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THE COMPLEX AND DYNAMIC NATURE OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS ENGAGED IN HYBRID WAR

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Abstract: The hybrid war foresees complex interdependencies of a historical, political, social, cultural and economic nature, which also generates a total commitment of forces and means of the most diverse, sometimes spontaneously configured for actions and effects that converge. The diversity of participants in the hybrid actions is also due to the evolution of social media technologies, making them an omnipresent tool with a full impact on every aspect of everyday life. The balance between state and non-state actors is favorably inclined towards an irregular, non-institutionalized component that develops non-transparently in geometric progression and becomes a successful alternative to current intra-state conflicts. The disguise of involvement in the hybrid war reduces the boundary between the state and non-state concepts and becomes a goal that has led the powerful states with very well-trained and equipped armies to set up atypical forces with special character and missions.

Keywords: global security, hybrid environment, diversity technologies, comprehensive engagement.

Introduction

Security has the syntax around which multiple definitions and approaches are developed, with their origins in Latin securitas-atis and it means - to be sheltered from any danger; the feeling of confidence and quiet that one gives to the absence of any danger.

In accordance with the UN strategy, there is security when the states appreciate that the danger of an armed attack, political pressures or economic coercion is null, and thus the conditions of ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state in general are guaranteed. In a statement accepted by NATO, security means "the status achieved when information, material, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, and against unauthorized loss and disclosure."

In the last period of time, the need for individual safety reflected collectively has led to the emergence of certain concepts derived from the concept of security such as political, military, social, public, community, economic, democratic, food, sanitary, informational, etc. At the same time, comparisons in the theory and practice of international relations have developed syntaxes such as international, global, collective, common, regional, national, multidimensional security, concepts used in relation to both the international and the national environment.

The multitude of events with negative effects on the stability of societies, such as terrorist attacks, illegal migration, abandoning international coalitions (see Brexit), cancels major differences between the two national and international plans, and causes the individual a state of insecurity, in the inability to define its own security need.

The current global security architecture highlights the essential features of the geopolitical environment in which it develops, that is: the desire of the various states to maintain or impose their influence at regional or world level, the transfer to the multipolar international system or to occupy decisive positions in security structures.

1. New phenomena of conflicts

The evolution of the security definition from the classical formula specific to the military component to a whole range of areas such as human, social, political, economic, ecological, technological and other causes a degree of difficulty in shaping the profile of future conflicts.

We can see that although we are witnessing a permanent reassessment of the security environment, the opinions of the specialists, however divided, remain bound to two dominant currents: inter-state conflict and interethnic conflict. This may be a strong argument for the very use of war-to-conflict terminology in defining security specifications.

The joining of interests, especially economic, organizational interdependence, the rhetoric of great powers, alliances and strategic partnerships at this beginning of the century, are solid considerations that lead us to the theory and the belief that state-state wars will in the future have a degree of probability very low.

We believe that in order to penetrate the phenomenon called war or conflict it is necessary to become aware of your own values, but especially of your own vulnerabilities.

A tendency in configuring and defining the physiognomy of conflicts is that they "come out of the tactical space, from the realm of the struggle and acquire new political, geopolitical, informational and media valences."

As a result, identifying the lessons identified as specific to cycles of significant security events, we identify the complexity of conflicts.

From our point of view this complexity is characterized by:
- hiring non-state actors;
- using all means in an armed confrontation;
- Integrated battle space with variable, discontinuous and often changing dimensions;
- promptness in organization and much innovation;
- different forms of aggression (terrorism, crime, cyber attacks, intimidation or interference);
- assuring the effects by determining the remote blows;
- the lack of identity of the conjugated actors in conflict;
- high resource consumption and unconditional acceptance of aid;
- the non-existence or non-observance of some employment rules;
- failure to comply with the decisions of the world institutions/organizations.

Thus, we must admit and bear in mind that the planning, organization and conduct of conflicts are in the orbit of the global evolution of the war, and they constantly assume a cycle of adaptation, determining the ways of military response that can not be constant either.

So, the latest generation of complex armed conflicts can be integrated into the concept of hybrid warfare. We consider it to be a complex historical, political, social, cultural, economic interdependence that determines both effects and solutions.

We believe that the term hybrid is used because it is both vague and complex enough to mean anything, but certainly the Trojan horse, the decisive vector, is generated by increased flexibility in decision-making, the freedom of action of the forces, accompanied by the technological factor.

2. State and non-state actors participating in the hybrid war

Man is the most flexible, adaptable, and most important part of a system, but also the most vulnerable to influences that can affect his behavior and performance. Behavior and performance are cited because they are the main cause of most accidents.

We can certainly claim, the human factor used as the physical and cognitive property of a subject or social behavior, in the context of our research, to be strongly influenced by the irregularity of hybrid actions. The diversity/diversification of the interests and causes of the current conflicts has also led to the development of new ways and solutions to achieve the proposed goal.

As the human factor could not be missed from this equation, one can find a diversity in terms of the hybrids of the war.

The new valences of the war in general and of the hybrid war in particular are decisive factors in designing and transforming the confrontations between state, suprastate or sub-state belligerents. Hybrid war, in our opinion, is a real challenge for the classical models of organizing, training and employing the human resource in the engagement space. No matter how technologically advanced and complex it is, the human resource remains the fundamental factor that influences the achievement of the effects.

The concept of a human resource in the case of a classical war can be integrated into an age gap starting from the age of the majority and up to the age close to the retirement threshold, the physiological limits.

We are entitled to ask the following question: can this theory apply to hybrid warfare? I appreciate that this would not be justified, due to the influence created by the diversity of the actions applied in such a confrontation. In this respect, examples are the examples of minors' actions used in some cases for transport or information gathering missions and the employment of elderly people in confidence-building actions for potential victims. All this leads us to the first conclusion that the typology and limits of the use of hybrid forces can not be related to a specific recipe, the effect sought, by any means being the only constant.

Another argument for supporting the diversity and diversification of the participants in the hybrid war is based on the evolution of social media technologies. They have become a ubiquitous contemporary instrument and have a profound impact on every aspect of our everyday life.

The multiplication of the number, but also of the type of actors that can relate through social media technologies as well as the access to military technology and know-how leads to globalization and implicitly to the uncontrolled participation of the human resource in low-intensity military operations, attacks or rebellions.

Summing up in this respect, in the view of the authors of the publication "Unrestricted Wars", the wars of the future can take place "anywhere, permanently, with all means".

As a result, we believe that the state has now lost its monopoly of waging, either interstate or intra-state wars. Moreover, they have been concerned to achieve their targets, in particular by supporting individual actors or representing certain structures / organizations and their use as a proxy.

The situation created by the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Afghanistan, where the rule of law has become incapable of managing phenomena, has determined the opportunity to develop armed microstructures developed on ethnic, religious or ideological grounds. In the same context, through the dissolution of the regular armed forces, these formations were composed of former soldiers whose experience specific to the use of armaments and equipment outweighed.

It can be noticed that Africa stands by the existence of military factions that have emerged and maintained assets supported by the financial support of countless other state and non-state actors and who have endowed themselves with the black market.

Thus, terrorist organizations have evolved continuously, starting from isolated cells in military groups, which, thanks to technological developments in communications, manage to control territories and regions, and can design and employ forces at appreciable distances.

Privacy 24 through 7 is influenced by the media. Blogs, social sites, sharing sites all operate as platforms that allow individuals and groups the opportunity to get diverse effects generated by political, economic, military-strategic and even terrorist interests.

New technologies have facilitated the simplification and development of the recruitment phenomenon via the Internet. Thus, with funding, recruitment and coordination, radicalization of followers has become possible in the online environment and their capabilities have reached their global reach.

In this context, of global connectivity, the actors of the hybrid war can no longer be recognized as direct participants in a conflict, and so may be anyone, civilians and activists, state or

non-state actors. Thus, we can say that the online environment has successfully funded, coordinated and recruited the followers. They later became, individually or in a group of non-state actions, globally capable.

It can be seen that the balance between state and non-state actors is clearly inclined towards the non-institutionalized-irregular component that develops uncontrollably in geometric progression and which becomes a successful alternative in current intra-state conflicts.

William Lind associates these transformations with the definitive loss of the state monopoly of wars. This conclusion develops the reality that the vast majority of current military conflicts are intrastate, where government forces are fighting without success against irregularities.

At the same time, the demographic explosion in the third world, urbanization, migration, increasing income gaps, and the limited possibility of controlling metropolises of tens of millions of people, make the cities of the future a paradise for "urban guerrillas", the emergence of ideological-radical groups, criminal organizations.

They can be extremely effective in conducting violent actions on an urban ground, against public order forces, the army, or special forces. The convergence and fusion of terrorism with international crime is an expanding phenomenon with the potential to create additional pressure on the defense, security and public order forces of states, poorly prepared to control an enemy with organizational structure and mixed action.

A relevant example of the evolution of irregular formations is the FARC - The Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People's Army of Colombia. It started from the form of guerrilla movement and managed to develop and act as an army with some 13,800 members.

This reveals that regardless of the nature and origin of non-state combatants, they achieve an organizational system and military hierarchy in order to achieve their goals.

It is important to note that the disastrous effects generated by the two world wars, the cold war and the phenomenon of globalization have led to the adoption of international laws whereby the use of force is only allowed for self-defense, and with the approval The UN Security Council.

And yet states must react and they diversify their capabilities of action both from the structural point of view and from the endowment with technique and weaponry, but without much leaving the sphere and typology of the armed forces. We can see that progress is notable in this respect, if we take into consideration, for example, only forces and means of intell. These largely solve the problem of prevention, and there remains solutions to the action itself.

Propaganda, along with other types of forces and means, plays an important role in the economy of the actors involved in the hybrid war (HW). Analyzing (the phenomenon) the participatory composition within HW from the perspective of propaganda, the beach of the subjects involved takes over the mass characteristic.

In a war, irrespective of the form of conflict, there are always two groups, a friend - enemy, one's own forces - an opponent. The study of belligerents involved in hybrid warfare must be carried out in a balanced manner towards both camps involved. By knowing who your opponent is, you will be able to anticipate, prevent and prepare action. By knowing our own possibilities, we will be able to organize, train and respond effectively.

The asymmetry of the forces involved in the hybrid raid is distancing itself as an enigmatic feature of this form of conflict, and we can exemplify the paramilitary forces, state armed forces or international organizations in this regard by engaging nationalist groups. Disguising engagement is a goal that has prompted powerful states with well-trained and equipped armies to structure their atypical forces with special character and missions, thus avoiding high costs.

The use of special forces, civilians, uniformed soldiers without distinctive signs means denying the involvement of their own forces and thus accepting credible denial.

In these circumstances, we can see that HW becomes by its characteristics a war with a global amplitude and consequently the regular armed forces have to adapt their systems of organization, training and action for such a war/conflict.

Regarding the limitation of operations within RH Lawrence Freedman states as follows: "avoiding escalation beyond a certain threshold, directly or unexpectedly agreed by the parties, in order to avoid a long war, thus limiting the operations over time, of the area of operations and avoiding expanding the battle beyond the established area, also limiting the intensity of the fight".

Deterrent factors such as: the acceptance and observance of international law established by the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the interconnection of both economies and political institutions, have as a benchmark the European Union, dictate a unique option for states, namely to avoid war as a way of obtaining advantages, no matter what kind.

Also, the accelerated evolution of communication and communication systems has resulted in military-type action limitations, given that the population as a target audience becomes a central actor in peace and war decisions or resource allocation.

Thus, although states are bound by the international system, society, and economic ties, not to have conventional state interstate wars, the non - conventional side of the conflict remains and is perceived as the "gray area of non - conventional operations".

In view of the above, one can find that the US Army defines non-conventional operations as "Operations driven by, with or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, insurgency or conventional military operation."

The tendency of states to use, in peacetime and wartime, the whole range of non-conventional means could be noticed even during the civil war in Spain, where the USSR, Germany and Italy felt their participation through soldiers and agents infiltrated into the bodies of volunteers and international communist brigades. At the same time, history proves that during the Second World War the state actors used non-conventional tactics.

At the same time, history proves that during the Second World War the state actors used non-conventional tactics. Thus, irregular forces such as the Resistance Movement and the Russian partisans in the areas of operations in France and the USSR, located in numerical and technical inferiority, in a hostile zone, combined the characteristics of conventional army action, special forces and intelligence services. In this respect, some military researchers claim that the Soviet partisans were the first organization to operate hybrids.

Nowadays, private military organizations, volunteer bodies, "tourists", are another vector of exploitation of non-conventional capabilities, perpetuating anonymity in the face of international opinion. All these non - conventional operations are duplicated and supported by political, diplomatic and economic actions.

They identify with a hardly definable range of constraints, and the challenge and development of a conflict is easy because operations can be carried either under the "false flag" or through the proxy, thus perpetuating the anonymity of the true belligerents. Equally, the globalization of actors is also validated by economic, political and cultural activities, by major powers such as Russia, USA, China, in terms of "undeclared war".

Some of the partial conclusions resulting from the previous analysis would be detached by:
- the tendency to reduce the use of armed regular forces in triggering and developing current conflicts;
- setting up and using non-state forces and structures;
- the globalization of the active and therefore implicit space of the body of the belligerents;
- mixing the gray area with green men;
- the use of border minorities and beyond.

Conclusions

In the present geopolitical conjuncture, where we have on the one hand the evolution of globalization and a more and more socio-economic integration, and on the other hand the beginning of a dangerous historical "amnesia" in which the demons of nationalism and xenophobia determine us to ask "Is this hybrid war another type of war?" And if so, are we for the first time in nearly 200

years, when we can stand outside the Clauswitzian paradigm according to which the nature of the war is perennial, only the character of the war is changing?

War as a social phenomenon remained of interest for generations of military historians who, in every historical age, wanted to understand this disaster either to prepare the next war or to try to normalize new methods of counteracting the methods used by enemy.

The war closely followed the international climate and states' stance on the breadth of relations between them. The existence of the power balance has generally favored conflicts limited in space and use of force because the equivalences of military and economic potential made it unrealistic to annihilate the opponent and pursue a victory of compromise.

Taking into consideration the statement of the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz that: "when we analyse war more than any other field, we must start from the analysis of the whole because more than in any other field the whole and the part must be thought together" this article aimed to highlight the characteristics of the hybrid war within the new provisions of the evolving global security environment.

Current international circumstances require new rules on the security dimension, a conclusion that has also provoked us in this work to support the need to redefine the rules, regardless of their nature.

The lessons learned as well as the evolution of the current security events lead us to the conclusion that the new types of conflicts have acquired a major complexity characterized mainly by:

- different forms of violence (terrorism, cyber attacks, clutter by intimidation or interference);
- Simultaneous pursuit of objectives of strategic importance, pursuing major social effects;
- the non-existence or non-observance of employment rules, as well as non-compliance with the decisions of institutions and organizations with global valences.

In this context, global connectivity RH actors can no longer be recognized as direct participants in a conflict, and so may be anyone, civilians, state or non-state actors, and even military. Moreover, it can be said that the hybrid threat belongs to any potential adversary, encompassing state, non-state or terrorist actors, with skills either validated or possible to engage at the same time conventional and non-conventional in order to achieve the objectives.

In our assessment, the two pillars, state and non-state, stand out as permanent benchmarks of the analysis, and we conclude that these actors position themselves on a balance that is favorably inclined towards the irregular side - the non-insignificant tendency of a hidden evolution.

As a conclusion, the asymmetry of the committed forces stands out as an obvious feature of the hybrid war and the exemplification comes from the use of nationalist groups, paramilitary groups, state armed forces, or simply individuals with disguised interventions.

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REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY' DYNAMICS, ESSENTIAL ELEMENT FOR GEOPOLITICAL REPOSITIONING OF MAIN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

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Abstract: It has become a certainty that the world is in the process of strengthening a multi-polar system in which the United States will continue to be a key factor in the dynamics of regional and global security. In this context, Russia has changed its strategy with regard NATO and, in particular, with regard US, the actions of Russian leaders being marked by the vision of "confrontation" as a priority in the decision-making process and the planning, organization and implementation of foreign, defense and security policy.

The development of regional power poles and the strengthening of different perceptions of security risks continue to generate heated polemics on the principles and mode of action to ensure a peaceful global security climate at the regional and global levels, reinforcing the perception of the imperative need for permanent strategic readjustment and thus a new geopolitical map of the world.

Keywords: multi-polar system, dynamics of security, consensus, state actors, non-state actors, strategic readjustment, geopolitical map.

1. The role of globalization in change of relationships between countries on the regional and global level

Although the globalization process is a long-standing process and sometimes a controversial topic, it continues to play an important role in the development of the world's states and their relations, facilitating access to a free economic market and new sources of information, communication and free movement and unprecedented mobility.

In the context in which this process of globalization is based on a number of geographic, temporal and organizational factors which underpin the achievement of interdependencies, some of them such as large migrations, the spread of religions and specific elements of some types of culture, and the influence of regional and world power poles have generated and continue to generate global effects, in support of the idea that the process of globalization has a cyclical historical form[1].

Unfortunately, in the same context, we are also witnessing the globalization of vulnerabilities, risks, threats, dangers and aggressions whose carriers are not just state actors, but also non-state actors, organizations, groups or even individuals organized in international networks which are very difficult to control. The international community is facing regional or global developments that are highly unpredictable and therefore very difficult to manage and require a proactive stance in identifying the most appropriate solutions to address efficiently and effectively the challenges because of the speed of the changes that capture the majority of international actors.

In this context, an extensive process for reconfiguring of political, economic, military and security relations in the international system and strengthening multipolarity has been started, mainly due to the effects and impact of these emerging global challenges faced by the states, such

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[1] Stelian Teodorescu, PhD thesis *The multinational intelligence in substantiation of decision-making process for planing of operations on the NATO level,* 2016, p.16.

as economic, social and political crises, migration, ethnic, religious and cultural conflicts, all of which are still underway in a historical cyclical form and generating security instability in a regional and international context[2].

It should not be forgotten that the dynamics of the process of globalization offer additional channels for expressing and accelerating the development of state power at regional and global level as well as alternative ways of challenging the attitude of some international actors trying to exploit existing vulnerabilities in some states. Thus, we can point out that the process of globalization provides opportunities that various state and non-state actors can use to support their interests through other approaches than classical armed confrontation.

Unfortunately, state or non-state entities seek to achieve the surprise at a strategic level through a diverse range of specific techniques, aspect which has generated the primary task of quantifying the individual and combined impacts of all these challenges, making a decisive contribution to repositioning the international actors. At present, more than at any other time, most states in the world make special efforts to avoid strategic surprise, seeking to anticipate the evolution and impact of the challenges they face and which are amplified by a number of other factors relating to the need for reformation and modernization of regional and global organizations.

In the same time with the definition of this new international security environment and the remodeling of the geopolitical environment, a new geopolitical map of the world is emerging, the main international actors being repositioned according to the new geographic, economic, socio-cultural and ideological realities, as well as the new entities emerging such as the Middle East, South-East Europe, the Western Balkans, South-Central Europe, Central Asia, South and South-East Asia, the Caucasus or the Black Sea region, each of which has an important role to play in building the new world security architecture.

In this context, the analysis of the global regional security environment reveals the following security challenges, which also concern states and the entire international community:

▪ The unresolved conflicts, the intensification of the autonomous tendency or the failure of the new state formulas, the instability of some states or regions. Delaying the identification of viable solutions on the long-term for cases of reminiscences of conflicting history favors the worsening of political, economic, military and social instability. Moreover, the emergence of social incidents can easily degenerate into open conflicts that transform states or regions into ideal refugees for organized crime groups and radical ethnic or religious extremist groups, these areas favoring the planning and launching of criminal and terrorist operations with global risk potential.

▪ Developing of transnational organized crime networks, insurgent groups and terrorism[3]. The phenomenon is manifested mainly due to the decrease of state authority, easy access to firearms and illegal trafficking, illegal migration and, last but not least, due to the connections of criminal networks in the spheres of power.

▪ Illegal migration flows and the impact of demographic changes[4]. Prolonged instability generates permanent flows of clandestine migrants that increase the pressure on countries or regions that enjoy relative stability, confronting them with major economic and social risks: imbalances in the domestic labor market, the development of organized crime networks, xenophobic feelings among the population, creation of a favorable environment for terrorist actions, etc.

▪ Impact of environmental degradation[5]. Rapid growth of the energy resource needs has led to fierce competition among international players with a particular potential in this area and exploiting vulnerabilities resulting from unbalanced consumption that exceeds the rate of recovery of these natural resources.

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[2] Ibidem, p. 17.
[3] Divya Srikanth, *Non-traditional security threats in the 21st century: a review,* Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore, International Journal of Development and Conflict, p. 61://www.ijdc.org.in/ uploads/1/7/5/7/17570463/2014junearticle4.pdf.
[4] Ibidem, p. 65.
[5] Ibidem, p. 64.

▪ Cyber confrontations and their impact on security[6]. The number of cyber attacks put in place by state and non-state actors is on the rise, constituting a credible threat to state security, mainly due to the relative anonymity of those underlying this type of attack, the absence of explicit legislation in this area, the high possibility of escalation, and especially because of the low predictability, which leads to the impossibility of anticipating, quantifying and controlling the consequences of a cyber attack.

The analyzes regarding the issue of international relations often mention the considerable transformations that have taken place in the regional and global security environment over the past decades. Accelerating economic integration processes at regional and international level, the growing influence of non-state actors as well as changes in the military and technological environment of information have contributed to the emergence of *"hybrid threats"[7]*, non-traditional threats with a level of unpredictability very high for their states and their defense structures, especially with regard to the protection of civilians, but also of the armed forces.

As a consequence, we can safely appreciate that the current dynamic of regional and global security highlights a very high level of complexity of risks and threats, but above all the effects on the functioning of state actors. The persistence of military conflicts in some areas and the regional ambitions of some international actors, the emergence of new regional power vectors overlap with the role of non-state entities such as radical-extremist groups, terrorist groups or those with autonomy or independence ambitions. In this context, the identification and quantification of relations between state actors and non-state actors is an ample and extremely important process for assessing security dynamics at national, regional and international level.

2. Repositioning of the main international actors, essential element for the generation of a new geopolitics map of the world

Radical claims and decisions adopted at state or non-state actors, acidic statements, lack of efficiency and effectiveness in solving of the international divergences due to the lack of consensus within international organizations, and the context created by the new threats facing the world have led to the definition of a new regional and global security environment with a high level of uncertainty.

Faced with the new threats facing mankind, being these classical, asymmetric or hybrid, the UN, the main guarantor of peace and social progress under the Charter, has serious difficulties in achieving a common position, especially at the level of the Security Council where some of the main international actors have the standing and veto power for decision-making.

The current security context, marked by a wide range of interests, is a favorable environment for the simultaneous occurrence of unforeseen events in different geographical areas, generating uncertainty and confusion, but also the need of an integrated approach for solving of the conflict occurred.

As a consequence, the evolution of international relations specific to the current period calls for a new approach to the regional and global security situation, and it is necessary for all states to rethink foreign policy priorities according to the roles of states in inter-national affairs, to increase responsibility for what is happening in the world and initiating relationships by using the opportunities identified in accordance with both national interests and regional and global interests.

Thus, referring to the United States of America *(US),* we can point out that the outcome and effects of the last electoral process have fueled analyzes and forecasts of changes in international politics that could change the "political game" at the planetary level. As expected, the new Washington administration has quickly reacted to the problems faced by the international community, taking the first steps towards revising its geopolitical priorities. An eloquent argument

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[6] Ibidem, p. 66.
[7] Stelian Teodorescu, PhD thesis *"The multinational intelligence in substantiation of decision-making process for planing of operations on the NATO level",* 2016, p. 20.

in this respect is to include in the area of US security concerns not only terrorist threats but also geopolitical implications generated by the new attitude tackled by various regional and international power grids proving rapid repositioning and irreversible in building international relations.

The need to modify national security views has most likely been clearly generated by the level of unpredictability of Russia's geopolitical decisions, the duplicate game of some states according to interests, the threat of the North Korean regime, and last but not least, by the uncertainty that marks the evolution of the general situation in the Middle East, all of which have negative effects on the long-term for geopolitical position of the states.

As a result, through approaches and involvement in resolving security conflicts, the US confirms that they have chosen to maintain their contribution to maintaining power balances in those areas marked by instability, but by implementing rational strategies that involve decision-making based on communication, negotiation and diplomacy, involvement and accountability of allies and other partner states and their material support in their actions and, last but not least, the assumption of minimal risks by avoiding direct military involvement and choosing this decision variant as the last available option[8].

It is important to underline the importance of the benefits of such an approach at a multinational, integrated and interoperable alliance level for efficient and effective management of security risks and threats, the effects of cross-border correlation multiplying the chances of success compared to singular policies uncalibrated in a broader participatory context. That is why it can be appreciated that a unitary approach to the regional and international security issue is more effective and, without making a strict delimitation, analyzes in this area can be elaborated on a common political, economic, social and security level.

Since the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, but continued with those in Wales and Poland, relations between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Alliance and, implicitly, the US have tightened and returned to persistent and systematic rhetoric from contradictory positions. Thus, in the last year, with the intrinsic methods adapted to the current period, the antagonism between NATO and Russia has seen a new hybrid face, in which the informational component of the media war has grown in a perfect combination with the classical security threats *(aggressive and revisionist behavior of Russia)* developed with means specific to the epoch, including cyber ones.

Moscow's involvement in electoral processes in other countries, the funding of extremist parties in Europe through various companies and offshore funds, support for subversive corruption and the exploitation of political, social and economic vulnerabilities in fragile states, support the implementation of autonomous ideas and plans, last but not least, the reactions and responses to military exercises and the presence in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea areas of Alliance confirm the repositioning of Moscow on a geopolitical plane, the dispute between the Russian leaders and the NATO states, and implicitly with the US, reaching a very special stage characterized by a strong symbolism[9].

The perception of Russian leaders that the expansion and development of NATO's military deterrent potential has the purpose the encircling of Russia, combined with elements of geographical insecurity, and especially with the fear of losing control over the world's dependence on oil and gas resources, have been generating the reposition of Russian state on a geopolitical level.

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[8] Ana Stan, *Stratfor Analysis: The US could manage the crises in Ukraine and Iraq and in the Black Sea region,* http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/analiza-stratfor-sua-putea-gestiona-crizele-ucraina-irak-zona-marii-negre-1_ 54072d500d133766 a8d3f3d1/ index.html

[9] Robert Lupițu, *NATO-Russia Information War Analysis: The Step of Disappointing Myths and Interpreting Reality. NATO: "No other partner has benefited from a similar status to that of Russia." Russian Federation: "The hostile attitude of NATO has missed immense opportunities for cooperation",* 02.06.2015, http:// www.caleaeuropeana.ro/razboiul-informational-nato-rusia-etapa-dezavuarii-miturilor-si-a-interpretarii-realitatii-nato-niciun-alt-partener-nu-a-beneficiat-de-un-statut-similar-cu-cel-al-rusiei-federati/.

This situation explains Moscow's need to create states or buffer zones near natural borders[10] by repositioning in a partnership relationship with certain states, or by exploiting the vulnerabilities of unstable and fragile states, and creating very easy-to-control enclave environments and maintaining influence significant in some regions, despite the size of the necessary military and financial efforts.

However, we must not overlook the fact that all these efforts of Russia are being made at a difficult time for Russia's economy that is in a significant decline, based mainly on the exploitation and exploitation of the oil and gas resources of whose prices are low. Moreover, Russia faces the effects of the penalties imposed after the annexation of the Crimea, the imposition of the international community embargo imposed on Iran, the increase in the shale gas exploitation in the US, and the possible increase in the amount of energy produced at nuclear power plants in Japan after the devastation earthquake from Fukushima.

From a military point of view, although Russia is a great land power, without natural barriers, the security of the Russian state can be affected by the vulnerabilities generated by the lack of those strong points of the maritime powers protected by large water springs. In such a context, under the pretext of defending Russian ethnic rights[11] in Ukraine, Russia invaded and occupied the Crimean Peninsula, which assured control of the Dnieper's mouths, the main objective being the control of the Black Sea space by the Sevastopol Naval Base and the development of military, naval and air military capabilities in the region.

For dominating and controlling the entire Black Sea commercial, shipping, air and military traffic[12], Moscow also repositioned itself in relations with Turkey, another important regional, international actor, as well as a NATO member state[13].

In this context, it is significant to note that in December 2014 Russia announced its abandonment of the South Stream gas pipeline project to Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary in favor of the Turkish Stream project, which involves the construction of a pipeline gas from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea, Russian energy group Gazprom intending to finalize work on this new project by the end of 2019. Moreover, natural gas deliveries to Turkey increased by 48% in September 2017[14].

Turkey also exploits the effects of security developments in the Black Sea region, pursuing its own political, economic, commercial and military interests.

Despite its status as a NATO member state and its aspirations to join the European Union, Turkey continues to develop relations with Russia, demonstrating the development of similar policies and strategies to those of Moscow in assuming the role of regional leader historical view, but also the rejection of the intensification of the political involvement and the military presence of some states that are not riparian to the Black Sea.

Synthesizing, we can appreciate that Turkey's favorable position in relation to Gazprom regarding the acquisition of natural gas and Gazprom intentions to consider the revival of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project, as well as Turkey's intention to acquire the S-400 anti-ballistic system from Russia[15], confirms a geopolitical context in the Black Sea area with a constantly evolving, increasingly tense and increasing level of uncertainty for the international security environment.

Another important player is China whose strategic security interests are closely linked to the achievement of superiority or even military supremacy by developing military capabilities that by

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[10] Alexandru Cristian, *Russia and the European Union – a geopolitical and geostrategic dilemma,* Bulletin of „Carol I" National Defence University, p.111.

[11] Ibidem, p. 111.

[12] Petre Munteanu, *Russia is preparing "to occupy" the Black Sea,* 28.01.2015*,* https://www.rumaniamilitary.ro/rusia-se-pregateste-sa-ocupe-marea-neagra.

[13] Constantin Crânganu, *Russia: Approaching Twilight (geopolitical),* 29.02.2016, Contributors.ro.

[14] Cristian Soare*, Turkey and the double game between relations with Russia and interests with Ukraine,* http://www.curierulnational.ro/Extern/2017-10-11/Turcia+si+jocul+dublu+intre+relatiile+cu+Rusia+si+interesele.

[15] Cristian Soare*, Turkey and the double game between relations with Russia and interests with Ukraine,* http://www.curierulnational.ro/Extern/2017-10-11/Turcia+si+jocul+dublu+intre+relatiile+cu+Rusia+si+interesele.

controlling and monitoring areas of interest *(eg. the Persian Gulf, the Hormuz Strait, the Bengal Gulf, or Malacca Strait)* and shipping lines, are primarily intended to prevent foreclosure of access to energy resources in the event of a major international conflict. In this context, it is important to underline that Chinese leaders consider vital access to oil and gas resources as a vital factor, describing this dependence as a factor with a huge destabilizing potential and with a difficult to quantify and controlled effects *(according to estimates, "oil needs for consumption in China will increase from 75 million barrels per day in 2004 to 120 million barrels in 2025")*[16].

In addition to developing its military potential, China's intention to develop and strengthen its influence, control and economic superiority in various regions of the world is becoming more and more important, one of the priorities being the maritime line between the Middle East and the South China Sea. The main reason for this is the volume of trade *("approximately 50% of world trade")* and the size of the annual maritime transit *("about 41,000 vessels")* in the South China Sea[17], which could generate a favorable framework for decision-making and total control China's share of transit rights for vessels from other countries in the region *(Japan or South Korea)* or other states. China can thus have a means to put pressure on other states whose trade and supply needs for oil and gas depend on maritime transport. Such a way to control the work of the South China Sea corresponds to the geostrategic doctrine *"The First Island of the Defense Chain"* advanced by General Liu Huaqing[18] in 1990, according to which, in order to ensure its security, China must control the whole region between Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. The imposition of supremacy in the South China Sea and other adjacent areas is closely linked to the need for energy resurfacing, which is extremely important for China at geopolitical level and, implicitly, closely linked to relations with Russia, but also on relations with other neighboring countries, the size of such alliances or partnerships, ensuring for China the access to energy resources in Central Asia and the Middle East *(eg. the Shanghai Cooperation Organization).*

Iran is another international actor who plays an important role in the Middle East, the Caspian region and Central Asia. In partnership with another important state of the world, Iran can offer the possibility of controlling the Persian Gulf and the Caspian region. As a result, in view of increasing Russia's influence in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean areas, Russian leaders consider it important to work with Iran as a regional power through which it can project its political and military power in the Middle East, but also to protect the economic interests in the field of exploitation and distribution of energy resources.

In the context of consolidating this unprecedented multi-polar world and experiencing rigorous Brexit and increasing autonomist trends maturity tests, the European Union *(EU)* is proving readiness for communication and dialogue with all these main actors, even if there is a weak political to finance the common military capabilities and intelligence[19] needed to be perceived as an important player in geopolitical developments. However, the perception of this quality is still supported by the attitude of the EU member states, most of them NATO members, to reaffirm and support the importance and value of the transatlantic partnership that creates the favorable framework for the partners to be more effective in addressing the global challenges of the Middle East, Asia, China and Russia.

It is essential to make sure that the challenges of ensuring the needs of oil and gas resources and of ensuring the energy security of EU Member States will largely depend on the increase in these needs in the context of ever-increasing global competition, all these being exploited by

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[16] *Geopolitical developments in crises and conflicts (former Yugoslav space, Middle East, Southeast Asia),* http://www.scrigroup.com/istorie-politica/stiinte-politice/EVOLUTII-GEOPOLITICE-IN-SPATII82316.php.

[17] *Geopolitical developments in crises and conflicts (former Yugoslav space, Middle East, Southeast Asia),* http://www.scrigroup.com/istorie-politica/stiinte-politice/EVOLUTII-GEOPOLITICE-IN-SPATII82316.php.

[18] Liu Huaqing *(October 1916 - January 14, 2011),* general in the People's Liberation People's Army, served as commander of the Naval Forces during 1982-1988, being considered as one of those who made a special contribution to the modernization of this categories of forces.

[19] Joseph Fitsanakis, *German spy officials dismiss calls to create European intelligence agency, 06.10.2017,* https://intelnews.org/2017/10/06/01-2191/.

Russia, which wants to develop a greater dependence of Europe on Russian exploitation and distribution capabilities.

Conclusions

Nowadays, the realities of this environment, characterized by the development of a global and multi-polar world, proves, more than ever, the imperative necessity of connecting all the participants in the play of globalization, an essential element for the management of the political, social, economic, those on defense and security. It is clear that some international actors agree to the new context, but to others they are afraid of both the generated negative effects and the accelerated, unpredictable, and often irreversible changes, the main argument in this sense being the perception of increasingly accentuated that many states are excluded from this game of globalization.

As a consequence, it can no longer be ignored that the current challenge is to design the future by setting specific long-term objectives, and decisions and attention must also be channeled to support those vulnerable countries that have remained outside the globalization phenomenon, the current primordial interest being to meet the future through clear visions in an ever-evolving global context in which no state can cope with such challenges alone.

The benefits of such a global strategy can only be specific to a positive-play game in which all state or non-state actors gain, with the main aim being to control risks and threats and, implicitly, to create a safer world. Thus, pooling information and experience and encouraging widespread communication, negotiation and diplomacy about ideas, actions and options is the best way to advance within joint projects at regional and international level.

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BALANCE OF POWER AFTER UKRAINE CRISIS

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Abstract: Based on the balance of power and balance of threats theories, the present research studies the security policies of a set of European Union Member States: Poland, Baltic countries and Germany. What influence has the occupation of Crimea and hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine had on the foreign and security policies of those countries? The research is aimed at revealing that the sense of threat forces countries to concentrate on their defense capabilities; on the one hand, to strengthen their military capacities and, on the other hand, to tighten alliances with other countries. States have such alternative, choose to balance the source of threat and not to bandwagon bigger countries. The given theory has been verified on the example of Baltic countries and Poland.

Based on the offensive realism assumptions, the research also analyses national security policy and military modernization of the Russian Federation. Unlike postmodern Europe, Russian political elite thinks and acts according to realism categories. NATO and EU extension towards its borders is perceived as the threat to national interests. It is ready to use military force for defending its interests.

At the end of the research, we discuss the changes underway in internal and foreign policy of Germany since the start of the Ukrainian crisis. Despite economic interdependence, Germany has supported imposing of sanctions on Russia. Threats coming from Russia has forced Berlin to give up economic benefits.

Keywords: balance of power, balance of threat, national security, bandwagon.

Introduction

The given paper reflects the new international reality that was formed after the occupation of Crimea, support to separatism in Eastern Ukraine by the Russian Federation and the following military actions. Russia launched the hybrid war against Ukraine after the government changed in Kiev in 2013. Reason of the conflict was the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. Russian leaders publicly opposed NATO extension at Russian borders; while in this case, it was not about military cooperation or extension of the European Union. The Association Agreement covered economic, political and cultural cooperation of Ukraine with the European Union. Russia perceived the Association Agreement as loosing Ukraine from its influence. Due to that, Russia conducted annexation of Crimea and initiated the hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine for stopping the given process.

Russia's neighbour countries which are also EU members are deeply concerned with the situation created in Ukraine. The paper is aimed at determining the logic of behavior after the crisis in Ukraine of the following countries: Poland, Baltic countries and Germany.

For the analysis of the situation, I will use theoretical approach of Realism, in particular, use of Balance of Power and Balance of Threat theories. According to these theories, states are unitary actors which at a minimum, seek their own preservation and a maximum drive for universal domination. In anarchic systems, states tend to achieve their goals in two ways: firstly, by increasing military capacities and economic development through the ways of domestic politics; and, secondly, by conducting such a foreign policy that will enable the country to become member

of alliances, to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliances or weaken and shrink opposing one.[1] In structural Balance of Power theory, balancing and bandwagoning are defined solely by capabilities. Balancing is alignment with the weaker side, bandwagoning means to choose the stronger[2].

According to Hans Morgenthau, the balance of power refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality.[3] In the international system, balance of power is used by the states for their security reasons. Generally, when we use the term balance of power in international politics we consider military power.[4] The theory has many supporters and critics. This theory is frequently criticized because it is considered rather vague. It is also relevant, in our opinion that the United States President Woodrow Wilson criticized balance of power theory as he thought that when put into practice caused wars and disassembling of nations. States can try to balance power unilaterally by developing armament or by forming alliances with other countries[5]. Therefore, balance of power does not necessarily mean maintaining peace, because states balance power not to preserve peace, but to preserve their independency.[6]

Stephen M. Walt, author of balance of threat theory, proves that states unite to balance not only the powerful, but also against those who they consider a threat. For example, states may balance by allying with other strong states, if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons[7].

According to balance of power theory states increase their power and join alliances in order to balance the most powerful country in the system. Logically, when states balance the most powerful they are allying the weaker states.[8]

The main difference between these two theories is that balance of threat theory proves that states balance those from which they feel threat; it is not necessary that the most aggressive country is also the most powerful. Power does not disappear during the balancing threat, it is added by other factors such as geographic proximity, offensive power and offensive intentions.[9]

In order to verify above mentioned theories, I will formulate these two hypotheses:

1. After the crisis in Ukraine, EU member countries bordering Russia (Poland and the Baltics) have begun to enhance their defence and security systems, while NATO deployed additional armed forces in Eastern Europe.

