldiers and the strength of fortifications. Wickedness, deceit, camouflage and artifices have always existed.

Misinformation belongs to the "*art of the detour*". It is always deliberate, and the decision to use it reveals a mood the complex resorts of which cannot be deduced clearly. It can be dictated by necessity, given the extent of the stake and the danger of an open confrontation, thus revealing weakness or fear. It can also be a deliberate action to achieve success with minimum of forces because the aggressor believes that influencing consciences is less risky than physical violence¹.

Misinformation can become, however, a fatal habit for a society that wants to be closed and which can thus insensibly lose touch with reality. Punctual misinformation can provide immediate advantage, sometimes decisive in a favorable conjuncture. When it is ongoing and systematic it represents a formidable destruction force that does not absolve the one who initiated it from retaliatory unexpected effects.

The oldest known theorist seems to have been Sun Tzi who, 500 years before our era, was concerned with "the profitableness" of war. Currently, misinformation constitutes the subject of a wide debate, in which passions and reluctance produce as much confusion as the non-acknowledgment of the subject. The novelty is that misinformation allows for the exploration of chaos in human thinking caused by the informative explosion. We appreciate that misinformation would only be possible only where there is information in the true meaning of the word, namely where the presentation of facts, events and ideas is made by means of free comments by expressing the for and against positions and discussions assertions devoid of ideological assertions or directives, exempt from pressure and censorship. In reality, there is a first phase or a form of misinformation which tries to act on individuals, but which

¹ A. Mucchielli, *Arta de a influența (The art of influencing)*, Polirom Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002.

still recognizes their opportunity to think and which seeks to envelop judgment, leaving them full responsibility for action.

A more radical form of misinformation prohibits its targets the right to thinking. Based on their acquired passivity, this form of misinformation denies, first of all, the right or opportunity to know the reality outside the appearances offered and standards imposed. It follows that, by its nature, misinformation offers many advantages for those who practice it. The one who misinforms exploits what he believes that it is vulnerable to his enemy, while he himself shelters, benefiting from the malleability of a submissive public opinion, which does not have the right to criticize.

The dialogue exists only in appearance. Communication is one-way, from the manipulator to the manipulated, in order to make the latter act with docility to the orders of the former.

Misinformation is not confined to counterfeiting consciences, it turns out to be a strong psychological drive, leading individuals, guiding the opinions and ideas, and human moods and behavior.

Misinformation exists, it is not a mere fancy of the imagination. For this you just have to listen to the protagonists of political debates, who never cease to accuse each other of lying and dissimulation, of the change of reality and of manipulation of the public opinion. Or what could be more relevant than the existence of bodies the official mission of which is to promote misinformation. The formidable magnitude of human forces and financial funds which these bodies have demonstrates the importance that is granted to misinformation actions.

There are many ways to address the problems posed today by misinformation. In this paper we want *to treat the phenomenon of misinformation as a present phenomenon of the society that deserves a careful description and an attempt of interpretation of its resorts.*

Scope of misinformation

a) Definition attempt

Disinformation, which comes from the Russian *dezinformația* consists in the publication of false news that will serve as psychological bait. The situation is similar to that of the conjurer who draws attention to the right hand in order to cover what he does with his left hand².

Misinformation designates an arsenal of known or occult means designed to influence foreign governments, to discredit political opponents, especially immigrants, to undermine trust between allies hostile to the Soviet Union, to counterfeit the appreciations of opponents on reality.

Misinformation is now seen as a kind of message, more or less explicit, some kind of a special communication between the misinforming one and its target. It may take the form of statements, of a significant gesture or of a certain attitude.

Misinformation is a psychological form of subversion.

Weapon or mental state, misinformation is the objects of some partisan discussions in which everyone's subjectivity is involved. Sometimes, people informed primarily may be interested to minimize the phenomenon of misinformation in order to dispose of it and use it as a weapon. Clearly, misinformation is a problem of our age. French Academy introduced it as a term in its dictionary, suggesting the following definition: *Intermittent or continuous action - using any means - that aims to mislead an opponent or favour subversion among it in order to weaken it*³.

² H.P. Cathala, *Epoca dezinformării (Misinformation era)*, Editura Militară, Bucharest, 1991

³ Nord Pierre, *L'intoxication*, Livre de Poche Publishing House, 1971

It can be concluded that misinformation includes all the procedures included in the game deliberately in order to succeed the manipulation of persons, groups or of a society, in order to deviate their behaviors, dominate their thinking or subjugate them. It involves concealing sources and real goals through a distorted representation of reality. It is a form of aggression that seeks to go unnoticed. It can be included among psychological subversive actions.

b) Misinformation actions

- Hiding an action - trying to keep the secret of an ongoing project. When keeping the secret proves to be difficult, the diversion of attention to a false action is attempted or confusing the opponent by making him draw the wrong conclusions regarding the purpose and scope of the project. This means providing a false perception of reality or create a false reality to the smallest detail.

- Discrediting a personality - involves the use of various means: rumors, innuendoes, even a smear campaign based on biased interpretations or on forged documents; the abuser uses a popular self-knowledge saying "no smoke without fire".

- Gaining the trust of a decision-making element - there are at least two ways of influencing a personality or a small group of decision-making elements through its leader. We can try, often after a preparation lasting for years, the infiltration of an agent in the entourage of a decision maker or his appointment in a position of great responsibility so that his influence may serve for the decision making process. Also, we can exploit a certain psychological predisposition as an element of vulnerability in case of a previously sighted personality.

- Manipulating the public opinion - statistics, census, surveys etc.

- Misinformation as a means of defense

c) Nature of misinformation

The great influence of misinformation and its omnipresence are due to the fact that currently you can use a whole panoply of means the technicality of which exert an irresistible attraction. Man loves technology, especially when it satisfies, on the one hand, the desire to have a tool able to increase his capacity for action, and on the other the pleasure of playing, stimulating his imagination.

This technique is what we generically call mass media. Misinformation is based on the desire to act, to change the normal course of events, reshaping the psychology of the opponent, especially given that the diplomatic, economic or military ways have become ineffective or excessively costly.

The relationship established between the one who is misinforming and the misinformed (clearly perverse for the former) is not totally innocent for the latter, similar to a sadomasochistic couple described by psychoanalysts.

The misinformed is not simply a victim of his thirst for knowledge, thirst quenched with a drink poisoned in secrecy: in many cases he/she is the first to proclaim distrust of all information, sometimes even knowing the one who is misinforming him/her.

This paradox arises from the fact that our judgments and opinions are formed only partly in a rational way.

Proximities-misinformation in the general framework of information

Information gives, by means of itself, hidden ways of penetration for misinformation. The relationship between the news broadcast and the effects on the public morale is often incomprehensible.

The revealing action of an event is followed by a brief interpretation, very general and often devoid of its true meaning. This is not due to the fact that the famous folk wisdom is always misleading, but to the fact that it does never rely on a rigorous argument, being rather intuitive.

The information message is always distorted by the receiver out of negligence or by means of useless additions according to one's own views.

Information responds to human curiosity, to the desire to know, to be informed. It should be noted that this curiosity mainly occurs in terms of events and personalities rather than in terms of ideas. However, an event is selected from others, it is presented, it is commented and each time there is an inevitable reduction of data, and therefore a growing distancing from reality.

Seen in this light, misinformation would be only a matter of quantity if there was no intent to deceive, which separates it from information. It should be noted that in all great cases of misinformation a natural misinformation pre-existed that has been exploited and reinforced by the deliberate action of the one who is misinforming.

a) Misinformation and propaganda

Between information and propaganda lies misinformation; there are numerous similarities between propaganda and misinformation. The distinction between open propaganda - which aims to be explicit, not hiding its purposes and origin - and the so-called "black" propaganda which dissimulates its source, deceives in terms of intentions and which can trade its messages, is unanimously accepted.

The latter is nothing but misinformation in action. And there is a fundamental difference between open propaganda and misinformation: the former seeks to persuade, to rally its consciences, even if its mode of expression is at the limit of legality, the latter aims to dismantle groups of ideas, thought disorganization and manipulation of individuals.

Both select their targets: the former considers subjects prepared in a certain way to receive it, willing to understand a message the source of which is unknown; the second, misinformation attacks unsuspecting individuals from whom it expects a certain reaction.

In principle, the propaganda is aimed at opinions; it tries to exploit certain ideas over others, to beautify events making them a favourable presentation. But the slightest inclination determines the imperceptible commencement of the slip towards misinformation.

b) Misinformation and advertising

Advertising does not hide its origin or purposes. It may originally hide under a certain anonymity, exactly the time required for the elicitation of curiosity, but very soon it will benefit from the effect of revelation which is the main point of its action.

By its volume, advertising can generate a detrimental action to the public. The man solicited daily protects himself through the refusal against what has become an obsessive aggression; he "closes" himself, he gets isolated, becomes impervious to the message.

It is not a defense in the true sense of the word, for a kind of an automatic perception of the messages remains, conditioned from time to time by stimuli that influence it without him knowing it.

Regarding protection of masses against misinformation, one can only reveal the fragility of advertising as compared to misinformation regarding the affirmation of pedagogical virtues of people's transformation.

c) Misinformation, intoxication, delusion, challenge

Many authors recommend a distinction between misinformation and intoxication, considered to be "broadcast via special services of altered or false information, the main target of which is adverse information services."⁴

In the same line with deception and intoxication there is the method in which misinformation is intertwined with the service "Action" in order to overcome the mere dissemination of false news or the publishing of fake documents.

For example, the development of machinations consisting in the execution of an action more or less spectacular, but which, performed at the order of the one who is misinforming, is expected to have an important echo within the public opinion, and which could be attributed to the adversary to discredit him or be used as a pretext for an intervention that otherwise would not find justification in the concrete situation of the moment. There are numerous examples of such challenges.

Psycho-sociology and misinformation

From the beginning the following question is addressed: *does misinformation address the individual or the group?* The answer can only be ambiguous. An individual totally isolated from society and in control of his reactions is a purely theoretical concept. If he existed, it would be of no interest for the one misinforming, who aims directly or indirectly at the mass effect.

In practice, the assessment of a misinformation action and of its result will have to be done either in statistical terms - the percentage of individuals manipulated in an efficient way or at the level of "involvement" of a personality or of a group leader⁵.

a) Aspects of individual psychology - moods and attitudes; behavior and conduct; judgments and opinions

The organization of the nervous system characterizes perfectly the notion of individual, well-defined as an ensemble with its own intimate operation which nonetheless "communicates" with the surrounding world. Formation of the individual as a social being is subject to a great number of genetic, educational, cultural influences.

The relationship of the individual with events, persons or objects does not depend on hazard, but rather on the feeling of attraction-repulsion. Here a very important concept of sociology comes into being: the attitude. The different attitudes of a subject are, at least in part, controlled by genetic determinants, but the experience acquired plays a key role along with the consistency with an example provided by a pattern.

The attitude involves three aspects in theory: a cognitive component, answering an information process assimilated in one form or another; the affective component, coming out to some extent under the provisions of rational assessment and the genetic component that most reflects the temperament of the one concerned.

The term "behavior" refers to the objective and observable manifestations of an individual's activity. Even automated behaviors are the result of learning, a process the purpose of which is to reach the achievement of a program adapted to a goal without the need for careful control, namely the program is automated, available and reliable⁶.

⁴ Popescu Cristian Florin, *Elemente de analiză a informației. Statistica: trucuri și capcane (Elements of information analysis. Statistics: Tricks and Traps)*, article in the magazine Psihosociologia.Mass media, no.4/2003.

⁵ N. Gueguen, *Psihologia manipulării și a supunerii (Psychology of manipulation and obedience)* Polirom Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007.

⁶ M. Milcu, *Psihologia relațiilor interpersonale (Psychology of interpersonal relations)*, Polirom Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008.

The reaction of the individual requested by a misinformed presentation or not, will be almost nonexistent, taking into account no volitional decision, but we should not consider that all of our actions would be irrational, because education has equipped us with numerous perfectly logical chainings that no longer need to be deliberated.

With regard to opinions, and attitudes, they act strongly on the orientation of behaviors and conducts.

A judgment can be intuitive, strongly affected by emotionality or subjectivity. It also may be the result of rational argumentation. What matters is that a judgment is possible only if the individual has benchmarks in advance. These are organized in a system of values, expressing adhesion or refusal.

To know the views of the one next to us we must not rely on the ability to deduce it by observing his behavior. This is because, under various influences, individuals act under the circumstances of the moment and the conditions existing at the time.

For the one misinforming, the very important question of the force of conviction, of the persuasive nature of the arguments is raised.

We are much more than we want to believe exposed to psychological manipulation, and the best defense remains modesty and prudence.

b) The individual within the group

The affiliation to one or more groups is a normal situation because the individual finds in this multiple affiliation the need to customize.

Group dynamics represents for them a permanent source of problems which solicits both thought and affection. This explains the fact that outside very strong personalities, the one who shapes the individual in a sustainable way is the social environment is not vice-versa. The group is considered by each of its members as a medium that offer security.

It was found that the simple placing in a collective situation causes often unconsciously, the appearance of common rules of perception that persist subsequently in the situation of loneliness, even if the initial individual rules remain changed in a sustainable way.

The feelings that trigger the revolt of the individual against his group of affiliation are mostly disappointment and frustration and less disagreement of ideas or standings.

The one misinforming knows very well the benefits he/she can draw from the dissident complainants. Outside the critical periods or of imminent danger, opposition to the default order, especially if the use of force is avoided, is regarded by the general public with sympathy.

Misinformation practice

Analysis of known misinformation operations reveals the thoroughness in preparing false documents, in contrast with the detached acceptance of psychological risks the consequences of which seem often not to be taken sufficiently into account⁷.

All of the actions of a misinformation operation are a complex process, more or less extended in time. Setting in motion vectors, public media of all kinds, assigning precise roles to many actors in accordance with a developed detailed scenario.

a) Purpose and objectives

The goal is the completion of the action aimed at achieving a political project decided by senior management, particularly determining the distribution of the various means at their disposal: contacts by negotiators, demonstrations of military force, economic pressure, media campaigns or manipulation of consciences.

⁷ B. Raquin, *Marile manipulări din epoca modernă* (Great Manipulations of the Modern Era), Editura Pro Editură și Tipografie, Bucharest, 2005.

Senior management for operations establishes the objectives, namely the opinions, attitudes or behaviors that it has to determine in relation to the targets very carefully chosen.

b) Targets

We name the individual targets or social groups upon which the exercise of influence or ensurance of their control, either directly or through intermediaries is suggested. The achievement of the objective set depends on the accessibility and malleability of the target. Whatever the size of the target, the one misinforming cannot dispense from its deep knowledge.

c) Relays and intermediaries

The intermediary is always a person more or less aware of the role they have to play, while the relay is an element of propagation and amplification of a message whose real influence he ignores.

Multiplication of intermediaries means protecting the anonymity of the source of misinformation, means triggering a current of opinion, the attempt to make people believe that the sources are independent and that false information is verified, becoming thus more credible.

Recruitment of intermediaries in "good faith" requires a skillful manipulation not to scare them; in reality this type of intermediary is never completely deceived; he simply prefers not to ask too many questions. The taste for paradox or the desire to make himself cherished often causes honest individuals, but insufficiently demanding to themselves, to become semi-conscious accomplices to the ones misinforming. The vanity and the desire of upstartness of these individuals are enough to turn them into "useful fools." A certain weakness of character binds the intermediate to the one misinforming, even after the former has lost all illusions. Rather than make public confession, which would destroy those who use him, the intermediary prefers to take refuge in silence and temporary oblivion. In the worst case, it will carry things too far, accepting to reconcile convictions with treason.

d) Messages and themes

The message is the raw, false or distorted information to be widespread, and this requires grafting the message on a theme. The theme is, therefore, the support of the message, providing it with a field of action.

e) The characters of misinformation

Limited partners - are represented by decision makers (governments, military staffs, etc.) and pressure groups seeking to steer according to their own points of view either a general political trend or a decision regarding a particular issue. Limited partners are the true sources of misinformation; they are interested in surrounding themselves with specialists in the field, in using their knowledge.

Specialists - planners must ensure that the operation of misinformation falls correctly without contradictions, within the overall political plan. It requires contacting other services and sometimes it can be difficult to keep the secret, indispensable to the action of misinformation, with trust-based cooperation with these services.

The controller is the equivalent of the "coordinating officer" or of the "operating officer" of the secret services. His role is determinant because he is the one that develops transmission networks and messages pass through him. The controller is the indispensable link between the governing body of the operation and the agents of influence.

The agents of influence are people recruited by the misinformation services often from the country concerned. They are collaborators sometimes aware of all the implications of their role and always aware that they are connected with a controller.

The agent of influence must enjoy a certain audience in the environment concerned. His credibility depends on the prestige and respectability that is recognized within the group. An agent of influence, given that he addresses a wide audience, will be able to increase his ascendancy if he uses the relationships he has, obviously in agreement with his controller. By doing this, he strengthens his influence and removes the source of false information. He will set up a misinforming orchestra with its own singers and instrumentalists, kept in complete ignorance regarding the whole maneuver.

Instead of conclusions

Misinformation is hard to define, but it exists without any doubt. Defending against misinformation, as the most dangerous and malignant form of aggression is everyone's problem, or rather of each of us. Our destiny lies in the power of our thinking. Protection against lying is above all, a matter of individual will.

The resurgence of misinformation in various fields can be seen. It may be even to a greater scale in industrial espionage, exploiting the high speed of top technical development and the mutual dependence between nations.

The originality of psychological warfare is that the attitude of sincerity is not determined by ethical reasons, but by realism and necessity.

This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/138822** with the title ***“Transnational network of integrated management of intelligent doctoral and postdoctoral research in the fields of Military Science, Security and Intelligence, Public order and National Security – Continuous formation programme for elite researchers - “SmartSPODAS”.*”**

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PUBLIC COMMUNICATION FROM PERSPECTIVE OF THE NATIONAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF EMERGENCIES

Luciana BALTEȘ,

PhD. Student at the “CAROL I” National Defense University,
Baltes_luciana@yahoo.com

Anca BÎRSAN,

PhD. Student at the “CAROL I” National Defense University,
anka_birsan@yahoo.com

Abstract: *The tragic events that took place in Romania in the last year, beginning with the airplane crash in the Apuseni Mountains in January 2014, revealed the difficulties with which the institutions involved in situations like this are taking action, intervene on the spot and with which they synchronize in solving such emergencies. Unfortunately the reality showed that the competent institutions are not prepared to intervene successfully and the difficulties are not only logistical, but in terms of communication, either internal or public communication and even from the institutional cooperation point of view. Therefore, the intervention procedures in emergency situations suffered changes, the latest changes been made in December 2014. From our point of view, in order for a crisis situations such as an emergency to be managed properly we believe that is necessary that each institution with responsibilities in this area must know very well its responsibilities and its obligations, to consolidate the public relations offices in order to meet the needs of the public when it has to act. In the National Management System of Emergencies, communication plays an important role reflected mainly in the inter-institutional cooperation and in the actions taken in order to notify the population. In this paper, we will analyze the public communication component because we believe that certain communication channels and certain actions represent strategic communication courses of action.*

Key words: *transformation, public communication, inter-institutional cooperation, intervention, emergency*

General aspects

“In order to act efficient in any crisis, stating with the preventions measures and up to the collective defense, Romania envisages full implementation of national integrated crisis management”¹, which includes today:

- the national defense system;
- the national management system of emergencies;
- the national system for prevention and fight against terrorism;
- the national management system of public order crisis.

Different institutions, depending on the problem and the crisis type, manage these systems; they operate specific responses and are coordinated at national level.

The National Defense Strategy shows that “a key component of the national integrated crisis management system is engaging the local authorities and population, depending on the situation, in supporting the efforts to manage the crisis, to help rebuild and manage the consequences after a crisis situation or a civil emergency”². The importance and the role of

¹ *National Defense Strategy. For a Romania that guarantees security and prosperity for the future generations (project)*, Bucharest, 2010, p. 27.

² *Ibidem*, p. 27.

the population in managing a crisis situation demands the need to develop efficient public communications strategies with the large public or a specific one (certain communities, for example) and from this perspective, the national crisis management system, in his different compartments (The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence etc.) or as a whole system develops different public communication strategies and also ensures a dialog between ministries and/or departments by developing different forms of collaboration and communication between institutions.

The national management system of emergencies

In the last year, the legislation concerning the management of emergencies suffered significant changes determined by the tragic events that took place, beginning with the airplane crash in the Apuseni Mountains in January 2014, which revealed the difficulties with which the institutions involved in situations like this are taking action, intervene on the spot and with which they synchronize in solving such emergencies. Unfortunately the reality showed that the competent institutions were not prepared to intervene successfully. In this regard, Government Decision 1.151 from December 23rd modified the legislation amended first in January and February of 2014³, in order to increase the performance of the management of emergencies.

According to the body text of the law, the changes were determined by the multiplication of nonmilitary threats to the national security, to which may be added the events causing human casualties, property damage etc. faced by the specialized structures/institutions in the last years. Considering this it was mandatory for the institutions to reevaluate, identify and initiate new mechanism based on the integrated crisis management system, on a new concept of cooperation between ministries and using a multidisciplinary approach, on a joint use of the capabilities and harness the knowledge of all the institutions with responsibilities in this area. Thus, a unitary coordination was considered necessary in order to ensure the efficient operation of the logistical elements and capabilities as well as a real control provided by the person that manages the situation, person with a great experience in the matter.

The analyses showed that it was considered necessary to coordinate these structures at the executive level, carried out by the Deputy Prime Minister and their effective coordination by a secretary of state, expert in the field, in a Department of Emergency Situations⁴.

According to the recent legislative changes, at a strategic level, the concept of integrated crisis management system is accomplished by the National Committee for Special Emergency Situations governed by the Deputy Prime Minister for national security within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

21 ministries and national institutions are represented in the National Committee for Special Emergency Situations⁵. Regarding the Public Ministry, the law states that this institution is represented in all meeting as a permanent guest. Also, at the invitation of the president of the Committee, depending on the issue stated on the agenda, representatives of other ministries or institutions might attend, as well as from the non-governmental organizations.

According to the approved documents, at technical level, the interventions and management of emergencies is secured by the Department of Emergency Situations, governed by the Deputy Prime Minister for national security, and the management of the information and the support for the actions taken during the intervention is provided by all the other

³ OUG nr. 1 from January 29th, 2014 and H.G. nr. 94 from February 12, 2014.

⁴ For more details on the reasons, see OUG nr. 1 from January 29th, 2014, first paragraph .

⁵ See Appendix 1 of the H.G. nr. 94 from February 12, 2014 modified.

institutions or departments governed by the secretary of the state responsible for public order and safety within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Capabilities integration and the concept of action are established in the operational coordination platform, all the state secretaries and specialists in emergency situations are present in this platform.

The new concepts has in sight the coordination of all resources on national level and, at the same time, risk analysis on typologies, the goal being an improved and more accurate system management during emergencies. In this regard, all institutions will operate using identical procedure sets in order to ensure interoperability and the coordination of all forces and instruments under the command of the National Committee for Special Emergency Situations.

This new concept considers the interoperability between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Transport and all the other institutions that are under the National Committee for Special Emergency Situations.

The new legislation abolishes the National Committee for Weatherability and Calamity whose attributions are now absorbed by the National Committee for Special Emergency Situations.

As it's defined by the above legislations, under the Department of Emergency Situations are the following organizations:

- the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations;
- the Air Force General Inspectorate, but only in case of emergency situations;
- the General Directorate for monitoring, operational control and survey of the ambulance activity and emergency rooms
- and the Medical Directorate (in coordination)⁶.

Of these structural elements, vital for the management of the situation, both in terms of consequences and communication will be the structures with responsibilities at different levels.

Emergency Committees

Emergency Committees are inter-institutional management support bodies, provided by their leaders. They will organize and operate at central and local levels, as follows:

- at national level:
 - *National committee for special emergency situations* - ministerial body composed of ministers and heads of central public institutions, depending on the types of risk or support functions assigned to jurisdiction in the National Management System for Emergency Situations, operating under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister for national security as President and the Minister of Internal Affairs as Vice President;
 - *Ministerial committees and other public institutions for emergency situations* - composed of individuals with power of decision, experts and specialists within the institution; is established and operates under the direction of ministers or heads of central public institutions.
- at local level:
 - *Committee for emergency situations of Bucharest* - composed of mayor, district mayors, heads of decentralized public services, decentralized and community management, managers of certain institutions and companies that offer support in emergency management, as well as and managers of economic agents, that by specific activity are potential risk factors in generating emergency situations; this committee is under the guidance of the prefect;

⁶ For more details see http://www.mai.gov.ro/index03_2_17.html (accessed on 14.02.2015)

- *County committees for emergency situations* - which includes county council president, heads of decentralized services and community management and other managers of institutions and companies that offer support in emergency management as well as and managers of economic agents, that by specific activity are potential risk factors in generating emergency situations; this committee is under the guidance of the prefect;

- *Local committees for emergencies* – formed in the cities, towns, villages and districts of Bucharest by the mayor. In this local committees are the deputy mayor, the secretary of the village, town, city or sector and where appropriate, representatives of public services and the main economic institutions from the administrative-territorial unit, as well as managers and leaders of economic agents, subsidiaries, local branches or working points, which by specific activity are potential risk factors in generating emergency situations.

General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations, as a specialized body under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, provides uniform and permanent coordination of the prevention activities and management of emergencies. Operational management of emergencies is done nationally by National Center for coordination and management of intervention, established at the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations, which provides permanent information flow for control of the Government Operations Centre.

At the level of ministries, other central public institutions with responsibilities in emergency management, the municipalities (except Bucharest), cities, districts of Bucharest and villages are established operative centers for emergency situations

In Bucharest and the counties are established coordination and management centers that provide intervention analysis, assessment of the situation and coordination of intervention and ensure the decision support for the county committees or of Bucharest.

At national level, depending on the seriousness of the situation, the responsibility to communicate until one of the two committees or the Department of Emergency Situations will convoke is of the ministry that manages the risk factor that caused the crisis and after its convening, is in the responsibility of the qualified department within the National System, namely the communication and public information center. Locally, the communication responsibility until the local/county emergency committee will convene falls in the task of the mayor or prefect office, executed the person appointed by the prefect/mayor and assisted by experts from local government structures. After the county committee is summoned the responsibility falls in the task of the qualified department within the operational county/Bucharest center, namely the public information center organized by the prefecture or, in case the local committee convenes, the operational center activated at the level of the municipality, city or village.

Decentralized public information is carried out according to the “one voice” principle, thus ensuring unity of message at all levels involved in managing the situation, the result of vertical coordination of local structures with central structures. In an emergency, the strategy is intended to be proactive in the sense that messages will be constructed in advance, adapted to each category of public and will be distributed, if possible, before rumors or speculation transmitted through the media or transmitted orally will escape from the control of communicators. Also, in the event of unforeseen incidents, the strategy is to inform target audiences in real time, but very important, only after verifying the verity of the information.

Coordination within and between institutions, cooperation with the media, maintaining a flow of public information, education activities undertaken before the events, analysis of risk factors and the development of institutional capacity planning communication and public relations, are all attributes of a strategic communication in emergencies.

Public communications from the National Management System of Emergencies perspective

We won't find a strict definition of emergency, but it is widely accepted that the emergency is an unexpected event with consequences that affect lives, goods and social values and in order to counteract we need to take urgent measures and engage all human and material resources at our disposal.