2. German foreign policy becomes more oriented on balancing Russia and starts empowering its defence and security capabilities.

1. Response of Poland

Poland is the European state, which borders Russia, at the latter's Kaliningrad exclave; Poland also borders Belarus, a close Russian ally. These borders are heavily militarized, and have seen many large-scale military exercises.[10]

In November 2014, Poland published a new national security strategy. The document reflects Poland's foreign security priorities. According the strategy, security of Europe will be determined by four main factors: NATO, European Union, US strategic presence on the European continent and relations with Russia. In difference with the 2007 year strategy, Poland sees the

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[1] K.N. Waltz, *Theory of international politics*. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, p 118.
[2] Stephen M. Walt, *Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia*, International Organization, Vol.42, No. 2. 1988. p. 279.
[3] Michael J. Sheehan, *The Balance of Power*, Routledge 2000, p 2004.
[4] Rondeli, Alexander, *International relations*, Nekeri 2006, p. 143.
[5] Joseph. S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*. Harvard University 2007, p. 60.
[6] Ibidem, p. 60.
[7] Stephen M. Walt, *Alliance Formation and Balance of World Power*, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1985, p.9.
[8] Joseph. S. Nye, Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History,* Harvard University 2007, p. 65.
[9] Stephen M. Walt, *Alliance Formation and Balance of World Power*, International Security, Vol. 9. No. 4. 1985, p. 9-12.
[10] Andrew Somerville, Ian Kearns and Malcolm Chalmers, Poland, NATO and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe"; https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/poland-nato-and-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-europe, accessed on 25.10.2017.

regional security more from realistic prism. In the previous strategy, the possibility of conflict was considered "low". But 2014 strategy foresees the Ukraine lesson and points out directly: In the neighbourhood of Poland, there is a risk of regional and local conflicts which could engage the country indirectly or directly. Moreover, Poland is not free from forms of political pressure which uses military arguments. In its closest vicinity, there is a large concentration of military potentials, also in offensive posture.[11]

State's military security has been in the focus of government before the crisis in Ukraine. The possible agreement about the deployment of American anti-airstrike systems in Poland was aggressively criticized and threatened by Russia. The former president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev has said that in exchange they would deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.[12] The Russian Deputy Chief of Staff General Anatoly Nogovitsyn warned Poland that it could become a target for a nuclear strike.[13]

The Defence Minister wants to increase the size of the Polish armed forces, starting with creating three new brigades for territorial defence on its eastern border. "For over 200 years we have not had a 100,000-strong army," - he said, - "I believe that in effect the Polish army should comprise of 150,000 soldiers. This is the minimum which is necessary to respond to military threats."[14]

Poland Ministry of Defence has a plan of technical modernization of the military forces, designed for the 2013-2022 time horizon. The purpose of the plan is to increase operational capabilities of military forces; to strengthen military forces' abilities to fulfil national and international tasks better. The total budget of this project is about 37 billion US dollars.[15]

Annual defence spending has increased by nearly 20% to reach a zł38.3bn (US$10.3bn) high in 2015, equivalent to 2.27% of GDP. In part, this was because Poland paid the final tranche of zł5.35bn (US$1.4bn) for F-16 aircraft deliveries. From 2016, spending is meant to remain at 2% of GDP, because of an update made to the modernisation act after the defence-spending pledge agreed at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales.[16] In addition, in 2014, simultaneously with the modernization process all the state military enterprises have been united under one organization (Polish Armaments Group).

Threats from Russia[17] force Poland to pay more attention to military security, to intensify the process of modernization. Also it is worth to mention that Poland was one of the countries which was strengthening its security forces even before the Ukraine crisis. Country tried to balance Russia's increasing influence in the region since 2008. Poland made its military forces more compatible to NATO; formed territorial defensive forces and engaged its citizens more actively in the process of state defence.

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[11] Polish national security strategy, available at: https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dok/NSS_RP.pdf. p. 20, accessed on 25.10.2017.

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[16] The Military Balance 2016, IISS, Routledge, p. 68.

[17] Douglas Ernst, Vladimir Putin's Russia threatens Poland with hidden 'hybrid war,' senior general says, available at https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/25/putins-russia-threatens-poland-hidden-hybrid-war-g/accessed on 12.11.2017.

2. Challenges of Baltic States

After the breakdown of Soviet Union when the Baltic States – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia gained independence, they managed to integrate in Euro-Atlantic organizations. They joined NATO and EU together in 2004. All of them are small countries. There is big disproportion between Russia and three Baltic States in terms of military capabilities. It is not surprising that they are concerned about Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Also, in my opinion, it is possible for Russia to use ethnical Russians who live in those countries. In case of hybrid war, Russia has opportunity to divide society inside and provoke destabilization locally. This assumption is based on the ethnical picture that is in Baltic countries. Population of Latvia is 1.9 million people, among them Latvian are 61.1%, Russian 25.6%, Belarusian 3.4% and others.[18] Population of Estonia is 1.2 million with ethnical groups: Estonian (official) 68.7%, Russian 29.6%, and others[19]. And Lithuania has population about 2.9 million people, among them 5.8 % are Russians.[20] In recent years, we have witnessed how Russia had used Russian speaking minorities in Eastern and South Ukrainian regions to weaken Ukrainian state and halt its integration to NATO and EU. Presumably Russia can impel separatism in Baltic countries among the Russian speaking minorities.

After gaining independence, Baltic States chose to balance Russia and joined NATO – one of the world's most powerful military and political alliance. Some of the members of this alliance exceed Russia with their military, political and economic strength. Military budget of United States is 8 times larger than that of Russia. For example, in 2016, USA's military expenditure was 611 billion US dollars, while Russia's military expenditure was 69.2 billion US dollars.[21] Also, according to the World Bank, in the list of world's top ten economies there are three EU members: Germany, France and Italy and number one is United States in this list. Russia is not in the top ten list. [22]

According to the study conducted by American analysts from Rand Corporation, Russia can totally occupy Baltic States in about 60 hours. The ratio between the military forces of three Baltic States and Russia's western military district gives this negative outcome. Since Russia's invasion of Crimea, other NATO countries, including the United States, have rotated forces through the Baltics, but these have typically been in battalion strength or smaller — hardly enough to defend the republics against a plausible Russian attack.[23]

At the end of 2014, Lithuania has created special unit for response to hybrid threats. "The situation in the region has changed", General Tamosaitis said. "And we need to counter these emerging threats, this new kind of hybrid war"[24]. Baltic States realize their difficult geopolitical circumstances after the Ukraine conflict and they have decided to increase the defence budget. In March 2014, Latvia and Lithuania announced their intention to raise defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2020, from 2014 levels of around 0.7%, respectively 0.9% of GDP. 2015 Latvian defence budget was 12% higher than 2014 levels, while Lithuania raised 2015 spending by just under one-third in its draft budgetary legislation.[25] In 2015, Lithuania has reinstated compulsory military

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[18] Latvia, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lg.html, accessed on 11.11.2017.

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[21] SIPR yearbook 2017, Oxford University Press, p. 328.

[22] Alex Gray, The world's 10 biggest economies in 2017, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/worlds-biggest-economies-in-2017/ accessed on 10.11.2017.

[23] David A. Shlapak, Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank. available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html, accessed on 15.10.2017.

[24] Rick Lyman. Ukraine Crisis in Mind, Lithuania Establishes a Rapid Reaction Force. available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/world/europe/lithuania-assembles-a-force-as-it-readies-for-whatever-russia-may-bring.html?_r=0, accessed on 05/07/2016.

[25] Military balance 2016, Routledge, p. 60.

service. Ministry of Defence of Lithuania has purchased from Germany 21 units of PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers; order for Grom MANPADs should be completed by 2021. Lithuania and Latvia reached an agreement 2015 to jointly pursue a new air-defence system. [26]

In 2015, military forces of Latvia acquired anti-tank systems; also they received from British army 123 units of armoured vehicles. The purchase of new air-surveillance radars in October 2015 was seen as a step towards modernising vital capabilities to assist wider NATO operations in the region.[27]

According to the budget of Estonian army, a large proportion of investment in 2016 will go towards the procurement of CV90 armoured vehicles from the Netherlands.[28]

Analysing Baltic States geography, demography, and military potential, it is crucial for these small countries to acquire defensive arms. They need to have anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, so that they could resist and slow down the invasion of adversary, before NATO could mobilize and support.

Baltic States were encouraged to increase their military budget after Russia's invasion in Ukraine and the rapid improvement of its military potential. Baltic States not only increased their military budget, but also created new structures for hybrid warfare. They have more intensive military trainings with NATO forces, where dominant power is still USA. All three countries are increasing their military techniques by acquiring more and more from different European countries.

3.   Has Ostpolitik Ended?

With the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, the country gradually developed into Europe's most powerful economy and influential state. Germany plays very important role on the European continent. According to the World Bank, Germany is the first most powerful economy in Europe and the fourth in the world[29]. Still, it is behind France and UK by means of military power[30]. Despite that, it is undoubted that Germany is a great power with increasing influence in Europe and in the world. After the USA, Germany is the only country with the potential to balance Russia on European continent. One of the architects of western policy towards Ukrainian crisis is Germany; Germany's approach towards Russia was shared by the US Administration. Their interests coincided in the given case. As it is known, Germany has been against military interference with Ukrainian conflict, but supported economic sanctions. Also, Germany opposed to supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. Minsk Talks showed Germany's leading role in the mediation process.[31]

Public opinion research have shown that 67% of German population believes that Putin's Russia is not a reliable partner at international level, while in 2012 such opinion was expressed only by 41% of German population. The reason for such change of public opinion could be Russian annexation of Crimea, fuelling the civil war in eastern Ukraine and military operation in Syria. In addition, the majority of German population negatively assesses the fact that Germany's energy sector depends on Russian energy resources.[32]

Ukrainian crisis and the reaction of the West to it have divided German political, business, cultural and academic societies into two parts. One group supports Putin and tries to justify his

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[26] Military balance 2016. Routledge, p. 116.
[27] Military balance 2016 P. Routledge, p. 114.
[28] Military balance 2016, Routledge, p. 91.
[29] Alex Gray, *The world's 10 biggest economies in 2017*, available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/03/worlds-biggest-economies-in-2017/ accessed on 10.11.2017.
[30] SIPR yearbook 2017, Oxford University Press, p. 328.
[31] Liana Fix, *Has Germany Led the West's Response toward Russia*, available at http://www.aicgs.org/publication/has-germany-led-the-wests-response-toward-russia/, accessed on 11.11.2017.
[32] Jacek Kucharczyk, Agnieszka Łada, Gabriele Schöler, Łukasz Wenerski, *Frayed Partnership, German public opinion on Russia,* 2016. available at http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/userupload/EZ Frayed_Partnership_2016_ENG.pdf, accessed on 16.10.2017.

actions by the mistakes made by West. In 2014, representatives of the "Pro-Putin group" published the article – „Another war in Europe? Not in our name!" In the article, they called on German government and parliament not to isolate Putin's Russia from Europe and to recognize its legitimate interests in the former Soviet countries. They especially criticized media and accused them in being biased and covering events unilaterally.[33]

In response to Putin's supporters, part of German civic society (academic and journalistic societies, activists) has published an open letter - Secure Peace, Do Not Reward Expansionism. The letter clearly states that the overwhelming majority of true experts agree that there is a clear aggressor and a clear victim in Russia's War on Ukraine. Russia cannot be regarded as a "victim."[34] It speaks to German society about Putin's unfulfilled promises: withdrawal of forces from Georgia and Moldova. Moscow never fulfilled the agreement's crucial provision, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Germany proposed a Modernization Partnership to Russia only a few weeks later.[35] The given group supports the sanctions against Russia.

Despite the differences in opinion in Germany, German government has supported sanctions against Russian Federation. Empiric researches confirm that the violation of international law norms by Russia, annexation of Crimea, conducting hybrid war, has changed the public opinion in Germany. Despite Kremlin's strong information campaign to represent Kiev's new government as radical nationalists, people negatively assess Russia's role in the Ukrainian crisis. The majority of German population also supports Chancellor Angela Merkel's policy towards Russia. 44% of the respondents believe that imposing of sanctions and diplomatic efforts against Russia are the correct approach.[36]

The opinion of German society on Russia, as a source of threat is also interesting. In 2016, 56% of respondents believed that Russia is of no threat for Germany. In addition, in case of attack by Russia on the Alliance members, they did not support the possible sending of German soldiers for protecting the allies. 57% of German population was against military assistance by Germany in case of attack by Russia on Poland and Baltic countries. Only 31% of Germans believe that Germany must protect NATO partners in case of attack.[37]

Does Russian aggression in Ukraine and its empowerment force Germany to pay more attention to the security of itself and eastern European countries? Actually, as export-oriented country it must be concerned with the security conditions created around the European Union.

I think that the crisis within the European Union, threats coming from the southern and eastern borders of the EU force Germany to think about empowerment of its military security forces. It is just the matter of time. Until 2014, it would be hard to believe that Germany would have supported sanctions against Russia, but now it is a fact.

By strengthening security in the eastern direction, Germany would further empower the EU and its own role in the Union. The events underway around the EU: the crisis in Ukraine, civil war in Syria and Iraq, flow of refugees, Euro-zone crisis, Brexit, and isolationist signals from United States - all these factors in the future may force Berlin to start thinking about strengthening its hard

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[33] Wieder Krieg in Europa? Nicht in unserem Namen! available at http://www.zeit.de/politik/2014-12/aufruf-russland-dialog accessed on 15.10.2017.

[34] Paul Roderick Gregory, *The Battle For German Public Opinion: The Russia/Ukraine Narrative*, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/12/15/the-battle-for-german-public-opinion-the-russiaukraine-narrative/#14e0f3f6794a, accessed on 15/10/2017.

[35] *Securing Peace Instead of Rewarding Expansion*, available at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/securing-peace-instead-rewarding-expansion. accessed on 21.10.2017.

[36] Jacek Kucharczyk, Agnieszka Łada, Gabriele Schöler, Łukasz Wenerski, *Frayed Partnership, German public opinion on Russia*, 2016. available at http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_Frayed _Partnership _2016_ENG.pdf, accessed on 16.10.2017.

[37] Jacek Kucharczyk, Agnieszka Łada, Gabriele Schöler, Łukasz Wenerski, *Frayed Partnership, German public opinion on Russia*, 2016. available at http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/user_upload/EZ_Frayed_Partnership 2016_ENG.pdf, accessed on 16.10.2017.

power. In my opinion, the best way of going so is the formation of European army, with the main function to defend EU member states. Defence Minister of Germany Ursula von der Leyen already mentioned about the possibility of creating an European army several times in recent years. In a foreign policy conference in Brussels, in 2015, she declared her conviction that a European army or a European defence union can be created as a logical consequence of European integration. [38] Very recently newly elected French president Emmanuel Macron called for EU army and shared defence budget. [39]

Despite these statements, currently, there is no common decision about the EU army among the member states. The ongoing crisis in Europe could be the moment, when Berlin can actively work for strengthening its own military forces that might become the essential part of unified European defence and security system. Germany's interests are tightly interconnected with the future of the European Union. The road that Germany will choose will be decisive for the development of the newer history of Europe.

4. Focus on Russia

The Russian Federation's foreign policy during the last several years was directed against NATO enlargement. In parallel, Moscow attempted to use economic ties with EU countries and to enhance the economic situation in Russia. Russia attempted to do so by negotiating with some EU countries and proposing different energy projects. On the one hand, Russia tried to sustain profitable economic ties with the EU countries, to attract investments and new technologies necessary for processing energy carriers and on the other hand, after the 2008 Russian- Georgian war, they started rapidly modernizing the armed forces. One of the main directions of modernization is the structural change of armed forces; from the Soviet mass mobilization system to the well-equipped, effective, mobile, contractual army.[40] Army was divided into four parts; Eastern direction – responsible for China direction; Central direction – responsible for Central Asia direction; South Caucasus direction and Western direction – directed at NATO forces. Military personnel were decreased from 1 million to 800,000. Change from mandatory military service to professional army is being implemented gradually.[41]

Russia responded to the EU's sanctions with sanctions. Changed defence concept in 2014 and the national security strategy in 2015. Strategy emphasizes that Russia's independent policy results in dissatisfaction of the United States and its western partners. Russia assesses the international situation as the competition between global actors for global resources, during which different sides try to control transportation routes and to utilize natural resources. It is also stressed in the strategy that in parallel with this, build-ups are underway in Russia's neighbouring countries, including attack weapons.[42]

The new strategy, just as the previous one, defines NATO extension as the threat to Russia. The West is accused of supporting state coup in Ukraine. It is also concerned with the existence of the US military biological labs in its surrounding countries.[43]

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[38] Valentina Pop, *German Defense Minister Supports Calls for EU Army*, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/german-defence-minister-supports-calls-for-eu-army-1426865423, accessed on 12.11.2017.

[39] Ben Kentish, *Emmanuel Macron calls for EU army and shared defence budget*, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/emmanuel-emmanuel-macron-eu-army-joint-defence-budget-french-president-nato-britain-brexit-russia-a7968346.html, accessed on 12.11.2017.

[40] Новая армия России, available at http://militera.lib.ru/science/0/pdf/sb_new-army.pdf, p. 10, accessed on 22.10.2017.

[41] Новая военная реформа россии, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP2-2011_military_rus.pdf accessed on 10/10/2017.

[42] Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации, available at http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/l8iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf accessed on 11.11.2017.

[43] Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации, available at http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/l8iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf accessed on 11.11.2017.

Geopolitical model of the European Union and the new geopolitical model of the Eurasian Union come into opposition right in the countries bordering Russia. The aforementioned power centres come across in Ukraine, Baltic countries and the South Caucasus. Concentration of military forces in those locations takes place. Military trainings through which the two powers demonstrate their forces take place nearby these locations.

J. Mearsheimer argues that the reason of Ukrainian crisis is not the ambitious goal of Russia to recreate the "New Soviet Union", but security. Just as other great powers, Russia is also sensitive about its security. Thus, it will not allow NATO and EU to get closer to its borders. He thinks that Baltic countries are too small to create threats for Russia because of their membership to NATO and the European Union, but Ukraine is already the red line for Russia. Security interest is the main factor that reasons Moscow's actions in Ukraine.[44]

Additionally, Moscow thinks that one of the goals of the western sanctions is to destabilize internal situation in the country.[45] Russian experts think that the United States forced its allies to impose sanctions against Russian officials, companies and different sectors of industry. According to them the aim is to press Russia so much that it backs down Ukraine and final goal is to change Putin's regime in Russia.[46] Due to the aforementioned, in the new strategy great attention is paid to security, prevention of mass unrest and protection of Constitutional order. Vladimir Putin formed National Guards and took it under personal command. In my opinion, it can be presumed that he is afraid of the tension existing inside the country and created his personal armed formation, which he will be able to use for preserving power further.

In response to frequent NATO military drills near the Russian borders, which are part of alliance's reassurance and deterrence policy, the Defence Minister of Russia has decided to create two additional military divisions – in the Western Military District and in the Southern Military District. The Defence Minister announced the given decision in the beginning of May 2016. Russia takes NATO military trainings and accumulation of its military forces near its borders as a threat and enhances its own military forces for balancing those threats.[47] Accumulation of military forces at the given territory of Eastern Europe is a challenge for international security.

Conclusion

In the given paper, I have tried to analyse what influence Ukraine crisis had on the behaviour of states and tested hypotheses about Balance of Power and Balance of Threat theory.

Military modernization has intensively continued in case of Poland. Creation of territorial reserve is in process. The defence budget has equalled NATO requirements. Defence expenses increase annually. New national security strategy was published at the end of 2014. Poland has chosen the threat balancing strategy. Poland has fully supported the West-imposed economic sanctions, despite the fact that its energy sector depends on import from Russia and Russia has always been an important market for its agricultural products.

As for the Baltic countries, here we also see the efforts taken towards balancing the threats. Military budget is being increased; hybrid war threat emergency response team has been formed in Lithuania. NATO military trainings are being intensively conducted at the territories of Baltic countries. They have purchased anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems; artillery systems have been renewed. Elements of preparation for defence war are apparent. Baltic countries have empowered

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[44] John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault, available at http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/Ukraine%20Article%20in%20Foreign%20Affairs.pdf, accessed on 21/10.2017.
[45] Polina Devitt, Lavrov accuses West of seeking 'regime change' in Russia, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-lavrov-accuses-west-of-seeking-regime-change-in-russia-idUSKCN0J609G20141122 accessed on 12.11.2017
[46] Dmitri Trenin, The Ukraine crisis and the resumption of great-power rivalry, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ukraine_great_power_rivalry2014.pdf, accessed on 15.10.2017.
[47] В России появятся три дивизии для противодействия НАТО, available at http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3257238 accessed on 22.10.2017

their defence and security systems. Empiric figures have shown that all three Baltic countries have chosen the balance policy instead of bandwagon policy. This opposes the wide-spread opinion that small countries more often choose the bandwagoning policy rather than the balancing policy.

The part of the hypothesis about NATO deploying additional military forces in Eastern Europe has been confirmed partly. NATO failed to agree on dislocating permanent military contingent in Poland, which was requested by Polish side, but instead of that alliance approved the rotation system of military units to the Poland and Baltic States. After the Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO members decided to take reassurance measures to demonstrate support to Eastern and Central European countries. In September 2014 in Wales summit NATO adopted Readiness Action Plan (RAP) to ensure quick response to the any kind of potential crisis occurred in the region. RAP relies on joint task force consisting of up to 6000 soldiers who are ready to move the frontline in a few days.[48]

The USA appeared to be more active than the EU and developed the special assistance program for empowering the given region, the budget of which is approximately 4 billion dollars. NATO and the USA have emphasized on the protection of NATO member countries. Military trainings and rearmament programs are underway, while the European Union focused more on financial sanctions and reforms in Ukraine.

Therefore, the research has shown that the security comprehension by the aforementioned countries is influenced by geographic proximity of external threats and the level of its aggressiveness. Geographic proximity to Russia and the aggressive plans of the latter are the decisive factors for the foreign policy and selection of alliances (NATO and EU) by its neighbour countries.

Despite sanctions, there is low probability that Russian Federation would return the annexed Crimea and give up the separatist regions of Ukraine. Moscow changed the national security and defence strategy and has launched strong anti-western information campaign inside and outside of the country. Moscow is completing the military modernization process and has more freely involved in the civil war in Syria; Russia is empowering the Western and Southern Military Districts, which directly border NATO member or NATO partner countries. Moscow is preparing its army for the network centric warfare and deepens energy cooperation with China.

Regarding Germany, we have seen that the soft politics towards Russia has changed. Germany has supported sanctions against Russia. By means of sanctions, Berlin attempts to weaken Russia's aggression. Germany only considered the formation of European army; but it has not brought any specific results yet. Thus, in the given context, our hypothesis has not been confirmed; Germany does not haste to strengthen its "hard power". The fact that majority of Germany population does not take Russia as a threat is probably the size and power of the country. In addition, Germany is geographically far from Russia. Still, German society is quite critical towards Putin's Russia and supports provision of economic assistance to Ukraine.

It appears that on the long-term perspective NATO will again remain as the main guarantor of European security. The parties will attempt to decrease the economic loss caused by mutual sanctions. Allegedly, no qualitative change or improvement of relations will take place; although, a wide-scale conflict between NATO and Russian Federation is not expected either. In my opinion, the parties will most likely continue the mutual threatening policy.

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[48] Readiness Action Plan, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_119353.htm accessed on 12.11.2017.

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RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR
IN THE AIR SPACE OF THE BLACK SEA REGION
BETWEEN 2014-2017

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Abstract: After the ilegal annexation of Crimea, in March 2014, the Russian Federation started to develop a provocative behavior in the Black Sea region against the riparian states, especially towards NATO member states. Between March 2014 and September 2017, Russian Air Force attempted to enter illegally, and in some cases it succeded, in Romanian, Bulgarian, Turkish, Georgian and Ukrainian air space. Also it limited the freedom of navigation and flight of NATO's ships and aircraft, in the Black Sea international space. Thus, this article aims to identify the main reasons which stands behind Moscow's behavior and the impact on the region. The working hypothesis of the article is about the emerging of a security dilemma in the Black Sea region fact that creates tensions, an unsafe climate and is favoring the perpetuation of regional instability.

Keywords: Black Sea, NATO, Russian Federation, dilemma security, provocative behavior.

1. Regional situation after the illegal annexation of Crimea

Starting with March 2014, Russian fighter jets, surveillance aircraft and bombers started to fly very close to the riparian states air space, sometimes even breaching it, being necessary to be intercepted by the air force of those states[1]. Since then, the Russian Federation started to organize annually military exercises in Crimea and in the offshore of its coasts[2]. After the "Kavkaz 2016" military drills, which last between 5 and 10 October 2016, were over, Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, stated that the Russian Black Sea fleet can destroy potential enemies from the moment when their military forces leave their ports[3]. In other words, Gerasimov suggests that the Russian Federation could easily neutralize Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia and Ukraine's military fleet, a fact that isn't false at all if we taking into account their limited naval capacities. Moreover, Gerasimov declared that if until now Turkey dominated the Black Sea, now thinks have changed[4]. Therefore, in order to counter the Russian expansion and threat in the region[5], NATO members such as Canada, the United States, Great Britain and others sent on several occasions, starting with 2014, fighter jets in Romania and Bulgaria, in order to carry out air-policing mission[6]. NATO's measures are part of its reassurance actions for the eastern allies and the airplanes are patrolling the air space 7/24 and they rotate every four months. After this

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[1] „Turkish jets scramble Russian intel plane", *Hurriyet*, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-jets-scramble-russian-intel-plane.aspx?pageID=238&nID=64984&NewsCatID=341, accessed on 08.09.2016.

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[4] „General Staff: Russia-Turkey balance of force in Black Sea has changed over years", *TASS*, available at http://tass.com/defense/899730, accessed on 12.10.2016.

[5] David Francis, NATO Fears Russia Could Control Black Sea Region, Foreign Policy, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/26/nato-fears-russia-could-control-black-sea-region/, accessed on 05.10.2017.

[6] North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, The Secretary General's Annual Report 2016, p.40, available at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_SG_AnnualReport_2016_en. pdf#page=7, accessed on data de 22.05.2017.

period they will be relocated in other regions of the Alliances[7]. More than that, the United States sent in Romania, since March 2014, surveillance aircraft AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), in order to monitor the Black Sea region, especially the naval and aerial actions of the Russian Federation[8].

2. Moscow's provocative actions in the Black Sea region

According to Laurian Anastasof, the Chief of Staff of Romanian Air Force, since the beginning of 2016 until June 2016, Romanian fighter jets has been lifted off the ground four times to intercept Russian jets which came very close to Romania's air space.[9] Starting with march 2014, Russia's fighter jets carried out more provocative actions against the riparian states and against NATO warships which, were in the international waters of the Black Sea. This actions are especially attempts of breaching the riparian states air space and to limit the freedom of flight and navigation of the ships and airplanes of other states in the Black Sea.[10] Also, from 28 February 2014, the moment of the illegal occupation of Crimea, and until September 2017, Moscow's fighter jets tried in many times to intimidate riparian states and NATO's warships and aircraft which, were passing through the Black Sea international waters and air space. Those actions lead to the emergence of a series of incidents between March 2014 and September 2017 as it fallows.

Table no. 1. The actions of the Russian Air Force in 2014

Period	States involved	The type of incident
03.03.2014	Russia – Ukraine	Ukraine fighter jets intercepted Russian helicopters which intended to enter into Crimea's air space[11].
03.03.2014	Russia – Turkey	Eight F-16 fighter jets belonging to Turkey intercepted a Russian IL-20 surveillance aircraft which was flying close to its air space from the Black Sea[12].
06.03.2014	Russia – Georgia	A MI-8 military helicopter belonging to Russian Federation entered twice, unauthorized, from South Ossetia in the Georgia's air space[13].
07.03.2014	Russia – Turkey	Six F-16 Turkish jets intercepted a Russian IL-20 surveillance aircraft near Turkey's coast from the Black Sea[14]. The plane's presence near Bosphorus strait coincided with the entrance in the Black Sea of the American destroyer USS Truxtun which come to held joint military drills with Romanian and Bulgarian navy[15].

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[7] „Allies enhance NATO air-policing duties in Baltic States, Poland, Romania", North Atlantic Treaty Organization website, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_109354.htm, accessed on de 24.07.2017.

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[10] Maksym Bugriy, „Russia's moves to gain dominance in the Black Sea", *The Ukrainian Weekly*, available at http://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/russias-moves-to-gain-dominance-in-the-black-sea/, accessed on 17.10.2016.

[11] Michael R. Gordon, „Kerry Takes Offer of Aid to Ukraine and Pushes Back at Russian Claims", *The New York Times*, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/world/europe/secretary-of-state-john-kerry-arriving-in-kiev-offers-1-billion-in-loan-guarantees-to-ukraine.html, accessed on 19.10.2016.

[12] „Turkey scrambles jets after Russian plane flies near its Black Sea coast", *Hürriyet,* available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-scrambles-jets-after-russian-plane-flies-near-its-black-sea-coast.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63193&NewsCatID=341, accessed on 19.10.2016.

[13] „Russian military helicopters violate Georgian airspace", *Agenda.ge*, available at http://agenda.ge/news/10088/eng, accessed on 19.10.2016.

[14] „Turkey scrambles F-16 jets against Russian surveillance plane", *Hürriyet*, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-scrambles-f-16-jets-against-russian-surveillance-plane--.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63322&NewsCatID=359, accessed on 19.10.2016.

[15] „Turkey Scrambles Jets After Russian Flyover", *Sky News*, available at http://news.sky.com/story/turkey-scrambles-jets-after-russian-flyover-10414632, accessed on 19.10.2016.

On 25 March 2014, Bulgarian mass-media presented a report from the Ministry of Defense in which were mentioned the efforts made by the Bulgarian air force in order to intercept the Russian spy planes which tried to enter Bulgaria's air space[16]. Shortly after came the declaration of Bulgarian president, at that time, Rosen Plevneliev which mentioned that in the last months Russian Federation fighter jets and surveillance aircraft tried to enter in many times in Bulgaria's air space[17]. Plevneliev stated that the total of the flights made by the Bulgarian air force in the last 20 years are not equal with the flights that its air force were forced to carry on in the last months in order to intercept the Russian planes[18]. Also, he added that if in the last years were two or three interceptions a year, now are between two and ten interceptions a week[19].

Table no. 1. (continuation)

Period	States involved	The type of incident
08.04.2014	Russia – Turkey	Four Turkish F-16 fighting jets intercepted a Russian IL-20 spy plane that was flying very close of the Turkish airspace in the Black Sea[20].
12.04.2014	Russia – U.S	One unarmed Russian Su-24, passed 12 times in 90 minutes at low altitude above the American destroyer USS Donald Cook that was in the Black Sea international waters[21].
24-25.04.2014	Russia – Ukraine	Russia's military planes, repeatedly, breached unauthorized in the Ukraine's air space from the eastern part of the country[22].
10.07.2014	Russia – Georgia	Georgia declared that its air space was violated by a military helicopter of the Russian Federation which enter in its air space from the separatist region of South Ossetia[23].
16.07.2014	Russia – Ukraine	A Russian jet entered Ukraine's air space and shut down an Ukrainian Su-25 fighter jet near the separatist regions Donetsk and Luhansk.[24]
07.09.2014	Russia – Canada	Two Russian jets and also one spy plane flew more times around the Canadian frigate HMCS Toronto which was in the Black Sea international waters[25].
29.10.2014	Russia – Turkey	Turkey's fighting jets intercepted near its Black Sea air space two TU-95 Russian bombers and two Su-27 jets[26].

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[16] „Russian reconnaissance flights test Bulgaria's Black Sea airspace – report", *The Sofia Globe*, available at http://sofiaglobe.com/2014/03/25/russian-reconnaissance-flights-test-bulgarias-black-sea-airspace-report/, accessed on 20.10.2016.

[17] „Bulgarian President Suspects Intentional Provocations From Russia", *Novinite*, available at http://www.novinite.com/articles/159427/Bulgarian+President+Suspects+Intentional+Provocations+From+Russia, accessed on 20.10.2016.

[18] *Ibidem.*

[19] *Ibidem.*

[20] „Turkish jets scramble Russian intel plane", *Hürriyet*, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-jets-scramble-russian-intel-plane.aspx?pageID=238&nID=64984&NewsCatID=341, accessed on 20.10.2016.

[21] „Update 1-Russian jet's passes near U.S. ship in Black Sea 'provocative' – Pentagon", *Reuters*, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-russia-blacksea-idUSL2N0N60V520140414#TmlqFb14qYOCTCUy.97, accessed on 20.10.2016.

[22] „Ukraine crisis: Pentagon says Russian jets violated airspace", *BBC*, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/27167187, accessed on 20.10.2016.

[23] „Russian helicopter illegally enters Georgian airspace", Agenda.ge, available at http://agenda.ge/news/17802/eng, accessed on 6.11.2016.

[24] David M. Herszenhorn, „Ukraine Says Russian Plane Shot Down Its Fighter Jet", *The New York Times*, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/18/world/europe/ukraine-says-russian-plane-shot-down-its-fighter-jet.html?_r=0, accessed on 20.10.2016.

[25] *Ibidem.*

[26] „NATO tracks large-scale Russian air activity in Europe", *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_114274.htm, accessed on 26.10.2016.

Actually, on 28 and 29 October 2014 the Russian Federation made a series of military exercises which consist in scrambling, in the same time, of more groups of war planes that flew very close to the NATO members airspace from the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the Black Sea[27]. The aim of this flights is to test the allies speed of reaction but also to make a tour of force in order to intimidate the NATO members. According to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the number of interceptions made by NATO's jets against Russian planes in 2014 was 442 times[28], two times more than 2013[29]. Therefore, the significant growth of the mission made by Moscow's air force near the allies' border is closely linked with the tensions that appeared between the Russian Federation and NATO after the illegal annexation of Crimea episode, from March 2014.

Table no. 2. The actions of the Russian Air Force in 2015

Period	States/ Actors involved	The type of incident
16.03.2015	Russia – NATO	A Russian IL-20 spy plane flew over more NATO ships that were performing military exercises in Black Sea international space[30].
30.05.2015	Russia – U.S	A U.S RC-135[31] surveillance plane that was flying in the Black Sea international air space, most probably near Crimea, was intercepted by a Russian Su-27 fighting jet[32]. Thus, in order to prevent the U.S to collect intelligence about Moscow's military capabilities placed in Crimea, the Russian air force intervened.
29.05.2015 - 01.06.2015	Russia – U.S	Russian Federation Su-24, unarmed, fighter jets flew near American destroyer USS Ross[33] which was 40 de kilometers away from the port of Constanța in a patrolling mission. The destroyer was sailing in the Black Sea international waters when the Russian jet flew at a distance of 500 meters and at 60 meters above de water.[34]

After the incident, *Sputnik International* news agency, Kremlin's main propaganda portal, stated that the U.S destroyer USS Ross was heading to Crimea's territorial waters claimed by

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[27] „NATO tracks large-scale Russian air activity in Europe", *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_114274.htm, accessed on 26.10.2016.

[28] Alberto Nardelli, George Arnett, „Nato reports surge in jet interceptions as Russia tensions increase", *The Guardian*, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/03/military-aircraft-interventions-have-surged-top-gun-but-for-real, accessed on 1.11.2016.

[29] Brad Lendon, „NATO jets scrambled more than 400 times this year for Russian intercepts", *CNN*, available at, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/21/world/europe/nato-russia-intercepts/, accessed on 1.11.2016.

[30] „Un avion rusesc a spionat fregata Regina Maria, în timpul exercițiilor din Marea Neagră", Digi 24, available at http://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/evenimente/un-avion-rusesc-a-spionat-fregata-regina-maria-in-timpul-exercitiilor-din-marea-neagra-371339, accessed on 11.05.2017.

[31] This type of aircraft can detect and analyse signals emitted by radars, aircraft, fighting vehicles, radios and mobile phones even if these are well camouflaged or hidden underground, for more details go to „Boeing RC-135 Reconnaissance Aircraft, United States of America", *Airforce – Technology*, available at http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/boeing-rc135/, accessed on 23.05.2017.

[32] „Russian fighter jet flies dangerously close to US plane, says Pentagon", *The Indian Express*, 13.06.2015, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/world/americas/russian-fighter-jet-flies-dangerously-close-to-us-plane-says-pentagon/, accessed on 1.11.2016.

[33] Paul D. Shinkman, „More 'Top Gun': Russian Jets Buzz U.S. Navy Destroyer in Black Sea", *US News*, available at http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/01/more-top-gun-russian-jets-buzz-us-navy-destroyer-in-black-sea, accessed on 3.11.2016.

[34] *Ibidem.*

Russia and therefore, this must have been avoided[35]. Also, shortly after, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov Anatolii Antonov that the US ship presence near Russia's borders represents a threat for the strategic stability of the region[36]. In turn, the Pentagon, by its spokesman, strongly denied the Russian official's declaration adding that USS Ross was in the Black Sea international waters in a patrolling mission and it did not changed it course despite Russian air force intimidation attempts[37].

Table no. 2 (continuation)

Period	States involved	The type of incident
19.08.2015	Russia – Georgia	A Russian MI-8 military helicopter enter unauthorized in the Georgian air space through the southern part of South Ossetia separatist region[38].
09.12.2015	Russia – Georgia	Georgia's Foreign Ministry announced that its air space was violated by a drone belonging to the Russian Federation[39].
10.12.2015	Russia – Georgia	Tbilisi accused Moscow that a MI-8 military helicopter entered illegally from South Ossetia region in Georgia's air space[40].
21.12.2015	Russia – Ukraine	Ukraine accused Russian Federation that a Tu-214R[41] spy plane of its breached its air space in the Black Sea[42]. The aircraft flew along Ukraine's eastern border with Russia. It continued its flight above the Azov Sea, Crimea and through Ukrainian Black Sea air space, coming close to the Romanian economic exclusive zone[43].

According to NATO Secretary General's Annual Report on 2015, the Alliance's jets were summoned 400 times to intercept Russian aircraft during this year[44]. The number of interceptions made by the Alliance in 2015 close to those realized in 2014 but in those two years the activity of the Russian Federation near NATO borders raised with 70% compared with 2013[45].