O.U.G. no. 21/2004, amended, defines the state of emergency as an exceptional event, of non-military nature which threatens the life or health of people, the environment, the material and cultural values and, in order to restore to the normal state, we are required to adopt measures and urgent action, to grant all specialized resources and uniformly manage all the forces and means involved (art. 2 a).

This definition is the foundation of the National Management System for Emergency Situations, and also of the institutional structures of communication required for an efficient management.

The participatory character of the civil society in the management of national security is a goal of the National Security Strategy⁷ and grant communication a great role in emergency management.

The national system for emergency management focuses on the proactive character, on educating people regarding potential risks and measures that need to be taken during crisis. From this point of view, communication consists of:

- informational and education public campaigns nationwide on how to act in case of civil emergencies (natural hazards, floods, earthquakes, technological hazards, nuclear accidents, breakage of dams etc.);

- local public campaigns on specific risks in the region, linked to the existence of special installations or targets (dams or large water reservoirs, industrial units with high-risk for population in an emergency etc.);

- making public the *risk insurance plans*⁸ or presenting them to the community and also involving local communities in the debate on various sections of defense plans;

- applying to all levels of education of an appropriate knowledge curriculum focused on understanding risk prevention measures, developing response capacity for self-support and first aid for the benefit of others, and also on the importance of engaging in volunteer activities to support interventions authorities⁹.

The National Strategy for public communications and information for emergencies¹⁰ is a component of the measures needed to launch a national campaign to educate citizens, the point being to educate people and foster a culture of security.

In case of an emergency, the following activities are to be taken, at national level:

- communicate vital information to the affected population (the specific information for the affected people will be disseminated and coordinated uniformly);

- fast and efficient mobilization of human and material resources needed to fulfill the responsibilities of public information related to the situation¹¹.

As we stated in the beginning, the legislation on emergency management was changed earlier this year because of the new realities emerged from the actual tragedies that took place in Romania. The analysis on how the different public institutions handled the

⁷ *National Defense Strategy. For a Romania that guarantees security and prosperity for the future generations* (project), Bucharest, 2010, p. 9.

⁸ HG no. 548/2008, *The National Strategy for public communication and information for emergencies*, p. 7.

⁹ The plan to implement The National Strategy for public communications and information for emergencies, pp. 5-7.

¹⁰ HG no. 548/2008, *The National Strategy for public communication and information for emergencies*

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

rescue mission and the difficulties that they confronted with showed the need to create an organism, a department to oversee all the operations on field. So, the Department of Emergency Situations was created in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, led by a secretary of state, specialist in this matter.

In our opinion, public communication during emergencies is important, but so are the activities of public campaigns on educating and preparing people for emergencies. A responsible institutions, whether is a national or a local one, has to do both: in crisis, during an emergency, has to keep the citizens informed and up to date with the measures that are being taken for damage control and rescue, to let people know what to do and/or what measures they need to take for their own safety and another important mission is to get the people's approval and to show them that the forces responsible are in control and capable to react and to intervene. Usually, in case like this the communication is guided by the "once voice" principle. When not in emergencies, a responsible institutions, national or a local, has to prepare the population according to the specific risks of the area.

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WHAT ARE POSTERS TRYING TO TELL US?

Mirela IONIȚĂ,

Associate professor, PhD., "CAROL I" National Defence University, Bucharest,
mirela_ionita@yahoo.com

Veronica PĂSTAE,

Junior lecturer, PhD., "CAROL I" National Defence University, Bucharest,
veronica_pastae@yahoo.com

Abstract: *A poster is a graphical promotional product which combines text and image elements in order to effectively convey a message. To serve its persuasive purpose, a poster should be well-designed, carefully printed and displayed so that the receiver could easily get the message. A poster is really efficient only if both the text and the image reach the audience. Therefore we shall analyze in this paper the interdependence of text and image as an important tool in compliance gaining. Additionally, we shall explore the processes of decoding and understanding the information contained in a poster, which determine the receiver to act in accordance with the message intended by the source.*

Key words: *poster, promotional product, image, text, message, sentence structure*

Introduction

A poster is an effective way of promoting products, services and ideas, as people can receive information by simply glancing at combinations of images and texts set up in high traffic public places. In a nutshell, the poster is a large image calling out its message and not a miniature merely whispering it. Whether in a macro version (the billboard) or a micro one (the flyer), a poster sells images, highlights the special moments of the collective daily life and acts as an invitation; it is an advertising product based on image impact. In order to reach its purpose, the poster should not only be well designed, carefully printed and properly displayed, but also properly interpreted.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the poster as a medium for conveying information and the assumption we start from is that the poster reveals its full message only by the integrated and correct perception of both text and image. The usual way of looking at a poster is a speedy ritual: if the image has caught the viewer's attention, he or she will first read the large text; If that should prove interesting, the viewer will read the rest of the text and the understanding of the poster message will be reduced to the information conveyed by the text. But a poster contains more significant information for the viewer if he or she took the time to decipher the image.

Since the subject of the present article is the extraction of information from poster image, we would like to suggest a rather empirical method that allows the viewer to grasp the visual message as quickly as possible. Thus we shall look into the message codification process which mainly consists of two stages: the graphic artist translates the verbal message into artistic language and the viewer puts it back into words. This process can help viewers obtain additional information from posters, which may prove useful in making a decision. Visual details could convince the viewer that the promotion action deserves to be taken

seriously because the entity that commissioned the poster, whether an organization, company or individual, has a coherent and credible message.

What we further want to argue in this paper, is the fact that most viewers ignore the information conveyed by the image because they are not skilled in reading this type of language. Nonetheless, when a viewer discusses the content of a poster, he or she will comment or debate over it, using words instead of images. Consequently, hereupon, we aim to offer a possible tool for translating figurative language into verbal language. To this end, we shall propose as a model for turning the visual message into words, a familiar framework, namely, the sentence structure. Following the syntactic patterns, we shall identify the parts of a sentence and their position. Yet, we shall not thoroughly analyze articulating components because that requires the mastering of more artistic grammar.

1. Verbalizing the image

The verbalization process begins by identifying both the mandatory and the optional components of the visual message, and continues by establishing an order depending on the clues offered by the image and putting them into words, according to syntactic rules. This way, the message of the image will be transferred to words in order to put the poster's full message in the same type of language. At first sight this may sound complicated, but a practical example will help readers understand.

1.1. Identifying the visual elements

In order to identify the information components of the image, we shall use the very text of the poster. The text and the image must convey the same message—this is the basic principle of every poster.

1.1.1. To begin with, we shall identify the visual representation of the subject. It can be an organization, a firm, a company, an institution, a public authority, etc., or a star, an individual, a band, a singer or an orchestra. When the organizer is a public institution or a commercial entity, the visual equivalent is the logo. The logo is a basic graphic symbol that synthesizes the main values of the brand image and points up the company's name or field of activity. The strength of a logo resides in concentrating values in one shape, representing the sum of all the ideas associated with the chosen symbol. To exemplify, the logos of automotive companies are frequently basic geometric shapes or their stylized versions. Logos can include letters (from characters to monograms), pictograms using popular symbols or ideograms based on the abstract images of natural elements. Since "Carol I" National Defense University does not yet have its own logo and the graphical composition needs a subject, it is usually replaced on posters with a military badge or with an image of its headquarters. Sometimes, a medallion featuring the headquarters or the founder's image is used.

1.1.2. The predicate is the next mandatory syntax element that must be identified. As a rule, the visual equivalent of what is said about the subject is the main image on the poster, the one that is meant to catch the eye of the viewer. This image should be powerful in order to quickly and easily convey a meaning, featuring the promoted object in a very explicit manner, by offering symbols largely associated with the object within the social environment for which the poster was designed. Complex ideas or values are frequently promoted with the help of symbolic images that synthesize the content. Adding the relevant details that will suggest the overall message is the artistic equivalent of a synecdoche. The way the artist chooses to refer to the promoted object and to provide additional information for the viewer, depends on the image style which will be discussed further down.

1.1.3. The subject and the predicate are mandatory elements in the phrase syntax, as a sentence does not make sense without them. Therefore, identifying the subject and the

predicate must be done before we begin the search for circumstantial information, which adds nuances to the message without changing its object.

Posters are meant to be parsed at a glance. This rule restricts the complexity of the context surrounding the promoted object. Usually, the context is simply a background designed to highlight the main image. A poster filled with details that require a successive interpretation of the various layers, as well as establishing complex relationships among the image elements, is seen as ineffective because it cannot be decoded at a glance. The same rule applies to posters that juxtapose several images, photos or symbols, even when they render relevant aspects of the promoted object and the artistic syntax is coherent. The more complex the poster, the more it turns into a collage and its message becomes needlessly complicated and ineffective. The details cannot be discerned or interpreted clearly and are therefore unable to catch the viewer's attention or to nuance and enhance the information conveyed to the viewer. The poster will look like a chromatic mishmash, a chaotic collage that confuses the viewer, being the equivalent of the prolix style in verbal communication. A poster is not supposed to tell the viewer everything. It should not tell too much at once. Its purpose is to convey the essential information about the object in question; while the range of image elements is narrow, the means of expression can only be limited by the artist's imagination. A poster is not a comic, nor a piece of baroque art. It is an advertising product supposed to promote something, a service or an idea, and is not merely an object of entertainment or contemplation. However, this does not mean that a poster is void of artistic value. The average movie poster, for instance, usually tends to feature the protagonist(s) in static poses, placed against an emblematic background for the movie in question, one that usually contains a defining element from the movie, either a building or an object (a cup, a tree, a flower, a weapon, an animal, etc.) that is very important in the plot. This highlights the relationship between the character(s) and the background. The characters' costumes may help build certain expectations regarding the movie's story and action. The viewer will make assumptions based on costumes and setting, and will guess where and when the action takes place - in the future or in ancient Rome, for instance. The image of a warrior may suggest a heroic or historical movie, while three characters portrayed together may suggest a love triangle. The information will be correlated with the movie's title and thus the invitation contained in the poster's message acts in a synchronized manner, but at two different levels: verbal and visual.

Consequently, a poster is an elaborate composition designed to send a promotional message. For this reason, posters rarely use plain snapshots; actually, almost any photographic material is processed, cut off, rearranged, re-colored, resized or distorted, depending on the artist's intention.

1.2. Sentence structure

Images can communicate messages just as effectively as language can do. The difference is that an image tells its message with all the components in full view, with all the information simultaneously presented to the viewer. The layman may therefore find it difficult sometimes to piece together the story told by an image. While the viewer may recognize the elements and the relationships between them, he or she may not always be able to achieve a coherent translation of the visual message into the sequential pattern of the verbal language. Therefore, we would like to suggest a simplified way of reading the visual language, using the structure of a sentence as the basis. In order to get as close as possible to what the artist intended, the components of the image must be ordered in a verbal manner, observing the rules of spoken languages, but drawing upon the expressive force of words. The syntax, the order of sentence elements in the verbal flow, is what makes a text expressive.

The first problem that many viewers encounter is that they do not know how to start the process of interpreting an image. The easiest way to catch the narrative thread of an image

is to find the main element, the one that the artist has displayed prominently in his work. The visual accent can be found by comparing the different sizes of objects, by focusing on the chromatic contrast or the lighting. To put it simply, the viewer should focus on the most obvious element. If the focus is on the logo of the organization, the verbalization process follows the standard syntax: subject, predicate, objects. For instance: "Company A organizes the event B on date C at location D." The image follows the logic of a written text. But if the focus is on the main image, then the event is brought to the fore and, in such a case, a passive or impersonal sentence could prove more appropriate: "Event B is organized by company A on date C at location D." The process of verbalization may seem slightly complicated when the visual focus is eccentric. Placing the visual focus in the background or in the setting must be taken as the beginning of a sentence. Assuming that the artist has done his job correctly, the viewer takes the highlighted object as an element that defines the subject: "At location D, company A organizes the event B on date C." In plain words, a certain place or time is chosen for the spectacular launching of a product. Eccentric focus can further be obtained by emphasizing a certain element of high priority for the organization. The image of a meeting featuring in the background, as well as an investment/sales/output/audience growth chart projected on a well lit screen, will direct the viewer's eyes toward the object highlighted by means of contrast, their role being to confirm the credibility/performance/profitability/popularity/efficiency of the organization. Only after the message of stability has been conveyed, does the image continue to present topical information about the event or product in question.

Another kind of focus is the shocking element, which is deliberately placed in a novel context or even in a confusing one, to push the viewer out of the reading routine and trigger associations of ideas that could change the viewer's behavior in the manner suggested by the message. This category can include the visual joke and other comical elements.

This is how the visual content of a poster can be put into words, the result being a complex sentence that should include references to as many pieces of information from the written text as possible.

2. Message reconstruction

The written part of a poster is meant to convey unambiguous information, an explicit message. The message is complete, correctly formulated and rendered in as few words as possible. The order of information piece and the highlighting of important aspects are easily understood because they are indicated by the design, size or color of letters. The image of a poster must catch the viewer's eye and provide nuance for the written information. In order to fully decode the message of a poster, the viewer must understand both the image and the text. The visual and verbal messages of a properly designed poster will be in harmony with each other. In the case of a good poster, the image will complete and enrich the text. However, harmony in ideas does not preclude the use of different tones. While the text is usually limited to a neutral, informative tone, or, in some cases, imperative or mobilizing, the image does not have to follow the same rule. It can be poetical, comical, allusive or aggressive. It can be argued that a poster is strictly illustrative if the visual message coincides with the verbal one, that a poorly made or poorly interpreted poster features divergent verbal and visual messages. By contrast, a good poster features a visual message that enhances the verbal message, from both the informational and the artistic perspectives.

As far as producers are concerned, the marketing component is crucial, whereas the artistic aspect, which may win the viewer's admiration, is purely optional.

Any reconstruction of a poster's message will inevitably be done verbally. The correct decoding of a poster, or any other advertising product, helps viewers make informed decisions. The decoding algorithm proposed here speeds up the process of understanding the

intended message and boosts the rational aspect of the viewer's decisions. Once the viewer learns how to decode a poster from both the verbal and visual perspectives, he or she will be less influenced by subjective impressions when deciding whether the object of the poster is interesting or whether the invitation is worth accepting.

Conclusion

The algorithm used to decode the message conveyed by posters is a simple exercise that shows once again how existing knowledge can be recycled and applied to new situations.

Since the beginning, we have argued that the main role of a poster's image is informative and that the esthetic aspect of a poster has simply a decorative effect which does little to influence the decision-making process. This method is a possible time-saving manner of reading a poster, but not the only possible method. Its purpose is to decode the useful information, but in no way does it replace an artistic education. The practical utility of this algorithm lies in accelerating the understanding of a poster's overall message by structuring the visual perception.

Therefore, the viewer will be able to quickly understand everything that a poster can and intends to convey, and will be able to act as an informed consumer.

By learning such a fast reading algorithm, the viewer adopts a new reading practice, consequently he or she will be able to extract the best available information from every advertising product, in order to make the best decisions.

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THE ROLE OF IMAGE IN ADVERTISING PRODUCTS

Mirela IONIȚĂ,

Associate professor, PhD., "CAROL I" National Defence University, Bucharest,
mirela_ionita@yahoo.com

Veronica PĂSTAE,

Junior lecturer, PhD., "CAROL I" National Defence University, Bucharest,
veronica_pastae@yahoo.com

Abstract: *This article focuses on advertising products and particularly on the manner in which customer persuasion is achieved through text-image combination. We shall explore how images support and enhance the text and we shall comment on the situations when images can even replace the written message. Thus we shall investigate the ways in which images should be interpreted and decoded in an attempt to spot the parameters that influence the audience almost subconsciously. In this respect we shall survey the main characteristics of several advertising products, highlighting the role of images in conveying the intended message. Considering the image components of promotional products we shall analyse the manner in which these relate to receivers' former experience so that to persuade audience into consumption.*

Key words: *image, text, advertising, poster, billboard, flyer, folded leaflet, pamphlet, brochure*

Introduction

Image plays such an important role in contemporary advertising that it is impossible nowadays to conceive an advertising product which lacks visual support. This aspect is clearly illustrated by the fact that radio commercials have almost zero impact without visual backing. Advertising is mainly directed at the affective level, relying on seduction, rather than on reasoning. As an essentially commercial activity, advertising becomes more effective through the use of image, regardless of the object being promoted.

Ever since the beginning of advertising, words and images have successfully combined in order to sell goods, services or ideas. Traders either displayed their products or used colorfully painted signs to attract customers. This language syncretism is still the most effective tool in advertising, and the strength of advertising materials lies precisely in the combined effect of the verbal and visual languages, whether we are talking about raising public awareness, product promotion or only memory refreshing campaigns.

That being said, we shall address the importance of images in promotional products and we shall discuss the manners in which the image successfully conveys the message. In this respect, we shall narrow the field of study and restrict our analysis to the simplest printed products - the poster with its macro and micro versions: the billboard, the flyer, the folded leaflet, the pamphlet and the brochure. Once the principles guiding the impact of images are understood, they can further be applied to advertising products which include sound, movement or interactive components, products that are built on more complex syncretism than the basic word-image combination.

Nonetheless, in this paper we shall explore only the relationship between image and words, approaching it from the visual language perspective, which we shall attempt to translate into verbal language. The artistic considerations will be put aside in favor of the information content.

To begin with, mention must be made that images influence the individual at a very basic level. The visual perception of reality does not require formal education and, in the end, not even the knowledge of an articulated language, because any being endowed with the sense of sight will react to visual stimuli. The main obstacle that advertising must overcome is not image perception, but conceptualization. Visual information is processed by verbalization because human beings formulate their thoughts using words and what people see gains meaning and (moral, artistic, utilitarian, etc.) value only after being translated into words. Images give an individual the immediate confirmation of reality; human beings believe what they see rather than what they are told – seeing brings certainty, while stories require verification. As a result, the image clearly offers a stronger point of reference than words. The suggestive force lies in synchronicity: images tell stories by presenting all the information at the same time and place, which gives the viewer multiple ways of reading and interpreting the story. This should be the reason why an image is said to be worth a thousand words and why, at the same time, an image can prove more deceiving than words. It can certainly induce suggestions and trigger combinations of ideas that cannot be controlled by any internal or external system. For this reason, image management is a major field of study in advertising, with significant implications for all promotion practices. In this respect, a universally accepted convention is to show only the good side of things. This bias of all advertising products is a prerequisite of their persuasive efficiency.

1. Instantiations of advertising products

In what follows we shall deal with the role of image in advertising and we shall explore the manner in which messages are conveyed in the most popular printed advertising products: the poster, the billboard, the flyer, the folded leaflet, the pamphlet and the brochure. We shall further comment on how images should be used depending on both the specific features of these formats and on the products being promoted.

A **poster** is a large advertising product, containing an invitation and is generally displayed in public areas. It may promote goods of general appeal, products or services (i.e. cars or telephony services), it may announce an event or an important moment in the life of a certain community (i.e. concert or sports event), or it may promote certain values (i.e. charity drives, political or religious actions, etc.). The message is simple and can be conveyed through a single sentence containing information about the organizer, the event, the time and place. The image will be found in the central part of the poster and will catch the eye through size and color.

Moreover, it indicates the promoted object in the simplest manner, usually in a way that illustrates the event, often through a symbol associated with the promoted brand, or through a logo the public is already familiar with. The image of a poster is mainly aimed at catching attention, but it should also enhance the written message. It usually completes the message by attempting to increase the event's attractiveness and the organizer's credibility. The full message of a poster and of any other image-based advertising product can only be decoded by corroborating linguistic and figurative information. However, we shall not discuss here the poster as a modern form of art or as an aesthetic product.

A **billboard** could be considered the macro version of a poster, as regards both message structuring and persuasive functions. The main difference is that billboards are rarely used to promote precise events. Since billboards are expensive, clients resort to them in order to convey information with a longer lifespan: brands, discount campaigns or actions taking place across weeks or months. The billboard is designed for quick viewing, while walking by or just driving, therefore its structure should be as simple as possible and reduce the message

to its essence. Splitting the graphic space, adding details to the background or including explanatory bits of text should be avoided in billboard design.

Just like the poster, a **flyer** expresses an invitation and can be viewed as its micro version. However, there are two major differences between the poster and flyer: the flyer is printed on both sides and, once handed out, it belongs to the recipient, who can read the information more than once, at a time and place of his or her choosing. Technological progress has made the printing and multiplication of flyers easy and cheap. The main consequence of this easy production is an overwhelming flow of such products. Mail boxes across the entire world are filled with flyers on a daily basis and a walk through a major city brings one into frequent contact with people handing out flyers which promote a wide range of activities and services (nonetheless, product promotion through flyers is less frequent). In order not to end up in the first waste bin, flyers contain all types of appealing graphical elements which tend to become increasingly strident. Since flyers are short-lived products whose value falls after the first reading, the design effort is mainly channeled to catch the reader's attention and not to cater for his or her artistic taste. The flyer has a small format, featuring oversized fonts and emblematic images on its presentation side (just as posters), and useful information on the reverse side. The huge amount of flyers in circulation greatly reduces their penetrating power.

The **pamphlet** is a printed advertising product which can contain various types of information such as: a short presentation of a soon to be published work, or the qualities and sale terms of a product, or the intentions of a company/ institution. Its purpose is to inform the public about the issuer's offer so it could attract new clients. The pamphlet is the equivalent of a road map to something that needs to be known and its basic principle is empathy. The issuer builds a message from the recipient's point of view, trying to meet his or her expectations/ needs by any means, using a type of language and tone tailored to the audience. The pamphlet is an advertising product that builds on the visual impact, therefore the use of a striking image is mandatory. If the image fails to attract attention, the pamphlet will not be read. For this reason, the image has top priority in a pamphlet, coming before slogans, titles or explanatory texts.

The image must combine the simplicity of a pictogram with the eloquence of a logo. Any decorative aspects are relegated to secondary images, which are usually supposed to make the offer more interesting with the help of relevant photos or figures. Objects are highlighted by being shown alone against a contrasting background, accompanied by information about their names, prices and availability. Such terms should be understood in a wider sense when the promoted activities are not strictly commercial. The clear, distinct and attractive presentation of each element against a contrasting, but not strident background helps the viewer to quickly get the general idea of the message. As regards the secondary images, their purpose is to give the viewer an idea of what the object of promotion looks like, something that words cannot achieve with the same ease.

The **folded leaflet** contains a synthetic presentation of the agent's identity and a brief offer, usually limited to a single object or to a range of closely related products. It is printed in a structured format, following the surfaces resulting from folding the printed paper. The folded leaflet offers a quick, but global presentation of an offer, in order to raise the reader's awareness. Unlike the pamphlet, which only seeks to catch the eye, the folded leaflet offers more information, which can be accessed by unfolding the 4 or 6 printed sides. The folded leaflet is cheaper than a brochure which is generally printed in excellent conditions and on high quality paper, but it can have the same impact if the message conveyed by the

combination of image and text is accurate and coherent, if it observes the natural reading structuring and takes advantage of visual aspects. Some of the rules for designing an effective folded leaflet are, actually, derived from plastic arts.

A folded leaflet contains up to three colors, one of which is pure and usually saturated. This will be the dominant color and it frequently suggests the agent's field of activity. The dominant color is accompanied by no more than two hues, frequently unsaturated and derived from the pure colors that could create an adequate context for the reader. The colors are chosen in accordance with the campaign purpose and highlight the relevant information by means of contrast.

Each visual element of the folded leaflet has a reason and a purpose. The figurative representation of the agent's identity always appears on the first page, next to the company's official name, written in full, without logos or abbreviations. For quick identification, any respectable company has a logo or a distinctive symbol. The first page of a folded leaflet will also feature an image designed to catch the eye through suggestive presentation of the offer. An emblematic image, no matter how attractive, cannot support the overall message unless it triggers a mental association which creates expectations in the mind of the viewer. For instance, the image of a person sitting in front of a computer can be an uninspired choice because it may conjure up too many possible activities and opportunities, thus confusing the viewer through a vague suggestion. If the viewer cannot tell at a glance what a folded leaflet is about, he or she will probably never bother to open it.

A folded leaflet has a dominating color and an image motif. The motif appears on the first page and it is repeated in various ways throughout the graphical concept. We shall refer to "Comunicare prin imagini," a book by Alain Joannes, for a practical example. A data analysis company wishing to promote its services has chosen as a motif the optical prism and the dispersion of white light, due to the analogy with the process of breaking down the flow of data into basic pieces of knowledge. The dispersion motif is found on every page of the folded leaflet.

The detailed information will be found on the inner pages. The text contained by a folded leaflet is reduced to the minimum needed for understanding the message and edited in such a manner that every piece of information can be seen distinctly. As a rule, titles, lists and enumerations complete the sentences. Spacing is also used to make reading easier, while eloquence is enhanced through the use of photos or graphs. The photos are used as testimony of the agent's activity and they tend to feature clear and easily identifiable aspects in order to convey credibility. Graphs that indicate the performance of an organization should be used only if their meaning is tied directly to the object of promotion and if the connection can be easily and quickly understood. The text to image ratio is clearly in the latter's favor. The less amount of text, the higher the chance to catch a viewer's attention.

As regards the last page, it is generally a road map, by which the viewer can reach the agent, whether the agent is a manufacturer, trader, public institution or an NGO. Thus, the last page offers the contact data and, sometimes, an access map. A recent trend is to put website addresses and social networking data on the last page, in order to give the viewer access to more detailed information regarding the agent's profile and activity.

The advertising **brochure** is a soft cover book-type material featuring several pages of high quality print-work. These pages are usually held together with staples. The purpose of a brochure is to convince the reader of the quality of a product or service, with information laid out in the manner of a guided tour. Shorter than a magazine or a catalogue, the brochure presents a company's profile and its offer of goods or services, accompanied by information that prospective buyers may find useful. For credibility, the brochure includes various opinions regarding the organization, such as appreciation statements of managers, employees, partners, clients or experts. The brochure conveys a complex image of the issuing

organization, institution, firm or company, and is different from other advertising products because it can contain short pieces of information about the issuer's internal organization, partnerships, projects or feedback regarding recent activities. As in the case of the other advertising materials, the rules concerning the use of striking images, the composition of the first and last pages, the dominating color and the motif, still apply.

2. Imagery in advertising products

The efficiency of advertising products can be increased by observing certain parameters and rules that apply to text and image alike. Since the purpose of this article is a discussion of images and their roles, we are actually interested in how the images contained by the above-mentioned advertising products are seen by viewers, and not in the details of art theory and its use in advertising.

While the impact of advertising images on the viewer cannot be dissociated from the effect of verbal communication, it is the image and not the word that catches the viewer's eye and makes him or her focus on the message. The image and the short text work hand in hand to inform or persuade the receivers. In psychological terms, the image has cognitive, attitudinal and behavioral effects. The relationship between the information and the esthetic sides of advertising is a subtle one. Artistic education is not a decisive factor in how the advertising image is perceived and marketing does not even take it into account; contemplation does not bring profits. Still, advertising operates at the emotional level, rather than at the rational one, making use of psychological mechanisms to trigger sensations and emotions, influencing attitudes and convictions in which the esthetic sense plays a rather subconscious role.