[35] „Russian Jets Force US Navy Destroyer Away From Territorial Waters", *Sputnik International*, 30.05.2015, available at https://sputniknews.com/russia/201505301022751505/, accessed on 3.11.2016.
[36] *Ibidem.*
[37] Paul D. Shinkman, „More 'Top Gun': Russian Jets Buzz U.S. Navy Destroyer in Black Sea", *US News*, available at http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/06/01/more-top-gun-russian-jets-buzz-us-navy-destroyer-in-black-sea, accessed on 3.11.2016.
[38] „Six-Point Ceasefire Plan", *Civil.ge*, available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19478, accessed on 5.11.2016.
[39] „Russian aircraft violate Georgian airspace", *Agenda.ge*, available at http://agenda.ge/news/48088/eng, accessed on 6.11.2016.
[40] *Ibidem.*
[41] David Cenciotti, „Russia's most advanced spyplane has deployed to Syria again", *The Aviationist*, available at https://theaviationist.com/2016/07/31/russias-most-advanced-spyplane-has-deployed-to-syria-again/, accessed on 6.11.2016.
[42] „Russian reconnaissance aircraft violates Ukrainian airspace", *Ukraine Today*, available at http://uatoday.tv/news/russian-reconnaissance-aircraft-violates-ukrainian-airspace-558632.html, accessed on 6.11.2016.
[43] *Ibidem.*
[44] „Secretary General's Annual Report 2015", *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_127529.htm?, accessed on 6.11.2016.
[45] *Ibidem.*

Table no. 3. The actions of the Russian Air Force in 2016

Period	States involved	The type of incident
25.01.2016	Russia – U.S	A U.S. RC-135 spy plane, that was flying in the international air space in the Black Sea, was intercepted by a Russian Federation Su-27 jet[46]. According to the Pentagon, the RC-135 aircraft was not near the Russian Federation airspace and the Russian jet made a dangerous and unprofessional interception[47].
23.03.2016	Russia – Ukraine	Kiev accused Moscow that a Russian Mi-8 military helicopter violated its air space breaching from Crimea into Kherson region.[48] After several minutes the helicopter returned to Crimea.
4.04.2016	Russia – Canada	The arrival of the Canadian HMCS Fredericton frigate in the Black Sea to realize a series of military exercises along with its allies alerted the Russian Federation which closely supervised the ongoing of the events.[49] More ships watched from distance NATO exercises and a Russian spy plane flew over at an altitude of 128 kilometers[50].
1.07.2016 – 24.07.2016	Russia – Bulgaria	On 24 July 2016, Bulgarian Defense Minister, at that time, Nikolay Nenchev, stated during an interview on *Nova TV* channel that Bulgaria's air space was breached 10 times during the last month by the Russian Federation civil and military aircraft.[51] According to him, in only four cases the Russian military aircrafts close their transmitters necessary for identification[52]. Although, the Russian Federation rejected those accusations claiming that their transmitters were always on[53].

Nikolay Nenchev catalogued Moscow's actions as provocations of which aim he does not understand but Bulgarian air force is ready to respond every time to them. At the same time, he stated that for the Bulgarian air force those interceptions are consuming an important quantity of its resources[54]. Rosen Plevneliev, Bulgaria's former president, stated the same thing in April 2014

[46] Sam Lagrone, „Pentagon: Russian Fighter Conducted 'Unsafe' Intercept of U.S. Recon Plane Over Black Sea", *USNI* News, available at https://news.usni.org/2016/01/28/pentagon-russian-fighter-conducted-unsafe-intercept-of-u-s-recon-plane-over-black-sea, accessed on 7.11.2016.
[47] *Ibidem.*
[48] „State Border Service of Ukraine says Russian Mi-8 helicopter violated Ukrainian airspace", *UAWire*, available at http://uawire.org/news/state-border-service-says-russian-mi-8-helicopter-violated-ukrainian-airspace, accessed on 7.11.2016.
[49] „Canadian Frigate Fredericton Deploys to Black Sea under Operation Reassurance", *Novinite*, available at http://www.novinite.com/articles/173861/Canadian+Frigate+Fredericton+Deploys+to+Black+Sea+under+Operation+Reassurance, accessed on 7.9.2017.
[50] David Pugliese, „NATO disputes Conservative claim that Russians confronted Canadian warship", *Ottawa Citizen,* available at http://ottawacitizen.com/news/politics/nato-disputes-conservative-claim-that-russians-confronted-canadian-warship, accessed on 7.11.2016.
[51] „Russian aircraft intruded in Bulgarian air space 10 times in past month – Defence Minister", *Sofia Globe*, available at http://sofiaglobe.com/2016/07/24/russian-aircraft-intruded-in-bulgarian-air-space-10-times-in-past-month-defence-minister/, accessed on 24.07.2017.
[52] Damien Sharkov, „Bulgaria concerned by spike of russian airspace violations", *Newsweek*, available at http://europe.newsweek.com/bulgaria-concern-spike-russian-airspace-violations-483694?rm=eu, accessed on 10.11.2016.
[53] Jason Bush, Alison Williams, „Russia denies its aircraft violated Bulgarian airspace", *Reuters*, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-russia-idUSKCN105230, accessed on 10.11.2016.
[54] Damien Sharkov, „Bulgaria concerned by spike of russian airspace violations", *Newsweek*, available at http://europe.newsweek.com/bulgaria-concern-spike-russian-airspace-violations-483694?rm=eu, accessed on 10.11.2016.

when he accused the Russian Federation for carrying out flights near its air space in order to provoke the Bulgarian air force and to consume its resources[55]. Besides this, Plevneliev was asking if by chance the purposes of those provocations are to overuse and to send faster to service Bulgarian MiG-29 aircrafts, soviet production, from the 80's.[56]

Table no. 3 (continuation)

Period	States involved	Type of incident
7.09.2016	Russia – U.S	A Russian Su-27 jet intercepted twice a U.S P-8A Poseidon[57] aircraft which was flying in the international air space in the Black Sea. In order to force it to change its course, the Russian jet flew at a small distance from the American jet, between 3 – 9 meters.[58] The Pentagon stated the interception was a very dangerous and unprofessional one and these actions may lead to escalating tensions between the two countries.[59] Actually, the Russian Federation took action in order to prevent the United States from gathering intelligence regarding the location of its submarines. The Russian Federation's Ministry of Defense spokesman stated the American aircrafts had their identification transmitters off and were approaching its border.[60]
12.09.2016	Russia – Ukraine	Russian Federation warships and warplanes entered in Ukrainian waters and tried to block the passing of a Ukrainian coast guard, that wanted to reach to the Ukrainian hydrocarbons extracting platforms located in the north-west of Ukrainian exclusive economic zone, more precisely in the port of Odessa offshore[61].
During 2016, NATO's jets were scrambled 800 times in order to intercept Russian military planes, the interceptions number were double than 2015[62].		

[55] „Bulgarian President Suspects Intentional Provocations From Russia", *Novinite*, available at http://www.novinite.com/articles/159427/Bulgarian+President+Suspects+Intentional+Provocations+From+Russia, accessed on 20.10.2016.

[56] *Ibidem.*

[57] U.S surveillance plane used especially in the anti-submarine war being able to detect them, for more details go to „Boeing receives $2.2bn order for 17 P-8As", *Flight Global*, available at https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/boeing-receives-22bn-order-for-17-p-8as-435845/, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[58] Sam Lagrone, „Updated: Russian Fighter Came Within 10 Ft. of Navy Surveillance Plane Over Black Sea", *USNI News*, available at https://news.usni.org/2016/09/07/russian-fighter-came-within-10-ft-navy-surveillance-plane-black-sea, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[59] *Ibidem.*

[60] Thomas Gibbons-Neff, „Russian fighter makes 'unsafe close range intercept' with U.S. anti-submarine aircraft", *The Washington Post*, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoin t/wp/2016/09/07/russian-fighter-makes-unsafe-close-range-intercept-with-u-s-anti-submarine-aircraft/?utm_term=.4c33d7c123da, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[61] „Ukrainian border guard service reports dangerous encounter between their ship and Russia's Black Sea Fleet", *UAWire*, available at http://www.uawire.org/news/ukrainian-border-guard-service-reports-dangerous-encounter-between-their-ship-and-russia-s-black-sea-fleet, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[62] Russian fighter jets 'buzz' US warship in Black Sea, photos show, CNN, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/16/us/russia-us-ship-fly-by/index.html, accessed on 05.09.2017.

Table no. 4 The actions of the Russian Air Force in 2017

Period	States involved	Type of incidents
01.02.2017	Russia – Ukraine	Ukraine accused the Russian Federation for shooting against an AN-26 Ukrainian military cargo plane which was flying near Ukrainian extraction platforms near the port of Odessa that were occupied by the Russian Federation in December 2015. However Moscow denied it.[63]
10.02.2017	Russia – U.S	Then, three incidents took place in which three Russian Su-24 fighter jets and an IL-38 surveillance aircraft and a U.S destroyer USS Porter, which was in the Black Sea for joint military exercises with NATO allies, were involved.[64] First, two Su-24 jets and shortly after another one, flew at low altitude above the American destroyer. On the same day a Russian spy plane flew around the American destroyer.[65] According to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Spokesman, Moscow denied this accusations[66].
06.04.2017	Russia– Ukraine	One of Russian Federation secret services, FSB, retained a Ukrainian fishing ship because it allegedly violated the Russian border and entered its waters[67].
09.05.2017	Russia – U.S	A Su-27 jet belonging to the Russian Federation intercepted a U.S P-8A Poseidon spying aircraft in the Black Sea international air space. According to Moscow, the American airplane was approaching its air space and was forced to act. The Russian jet once more came very close to the American one, at only 6 meters away and kept this distance for 5 minutes[68].
11.05.2017	Russia – U.S	A Russian Su-27 fighter jet intercepted an American P-8A Poseidon, flying in the Black Sea international waters, at a distance of almost 160 km away from Crimean peninsula, in its north-west[69].
25.07.2017	Russia - NATO	A NATO fighter jet took off from the Mihai Kogălniceanu air base, from Romania, in order to intercept two Russian Federation Tu-22 bombers that were flying in the vicinity of NATO's Black Sea air space[70].

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[63] Denis Pinchuk, „Moscow denies it shot at Ukrainian warplane: Tass", *Reuters*, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-airplane-idUSKBN15G4RM, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[64] Brock Vergakis, „Navy releases video of Russian aircraft buzzing USS Porter", *Stars and Stripes*, available at https://www.stripes.com/news/navy/navy-releases-video-of-russian-aircraft-buzzing-uss-porter-1.456784#.WSS5lOuGOUn, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[65] *Ibidem.*

[66] Stephen Losey, „Russia buzzed NATO aircraft four times in a single day", *Defence News*, available at http://www.defensenews.com/articles/russia-buzzed-nato-aircraft-four-times-february, accessed on 24.04.2017.

[67] „Russian FSB in Crimea detained a Ukrainian ship for "violation of the border"", *Ukrainian Hot News*, available at https://ukrhotnews.com/2017/04/06/russian-fsb-in-crimea-detained-a-ukrainian-ship-for-violation-of-the-border/, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[68] *Ibidem.*

[69] Lucas Tomlinson, „Russian jet 'buzzes' another US plane in Black Sea, second incident this week", *Fox News,* available at http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/05/13/russian-jet-buzzes-another-us-plane-in-black-sea-second-incident-this-week.html, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[70] „RAF Typhoon scramble in response to Russian aircraft over the Black Sea", *Royal Air Force website*, available at https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/archive/raf-typhoon-scramble-in-response-to-russian-aircraft-over-the-black-sea-25072017, accessed on 09.10.2017.

At the same time, this close range interceptions are very dangerous. In 2001 in South China Sea, above the Hainan island, an incident between a J-8II Chinese fighter jet and a U.S EP-3E spy plane took place. The first one was in an interception mission but he come to close to the American aircraft and the two planes collided. The incident has ended with the death of the Chinese pilot and with an American plane seriously damaged[71]. In order to prevent such events the United States, the Russian Federation and China, along with other states, signed on April 2014 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, but this convention is not respected by the three powers[72].

Conclusions

Thus, after the incidents from the Black Sea and the declarations of the involved states officials we can say that the Russian Federation actions, between 2014 – 2018 aimed:

To test the reaction time and the capacities of the riparian states fighter jets when an aircraft is approaching their air space or even breaches it. This thing will help the Russian Federation to obtain useful information regarding the capacity of rival air forces. More than that, with the gathered information Moscow could simulate an air attack to observe the efficiency of the Russian air force and its results in case of conflict.

To test the riparian states radars capacity, if they detect the Russian fighter jets and bombers long before their approach by these states air space or immediately after. This thing is very important because in the first case a state can send fighter jets beforehand to prevent Russian aircrafts breaching its air space. In the second case, the summoning of the planes would get there late, fact that would allow Russian aircraft to enter unauthorized in a state's air space. Thus, the main purpose is to find weaknesses that could be exploited in case of an eventual conflict and not only.

To put pressure on the riparian states and to produce them more costs with the maintenance of their aircraft. Only one Russian Federation fighting jet or bomber, if it's performing a flight around the Black Sea basin it can lift from the ground at least 1 or 2 Romania's, Bulgaria's Turkey's, Ukraine's and Georgia's fighter jets. So, following the increasing of the flights hours the riparian states aviation must use more fuel and more spare parts for the maintenance of the aircraft, thing not easy at all. If we look at the Bulgarian air force we can see that since the Russian flights near its air space increased Bulgaria has difficulties in maintaining its fighting jets operational[73].

To show to the riparian states political and military leadership that Russia is present in the Black Sea and that it controls the international air and maritime space in this region. Moreover it wants to show that it is the most powerful actor in the region.

To limit de liberty of flight and navigation in the Black Sea basin, especially for NATO's ships and aircraft, in an attempt to show that the space belongs to it and that is its zone of influence.

To discourage NATO member states to do military and reconnaissance missions in the Black Sea region[74].

At the same time, the situation generated by the illegal annexation of Crimea and by its militarization in conjunction with the provocative actions of the Russian Federation in the last

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[71] „Why Russia Harasses U.S. Aircraft", *Stratfor*, available at https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/why-russia-harasses-us-aircraft, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[72] „Document: Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea", *USNI News*, available at https://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/document-conduct-unplanned-encounters-sea, accessed on 24.05.2017.

[73] „Bulgarian President Suspects Intentional Provocations From Russia", *Novinite*, available at http://www.novinite.com/articles/159427/Bulgarian+President+Suspects+Intentional+Provocations+From+Russia, accessed on 20.10.2016.

[74] „Why Russia Harasses U.S. Aircraft", *Stratfor*, available at https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/why-russia-harasses-us-aircraft, accessed on 24.05.2017.

years[75] lead to the deterioration of region's security environment[76]. Also, I consider that these elements lead to the emerging of a security dilemma in the Black Sea region, fact that is favorable for the emerging of a conflict. This „psychological mechanism"[77] entitled the security dilemma was theorized by John Hertz in the 50's and in order to become operational needs two elements, fear and arming. John Hertz states that fearing of not being attacked, subjugated or annihilated, humans use to obtain as more power in order to not be dominated by other groups[78]. Also, the other groups can do the same thing, too, starting this way an arms race which may lead to an increased risk of war[79]. Thus, „the feeling of fear in the international relations between state political entities is explained by factors such as historical experience, deducted hostile intentions/expressions, vicinity/proximity, relative strength and effectiveness of offensive military capabilities"[80]. Thus, the historical experience of the riparian states with the Russian Federation is not the most pleasant one and their geographical position, in Russia's immediate proximity scared them after the illegal annexation of Crimea.

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3. „Boeing receives $2.2bn order for 17 P-8As", *Flight Global*, available at https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/boeing-receives-22bn-order-for-17-p-8as-435845/, accessed on 24.05.2017.

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CAUCASIAN FROZEN CONFLICTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON NATO AND EU'S EASTERN FLANK

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Abstract: The Caucasian region is not only a bridge between Europe and Asia, but also a battlefield between the two of them. Therefore, it is not surprising that the area has been, and continues to be, full of conflicts. After leaving the USSR, several nationalist voices have emerged among the former communist states, some of them striking even in the territorial integrity of the new states. After the Kosovo War, the Russian Federation had an ace up its sleeve at the negotiating table regarding the secessionist republics status in the Caucasus, putting an end to a period of international relations characterized by collaboration. Russia's aggressive intervention in 2008, in the war between Georgia and the two secessionist republics on its territory, started a new reality towards the security on the NATO's eastern flank. After the loss of Romania and Bulgaria in favor of the Western structures, Russia strengthened its power using force. So it used frozen conflicts on the former territory of the USSR, whenever the states in its geographical proximity made one more step to Europe. The Ukrainian war was the most complex issue for both NATO and the European Union to deal with, after the Cold War. Frequent conflicts and Russia's attitude in recent years, pose a real threat to regional stability in the east. That is why Western organizations, together with local actors, must address the new situation in the East, with tact and responsibility, especially under the new circumstances of unpredictability that have characterized the Caspian region over time.

Keywords: frozen conflicts, separatist republics, security, cooperation, NATO, Russia.

Introduction

After the collapse of the USSR, the former communist states, sought to gain autonomy from the Russian Federation. On the other hand, Russia did everything in its power to maintain them in its sphere of influence. Therefore, inevitably disagreements arose. This also happened, because the former communist states tried to hide under the protective wing of the West, since the first years after regaining their power of self-government.

Immediately after the collapse of the communism, the eastern countries were desperate to reach on NATO's side, because they considered this as being the only possible way to finally get rid of Russian influence and gain stability. The involvement of Western forces in Eastern Europe has reached its peak after the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in NATO, followed by inclusion in the European Union, in 2007. Thus, the western influence reached a limit considered to be sensitive to the Russians. Moreover, as the two states became full NATO members, the military organization expanded its sphere of influence in the Black Sea, way too close to the Russian western frontier. Western states hadn't had only a geopolitical interest, but also had a geostrategic aim. As a result of its enlargement, involvement in the conflicts in the wider Black Sea region, had also became a security need, for both NATO and the European Union.

After the Cold War, Russia lost a lot from a geostrategic point of view. By far, the biggest loss, immediately after the fall of communism, was the integration of the two former communist states, Romania and Bulgaria in NATO and in the EU. With a traditionally rival Turkish state, as well as, with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine desiring to become members of the EU, Russia would have become a state cornered at its western frontier and would have lost control of the Black Sea and the Caucasus.

In this context, in order to cope with NATO's enlargement policy, the Russian government decided to support the separatist regions of the former soviet satellite states. Maintaining a tense situation in the region, has only made the independent states weaker, as a result of numerous ethnic uprisings, therefore their territorial integrity has been affected. In this circumstances, more or less officially, Russia interfered from a military point of view.

After the end of the Cold War, a great number of conflicts arose in the Soviet area. They were based on multiple factors: armed conflicts, fragmentation of some states, conflicts with ethnic and religious origins, or autonomist and separatist tendencies[1]. Some of these conflicts solved after they have been consumed, while others have ended without peace treaties or mutual agreements between the involved parties, so they are referred as frozen conflicts.

Many of the former Soviet states have sovereignty only on paper, because in reality power is held by rebels. No less than 6 territories, that self-declare sovereign and independent republics, do not have international recognition. This is the case of the provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Georgian territory, Nagorno-Karabakh located at the Azerbaijani border, Transdnistria in the Republic of Moldova, Novorossiya and the Republic of Crimea in Ukraine. The number of frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space has increased considerably, even if long time passed, and international mediation has failed to solve them, despite numerous attempts.

Frozen conflicts have remained in an uncertain situation, ready to start again creating instability and insecurity, whenever Russia's interests in the area contradict those of the international community. All these conflicts are open, fact that gives Russia the opportunity to interfere any time it wants to restore peace in its own conditions.

Americans and Russians have mutually accused themselves of interventions in the internal policies of the states in the Caucasus. Russia defends and declares that it involves in the region's situation for the fact that due to its geographical position it better understands the internal situation of the states in its proximity and proclaims itself as a link between the West and the Islamic world. The United States, through the voice of NATO, on the other hand, motivates its involvement through the traditional policy of spreading democratic values all over the world.

1. Frozen conflicts - unfrozen conflicts

Administered by the Azerbaijan, but dominated by Armenians from an ethnical point of view, Nagorno-Karabakh region became the first area of interethnic conflict in the former Soviet space and it began even before the dissolution of the USSR. Due to the destabilization of the USSR's power, a conflict broke out between the Armenians and Azerbaijani in the region that grow and transformed into a real war. The two states, both ex-Soviet, Armenia and Azerbaijan, were involved in the war, but none admitted any type of connection. After the fall of communism, Armenia sent troops to Nagorno-Karabakh, while the Azeri tried to defend their territorial integrity. In 1994 the conflict ended, but the Armenian armies continued to occupy a large part of Azerbaijan's territory today. This is the reason why Azerbaijan imposed an embargo on Armenia and ceased any diplomatic relations with it.

The efforts of the international community to find a solution regarding the legal status of this region, have not made significant progress, although more than two decades have passed since the truce was signed. The conflict has serious repercussions, especially for Armenia, which has two closed borders, with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

In 2016 the conflict re-emerged, Armenia accusing Azerbaijan of violating the armistice. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani administration defended by declaring that the fire was open in order to defend its territory. After the international community insisted that the two countries should solve the problem through diplomacy, Azerbaijan, has ceased hostilities. However, the 2016 crisis was the worst in the last 20 years, and proved how inflammable the situation in the area is.

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[1] *Conflictul transnistrean – războiul care a înghețat acum 25 de ani*, https://crimemoldova.com/news/history-of-Independence/conflictul-transnistrean-r-zboiul-care-a-nghe-at-acum-25-de-ani/

The conflict in 2016 took place in a period of geopolitical changes in the region, as Armenia maintains good relations with Russia, Russia intervenes in the Syrian War, and Turkey, the historical ally of Azerbaijan, oscillates between the West and the East. Concerning is the fact that, amidst instability in the region, the conflict could degenerate into clashes between the two religions, Christian and Muslim.

Georgia also has been troubled by conflicts between the central power and the separatist republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In November 1989, South Ossetia proclaimed its autonomy. Thus this event degenerated into the first armed conflict in the region. Since neither of the parties wanted to negotiate in order to reach a compromise, the tensions in the region begun to accumulate, and in December 1990, the conflict started. The first attempt to solve the problem occurred in 1992, but tensions between Georgia and Russia escalated in 2008.

The situation in Abkhazia, similar in some concerns, calmed down in 1994, but the hostilities resumed in 2008, when Georgia intervened in the two separatist provinces.

Russia used Kosovo's example in order to compare the situation in the east to that in the Balkans, when the European Union recognized the Republic of Kosovo independency, despite Russian opposition. With this similar situation taken into consideration, Russia has increased control in the region. As a result, several clashes between Russia and Georgia took place in the spring of 2008, and even a real war broke out on the night of 7 to 8 August. Fortunately, only four days later, following international pressure, the two countries ended an armistice. However, Russian military intervention in a foreign country in 2008 has drawn attention of international community. The Western countries saw, after a long peaceful period, an aggressive country that would do risky steps towards imposing its will in the former soviet countries.

Regarding Moldova's Transdnistrian conflict, there are some similarities with those in the other post-soviet areas, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia or Abkhazia, but there are also lots of elements that clearly differentiate it from the other conflicts. For example, ethnic, religious, or demographic causes are missing in this frozen conflict, as it is a dispute based on ideological and political factors[2].

The conflict's origin is in the collapse of the USSR and has nothing to do with the previous period. RSS Moldova adopted two very important laws in 1989, changed the official language from Russian to Moldavian and switched to the Latin alphabet, fact that created an official language identical to the Romanian language. These aspects, corroborated with the revolution in Romania, created panic among the Russian-speaking population, therefore a small territory in eastern Moldova proclaimed its independence. Separatists have installed control over several areas on the Nistru Bridge, and consequently in 1990 the Moldavian authorities lost their control in the region. Realizing that a considerable percentage of Moldavians are on the territory of Transdnistria, the Republic of Moldavia attempted to regain control over the Transdnistrian territory. As a result, a short war broke out in the spring of 1992.

Being helped by the Russian army, separatists in Transdnistria have managed to preserve their status as a self-proclaimed republic, although the international community has never recognized the existence of the Transdnistrian state. Subsequently, all rounds of negotiations have failed. In 2006, Transdnistrian citizens voted for independence, but Transdnistria has remained de facto an unrecognized state and not even Russia officially admitted its independence[3].

After the collapse of the USSR, Chechnya also declared its independence. But it was an unilateral act that it was not recognized by the international community. Consequently, there were military confrontations, but this time they were on Russian territory. The Russian military intervention in Chechnya (1994-1996) was a total failure. Confrontations were extremely violent.

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[2] Sergiu-Toader, Medar Gheorghe Savu, *Conflicte „îngheţate" în zona Mării Negre, Securitate şi stabilitate în bazinul Mării Negre*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2005, pp.74-76.

[3] Henry Srebrnik, *The frozen conflict between Moldova and Transnistria*, 2013, http://www.theguardian.pe.ca/opinion/letter-to-the-editor/2013/12/17/the-frozen-conflict-between-moldova-and-3546763.html

The first Chechen war was something like the "Vietnam" of Russia[4], the Russians lost many soldiers in just a few weeks[5], and the losses were not limited to human lives. The international community also expressed its disapproval of the events in Russia.

In 1999, there was a new clash between the Russian and Chechen forces. Chechens were accused of being involved in bombings in Moscow and other cities in Russia. The Russian Federation started a fight against terror and associated Chechnya's separatists with terrorism, drawing attention to the fact that in lack of founding, in order to support the war with the Russians, they often participated in organized crime activities, such as human trafficking, drug trafficking and illegal weapon trade.

Nevertheless, the main reason of the Chechen war, was its geographical position. Chechnya was crossed by important Russian pipelines, and the territory occupied by Chechens was recognized as having important oil reserves.

There exists a real problem regarding the Chechen situation, not only for Russia, but also for Europe and for the USA. In Chechnya there are a lot of terrorist organizations affiliated to the Islamic State[6], the greatest threat to the security of the Old Continent since the Cold War. Therefore, it does not exist a real interest of the European Union for an independent Chechen state, on the contrary, Kremlin's control contributes a lot to the stability in the area.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has older connections, regarding both the internal situation and neighboring powers. Russian-Ukrainian relations have been altered since 2004, following the so-called Orange Revolution. The revolution was the answer to the Ukrainian presidential elections fraud, in 2004. At the same time, Ukraine's foreign policy to approach the European Union, as the most important geopolitical factor in the area, has contravened Russia's interests.

Events in Ukraine began on the night of November 21, 2013, when several Ukrainian citizens began a spontaneous protest following the President's refusal of signing the Association Agreement with the EU and the Free Trade Agreement. In February 2014, what started as a simple protest, took a bloody turn and culminated in dozens of deaths and anticipated elections.

Ukrainian crisis was extremely surprising for both the Ukrainians, and the international community. On February 26, 2014, groups of people dressed in military clothing, without any logo, took control of the Crimean Peninsula. Later on, the Crimean Parliament voted to annex the peninsula to the Russian Federation. As a result of the Referendum, 95% of the Crimean population opted for union with Russia.

The international community considered the best is to solve the conflict with diplomacy and tact, but Russia's military intervention on the territory of an independent state on the European continent, marked tensed relations between the US and the EU, on the one hand, and Russia on the other.

In September 2014, an armistice agreement[7] was signed and until now, the Western powers have not recognized the annexation of Crimea to Russia, Russian action being described as aggression, so the Referendum was illegitimate in the western eyes.

The geographical position came as a curse for Ukraine, given the fact that NATO and the US had no intention to start a direct confrontation with Russia, because neither politically nor economically, none of the parties would have gained. Costs would have been much higher than benefits, even if Western officials condemned President Vladimir Putin's attitude.

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[4] *Chechnya, Russia and 20 years of conflict*, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/12/chechnya-russia-20-years-conflict-2014121161310580523.html

[5] *Conflictul Cecen, 1988-1998 decada care a schimbat faţa Europei*, pp. 31-32, http://cpc-ew.ro/pdfs/conflictul_cecen.pdf

[6] Craig Douglas, *Islamist extremism in Chechnya: A threat to the U.S. homeland?,* 2013, pp. 2-13, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg80551/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg80551.pdf

[7] *Criza din Ucraina: Acord pentru un armistiţiu intre ucraineni şi separatişti, obţinut la Minsk*, http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri- international-18041585-criza-din-ucraina-tiruri-artilerie-langa-portul-mariupol-est.htm

Russian annexation of Crimea led to a new geostrategic reality in Eastern Europe. Russia increased its influence in the Black Sea region. Crimea is geographically at a strategic point, both military and economic, linking the Mediterranean Sea, thus helping Russian transport of any kind. The new Russian territory has two major roles: to stop eastward expansion of Western power and to re-engage Moscow's influence in the Black Sea, right next to NATO.

In conclusion, with the annexation of Crimea, Russia wanted to strengthen its geostrategic position, but also to stop Ukraine from acceding to the Western structures and have access to the Black Sea area. In 2017, Ukraine entered the fourth year of this bloody conflict, despite repeated armistice. The western press described the conflict in Ukraine as a frozen one, but a real solution for it has not been found.

2. Separatist republics, real threat to western security

The methods used by Moscow's authorities to annex Crimea were initially tested on other frozen conflicts in the former Soviet republics. The steps were quite identical and aimed to destabilize local authorities by supporting separatist groups. Frozen conflicts have been an alternative for Russia over the past few years, to show its control, any time it feels unsafe.

In the case of Ukraine, the stake was much higher than in the other regions, taking into consideration NATO's enlargement in the eastern part of Europe, pushing the limit of the North Atlantic Organization at the border of the Russian Federation.

If we make a brief analysis of Russia's international context and foreign policy, we would see that it is unlikely that it will abandon its policy of involvement in the post-Soviet conflicts, especially given the fact that it can use frozen conflicts, any time in order to maintain its control over its neighborhood countries, such as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and even Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Organized crime in the separatist republics, is out of control, not even the central authorities of the states in territorial disputes, can combat it. Organized crime represents a real challenge for the European Union, which has to keep its eastern flank at a high level of security. Besides that, NATO and the European countries confront with the threat of Islamist terrorists, extremely aggressive on European's land. For Russia, however, organized crime in the conflict zones has been prolific in order to support Putin's regime, especially from a financial point of view[8].

Georgia continues to have a big problem between its borders. The uncertain situation, the weakened control and the isolation in a geographical area that does not allow it direct rapprochement with Western European forces, led to the destabilization on frontiers. Drugs trafficking from Georgian territory through Abkhazia and South Ossetia was one billion dollars in 2012[9]. This is very serious, given the fact that most fundamentalist organizations have recognized that they use drug trafficking to finance terrorist actions.

Although Russians have gained on short time, as a result of maintaining conflicts at its borders ready to erupt at any time and thus strengthen Russian military presence, and implicitly the enhancing control in the region, on long-term is one of the most unfortunate strategies. Regional security in the Caucasus is just an illusion, as organized crime, illicit arms trade and drug trafficking, finance and attract extremist organizations.

The events in South Ossetia and the self-proclaiming independence of Abkhazia were the first signs that Russia is becoming an important geopolitical factor in the wider Black Sea area. At the same time, NATO has considerably increased its Black Sea naval capabilities being helped by member states like Turkey and Romania amid the fight against terrorism.

Geographically speaking, the Caspian Sea area has always been reason for conflict between the great powers, ever since the days of the Great Ottoman, Persian and Russian Empires. This

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[8] *Putin Frozen's Conflicts, 2015,* http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/13/putins-frozen-conflicts/
[9] Kevin Kennelly, *The role of NATO and the EU in resolving frozen conflicts,* 2006, p. 47, http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/2435

geostrategic area is a commercial hub between Europe and Asia, assuring an exit to the Black Sea, therefore a direct link to Europe. The dispute's objective of the Caspian region goes beyond political influence, in the economic area, especially in terms of energy transportation to the European market.

The new geostrategic position of Russia in the Black Sea can signify beyond political tensions, the beginning of a long-term cooperation contributing to the development of the littoral states and their coalitions. Given the fact that in 2017 the reality makes NATO meet Russia in the Black Sea, this could have two opposite effects, the first can lead to a worsening of international relations and geopolitical conflicts, and the second can determine multilateral discussions of cooperation between the political forces for the economic development of the area, for the protection of the environment and for maintaining a peaceful climate. It depends only on NATO, EU and Russia if they will be able to cope with this new geopolitical reality in the wider Black Sea area.

Romania is and it will remain a reliable partner for Europe and the US, both economically and militarily. Especially in the context of the new relations between Romania and the US, amid the visit of the Romanian President, Klaus Iohannis at the White House, it could become a regional force. Following a press conference held by the presidents of the two states in 2017, a new type of relationship was established between Romania and the United States of America, a strategic partnership based on bilateral relations. The relationship between the US, NATO and Romania improved considerably. On that occasion Romanian president declared his support for the peacekeeping efforts of the international community. On the same occasion, US President, Donald Trump said that both the US and NATO want a dialogue with Russia, but at the same time they cannot agree with its attitude, saying that Russia's discouragement is still desirable[10].

In the context in which a president with authoritarian visions won elections in Turkey, the future of NATO troops on its territory is uncertain. In this direction, the next European state, politically and economically stable, but also vertically that shares western values, is Romania.

Conclusions

Few European leaders are willing to accept that Russia has a traditional veto right regarding the trajectory of the states in its immediate neighborhood, and fewer are willing to engage in a direct conflict with Russia.

The Russian Federation has increased its military activities lately and has placed military bases, on neighboring countries such as Belarus, or Armenia. All these moves culminated with the military base that was conquered by the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. Thus Russia gained the unconditional Black Sea exit, which until recently was exclusively under the influence of NATO forces through Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria.

It is very important that NATO and the EU make realistic assessments of these conflicts and try to develop practical strategies for solving problems in this tensed region. The stability of states that suffered from Russia's aggression: Georgia, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldavia, represent for both NATO and the European Union a security challenge. That is why they are forced to involve in future events on this territory. Moreover, cooperation between the three main countries that passed through similar situations, could contribute to increasing security in Eastern Europe, but also in the Caucasus.

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[10] Video update, *Întâlnire Trump-Iohannis: Președintele american apreciază România ca aliat și pentru lupta împotriva corupției,* 10 iunie 2017, https://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2017/06/10/intalnire-trump-iohannis-presedintele-american-apreciaza-romania-ca-aliat-si-pentru-lupta-impotriva-coruptiei-00-30-16

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ENHANCING EUROPEAN DEFENCE – EU'S WAY OF TACKLING MAJOR VULNERABILITIES?

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Abstract: In the context of the successive overlapping crises and deepening vulnerabilities, one of the top priorities set at EU's level is enhancing its security and defence dimension, namely CSDP. The effervescence of documents and measures undertaken in the last two years stand as a proof of the engagement of Brussels in this direction. The analysis of the present paper departs from the premise that EU experienced a similar tendency every time it faced a serious crisis with a strong impact on its security, and that most of the initiatives launched in those contexts were prone to vanishing when the crises deescalated and the consequences mitigated.

This research paper approaches major vulnerabilities, which could threaten the success of the current EU initiatives in security and defence matters and, the main focus is on the political dimension. The reason for this is that, in the absence of the political will, there is no possible progress in CSDP, an inter-governmental area where states have always been reluctant in giving up sovereignty. Therefore, after a brief presentation of the progresses registered in CSDP area, the analysis turns towards the main political challenges, as well as to the external actions deepening those challenges and making it even more difficult for these initiatives to be successful.

Keywords: CSDP, crisis, anti-EU populism, hybrid warfare.

Introduction

Talking about vulnerabilities has become implicit to almost any debate about the future of the European Union. The numerous crises seriously impacted on almost every single level of EU action – economic, financial, political, social, military, energy etc., revealing a worrisome congestion of this organization's weak points: Brexit, the rise of far-right populism, the lingering migration issues, Russia's aggressive rhetoric unto Western actors, the doubts raised by Trump's administration regarding US engagement in European security which is conditioned by European states complying with their financial engagements in NATO, the increasingly frequent terrorist attacks on European states' territories. All these create the image of an EU shattered from within while its security is seriously being challenged from the outside. In our opinion, all of them point out EU's legitimacy crisis has reached a new peak point in the history of its escalation.

However, under these challenging conditions, there is an obvious trend of focusing more on enhancing the Euro area and EU's security and defence dimension. Namely, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the so-called "EU's armed hand", which has never benefitted of much capital of trust due to the primacy of NATO's role in European security equation and of the mainly economic and political nature of the Union. Consequently, neither has it seen too much will of EU's member state to initiate or support its genuine development.

At the same time, when studying CSDP evolution in the course of time, one could easily notice a reactive nature of its development, the fact that EU member states have inclined to show more will and allot more financial resources to CSDP in a crisis context. In this regard, we could recall the fact that the first steps towards what we know today as CSDP were taken during the wars determining Yugoslavia's dissolution or that EDA took birth following an EU Council decision in 2004, soon after the war in Iraq begun. In a similar way we could report to pooling and sharing

initiative, launched in 2010, when the world was strongly marked by the world economic and financial crisis.

1. Recent EU defence enhancement initiatives

On the background of the aforementioned crises and almost simultaneously with British citizens' decision to leave the EU, Brussels entered one of the most effervescent stages of CSDP development. At the end of June 2016, EU's High Representative issued a new security strategy coming to the fore through the fact that it is based on a realist evaluation of the international security environment and by setting some key principles – principled pragmatism, resilience of states and societies and strategic autonomy[1].

In fact, in our opinion, strategic autonomy concept is the key for understanding the recent evolutions in EU defence as it refers to developing the capacity of initiating actions for guaranteeing European security and the security of EU's close vicinity, as well as of the instruments necessary for putting this into practice. The document emphasizes the development of hard security. EU's attachment to this idea has been proved through a series of subsequent documents.

Thus, in November 2016, it was issued an *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* (IPSD), containing a set of actual actions meant to allow the EU to reach the level of ambition established through the EUGS[2]. In the same period of time, European Commission issued a *European Defence Action Plan* (EDAP), containing its proposals for creating new financial instruments for developing European capabilities and cooperation supporting European defence industry and technological innovation[3]. The main propositions are: a) an European Defence Fund for supporting investment in European equipment and technology research and development; b) encouraging small and medium defence industries companies; c) enhancing the defence common market.

In March 2017, there was an EU Council on Security and Defence, deciding the following further measures: a) setting the Military Planning and Conduct Capability b) engagement to implement permanent structured cooperation (PESCO); c) establishment of a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD); d) enhancement of EU rapid reaction tools, including EU Battlegroups and civilian capabilities[4].

Another key aspect of the recent evolutions is the fact that, after Brexit referendum, two countries affirmed themselves as EU leaders, forming a new core engine for the organization's further development – Germany and France – and security and defence is no exception from this trend. In this line of thought, we consider notable the six page Franco-German proposal to re-launch European defence[5], coming into the open in September 2016. This proposal contained the following key points: higher rapidity and efficiency of the deployment EU missions and operations; a permanent EU Military Headquarters, a joint civil and military capacity to plan and conduct operations; facilitation of EU Battlegroups deployment, EU's rapid response force created in 2007 but never used; member states who want and have the capacity to share their defence capabilities within the permanent structured cooperation, without the opposing states to be able to prevent them from doing so; a medical headquarters to pool and share resources; a European transport and

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[1] ***, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, Bruxelles, June 2016, URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_review_web.pdf, accessed on 8 September 2017.

[2] ***, Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Council of the European Union, 14 November 2016, URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf, accessed on 12 September 2017.

[3] ***, European Defence Action Plan: Towards a European Defence Fund, European Commission, 30 November 2016, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4088_en.htm, accessed at 10 October 2017.

[4] ***, Security and defence: Council reviews progress and agrees to improve support for military missions, URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/06-defence-security/, accessed on 6 September 2017.

[5] Alain Barluet, „Le feuille de route franco-allemande pour relancer l'Europe de la défence", in *Le Figaro*, 11 Septembre 2016, URL: http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2016/09/11/01003-20160911ARTFIG00140-la-feuille-de-route-franco-allemande-pour-relancer-l-europe-de-la-defense.php, accessed on 20 February 2017.

logistics hub; developing a European Defence Fund to fund military-related programs and stimulate research and innovation in this field.