The current trends of advertising imagery are complementary. On the one hand, content becomes simplified, while on the other hand, the presentation becomes more complex. The trends can be traced back to the supreme goal of advertising: materials must catch the eye of as many hurried passers-by as possible. Therefore, it must communicate its message briefly and strikingly, using every scientifically proven or empirically tested tricks that could appeal to the minds of the viewers. Logos have become abstract, moving from natural motifs to geometrical symbols. The best example is the automotive industry, where logos range from the Ferrari horse and the Peugeot lion, to the Renault diamond and the Audi circles. The logo is the symbol by which a company is recognized at a glance. It defines the company during its existence and, for that reason, it must inspire confidence by conveying a message of durability, stability and success. The poster image, on the other hand, is designed to indicate a single moment from the company's existence or evolution, be it an event or the launching of a new product. This means that the image should be novel, attractive and should present something new that can be associated with the object of promotion. That is why posters have become increasingly spectacular so as to draw attention in an environment flooded with colorful images. The advertising imagery can remain attractive by using various methods that are greatly dependent on technological progress: content is simplified, the object of promotion tends to occupy the entire space, secondary layers vanish, graphical accents are obvious, but limited, objects are cut off and placed against contrasting backgrounds, any blemishes are removed while desirable features are highlighted in a process known as *photo-shopping*. Everything is done to seduce the viewer and make sure that he or she understands the message effortlessly. In the rush for higher appeal, advertising images show an alarming tendency towards vulgarity. Some critics have always rejected the aspiration of advertising imagery to be considered a modern form of art, a fact partly justified by the low quality of certain commercials which are rather kitschy.

Conclusion

All things taken into account, we can assert that the role of image in advertising is quite significant, but not independent. Images catch the eye, complement the written information and nuance the verbal message, but do not modify it. The message conveyed by any image-based advertising product can be fully decoded only through the integrated interpretation of the verbal and visual languages. This means that images should not be given solely the role of catching attention. Any coherent advertising message is based on the convergence of information expressed in different kinds of languages.

However, it is obvious that contemporary advertising cannot be imagined anymore without images designed and processed at the highest quality standards, due to the fact that advertising heavily relies on visual fascination. It is less obvious, however, that the informative advertising text has become shorter, especially since the advent of QR (quick response) codes which can be read via mobile applications in order to give access to websites featuring all the information of interest. Image has thus taken over the task of making the viewer pay attention to the poster, placing the mobile phone close to the code and accessing more information about the object of promotion. If a company's identity can be expressed through a logo, which is a symbol, then the object can be turned into a suggestive image and detailed information reduced to a code.

This leads us to an open-ended question: could posters end up featuring only images and (almost) no text?

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WORK-FAMILY RELATION IN SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

Dragoș Florin COARFĂ,

Assistant Lecturer, Military Technical Academy,
cdragosflorin@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Contending to dominate the individual's life, family and military exchange values that ultimately influence and transform these social institutions. The military organization based on conscription influences soldiers' family life in specific ways, since the military is seen as a "bigger family". The All Volunteer Force assimilates the military personnel with laborers and the result is an increased exposure to values unknown to the previous conscription-based system. Family plays a key role in individuals' adaptation to the military, proving to be a valuable resource in enhancing work proficiency.*

Key words: *family, military, institutional model, occupational model.*

What is a family? is a simple question, and that because family is the most common social group. We are borne in a family, we want to make a family of our own or we know different families in the community that we are living in. No matter the perspective, for example the sociological one -a group based on marriage or consanguinity, sharing feelings, aspirations and common values-, or legal one emphasizing contractual nature of the relationship of the family members, it is inevitable not to be influenced in our perception of the family by personal experiences. The idea of family conceptualization as a source of understanding and empathy more than as a statistic and normative phenomenon is already stated¹ and it will be our guidance in this article.

From the beginning it is important to bring into discussion some of the relations inside family structure, relations regarding the couple, parents and children and extended family. Those relations materialized themselves in roles performed by family members, such as father, mother, spouse and child, each of them associated with specific behaviors. The roles generate a family structure, and from this perspective, families can be complete or incomplete.

Industrial societies created the context for a type of family to be largely encountered- the nuclear family, with father, mother and children. By using the term *family*, we will refer further on to nuclear family as a specific type and defined as a social group generated by marriage composed from individuals living together and connected by biological, economical, morale and legal relations, with specific social responsibilities.² A special interest for can be brought by the specific context of the military organization in which nuclear family can function. This context permitted to conceptualize the *Army family*, as a special group living by special rules, not so different from a civilian family, but with a specific psychological climate.³

¹ Levin, I., Trost, J., Understanding the Concept of Family, *Family Relations*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), p. 351

² Voinea, M., *Sociologia familiei*, Editura Universității din București, București, 1993, p. 6.

³ Urey, John H., The Army Family. Special Group with Special Needs?, *The Family Life Coordinator*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Jul., 1962), p. 60.

Both family and the military are social institutions, with stable structures of roles and statuses in order to fulfill social functions⁴, and they share the same type of integrative values, maintaining social solidarity as a primary function.⁵

To follow up the ties between family and military and to understand their exchange of values, it is important to have a look on dynamics of the military institution in the last years. The military suffered major transformation, focused on the status of the soldier. Transition from conscription based army to a volunteer based one changed the perception on the military environment. For a better understanding of these changes, Moskos introduced the institutional/occupational model⁶ in order to study transformations occurred in US military in the '70s. Starting from those models, we will try to understand the relation between military and family.

Institutional model has in its center “the common good”, for which the military are ready to sacrifice their own personal interests. The military environment is transformed in a community that includes family in a larger *family*- the army. A classic example for this military organization is the US military, where the families live in military bases or near them, in which the rigid military hierarchy is brought in community (mainly formed of military). Spouses adopt for themselves the status of the military family member and a value system specific to the military institution; military life and personal life blend together, transforming work in a part of the community life.⁷ Military institution expects, according to institutional model, to unquestionable devotement as main coordinate of a specific moral code.

In this specific context of the institutional model started the first studies about relation between military organization and family, urged by the largest military conflict in human history. The relation between military and family tend to be studied from the perspective of the war influence on family remained home, on marriage status of the enlisted soldiers and divorce rate during and after war.

During, and immediately after World War II, the family context in which one member was enlisted and acting in a war zone generated a special interest to discover how this situation affects family relation dynamics. Heaving already experience from World War I regarding the effects of industrial war at individual level, the transfer of the irrational character of war from combatant back home to his family and society became interesting to study from scientifically point of view. Marriage, work, couple relation, parental relation with children, the absence of adults in youth's life, all are influenced and under suspicion of bringing social equilibrium.⁸

War effort concentrated the attention mainly on the transfer of roles in society due to transition from peace economical production to the war effort. A key role in these circumstances is played by women by assuming, in the absence of men, cumulating responsibilities of industrial skilled worker and bread winner for the family.

Another aspect brought in attention after the World War II is social reintegration of the enlisted soldiers. Readjustment to family life was difficult because of changes produced by war exposure of men, some of them regarding the loss of normal social functioning out of the military system, the attempt to avoid family responsibilities, loss of the daily routine of the

⁴ Vlăsceanu, M., *Grupuri, organizații, mase*, în volumul „Psihologie socială”, Iași, POLIROM, 1997, p. 383

⁵ Abrahamson, M., Anderson, William P., People's Commitments to Institutions, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec., 1984), p. 372.

⁶ Moskos, C. C., From institution to occupation. Trends in military organization. *Armed Forces & Society*, 4(1), 1977, pp. 41-50.

⁷ Soeters, J., Winslow, D. J., & Weibull, A., *Military culture*. In G. Caforio (Ed.), *Handbook of the sociology of the military* (p. 237-254), New York: Kluwer, 2003, p. 241.

⁸ Burgess, E., W., Postwar Problems of the Family, *Marriage and Family Living*, Vol. 6, No. 3, Summer (Aug., 1944), p. 47-50.

family life, hyperawareness of the problems generated by the transition to a normal family life, or low morale caused by the lack of noble purposes like those defended by their participation to war, etc.⁹

Readjustment to a normal life proved to be a complex process, with different results in similar objective contexts (tolerant wife, decent work place, children, etc.), the difference been made by other preexisting situations like couple history, the birth of the child was wanted or not, wife's adjustment during separation, exposure to intense military conflict, etc.¹⁰

A special place in life course of military service men study is occupied by the connection between military service and marriage. Many questions have been raised in this filed, some of them tried to find out if military service influences positively or negatively the marriage status or divorce rate of the enlisted soldiers.¹¹ There is a relation between marriage and military service that depending on variables like the age of conscription or war deployment and exposure to combat actions.

Just a brief view on connection between military organization in accordance with perspective of institutional model and family is enough to emphasize the *accidental* character of their interaction in exchanging values. Only when a war occurs, a specific generation is involved in as mandatory conscripts, with consequences in their life course. Disruption in age of marriage, in sudden assuming of new social roles for both of spouses with a abrupt abandoning of those roles after the war, are just some of the coordinates of this relation between army and family. Things are different when the exposure to the military values is longer, when being a soldier is not an accident in history but a career choice. In this context, family is more exposed to, and has more influence on the military institution.

The process of transformation from conscription based armies to volunteers based ones has the start point at the beginning of the nuclear era and evolves gradually to smaller, fully professionalized armies, with high level of readiness.¹² The end of Vietnam war is the beginning of a radical change in organizing the US military, that bring to discussion to options- to continue the existing system of conscription with its already proved limits (*institutional model*), or to adopt a new model, of the professional army based on volunteers (*occupational model*).¹³ Volunteer based system, in an opinion one of the largest and most important experiments of its type ever conducted¹⁴, generated the interest to study the identity of this new social group and the values that direct volunteer soldiers in vicinity of vocation, profession or occupation. War shifts from the struggle of the entire society to a specific occupation of few, making less interesting for the entire population of a nation concepts like war mobilization.¹⁵

Occupational model, in opposition to the institutional model, central the idea is that the military is an employee, in the same context of the free work market. According to the occupational model, the military is oriented to maximize his professional opportunities by developing his own career and to material reward. The larger group of the army as a common family vanishes and the ties between military organization and family in peace time diminish.

⁹ Cuber, J., F., Family Readjustment of Veterans, *Marriage and Family Living*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Spring (May, 1945), p. 28.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹¹ MacLean, A., Elder, G., H., Jr., Military Service in the Life Course, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 33, 2007, p. 180.

¹² Janowitz, M., *Military Organization in Industrial Society*, în vol. Armata și societatea- culegere de texte de sociologie militară, București, ed. INFO-TEAM, 1998, p. 59.

¹³ Moskos, C. C., op.cit., p. 41-50;

¹⁴ Cooper, Richard V. L., The All-Volunteer Force: Five Years Later, *International Security*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring, 1978), p. 101.

¹⁵ Modell, J., Haggerty, T., The Social Impact of War, *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 17, 1991, p. 212.

Physical connection between the military and family is reduced in intensity due to the tendency of the families to live outside military bases or special residential areas. Social relationships are more diverse and not in direct connection to work, a direct consequence of this fact is a lower exposure of the family members to the traditional military values. Being an individual player on the work market, the military member of the family feels a lower attachment to the military institution and tries to maximize his personal opportunities. Even in this context, the military institution claims commitment from the military personnel, despite the fact that such expectations are no longer in accordance with a specific way of life.

Occupational model is just a theoretical framework, the actual influence of the military institution to the family remaining an important one. Every military family is confronting with the same problems as an average family, such as taking care of children or elders, involvement in children education, career evolution, but also with specific problems, capable of generating stress, like moving in different garrisons, frequent family separation, reorganizing of family life during and after peace time or war time deployment. More than that, families must deal with other stressor factors from an environment that sometimes impose a specific behavior, by assuming in informal relations by wives and children the rank of their military member.¹⁶

We could expect a lower impact of the military traditional values to the family since the *occupational model* created the context of such development. In fact, military values still play an important role in military families because adopting this life style can reduce the stress provoked by functioning of individuals in the military organization.¹⁷

Separation in couple is a sequential process, with comebacks to the initial situation or ending in permanent separation and divorce. Separation motives can be found in marital disputes or in other reasons, such as economic pressure, with direct implications in future evolution of relationship. Separation from other reasons than couple relation can evolve to a permanent one if during the separation intervene changes in daily routine, in emotional relations or in financial burden of the family. In this context, marriage is a stronger connection, with a higher level of involvement and stability than any other relationship.¹⁸

Military families are forced to adapt to a work-family context in which long term separations are constant.¹⁹ The central role of the man bread winner of the family is strictly connected with woman's work perception as subsequent to man's job and in a direct support relation. Some of the families with one member military force the other member's career to gravitate around military environment, with implication in freedom of professional choice and in creating a low self-esteem feeling.²⁰ More than that, working program of the military member of the family sets the routine of the entire family, affecting family relations.

Military career requests a high level of mobility, changing the location of the family can bring difficulties for the children from military families. Continuous reorganizing of the family life is seen as the cause of a so called *military family syndrome* with psychopathologic effects on children facing frequently peace time redeployment of their military parents.²¹ But there are also positive outcomes of moving the family in new locations, some of them

¹⁶ Reinkober Drummet, A., Coleman, M., Cable, S., Military Families under Stress: Implications for Family Life Education, *Family Relations*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), p. 279.

¹⁷ Boss, P. G., McCubbin, H. I., & Lester, G., The corporate executive wife's coping patterns in response to routine husband-father absence, *Family Process*, 18, 1979, p. 83.

¹⁸ Binstock, G., Thornton, A., Separations, Reconciliations, and Living Apart in Cohabiting and Marital Unions, *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Vol. 65, No. 2 (May, 2003), p. 442.

¹⁹ Zvonkovic, A., M., Richards Solomon, C., Humble Á., M., Manoogian, M., Family Work and Relationships: Lessons from Families of Men Whose Jobs Require Travel, *Family Relations*, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 411-422.

²⁰ Zvonkovic, A., M., Richards Solomon, C., Humble Á., M., Manoogian, M., *op. cit.*, pp. 412-413.

²¹ Reinkober Drummet, A., Coleman, M., Cable, S., *op. cit.*, p. 280.

materialized in higher school performance or in perception of the change as the chance to start things over and make them better.