The second part of 2017 has been marked by a continuation of these initiatives, with an emphasis on PESCO. In this respect, EU actors issued some notable documents and positions. Firstly, we shall consider *Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence[6],* released by the European Commission June, 7th, 2017. It is the second scenario-based paper after the *White Paper on the Future of Europe*, issued in March 2017 and, similarly, it describes three main scenarios on EU defence evolution departing from one not implying major changes from the current situation to the most ambitious one, supposing the creation of a defence and security union, of the common defence as described by the text of the Treaties.

As far as this document is concerned, a major importance is borne by the selected criteria for evaluating the international security environment, which actually contains the reasons for which it is necessary to deepen integration in this area. Here, there are included not only increased security risks and threats or the need for sovereign states to cooperate in order to cope with the current challenges of the security environment, but also the evolution of the Transatlantic relation, Brexit implications and the need to expand the extent and the efficiency of defence expenses[7].

As mentioned before, security and defence integration has been recently a recurrent topic for the French and German leaders. The creation of a common European reaction force until 2020, of a common defence budget, a common defence doctrine and PESCO are among the main ideas resumed within public discourse of both leaders[8].

Subsequently, in November, the 13th, 23 EU Member states agreed a Joint Notification on the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)[9] and promoted it to the High Representative of the EU. PESCO is a provision included in the Treaty of Lisbon, providing that those EU member states which have the will and capacity can agree to enhance their cooperation in defence capabilities development, common defence investments, operational readiness and contribution to their armed forces. The states that signed the notification are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

The text of the notification includes not only the expression of these states engagement to cooperate within PESCO initiative and the adhesion to its principles, but also the acceptance of the two tools allowing PESCO to function and proposed previously by the European Commission – European Defence Fund and CARD.

2. Political trends on the European arena

The last two years have seen an abundance of efforts to enhance EU's security and defence. At a first glance, this might seem paradoxical, especially if we take into account the recent evolutions specific to EU member states' domestic political arena, namely the rise of far-right political extremism characteristic to several European countries deeply rooted in a loss of European institutions' capital of trust. This happens because CSDP development is actually highly dependent on political will and financial means to initiate and support it.

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[6] ***, *Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defence*, European Commission, 7 June 2017, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defence_en.pdf, accessed on 7 September 2017.
[7] Ibidem, pp. 11-12.
[8] In this respect, we could follow the discourses and decisions made on the German-French ministerial meetings in June, 10th and July, 13th, the speech held by the French president during his visit to Romania on August, 25th, or at Sorbonne University on September, 26th, as well as the manner in which all these ideas are mirrored within the speech of the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Junker, on the State of the Union 2017.
[9] ***, Notification on the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf, accessed at 13 November 2017.

Beyond the institutional and technical details of CSDP evolution, a high or, even higher relevance for its prospective success could be attached to the European internal politics related trends constituting both the context and the stimulus for these developments.

CSDP development has been for a long time a lingering issue both for EU member states and for Brussels. NATO's duplication was one of the main reasons invoked when coming to CSDP. Namely, investing in European defence wasn't seen so much as a rational action on the international arena as long as most of EU's member states were also NATO's members, benefitting of its highly reliable security guarantees and, implicitly, of US security guarantees.

At the same time, Europe has enjoyed a long time of peace and prosperity, when military risks and threats were considered almost void. In this context, contributing to the stability and security of the neighbouring countries mostly through "soft" power instruments, turning to advantage its normative power was also a rational choice. Military instrument of power was considered important, but, in the hierarchy of the instruments of power, it always fell on a second or third or fourth place, usually being outpaced by the economic, diplomatic or informational ones.

Briefly, EU member states weren't identifying a strong interest in investing in this area. Their awareness on its importance and the lack of incentives to take decisive steps towards its development is mirrored within the Treaty of Lisbon: "The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence" (article 24)[10]. Common defence was described as a desideratum, as a process in the making.

In the current context, the extent and intensity of crises function both as stimulus for reformation and as lingering challenges to its success. In this line of thought, whether these initiatives would lead to a genuine evolution of CSDP or not strongly depends on EU member states will and capacity to support it politically and financially. Brussels' legitimacy crisis can be related to a serious decrease of European citizens' trust in EU, which, nowadays is also reflected in the rise of populism in many EU member states, which is based in critics to EU's performances.

The subsequent crises started with 2008 economic and financial crisis, continuing with the Arab Spring, the Ukrainian crisis, the Syrian civil war, culminating with the European refugee crises, the increase of the frequency of terrorist attacks in EU member states and Brexit determined a decrease of the capital of trust of Brussels' politics on all levels. It has been a trend clearly reflected both in official statistics and in the domestic politics of the member states.

Figure no. 1. Optimism for the future of the EU
Source: Spring 2017 - Standard Eurobarometer:
Trust in the EU and views on the state of the economy are improving[11]

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[10] Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2010, p. 30.
[11] European Commission - Press release, "A European spring? Latest Standard Eurobarometer shows Optimism is on the rise", Brussels, 2 August 2017, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2127_en.htm, accessed at 9 November 2017.

Eurobarometers show a declining tendency of EU citizens' optimism regarding the future of the EU ever since 2007, reaching a lowest point in 2011 when the consequences of the economic and financial crisis were felt the most, but also in 2016, when UK organized the referendum on its exit from the EU. In 2017, we can see an increase of European optimism regarding EU's future (Figure no.1).

All these fluctuations in terms of population's optimism regarding the EU have had a correspondent in the domestic politics, which has often been translated in the rise of populism based on critics to EU's performances, as well as of the far-right political extremism.

Theoretically, populism was described as less an ideology and more a certain manner of relating to the world, based on the idea that society is divided in two homogeneous and antagonistic parts and that politics shall be the expression of the people's general will[12]. Therefore, populism has a deep illiberal nature, rejecting the diversity of ideas and opinions within societies, as well as the fundamental principles of the modern constitutional thinking and turns to advantage the gap between political leaders' promises, on the one hand, and, on the other, what they succeed in actually doing[13]. As it lacks a solid ideological content, populism generally is manifested together with other ideologies and in the current crisis-prone European environment, it finds a favourable terrain for development.

Thus, studies illustrate that, in European states, ever since 1960, right wing populist parties have doubled the percentage of the votes; and the percentage of the votes received by left wing populist parties are five times higher. Also, a recent report of Freedom House, *Nations in Transit. The False Promise of Populism*, reveal a decay of democracy on the entire European territory. The report shows that, in 2017, out of the 29 states which were the object of the study, more than a half of them registered decreases of the democracy scores – the second biggest decrease registered in the history of this report, ever since the world financial and economic crisis[14].

Examples in this sense are not scarce, but, in my opinion, the European refugee crisis has been the one constituting the most favourable environment for nationalism, populism, xenophobia, and Euroscepticism. In other words, the increase of the feeling of insecurity at European level, on the background of a slow economic recovery after the world economic and financial crisis, and of the increase of the migrant flow on the European territory formed the basis for the development of nationalist and/or populist political discourse. Moreover, as all these crises reached a European extent and the measures for their mitigation undertaken at European level haven't generated the expected results, the same discourse generally concerned the European elites. As a consequence, nationalism and populism rise go hand in hand with Euroscepticism, with the harsh critique of the EU institutions efficiency and anti-EU attitude.

Although rarely have these political formations acceded to European states' lead, they have certainly known an accession on European states' domestic political arena. Eloquent examples in this respect are the result of national legislative elections held this year in Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Netherlands[15].

In France, after giving the main counter-candidate for the current president of the state, *the National Front* received, at the parliamentary elections in June, 11th, 8 mandates and its president, Marine le Pen, entered for the first time in the lower chamber of the legislative. In Germany, on September, 23rd, it is the first time after WWII when a far-right party – *Alternative für Deutschland* – entered the Bundestag. Unpopular measures undertaken both in Germany and at EU's level in the context of the European refugee crisis seem to have played a major role in this respect. Thus, these

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[12] Cass Mudde, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism. A very short introduction*, Oxford University Press, UK, 2017, p. 6.
[13] Nate Schenkan, "The false promise of populism", The Freedom House, 4 April 2017, URL: https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-20171, accessed at 5 October 2017.
[14] Ibidem.
[15] For details, see Katya Adler, "Is Europe lurching to the far right?", in *BBC News*, 28 April 2017, URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36150807, accessed at 28 September 2017.

two ballots are illustrative as they show an increase of anti-European political extremism in the countries asserting themselves as the core European leaders after the Brexit.

These political trends are extremely significant not only for the success of the new EU defence and security initiatives, but also for the entire future of EU security. There are many reasons for this. Maybe one of the most obvious is that it would be only difficult to get the political support necessary for registering evolutions in an area in which the main decision lies in the hands of national governments. It is also a framework for better understanding the apparent paradoxical attitude of EU in the current context. On the one hand, we have clear statements regarding the attachment to EU solidarity and will to continue together as a Union of 27 Member States. On the other hand, we also witness a tendency of making progresses of those who have the necessary political will to, namely a reification of multi-speed Europe. And here, security and defence, through PESCO is an eloquent example. A good illustration of this state of facts can be also found in the text of the Rome Declaration (2017). In this document, the leaders of EU's 27 member states, of the European Council, European Parliament and European Commission express their will and engagement to EU's institutional framework, flexibility/"multispeed Europe" being just a part of it. "Unity is both a necessity and our free choice. Taken individually, we would be side-lined by global dynamics. Standing together is our best chance to influence them, and to defend our common interests and values. We will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the door open to those who want to join later. Our Union is undivided and indivisible"[16]. Our explanation is that, as long as the political context doesn't allow the full unity of effort for making progresses on a certain direction, the sole solution left is to gather some effort and hope for the rest to join when ready.

3. Political vulnerability to current security risks and threats

This state of art becomes even more important when considering the recent evolutions in terms of security risks and threats and, here, one shall reckon the international and regional security context created after the escalation of the tensions between Western actors, the EU and its member states included, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Russian Federation. In these conditions, the idea of hybrid warfare has become a new series of buzz word in security and defence studies.

Hybrid warfare is usually used in relation to the Russian actions in Ukraine, to describe a certain type of conflict characterizing the tensions between the West and Russia in the current context. From a military point of view, this state of facts is attached to the 5th Generation Warfare, highly asymmetrical, hybrid, unrestricted, defining a non-contact conflict carried out with high precision ammunition and weapons, UAVs, offensive and defensive cyber techniques, information operations, psychological influence and propaganda on a large scale, strategic communication techniques, etc. all of them turned to advantage in order to support an actor's own actions and delegitimize the actions of the adversary[17]. In other words, hybrid warfare supposes the use of the entire spectrum of means in combination (political, military, economic, financial, information) etc.

For the purpose of the present study is the information war, the strategic communication and propaganda dimension of this type of conflict, directed towards influencing the opinions and beliefs of population. In order to understand the implications of these evolutions in terms of security risks and threats and even of the current way of conducting warfare, one of the most eloquent explanations could be found in the Russian definition of information warfare: "the ability to, among other things, undermine political, economic, and social systems; carry out mass psychological

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[16] ***, *The Rome Declaration. Declaration of the leaders of 27 member states and of the European Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission*, 25 March 2017, URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2017/3/47244656633_en.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017.
[17] Stan Anton (editor), Alexandra Sarcinschi, Eugen Siteanu, *Conflictele atipice ale secolului al XXI-lea*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, p. 33.

campaigns against the population of a State in order to destabilize society and the government; and force a State to make decisions in the interests of their opponents"[18].

This approach has been proved successful in Ukraine and there are also clear tokens that this strategy could be also put into practice in any type of confrontation with the Western actors[19]. Actually, the fact that Russia carries out and encourages active measures in Europe to destabilize and confuse governments and societies, with the sole objective of weakening NATO and EU and creating a more conducive environment for itself[20] has also been well documented. Moreover, at EU's level was organized East StratCom Task Force, meant to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns in the Eastern Neighbourhood, which is a clear indication of the extent of this type of actions in international politics nowadays.

Going back to the study of these measures meant to destabilize European states and societies, M. Galeotti warns that they can consist in actions going from supporting populist parties through disinformation to espionage campaigns. Even more, when assessing the level of European states' vulnerability to these active measures, depending on the institutional strength, he shows that in European leader states, such as France and Germany, these measures are aimed at disruption, at encouraging internal divisions and uncertainties which would finally make the respective country incapable of playing a strong role. As far as the countries with a low institutional strength (Hungary, Montenegro, Romania) concerned, these measures are oriented towards influencing them in specific issues, such as sanctions, by pushing an anti-American, anti-EU narrative in the public speech[21].

To all these, shall also be added the high dependency of some European states on Russia in terms of energy security. Imposing and supporting economic sanctions against Russia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis has often been considered an unexpected show of solidarity among EU member states, especially due to the fact that some of them have had relatively strong economic ties with Moscow, especially in the energy area. In this respect, we can retrospect to the fact that some European states developed special relations with Russia, even undermining EU common policies, being considered "friendly pragmatics", such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain[22].

Therefore, the measures envisaging to shatter EU solidarity can find a favourable terrain in the current EU political landscape and could aggravate the legitimacy crisis at Brussels level, not only by targeting the institutions at this level, but also by favouring an anti-EU discourse at the level of EU member states' domestic arena. The recrudescence populism is, under the conditions characteristic to a hybrid approach in conflict, a vulnerability which might be amplified in order to deepen the institutional and legitimacy crisis at EU's level and to erode even more the European solidarity, to deepen even more an already vulnerable point.

Conclusions

EU's efforts to enhance its security and defence policy have come to the fore, together with the ones of consolidating Euro area both as a result and as a solution of Brussels' legitimacy crisis, which brought up the need for a strong re-foundation discourse. In this context, EU leaders choose to strengthen the most obvious European success story – Euro area – and the most discrete one – security and defence.

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[18] ***, Russian Federation Armed Forces' Information Space Activities Concept, URL: http://eng.mil.ru/en/science/publications/more.htm?id=10845074@cmsArticle, accessed at 30 October 2017.

[19] Edward Lucas, Ben Nimmo, Information Warfare: What Is It and to Win It?, CEPA Infowar Paper No. 1, Center for European Policy Analysis, November 2015, p. 2, URL: http://www.cepa.org//sites/default/files/Infowar%20Report.pdf, accessed at 20 October 2017.

[20] Mark Galeotti, *Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages Its Political War in Europe*, Policy Brief, European Council of Foreign Relations, August 2017, URL: http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/controlling_chaos_how_russia_manages_its_political_war_in_europe, accessed on 12 September 2017.

[21] Ibidem, pp. 7-8.

[22] Mark Leonard; Nicu Popescu, *A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations*, Policy Paper, European Council on Foreign Affairs, 2007, pp. 29, 34-35, 39-41, 43-45, 49.

We shall also keep in mind that enhancing EU security and defence has also seen periods of effervescence, coinciding with major crises. So, is the current crisis-marked and crisis-prone European security environment favourable to a genuine progress in CSDP area? Namely, will these new initiatives overcome the stage of mere political declarations vanishing away in the course of time? Is there a real interest at European member states' level for this to happen?

What is certain is the fact that the topic of forging a genuine common defence as stated in the treaties, of pulling it out from the desideratum area and putting it into practice has entered the public discourse at European level again and is accompanied by corresponding documents and decisions.

So, in my opinion, if the crisis context could indeed function as an incentive for EU security and defence development, not the same happens when this crisis concerns the political will to deepen integration in this area. On the one hand, it is a rational measure to pay more attention to security and defence in a context where there is a recent military action within a neighbouring country and the extended neighbouring area remains unstable. On the other hand, there is a clear impact of the thickening of populism trend in EU Member States. Even though rarely this type of political parties came to the leadership of the states, recent political evolutions are noteworthy and can function as a threat to the success of EU's effort to enhance security and defence.

As a *sui generis* organization, defining itself as having both a supra-national and inter-governmental nature, EU has always been vulnerable from this point of view. Its relatively poor performances, the lack of sufficient levers of undertaking actions in security and defence matters have been, in the course of time, connected to the difficulty in reaching consensus among the member states. The successive crises with a high impact on people's living, determining both national and European institutions to adopt unpopular measures in order to manage the crises and their consequences created a favourable terrain for populist parties to rise. Their main current characteristic is that most of them are anti-European, contesting EU fundamental values. And in this very point are concentrated the external active measures meant to shatter European solidarity and cohesion. The success of the current CSDP initiatives is strongly dependent on overcoming an EU vulnerability, which, in this context, might get even deeper.

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TRANSPARENCY DEFICIT WITHIN NATO-RUSSIA RELATION – A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA

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Abstract: *In the context of a current challenged regional security environment, in which a central element is the tension amplification in NATO-Russia relation on the pattern of security dilemma, a key element is the transparency issue. The present article aims to approach the crucial role of transparency in the security dilemma both form theoretical and applied perspectives. In order to fulfill this goal, the research will use the literature analysis and the analysis of international events relevant for transparency in NATO-Russia relation. The research will address the following questions: what is the relation between transparency and the theoretical pattern of security dilemma? Is transparency a priority in NATO-Russia relation? What is the current situation regarding the level of transparency in NATO – Russia relation?*

Keywords: *transparency, trust and mistrust, security dilemma, NATO-Russia Council, ZAPAD exercises.*

Introduction

Almost at the end of 2017, one can find the international security environment at its highest level of tension since the end of the Cold War. At global and mostly regional levels, this kind of dynamics is influenced at a large extent by the way in which the relation between NATO and Russian Federation evolves.

Even though military and civil cooperation between NATO and Russia has been suspended as a consequence of the Ukrainian crisis, there has been acknowledged the importance of maintaining a political and military dialogue in order to reduce the risk of tensions' escalation. This is the reason why NATO-Russia Council is a very important platform.

The above mentioned information are designing the context in which the present article aims to emphasize the role of transparency in improving NATO-Russia relation. In this pursue, first of all, we shall analyze, from theoretical perspective, what is the role of transparency in the conceptual pattern of the security dilemma. This is because our premise frames NATO-Russian Federation relation in this particular spiral pattern. After this ground framework, the subject will be approached at an applied level. Firstly, this article studies the integration between NATO and Russia in terms of transparency within NATO-Russia Council and, then, by offering a counterexample of communication in terms of transparency, by analyzing the ZAPAD exercise, which we named as a pseudo-transparency case.

2. Security Dilemma and its six constituent elements

In a previous research[1], we have concluded that in order for a situation to be called a security dilemma, a relation between two actors must involve the simultaneous existence of six constituent elements. This finding resulted from analyzing some of the major classical (John Herz,

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[1] Cătălina Todor, "Security dilemma/spiral model's topicality in the analysis of the international environment", *Strategic Impact,* no. 2/2017, available online at https://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm

Herbert Butterfield, and Robert Jervis) and actual (Charles L. Glaser, Andrew Kydd, Shiping Tang, Avid Acharya and Kristopher W. Ramsay) theoretical approaches on the security dilemma.

The six constituent elements are represented in the bellow figure.

Figure no. 1. Constitutive elements of security dilemma in topicality[2]

The detailed description of the six elements meaning is developed in the previous mentioned research. What is of interest for the current article is the 4ᵗʰ element: *Incomplete information*. In this category, we can include the key role played by transparency.

First of all, we must underline that the thesis of incomplete information in the dilemma of security was introduced by Andrew Kydd. In the book entitled *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*, A. Kydd presents the problems of trust as being „at the heart of the security dilemma"[3]. Further, he explains how the incomplete information can affect the degree in which actors cooperate or choose not to cooperate, this impacting the spiral model of security dilemma. The premise for this logic is the level of trust. The author asserts: "...the cooperation is possible when the level of trust for the other exceeds a *minimum trust threshold* for each party (Luhmann 1979:73) ... if levels of trust falls below 50 percent, trustworthy actors will defect because of mistrust ... To mistrust someone is to think it is relatively likely that they prefer to defect even if they think one will cooperate"[4]. Those percentages are calculated using the Prisoner's Dilemma and Assurance Game. Kydd further explains why this concept of truth is distinctive especially in the study of international relations, offering two main reasons: 1. "trust as belief that the other will cooperate in a Prisoner's Dilemma"[5]; 2. "trust as a belief about anticipated behavior rather than about preferences".[6] In this equation of security in which trust plays a crucial role, incomplete information has the potential to decrease its level. He affirms: "Since trust is fundamentally concerned with this kind of uncertainty, uncertainty needs to be at the center of the model, not left as an informal addendum to a complete

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[2] This figure was first published in a previous extended theoretical research: Cătălina Todor, "Security dilemma/spiral model's topicality in the analysis of the international environment", *Strategic Impact,* no. 2/2017, available online at https://cssas.unap.ro/en/periodicals.htm

[3] Avidit Acharya, Kristopher W. Ramsay, „The Calculus of the Security Dilemma", Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, 2013, online at http://stanford.edu/~avidit/security.pdf, accessed at 15.08.2017, p. 2.

[4] Andrew Kydd, „Trust and Mistrust in International Relations", Princeton, , New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 9.

[5] *Ibidem.*

[6] *Ibidem.*

information game."[7] Kydd beliefs that, in the case of incomplete information game models, there can be two types of equilibria[8]: 1. pooling – actors have different motivations, but behave the same, therefore there is not enough information about their preferences; 2. spearing - actors have different preferences and beliefs and they act differently; in this situation a shift from preferences to actions occurs, "the information provided by the actor's behavior may not be conclusive, and there will often still be room for doubt."[9]. In this context, transparency could enhance trust, and trust may lead to better cooperation, if in a relation we identify two security seeking actors.

On the other hand, if we study another essential element, such as the lack of trust and the existence of fear (based on not knowing the intensions of the other actor), most of the studied authors (John Herz, Herbert Butterfield, Andrew Kydd, Shiping Tang) consider the former to be a key component part of the security dilemma. Fear and lack of trust can also be generated by a lack of information, incomplete information and/or inaccurate information.

Taking in consideration the theses of incomplete information, transparency can play a very important part in building and strengthening cooperation between actors. On the reverse path, the lack of transparency and the inaccurate information can lead to uncertainty and can deeply affect the levels of trust in a relation, thus contributing substantially to maintaining high levels of tension. One can observe that this subject is being taken into consideration within NATO-Russia Council reunions.

3. Transparency as key issue in NATO-Russia Council discussions

After the beginning of the Ukraine crisis (2014), which lead to the suspension of military and civil practical cooperation (April 2014), NATO-Russia Council became a very important forum for maintaining political dialogue and military communication (especially in order to increase transparency).

From NATO's perspective, the efforts to create transparency (most of all in the field of military activities) by continuing the dialogue with the Russian Federation, through NATO-Russia Council, has had as a goal to enhance the predictability, to limit/avoid "miscalculations, misunderstandings, incidents, accidents, and if they happen, to make sure that they don't spiral out of control"[10].

Regarding directly the transparency, J. Stoltenberg asserts: "This remains a vital issue for the NATO-Russia Council".[11]

Since 2014, three meeting meetings took place in 2016 and three in 2017, in this format.[12] All these meetings focused around three main directions of dialogue: 1) the Ukraine crisis; 2) regional security challenges such as Afghanistan and terrorism; 3) transparency and risk reduction.[13] As we can observe, one of the key subjects along all these meetings was transparency. Table no. 1 structures the main information exchanges topics between NATO and the Russian Federation in order to increase transparency and reduce the risks.

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[7] *Idem*, p. 10.

[8] *Idem,* pp. 24-25

[9] *Idem*, p. 25.

[10]***, *Press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*, Site oficial NATO, 13.07.2017, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_146220.htm, accessed at 14.07.2017.

[11] *Idem*.

[12] ***,*NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_50091.htm, accessed at 22.10.2017.

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Table no. 1. Information exchanges between NATO and Russian Federation for transparency and risk reduction

NRC Meeting		NATO: information exchanged with Russia	Russian Federation: information exchanged with NATO
2016	20th April	▪ expressed concern about April's incidents in the Baltic region involving Russian military aircraft[14] ▪ „NATO nations have tabled concrete proposals on how to modernize the Vienna Document on military transparency"[15]	Maria Zakharova: "We intend to express our concern over the bloc's open policy of military and political deterrence of Russia and the continued eastward movement of its military infrastructure, which we see as contradicting the spirit of the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act,"[16]
	13th July	▪ „NATO briefed Russia on Warsaw Summit decisions"[17]	The Russian delegation „raised a proposal on air safety in the Baltic Sea"[18]
	19th December	▪ briefings on Baltic Sea Project and the International Civil Aviation Organization ▪ Presentation on Exercise Trident Juncture 2016 ▪ „concern over the excessive use of snap exercises"[19]	Russia gave a briefing on the KAVKAZ-2016 exercise[20]
2017	30th March	▪ an exchange on military postures ▪ briefing on the four battle groups deployed to Poland and the Baltic countries[21]	Briefing on the three new divisions in its Western Military District.[22]
	13th July	▪ advance briefings on upcoming exercises ▪ NATO briefed Russia on Exercise Trident Javelin 2017[23]	Russia briefed NATO on the ZAPAD 2017 exercise[24]
	26th October	▪ exchanged information on recent exercises ▪ „Allies made clear that the scale and geographical scope of exercise ZAPAD 2017 significantly exceeded what Russia had previously announced"[25]	▪ exchanged information on recent exercises[26]

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[14] ***, *Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the NATO-Russia Council meeting*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_129999.htm, accessed at 22.10.2017.

[15] *Idem.*

[16] Francois Lenoir, „First Russia-NATO Council Since June 2014 Kicks Off in Brussels", *Sputnik International*, 20.04.2016, apud Reuters, online at https://sputn iknews.com/politics/201604201038304823-russia-nato-council-brussels/, accessed at 29.03.2017.

[17] ***, NATO Secretary General welcomes frank and open discussions in NATO-Russia Council, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_134100.htm, accessed at 22.10.2017.

[18] *Idem.*

[19] ***, *Statement by the NATO Secretary General following a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, , online at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions_139569.htm, accessed at 22.10.2017.

[20] *Idem.*

[21] ***, *Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg ahead of meetings of NATO Foreign Ministers and after a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions_142782.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed at 22.10.2017.

[22]*Idem.*

[23] ***, *Press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions_146220.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed at 22.10.2017.

[24] *Idem.*

[25] ***, *Press point by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions147976.htm?Selected Locale =en, accessed at 27.10.2017.

[26] *Idem.*

Since 2016, some progresses has been observed in terms of dialogue over transparency. For example NATO emphasized the progress made during the meeting in December 2016, where the actors provided a briefing on their exercises. Within the March 2017 Council, another step was taken by exchanging military postures. The second NATO-Russia Council meeting in 2017 pointed out the fact that such exchanges of military information are important elements for continuing the dialogue. This can have the role to help limiting "the risk of misunderstanding, miscalculation and unintended escalation"[27]. Even though progress could be observed in terms of dialogue over transparency, the latest Russian military exercises proved the need to further enhance transparency and predictability in the region. Furthermore, within the October 2017 meeting of the Council, J. Stoltenberg asserted: "So the importance of these kinds of tools [referring to the specific tools in order to increase transparency, such as: possibility of having snap observation] and respecting them is even more important now and therefore we call on Russia to fully respect the Vienna document but also to engage in a constructive dialogue on how to modernize the Vienna document to improve the way it can be a tool for transparency and risk reduction."[28] Also, he expressed the wish for such information exchanges to continue within the Council, on the principle of reciprocal exercise briefings, including advance briefings which has proven to be useful.[29]

Even though NATO- Russia Council focuses on increasing transparency, ZAPAD, as the latest most important and relevant Russian military exercise in this region of interest, proved the existence of incomplete or inaccurate information that can deeply affect the trust between NATO and the Russian Federation.

4. ZAPAD an exponent for pseudo-transparency[30]

Before the exercises took place, the Russian Defence Ministry offered some data over ZAPAD 2017, among which we can mention the following[31].

➢ **Number of officially announced troops**: about 12.700 troops, out of which 7,200 Belarusian troops, 5,500 Russian troops and 3 thousand of them – on the territory of Belarus[32].

➢ **Military equipment:** „about 70 aircraft and helicopters, up to 680 pieces of military hardware including about 250 tanks, up to 200 guns, MLRSs and mortars as well as 10 warships are planned to be involved in the exercise"[33].

➢ **Russian detached operational groups**: MIA, Rosguard, FSB and EMERCOM.

➢ **Location:** Republic of Belarus, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, and Pskov regions.

➢ **Scenario:** „The exercise stipulates that some extremist groups have penetrated to the territories of the Republic of Belarus and the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation in order to carry out terrorist attacks and destabilize the Union State of Russia and Belarus. The simulated extremists are supported from outside by receiving logistics assistance and military hardware by air- and sealift."[34]

➢ **Tactical episodes imply:** deployment of military units, airborne and air defence operations, special operation, naval blockade of the special operation area.

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[27]***, *Press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/opinions_146220.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed at 22.10.2017.

[28] ***, *Press point by the NATO Secretary ...*, 26.10.2017, *op.cit.*

[29] *Idem.*

[30] Some of the informations form this chapter were used also in a previous research, published only in Romanian: Cătălina Todor, „Dialogul şi transparenţa în relaţiile NATO-Rusia ca urmare a celor mai importante evenimente din perioada iunie – septembrie 2017", *Dinamica mediului de securitate iunie-septembrie 2017*, online at https://cssas.unap.ro/ro/dms.htm.

[31] ***, *Zapad 2017 joined strategic excercise*, Official site of Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation , online at http://eng.mil.ru/en/mission/practice/more.htm?id=12140115@egNews, accessed at 22.10.2017.

[32] *Idem.*

[33] *Idem.*

[34] *Idem.*

➢ Purely defensive nature of the exercise.

Even though the Russian Federation offered this information before the developments and ZAPAD exercise was discussed within NATO-Russia Council, NATO representatives addressed a call for transparency to the parts involved. J. Stoltenberg asserted: "We expect Russia to follow those obligations [referring to the so called Vienna Document], they haven't done that so far … Russia has used different loopholes and not notified and not facilitated international inspections of their exercises for many, many years"[35]. Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges stated that: "For me, Zapad represents an opportunity for the Russians to demonstrate that they are committed to security and stability in Europe also through transparency, by inviting media, by inviting observers, more than the minimums required by Vienna, to demonstrate, to show what's going on, to be transparent"[36]. This type of messages signifies a level of fear that inaccurate or incomplete information might bring in the case of this event, affecting the transparency in the relation between NATO and Russia. Therefore, such a dynamics could lead to uncertainty and possible influence in terms of the spiral model of the security dilemma (to contribute to increased tension, due to the fact that lack of information/transparency can lead to fear about the other actor's intention, and fear can lead to accumulation of power, and accumulation of power to a decreased level of security in the system).

Belarus, by the voice of its President, Lukashenko, requested transparency of all the ones involved in ZAPAD, right from the beginning of the year: "I require from all of you to make this event transparent on the territory of our country and all measures accessible not only for our friends from the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization], the EAEU [Eurasian Economic Union] and the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] member states but also for representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance – NATO".[37] Furthermore, he added: „We are not hiding and should not hide anything. If NATO representatives want to be present at our drills, you are welcome. Moreover, I'm already receiving such information and such signals from them … We are not shutting down from anyone. We will invite all those who wish to these exercises and you'll see that they are solely of defensive nature"[38].

On the other hand, Major General Igor Konashenkov, Russian Defense Ministry's Spokesman, pointed out a lack of reciprocity regarding the transparency, but the engagement of Russia in assuring full media coverage of the ZAPAD exercise, asserting: "It is highly improbable to find either a motivated journalist or a media outlet in Russia that the Defense Ministry has not invited to cover military exercises over the last five years … Instead of urging us to be transparent, General Hodges should recall whether Russian journalists have ever been invited to cover the US Army's exercises in Europe"[39].

The analysis of some data observed after the ZAPAD exercises took place indicates that the concerns related to transparency were valid:

➢ **Numbers**: one can find a significant difference between the official data and the real ones. As we previously mentioned, the official estimates were around 12,700 Russian and Belarusian troops. After the events, Ben Hodges assessed the number of troops was somewhere around 40,000.[40] Even though this number is much smaller than the one feared before the exercises by Lithuania, Estonia and Germany, where this exercise was expected to attend approximate

[35] Andrew Rettman, „Nato's Russia-deterrent force 'fully operational'", *EU Observer*, Bruxelles, 30.06.2017, online at https://euobserver.com/foreign/138399, accessed at 30.06.2017.

[36] ***, „U.S. general wants Russia to open up major exercise to observers", *Reuters*, 01.03.2017, online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-military-exercises/u-s-general-wants-russia-to-open-up-major-exercise-to-observers-idUSKBN1684CE, accessed at 23.03.2017.

[37] ***, „Lukashenko calls for 'transparency', consents to NATO observing Belarus-Russia drills", *TASS*, 20.03.2017, online at http://tass.com/world/936455, accessed at 23.03.2017.

[38] ***, „Lukashenko calls for 'transparency', consents to NATO observing Belarus-Russia drills", *op. cit.*

[39] ***, „Russia set to invite media to military exercises without West's advice - defense ministry", *TASS*, 13.03.2017, online at http://tass.com/defense/945741, accessed at 23.03.2017.

[40] Mihaela Moise, „Exercițiul Zapad a mobilizat peste 40.000 de militari din Rusia și Belarus, anunță armata americană", *Agerpres*, 02.10.2017, online at https://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2017/10/02/exercitiul-zapad-a-mobilizat-peste-40-000-de-militari-din-rusia-si-belarus-anunta-armata-americana-19-40-33, accessed at 02.10.2017.

100,000 troops[41], it is still at least three times bigger number than the one official declared. A *Helsinki Commission* Report asserts that Western officials believe Russia has manipulated the number of troops in order „to fall conveniently below the Vienna Document thresholds requiring full observation missions"[42].

➢ **Observers**: according to some media information, Belarus invited military observers from seven states to participate at the exercise.[43] But J. Stoltenberg asserted that the number of observers allocated to NATO (three) was not enough to ensure the transparency.[44] On the one hand, Belarus made efforts in order to increase transparency: „including providing briefings at NATO headquarters; organizing the distinguished visitors program; and inviting a selected group of neighboring states for somewhat more extensive observations."[45] *Helsinki Commission* Report mentions that an invitation to approximately 90 officials from neighboring countries and international organizations (Helsinki Commission, OSCE, NATO, and the ICRC) was made for this purpose.[46] However, this report identifies a series of issues that decrease transparency even though Belarus made efforts in this direction: „while the military demonstration provided during the visitors' program was certainly impressive, it offered its participants little chance to assess the totality of the exercise and verify, for example, its scale and scope through first-hand observation."[47] Instead, a full Vienna Document observation mission would have provided a satisfactory level of transparency.[48]

Therefore, ZAPAD exercise proved once again that there is a deficit of transparency and it has the potential to contribute to the deterioration of the security environment. The inaccurate nature of information may damage even more the level of trust in the NATO - Russian Federation relation, which can contribute at uprising the spiral pattern of the security dilemma. This idea is emphasized by Tomasz K. Kowalik and Dominik P. Jankowski: „reciprocal transparency is a key element to avoid an uncontrollable military escalation or a spillover effect. Russia, in numerous cases, does not comply with the provisions of the OSCE Vienna Document, which was designed to ensure transparency regarding military exercises, among other considerations. …a growing lack of transparency on the Russian side combined with an increase in Russian snap exercises (four in 2013; eight in 2014; twenty in 2015; eleven in 2016) limits the room for a genuine dialogue and adds political pressure on the decision makers in the West"[49].

Conclusions

This article aimed to emphasize that transparency has a key role in security dilemma patterns, both in theory and practice.

From theoretical perspective, the analysis of literature shows that trust is one of the key elements of the security dilemma pattern. Trust is usually based on information and if it is

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[41] Lilia Traci, Gabriela Badea, „Manevre militare ruso-belaruse: Minskul invită reprezentanți din șapte țări din regiune ca observatori", *Agerpres*, 17.09.2017, online at https://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2017/09/17/manevre-militare-ruso-belaruse-minskul-invita-reprezentanti-din-sapte-tari-din-regiune-ca-observatori-09-50-47, accessed at 17.09.2017.

[42] ***, *IN BRIEF Witness to ZAPAD – Helsinki Commission Report*, Helsinki Commission, online at https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/Report%20-%20Zapad%20-%20Design%20FINAL.pdf, accessed at 25. 10.2017, p. 2.

[43] Lilia Traci, Gabriela Badea, „Manevre militare ruso-belaruse: Minskul invită reprezentanți din șapte țări din regiune ca observatori", *Agerpres*, 17.09.2017, online at https://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2017/09/17/manevre-militare-ruso-belaruse-minskul-invita-reprezentanti-din-sapte-tari-din-regiune-ca-observatori-09-50-47, accessed at 17.09.2017.

[44] *Ibidem.*

[45] ***, *In Brief Witness to ZAPAD – Helsinki Commission Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[46] *Idem*, pp. 2-3.

[47] *Idem*, p. 3.

[48] *Idem.*

[49] Tomasz K. Kowalik, Dominik P. Jankowski, „Russia has a long history of using military exercises as a platform for waging actual wars", *The National Interest*, 07.05.2017, online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/zapad-2017-nato-should-be-keeping-eye-russias-training-20540, accessed at 22.05.2017.

incomplete or inaccurate, can lead to mistrust, misunderstanding and even incidents and accidents. If this happens the lack of trust can contribute to fostering the spiral model of security dilemma: mistrust can lead to fear of the actions of other actor, fear may lead to accumulation of power for preserving self-security, the other actor may decide to accumulate power too as a consequence of feeling threatened by the power of the first actor, all this can increase the insecurity in the system. Transparency can play a crucial role by its contribution to increasing the trust levels. This is best emphasized by Kydd approach of trust, incomplete information and security dilemma.

At an applied level, transparency is considered a very important topic in NATO-Russia relation. This has been demonstrated by analyzing the role of transparency within NATO-Russia Council meetings. The results of the research show that transparency has been being constantly since 2016 one of the three main discussions topics of the Council meetings. There have been made progresses in terms of military information exchange, but significant challenges still persist. This has been emphasized through the case of ZAPAD exercises, in which transparency was not at a desired level due to official underestimation of troop numbers and insufficient observation.

The inaccurate nature of information may damage even more the level of trust in the NATO - Russian Federation relation, which can contribute at uprising the spiral pattern of the security dilemma. Therefore, transparency is crucial for current amelioration of the security environment, and constitutes a theme of research of interest and topicality.

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9. ***, „Russia set to invite media to military exercises without West's advice - defense ministry", *TASS*, 13.03.2017, online at http://tass.com/defense/945741.

10. ***, „U.S. general wants Russia to open up major exercise to observers", *Reuters*, 01.03.2017, online at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-military-exercises/u-s-general-wants-russia-to-open-up-major-exercise-to-observers-idUSKBN1684CE.

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12. ***, *In Brief Witness to ZAPAD – Helsinki Commission Report*, Helsinki Commission, online at https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/Report%20-%20 Zapad%20-% 20Design%20FINAL.pdf.

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16. ***, *Press point by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/ cps/ic/natohq/opinions_146220.htm?selectedLocale=en.

17. ***, *Press point by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/ ic/natohq/opinions147976.htm?Selected Locale =en.

18. ***, *Statement by the NATO Secretary General following a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/ cps/ic/natohq/opinions_139569.htm.

19. ***, *Zapad 2017 joined strategic excercise*, Official site of Ministry of Defence of Russian Federation, online at http://eng.mil.ru/en/mission/practice/more.htm?id= 12140115@egNews.

20. ***, *NATO-Russia Council*, Official site of NATO, online at https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_50091.htm.

BALANCE OF POWER,
A NEW VISION OF THE 21st CENTURY

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Abstract: The theoreticians in international relations have a remarkable ambiguity not only in the meaning of the balance of power but also in the expected results of operating a successful balance of power system. What is the final promise of the balance of power theory? The aim or purpose of the balance of power is not the maintenance of international peace and stability, as many critics of the theory have inaccurately affirmed. It is rather to preserve the integrity of the multi-state system, preventing any ambitious state from absorbing its neighbors. I believe that states should not trust the exaggerated power that threatens all members of the international system. The danger is when a great power manages to gain more than half of the system's total resources and thus to be in a position to subdue the rest.

Keywords: anarchy, international relations, the power of balance, belt of ruins.

1. Theoretical considerations of the power equipment concept

The idea of a balance of power in international politics emerged in the Renaissance as a metaphorical concept borrowed from other fields (ethics, arts, philosophy, law, medicine, economics and science), where equilibrium and imbalance had a particular impact. The metaphor of "balance" has been conceived as a law of nature that underlies most of the things we find appealing. Hans Morgenthau said in the introduction of "The Balance of Power "… aspiration for power of the few countries in which each tries either to retain or to overturn the status quo, leads to the need to create a configuration that is called balance of power and politics, that aim the balance of power[1]". Similarly, in 2000, the founder of neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz, said," as nature has a repulsion to the void, so international politics hates the imbalance of power[2]". Realists, like Arnold Wolfers, invoke the same metaphor, a "law of nature", to explain the opportunistic expansion: "Because peoples, like nature, do not bear the void, then it is said that a powerful nation would feel compelled to fill the void with its own power [3]". Using the same logic, John Mearsheimer argues that "powers to keep the political-military situation unchanged are seldom found in world politics, as the international system creates strong incentives for them to seek opportunities to gain power in the detriment of rivals and to take advantage of those situations where benefits outweigh the costs[4]".

However, from the perspective of political decision-makers, balancing the superior power and power needed to fill the void (power) can hardly be compared to the laws of nature. Instead, this way of filling the power vacuum has a considerable cost and a significant political risk. The need to fill the power vacuum appears in the political process as a product of competition and consensus building, the nation's having different ideas about the politico-military world, and divergent views on the goals and means that will best serve these purposes. Nicholas Spykman, "political balance is no gift from the gods, no inherent stable condition. It results from the active

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[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, *A realist Theory of International Politics*, 2001, p 52.
[2] Keneth, Waltz, *Structural Realism after the Cold War*, International Security nr. 25/1, p 28 http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf, accessed on August 22nd, 2017
[3] Wolfers, A., Discord and collaboration: Essays on international politics, p 15, http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-119, accessed on August 22nd, 2017.
[4] John J. Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, p 73, http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf, accessed on August 22nd, 2017.

intervention of man through the exploitation of political forces. States cannot afford to passively wait for a happy moment when a balance of power, miraculously reached, will bring peace and security.

If they want to survive, they must be willing to go to war and to maintain a balance against powers with increasing hegemonic tendencies[5]".

The decision to equipoise an unbalanced power with the help of weapons and alliances are commitments that need to be analyzed in terms of the benefits expected from this act of restoring the balance of power. Thus, political elites have to weigh and then to assess, the likely costs of this balancing policy compared to other available alternative means.

Next, I will analyze the intricate link between international law and the balance of power which Hedley Bull regards as paradoxical. Bull argues that the balance of power is "an essential condition" of international relations, and the necessary actions to maintain this balance "often implies" the violation of laws.

Hedley Bull, a central representative of the English School of International Relations, described in his work " The Anarchical Society, A Study of Order in World Politics," from a heretic position of the international relations dogmas, another perspective of the theory of international relations. Bull suggests that states respect specific rules and regulations, thus allowing much more stability in international politics than they were willing to admit the classical realists. States act in such a way as to preserve the global order, because this rule is in their best interest, facilitating the exercise of security and prosperity by states.

Hedley Bull was not the only international relations researcher to identify the interdependence of morality and reality. E. H. Carr, in his book "The Twenty Years' Crisis", stated that "any political situation contains mutually incompatible elements of utopia and reality, morality and power[6]". Carr renounced morality as a subjective concept, meaning different things for different nations. "The principles we presume are absolute and universal," he argues, "are not principles at all, but unconscious reflections of national politics based on a certain interpretation of national interest at a given time[7]." Under these conditions, power defines the reality of global politics, and the only imperative of states is to exercise their power by all means. Carr's pessimistic character is resumed in the works of other realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, who builds his argument regarding the assumption of an international system, which he defined it as "an arrangement of independent and autonomous states that align and realign to protect their security[8]." In Waltz's view, there are no common principles or rules, except for the supreme principle of international politics: the balance of power.

The distinction between a "system" and a "society" is crucial. "The System," as Stanley Hoffman argues, "means the contact between states and the impact of one state to another[9]". Society, for Bull, supposes the existence of "certain interests and common values [...] of a common set of rules and institutions[10]". International law and diplomacy are precisely those common rules and institutions, which, according to Bull, implicitly regulate the anarchic society of states. Bull disagrees with the practical aspects of international law as simply being a roof of the national interests of states. According to Bull, it is quite surprising that states "often judge for their interest and then comply with [international law][11]." Bull has been increasingly inclined to accept a

[5] Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power, p 25, Balance of Power in World Politics – Oxford Research, http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/ acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-119, accessed on September, 12 2017.
[6] Edward H. Carr, *Criza celor douazeci de ani (1919-1939): O introducere in studiul relațiilor internaționale*, Collegium, Polirom, 2011, p 93.
[7] Ibid., p 87.
[8] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 2010, p 95.
[9] Stanley Hoffman, *Hedley Bull and his Contribution to International Relations*, International Affairs, Vol. 62, Nr. 2 (spring 1986), p 185.
[10] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, second edition, London: Macmillan, 1995, p 40.
[11] Ibid., p 140.

common justice in anarchic society. He advocated, for example, the universal application of fundamental human rights and the redistribution of international wealth as a way to reconcile the "northern" and "southern" understanding of justice, without appearing in the inappropriate posture of a defense lawyer of Western values[12]. Thus, Bull gradually came to the belief that "without justice, there could be no lasting order[13]." Ian Harris, in examining the Bull' Order concept, argues in fact that, although Bull does not unequivocally affirm this in The Anarchical Society, for him Justice was clearly a "part of the Order[14]." In fact, Bull has asked, in a somewhat controversial way, "the states with certain powers, to act as [...] local agents of the global common goods[15]." But if the states fail to agree on what constitutes a common good? Clearly, different perceptions of justice can undermine the Global Order, in the situation where Justice should be a priority in the exercising of foreign policy by states.

But the Western concepts of justice, as manifested in contemporary global politics, have made room for the political and economic preoccupations of the South; for example, the activity of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and other organizations that increasingly reflect the awareness of Southern justice, namely the redistribution of wealth and of goods. In particular, the Doha World Trade Organization communiqué[16] provided more concessions to developing countries than any other previous statements of the organization. This may indicate that the anarchic society is moving towards a common understanding of justice. If so, it may eventually be possible to reconcile order and justice in international politics.

In conclusion, Hedley Bull's concept of anarchic state society has contributed significantly to the theory of relations by introducing the notion of "common rules and institutions," which probably governs the behavior of states in jointly building the international order. In my opinion, Bull, in his references to international order, leaves somewhat unclear the role of justice in international politics. The tense situation between order and justice was evident at the time of the writing of The Anarchical Society and did not diminish with the passage of time. The different understanding of justice among states erodes the stability of international order. Although there are common rules and institutions to keep this Order, no one is sure that a state, through its political action, helps to maintain international order or promotes a specific legal interpretation of that state. Only a gradual emergence of universal values would make the Hedley Bulls Anarchic Society stable in the long run. On the other hand, the rise of such universal values could undermine the sovereign state's rationale and pave the way for the development of the anarchic society of states into a society of individuals.

2. Modern foundations of balance of power

In the attempt to put an order in defining this principle of international politics and relations, various scholars have identified the multiple meanings of the balance of power. Hans Morgenthau regards the balance of power in four different ways: "(1) as a policy that pertains to a certain state of things; (2) as a real state of affairs; (3) as an approximately equal distribution of power; (4)

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[12] Nicholas J. Wheeler & Timothy Dunne, *Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will*, p. 99.

[13] Ibidem, p. 98.

[14] Ian Harris, *Order and Justice in the Anarchical Society*, International Affairs, Vol 69, Nr. 4 (October 1993), pp. 731-732.

[15] Nicholas J. Wheeler & Timothy Dunne, "Hedley Bull's Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will", p. 99.

[16] In paragraphs 42 and 43 of the WTO Ministerial Declaration of 14.11.2001, dedicated to the less developed countries, the member governments of the organization have made decisions regarding access to non-free of taxes markets for products from LDCs, improving market access for these exports, increasing donations and contributions. Paragraph 44 of the Declaration highlighted support for the special and differential treatment work program set out in the decision on issues and concerns related to the implementation of a framework agreement. Accessed from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm, on September 12, 2017.

distribution of power [17]". Morgenthau identified the fundamental elements of power: geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military training, population, national consciousness, diplomacy and quality of government. In Politics Among Nations[18] he defined international politics as the struggle for power (inherent to human nature) and the policy of power. Aspiration for power is the "distinctive feature of international politics" and "it is universal in time and space, being an incontestable fact of experience".

Inis Claude sees the balance of power as a situation, a policy and a system[19], and Richard Little as a metaphor, a myth, and a model[20]. Martin Wight found the following nine ways to approach the concept:

1. A uniform distribution of power;
2. The principle that power should be distributed evenly;
3. Current power distribution. Therefore, any possible distribution of power is essential;
4. The principle of equal generalization of the Great Powers at the expense of the weak;
5. The principle that our party should have a margin of strength to avoid the danger of uneven distribution of power;
6. (When governed by the verb "to hold"): A special role in maintaining a uniform distribution of power.
7. (As we have highlighted above) A special advantage in the existing power distribution;
8. Superiority;
9. An inherent tendency of international politics to produce a uniform distribution of the power[21].

Within these possibilities, a multitude of definitions has inevitably been offered. Sheenan in his The Ballance of Power. History and Theory presents the most significant definitions in chronological order from 1741 onwards and ending with Quester in 1977. In these definitions, Hans Morgenthau focuses on the balance and sees the balance of power as "a real state in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality[22]". John Mearsheimer, an outstanding representative of structural realism, concluding on the question "Why States Want Power?" uses a narrower approach and concludes that "the balance of power is largely synonymous with the balance of military power[23]". A broader definition considers the concept as "a special distribution of power among the states of that system so that no single state and no existing alliance have" an "overwhelming" or "predominant[24] ".

It is important to note that Mackinder's ideas were explicitly politically oriented. Throughout its history, geopolitics have never tended to represent a description of one or another state's behavior, as Waltz said in "Theory of International Politics." In fact, Kenneth Walts clearly explains that neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, in the sense that geopolitics, from Mackinder, Haushofer to Brzezinski, have always been perceived in this sense. Mackinder's target audience was the English and the French politicians. Haushofer wanted to help to create a successful policy for

[17] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th edition, 2006, pp. 3-17, http://www.sisekaitse.ee/public/Valissuhted/ERASMUS/Morgenthau_A_Realist_theory_of_international_politics.pdf, on August 18, 2017.

[18] Morgenthau Hans, Politics Among Nations, pp 3-12.

[19] Inis L. Claude Jr., *Review of International Studies,* pp 77-85, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097172, accessed on August 18, 2017.

[20] Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models*, pp. 19-87.

[21] Martin Wight, *The meaning of the ballance of power*, pag16, http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/pdf/Sheehan%20-%20Balance%20of%20Power.pdf, accessed August 18, 2017.

[22] M. Sheehan, *The Ballance of Power. History and Theory,* London and New York: Routledge. Taylor and Francis Group. (2000). p 3.

[23] John J. Mearsheimer, 2001, Why do states want power?, http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/StructuralRealism.pdf,, accessed on August 20th, 2017.

[24] Sheehan, M., *The Ballance of Power. History and Theory,* London and New York: Routledge. Taylor and Francis Group. (2000). p 4, citing Dina Zines 1967 p. 272.

the Reich. Brzezinski sought to shape American actions on Eurasia's "grand chessboard". In fact, Mackinder points out that geopolitics have always been "an aid to state affairs"[25]."

Political scientists have long studied the mechanism of alliance formation and the tendency of states to "balance" or "call for consensus." Balance takes place in response to the threat to national interests, especially when such a threat can't be countered by itself. In a system where the vital national interests of its actors rarely end up in conflict, as well as those who can't be challenged by force, enthusiasm for balance can be greatly reduced.

Naturally, adopting a balance of power approach can be prudent, but it does not provide inherent results and no guarantee of success, but refers to the principles of ordering international relations. The balance of power theories are less useful in explaining state policy choices. John J. Mearsheimer, in an article titled Reckless States and Realism, paraphrased Kenneth Waltz, who warned of this limitation: "To explain the expected differences in national responses, a theory should show how the different internal structures of states affect their policies and their external actions[26]". It may therefore be that the theories of balance of power cannot tell us enough about "target selection" (why and against whose specific states it balances).

The threat represented by Heartland's power is that it could irritate the "massive balance of humanity" that Mackinder assumed would be "happy because of balance and thus, free[27]." Metternich and his contemporaries, revising the post Napoleonic "Concern of Europe," felt that the balance of power was the only inevitably way that the thirsty states for power could coexist peacefully. If a state perceives an advantage over its neighbors, it will be tempted to expand. This feeling persisted throughout the 20th century, despite the fact that the balance almost perfectly before the First World War was not enough to prevent its outbreak.

The idea that any state consciously sought a "balance" is of course open to discussion. In a perfectly balanced world, a state could expect 50 percent success in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, which is not really comforting in a world of war that unfolds continuously in different regions of the globe. In reality, states are looking for a favorable balance of power, or more precisely, the imbalance in power in which they are advantaged. Henry Kissinger's geopolitics (who, of course, advocates the concept that all geopolitics are explicitly politically oriented) is obsessed with "balance," while in reality he is looking for an imbalance in favor of the US[28]. The perception of balance is in fact threatened when the other side grows up close to parity. If state people really believe that the balance of power is in their interest, then they would follow Waltz's advice, which said that "there is a state that wants peace and security not to become too strong or too weak[29]." There is little evidence that this way of thinking has become a state policy somewhere.

Indeed, for "island" powers, a "balance" has always had another meaning. Mackinder often repeated that the British want to see mainland Europe divided not only to maintain peace but also to prevent the emergence of a rival who, with the combined resources of the entire continent, would be able to rival the Royal Navy and thus threaten Britain. No power has been able to attack UK on its own, but a hostile hegemonic power or coalition could do so. That is why maintaining a balanced (divided) Europe was most important for "perpetual and eternal interests" according to Palmerston

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[25] W.H. Parker, Mackinder, *Geografia ca ajutor al Statului* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). Gearoid O. Tuathail, "Cum să înțelegi Geopolitica Critică: Geopolitica și societatea de risc," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1999, pp. 107–124, 2017 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402399908437756, accessed on August 18.
[26] John J. Mearsheimer, *Reckless States and Realism*, pp. 247-248.
[27] H. J. Mackinder, *The Round World and the Winning of the Peace*, Foreign Affairs, 21(4), July, 1943, p. 605.
[28] Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Random House, 1994).
[29] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 222.

political scientist[30]. Britain has constantly intervened alongside the smaller continental powers for three centuries.

The United States has inherited a great strategic responsibility with the erosion of Britain's power. They became the leader in maintaining the stability of the free sea, the financial markets, and the Persian Gulf. They have assumed the leadership of the free world in the fight against tyranny, especially against communism, and have also become the watchdog of the Eurasian masses' balance of power. Spykman evoked British 19th century terrorists when he spoke of this, stating that: "If the New World can be united and organized so that the masses of unstable forces are available to action across the ocean, this can influence politics Europe and Asia. If the Old World remains divided and unbalanced, the external force can play a determining role in its political life. If, on the other hand, the Old World can be united and organized in such a way that the broad masses of unbalanced powers become available to action across the oceans, the New World will be encircled and depending on its strength to withstand it may become subject the Old World [31]".

Spykman not only understood the implications for the American security of the German challenges of the European equilibrium of power but he was familiar with the German geopolitical writings published by Karl Haushofer and his associates at the Institute of Geopolitik in Munich. Spykman summed up the German geopolitical vision as follows: The European continent, from the North Sea to the Ural Mountains, will be organized on continental fundamentals, [...] well prepared for war, and for the intercontinental battle for power. The Near East, which controls the routes to the Indian Ocean and holds the oil on which European industrial life depends, will be integrated, economically and politically, in the form of semi-independent controlled states in Berlin[32].

Walt Rostow identified two possible types of Eurasian (communist) threats against the United States. The first military threat - "Eurasia's combined resources could pose a serious threat to US military defeat." The emergence of nuclear weapons has made such an attack almost impossible, a trans-ocean massive fleet in Eurasia, a perfect target for the nuclear arsenal of a great power that opposes the threat of an imminent invasion. The second threat is more realistic, because of modern communications technologies,

Whatever the military situation, an Eurasia collapsed under totalitarian dictatorships would threaten the survival of democracy elsewhere, as well as in the United States. That is why it is equally in the American interest that the Eurasian societies develop broadly in line with the ideology of the nation; because under modern conditions, it is difficult to consider the survival of a democratic American society as an island in a totalitarian world[33].

These two types of threats identified by Rostow can be added to a third: the danger that a united and hostile communist Eurasia may be damaging to the economic health of the United States. The impact of an embargo on Euro-Asian trade would undoubtedly have been devastating to the western hemisphere and unacceptable for the United States.

The fact that this unbalanced power of the Eurasian space would still be a major threat to the United States has become a truism. It is a notion that has penetrated politics and theory at the highest levels, the 1990 National Security Strategy of the first Bush administration underlining that "for most of this century, the United States has considered it a vital interest to prevent any power or hostile group of powers from the domination of the Eurasian space[34]." The fear of a united Eurasia persists amongst the post-Cold War geo-strategists. Samuel Huntington argued that "if the European Community's political integration would take place, it would also bring an extraordinarily powerful

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[30] "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." The speech of Lord Henry Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, March 1st, 1848, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8762714/Time-for-a-foreign-policy-that-puts-Britain-first.html, accessed on August 8th, 2017.

[31] Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics, p. 132.

[32] Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics, p. 121.

[33] Walter W. Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena: A Study in Recent History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 544.

[34] Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, p 128.

entity that could be perceived as a major threat to American interests[35]" The objective of Brzezinski's "chessboard" is to prevent the emergence of a hegemonic and hostile coalition in Eurasia, and he recommends that the United States, as Britain did before them, should support the weaker nation in Eurasian disputes. Analyzing this situation from the perspective of the 21st century, the intellectual foundation on which such fears are based is static, archaic and, ultimately, irrelevant to the system of modern international relations.

Unlike in the past centuries, today's people do not have to worry about "relative gains." In fact, all states benefit from the growing power in the system, because the international economy is now a positive, cumulative play, in which the flow of tides raises all the boats[36], rather than sinking them. Mackinder argued that all the "great wars of the history" were "the direct or indirect result of the uneven growth of nations [due to] unequal distribution of fertility and strategic opportunities on the face of the globe." Today, we must not fear unequal economic growth. The West should not feel threatened by a growth of Russia or China, for example, because in a world without major war, the potential military power does not become kinetic.

The United States would do well to recall that Palmerston's "eternal and perpetual interest" has become obsolete - today the UK has no reason to fear a united Europe and does not accept the idea of intervening on behalf of smaller powers. Similarly, the United States has no reason to fear imbalances on Euro-Asiatic land despite obsolete geostrategic analyzes.

In Geology and Politics in a World Divided, Saul B. Cohen presents, in the first two chapters, the essence of political geography and geopolitics starting with German geopolitics. Thus, Cohen guides political geography in six approaches, as follows: approach to power analysis, historical approach, morphological approach, functional approach, behavioral approach and systemic approach. Cohen and Rosenthal made a very important theoretical contribution to the systemic approach. In the model proposed by these authors, a geographic system is promoted as a unit with which the political process interacts with geographic space. The political transactions, the structures and the forces of society are the components of the process and the place, the area and its surroundings are the components of the geographic space. The process and space interact with the formation of political action areas, and the various derivative organizations and ideological perceptions characterize these areas of action. This approach characterizes Cohen's unique perspective on geopolitics.

In contrast to Mackinder or Spykman, the American geopolitical, geographer, and political scientist, Cohen published "Geography and Politics in a World Divided" in which he revealed a new geopolitical vision of the world. The model created by him is no longer based on the pivotal area, in contradiction with the unitary model centered on the idea of the pivot area and the concentric semicircles. He rather promotes the world's balance of global space.

In 1998, Cohen published the article "Presidential Address: Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era[37]," in which he resumed the main concepts of global space theory. The instability of the international system is the result of mutual causal actions between geopolitics and geo-strategy, between the great powers and the secondary states. Cohen states that a state is the more stable as the diplomatic, informational, political, and military influence of a superpower is wider, and the well-organized is the system and its components.

The Hierarchy of Powers is organized on five levels as follows:

1. The first level is represented by the great powers - USA, Russia, Japan, China, EU;

2. The second level is held by regional powers exercising their power only within the boundaries of their region - Iran, Turkey, Australia, South Africa;

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[35] Samuel P. Huntington, *America's Changing Strategic Interests*, Survival, Vol. 23, No. 1, January/February 1991, p. 12.

[36] Duncan Snidal, *Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation*, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3, September 1991, pp. 701-726.

[37] Saul B. Cohen, *Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era*, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol 81, 1991.

3. The third level is composed of countries possessing all elements of power, DIME, to exert an ideological or cultural influence on neighbors - Cuba and North Korea;

4. The fourth level consists of states that can't constrain neighboring states;

5. The fifth level resides in states that depend on other powers / states to secure their survival.

In conclusion, Cohen promotes non-polarity, in the sense that power is rather distributed among the states belonging to the categories mentioned above.

In his book Geopolitics of the World-System, Cohen has adapted the new global system to the various political changes. In the spatial hierarchy of the global structure, the highest level is the geostrategic field. Cohen proposes three geostrategic domains: The Maritime Region Dependent on Atlantic and Pacific Trade, the Continental Russian - Eurasian Heartland, and Continental-Continental East-Maritime Asia.

The Maritime Dependent Trade Area, which includes the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean basins and their inner seas, has been influenced by international trade. The Continental Eurasian Domain, which is anchored today in the Russian Heartland, is inwardly oriented and less influenced by external economic forces or cultural influences. The borders of the Russian Heartland region have changed substantially. To the west, East European countries are no longer strangled by Moscow's hands, but in the East, the former Soviet republics of the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia are still under Russian strategic oversight. In the third area of Eastern Asia, China appears as a major trading nation but has not become part of the maritime world and is still oriented towards the continent. China has expanded southward to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. South Asia differs from the other three areas, being an independent geopolitical region which, when connected with the Middle East, forms a bow of instability.

Also, Cohen hierarchizes states, pyramidal, geo-strategically and geopolitically, on three separate levels, as follows:

1. The first level is a geostrategic, macro level between the Eurasian continental bloc and the sea power block;

2. The second level is the middle-level geopolitical one. This level is attributed to the bloc of Eurasian continental powers and the bloc of sea powers, tracing geopolitical areas;

3. The third level is the micro-level, belonging to the national states and the autonomous regions.

Apart from this hierarchy, there are also regions, groups of states, countries, non-state actors that do not belong to any of the levels listed above. They are classified as follows:

1. "Shatterbelts[38]" are geopolitically fragmented states or territories which have a high degree of linguistic and / or religious ethnic diversity, of great geostrategic importance, situated at the confluence of global spaces, with a history characterized by antagonism and hostility between groups living there, subject to geopolitical pressures, swinging between spaces, and therefore having uncertain paternity[39];

2. "Compression zones" are divided States and territories subject to constraints and limitations on the part of their neighbors; "crossing passages" areas with special characteristics to neighbors or regions, consisting of small states at the crossroads of commercial roads and historical geopolitical interests (Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea, including the Balkans, the countries around Caspian Sea, and the Maghreb countries). These make the connection between the

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[38] Shatterbelts, *A region of persistent political fragmentation due to devolution and centrifugal forces*. http://dictionaryofgeography.blogspot.ro/2015/10/shatterbelt.html, accesat on August 18, 2017.

[39] It remains to establish the future of the Middle East and Eastern European Shatterbelts, either as regions with a solid policy or as unstable regions. The major feature of a Century of Ruins is that it represents a land of equal opportunity for two or more rival global powers operating from different geostrategic areas and perspectives. Middle East, the Balkans and the countries around the Baltic Sea remain possible future Shatterbelts. The future can bring additional shields to the world stage: the countries between Mb Baltic and Eastern Europe are the most likely candidates.

geostrategic spaces with the role of adapting the geopolitical dynamics in different ways, between states with different geo-strategic particularities;

3. "Convergence zones" - "states situated among other states with uncertain geopolitical configurations".

Cohen also proposed the classification of Eurasia into three geopolitical regions, as follows:

1.   The extended pivotal area - Eastern Ukraine, Belarus and Transdnistria;

2.   The Eurasian Convergence Area - Eastern Europe, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Central Asia and Mongolia;

3.   The geopolitical area represented by South Asia.

From a geostrategic point of view, *China and Indochina are treated independently*.

Cohen claims that the global system will be defined by a new type of power, namely the power propagated in the network, configured by geopolitical dynamics and not hegemonic hierarchy.

Although Cohen had objections to Mackinder's theory of the pivotal area, characterizing it as immobility, he fits perfectly into the reasoning of the English thinker as follows:

1. The concept of "*Shatterbelts*" coincides with the geostrategic pivot and almost overlaps the inner half circle (Mackinder), Rimland (Spykman) and the "*Arc of Crisis*" (Brzezinski).

2. The trade-dependent maritime world and the Euro-Asian continental world were the subject of the concept of global domination. Convergence areas have been defined as the pivotal area security area: "Heartland for strategic reasons includes the Baltic Sea, the Lower and Middle Segment of the Danube, the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet, Mongolia[40]."

Conclusions

Almost always, the balance of power theories present the state as preoccupied with power (especially military power) and its distribution into an international system characterized by uncertainties and insecurities. Moreover, states are considered to be the most important players in international politics. They are considered rational actors, making decisions based on cost-effective calculations and using existing information and resources.

Because the balance of power is a theory of international security and preparations for a possible war centered on military and political capabilities, the balance of power refers to the creation and promotion of all existing forms that the army can have internally or supported by alliances to discourage another state or alliance to exert their domination. The state or alliance may intervene for balance to prevent the loss of territory or parts thereof, foreign vital interests (maritime communications, colonies, or other territories of vital strategic interest).

It is also supposed that the only really effective and reliable antidote for power is power. Increasing the power of an enemy state must be compensating instead by the accumulation of threatening power by building weapons (internal balancing) and alliance formation (external balancing). In order to determine what capabilities must be measured, the context is crucial. In order to verify a balance of power in different historical and temporal contexts, equivalent, not identical measures are needed. A correct balance of power assessment must include:

a) the military capabilities (means of destruction) that each person holds and can use;

b) diplomacy, the political ability to extract and apply these capabilities;

c) capabilities and reliability of commitments with allies and possible allies;

d) the fundamental characteristics of the political geography of the conflict.

Components of a certain power capability vary. They typically include combinations of the following measurable elements such as terrestrial area (territorial total size), total population, armed forces size, defense expenditures, global economy value per capita, technological development,

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[40] Makinder, *op. cit.*, p 64.

GDP, foreign trade, government revenues, but also unmeasurable capabilities such as willpower, political competence, and combat effectiveness.

In conclusion, the general principle of action of power can be established as follows: when any state or coalition becomes or threatens to become overly powerful, other states should recognize it as a threat to their security (sometimes even at their survival) by taking measures, individually, jointly, or both, in order to increase their military power. This balancing process is considered to be the main rule for operating the system. In practice, however, there is a disagreement about how the process works. There are three types of balance of power systems: automatic, self-regulating and spontaneous; semi-automatic, whereby balancing requires a "balancing" (by moving its weight on one side of the scale or the other, whichever is easier) to adjust the system; manual, where the equilibrium process is a function of human intervention, with the emphasis on the ability of diplomats and state people to manage carefully the affairs of states or other non-state territories that constitute the system[41].

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THE NEW SILK ROAD: ONE BELT, ONE ROAD – A STRATEGIC POWER ASSET FOR CHINA

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Abstract: China, the country considered, to be the engine for the global economic growth for some time, has, seemingly surprising, initiated the project of "The New Silk Road", which is nothing more but a small part of a well-developed plan aiming to assert the main Asian pivot as a global power. Compared to "The Old Silk Road", which owned only a land-based path, „The New Silk Road" follows two different paths (One Belt – the road onshore, One Road – the oceangoing route), whose undeclared purpose is to commercially surround the Eurasian supercontinent, giving Eurasia's context being the main geopolitical and geostrategic stake of our time. While Russia mainly focuses on the theoretical concept of the Eurasianism, we notice China in action, operating. The initiative surprises, not only through its geographical dimensions amplitude (tens of thousands kilometers land and sea), but also, through its financial dimension (rolling unbelievable amounts of money). A relevant argument would be the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the only bank in the world whose nomenclature includes the "infrastructure" notion, such an important and circulated element nowadays.

Keywords: The Silk Road, The New Silk Road, great power, global power, Eurasia, Eurasianism.

China's significant general data[1] as a Great Power

Location: East Asia, with 14 neighboring countries and 3 bordering seas.
Surface area: 9,596,961 km^2 (closely comparable to Canada's and USA's), 4th place globally.
Population (2017): 1,379,302,771 inhabitants, 1st place globally (approximately 1/5 of the global population, twice as much Europe's population between the Atlantic Ocean and Ural Mountains).
Total GDP (2016, PPP): $21,290 billion, 1st place globally (approximately 1/5 of the Global GDP; the annual growth rate, although declining lately, remains at around 7%, being one of the highest on the Globe).
Exports (2016): $2,098 billion, 1st place globally (approximately 1/5 from the global volume).
Motor vehicle Production (2016): 28.12 million units, 1st place globally (30% of the global total number).
Ports (2016): holding 7 out of 10 world's largest ports, including Shanghai (largest port in the world with over 700 million tones moved yearly).

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[1] Data source: *The World FactBook* (2017); also see Horia C. Matei, Silviu Neguț, Ion Nicolae (2016), *Enciclopedia statelor lumii*, ediția a XIV-a, Ed. Meronia, București, pp. 141-149, 755-776.

Companies (2017): biggest company in the world starting with 2007, PetroChina, with a market value exceeding \$1,000 billion, surpassing twice the value of the former global lieder (Exxon Mobile, SUA).

International tourists number (2016): 59.3 million for Mainland China (4th place globally); 101.6 million including Hong-Kong and Macau (1st place globally).

Tourism generated income (2016): \$44.4 billion, for Mainland China (4th place globally); \$107.2 billion including cu Hong-Kong and Macau (2nd place globally).

Foreign-exchange reserves (2015): \$3,220 billion, 1st place globally, over 7% of the global total number.

Military spending (2016): \$215.7 billion, holding the 2nd place globally behind the USA, although representing only 1.9% of its GDP.

1. The Old Silk Road

The Old Silk Road was an ancient caravans route, connecting the Orient with the Occident, since the Antiquity times, contributing to the emergence of trading not only for the silk (coming from China), but also various other goods, including gemstones, pearls, ivory, spices and so many others.

The route started from Xi'an (former Changan), a thriving city in central western China, located on the Wei River, a tributary stream of the great *Huang He* River, which was the capital of no less than 11 dynasties. From here, the road headed for *Urumqi*, in the far northwest of China, aiming for the Central Asia, however meeting *Dun-huang/Tun-huang*, at the confluence of the rivers *Wei – Huang He*, the route begun to fork into 2 totally different caravan roads:

I. *Nan Lu* ("The Southern Route"), passing through the oasis city of Hotan/Khotan, from the southern edge of the Taklimakan or Shamo Desert, and north-west by the great Kunlun mountain range (2.700 km long), which forms the northern and western limit of the great Tibetan Plateau, and after crossing the Himalayas, reaches the northern India heading for the Middle East.

II. *Pei Lu* ("The Northern Route"), north of the Taklimakan Desert, a representing cross point being the city of Kashgar, in the heart of Kashgarian region, followed by Fergana Valley, the great intermountain depression in Central Asia, crossing the famous historical and trading centers of Tashkent, Samarkand, Bukhara and so many others, reaching thereafter the Caspian and Caucasian regions, then, south by the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea, heading for the north of Africa[2].

2. The New Silk Road

2.1. General Aspects

Publicly revealed for the first time in 2013, the New Silk Road has officially become operational with its inauguration in mid-May 2017 at an international summit in Beijing, attended by 29 Heads of State and Government.

As its names indicates – *One Belt, One Road* –, the new structure follows a much greater extent compared to the Old Silk Road, including, as noted, a maritime route as well.

The Belt broadly follows the former ancient Silk Road: starts from Xi'an, towards Urumqi (today the capital of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) heading to the Ex-Soviet Central Asia, a region rich in natural resources, especially hydrocarbons, with historical sites such as Almaty (the old capital of Kazakhstan) and the capitals of the other ex-Soviet Central Asian republics – Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Dushanbe (Tajikistan), Ashgabat (Turkmenistan). It then passes south of the Caspian Sea (including northern Iran, and the capital Tehran and Iraq, with its oil rich cities: Mosul – Kirkuk – Din Salah), arriving in Istanbul, Turkey, one of the main „pivots" along the way. From this point a branch is heading to the Balkan Peninsula and then to Romania, the Republic of Moldova and

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[2] A Romanian diplomat discovered in the National Library of Beijing a map which showed a branch of this famous road passing through *Dobrogea*.

Ukraine, and the other to Moscow and from there to Rotterdam (both cities representing key milestones of the road), crossing many central and western European countries. One may easily notice that choosing the Dutch port city of the North Sea as an end point, was surely not by chance. By all accounts, the city is Europe's largest port, also ranking 4th place globally in the present.

Giving the context, it is also worth mentioning the "Iron Silk Road" initiated a little earlier and designed over half a century ago, a trans-Asian railway, connecting not less than 28 states, having as terminal points Shanghai, the giant city port of the East China Sea, and Rotterdam, the largest European city port, of the North Sea. Its enormous route of 81,000 km covers a number of existing railways, including the famous *Transsiberian*.

The Road basically follows the same "belt" concept but this time making its way across the ocean. It starts with the Zhanjiang, a port city in southeastern China, inlet of the South China Sea, a wisely chosen start point due to its spectacular growth already seen as a symbol of the "New China" on one hand, but also being located near three major urban and economic metropolises (Guangzhou/former Canton, Hong Kong and Macau), neighboring also areas of oil and gas fields.

Going round the Hainan Island, one of the 18th provinces of China (due to its geostrategic location), the road reaches Haiphong, the main city port of Vietnam (the country exporting its oil majorly to China) and goes forward, passing through the Strait of Malacca (the famous "Orient's Getaway"), which is particularly important for China, as 70% of the oil imported here is transiting this strait.

From this point, a route is heading to Indonesia (a major oil producer and exporter), and another one passing through the above mentioned strait (Malacca), passes by Malaysia (another major state in terms of oil production and export) and meeting the Indian Ocean, is heading for Sri Lanka (Colombo) and of course, India (the great city port of Kolkata), making a U turn towards East Africa, to Mombasa (Kenya) and then takes another loop towards Europe, through the Gulf of Aden – The Red Sea – The Suez Canal – The Mediterranean, in the last one leaning upon two major strength points and vibrant centers: *Athens* (and the Piraeus port, in which China has recently majorly invested), most probably in memory of the Hellenism spread in Asia via the Silk Road, and *Venice*, not only because it was one of the terminus points of the famous trading road, but probably also because in the near area, there is Trieste hosting ADRIA pipeline's terminal with large oil reserves embedded in the rock.

2.2. Eurasia – the Eurasianism

By *Eurasia* we understand the combined continental landmass of Europe and Asia, covering 57.25 million km^2 (out of which 2.75 million km^2 are neighboring islands), equating to 37% of the Earth's total land area hosting approximately three quarters of the human population. The terminology was introduced by the Austrian geographer Edward Suess (1831-1914) in *Earth Science* field (his work *La face de la Terre*, 1883-1901), while in the political field was firstly used by Pyotr Nikolaevich Savitsky (1895-1968) a Russian geographer, economist and geopolitical figure (his work The *Eurasianism*, 1925). The ideology has soon become a popular topic in the era for the Russian school of geopolitics with other key figures like, Nikolai Trubetzkoy (1890-1983), Georges Florovsky (1893-1979), Lev Nikolaievici Gumiliov (1912-1992) supporting the *Pan*-idea, and so many others followed over time, like the contemporary geopolitical figure, Aleksandr Dugin (born 1962).

The term has gained important connotations in our times, since Eurasia is definitely the main geopolitical and geostrategic stake of the 21st century world.

The *Eurasianism* concept was clearly inspired by the *Heartland Theory* of the British Halford Mackinder, who talked about the *World Island* (pointing to Eurasia) and about the *Heartland* (referring to the European Russia). After the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the new Russia is highly supportive of the Eurasianism ideology, dreaming and aiming to restore its power; the most recent theoretician and fervent supporter being the above mentioned Dughin, author of various theoretical works (*The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of*

Russia, 1999; *Calea eurasiatică* – The Eurasian way, 2002; *Bazele eurasianismului* – Foundations of Eurasianism, 2002 ş.a.)[3]. Claiming statements such as "the Russian people – a messianic nation", "Russia – The Third Rome", Aleksandr Dugin concludes that "A new Eurasian Empire must be raised (...) as the only honorable and natural form of existence for the Russian people and the only way to accomplish its historical and civilizing mission."[4].

However, if we notice Russia attesting various theories with regard to eurasianism and Eurasia as a geopolitical stake, we may just as clear see China taking action, *The New Silk Road* indicating a significant concrete step of its plan.

2.3. The significance of the New Silk Road

One can easily observe that both *"roads"* (by land and sea) finally lead to Europe. They both mainly follow the old routes, circulated by the merchant caravans or ships. We can without question identify the land route as the old *Silk Road*. In the second case we may not find the link so easy, although the road overlaps e very well-known maritime route: *The Road* is nothing but a backwards reconstruction, of the British Empire's maritime route. Starting from city ports like London, Liverpool, Southampton, pursuing the following itinerary, the Strait of Gibraltar – Malta – Suez Canal – Aden – Bombay/ Mumbai, Indian – Colombo (Sri Lanka) – Malacca Strait, it reaches for Hong Kong, the important colony in southeastern China, which is in fact, the new start point for the *Road*.

In the same time, if we look at a map of the two routes (*One Belt, One Road*), we can clearly notice *a "pair of tongs upon Eurasia" a commercial one at a first glance, in fact indicating a new strategic power element on China's agenda.*

The achievement of this initiative would certainly bring China economic superiority compared to the other stakeholders with high interests for the supercontinent, and as a result would definitely bring her a new power asset, *capable to shift Chinas 'status from a regional power* (according to some analysts) *to a global power*, as desired.