The exposure to violent military action affects couple relations in various ways, from divorce or separation to abuse and infidelity. Military participating to violent action can suffer deterioration in couple stability and life quality, but this is not a pattern that automatically leads to divorce or abuse. An essential role in deterioration of marital relation is played by the factors that drive the military personnel in vicinity of high risk situations, such factor can be found in emotional problems materialized in antisocial behavior that precede active service. The turning point is represented by the moment when unacceptable and punishable by law behaviors in peace time are discovered by individuals as acceptable and reworded in war time, with a direct effect on disintegration of the barrier between what is socially accepted and what is not, with consequences in reproducing such behaviors in family environment.²²

All volunteer force and adoption of the *occupational model* are the cause of a fundamental change in making accessible the military role to women. An easy explanation is provided by the need of new recruits for this type of military organization, recruits available on a free work market. But there are some variables that contribute to an acceptance of the women in the military; among them are *military variables* (security context, evolution of the military technology, rapport of combat support/ combat in structure of military force), *social structure variables* (demographic evolution, work force characteristics, family structure), or cultural variables (social values regarding gender, family)²³

Women see the military service as a chance to prove themselves strong, handy and powerful, in contrast with traditional perception of the female in society. The enthusiasm shown in performing training drills and willingness to command of different military structures are markers of their determination to assume military roles.²⁴

Family relations dynamics are different when the military is woman and mother, for example, divorce rate proved to be higher among women participating in Desert Storm in comparison with military men participating in same operation.²⁵ It seems that wives of the military men are more adaptable to the stress generated by deployment than the spouses of military women facing the same situation.

No matter the particular context of each army, a complex image of the work-family relation in the specific context of the military organization emerges. The specific military environment, with its own behavior expectations and with a high request for mobility in peace time and in conflict, influences the relation between family members. Both of institutions disputes commitment of the individual and a perspective of conciliation between them is possible by developing adaptive strategies capable to integrate values from military and family. And all of this is important in free work market conditions, where cheap work force of the mandatory conscripts is history.

²² Gimbel C., Booth, A., Why Does Military Combat Experience Adversely Affect Marital Relations?, *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Aug., 1994), p. 702.

²³ Wechsler Segal, M., Women's Military Roles Cross-Nationally: Past, Present, and Future, *Gender and Society*, vol. 9, nr. 6 (Dec., 1995), p. 759.

²⁴ Silva, J., M., A New Generation of Women? How Female ROTC Cadets Negotiate the Tension between Masculine Military Culture and Traditional Femininity, *Social Forces*, Vol. 87, No. 2 (Dec., 2008), p. 943.

²⁵ Angrist J., D., Johnson, J., H., IV, Effects of Work-Related Absences on Families: Evidence from the Gulf War, *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Oct., 2000), p. 55.

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COORDINATES OF THE CHURCH'S ROLE IN BUILDING SOCIAL SECURITY

Cristian Vlad IRIMIA,

PhD. Candidate of “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy - Bucharest
icvpcs@yahoo.com

Abstract: *Global security is a state of dynamic equilibrium, a result of multiple and complex interactions between world states and also between these and non-state actors in the natural development of human life and activities. Between these actors can be found the religious component, or church, that understands security as a social construction. At the psychosocial level, pastoral counseling made in the Church seems to be a regulatory social mechanism and also a mechanism of negative influence reduction of the psycho-trauma, of the suffering and even of the social deviance. The Church and the Christianity in general contribute to the development of a culture of peace, for a new concept of development. The Christian dimension represents also an important part of defense diplomacy that aims to build and maintain trust between states, to prevent conflicts, to intervene in support peace operations and humanitarian aid. According to the comprehensive approach towards security issues, the Orthodox Church has the call to humanize the war, using weapons called soft power that requires attraction and persuasion through culture and values.*

Key concepts: *soft power, think-tank, cultural domination, culture of peace*

Contributions Church and religious leaders in the field of social security

Over time has been discussed and has been attempted to determine the role of the Church in society, but hasn't been defined yet ,systematically and clear, the overwhelming importance of the Church in construction of a safe, prosperous, happy, peaceful and balanced world, in all its aspects.

The lack of references and academic approach to the role of the Church in the dynamic of security concept, led me to treat this topic of great importance.

The study is based on the working hypotheses:

- Existence of the growing concerns on national and international level about religious phenomenon due to its interactions with other plans of human existence: political, economic, military and social.
- Deeper involvement of religious leaders in the international arena in order to find solutions to climb out of the sphere of human security risks.
- Best results of Christian mission reflected in the field of security.
- Approaching, dialogue and cooperation of representatives of various religions that constitute premises of worldwide security.

"Social Security is concerned with the capacity to support the traditional elements of language, culture, identity and cultural and religious traditions, in the limits of some acceptable development conditions."¹

Security analysis should be based on human security, because human individual is the basis of all social organization.²

¹ Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, statele și frica*, Second edition, translation from english by Vivia Săndulescu, Publisher Cartier, Chișinău, 2014, p. 31.

² http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/elemente_noi_in_studiul_securitatii_nationale.pdf

The subject of security, at any level, is the human being, who transcends all borders. In this case, what should be emphasized in security studies is precisely the individual security or, as some experts call it, human security.³

"Analysis of current dilemmas in world politics requires religious views to be taken seriously, and this understanding has gained wide credence throughout the discipline of international relations"⁴

Efforts are being made to investigate how "certain conceptions about religion influence foreign politics, or how they promote religious freedom as a fundamental human right; then are studied complex intersections between religion, identity, domestic and foreign policy."⁵

Involvement of people in solving mankind's is a current issue that needs to be reflected deeply. For instance the Conference of European Churches held on 7th and 8th March on theme "Churches together for human rights" in Helsinki, Finland.⁶

The conference was aimed to clarify the concept of human rights from a Christian perspective and were presented views on this concept of the Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant Churches.⁷

World Council of Churches Conference (General Council) issued in June 2013, a joint statement in which "Churches are called to continue to engage in building democratic civil society based on the law, social justice and human rights, including religious freedom".⁸

In 2013, besides the usual economic issues on the agenda at the World Economic Forum in Davos, world leaders discussed a number of controversial issues, called "X factors". Among these topics are improving cognitive capacities, hope prolonged life of the people and religion. The list of topics was conducted in partnership with editors of scientific journal *Nature* and includes factors that have the greatest potential to change the world and politics in the coming decade. In the context of which religion and conflict based on religious themes become an increasingly discussed topic in public debates about God and religion have become commonplace in Davos.

"Religion is more relevant now than it was ever" Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt said the leader of the Russian Hebrew community, for Associated Press.⁹

With the popularity affected by the economic crisis, the EU is looking for a bailout.

"Religious Authorities, help us with your social and spiritual contributions to rediscover the fascination of the future and to rebuild our European soul power", pleaded Herman Van Rompuy, devout Catholic, at the annual meeting of European leaders with representatives of religious.¹⁰

We must remember one unique thing, namely: Bulgarian Orthodox Church was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.¹¹

"Christianity is one of the largest European powers that EU has, and if it is lost," we will be condemned to erosion of the European spirit, "said European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek. He defended placing Christian symbols in public spaces. In a message recalled

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Diana Andersson Biro, *Teme centrale în politica mondială*, Polirom publisher, 2013, p. 282.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ Cf. ceceurope.org.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ Cf. www.oikoumene.org, Foreign news in brief – June 2013, "Porunca iubirii" Magazine, Agaton publisher

⁹ Cf. www.oikoumene.org, Foreign news in brief – February 2013, "Porunca iubirii" Magazine, Agaton publisher

¹⁰ Cf. <http://www.semneletimpului.ro/stiri/Religii-in-criza-invitate--sa-si-dea-mana--pentru-a-salva-Europa-10505.html>

¹¹ Cf. www.oikoumene.org, Foreign news in brief – March 2013, "Porunca iubirii" Magazine, Agaton publisher

that the "founding fathers of united Europe were active Christians". He continued: "At the same time, the question is whether Christian heritage is still valuable, if not just another historical tradition - respectable but useless? Let me be clear: a courageous witness of Christians, present also in politics - tolerant and open to others - is one of the greatest powers that we have. If we give it up, we will be condemned to erosion of the European spirit, digested of nationalism or atomization, and also of a growing sense of spiritual void – the disease of a world of excessive consumption ". He warned that the loss of values "could be more dangerous for Europe than the lack of capital or lack of political power."¹²

He also said that for centuries, Europe has developed a model in which "public authorities and religious authorities retain their own authority". But, Buzek insisted, there is "absolute need for cooperation between public authorities and religious ones in many areas, because cooperation is important to build together a fair and just society." I am convinced that we can not only save our faith, but with our attitude in a secular world, we, Christians, can be the salt of the earth and a light to every man."¹³

"Dialogue and cooperation between political and religious leaders are particularly important, as it is the dialogue between representatives of different religions and denominations, to reach a peaceful coexistence or cohabitation. Common problems call us to a common reflection and also to common action, for the common good, confesses His Beatitude Daniel of Romania."¹⁴

Despite differences of religion and culture, approach and motivation, in the face of suffering and humiliation of human dignity, churches, religions, States, international organizations and individuals have more common responsibility towards human life and towards protection of nature and the environment. Therefore, our true spiritual freedom is measured by the intensity of our love and solidarity towards people or nations in need.

Paradoxically, the secularisation of contemporary society calls for seeking holiness, joining it in peace and justice, responsibility and forgiveness, others' rights and our duties, because the source of holiness is brotherly love (different from passionate and possessive love), which has its roots in God, eternal friend and humanity's lawyer. A secularized society is gaining in terms of individual freedom, but it weakens communion with others in family and society. For these reasons, the new culture of coexistence must be rather a culture of healthy human relationships. "¹⁵

Nowadays, the Middle East Orthodox Patriarchate, Constantinople, Russia and also other countries have taken the initiative to promote interreligious dialogue at the level of religious leaders and experts in the field, to encourage education for peaceful coexistence and social cohesion. In this regard, His Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, through his efforts has greatly contributed to this."¹⁶

The Russian Patriarch Kirill, peace ministry has urged the US to abandon the attack on Syria. The Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church has also written to US President with the message to waive military attack on Syria."¹⁷

A special signal was the meeting of the representatives of 15 National Orthodox Churches, which have more than 227 million believers, who have officiated together at Christ

¹² Cf. The newsletter of Families Alliance of Romania, no. 176 from 31 January 2012; translation belongs to the publisher of the newsletter "Viața Cultelor"

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ Cf. The Conference of His Beatitude Daniel, The Patriarch of Romanian Orthodox Church, held at „Notre Dame“ cathedral from Strasbourg, 11 aprilie 2011

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ Cf. The speech of His Beatitude Patriarch Daniel, in the plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly

¹⁷ Cf. www.oikoumene.org, Foreign news in brief – September 2013, "Porunca iubirii" Magazine, Agaton publisher

the Savior Cathedral in Moscow, during the festivities marking the celebration of 1025 years from the Russian's Christianization. President Putin welcomed the delegates to a joint meeting in Kremlin. According to Inter Religion agency news, discussions were not confined to only religious matters but they also referred to current issues facing the international community.¹⁸

No fewer than 300 representatives of major religions and civil society from Sant'Egidio community, decided against religious terrorism which was declared a "blasphemy".

Participants at the 27th meeting of the UN community nicknamed ONU from Trastevere (a neighborhood in Rome) submitted a joint appeal to eradicate religious terrorism, deploring the phenomenon as "a contradiction of religion".¹⁹

Mission of the Church - a major security vector

"Evangelical ethics, aims at the transfiguration of life, its total renewal, not only changes in external attitudes or suppression of behavior that disturbs social order. In the chosen profession, in politics, in the daily conduct, relationships between people change. They convert coexistence into fraternal communion. The commandment of love "is the fulfilling of the law", not as a better and more effective law, not as an "addition" to the law, but as totalizing and "end" of the law, as an event through which all purpose of the law become reality and find fulfillment. "(Christos Yannaras" moral freedom ")

Each type of threat (challenge) has a psychological component, namely, a psychological effect. At psychosocial level, pastoral counseling done in Church, appears as a regulatory social mechanism and also a mechanism that reduces the negative influence of traumas, suffering and even social deviance. In the 1994's UN report, human security is defined by its purpose, to safeguard the vital essence of human lives, in the face of universal threats, towards human development on long term.

"The moral of the Church itself creates a social coexistence and a specific way of using the world, so a civilization, a universal attitude of life that could find its expression in the field of politics and economics," said Christos Yannaras, (the "moral freedom"), but, I would add, security too.

Church in its mission to educate the human person in the spirit of love of neighbor and enemy of society contribute to the stability and harmonization thus constituting an important vector of security.

The Church, in her attempt to make timeless divine message to people causing human freedom to embody Christian morality in collective conviviality of people, transforming the world in a release of passion, love, justice and communion, but also for managing the common good in the direction of improving living conditions, reducing arbitrary of autonomous structures, a fair distribution of goods, etc.

Acquiring happiness in the Church refers to achieving that state of mind full of peace and quiet, knowledge and wisdom, faith, hope and love that make the church a supportive environment for the fulfillment of the human person.

This happiness is based on interior resorts and also of a divine spirit, not on external factors which can disturb, can instigate, lead to revolt, and also to determine facts against moral law, to insecurity.

¹⁸ Cf. www.oikoumene.org, Foreign news in brief – July 2013, "Porunca iubirii" Magazine, Agaton publisher

¹⁹ Cf. <http://www.semneletimpului.ro/stirescurta/Reprezentanti-ai-religiilor-lumii-fac-apel-pentru--respingerea-terorismului-religios-12111.html>

The Church, through its philanthropic mission, essentially contributes to ensuring human security, understood as indispensable resource of everyday life that enables individuals and communities to freely perform their aspirations and ideals.