China, the *Eurasian production hub* (see top ranks for the most important indicators), aims to become *a global trade hub* (to become the world's largest exporter) considering the exports index are higher than the production index (everyone is producing but not all export!).

China has lately been a master in using the *soft power* (opposite to *hard power*, implying the use of force): the most successful Olympic Games (Beijing 2008) the Universal exposition (Shanghai 2010), winners of Miss Universe (2007 – Zhang Zilin, 2012 – Yu Wenxia) and Nobel Prize in Literature (2012 – Mo Yan), the foundation of Confucius Institutes (including in Romania) and radio and television channels in many regions of the world, etc.[5] To all this, China added a new *soft power* element: *The New Silk Road*, which, at least at first glance, contains nothing "harmful".

The Romanian analyst Paul Dobrescu fairly believes that "the trade infrastructure that will rise within the New Silk Road will bring with it a communication infrastructure as well." It is true that, "the goods and trades traveling across Eurasia is carrying a message with it" [6]

Another analyst, the Japanese-born American Francis Fukuyama, the author of the optimistic book *The End of History and the Last Man*, is convinced that "Asia, the periphery of the past, will become the center, and the center that has brightly shone in the last centuries can easily slide towards the periphery"[7].

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[3] Silviu Neguţ, *Geopolitica*, Ed. Meteor Press, Bucureşti, 2015, p. 525.
[4] Aleksandr Dughin, *Bazele geopoliticii şi viitorul geopolitic al Rusiei*, Ed. Eurasiatica.ro, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 141.
[5] See Silviu Neguţ, Marius-Cristian Neacşu, *From „hard power" to „soft power". Intelligent power*, în „Proceeding of The International Scientific Conference STRATEGIES XXI: The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment", Bucharest, November 22-23, 2012, „Carol I" National Defence University Publishinghouse, pp. 216-226.
[6] Paul Dobrescu, *Crizele dupa Criza. O lume fara busola si fara hegemon*, Ed Litera, Bucuresti, 2016, p 205.
[7] *Ibidem*.

2.4. Favoring and opposing countries

Although it may be too soon to have such standpoints crystalized, it is possible to distinguish, at least a tacit agreement of quite many countries, which will benefit from concrete visible direct investments, and which are, obviously, in favor of the initiative. At the same time, we may also notice the restrained attitude of some important regional stakeholders (Japan, India, European economic powers) and from outside the area (primarily the US). According to many analysts, a big issue would be the attitude of the two largest neighboring states: India and the Russian Federation, each of them considering different reasons.

As far as Russian Federation is concerned, the rise of China cannot be seen as a positive asset, especially as China is operating in her sphere of influence (the famous "Russia's near neighborhood"). However, she doesn't have much of a choice, due to reasons such as: the lack of financial capital necessary to boost her as a regional financial-economic stakeholder, or the support needed, or at least China's tacit agreement towards achieving its geopolitical goals.

India, on the other hand, is under no circumstance sympathetic with China's initiative, which seems to annihilate her as a regional actor, considering that the Indian subcontinent has second largest demographic potential in the world, (with 100 million inhabitants less than China), being the 4th global economic power by GDP (PPP) – 3rd if we exclude the European Union – and is ranking 5th place in military spending ($56 billion; 2.5% her GDP), holding the same place in motor vehicle production.

2.5. Concrete projects

In 2015, China has overseased the $100 billion abroad investment threshold, mainly within the *New Silk Road* perspective, especially for the alongside *Economic Belt* initiative, which will include industrial and trade areas from east Asia to Europe and Africa, covering no less than 65 states.

a) In December 2016, China has took over two-thirds of Piraeus Greek port' shares (amounting $368.5 million), one of the terminus points for the *New Silk Road*, and has also invested $350 million building the largest maritime hub in the Mediterranean;

b) China builds harbor facilities on the North African coast, in Egypt and Algeria (the countries being significant oil producers and exporters); moreover in January 2016, China has signed an agreement (with investments worth $ 3.3 billion for the construction of Algerian port Cherchell);

c) A large oil refinery was built on the shore of the Red Sea of Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer and exporter;

d) Has initiated the construction of the Pakistani Gwadar port ($1.6 billion investment) as a starting point of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which will ultimately bring in investments of no less than $46 billion. The project also includes Gwadar-Kashgar connection achievement in Northwest China (the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region) using a complex network of high-speed rail-ways, highways and oil pipelines;

e) In December 2015, China has signed an agreement with Kazakhstan (the country with the largest hydrocarbon reserves and production in Central Asia), mainly in the energy and petrochemical sectors, including the possible takeover of the Romanian company ROMPETROL from KazMunaiGaz; the initiative has already been achieved.

f) With many objectives on the list, Iran has also been targeted (one of China's major sources for oil supply).

We must also mention the energetic partnerships (closed with 24 de state), with countries from other areas of the world (especially with the USA), highlighting the Chinese oil strategy, which aims for reducing the vulnerabilities facing any possible risks regarding dollar depreciation and oil price appreciation, (China has also benefit from the "Geopolitics of the cheap oil" experienced in the last decade of this century) and, on the other hand, increasing its financial power.

2.6. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Founded on the initiative of a single country, China, and inaugurated on 16th of January 2016, with headquarter in Beijing, AIIB is the only bank in the world who's nomenclature includes the word Infrastructure, and is also focused to support the building of the infrastructure in the Asian region as it claimed initially, however we can see today the area is expending. The objective of the bank is certainly very ambitious, as the infrastructure issue is getting acute in many regions of the world. According to the bank's calculations only the modernization of the Asian infrastructure would require $12,000 billion. It is important that the promise of winning is both safe and extremely tempting, hence the belief this would be the "business of the century", in addition to the *New Silk Road*. At first, the bank was cautiously regarded by a number of important states (Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Poland), which have later joined (!). Only Japan and Canada are still outside of the project. It is worth mentioning that only four states hold half of the company shares (and thus control decisions): China (30.34%, already advancing 50 billion dollars), India (8.52%), Russia (6.66%) and Germany (4.57%). Other relevant stakeholders (with over 3% shares) are Australia, France, Indonesia, Brazil and the UK. The bank is obviously part of the list of Chinese political elements aiming to "commercially conquer" Eurasia, but in the same time to raise China as a global power.

3. China's capacity to invade and conquer the world market

More than 20 years ago, the French geopolitician Yves Lacoste affirmed: "China is globally seen through its reality as a middle power, and in Asia, regarded at a continental-nation level. It followed a laborious and uncertain road to development, incompatible with the political party monopole."[8]

Today things are not the same. No one can claim anymore that China is just a middle power and that the single party monopole is incompatible with the country's development. The "socialist market economy" promoted by its reformer Deng Xiaoping, has shown the results, China becoming already the world's largest economic power (in terms of GDP at purchasing power parity) – despite the World Bank forecast in 2010, that calculated such an achievement within a time horizon by 2040 – and the world's largest exporter, in both cases holding 5% of the global total, envied by traditional economic powers (Great Britain, Germany, Japan, USA) maintaining, after such a spectacular development, a high growth rate (around 7% per year). We are dealing with an "astonishingly fast changing China will from now on, in many aspects, transforming the whole world with it. It is worth noticing that what is happening in today's China is no significantly impacting the Chinese people only, but the whole mankind"[9].

China is currently experiencing a paradigm shift regarding the country's economic development: swinging from „rapid growth" to „high-quality growth", move as confirmed by Xi Jinping, the president of the state and the Chinese Communist Party, in the opening speech of his 19th Congress (18 October 2017)[10].

Spectacular economic development has demanded an increased intake in natural resources majorly imported. China secures its consumption needs counting on its production only out of coal (almost half of the world total), rare metals (95% of planetary extraction), precious metals (gold, silver), and some non-ferrous ores (copper, lead, zinc, partially bauxite). On the other side, although it registers representative production of hydrocarbons (over 210 million tons of oil, the world's fourth largest production, more than 110 billion cubic meters of natural gas, the world's 7th place), due to its high consumption rate the import scores a massive number as well. For example, between 1982 and 2015, although doubled its oil production (from 102 million tons to over 210 million

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[8] Yves Lacoste (sous la direction de), *Dictionnaire de Géopolitique*, Flammarion, Paris, 1995, p. 428.

[9] Andrei Marga, *Ascensiunea globală a Chinei*, Ed. Niculescu, București, 2015, p. 227.

[10] Radio China International (romanian.cri.cn).

tons), consumption registered a much faster growth (7 times higher, raising from 80 to over 550 million of tons), becoming the second largest importer and consumer of the planet after the USA[11].

It is noteworthy that for a long time already, China is promoting a diversifying import sources policy. A best example would be the oil export, which has long been imported almost exclusively from the Middle East, but in the past 10-15 years other regions have been added, such as Africa (the most representative example being Angola, which has become the second source of supply after Saudi Arabia, followed by Iran), Latin America (especially Venezuela), the Russian Federation and ex-Soviet Central Asia. Besides, the last two mentioned, plus the Middle East, are strongly targeted by the *New Silk Road*. It is also true that, China has started the import resources diversification much earlier in the closest region, closing contracts (including pipelines built) with Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, the last case pointing out the *ESPO pipeline (Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean Pipeline)*, inaugurated in 2011.

The most conclusive proof of China's long-term thinking is the relationship built with Africa, where Chinese capital accounts for 40% of the foreign investment (double compared to the USA, which has long held the supremacy)[12], especially in the extractive industry, oil exploration and processing and infrastructure (majorly highways), with almost one million Chinese people located in the project countries (causing dissatisfaction among local workforce who could have been employed). It is also significant to say that China has oil partnerships with all major African countries in the industry.

China has also infiltrated the American continent, the most significant examples are Venezuela, with a slightly older partnership (the Chinese state is the second destination for Venezuelan oil after the USA), and Canada, which became the second largest trading partner in America after the USA. The main recent investment here being the pipelines designed to transport the oil exploited in the sands of Alberta to the Pacific coast of British Columbia.

Conclusion

As the Chinese call it, "The 21st century Project", officially inaugurated in May 2017, *The New Silk Road* is *a much greater initiative, than the Old Silk Road or any other economic project ever proposed.*

As the name indicates, "One Belt, One Road", it owns two different branches. *The Belt*, the land-based route follows the Old Silk Road (similarly starting from the ancient Chinese capital of Xi'an, however ending not in northern Africa but in Europe's greatest North Sea port, Rotterdam) and having many ramifications along the way (one of them pointing to the Romanian port of Constanta, the largest port by the Black Sea). *The Road,* the oceangoing route leaves Zhanjiang a port city by the South China Sea, in southeastern China – chosen, among other assets, thanks to its geographical position, located near three major urban and economic metropolises (Guangzhou/ former Canton, Hong Kong and Macau) – and going down the route of Malacca Strait – the Indian Ocean – Suez Canal, arrives in Europe, ending its journey with the terminus Mediterranean city ports of Athena (Pireu) and Vanice.

China's *Great Initiative* has already announced the development of a $127 billion investment and supported by the Asian Bank for Investment and Infrastructure (ABII), inaugurated in January 2016, *will engage no less than 65 states from three different continents (Asia, Africa, and Europe).*

Although crystalized standpoints (opposing or favoring the idea) are premature, it is possible to distinguish, at least a tacit agreement coming from the countries, which will benefit from concrete visible direct investments, but we may just as clear notice the restrained attitude of some important regional stakeholders (India, Japan, European economic powers) or global stakeholders

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[11] Data source: *The World FactBook*, 2017.
[12] *World Investments Report*, UNCTAD, Geneva, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf, 2017.

(mainly USA). Of great importance is, of course, the attitude of the two largest neighboring states: India and the Russian Federation. India is clearly denying the initiative, while Russia, worriedly looking at China's advancement progress within her former sphere of influence (majorly in „Russia's near neighborhood"), artificially supports the project driven by various reasons, such as the lack of financial capital necessary to promote her as a regional financial-economic stakeholder, and the acute need of China's support, or at least her tacit agreement, towards achieving its geopolitical goals.

Without any doubt, *One belt, One Road represents, at a first glance, a commercial "pair of tongs upon Eurasia"*, however being just as *geostrategic*, as it represents a new power asset for China, already awning various such advantages (population, total GDP, exports, largest ports, foreign exchange reserves, etc.)

This statement becomes more and more significant in the current context of Eurasia regarded as the main geopolitical and geostrategic stake of the 21st century.

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THE TERRITORIAL CONFLICT OVER THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES/ KURIL ISLANDS AND SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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Abstract: The paper aims to examine the geostrategic situation in the Asia Pacific Region, the relations between the key-actors and what are the perspectives for the progression of the Russian-Japanese relations in the existing circumstances.

For more than 70 years, relations between Russia and Japan have been modeled on the territorial conflict over the Northern Territories (called so by Japan) / Kuril Islands (called so by Russia) and no Peace agreement has been concluded yet. The most serious obstacle on that way has been the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

For the Russian side, in the center of the cooperation lies the economic factor, while for the Japanese – the territorial settlement.

What comes to the security issues, we encounter with more complicated situation. Here we have comparatively neutral geopolitical zone where meet the interests of the global powers such as the US, the Russian Federation, plus the regional actors.

Keywords: Asia Pacific Region, Russia, Japan, the United States, People Republic of China, security system, Northern Territories/Kuril islands.

Introduction

The security aspect remains one of the principal concerns in the Asia Pacific region because there is no collective security system per se, capable resolving the regional escalations. The US attempts to establish "an Asian NATO" apparently did not work. So the US tried to fill the gap with bilateral or multilateral agreements.

The regional organizations, in their turn, sometimes do not function according to initial expectations, due to tangled relations between the states of the region.

One of the most disturbing problems of international relations in the region can be considered the growing contradiction between the US and the People Republic of China, including the rivalry in the military-strategic sphere.

Russian-American relations remain rather complicated, but in the Asia-Pacific region, the US does not officially view Russia a significant threat to its positions. After the end of the Cold War, the United States in its security policy in the Asia-Pacific region paid more attention to North Korea, and later to China.

However, some Russian politicians think that the US expose all its power in the Asia Pacific as a counterweight to North Korea but, in fact, its military presence in the region introduces a threat to Russian and Chinese national security as well.

In this context, the Northern Territorial dispute with Japan introduces more importance and some complications in the settlement procedure. For the Russian side one of the hindering factors to the settlement of the territorial dispute with Japan remains the fear that after handing over the South Kuril Islands, Japan may allow its military partner to launch its bases there. The US already has its forces on Okinawa island, and for Russia to expand this chain near its maritime borders is unacceptable.

Another factor is the national prestige. The Russian Federation has a number of ethno-political issues and cannot go to any territorial compromises, even though the territorial settlement with Japan would solve some economic and energetic problems.

Japan's position on the Northern Territories' issue has not really had an evolution since the origins of the dispute. There were some historical moments under more pragmatic political leaders when Japan expressed its readiness to go to compromises on its official position but eventually the issue returned to its initial state. The reasons are quite clear: Japan's commitment to its Peace Constitution and Japan-US Security Treaty.

1. The politico-strategic situation in the Asia Pacific Region

The Asia-Pacific Region is considered as unique with its relation-building style between the member states. Politically and ideologically being one of the most neutral parts in the World, this area became a target for the global powers, such as the United States and the Russian Federation, to pursue their geostrategic interests.

According to Brzezinski here are the top of the disputes in the region which are open to explosion:

1. The Taiwan's status and relations with China,
2. The Senkaku islands in Sino-Japanese relations and its historic significance
3. The divided Korea and the North Korea's regime itself,
4. And, finally, the Kuril islands' or North Territorial issue.[1]

Except these, there are even more territorial problems of less geopolitical importance.

But the territorial disputes between the countries are not the only phenomenon identifying this region; it differs with its political structure as well. Some believe the reason is that the dynamic economy plays undeniable role forming the foreign political sector.

This idea also explains the security and the identity issues that are not followed by the regionalization concept. It is too focused on business and not enough on states.[2]

In the Asia-Pacific region there are some organizations assumed the security maintenance obligations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). These organizations took the role of the security balancer. In comparison with ARF, SCO seams more effective due to its focused activity. The main reason is that there are more common interests between the member-states.

Since the end of the World War II the US gradually took over the security responsibility in the Asia Pacific region through the network of various bilateral and multilateral agreements with the member countries in the region and regional, non-governmental organizations such are the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) (members: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Europe, India, Indonesia, Japan, DPR Korea, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, United States of America and Vietnam), Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) (members: China, Russia, North and South Korea, Japan and the US), etc.

For America's global policy a close relationship with maritime Japan is essential, but a cooperative relationship with mainland China is imperative for America's Eurasian geo-strategy.[3]

Zbigniew Brzezinski, identifying the region and referring the US-Chinese cooperation, states that geopolitical situation in the region dictates this principle: "my neighbor's neighbor is my ally".[4] He explains this theory relaying on the historical facts. For instance, Russia and Japan as

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[1] Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Published by Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 151.
[2] Uwe Wissenbach, *Barriers to East Asian Integration: North East Asia – A Non-Region?*, Published online 03.09.2013, p. 5, available at https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s40320-013-0042-3.pdf, accessed 11.09.2017.
[3] Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, p. 151.
[4] Ibidem.

well, have always been having territorial claims towards China. In this circle the leading vectors are the interests.

But it is not possible to ignore that along with the US strategic interests towards China there are many tensional moments which are not overcome yet by the two sides. For Chinese it is the US close relations with Taiwan, and for the US -the current political regime in China.

For Japan as well, the development of ties with the "rising China" have become one of the main directions of the foreign policy and diplomatic activity.[5]

Since the beginning of the 2000s Beijing is also expressing its desire to form a "good-neighbor zone"[6] using the accessible tools and resources. Expanding its sphere of influence due to its economic superiority, China, at the same time, is trying to form a cautious policy, because in too close economic relations, small states of the region see a threat to their own independence. So, in the economic relations keeping the distance, China uses the opportunity of "velvet expansion" I would say. From the Chinese neighbors Japan remains the most problematic. The late 2000s - early 2010s were marked by complications in relations between China and Japan related to a maritime territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Archipelago.

The governments of the two countries have been increasingly fierce about a group of islands located halfway between Okinawa and Taiwan, and the Japanese call this archipelago Senkaku, the Chinese call it Diaoyu. Although the islands have been under the Japanese control for more than a century, China still has claims about them and China's actions become more and more aggressive.[7]

Basically, such a negative predisposition comes since the World War II. Tokyo's enormous military outlays (now the fourth largest in the world after the United States, China and France) and defense modernization programs are also causes for concern. Not surprisingly, any talk of revising the country's so-called "Peace Constitution" and/or scrapping Article Nine of that document sets off alarm bells in Beijing.[8] Although diplomatic relations between Japan and China were restored in 1972, they have never been in harmony.

At the moment, the alignment of forces in North-East Asia is as follows: on the one hand, the US and its allies Japan and Korea, on the other - China together with Russia. To build an effective security structure in such a situation is impossible: there is too much mutual distrust between "the members". The situation can break if a third player with influence in the international community appears in the region.

If the bipolar structure disintegrates and the countries of the region can move away from the paradigm of the US-China confrontation, the situation in the region may change. Such role might accept Russia if its economic condition allows, but not in the near future.

In addition to this Japan's military capability is also increasing, and in terms of quality, it has no regional peer. At present, however, the Japanese armed forces are not a tool of Japanese foreign policy and are largely viewed as an extension of the American military presence in the region. As we know, since 1971 Japan respect the decision of the parliament about three non-nuclear principles - not to produce, not to have and not to import nuclear weapons, although, Japan is able to create nuclear weapons in short time if needed.[9]

It is natural not to notice military successes of the Asia Pacific countries because this region, being observed more from the economic aspect, is sometimes overshadowed by that fact.

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[5] *Japanese strategic thought toward Asia*, edt. by G. Rozman, K. Togo, J. P. Ferguson, Published by Macmillan Palgrave, NewYork, 2007, p. 83.

[6] *China's "Good Neighbor" Diplomacy: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?*, edt. by Gang Lin, John W. Garver, Dennis V. Hickey, Michael R. Chambers, Published by Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Asia Program), Special Report, 01. 2005. No. 126, p. 1, available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIAreport_No126.pdf , accessed 15.09.2017.

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[8] *China's "Good Neighbor" Diplomacy*, p.10.

[9] Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard*, p. 155.

Here is one more interesting notice: according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, in 1995 the region became the world's biggest importer of arms, outstripping Europe and the Middle East.[10]

The discussions on the preservation of the treaty between Japan and the US are going on in the both countries. In the U.S. some of the specialists think that Japan saves on defense and, through this, increases competitiveness in relation with the United States. The others say that those expenses are justified. Supporters of this view believe that militarily independent Japan can represent a serious challenge not only for its neighbors but for the US itself.

Studying the political game of the concerned parties in the North-Pacific region, we may sum up the main tasks and goals of each of them. So, those are:

For the United States: to accomplish the security policy missions and its dominance in the region collaborating with Japan and, at the same time, to keep the balance of the powers with China using Taiwan.

For Japan: After Abe's enrollment the there could be noticed some new initiatives in Japan's regional policy. That is the new tendency directed to the comprehensive policy in the region. Gradually and softly Japan tries to resume its geopolitical status lost after the World War II and to acquire some independency.

For the Russian Federation: On the image of the recent political developments Russia will try to use the cooperation in the East Asian region to overcome political and economic isolation after the Crimean crisis. In this context Japan and China will play a very important role.

For the People's Republic of China: In the case of China there is much to say, the subject appears more complicated and, from my point of view, not enough observed. On the surface it seems that China is the leading country in the East Asian region. There are numerous predictions about China's new global role. Well, the economic development, as the history shows in the U.S. case, is the first step to the global dominance but it is not enough. The economy is a potential but the policymaking art is the tool to the top. For the Chinese diplomacy the main problem in the region remains the Japanese-US alliance.[11] On this way the considerable Russian-Chinese alliance may serve as a counterpoise but for the future China needs more sustainable and reliable regional partners considering the rising Indian factor.

2.   The territorial conflict over the Northern Territories / Kuril Islands

Originally, the Kuril Islands (called by Russia) or Northern Territories (called by Japan) were inhabited by Ainu people. They were the indigenous inhabitants of Hokkaido. They're also present on Sakhalin, the island off the east coast of Russia, as well as northern Honshu, Japan's biggest island.[12] They have often been referred to both in Japan and in the West as being a "dying race".

In 1945, at the Crimean (Yalta) conference of the heads of government of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain agreed to include Kurils and Southern Sakhalin in the Soviet Union's territory.[13] Since then, four islands Kunashir (known in Japanese as Kunashiri), Iturup (Etorofu), Shikotan and the rocky Habomais, in total having 5036 sq km[14], have become more than 70-year dispute between the two states and do not allow them to conclude a peace agreement.

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[10] Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard,* p. 154.

[11] Idem p. 160.

[12] Dean Irvine, *Japan's hidden people: Ainu try to keep ancient traditions alive*, CNN, 10.02.2015, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/09/travel/cnngo-travel-hokkaido-ainu/, accessed 12.09.2017.

[13] *Crimea (Yalta) Conference, 1945: Entry of Soviet Union into war against Japan, 59 Stat. 1823; Executive Agreement Series 498; 1945 For. Rel.*, available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000003-1022.pdf, accessed 17.09.2017.

[14] *Kuril islands dispute between Russia and Japan*, BBC, 29.04.2013, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11664434 , accessed 01.09.2017.

After the USSR collapse Russian Federation was in the most complicated situation comparing with the other states in the Asia Pacific Region. Russia needed to pass over the integration process within the capitalistic community and has never been accepted friendly by the Western countries, which have been viewing Russia as a failed state in democratization.

American strategist Zbigniev Brzezinski in his book "The Great Chessboard" openly spoke for "dismemberment of Russia. Brzezinski's idea is to divide Russia into three independent republics: "the European part, the Siberian Republic and the Far Eastern Republic."[15]

This negative perception motivated Russia to focus more on its European policy.

For the newly formed Russian Federation the end of the Cold War established new conditions and rules for its political formation. The collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War led to a new geopolitical situation as in the entire world, as well as in the North-Pacific region. A new tendency launched, to establish closer economic ties between Russia and the other countries in the Asia Pacific Region. It gave a hope to the Japanese side that the new Russian government would be more motivated to conclude the peace agreement. The Russia's position have been clear, the handover of the two smallest islands (Shikotan and Habomai islets) was the maximum compromise. After some hesitation the Japanese side did not accept this scenario and since then, there has been no progress in the territorial settlement.

Starting May of 2014, Putin announced new priorities in Russian foreign policy where Asia became the main vector. A new Asian direction of Russian foreign policy is different from the one it had since the end of the Cold War, 1991.[16] Before it, the Russian-Japanese perspective has not been representing significant importance in the security architecture and in creation of common mechanisms to solve the regional problems, but more was relaying on the importance of its economic vector.

For "Russia's new pivot to Asia" the recent political events played crucial role. The recently emerged Ukrainian crisis better explains the Russian new aspirations to improve the relations with its Pacific neighbors, especially with China and Japan. The new political discourse was caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the European countries. As far as Japan also announced about its disagreement regarding the Crimean annexation and participated in "the sanctions' parade", Russia's ongoing closer cooperation with China was expected in the first period. But the future interaction showed that Japan did not apply for the considerable sanctions entirely. The reason could be the fear to push Russia to closer to Japan's regional rival. For the People Republic of China, in its turn, the high-level relations with Russia are inevitable in the China-U.S. confrontation context. On the other hand, regionally talking, Beijing seeks backing from Moscow for its struggle with Japan too.[17] It is noteworthy that in 2014 Chinese envoy in Germany was calling the West to avoid imposing sanctions against Russia, saying that the negotiations were still possible and warning that it might lead to a negative chain reaction.[18]

China is also one of the control levers of the region and Russia will not risk worsening the relations with one of the main policymakers in the Asia Pacific region.

Japan's case is a little different. Russia still does not consider Japan as an independent actor in the international relations, thinking that in most of the cases it reflects the US policy characteristics.

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[15] *Shifting Priorities in Russia's Foreign and Security Policy*, edt. by Roger E. Kanet, Rémi Piet, Published by Ashgate, Qatar, 2014, p. 65.

[16] Alexander Korolev, *Russia's Reorientation to Asia: Causes and Strategic Implications*, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 1, 10.03.2016, p. 2, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2745718, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2745718.

[17] *Uneasy Triangle: China, Russia, and the United States in the New Global Order*, co-authored by Stephen Blank, Gilbert Rozman, and Alexander Lukin, Center on Global Interests, 23.10.2015, p. 20, available at http://globalinterests.org/2015/10/26/uneasy-triangle-china-russia-and-the-united-states-in-the-new-global-order/, accessed 09.09.2017.

[18] *Chinese ambassador warns against sanctions on Russia*, South China Morning Post, 14.03.2014, available at http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1448188/chinese-envoy-shi-mingde-warns-west-against-sanctions-russia, accessed 01.09.2017.

From the geopolitical aspect Japan understands that the Russian-Chinese alliance could be viewed as a contra-power against US or the unipolar system of the World.

On May 9, 2015 during the military parade in Moscow Russian President Vladimir Putin together with China's president Xi Jinping was discussing not just the memories about the World War II, but also expressing his concern regarding Japan's defense reforms, stating that the revision of the U.S.-Japan military cooperation is a threat to the post-war international order.[19]

As it appears, Putin's pivot to Asia is not just an "energy pivot to China" and that Russia hedges its regional economic and security bets by extending cooperation with South Korea, North Korea, and Japan, which corresponds to Russia's broader view of multipolarity both globally and regionally.[20]

The island deal with Japan could ease Russia's international isolation, reduce country's dependence on China and stop it from slowly becoming China's reservoir of cheap natural resources, and initiate the positive economic growth in Russian Far East with the help of Japanese contributions, to add to the amount of investments from China that already exceeds the regional budget.[21] This concern in Russia has been lasting since the end of the 20th century.

That is why the negotiations about the territorial affiliation of the islands were held in parallel with the talks on economic cooperation. A number of adopted joint documents fully reflect the political and economic nature of these efforts. Such documents include the Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan, adopted in November 1997 (economic cooperation package aimed to boost Russian economic development), the "Putin-Mori" program adopted in September 2000 (aimed to innovate the earlier Hashimoto-Yeltsin plan), and the Japanese-Russian Plan of 2003.[22] By adopting these documents each side pursued the goal to show the strategic significance of the South Kuril Islands for each of himself and demonstration not to concede one another. Despite this, at the moment it is possible to observe non-traditional approaches to its resolution, different from the previously proposed options: for example, equal division of these territories, the return of 3.5 islands, join economic exploitation of the islands.

As a basis for such kind of options, was the example of diplomatic resolution of the territorial dispute between Russia and China.[23]

In 2013, restarting the new round of almost frozen negotiations with Russia, Abe was intended to give a solution, first of all, to the territorial issue, secondly to prevent Russia's possible approach with China.[24]

In general, Russia will try to keep the situation balanced but based on its national interests. As one of the global powers in the world, for Russia, its economy has always been its "Achilles' heel" and Russia's political decisions in the Pacific region will mostly be explained through economic impulses. Along with that, it never kept Russia apart from making important political or military steps using its military capacity, for the sake of its "international prestige".

That is why, no matter how much Japan and Russia are interested in the resolution of the problem in bilateral approach, history repeatedly shows that the third party involvement always has its impact on the outcomes of the negotiations.

Thus, analyzing the nature of the development of Russian-Japanese relations in the regional context, we may conclude that they are mostly explained by the political peculiarities of the region.

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[19] Shannon Tiezzi, *At Russia's Military Parade, Putin and Xi Cement Ties*, The Diplomat, 09.05.2015, available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/at-russias-military-parade-putin-and-xi-cement-ties/ , accessed 17.09.2017.
[20] Korolev, *Russia's Reorientation to Asia,* p. 2.
[21] Sofiya Sayankina, *New approach: Why Russia and Japan might finally settle the island dispute*, Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, 27.10. 2016, available at https://www.journalofterritorialandmaritimestudies.net/single-post/2016/10/27/New-approach-Why-Russia-and-Japan-might-finally-settle-the-island-dispute, accessed 17.09.2017.
[22] Brad Williams, *Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations*, Published by Routledge, New York, 2007, p.39.
[23] As we know, in October 2004, Russia and China managed to settle the issue of disputed islands, because of which, in the past, the two countries found themselves in an armed conflict.
[24] *Japan-Russian Relations: Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance*, edt. by Gilbert Rozman, Published by Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Washington, 2016, pp. 4-5.

China and the USA play a key role in this procedure and have their inevitable impact on the decisions of the parties but, also, it is worth to mention that the future of the relations between Russia and Japan depends on the parties' non-standard approach .

Conclusion

Going forward, we may state that the Asia Pacific region, first appearing as a part of the world where the so-called "economic diplomacy" was born, is not limited just with that definition in the 21st century. Having approximately 60% of the global population this world-piece is rich with religious, regimes' and cultural diversities and it is open to any explosive situation such are the terrorist attacks, natural disasters, nuclear threats, etc. Along with the economic prosperity, it is being developed the emergency of more efficient security system foundation. And the territorial disputes between the member-states are the main obstacle on that way. The Kuril islands' dispute is one of them which on the regional mosaic does not play a definitive role and is less examined. But it is important in the development of the two main actors in the Asia pacific Region.

The normalization of the Japanese-Russian relations will be supportive for Japan in maintaining its influence and role in the Region and for Russia it will open new doors for cooperation in energetic, economic and, finally, security section.

The Chinese factor played and is playing a crucial role. First conquering the region with its economic power, recently it keeps transforming to a great military power. Between Japan and China have always been escalations-from territorial disputes and the struggle for natural resources to a kind of arms race. The arms race worries more because it arose after years of futile attempts to put aside bitter memories of the Japanese aggression against China and other Asian countries in the twentieth century.

The Russian-Chinese relations in the current stage are highly estimated; economically the interconnection between the two countries is constantly growing. On the other hand, it is growing the Russian dependence on China. That is why the territorial settlement with Japan could become a balancing cornerstone for Russia.

However, despite the recent efforts, initiated by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the Russian President Vladimir Putin, the negotiations still cannot move forward to more to more productive results because there still remain some fundamental issues slowing down the procedure.

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IRANIAN GRAND STRATEGY IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST, THE IRGC AND GENERAL QASSEM SOLEIMANI

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Abstract: Along the past few decades, starting from 1979, the Shiite Iran was continuously involved in a massive effort aimed at expanding its sphere of influence in the Greater Middle East. Such a grand strategic design is clearly combining two potent roots: a very strong imperial tradition, and the desire of the regime in Tehran to export the political change which started in Iran in 1979, and also the Shiite system of values, to larger and larger regions, even beyond the limits of the Middle East. In this effort, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and mainly its elite Quds Force are continuously playing a major role. The text is exploring the IRCG's role on the international arena, mainly by means of analyzing open sources directly dealing with significant aspect and moments of the professional career of the Quds Force commanding officer, General Qassem Soleimani.

Keywords: Iran, grand strategic agenda, imperial tradition, Greater Middle East, Qassem Soleimani, IRGC, sphere of influence, foreign intervention.

Introduction

In early spring of 2015, a *BBC* piece of news was stating General Qassem (or Qasem, in some texts) Soleimani, "the once reclusive head of the Revolutionary Guards' elite Quds Force has emerged from a lifetime in the shadows directing covert operations abroad, to achieve almost celebrity status in Iran", also adding that "the man who, until a couple of years ago most Iranians would not have recognised on the street, is now the subject of documentaries, news reports and even pop songs". The same *reliable* open source was also reporting "one music video widely shared in Iran was made by Shia militia fighters in Iraq. It shows soldiers spray-painting the general's portrait on a wall and parading in front of it while stirring music plays in the background". More important for our debate, the Iranian general "is currently in Salahuddin province in northern Iraq, commanding Iraqi and Shia militias as they try to recapture the city of Tikrit from Islamic State (IS)", *BBC* was also reporting on the same occasion, adding that "Iran's Fars News agency has published photographs of him with the troops, and militia sources in Iraq have told BBC Persian he has been there for some time helping the Iraqis prepare for the mission"[1].

This brief piece of media news might be used, we think, as an appropriate starting point for a brief analysis focused on General Soleimani's biography and professional career, and – in more general terms – on Iran's grand strategic[2] agenda, and on the military and political role the *Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps* (*IRGC*) is playing in the Greater Middle East.

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[1] Bozorgmehr Sharafedin (BBC Persian), "General Qasem Soleimani: Iran's rising star", on the *BBC News* webpage, March 6, 2015, at the internet address http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27883162, accessed on September 17, 2017.
[2] For the definitions *of grand strategy* and *military strategy* see, for example, B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategia: Acțiunile Indirecte*, Editura Militară, București, 1973, pp. 334-335.

1. Soleimani's biography and professional career

A text published a few years ago, in 2011, offers some data allowing us a better understanding of the different stages of the professional career of General Soleimani. He was born in 1957, in a village called Rabord, in the Kerman[3] Province of Iran. Between 1964 and 1970, Soleimani attended the local school in Rabord, and then he has worked, for several years (1970-75) as a construction worker in his native province. Then he was, for several years (1975-1979), a Kerman Water Organization contractor. As far as we know, the first significant steps of his political radicalization took place starting with 1977-1978. In 1979, when the new theocratic political regime came to power, replacing the regime of the Shah (which has been clearly authoritarian, but also a reformist one, intensely favoring strong economic and strategic ties with the Western world), Soleimani became a member of the Kerman branch of the newly established *IRGC*, and reliable open sources say he has been directly involved "in suppression of separatists in Iranian Kurdistan". Most probably he proved both ideological reliability and political loyalty, and also an important (and probably increasing) amount of military skills, so that after only one year he was appointed chief of the 41st *Tharallah* division[4] (other open sources are speaking about a brigade[5], which usually is a smaller unit than a division), being active in the war against Iraq[6], until 1988. Later on, starting with 1988, Soleimani has begun leading "the fight against drug cartels and smugglers in southeastern Iran from his headquarters in Kerman" (a job associated with a greater responsibility than the previous one). After roughly ten years, Soleimani has been appointed, in 1997/1998, IRGC Quds Force chief, and he has led, between 1197/98 and 2001, "the Iranian effort against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan"[7].

As far as we know, from a very interesting text published by *The New Yorker* in 2013, Soleimani took command of the elite branch (called *Quds Force*) of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) at the end of the 1990s (most probably in 1998, when he was only 41 or 42 years old), trying, from a very early stage of his new official assignment, "to reshape the Middle East in Iran's favor, working as a power broker and as a military force: assassinating rivals, arming allies, and, for most of a decade, directing a network of militant groups that killed hundreds of Americans in Iraq"[8]. Open sources are indicating that in 2008 Soleimani was already coordinating the Iranian military, political and ideological effort in a very large area, *beyond* the borders of Iran. In a message addressed to General David Petraeus, the commanding officer of the Multi-National Force which was trying at that moment to pacify and stabilize Iraq, Soleimani presented himself this way: "you should know that I control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and

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[3] For the geography and economic life of this large Iranian province see "KERMAN I. Geography", in *Encyclopædia Iranica*, at the internet address http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kerman-01-geography, text accessed on September 23, 2017.

[4] *Tharallah* means "Vengeance of God", many open sources say. Some other open sources offer a more a more detailed explanation of the significance of *Tharallah*. According to a quite long text published online by *Al-Islam.org*, "the word *thar…* in the Arabic language has been employed for different meanings: avenging for blood, rancour, blood, the slain, etc", and "*thar* has also been translated as *qatil* (the one who is killed). And when Allah is annexed to the word *thar*, it confers the meaning *qatilullah* (the one killed for Allah or in His way)" – see "Chapter 5: Peace be unto you, O blood of Allah and the son of the blood of Allah", on the *Al-Islam.org* website, at the internet address https://www.al-islam.org/the-sacred-effusion-reflections-on-ziyarat-ashura-volume-1-shaykh-muhammad-khalfan/chapter-5-peace, accessed on September 23, 2017. Anyhow, the very name of the division we are speaking about is clearly indicating a *very* significant amount of religious fervor, this being a special feature of the official ideology of the Iranian regime.

[5] See, for example, "Report: Iran's General Soleimani; Barrier Ahead of ISIS, US", on the website Alkwaght News & Analysis, June 12, 2016, at the internet address http://alwaght.com/en/News/57266/Iran%E2%80%99s-General-Soleimani;-Barrier-Ahead-of-ISIS,-US, text accessed on October 9, 2017.

[6] In order to understand how difficult and cost-intensive that was has been for Iran (and for Iraq as well), see, for example, Kaveh Farrokh, *Iran at War 1500-1988*, Osprey Publishing House, Oxford, 2011, pp. 342-415.

[7] Ali Afroneh, "Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani: A Biography", in *Middle Eastern Outlook*, no. 1, January 2011, on the website of the *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research*, pp. 1-2, at the internet address http://www.aei.org/publication/brigadier-general-qassem-suleimani-a-biography/, accessed on September 22, 2017.

[8] Dexter Filkins, "The Shadow Commander. Qassem Suleimani is the Iranian operative who has been reshaping the Middle East. Now he's directing Assad's war in Syria", in *The New Yorker*, September 30, 2013, at the internet address https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander, text accessed on September 20, 2017.