Material and spiritual aid, provides to those in poverty, in trouble and needs, represents a strong support in the security process, because degradation of living conditions, depreciation of citizen safety, economic imbalances and fear of tomorrow, surely induce a bad mood, influence the creation of a state of danger and may become potential sources or causes of social conflicts.

Church, by its supporting actions of people with problems (illness, lack of income, loneliness, etc.) from parishes from each village or town, constitutes a support in the protection and welfare of the people, perfecting thus the individual and social security process.

This paper is made and published under the aegis of the Research Institute for Quality of Life, Romanian Academy as a part of programme co-funded by the European Union within the Operational Sectorial Programme for Human Resources Development through the project for Pluri and interdisciplinary in doctoral and post-doctoral programmes Project Code: **POSDRU/159/1.5/S/141086**.

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INTERNATIONALIZATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION -THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION-

Maria Magdalena POPESCU,

Associate professor, "CAROL I" National Defense University,
popescu.maria@myunap.net

Abstract: *Globalization, a process that identifies itself with internationalization in an ever growing manner, is a process whose presence in day-to-day manifestations, from education and training to the multicultural labour force, has brought along new policies, new approaches and changes at all levels. As far as the Romanian higher education is concerned, a significant growth has been recorded for mobilities both with students and teachers, both for education and training as well as for job shadowing, vocational practice, share of expertise, teaching or research.*

Key words: *internationalization, higher education, curriculum, mobility, exchange*

We have been living in an ever changing world, where borders have been erased yet frontiers are still there, where centre is dissolved and dissolved into infinitesimal tiny particles while distances have become common spaces, where everybody befriends somebody and anybody, either within real tangible spaces or technologically mediated, via internet. Globalization has been coined as a term to cover all of the above mentioned facets while turned itself into a phenomenon and is still here to influence all areas ubiquously.

Background information

Whereas some see globalization as a phenomenon influencing economy and geo-politics, higher education has lately suffered changes under the umbrella of internationalization, a term that identifies itself, to a larger or lesser extent, with globalization. Trying to define internationalization, we will bring forth some approaches already documented by researchers-

1. The process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension in the target of providing higher education studies¹
2. A sum of processes, whose combined effect, be it planned or not is to ensure the international dimension of experiences in similar institutions and universities²
3. To UNESCO, this concept covers all types and ways to provide higher educational courses or educational services in which students find themselves in another country than the one offering the degree diploma.

In a way, internationalization is somehow catalized by globalization, yet, while globalization does a somehow smooth uniformization, internationalization within an academic space compensates by highlighting peculiarities of each cultural, economic and political environment³

Internationalization is thus a complex set of procedures, endeavours and steps taken to adapt curricula, to send teachers and students abroad on an exchange basis, to tailor programmes that would match the similar programmes anywhere in the world, to select students and make sure they know the language, to allot funds.

¹ Knight, J., Updating the definition of Internationalization, *International Higher Education*, 2003.

² Priscopie R., „Gaudeamus Igitur- challenges for the Romanian Higher Education system”.in *Review of management and economical engineering*, special issue, 7(5) 2009.

³ Knight, J. 2003- *op. cit.*

While an intrinsic two way link is created among nations both economically, socially, politically and culturally, mobility is the key term that makes globalization/internationalization characterize all- goods, services, people. Gaps are bridged either by products or by relations, interconnections are being made among humans and to their own benefit. When it comes to instruction within higher education, internationalization has fueled intensified mobility of ideas, students and academic staff and expanded wide arrays of collaboration and global dissemination of knowledge, introducing alternative aims, activities and actors engaged in common approaches, exchanges of common practices and ideas headed towards building a common set of skills needed on a multicultural labour market. As we can see, various terms have been given to refer to the same phenomenon- Thus, "cross border higher education" is the most frequently used term to call students and teachers outgoing and incoming mobilities, either for study or training.

Since the European policies have shaped four approaches into internationalization, at our country's level this pursuit consists in:

- promoting activities on teacher and student exchange
- developing skills, competencies, knowledge, attitudes and values in students and teachers
- creating a culture in support of perspectives and initiatives
- integrating an international/ intercultural dimension within the academia

Seen as such, the European dimension in education provided by the ERASMUS+ programs and other similar ones is a means to an end for understanding new cultures, for crossing borders within our own university with all our students, teachers and researchers towards reaching quality standards and reputation required by the new global paradigm, while preparing youth's integration on the global labour market.

Steps towards internationalization seen as outgoing mobility

It is not hard to write down recipes but neither easy, should we take into consideration that we, as a university promoting internationalization are at our very very beginning. To apply what others have done and documented as good practices again might not be difficult, yet we should not forget our specificities, our double subordination and the limitations imposed by security rules. Not laying all these aside, then we should reaffirm that by applying internationalization as change and improvement into our university we should highlight intercultural learning, inter-institutional cooperation and fair partnership, an academic balance in the envisaged cooperation regarding mutual respect and benefit.

Just like the International Association of Universities states into its program," nearly all higher education institutions worldwide are engaged in international activities and are seeking to expand them. Engaging with the world is now considered part of the very definition of quality in education and research."⁴

In a search to disseminate all the basic information that we have gathered so far since we started internationalizing our students' skills, this paper draws attention on the steps to be taken and important aspects to be considered when internationalization is brought about, as the concept has wide implications not only for those directly involved but also for the staff preparing the endeavour, for the sending and the receiving institution as well.

First of all, *at inter-institutional agreement level*, similarities of programmes have to be identified, in terms of curriculum and skills to be developed. The number of credits for each discipline is important as some disciplines can last for one or two terms with credits varying accordingly. Also, even though some disciplines may look similar, a thorough search has to be performed, to identify the description of the specificities of the subject matter, since details

⁴ <http://www.iau-aiu.net/>- International Association of Universities, retrieved at 09.02.2015

will give information over the competencies to be developed, competencies which have to be fairly identical in both exchange programmes. Once this has been done then the type of agreement has to be clarified in terms of common actions to be performed between the two universities in case, as well as the number of students and teachers that can benefit from this per each year. Types of common actions could include exchange of students, exchange of teachers and staff. Students can either travel abroad for training or study or even for internship –based volunteer experiences, while teachers can get mobilities for either teaching or job shadowing and also for training. Terms and duration for each case can be different, regulated by the Erasmus+ program guide in this case, while for similar types of international agreements these terms are agreed upon between the two universities at the beginning of the program settlement. (for cases with countries that are not part of the Erasmus+ program).

The next stage concerning the *academic preparations* vary from one university to another. In our university stages are not that many since we are at the beginning of the process and the number of students enrolled is not that high. When it comes to students, language test and specialized interview are to be performed for establishing who is the nominee for each allotted outgoing place. The language level is decisive as the language exam is the elimination step even before looking at specialized interview performance and at grades obtained in the previous semester. An online application is the next step, yet settling up the learning agreement follows as a sensitive issue. Why so? Attention is needed now with the clear description of objectives for each subject matter, as differences may arise at a closer look with a view to applying the post-mobility ECTS. If the "changes in mobility" section inside the learning agreement seems a mere preventive part inside the document, alterations are frequently made once the students arrive at the host university. With teachers things are far more easier: Once a project proposal for teaching some modules has been sent to the receiving university and it has also been agreed upon, the program a teacher unfolds is as similar to the one taken in one's home country- teaching and academic work eight hours a day, to be performed also in the agreed language – either the language of instruction of the modules where the guest teacher unfolds his classes or in the host country's national language. Attention must be paid at the end of mobility as well with transferring the credits for the agreed courses beforehand, provided that the student had passed all his/her exams satisfactorily.

What is important and should be mentioned is that similar processes apply both for the Erasmus+ mobilities program and for exchange agreements with countries that are not part of the program (Switzerland, USA, etc)

Internationalization seen as home process

Apart from seeing the importance, benefits and tangible outcomes of being part of the Erasmus+ program or having international exchange/ cooperation with other universities around the world, internationalization must be present and manifest itself at home as well, just the way globalization does not affect the host or neighbouring countries only, but our country and educational system as well.

In order to settle internationalization within home universities things do not differ too much from what we expect in others when seeking partnerships:

- Including into the curriculum comparative analysis content (international law) or regional specialized studies (european studies, intercultural management studies, intercultural communication studies, etc)
- Teaching modules or full programs into an international language so that incoming students irrespective of nationality should be able to come and attend, get knowledge and develop skills.
- If the first joint programmes, at the end of the '70 s used French, English and German as language of instruction, today English is most widely used. Thus, English has become a criterion per se in choosing mobilities, as barrier languages might hinder one get full credits from class attendance and examination- not all universities offer free language courses simultaneous to attending classes during the mobility. Preferring mobilities in English mainly, the multilinguistic and multicultural factors are affected, being kept at lower rates.⁵
- Creating a multicultural community both for teachers and students, that would cooperate and exchange ideas on forums, conference attendances and research projects unfolded in common, volunteer work to be done in joint company programs, and other related issues.

As serious motivation to help promote and build internationalization within one university the following are to be considered among other serious reasons brought by globalization :

- Interest in national security
- Maintaining economic competitiveness
- Human understanding among nations⁶
- Ethnic and religious diversity
- International trade influence over small businesses
- Variety of racial and ethnic components within the future work group
- Peaceful relations among nations⁷
- Political motivations (peace, stability, ideological influences)
- Competitive human resource development
- Added value to the academic teaching, learning, research and innovation
- Cultural and social reasons to shape individuals for an international and competitive labour market⁸

To measure the degree of internationalization within a university one should consider the number of teachers arrived from abroad and teachers hosted by others abroad, research activity (international projects, papers, conferences, PhD candidates from abroad or other innovative activities), while in terms of foreign languages- teaching and entrance examination tests should be considered along with other courses taught via foreign languages, academic partnership and strategic alliances, job placements abroad (acc. to a univ in France)

While the foreign students coming to study in our country are extremely low in number and the Romanians going abroad are higher in number compared to their incoming counterparts, steps have to be taken to build and implement internationalization in our universities as only by joint efforts can we stimulate competitiveness and raise

⁵ www.oecd.org- OECD statistics ,retrieved at 02.02.2015

⁶ Aigner J.S., Nelson P, Stimpfl J. R., *Internationalizing the university; making it work*- Springfield, CBIS Federal, 1992.

⁷ Scott R. A., *Campus Development in response to the challenges of internationalization*, Springfield, CBIS Federal, 1992.

⁸ Knight J- *A shared vision? Stakeholders perspectives on internationalization of higher education* , in Journal of studies in International education,1 spring, 1997.

quality. Starting with the 90s universities in Romania have undergone changes in curriculum and new subject matters have emerged to be able to attract foreign students and offer standards similar to the ones in the west; however, the process of internationalization is still slow.

Our university is set on a positive path with the programmes that differentiate ourselves and still bring a touch of specificity maintaining the common core yet, so that common disciplines can be found in case of exchange programmes. Due to the variety of foreign languages studied within our BA program, our students can break the pattern of the huge flow of students that prefer attending courses delivered in English. Due to our variety in languages taught, our students can attend programs abroad in Italian, French and German beside English, thus raising their chances of both getting more intercultural and multilingual skills and becoming more prepared for the international labour market.

Even though reluctant and having to cope with the reluctance of an incipient stage in internationalization, continuous efforts are being taken into raising the number of inter-institutional agreements and find ways to stimulate both teacher exchange and training as well as other types of cooperations like joint programmes, policies, research and innovation.

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ENGLISH AS AN INTERNATIONAL MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

Doina IVANOV,

Associate Professor, PhD., “Dimitrie Cantemir” Christian University,
Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Bucharest
e-mail: doina.ivanov@gmail.com

Abstract: Nowadays in the whole world more and more young people and adults are involved in the study of English. The interest in the learning of English has increased so much that English is now considered by many researchers to be an international language. In many instances it is a language of wider communication both among individuals from different countries and between individuals from one country. In this way, English is an international language in both a global and a local sense. Language teaching has always been subject to change, but the process of change has not resulted from the steady accumulation of knowledge about the most effective ways of teaching language: it has been more the product of changing fashion. The present paper proposes to provide readers with some information that inspires guides and encourages them to make their own contribution to teaching of English as an international means of communication.

Key words: EIL (English as an international language), ELT (English language teaching), CLT (Communicative language teaching), lingua franca, world language.

English as a world language

Motto:

“Nowadays we face a rapid development of science and technology and a continuous growth of cultural, economic and political relations between nations and humanity has difficulties in the assimilation of useful and necessary information. No way has yet been found to solve the problems in overcoming language barriers and of accelerated assimilation of scientific and technological achievements by either the traditional or modern methods of teaching. A new approach to the process of teaching and learning is, therefore, required if the world is to meet the needs of today and tomorrow”¹.

Today the English language has acquired the status of a *lingua franca* that is the language which has been internationally adopted for communication between people whose native languages are different from each other.

Why a language becomes a world language, although this is influenced by the number of speakers and users, has little to do with the number of people who speak it. It has to do with *who* those speakers are. Without a strong power-base, whether political, military, economic or cultural, no language can make progress as an international medium of communication. The need for a world language is particularly appreciated by the international academic and business communities, and it is in these contexts that the adoption of a single lingua franca is most in evidence. For example, a conversation over the Internet between physicists in Norway, France and India is practicable only if a common language is available. English has emerged as the medium of the world’s knowledge, especially in such areas as science and technology. And access to knowledge is the business of education.

Nowadays in the whole world more and more young people and adults are involved in the study of English. The interest in the learning of English has increased so much that English is now considered by many researchers to be an international language. In many instances it is a language of wider communication both among individuals from different

¹ Georgi, Lozanov, 1992. *Suggestology and Outlines of Suggestopedy*, Philadelphia: Gordon & Breach, p. 17.

countries and between individuals from one country. In this way, English is an international language in both a global and a local sense.

Defining an international language

For the first time English was defined as an international language by Smith L. who stated that an “*international language is one which is used by people of different nations to communicate with one another*”².