Afghanistan"[9]. According to open sources, the international role of the Iranian general started to significantly grow some years before the moment when he became a 'media rising star'. For example, in 2013, "in an interview for a BBC Persian documentary... former US ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker recalled the crucial behind-the-scenes role played by Gen Soleimani in the Baghdad talks". The U.S. diplomat said that along those talks trying to properly address the problem of the "deteriorating security situation" in Iraq, the Iranian ambassador in Baghdad "called repeatedly for breaks". Only some time later, U.S. officials managed to discover the logic of these quite long negotiations breaks: whenever the American envoys "said something that he didn't have covered in his points, he would need to call back to Tehran for guidance - he was that tightly controlled. On the other end of the phone was Qasem Soleimani"[10]. As far as we know, from reliable open sources, the same Iranian general was tightly controlling – or at least extensively supervising – the talks of Iranian diplomatic officials, in Afghanistan, with U.S. diplomats posted in that country. A very senior U.S. diplomat[11] is openly stating "my Iranian interlocutors on Afghanistan made clear that while they kept the foreign ministry informed, ultimately it was Gen Soleimani that would make the decisions"[12].

As far as we know, starting with 2014, "Soleimani masterminded the strategy that contained the expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq" *and* in Syria. And "Soleimani personally led the battle to lift the siege of Amerli – and his forces' way was paved by US airstrikes. 'General Soleimani allowed himself to be photographed last September on the battlefields of Amerli, clearly sending a message to the West that Tehran was very present', Newsweek later wrote"[13].

The way in which different individuals and institutions are evaluating the significance of Soleimani's actions in different regions of the Greater Middle East is *very diverse*. For some (and not at all very few) *senior* Western officials, the Iranian general is nothing else but a very dangerous criminal of a special sort. Some years ago, John Baird, at that very moment the foreign affairs minister of Canada, has publicly said Soleimani is "an agent of terror in the region disguised as a hero". Predictably, Iranian (or other Shiite) ideologically radical voices are praising the general's deeds and political wisdom. Back in 2015, for example, Mohammad-Reza Bahonar, at that very moment first deputy speaker of the Iranian Parliament, declared, speaking about Soleimani, "his political analysis is no less than the Iranian Supreme Leader or Hassan Nasrallah, head of the Lebanese Hezbollah". In December 2014, Hassan Mousavian, who is one of the Iranian former nuclear negotiators, publicly defended Soleimani, stating the general "has risked his life to fight against IS terrorists"[14]. Also speaking about the way in which Soleimani's role is evaluated, let us remember that in 2013, even if at that very moment Soleimani was not yet a really major media star, John Maguire[15], a former CIA officer in Iraq, was openly stating the Iranian general "is the single

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[9] Ali Afroneh, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[10] Bozorgmehr Sharafedin (BBC Persian), *op. cit.*

[11] Ryan Crocker, former U.S. Ambassador to both Iraq and Afghanistan. He stepped down as U.S. most senior diplomatic representative in Afghanistan in May 2012 – for this element of official chronology see Emma GRAHAM-HARRISON (in Kabul), "Ryan Crocker to step down as US ambassador to Afghanistan", *The Guardian*, May 22, 2012, at the internet address https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/22/ryan-crocker-step-down-ambassador-afghanistan, text accessed on September 17, 2017. This means that at that very moment, Soleimani's role in controlling at least some very sensitive areas of Iran's strategically significant foreign affairs was already a *very* important one (including Iraq and Afghanistan, countries on the Western and Eastern borders of Iran).

[12] Bozorgmehr Sharafedin (BBC Persian), *op. cit.*

[13] "Qasem Soleimani", on the website called *Global Security.org*, last modified August 22, 2016, at the internet address https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/qods-soleimani.htm, text accessed on October 10, 2017.

[14] Bozorgmehr Sharafedin (BBC Persian), *op. cit.*

[15] As far as we know, obviously from open sources, "John Maguire served as a Senior Service officer at the CIA, and police officer and SWAT team leader in the Baltimore Police Department", and he had "wide ranging experience and success in Iraq, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Africa, with global Special Operations, security issues related to business development and emerging market challenges, international banking and risk management and mitigation. He has over 30 years of intelligence, special operations, counter terrorism, and business planning and development in challenging, emerging markets" – see the text "John Maguire, Managing Director", on the webpage *Iranian Freedom Institute for a Free and Democratic Iran*, at the internet address http://www.iranianfreedom.org/john-maguire.html, accessed on September 20, 2017.

most powerful operative in the Middle East today", even if almost "no one's ever heard of him"[16]. We also know, for example, that "the U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned Suleimani for his role in supporting the Assad regime, and for abetting terrorism"[17]. The really influential role Soleimani is playing is also proved – at least partially – by the basic fact that on some occasions, *very* senior officials in Western countries simply do not wish (or are avoiding, more or less skillfully, and more or less successfully) to offer any comments dealing with the role of General Soleimani on different fronts, in various countries of the Middle East. In October 2014, for example, both Defense Secretary Charles Timothy "Chuck" Hagel and the acting Chairman (at that moment) of the JCS tried a lot to avoid, as much as possible, any official comment concerning the presence (and the role) of the Iranian general in Iraq[18], even if the journalists tried many times to ask questions concerning this very topic.

On *several* occasions, reliable open sources in the Middle East and in the West (including large and notoriously serious press agencies, and important newspapers) have reported Soleimani has been killed. In 2015, for example, at the end of November, *Reuters* was publishing a text stating the Iranian general was denying the rumors saying he has been killed (or at least severely wounded), in mid-October, by artillery shrapnel, "on Aleppo's southern front in Syria". On that occasion, Soleimani declared he has actively searched martyrdom "in the plains and the mountains" (a way of speaking about how large and geographically diverse the region he is directly responsible for is), and *Reuters* was reporting that the Iranian general is the core element of a reality which we can legitimately call a quite strong political and military modern mythology[19]: "once a reclusive figure directing covert operations abroad, Soleimani now enjoys almost celebrity status among Shi'ites, with Iraqi fighters and Syrian soldiers posting selfies with him from the battlefield on social media"[20].

In the end, putting together all these pieces, we can configure a professional (and ideological) portrait with these basic features and elements: a. We are speaking about and individual whose early life might explain, up to a certain point, his *political radicalization* (poor family background, forced to abandon school very early, in order to work for getting money, necessary in order to support himself and for paying important financial debts of his family, heavily alienated and hit by poverty as a result of failed reform in the final stages of the Pahlavi era); b. Soleimani has, according to what we know, a *very limited amount of formal studies* and training (only primary school in the native village, and a very short course – 45 days, according to some sources – in the field of military training). In spite of this lack of formal education, his results tend to indicate he has the ability to reach goals even in difficult political and military contexts (probably being what we are usually calling a naturally gifted administrator and military leader, and possibly what we are usually designating by means of using the concept of *charismatic leader*[21]), c. *intense political radicalization*, at a mature age (about 20 years old), something potentially indicating not only

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[16] Dexter Filkins, *op. cit.*

[17] Dexter Filkins, *op. cit.*

[18] "News Transcript: Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey in the Pentagon Briefing Room", on the official website of the *U.S. Department of Defense* (*DoD*), October 30, 2014, at the internet address https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/606955/department-of-defense-press-briefing -by-secretary-hagel-and-general-dempsey-in/, text accessed on September 21, 2017.

[19] In this context, the word mythology has the meaning of "a set of stories or beliefs about a particular person, institution, or situation, especially when exaggerated or fictitious" – see, for this, one of the meanings listed in "Definition of *mythology* in English", in the online version of the *English Oxford Living Dictionaries*, at the internet address https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mythology, accessed on September 23, 2017.

[20] Reuters Staff (including reporter Bozorgmehr Sharafedin and editor Andrew Roche), "Iranian general Soleimani denies rumours of his death", *Reuters*, November 30, 2015, at the internet address http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-iran-soleimani/iranian-general-soleimani-denies-rumours-of-his-death-idUKKBN0TJ1T720151130, text accessed on September 21, 2017.

[21] For the basic features of charismatic leaders and some significant examples, and for the detailed portraits of five European leaders actively involved in colonization of Africa see Len Oakes, *The Charismatic Personality*, Australian Academic Press, Bowen Hills, Queensland, 2010, and also Edward Berenson, *Heroes of Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa*, University of California Press, Ltd., Berkeley and Los Angeles, London, 2011.

religious fervor and a desire for political change, but also a rational (and obviously cynical, frankly speaking) understanding of the way in which political activism might be an immensely important window of opportunity; d. He started a *skyrocketing career* by means of becoming involved in the *heavy-handed repression* of some domestic opponents; e. Directly involved in different military operations of various sorts and magnitude degrees, along the *very* difficult war against Iraq. We do not know anything about the details of his direct military involvement in the war, but he was appointed, quite soon, divisional commander. For someone without proper military studies, such a position is to be regarded, in normal circumstances, as an extraordinary reward. Most probably, the general shortage of ideologically really and fully reliable Army officers at that time, plus his already proved ruthlessness, and a presumable amount of personal courage and luck are some of the ingredients of his ability to quickly escalate the institutional ladder of within the IRGC command structures. f. After some years of strictly (or mainly) military activities, at war, on several fronts against Iraq, Soleimani proved himself to be *flexible enough, professionally speaking*, so that he was able to smoothly switch from brutally repressing minorities in a limited or narrow regional context, and from frontline activities, to a clearly wider and more complex task, that of destroying (by means of using extensive intelligence work, administrative tools, and also quite large – and highly heterogenous – police and military forces) entire networks of drug-smugglers, operation implemented and pursued in a very large region.

Dealing with the reasons leading Iranian most senior leaders to promote Soleimani to more and more senior positions (and Iranian state-controlled media to pursue a propaganda strategy extensively presenting many moments in Soleimani's activities - even some minor episodes, on different occasions), we think that: a. For Iran, a *very* visible Soleimani – present a lot in various media contexts, starting with the government-controlled Iranian media, but also being a topic of debate in many serious and influential Western media outlets (newspapers, magazines, news agencies) – is, most probably, significantly useful because of several reasons. b. First of all, he is presented, on many occasions, as a *military hero*. And such a public image is, quite clearly, boosting Iranian national morale[22], in a quite difficult context for the regime in Tehran (both on the domestic arena, where larger and larger groups are openly asking for reforms, and on the international arena). In a way or another, a special type of modern political and military 'mythology' is growing, with General Soleimani playing the role of its 'core element'. It is nothing new, in the end: lets us remember, for example, in which way Nazi Germany had managed to use the image of General (later on Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel, using his image in order to increase morale of its own troops, of some segments of the German nation, and also in order to disrupt, as much as possible, the war morale and war propaganda of the liberal and democratic Anglo-Saxon powers[23]. c. We are also to seriously take into account that General Soleimani *is not* representing the regular armed forces of Iran (the Army), but the more politically loyal and ideologically reliable *Revolutionary Guards Cor*ps (*IRGC*), which has been established very early after the 1979 Islamic revolution, "as an ideological custodian charged with defending the Islamic Republic against internal and external threats", and which is presiding now "over a vast power structure with influence over almost every aspect of Iranian life", also being "generally loyal" to the immensely and perennially politically influential "hard-line elements in the regime"[24]. In such a situation, *any* military victory won by Soleimani is a tool able to concomitantly reach *two significant goals*: pushing ahead the grand strategic agenda of the regime in Tehran on the international arena, but

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[22] Some important authors in the field of International Relations are stating national morale in a *very* important element of national power; see, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între naţiuni: Lupta pentru putere şi lupta pentru pace*, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2007, pp. 174-176.
[23] For better understanding Rommel, both as real military commander and as a product of the German propaganda see, for example, David Irving, *The Trail of the Fox*, Avon Books, New York, 1977, and also B. H. Liddell Hart, *Istoria celui de-Al Doilea Război Mondial*, Editura Orizonturi, Editura Lider, Bucureşti (no publication year), vol. 1, pp. 243-244.
[24] Greg Bruno, Jayshree BAJORIA, Jonathan MASTERS, *Iran's Revolutionary Guards*, Council on Foreign Relations, text last updated on June 14, 2013, at the internet address https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards, accessed on October 6, 2017.

also strongly reinforcing the *domestic* political influence of the *conservative hardliners* who are not at all wishing to accept a potentially diminished domestic influence. And the connection between political hardliners and the IRGC cannot be denied: recent very serious works, published by major academic institutions, are openly stating that, along more than a decade, "by far the most important institution to serve as the foundation of the conservative resurgence [in Iran] was the Revolutionary Guards"[25]. d. *Very* probably (at least according to open sources of all sorts), at least *some* political and religious circles in Tehran might be interested in preparing a popular hard-liner for a *very* senior political position. Along the past few decades, the political competition in Iran – an almost open clash of the hard-liners with more moderate politicians - has led to different results. On some occasions, the conservatives won; on other occasions, including in presidential elections, they lost. Mahmud Ahmadinejad has clearly been a very rigid conservative, politically speaking. The present president, Rouhani, is regarded by many as being more moderate. It is possible, we think, that conservative political circles might be interested in identifying and grooming a loyal and clearly ideologically reliable candidate of theirs, and Soleimani, with a solid and almost continuously enhanced legitimacy generated by his military deeds, might be an appropriate person for such a major *conservative* political bid. Such a hypothesis is supported by some interesting media reports. One year ago, in 2016, a quite reliable open source was openly stating "Soleimani is a good choice for hardliners in the next presidential election", mainly because he "is one of the few politicians within the Iranian political system who is popular among a number of voters". The same open source was also stating "the hardliners can count on Soleimani who has been somehow introduced as a 'national hero', wasn't involved in financial corruptions, and has a good relationship with the supreme leader", also adding that recently, "the number of his [Soleimani's] internal speeches in the House of Representatives and among military commanders and police chiefs has increased [26]. More recently, the same basic idea was a topic of debate in a newspaper in Iraq. In March 2017, that English language newspaper was openly stating was openly stating Soleimani "is expected to run for presidential elections in 2021, press reports said" and that "political analysts say Soleimani's importance in the Shiite country goes beyond the military limits, expecting him to replace Hassan Rouhani after more four years"[27]. We are also speaking about other *possible* reasons making important decision-makers in Tehran to strongly prefer Soleimani. If anything goes wrong in any military action abroad, the regular army *will not* be openly involved, so that, politically speaking, some vital state institutions in Iran can preserve their 'honorability' in an easier way. As far as we are concerned, this hypothesis is not in collision with those listed above: conservatives might be interesting in boosting his image, in order to use him in elections, while some moderates might tolerate him as a potentially useful scapegoat to be used in case of need.

2. Brief comments on Iran's grand strategic agenda, and about the role played by the IRGC

In a clearly obvious way, Soleimani's biography and skyrocketing professional career can easily be used (within the framework of a '*pars pro toto*' thinking pattern) in order to better understand the Iranian grand strategy in the Greater Middle East, and a large share of the main elements of the Iranian foreign policy.

First of all, we are to remember that, if we are evaluating the general trend on the relations between Iran and the West (including the U.S.), "in the post-9/11 years, tensions had increased".

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[25] Ray Takyeh, *Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of Ayatollahs*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p. 227.

[26] Nozhan Etezadosaltaneh, "Will Qasem Soleimani Become the Next President of Iran?", in *International Policy Digest*, May 16, 2016, at the internet address https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/05/16/will-qasem-soleimani-become-next-president-iran/, accessed on October 7, 2017.

[27] "Qassem Soleimani may be Iran's next president, observers", in *The Baghdad Post*, March 22, 2017, at the internet address http://www.thebaghdadpost.com/EN/story/8502/Qassem-Soleimani-may-be-Iran-s-next-president-observers, text accessed on October 8, 2017.

And these increased tensions have been – and still are – based on serious strategic concerns: "Iran's aggressive pursuit of nuclear technology under the leadership of President Ahmadinejad, and growing concern… about the advent of radical political Islam and terrorism in the Middle East had driven this historically divisive relationship to new heights of antagonism and urgency"[28].

We are also underlining here that some central elements of the Islamic ethos are, as far as we can understand (we have used here mainly a text written by Robert Spencer, the director of Jihad Watch, a program of the David Horowitz Freedom Center, and also the author of 17 books, some of them dealing directly with the problem of better understanding Islam), strongly emphasizing the value (regarded as being intensely positive and obviously desirable, in significant Islamic sources) of *armed violence against the infidels*[29]. In such a context, focusing public attention on a military senior official is, *ideologically* speaking, a quite sound move, at least from the Iranian official point of view.

We are also underlining that *at least* some senior Iranian leader tend to think that their country is strictly in a defensive strategic posture (which is not at all true). For example, according to the opinion – quoted by a reliable open source – of a very senior Iranian cleric (opinion which most probably represents the perception of the strategic situation in the Middle East many senior Iranian decision-makers are preoccupied, or even strongly obsessed by), "if we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran"[30]. If we are to 'translate' this short phrase into more operational terms, it has several complementary meanings. First of all, it means that foreign intervention is made more legitimate, simply by means of presenting it as being just a defensive method; secondly, we are told that if the Assad regime collapses, one of the very probable consequences is to be the a very grim one for Iran: the loss of its direct land link to Hezbollah, which dominates Lebanon (or at least large regions in this country) and represents a major forward base against Israel (and also a vitally important gate, leading to increased influence in the Mediterranean).

We are also underlining that open sources are clearly indicating the military units belonging to the *Quds Force* – the *elite* part of the IRGC which is directly led by General Soleimani – are a major "sharp instrument of Iranian foreign policy, roughly analogous to a combined C.I.A. and Special Forces"; the Quds Force name "comes from the Persian word for Jerusalem, which its fighters have promised to liberate" (from the point of view of Muslim believers, both Sunnis and Shiites, integrating Jerusalem into the Israeli state, according to an undeniable historic tradition, is something not at all acceptable). We also know that "since 1979" (which means from the earliest stages of the new political regime established in Iran after the fall of the Shah), the main goal of the Quds Force "has been to subvert Iran's enemies and extend the country's influence across the Middle East", and many commanders or common operatives in the force had spent their careers abroad. For example, we clearly know Hassan Shateri, closely connected to General Soleimani, had been deployed "first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, where the Quds Force helped Shiite militias kill American soldiers"[31].

And, finally, in order to better understand which are the geo-strategically significant realities we are now speaking about, let us take into account that "Ryan Crocker, a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq in the George W. Bush administration, told… in February 2016 that 'Anyone who thought that the Iran nuclear deal was going to herald a new era of a gentler, kinder Iran in the region is nuts', he said". On the same occasion, the same U.S. senior diplomat said: "What you're seeing now in Iraq is the old Iranian playbook that they began to write in the early '80s". Dealing directly with Soleimani's role, within the larger framework of Iran's plans and actions, "Crocker indicated that there's a need to foil an expanded Iranian role in Iraq. 'Qassem Suleimani, the Iranian Quds

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[28] Alex Mintz, Carly Wayne, *The Polythink Syndrome: U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions on 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Isis*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2016, p. 114.

[29] See, for example, Robert Spencer, "The ethos of Islam", on the *Jihad Watch* webpage, April 13, 2004, at the internet address https://www.jihadwatch.org/2004/04/the-ethos-of-islam, text accessed on September 15, 2017.

[30] Dexter Filkins, *op. cit.*

[31] Dexter Filkins, *op. cit.*

Force commander, is seeking to achieve what Iran could not in the 1980s: to gain a definitive victory over Iraq by fragmenting it', he said. Crocker [also] warned against repeating an American policy mistake from the past: 'As the United States withdrew from Iraq, it ceded the battlefield to Iran and its proxies in the center and south, and to ISIS in the west'"[32].

Conclusions

As far as we can understand, open sources are clearly indicating the IRGC is playing a more and more prominent role in implementing Iran's expansionist and aggressive grand strategic agenda in the Greater Middle East, and IRGC's most visible (at lest in the media) commander, general Qassem Soleimani, is (if we are carefully taking into account all his known actions and activities) a *very* clear embodiment of both the aggressive and expansionist trends which are dominating Iran's neo-imperial foreign policy, and of the increased domestic political efforts of the very influential hardline conservatives in Iran.

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QATAR CRISIS IN THE RECENT SECURITY CONTEXT OF THE MIDDLE EAST

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Abstract: The Qatar crisis started in an already challenging period for the Middle East region. Thus, against the backdrop of yet-effervescent Islamist terrorism in Syria and Iraq, the evolution of Iran's nuclear program, dictatorial regimes that are detrimental to human rights and to the interest of their own citizens, the involvement of great powers in the region in the struggle for resources and in the context of regional "pacification", the Kurdish conflict, the ongoing crisis of the refugees, the prospect of a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Qatar crisis is part of the inter-state crises triggered by the hegemonic tendencies of some states in the context of the general shift of the regional balance of power.

In the following, we will present the regional context of the crisis, the chronological actions undertaken by the actors involved in the crisis and some factors and trends determining the future evolution of the Qatar crisis.

Keywords: crisis, Middle East, geopolitics, GCC, security, interests.

Prior to the Qatar crisis, the Middle East was already in a complicated security situation. Thus, the Global Conflict Tracker[1] of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Armed Conflict Database[2] of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) showed in the region a series of five open conflicts existed already and created major regional and international problems (the civil war in Syria, the war against Daesh in Syria and Iraq, the Yemen war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Lebanese sectarian conflict) and a series of adjacent crises, such as humanitarian situations for massive groups of population resulting from precarious situations in the armed conflict areas - such as Syria and Iraq - or the Lebanese political crisis.

Until the outbreak of the Qatar crisis in mid-year, states rich in energy resources neighbouring the Persian Gulf are considered to be pillars of stability in a largely agitated Middle East. These countries associated in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have helped to stabilize the regional security environment by protecting the region from terrorists, smuggling groups and pirates that continuously threaten the vital interests of the countries of the region. At the same time, these countries have established many military bases in the Horn of Africa, and an Arab Saudi-Arabia-led coalition began a military campaign in the Yemen war in March 2015.

At present, the GCC oil and gas states are divided by positioning themselves differently in relation to the diplomatic and economic boycott, the subject of which is Qatar, which disrupts the fragile balance that they created until the emergence of the crisis. The tension between the GCC partners, respectively, the three states (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates) - pro-blockade, Qatar - anti-blockade state and Kuwait and Oman - states that have expressed their neutrality about the *de facto* situation - generated insecurity not only at the regional level but also globally because most of the world's states have positioned themselves on either side of the Qatar barricade.

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[1] ***, „Global Conflict Tracker", 30.05.2017, URL: https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/global-conflict-tracker, accessed on 01.06.2017.

[2] ***, „Armed Conflict Database", 30.05.2017, URL: https://acd.iiss.org/Conflicts?tags=D6943ABDB5364229 B5A0E 3338AC94EA1, accessed on 01.06.2017.

1. Geographic and Economic Coordinates of Qatar

Qatar is a small state geographically located on the west coast of the Persian Gulf, occupying a small desert peninsula that extends in the vicinity of the Arabian Peninsula. Its main neighbours are Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. See the figure below.

Figure no. 1. Qatar and its neighbours

Source: Tyler Durden, „It's A "Geopolitical Earthquake": A Stunned World Responds after Saudi Alliance Cuts All Ties with Qatar", Zero Hedge, June 5, 2017, URL: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-06-05/its-geopolitical-earthquake-stunned-world-responds-after-saudi-alliance-cuts-all-tie, accessed on 10.06.2017.

Qatar holds one of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. In fact, in the Gulf waters between Qatar and Iran, there is the world's largest gas field, a 9,700-km stretch of land that holds at least 43 billion cubic meters of gas[3]. The southern part of Qatar is known as *North Field*, while *South Pars* is part of Iran. So both countries share exploration rights in the area and this is one of the many links that bind them.

Based on its rich energy resources, Qatar is the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG), accounting for 30% of world trade[4]. Its important role in the oil market is largely due to its low production cost, which is one of the lowest in the world. Also, due to its wealth in oil, the country's residents enjoy a high level of living conditions and a well-established social service system.

2. Pre-Crisis Geopolitics of Qatar

The geopolitical importance of Qatar is mainly highlighted by both its vast wealth, which has probably fuelled the Syrian war, as well as the hosting of USCENTCOM's headquarters, the United States Central Command representing American interests in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

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[3] ***, „The crisis over Qatar explained (1): what has happened and the role of the US foreign policy", Eyes on Europe and Middle East, June 8, 2017, URL: https://middleeastnewsservice.com/2017/06/08/the-crisis-over-qatar-explained1-what-has-happened-and-the-role-of-the-us-foreign-policy/, accessed on 10.06.2017.

[4] David Livingston, Sagatom Saha, *Beyond the Qatar Crisis*, Carnegie Middle East Center, August, 14 2017, URL: http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/72785, accessed on 30.10.2017.

In the context in which Qatar has developed good relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia's main rival, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have never had a particularly good relationship. They had conflicts at the border and before the Qatari state gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1971[5]. Following repeated conflicts at the border between the two states, although in 2001 an agreement was reached, relations continued to deteriorate. It has come so far that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain had withdrawn ambassadors from Qatar for a period in 2014, the reason being that the Qatari state supported militant groups[6]. The wealth of gas sales has turned Qatar into the richest nation in the world, with an annual per capita income of $ 130,000 a year[7]. This has allowed the Qatari Emirate to break the domination of Saudi Arabia and has facilitated its rapprochement with Iran.

Qatar has long practiced an ambitious foreign policy with different priorities than its neighbours, but two key issues have irritated them in recent years. One is Qatar's support for Islamist groups, and the Qatar recognizes that it has been assisting people in certain organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, but denies the support of al-Qaeda or Daesh-related military groups. The other key issue is that of Qatar's close ties with Iran, with which the Qatari state shares the largest gas field in the world, amid the fact that Iran is the Shiite Muslim power that is the main regional rival of Saudi Arabia, Sunni Muslim power. This time, in June 2017, the measures taken in connection with this approach have exceeded only diplomatic restrictions on Iran.

The diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar, launched on 5 June 2017 by its neighbours - Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates - , from which three were GCC members, pushed the Middle East into another crisis, increasing regional instability.

3. Triggering the Diplomatic and Economic Blockade

The diplomatic crisis started when some GCC countries (UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain) suddenly broke off diplomatic relations, later Libya and the Maldives joined the diplomatic boycott. Although the main reason invoked for the boycott was the fact that the Qatari state "supports various terrorist groups" [8], also, Saudi Arabia and other countries of the region criticize its relations with Al Jazeera and Iran, elements about which the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council[9] believe are destabilizing the region. Moreover, they began to threaten the Qatar with exclusion from the GCC.

Consequently, the aforementioned states have imposed Qatar on some commercial and travel bans, including the closure of transport links, including airspace, the expulsion of diplomatic delegations and the withdrawal of ambassadors from Qatar. Visitors and Qatari residents were given

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[5] Kamran Bokhari, „Qatar: A Testament to Saudi Weakness", Geopolitical Futures, June 6, 2017, URL: https://geopoliticalfutures.com/qatar-testament-saudi-weakness/, accessed on 15.06.2017.

[6] Tyler Durden, „It's A "Geopolitical Earthquake": A Stunned World Responds after Saudi Alliance Cuts All Ties with Qatar", Zero Hedge, June 5, 2017, URL: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-06-05/its-geopolitical-earthquake-stunned-world-responds-after-saudi-alliance-cuts-all-tie, accessed on 10.06.2017.

[7] ***, „Ce se ascunde in spatele blocadei economice a Qatarului: "Rascumpararea" de un miliard de dolari care a suparat lumea araba", Pro TV News, June 6, 2017, URL: http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/stirileprotv-special/ce-se-ascunde-in-spatele-blocadei-economice-a-qatarului-rascumpararea-de-un-miliard-de-dolari-care-a-suparat-lumea-araba.html, accessed on 09.06.2017.

[8] Bassima Alghussein, Jeffrey A. Stacey, „How Saudi Arabia Botched Its Campaign against Qatar. The Costs of the Pressure on Doha", Foreign Affairs, July 12, 2017, URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-07-12/how-saudi-arabia-botched-its-campaign-against-qatar?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20170713, accessed on 15.07.2017.

[9] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), political-economic alliance of six countries in the Middle East – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. See details: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Encyclopaedya Britannica, URL: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Gulf-Cooperation-Council and Gulf Cooperation Council Portal, where Qatar still appears as member state. See: *GCC Member States*, URL: http://www.gccegov.org/en/web/guest/gcc-member-states, accessed on 30.09.2017.

two weeks to leave the respective countries. Qatar was also expelled from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.

But there are also some states that have expressed their support for Qatar. For example, on June 7, 2017, Sheikh Sabah Shah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah arrives in Qatar after meeting with King Salman bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia and Turkey sends troops to the military base in Qatar, while President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, expressed solidarity with that state. Also, two of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have not reduced their ties with Qatar - Kuwait and Oman. Moreover, Kuwait has offered to mediate the dispute[10] created with the other Arab states of the Gulf.

Below is the map of allies and opponents of Qatar at the time of the crisis triggering.

Figure no. 2[11]. Allies and opponents of Qatar during the blockade in June 2017

Some sources[12] report that the triggering factor was a Twitter news showing some controversial statements by Qatari Sheikh Tamir bin Hamad Al Thani regarding US President Donald Trump, Iran, Israel and Hamas. Also, in the source the foreign minister of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, was quoted on a Doha decision to withdraw Qatari ambassadors from Egypt and most of the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

Qatar quickly rejected the material as a fake news from hackers, but the Saudis and their allies were not convinced. Moreover, Qatar, in response to these allegations, argued that it supported the US in the war on terror and participated in the ongoing military intervention against Daesh[13].

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[10] ***, „Qatar crisis: What you need to know", BBC News, July 19, 2017, URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40173757, accessed on 30.09.2017.

[11] ***, „The crisis over Qatar explained (1): what has happened and the role of the US foreign policy", Eyes on Europe and Middle East, June 8, 2017, URL: https://middleeastnewsservice.com/2017/06/08/the-crisis-over-qatar-explained1-what-has-happened-and-the-role-of-the-us-foreign-policy/, accessed on 10.06.2017.

[12] Idem.

[13] ***, „US, Arab allies launch first wave of strikes in Syria", Fox News Politics, September 23, 2014, URL: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/09/23/us-launches-first-wave-bombing-strikes-over-syria.html, accessed on 25.07.2017.

4. Diplomatic Reactions and Actions of interested actors

The Coalition led by Saudi Arabia created in some GCC Arab states gave Qatar the deadline of July 2, 2017 for compliance with a list of 13 requests as follows[14]:

1. Reducing diplomatic ties with Iran and closing Iranian diplomatic missions in Qatar, expelling members of the Revolutionary Guards in Iran and disrupting military and intelligence cooperation with Iran. Trade with Iran must respect US and international sanctions in a way that does not jeopardize the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council;

2. The immediate closure of the Turkish military base, which is currently under construction, and the cessation of military cooperation with Turkey inside Qatar;

3. Weakening ties with all the terrorist, sectarian and ideological organizations, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, Daesh, al-Qaeda, Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front) and Lebanon's Hezbollah, and formally declaring these entities to be terrorist groups according to the list announced by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt, and agreeing to all subsequent updates of this list;

4. Stopping all funding for people, groups or organizations that have been designated as terrorist by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, the US and other countries;

5. Repatriation of "terrorist figures", fugitives and individuals in their countries of origin, from Arab Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain. Freeze their assets and provide the desired information about their residence, movements and finances;

6. The closure of Al Jazeera television and its affiliated posts;

7. Stopping interferences in the internal affairs of other sovereign countries. Stopping the granting of Qatar citizenship to citizens of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain. Revoking Qatari citizenship for nationals for whom such citizenship violates the laws of these countries;

8. Compensation payments, established with Qatar, for loss of life and other financial losses caused by Qatar's policies in recent years;

9. Alignment of Qatar's military, social and economic policies with the other Gulf and Arab countries, as well as economic issues, in line with the agreement signed with Saudi Arabia in 2014;

10. Ending contact with the political opposition of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain. Submission of files detailing previous contact with Qatar and showing support to opposition groups and sending details of personal information and support Qatar has provided;

11. Stop all news agencies funded directly and indirectly by Qatar, including Arabi21, Rassd, Al Arabi Al Jadeed, Mekameleen, Middle East Eye etc.;

12. Accept all requests within 10 days of sending the list to Qatar or the list will become invalid;

13. Approval of monthly compliance audits in the first year after they have agreed upon the requirements, followed by quarterly audits in the second year and annual audits over the next 10 years.

None of the requirements was met in the context in which many of them relied on false preconceptions about Qatar's behaviour from the start. Indeed, the Foreign Minister of Qatar declared on July 4, 2017 that "the list is unrealistic and impossible to achieve" [15]. Moreover, the diplomatic gait (or not) of the Qatar leader worsened the situation when, a few days later after the boycott, he congratulated Iranian President Hassan Rouhani for his re-election, which was

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[14] ***, „Arab states issue 13 demands to end Qatar-Gulf crisis", Al Jazeera, July 12, 2017, URL: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-170623022133024.html, accessed on 15.07.2017.
[15] ***, „Qatar Gulf Crisis", Al Jazeera, July 4, 2017, URL: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/qatar-crisis-developments-july-21-171022153053754.html, accessed on 09.07.2017.

considered a clear defies against Saudi Arabia[16]. Then came the terrorist attacks that killed 12 people in Tehran, about which the Iranian Revolutionary Guard argued that they had been initiated by Saudi Arabia, although the Islamic State terrorist organization assumed responsibility for them, events that only degraded the diploid situation already precarious in the region.

Subsequently, amid the emergence of the diplomatic crisis, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates initiated a campaign to isolate neighbouring Qatar, in the context of the still GCC member being dependent on land and sea imports for the basic needs of its population of 2.7 million inhabitants, and about 40% of food arrived in the country through the borderland with Saudi Arabia[17]. Also, the GCC states' decision to eliminate diplomatic and transport links with Doha has prompted many foreign banks to reduce their business with Qatar and have forced it to arrange new maritime links through neutral countries like Oman[18]. Its neighbours' embargo has led the Qatar to inject about $ 38.5 billion of its $ 340 billion in reserves in its economy[19] to cushion its impact.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson signed an agreement on combating terrorism with the Qatar government on July 11, 2017[20], following a visit to the region to disseminate the tension in the regional security bloc. By signing it, the Qatar intended to encounter statements by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that Doha did not do enough in the fight against terrorism[21]. On July 16, the American Washington Post reported that US intelligence officials said the United Arab Emirates was behind government-made news and Qatar's social media[22] that led to the blockade. The situation has become complicated for Qatar, and on July 20, 2017, the regional press referred to an American report[23] that exploited the Doha financial system to support terrorism by its Qatar financiers.

On July 21, 2017, the head of the state of Qatar set two conditions for resolving this crisis, stressing that it should be done "with respect for the sovereignty and will of each state" [24]. On July 28, Qatar said the UN should play a mediating role in this crisis and on July 29 reiterated its cooperation with various UN bodies on the fight against terrorism.

On 30 July 2017, with the organization of the Manama meeting, where Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain met to discuss a possible dialogue with Qatar for the

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[16] ***, „The crisis over Qatar explained (1): what has happened and the role of the US foreign policy", Eyes on Europe and Middle East, June 8, 2017, URL: https://middleeastnewsservice.com/2017/06/08/the-crisis-over-qatar-explained1-what-has-happened-and-the-role-of-the-us-foreign-policy/, accessed on10.06.2017.

[17] ***, „Qatar crisis: What you need to know", BBC News, July 19, 2017, URL: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40173757, accessed on 30.09.2017.

[18] Andrew Torchia, „Diplomatic crisis triggers only minor Qatar economic forecast cuts: Reuters Poll", Reuters, July 20, 2017, URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-economy-poll/diplomatic-crisis-triggers-only-minor-qatar-economic -forecast-cuts-reuters-poll-idUSKBN1A516M, accessed on 21.07.2017.

[19] Simeon Kerr, „Qatar injects $38bn into economy to counter embargo", Financial Times, September 13, 2017, URL: https://www.ft.com/content/1715f67e-9887-11e7-b83c-9588e51488a0, accessed on 15.09.2017.

[20] ***, „The U.S. Charges Head-On Into the Gulf Crisis", Stratfor, July 12, 2017, URL: https://worldview.stratfor.com/ article/us-charges-head-gulf-crisis?utmcampaign=LL_Content_Digest&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email& utm_content=54228684&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_bUV_W0iB076U3Bu-f1WrrMBEt7LUQJrajdQ_Uwk4cETz8uwCzGqS Wzv PCWrHg2PSnC1s3JUJusu_F-bVs-9r8Q6rfLA&_hsmi=54228711, accessed on 14.07.2017.

[21] ***, „The U.S. Charges Head-On Into the Gulf Crisis", Stratfor, July 12, 2017, URL: https://worldview.stratfor.com/ article/us-charges-head-gulf-crisis?utmcampaign=LL_Content_Digest&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email& utm_content=54228684&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_bUV_W0iB076U3Bu-f1WrrMBEt7LUQJrajdQ_Uwk4cETz8uwCzGqSW zvPCWrHg2PSnC1s3JUJusu_F-bVs-9r8Q6rfLA&_hsmi=54228711, accessed on 14.07.2017.

[22] Mohammed El-Said, „The Qatar crisis two months on: a timeline", Daily News Egypt, July 31, 2017, URL: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2017/07/31/qatar-crisis-two-months-timeline/, accessed on 01.08.2017.

[23] ***, „Washington: Terrorists in Qatar are exploiting their financial system", Alarabiya, July 20, 2017, URL: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2017/07/20/Washington-Terrorists-in-Qatar-are-exploiting-their-financial-system.html, accessed on 30.08.2017.

[24] ***, „The crisis over Qatar explained (1): what has happened and the role of the US foreign policy", Eyes on Europe and Middle East, June 8, 2017, URL: https://middleeastnewsservice.com/2017/06/08/the-crisis-over-qatar-explained1-what-has-happened-and-the-role-of-the-us-foreign-policy/, accessed on 10.06.2017.

first time since its inception[25], it appeared that the diplomatic situation in the region will have a revival, but neither the Kuwaiti mediation nor the good offices of several Western countries, including the US, have been able to defuse the crisis[26]. Following the intransigence shown by the regional states in Manama, Qatar launches a complaint to the World Trade Organization against commercial boycott.

The results of the media campaign of the Qatar supporters also begin to show, when, for instance, on August 22, 2017, Senegal resubmitted its ambassador to Doha, and on August 26, 2017, Qatar's ambassador was returned to Iran[27], which represented the full restoration of relations between Qatar and Iran.

On August 28, 2017, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov began his tour of the Gulf Arab countries in connection with the Qatar diplomatic crisis with a visit to Kuwait to visit Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Afterwards, on September 5, 2017, the French Foreign Minister declared that he had elected his former ambassador to Saudi Arabia as a special representative to support mediation efforts in the break-up between Qatar and his neighbours.

Meanwhile, President Trump has been involved in resolving the crisis by welcoming Kuwait's emir in Washington, but his intervention fails as he makes subsequent offices between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who are going to have a telephone conversation setting out some steps to follow in the context of crisis management co-operation, which is subsequently suspended by Saudis.

On September 10, 2017, Lavrov returns to the region, and on September 11, after Kuwait and the US, it is up to the Russians to try a solution that was not yet found at the end of September 2017.