As an international language, English is used both in a global sense for international communication between countries and in a local sense as a language of wider communication within multilingual societies.

As English is an international language in a global sense, one of its primary functions is to enable speakers to share with others their ideas and culture.

An international language is by definition a language that belongs to all those who speak it and not to the few who acquire and use it from childhood.

One may wonder who is learning English. English is a required subject in many countries and school children have some exposure to it. Those who want to attain a high level of proficiency in English, often for exam and professional purposes, seek other means of learning, often in private institutes. Access to higher education in many countries is dependent on knowledge of English. Although it may not be the medium of instruction, accessing key information in a great variety of fields is often dependent on having reading ability in English.

One of the primary reasons for the spread of English today is because it has such a variety of specific purposes. Knowledge of English is necessary for accessing many discourses at global level from international relations to popular culture to academia.

Knowing another language means a chance to become educated, study abroad, get a job, emigrate, access technology or simply expand one’s cultural horizons. Nowadays, in a globalized world, language learning and, respectively, teaching has become vital to the everyday lives of millions of people.

Teacher-training programmes usually show trainees how to teach while too little attention is given to the need of thinking – before, during and after – about the process of teaching and implicitly, learning. Why is this kind of thinking so important for teachers? It is important because teachers should be reflective and always ask themselves: “How can I become the best teacher that I can be?”

Who is learning English?

As Sandra Lee Mc Kay says “*Today in classrooms around the world young people and adults are involved in the study of English. Indeed this interest in the learning of English has increased to such an extent that English is now considered by many to be an international language*”³.

English is used both among individuals from different countries and between individuals from one country and in this case English is the international language par excellence, in both a global and a local sense.

D. Graddol concluded that “the number of people using English as their second language would grow from 235 million to around 462 million during the next 50 years”⁴. In many countries English is a required subject in state and private schools and children learn this foreign language. Those school pupils who want to attain a high level of proficiency in English seek other means of learning in private programs to help them for exam and professional purposes. Access to higher education in many countries is dependent on

² Smith, L., 1976. *English as an International Auxiliary Language*, *RELC Journal*, 7/2: p. 38.

³ Sandra Lee, Mc Kay (2009): *Teaching English as an International Language*, OUP, p. 1.

⁴ Sandra Lee, Mc Kay (2009): *Teaching English as an International Language*, OUP, p. 1.

knowledge of English. Although it may not be the medium of instruction, accessing key information in a great variety of fields is often dependent on having reading ability in English. One of the primary reasons for the spread of English is that it has been in the right place at the right time. D. Crystal shows that “in the 17th and 18th centuries English was the language of the leading colonial nation – Britain. In the 18th and 19th centuries it was the language of the leader of the industrial revolution – also Britain. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries it was the language of the leading economic power – the USA. English emerged as a first-rank language in industries which affected all aspects of society – the press, advertising, broadcasting, motion pictures, sound recording, transport and communications”⁵.

English as an international language is not English for specific purposes in any narrow sense. Rather it is primarily because EIL is central to such a wide variety of specific purposes that it has gained global currency.

Communicative Language Teaching (CLT)

CLT is often viewed as the ideal methodology for English language teaching, and as the most productive approach. The history of English language teaching is usually described as if one method followed another. In 19th century grammar-translation was the main method in language teaching, and was followed in the 20th century by the direct method. Today the emphasis is put on communicative language teaching (CLT). Such historical accounts of language teaching reflect the history of language teaching in Inner Circle countries (Britain, Australia and North America). Grammar translation and audiolingualism are still used in countries outside de Inner Circle. The goal of CLT is to promote meaningful, appropriate language use.

Holliday⁶ contends that there are essentially two versions of CLT. The first one, which he terms the ‘weak version’, was developed largely in private institutes, either in Inner Circle countries or sponsored by Inner Circle countries in other countries. He calls the methodologies which comprise these version BANA methods. (BANA stands for Britain, Australia and North America). In this version of CLT, Holliday argues that “a high premium is placed on oral work and maximum student participation in group and pair work.”⁷ What he terms the ‘strong version’ was developed in public education systems either in primary and secondary schools or in universities in Inner Circle countries. He terms the methodologies which comprise this version TESP, standing for tertiary, secondary and primary. In the TESP version of CLT, the focus is on learning about how language works in discourse. Students carry out tasks which are designed to pose language problems that help them understand how a text is constructed. This version is considered to be communicative in the sense that students communicate with a text. They may work with one another to solve a language problem and use their mother tongue in talking about the text but must report their results in English. Holliday argues that “the strong version of CLT may be more applicable to a wider range of teaching contexts, particularly in Outer and Expanding Circle countries, where there are fewer resources and where students may not have the same instrumental purposes for learning English as students enrolled in private language institutes. However it is the weak version that is generally referred to when educators talk of CLT.”⁸

What has led to the widespread promotion of the weak version of CLT as the most productive approach for teaching English? Tollefson⁹ argues that the spread of English is linked to what he terms the ‘modernization theory’. According to this theory, “Western

⁵ Sandra Lee, Mc Kay (2009): *Teaching English as an International Language*, OUP, p. 1.

⁶ A., Holliday (1994): *Appropriate Methodology and Social Context*. Cambridge: CUP, p. 60.

⁷ A., Holliday (1994): *Appropriate Methodology and Social Context*. Cambridge: CUP, p. 60.

⁸ A., Holliday (1994): *Appropriate Methodology and Social Context*. Cambridge: CUP, p. 60.

⁹ J., W., Tollefson. (1991) *Planning Language, Planning Inequality*. London: Longman, p. 97.

societies provide the most effective model for underdeveloped societies attempting to reproduce the achievements of industrialization.”¹⁰ When applied to ELT, in modernization theory, “Western experts are viewed as repositories of knowledge and skills that pass them on to elites who will run modernized institutions”¹¹. The spread of CLT is a clear example of modernization theory.

The so-called experts from Inner Circle developed countries have passed on their expertise regarding language teaching methodology to help modernize English language teaching in ‘underdeveloped’ countries. CLT has spread not only because of the promotion of the approach by western specialists but also because educators in these countries have advocated its adoption. In many countries the ministries of education released new guidelines for the study of foreign languages in junior and senior high schools. Teachers were required to promote speaking and listening skills as a way of developing the communicative language ability of the students. Furthermore teachers were to strive to adopt CLT methods in their classrooms.

Thus, in a variety of countries educational leaders have chosen to attempt to implement the use of CLT in the belief that this is the most modern and productive way to teach English.

The communicative approach or Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) have become “umbrella” terms to describe learning sequences which aim to improve the students’ ability to communicate, in contrast to teaching which is aimed more at learning bits of language just because they exist and without focusing on their use in communication.

An important factor that has clearly contributed to the spread of CLT is textbooks. Many current ELT textbooks published in Inner Circle countries encourage activities which support the weak version of CLT in that a premium is placed on oral activities in which students interact with classmates. The purpose of the textbooks is to introduce communicative activities and to involve students in learning activities by means of such devices as role plays, discussion topics and games. The textbooks specify the way to undertake the activities which create an expectation among students and teachers that this is the correct way. This can also reflect a CLT methodology, particularly when the Ministry of Education has encouraged this approach.

Natural and instructional settings

Natural acquisition contexts are those in which the learner is exposed to the language at work or in social interaction or in a school with native speakers of the target language. The instruction is directed toward native speakers rather than toward learners of the language. The learning takes place in interaction with peers as well as through instruction from the teacher. In structure-based instructional environments, the language is taught to a group of second or foreign language learners. The focus is on the language itself; the students learn the vocabulary and grammatical rules of the target language. The classroom is the only contact with the target language. The learners’ goal may be to pass an examination rather than to use the language for daily communicative interaction beyond the classroom.

Communicative, content-based, and task-based instructional environments involve learners whose goal is learning the language itself, the emphasis is on interaction, conversation and language use, rather than on learning about the language.

Questions in the classroom

Teachers’ questioning behaviour has been the focus of research in second language classroom. Questions are fundamental in engaging learners in interaction and in exploring how much they understand. There are two types of questions: display and referential ones. Display

¹⁰ J., W., Tollefson. (1991) *Planning Language, Planning Inequality*. London: Longman, p. 97.

¹¹ J., W., Tollefson. (1991) *Planning Language, Planning Inequality*. London: Longman, p. 97.

questions lead to short, simple responses that require little cognitive effort on the part of the learner. The referential/genuine questions require more cognitive processing and generate more complex answers.

Another distinction similar to the above mentioned one is that between open and closed questions. Closed questions lead to simple one-word responses, making them quick and easy to respond to. Open questions lead to longer and more complex answers, including explanation and reasoning.

Wait time

‘Wait time’ is the amount of time the teacher pauses after having asked a question to give the learner time to respond. There are teachers who give learners no more than two seconds before they direct the question to another learner. Others repeat or paraphrase the question several times rather than silently wait for the learner to formulate a response. These rapid question/answer patterns occur in audio-lingual classes and in communicative instruction too. Good teachers should find the right balance between asking the question and the time for the answer, so that learners provide full answers, expand their ideas and learn more successfully. The learners should be encouraged to develop their fluency, accuracy and comprehension skills in the process of language learning.

Six proposals for classroom teaching

Research has investigated the relationships between teaching and learning. Many theories have been proposed for the best way to learn a second language in the classroom. Some researchers proposed the following items for the foreign language classrooms:

1. Get it right from the beginning
2. Just listen and read
3. Let's talk
4. Two for one
5. Teach what is teachable
6. Get it right in the end

Get it right from the beginning is the proposal that characterizes second and foreign language instruction. Grammar translation approach is widespread and useful for the intensive study of grammar and vocabulary. Teachers focus on correctness in the earliest stages of second language learning and learners are encouraged to develop accuracy before fluency.

Just listen and read is the proposal based on the hypothesis that language acquisition takes place when learners are exposed to comprehensible input through listening and reading. Learners can make considerable progress if they have sustained exposure to language they understand. Comprehension-based learning is an excellent way to begin learning; active listening and reading for meaning are valuable components of classroom teachers' pedagogical practices.

Let's talk is the proposal that emphasizes the importance of access to both comprehensible input and conversational interactions with teachers and other students. In task-based instruction learners are working together to accomplish a particular goal, they engage in interaction and express and clarify their intentions, thoughts, opinions, etc. Conversational interaction promotes second language development and corrective feedback plays a crucial role in helping learners make connections between form and meaning.

Two for one is the approach to language teaching referred to as content-based instruction, in which learners acquire a second language as they study subject matter taught in that language. It is implemented in a great variety of instructional settings including bilingual education and the ‘content and language-integrated learning’ programmes in Europe. The expectation of this approach is that students can get ‘two for one’, learning the subject matter content and the language at the same time. Content-based instruction has many advantages. It increases the amount of time for learners to be exposed to the new language. It creates the need to communicate, motivating students to acquire language in order to understand the content.

Teach what is teachable is a view that suggests that while some features of the language can be taught successfully at various points in the learners’ development, other features develop according to the learners’ internal schedule. Instruction should have a natural developmental course. Teachers should assess the learners’ developmental level and teach what would naturally come next.

Get it right in the end is a view that emphasizes the form-focused instruction. Its supporters consider that the language features (pronunciation, vocabulary, grammar) are acquired naturally if learners have adequate exposure to the language and a motivation to learn. The proponents consider that meaning-focused instruction is crucial for language learning and learners will do better if they also have access to some form-focused instruction. Proponents of ‘Get it right in the end’ argue that it is sometimes necessary to draw learners’ attention to their errors and to focus on certain linguistic points. Teachers should look for the right moment to create increased awareness on the part of the learner – ideally, at a time when the learner is motivated to say something and wants to say it as clearly and correctly as possible. The classroom activities should be built primarily on creating opportunities for students to express and understand meaningful language. Form-focused instruction and corrective feedback are essential for learners’ continued growth and development. Teachers should find the balance between meaning-based and form-focused activities and take into account the characteristics of the learners: age, prior educational experiences, motivation and goals.

Summary

Research and studies offer support for the view that form-focused instruction and corrective feedback provided within the context of communicative and content-based programmes are more effective in promoting second language learning than programmes that are limited to an exclusive emphasis on comprehension, fluency or accuracy alone. Second language teachers should provide guided, form-focused instructions and corrective feedback in certain circumstances. For example, teachers should not hesitate to correct persistent errors that learners seem not to notice without focused attention. They should also point out how a particular structure in a learner’s first language differs from the target language. Through continuing research and experience, teachers will find the most effective way for second language teaching and learning.

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Acest material este realizat în cadrul proiectului cu titlul:
**Rețea transnațională de management integrat al cercetării doctorale
și postdoctorale inteligente în domeniile „Științe militare”,
„Securitate și informații” și „Ordine publică și siguranță națională” –
program de formare continuă a cercetătorilor de elită – „SmartSPODAS”**

coț nanțat din: FONDUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN

prin:
Programul Operațional Sectorial Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013

Editor:
Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I”

Data publicării: aprilie 2015

Conținutul acestui material nu reprezintă în mod obligatoriu poziția oficială
a Uniunii Europene sau a Guvernului României

Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I”
Șos Panduri nr. 68-72, sector 5, 050622 București
Telefon: 021 319 48 82 Fax: 021 319 48 84
E-mail: secretariat@spodas.ro Website:
www.spodas.ro

“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING HOUSE
(Highly appreciated publishing house within “Military science, intelligence and public order”
of Titles, Diploma and University Certificates Awards National Council)

ISSN 2285-8318
ISSN-L 2285-8318



PROCEEDINGS



Proiect cofinanțat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operațional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007 – 2013
“Investește în oameni!”

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY „CAROL I”
SECURITY AND DEFENSE FACULTY DOCTORAL SCHOOL

PROCEEDINGS THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE “STRATEGIES XXI”

STRATEGIC CHANGES IN SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Volume 1

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April 2 - 3, 2015
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