We do not know whether the crisis will degenerate into military action, but we know that at the moment the Qatar is preparing in this proactive direction. Indices of Qatar's preparation for such a type of action can be considered as its actions in the last months of our analysis: the signing of a letter of intent with the United Kingdom of Great Britain (as early as September 2017) for the purchase of 24 Typhoon fighters; also in June, Qatar and the US signed a $ 12 billion deal, in which Doha bought 72 multi-role fighter planes; a bilateral security agreement with the People's Republic of China signed on 28 September 2017; benefits from Turkey's military support and hosts the US Central Armed Forces Headquarters in the Middle East. So, these facts are not very consistent with the Kuwaiti mediator's statements that the possibility of military action in the context of the Qatar crisis has been eliminated but it also can consists in proactive measures in terms of ready for combat just in case.

Conclusions

Qatar has long practiced an ambitious foreign policy with different priorities than its neighbours, but two key issues have irritated them in recent years. One is Qatar's support for Islamist groups, thus Qatar recognizes that it has been assisting people in certain organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, but denies the support of al-Qaeda or Islamic state-related military groups. The other key issue is that of Qatar's close ties with Iran, with which the Qatari state shares the largest gas field in the world, amid the fact that Iran is the Shiite Muslim power that is the main regional rival of Saudi Arabia, Sunni Muslim power.

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[25] ***, „Four Arab countries say they are ready for Qatar dialogue with conditions", Reuters Press Agency, July 30, 2017, URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-meeting/four-arab-countries-say-they-are-ready-for-qatar-dialogue-with-conditions-idUSKBN1AF03T, accessed on 02.08.2017.

[26] ***, „Crise du Golfe: réunion du Quartet anti-Qatar à Bahreïn", Europe 1 France, July 30, 2017, URL: http://www.europe1.fr/international/ crise-du-golfe-reunion-du-quartet-anti-qatar-a-bahrein-3400106, accessed on 02.08.2017.

[27] Declan Walsh, „Qatar Restores Full Relations with Iran, Deepening Gulf Feud", The New York Times, August 24, 2017, URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/world/middleeast/qatar-iran-boycott-saudi-arabia.html, accessed on 26.08.2017.

The new geopolitical breach in the Persian Gulf was interpreted by some observers as being the largest diplomatic crisis in the region since the 1991 Gulf War. At the moment, the situation among the mentioned states of the region is at the stage of mutual diplomatic paralysis. However, someone has benefited from this boycott situation created by the former regional economic partners of the Qatari state. The context has led to significant trade gains for Iran by the boycotts, which became the main economic partner of Qatar in the current period, subsequently resulting in an adverse effect unforeseen by states that have expressed opposition to the Qatar towards Iran, materialized in strengthening the diplomatic relationship between the two states. Turkey has also become a core partner, along with Iran, for Qatar, replacing Saudi Arabia and UAE with the provision of food and drinking water supplies right after the boycott.

Although the countries of the region have responded differently to the Qatar crisis, the region as a whole and the GCC states are highly geographically, religiously, culturally, financially and militarily interconnected so that all the Persian Gulf states have felt the result of the diplomatic pressure exerted, on the one hand, by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, on the other, to take part in the Gulf dispute.

Currently, with regard to the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council, we can only wait for December and see if all the leaders of Council members (including the Qatar) will be present at its 39th Summit. Personally, I think it is not possible for a GCC without Qatar.

I also believe that further rhythm or acceleration of this crisis will exacerbate geopolitical risks in the Middle East and undermine the confidence of businessmen and investors in the Gulf region so that, although so far the economic impact of the diplomatic breach between Qatar and its neighbours was limited, on medium-term, a prolonged crisis could weaken economic growth not only of Qatar but also of the region as a whole.

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THE EFFECTS OF THE GERMAN ENERGIEWENDE PROGRAM
ON THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

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Abstract: *The aim of this article is to build a geographical analysis of political relations and possibilities related to Central European energy security, due to the German Energy Transition program. Competition for energy is constant: the availability of secure energy sources is essential for the proper functioning of the state economy. That is why energy consumption is expected to increase, because is driven by the economic growth of the emerging economies. This article analyses strategic areas of Central European countries, which are in the proximity of Germany. The energy supply, which are important for the geopolitics of Europe, are here. The study proposes some synthetic geographical and qualitative representations through the scenarios of the European energy geopolitics.*

Keywords: *Energiewende program, Central European countries, energy security, geopolitics, renewables.*

Introduction

The impact of Germany's nuclear approach on the energy security of Central European countries has been very profound, due to the proximity to the Central Europe to it and also through the Energiewende program. The countries of Central Europe need the nuclear power plants to generate electricity and to be partially independent from Russia. The tendency to a good neighbouring relations on the energy aspect, is a close partnership between Germany and the Central European countries based on the exchange of know-how regarding the renewables energy policy. This partnership should help decrease the need of nuclear energy.

In 2015, Germany reached to generate 30% energy electricity by using solar energy, wind energy, biomass and hydropower resources (figure no.1). Nevertheless, the energy policy making suggested by the European Union, when it comes to the third liberalization package to create a single energy market, has had positive effects on the connection with the regional energy market and also good benefits for the consumers.

Figure no. 1. Germany's energy mix in 2015
Source: AG Energiebilanzen, Richard Fuchs, German cabinet puts brakes on clean energy transition, Wind Action, Deutsche Welle, June 2016, http://www.windaction.org/posts/45174-german-cabinet-puts-brakes-on-clean-energy-transition #.WgPfJ5VryP8, access date 10.11.2017.

A united Energy Union starts within good transnational relations and good energy governance, when it comes to the implementation of the energy packages. At the beginning of the 2015, Germany highly supported the building of the LNG terminals in Europe and by developing this infrastructure, the internal European Energy Union will be deepen. Diversification is the key element of the Central European countries against the Russian energy dependency and not only. Transparency and common goals are the main priorities to create a single internal European energy market.

After years of using fossil-based energy systems, a few of the leading countries in the world, are confronting with a climate change dilemma, which led them to decide to embrace a new model of energy system based on renewable energy resources, that are considered to be more sustainable for the future.

The so called German Energiewende program or known as the energy transition[1], has developed throughout the years after the unification, by facing the new energy paradigm with an energy policy that supports the goals development of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions and replaces gradually the nuclear and coal power with renewable energy.

In Germany, the energy transition process has reached important outcomes over the past years, due to the constructive scientific and political debates that contributed to the transformation of the energy system. The German reshaped energy system is known especially for its instruments efficiency. Renewable energy resources established a decentralized energy policy making, where citizens can involve directly in the energy process. Moreover the Energiewende program is likely to be seen as a role model energy system for the European energy market, accordingly to the positive results from the energy mix in 2015; also it is very well-known to be compatible with the European Union emissions trading system. [2]

The aim of this analysis consists in the effects of Germany's energy transition process on the Central European countries. In this concise analysis, Central European countries, covers the Visegrad group (V4 countries – Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary), plus Austria and Slovenia.

At the beginning of the cooperation within the V4 countries, it was stipulated, the explanation of the energy policy "as a development of the infrastructure […] mainly in the north-south direction, and an aim to further coordinate their energy systems."[3] But after this declaration, they faced few challenges in practice until the new energy paradigm had come into the debate. Once with the energy supply disruptions from Ukraine in 2006 and again in 2009, the interdependence from Russian natural gas has come into question.

The objectives of this analysis consists in: analysing the pros and cons between nuclear power and renewables; the effects of the Energiewende program on the Central European countries and the analysis of the statistics data of the share of renewable energy resources electricity consumption both in Germany and in the Central European countries.

The method used in this research is qualitative, focussed on the positive aspects of the German energy transition that offered a new approach for the Central European countries for an energy independence, as much as it can be achieved by using the renewable energy system.

1. Brief analysis between nuclear power and renewables

Throughout the energy sources literature there are multiple and diverse opinions regarding the advantages/disadvantage between nuclear power and renewables. Both energy sources are the

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[1] David, Buchan, *The Energiewende – Germany's gamble*. Oxford, UK: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, June 2012, p.6.

[2] *Ibidem*, pp.11 -12.

[3] Patty Zakaria, *Visegrád at a crossroads in Europe: nuclear energy,* European Perspectives – Slovenia's Role in Visegrad Group, Volume 7, No. 2 (13), October 2015, p.2.

principal competitors for low-carbon electricity in many countries, which represent a positive outcome in the debate.[4]

Proceeding further in the debate between nuclear power and renewable energy, after the Fukushima disaster, the debate become very intense, and the public opinion was having doubts regarding the use of nuclear power plants by producing electricity.

On one hand the nuclear power is a good source of low carbon energy and offers energy security benefits as a reliable energy source and reduces the share of imported natural gas, on the other hand renewable energy is eco-friendlier and sustainable as well, without affecting the environment. However, both those energy sources have other pro and cons arguments against each other.

Nuclear power provides a low-carbon electricity for more than one half of the necessary energy supply in Central Europe and overall in Europe, where the technology and the infrastructure already exists (figure no. 2.) Austria and Poland are the only one in the region of Central Europe without nuclear power plants, that's why they use alternative ways to face the energy demand of their countries.

Figure no. 2: Nuclear power plants in European Union
Source: World Nuclear Association, *Nuclear Power in the European Union*, May 2017, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union.aspx, access date 12.10.2017

Nuclear power is a clean energy, due to no sulphur dioxide or no nitrogen emissions. Being the cleanest and cheapest energy resource in Europe, there are 186 active nuclear power plants, which proved they met the safety requirements through years of functionality. With the exception of Chernobyl in 1986 (a faulty design of the nuclear reactor, an unstable reactor, operated in an experiment with all security systems disconnected) and Fukushima in 2011 (the nature fatality of the earthquake followed by the tsunami, damaged the reactors and triggered an explosion), nuclear energy proved to be a reliable and competitive energy resource.

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[4] Mark Diesendorf, *Renewable energy versus nuclear: dispelling the myths.* The Ecologist, April 2016, reprinted in RenewEconomy, http://reneweconomy.com.au/renewable-energy-versus-nuclear-dispelling-the-myths-48635/, access date 12.10.2017.

Table no. 1. Nuclear power plants in operation in Central Europe
Source: European Nuclear Society, *Nuclear power plants in Europe,* as of November 2016,
https://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-europe.htm, access date 12.10.2017.

Country	in operation as November 2016	
	number	net capacity (MWe)
Austria	0	0
Czech Republic	6	3.930
Germany	8	10.799
Hungary	4	1.889
Poland	0	0
Slovakia	4	1.814
Slovenia	1	688
total	**23**	**19.120**

Currently, only five Central European countries, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Slovenia have nuclear power plants and some of them are in the process of expanding their nuclear industry. Of course, Germany wants to reduce the number of active power plants in the future, as it already did with eight of its 16 previously power plants after 2011. Czech Republic, for example, has six nuclear reactors in electricity production in 2016, whereas both Hungary and Slovakia have four each; Slovenia is the only one with one reactor and planning in the future to expand in case the renewable energy production will not increase.

The challenges of today need to face the technologies and infrastructure of yesterday. In many countries of Central Europe and not only there, nuclear power plants were built to be able to supply consumers with the requested energy consumption. It is very difficult in some countries to adapt the grid infrastructure to the modern technology. But as it was needed to meet the requirements in case of peak load, the grids infrastructure can be adapted to the renewable energy's redundancy, while meeting the international standards and maintain the energy supply.

Renewables are a rich energy source, when using modern and adapted technologies to the national and international standards. They are well known for the reducing pollution and low greenhouse gas emissions, by having a clean energy system, which protects the environment. Although renewables are perceived as an opportunity for the economy, in contrast to nuclear power, they create competition for the use of land (regarding agriculture and biodiversity conservation), when producing wind and hydro-energy.

The availability of renewable source it doesn't make less expensive than the conventional energy source. Due to the nowadays technologies, the costs for exploitation and converting to energy to be able to penetrate the consumers market, are too high, and rarely affordable to the end consumer. The lack of storage for the accumulated energy resulted from renewables are often forced to go beyond the national energy market and explore the regional markets.

There will always be fear of the unknown regarding a new energy system or technology, that's why energy mix is an essential element in electricity production. Nowadays nuclear plants are far more complex than the ones built decades ago, therefore renewables are having a major advantage in sense of time and also costs. From the perspectives of the utilities and consumers, they are really driving the push for renewables over nuclear, but the answer is somewhere in the middle. Depending on which renewable source it needs to explore: solar, wind, biomass, or hydro energy, the capacity produced by a certain energy system needs to face the energy demand on the market. That's why energy efficiency and alternation of energy sources must be further developed.

2. **The impact of the Energiewende Program on the Germany's Eastern neighbouring countries**

The road to the energy transition started in Germany in 1970, by building efficiency standards and green certification and developed through the years in the Renewable Energy Source Act adopted in 2000, which includes the feed-in tariff, guaranteeing full-cost compensation to cover the costs of a specific renewable energy investment, depending on the technology and size of project.[5]

Following the Fukushima accident, the public opinion started a debate regarding the safety of nuclear power plants, which led to a decision from the German government to close the older half of the nuclear power stations immediately, and by the 2022 also the rest of them. Germany extended rapidly in the green energy sector, by promoting and explore more of the renewable energy. Germany's neighbours were less direct affected by the quick decision, because the green energy had a low share of electricity generation. After a couple of years, due to the increase of the energy production resulted from renewables, the impact changed completely, because of the large production of electricity which had the tendency to fluctuate and needed to be exported.[6]

The energy prices from the German renewable electricity production are very attractive and because of the well connection to its neighbours, the energy exports raised. Some of the neighbours can hardly cope with the large influx of the electricity production[7], that's why Czech Republic fears about blackouts, due to the grid infrastructure, which may not always maintain the stability in case of a large electricity imports. To be able to have a stable grid infrastructure for the incoming cross boarded electricity, Germany along Czech Republic and Poland agreed to a common project to a better electricity connection.[8] The project regarding phase-shifters should be finished by 2017, these construction should be able to block the electricity flows and by not damaging the grid infrastructure.

Between the German – Austrian borders, were there is a bidding area of shared trade electricity at a uniform price, unfortunately is put another debate, because of the Germany's security supply reasons, about having a reserve power station in case of emergency in the southern part of Germany. Moreover, because of the large amount of electricity trade with Austria, there were power shortages in southern Germany, when the normal capacity was exceeded.[9]

The statistics between 2007 and 2015 regarding the V4 countries, shown positive progress towards the renewables energy, but also a challenging need for the increase of the nuclear energy to sustain the electricity demand of the market, before the German electricity boom exports. The political circumstances along these eight years, underline the need of energy diversification and development of new paths of energy system that is efficient to respond to the markets demand (figure no. 4).

There are countries such Slovakia and Slovenia, who depend on the nuclear power plants to produce the energy demand of their customers, but with the increase of the Germans electricity exports and change of energy systems know-how regarding renewables, these countries shown an increase by 6 % in 2014, meaning 22% energy coming from renewables.

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[5] Elke, Bruns, Dörte Ohlhorst, Bernd Wenzel, *A success story: twenty years of support for electricity from renewable energies in Germany*. Renews Special. Berlin, Germany: German Renewable Energies Agency, September 2010, pp. 6-9.

[6] Kenneth, Bruninx, Erik; Delarue, William D'haeseleer, *Impact of the German nuclear phase-out on Europe's electricity generation – a comprehensive study.* Energy Policy, pp. 252–254.

[7] Jakob Schlandt, *Energiewende, Germany is not alone,* 2015, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/energiewende-germany-not-alone, access date 12.10.2017.

[8] Andreas Mihm, *Deutsche und Polen begraben Stromstreit,* Frankfurter Allgemeine, 2014 http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/oekostromausbau-deutsche-und-polen-begraben-stromstreit-12844075.html, access date 12.10.2017.

[9] Jakob Schlandt, *Idem.*

Figure no. 4. Electricity production % from 2007 and 2015 (source: EIA)[10]

The renewable target that Slovenia should achieve by 2020 is 25% of energy from green sources in gross final energy consumption.[11]

Germany's renewables boom electricity production of 30% and more, depending on the climate change, pushed the neighbouring countries to develop and explore the renewable energy, such as wind and solar energy that resulted in the following percentages: 23% in Slovakia, 16% in Czech Republic, 12% in Poland and 10% in Hungary by the end of 2015, compared with the low electricity production from 2007, according to EIA statistical data.

These percentages reflect that although the nuclear power remains a vital energy source, renewable energy sources should play further on a significant role in the Central European countries future electricity mix. There are 13 projects of cooperation to promote and focus on the sustainability of the renewable energy in public buildings investment and energy efficiency consumption.[12]

3. Overview on the share of renewable energy resources of electricity consumption in Central Europe

Energy represents a central topic in the security debates of nowadays. This overview of the share of renewable energy resources consists an important part of the Central European countries energy policy, because of the need to find an alternative to the demand of nuclear energy and fossil fuels. The share of renewable energy in electricity consumption is typically lower in the V4 countries than in other Western European countries.

Share of renewables sources may be achieved in a higher percentage through significant investment programmes, which are considerable expensive for some countries budget and also harder to finance from European Union funds.

Although it may seem that are a few impediments in reaching the 20-20 targets, because European Union promotes such ambitious goals, the countries geographical situation and land allows and offer the possibility to explore and develop their renewables potential resources.

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[10] International Energy Statistics, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=00000000000 0000000000000000000005vm&c=00200000002g000000002000000000000000400001g&ct=0&tl_id=2-A&vs=INTL.27-12-AUT-BKWH.A&cy=2014&vo=0&v=H&start=2007&end=2015, access date 12.10.2017.

[11] Invest Slovenia, *Infrastructure and Utilities*, https://www.investslovenia.org/business-environment/infrastructure-utilities/energy/, access date 12.10.2017.

[12] Central Europe programme, *Project Stories from the Central Europe Programme Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energies,* June 2014, p.13.

Figure no. 4. Share of renewable energy within electricity consumption % from 2013
Source: Visegrad countries in figures, https://www.e3g.org/library/the-visegrad-countries-in-figures; access date 6.11.2017.

As it can clearly see in the below figure, Austria has the highest percentage of share renewables within the total energy consumption 30%, compared with the rest of Central European countries in 2013. The V4 countries reached near to 10% of renewable energy share in 2013. Slovenia succeed to reach 21, 5 % in 2013 of the renewable energy and is on the good track to reach its 25% target until 2020.[13] Germany reached only 25% by 2013 of share renewable energy in the gross energy consumption[14], due to the fact that the rest of the share energy was from nuclear energy and coal.

Competition is the key factor to increase the renewable energy consumption and production to be able to have an energy market that offers the consumers the best sustainable energy resources. That's why, renewable will become more efficient over time, and also their costs and prices will be more affordable for the citizens.

Germany is shaping the next era with its energy transition program, which over time will have to deliver the energy demand in order to support the security of supply, by having better grid infrastructure connection within its federal states and its neighbouring countries. This will goes along with the possibility to have efficient technologies in the renewables sector to be able to even have higher shares of renewable energy in the electricity consumption and somehow will integrate the benefits of the mobility and heating sector.

Conclusions

The brief analysis highlighted that the Visegrad group and other countries of Central Europe increased their renewable energy potential by far that was expected, but in the same time the electricity energy demand of the market needed to be completed by the nuclear energy production.

In the past years, the energy investments in energy infrastructure, generation and transmission had shown positive improvements, but there is a need of deepening the cooperation between Germany and the Central European countries. To be able to achieve the EU 2020 energy

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[13] Country Factsheet Slovenia, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015SC0238, pp. 4-5, access date 6.11.2017

[14] https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-energy-consumption-and-power-mix-charts, access date 6.11.2017.

goals is a necessity to unite with other EU partners that could lead to successfully results of the energy policy making.

Before having a united European energy market, we need to have a close regional cooperation by building a sustainable energy infrastructure that will help to shape the cooperative energy policies and will stimulate the energy companies to involve themselves in creation of the integrated energy market. For greater benefits for Germany and other European neighbours, a better interconnected regional market with the Central European countries would result in a better energy security.

Exchange is the key element to balance energy production from fossil fuels, nuclear power and renewable energy source by having cooperation projects between neighbouring countries to develop and spread the know how in obtaining an interconnected a stable European energy market.

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
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7. Invest Slovenia, Infrastructure and Utilities, https://www.investslovenia.org/business-environment/infrastructure-utilities/energy/, access date 12.10.2017

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9. PATTY Zakaria, *Visegrád at a crossroads in Europe: nuclear energy,* European Perspectives – Slovenia's Role in Visegrad Group Volume 7 No. 2 (13), October 2015 pp 87-113.

10. SCHLANDT, Jakob, *Energiewende*, Germany is not alone, 2015, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/energiewende-germany-not-alone, access date 12.10.2017.

11. Visegrad countries in figures, https://www.e3g.org/library/the-visegrad-countries-in-figures; access date 6.11.2017.

12. World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in the European Union, May 2017, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union.aspx, access date 12.10.2017.

13. https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-energy-consumption-and-power-mix-charts, access date 6.11.2017.

14. International Energy Statistics, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=000000000000000000000000005vm&c=00200000002g0000000020000000000000400001g&ct=0&tl_id=2-A&vs=INTL.27-12-AUT-BKWH.A&cy=2014&vo=0&v=H&start=2007&end=2015, access date 12.10.2017.

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16. World Nuclear Association, *Nuclear Power in the European Union,* May 2017, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/european-union.aspx, access date 12.10.2017.

HOW COMPREHENSIVE CAN SECURITY BE?
A THEORETICAL APPROACH

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Abstract: *The purpose of this paper is to answer the question of "How comprehensive can security be?" as the last decade has been marked by the abundant use of this concept with or without practical coverage. For this, I will review some of the most representative theories and strategies on the comprehensive security concept, from the national level to the one of the main international organizations in European and Euro-Atlantic area, highlighting both strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Also, I will make some recommendations on broadening not the security agenda, as it was done before, but the framework for analyzing security, as "comprehensive" being more than "broad" and having the connotation of "understanding the nature of security".*

Keywords: *comprehensive security, comprehensive approach, security perception, security social representation.*

Introduction

In a world where security is a fashionable subject, approached by both experts and those who do not have related studies, the main meaning of this word remains "the feeling of confidence and tranquility that one has by the absence of any danger"[1]. Hence, the debates depend on the security's object of reference, the level of approach, the degree of systematization, etc. Barry Buzan was best capturing these ideas in his famous book, a landmark to any writing in the field of security, "People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era"[2], in which he calls security an incompletely developed concept in that, at least in the field of IR, literature relating to this concept cannot be compared to the one dedicated the concept of power, which includes both empirical works, and especially a well-developed body of theoretical writings[3]. Well, according to Buzan, in the early '90s, security was lacking the very theoretical corpus. Our view is that, even now, 20 years later, in the field of security the theoretical literature is not preponderant to empirical writings. However, there are proposals from international think-tanks to provide security analysis models, but they focus mainly on the national level and on the process of policy formulation.

1.   Timeline of security concept formulation

Helga Haftendorn, former president of the Association for International Studies (USA), asserted in the early '90s that each security concept developed at one time or another corresponds to specific values, threats and capabilities of a certain perception or, in my view, certain *representations* of threats; in her opinion, the historical evolution of security concept is related to

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[1] Academia Română, Institutul de Lingvistică "Iorgu Iordan", "Securitate", in *Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române* (ediția a II-a revăzută și adăugită), Editura Univers Enciclopedic Gold, 2009.
[2] Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, statele și teama. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internațională în epoca de după Războiul Rece*, Ed. Cartier, București, 2000.
[3] *Ibidem*, p.15.

the expansion of the "frontiers" of the international system, from one in which the nation states were regionally anchored, to the strongly interdependent political systems of the industrialized world and, further, to the global community[4]. Why *representation* instead of *perception*? In an extremely synthetic answer that will not divert this work from the established theme, I choose for the *social representation of security* because perception is a sensory psychic process (sensory organs are directly influenced), while representation is the transition of a feeling to a thought, it is an image of that object kept in memory. Thus, security is perceived, but the product is similar to the perception of time/space. Instead, advancing to a higher level, the representation of security can also occur in the absence of those objects and, moreover, involving an image and a meaning between which there is a close correspondence. Moving from individual to social group, it is obvious that only the word *representation* is not enough to capture the complexity of relationships between human individuals and their aggregate image of security, so we turn our attention to *social psychology* that provides the theoretical framework for understanding these aspects. According to the Romanian-origin psychologist, Serge Moscovici, social representation is a system of values, ideas and practices with a dual function: on the one hand, to establish an order that will allow individuals to orient and master their social material world and, on the other hand, to facilitate communication among members of a community by providing a code by which the various aspects of both personal and common history are named and classified[5]. In other words, Moscovici synthesizes that the function of all social representations is to transform something unfamiliar into something familiar. So, when that abstract thing in our mind becomes an image or a figurative node through the process of objectification, and when something unfamiliar is embedded in the network of categories that are familiar to us through the anchoring process, we are dealing with social representations, not only with perception[6]. These two important processes are constantly being updated, especially in cases where individuals face unexplained or unexpected situations. The theory of social representations is a central element in explaining the way in which the image of security is changing, and this has been the subject of a previous research study in which I have shown how social dynamics has triggered conceptual transformations, or, in other words, as the reference object of the security analysis has been subjected over time to conceptual reevaluations, both caused by "paradigmatic" innovations and the transformation of the international security environment[7]. This approach is obviously more closed to the one of constructivists who claim that International Relations are basically socially constructed and, in the same manner, security is itself based on shared premises on reality.

A personal analytical approach completed a few years ago was concluded in that security has gone through three major phases in its conceptual development. They are not clearly timeline delimited and their development and existence are overlapped. The first phase, after T0 - the establishment of the security studies with a predominant military denotation between the two World Wars, was the one moving the center of gravity from the military dimension of security to the non-military ones: the context was one of peace and understanding, a pledge for cooperation and development that followed the end of the Cold War. The second phase was triggered by the 9/11 terrorist attacks followed by the first invocation of NATO Article 5: terrorism was the new enemy

[4] Helga Haftendon, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security" in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1991, pp. 3-17, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600386?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents, 26.09.2017.
[5] Apud Korina P. Sotirakopoulou, Glynis M. Breakwell, "The Use of Different Methodological Approaches in the Study of Social Representations", in *Ongoing Production on Social Representations – Productions Vives sur les Representations Sociales*, Vol. 1(1), 1992, pp. 29-38, URL: http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/Psr/PSR1992/1_1992Sotir.pdf, 26.09.2017.
[6] For more details on the general features of social representations, see Willem Doise, Augusto Palmonari, "Caracteristici ale reprezentărilor sociale", in Adrian Neculau (Ed.), *Psihologie socială. Aspecte contemporane*, Ed. Polirom, Iași, 1996, pp. 23-33.
[7] For more details, see Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Vulnerabilitate, risc, amenințare. Securitatea ca reprezentare psihosocială*, Editura Militară, București, 2007.

and the content of security gained once again a predominant military content. Finally, the third phase of security concept development is the one we are living in, even if its academic development started in the '90s: the comprehensive security. Comprehensive security, from an academic point of view, is not a new concept and is practically everything: beneficiaries - sources of threat – tools and actors to counter the threats.

In this context, it is very important to stress out that the "comprehensiveness" of security is referring not only to its sectors (according to B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, there are five sectors: military, environmental, economic, societal, and political sectors[8]), but also to the level of analysis (from individual to states and groups of states) and, most important, to the way in which security is socially represented.

2. Some cultural aspects of comprehensive security: from national perspectives to international ones

An interesting example that underlines the gaps in security concept development is that in the years when the U.S. and Europe struggled to theoretically further develop this concept (through the writings of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, who in 1997 published "Security: A New Framework for Analysis"[9]), Japan was already using the concept of *comprehensive security* through the voice of the 43rd Prime Minister, Masayoshi Ohira who invoked a security concept that includes the protection of all key-sectors: a robust industrial base, a robust economy, beneficial external trade relations, and an active external assistance program[10]. There are also opinions stating that Swedish politician Olof Palme would have used this phrase for the first time in a context of common security and disarmament[11]. However, I believe that not the author/authors of the first occurrence is/are more important/important, but concept's current content.

According to the "Dictionary of International Security"[12] translated into Romanian in 2010, the term used by Masayoshi Ohira is translated into *securitate comprehensivă*, but from my point of view this is an inappropriate choice because, in Romanian, *comprehensive* (in Romanian, *comprehensiv*) signifies "a person's ability to understand quickly and correctly; intelligent, penetrating"[13]. A proper translation is considered to be *cuprinzător* (in English, *broad*) because, in English, the primary meaning of the comprehensive word is "covering all or all of the important aspects" (similar with the English word *broad* or *inclusive*)[14]. According to the cited Dictionary, the *comprehensive security* includes all of security's important aspects - economic security, energy security, environmental security, human security, and social security -, and also military defence; this approach stresses out the need for cooperation between states on topics of common interests and a vision of state that goes beyond the state as a sole reference object in international security[15].

Apart from this linguistic aspect, the Romanian case is interesting due to the fact that the entire national security strategy is published in a document called 'The National Security Strategy

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[8] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, *Securitatea: un nou cadru de analiză*, CA Publishing, 2011.

[9] *Idem.*

[10] John Endicott, "Comprehensive Security: Politico/Military Aspects for a New Century", Japan, 2001, apud James C. Hsiung, *Comprehensive Security: Challenge for Pacific Asia*, New York University, URL: http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/hsiung/comp_sec.pdf, 26.09.2017.

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[12] For a better understanding of this particular issue of translation, I have used both the original and Romanian versions of the cited Dictionary: Paul Robinson, *Dictionary of International Security*, Polity Press, UK, 2008 and Paul Robinson, *Dicționarului de Securitate internaţională,* Ed. CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010.

[13] Academia Română, Institutul de Lingvistică "Iorgu Iordan", "Comprehensiv", in *Dicţionarul explicativ al limbii române* (ediţia a II-a revăzută şi adăugită), Editura Univers Enciclopedic Gold, 2009.

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[15] "Comprehensive security" in Paul Robinson, *Dictionary of International Security*, Polity Press, UK, 2008, p. 45.

2015-2019. A Strong Romania within Europe and the World" which is built around the *extensive national security* concept[16], defined as "grounded on constitutional democracy and mutual respect between state and citizens – regarding interests related to ensuring national security in the following fields: defense (perceived in a double normative stance of national defense and collective defense), public order, intelligence, counterintelligence and security activity, education, healthcare, the economic field, the financial sector, environment and critical infrastructure"[17]. "The Guide for the National Defense Strategy 2015-2019" goes deeper in defining this concept: "the state of normality of the nation, provided by protecting and promoting constitutional principles, social, economic and political stability, maintaining the rule of law, as well as exercising the fundamental rights, freedoms and duties of citizens. The extensive national security is accomplished through a set of processes, actions and measures of political, legislative and administrative nature in the areas of defense, public order, information, counterinformation and security, education, health, economy, energy, financial, environmental and critical infrastructure"[18]. It is obvious that this *extensive national security concept* is tributary to the Copenhagen School, but also includes new elements derived from a comprehensive security approach. What is particularly important is that the *extensive national security concept* can be a perfect illustration of the nexus between internal and external security and this fact is underlined by the supplementing of the "national" attribute by the "extensive" one, because in the era of globalization the "national", as circumscribed only to a country's borders, become an obsolete term.

This is the case of Romania, but there are other examples of countries with far more tradition in this approach than our country. For instance, American "National Security Strategy"[19] promotes a *comprehensive national security agenda* based on all elements of national power and tailored to the strategic risks and opportunities America is facing. This agenda addresses to the top strategic risks of America: catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland or critical infrastructure; threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and our allies; global economic crisis or widespread economic slowdown; proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction; severe global infectious disease outbreaks; climate change; major energy market disruptions; and significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime)[20].

Another example is the one of Canada. Canadian experts propose a comprehensive security term, the definition of which includes the *3-D Approach* (Defence, Diplomacy, Development), and the *Whole of Government Approach*: "the end-state of a nation's security policy achieved through the coordinated application of multiplicity of government and non-government components and instruments involved in developing and maintaining a stable and peaceful environment that permits the effective operation of political, economic and social institutions for the overall benefit of citizens"[21]. This idea is also found in programmatic documents, but without direct reference to the comprehensive security concept. The Canadian approach of the international security environment includes a multidimensional approach to risks and threats, structured on three key-trends that shape

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[16] Romania, The Presidential Administration, *National Defense Strategy 2015 - 2019. A Strong Romania within Europe and the World*, Bucharest, 2015, official translation available at URL: http://old.presidency.ro/static/National Defense Strategy 2015 - 2019.pdf, 02.10.2017.

[17] *Ibidem*, p. 5.

[18] România, Administrația Prezidențială, *Ghidul Strategiei Naționale de Apărare a Țării pentru perioada 2015-2019*, București, 2015, p. 7, author's translation, URL: http://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Ghid_SNApT_2015-2019_AP.pdf, 02.10.2017.

[19] The White House, *The National Security Strategy*, Washington, 2015, p.2, URL: http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf. This is the last strategy in place (Obama Administration). The next Strategy is announced by the current Trump Administration for the end of 2017.

[20] *Ibidem*, p. 2.

[21] Ann Fitz-Gerald and Don Macnamara, *Comprehensive Security Requires Comprehensive Structures – How Comprehensive Can We Get?*, Canadian International Council, Strategic Studies Working Group Papers, March 2012, p. 4.

events: the evolution of balance of power, the changing nature of the conflict, and the rapid evolution of technology. Those risks and trends are a slightly broader and more comprehensive than in the American approach, which is more focused.

Turning to Europe, there are some countries that make specific references to comprehensive security and comprehensive approach, such as Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, etc. Of course, other European countries are using a similar approach, but the terms they use are different.

For instance, Estonia considers a *broad security concept* that "entails the involvement of all sectors of the society, as well as an integrated approach, where the foreign policy, defence policy and internal security policy, as well as cohesion and resilience of the society, are employed for the purpose of achieving the security policy goals for the country as a whole"[22]. Also, Estonia suggest a new approach of defence in terms of *psychological defence* as a component of the national defence system, alongside with military defence, civil contribution to military defence, international activity, ensuring of internal security, securing the resilience of critical services[23]. The psychological defence means "the development, preservation and protection of common values associated with social cohesion and the sense of security" and its aim is to safeguard the security of both the state and the society, to enhance the sense of security, to avert crisis, and to increase trust amongst society and towards the actions taken by the state[24]. This approach is a constructivist one and combines in an interesting manner the issue of security perception and the means to improve it in order to provide defence. This original approach is based on the premise that in order to be able to offer a basic service, as defence is, a government must enhance the societal sector of security. In fact, this term of *psychological defence* is also to be found in Singapore's Defence Strategy, but its origins are in Psychology where it means an unconscious psychological mechanism that reduces anxiety arising from unacceptable or potentially harmful stimuli[25].

Other countries, such as France, considers a *holistic approach* as an expression of the national security concept[26], while Germany uses the *holistic approach* only in implementing its Cyber Security Strategy[27]. Another term used in security papers is the *multi-component national security* which is also a tribute to Copenhagen School given by the Government of Croatia in its strategy on national security[28].

Moving the analysis to a level up, we notice that UN, NATO and EU also have comprehensive approaches to security.

Implementing such an approach requires a global actor, so it is no surprise that the UN is a leader in the field. In 2000, the "Brahimi Report" ("Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations") launched the process of reforming peace operations and introduced the concept of *integrated missions*, followed six years later by the elaboration of the "UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines". Behind this Report is the idea that the new forms of conflict at the end of the 20th Century require the need for peace operations to benefit from the political, logistical and/or military support of a major power or of a major regional power, correlated with the sound identification of the sources of the conflict, which may vary from political, economic, environmental to ethnic, religious and human rights violations. The Report stresses out that these sources might be combined and, while some are more fluid and open to compromise, such as

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[22] Estonia, *The National Security Concept of Estonia*, May 2010, p. 3

[23] *Ibidem*, p. 13.

[24] *Idem*.

[25] Phebe Cramer, "Defense mechanisms in psychology today: Further processes for adaptation", in *American Psychologist*, Vol. 55(6), June 2000, pp. 637-646.

[26] France, *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, 2013, p.10.

[27] Germany, The Federal Government, *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr*, 2013, p. 59.

[28] Croatia, The Parliament, *The Strategy for the Republic of Croatia's National Security*, 2002, p. 8. In July 2017, The Croatian Parliament adopted the new National Security Strategy, but its text is not yet published in English or another international language.

economic and political ones, others are rigid, such as those related to energy resources, ethnicity, or the mass violation of human rights. This multitude of sources of conflict, which can interrelate, leads to an increase in the complexity of negotiations and the peace process, which can increase the number of parties involved and the divergences between them. Also, the complexity derives from the fact that the number of victims, the dislocated population and the destruction of infrastructure will increase the level of injustice generated by the war, the difficulty of reconciliation and, finally, the complexity and costs of reconstruction[29].

According to the Danish experts from the Institute for International Studies, the most advanced forms of UN's *comprehensive approach* are the UN's *integrated approach* and the UN's *integrated missions model*[30]. The *integrated approach* is connected to the concept of *whole-of-government* at the Member States level, calling for policy coherence at both national and inter-agency levels. The next step is achieving structural integration which allows *integrated missions* that "refers to the degree to which the humanitarian coordination function has been integrated into the peacekeeping operation or the political or peacebuilding role"[31]. There is some criticism regarding UN's approach focused on the following: the gap between reality and policy, as some of the UN policy assumptions are not clearly and unambiguously stated; the conflicting values and principles, as the organizational values and operating principles can conflict with each other and with the values and principles of the political actors in the intervention area; the conflicting rules, regulations and resource management processes, as they take a long time and many resources to change even if the environment where they apply is very dynamic; the inappropriate management philosophies, processes and tools, as they are mostly to lack the interdependence characteristic[32].

NATO correlates the comprehensive approach to crisis management. In the "Lisbon Summit Declaration"[33] (2010), the Alliance decided to strengthen its comprehensive crisis management approach as part of the international community's effort to improve NATO's ability to provide stabilization and reconstruction. The comprehensive approach has more remote origins in the history of the Alliance, since 2004 when Denmark introduced this subject on NATO's Agenda (also at the Bucharest Summit, 2008), responding to the challenges of the international security environment at the beginning of the 21st Century.

In 2008, a Report by the Danish Institute for International Studies showed that until that time, the comprehensive approach had not reached a practical dimension, and several criteria had to be fulfilled to materialize it in an ideal form: common understanding of the problems that need to be addressed, resolved and agreed on the political and strategic goals that international engagement in a conflict should seek; the existence of institutional doctrines and procedures to facilitate the formulation of common operational objectives and strategies, as well as joint plans at all stages of an operation (pre-deployment, deployment, post-deployment); the existence of a culture of cooperation and mutual understanding that will provide the various actors with the mental basis for thinking and acting in a comprehensive manner; economic, civil and military capacity to implement a comprehensive approach in the field[34].

Four years later, in 2012, Wilton Park, the non-profit executive agency of the UK's External Relations and Community Bureau, organized with the support of SHAPE and ACT a conference

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[29] United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, General Assembly, A/55/305 S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, pp. 1-2 URL: http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml, 04.10.207.

[30] Cedric de Coning, *The United Nations and the Comprehensive Approach,* DIIS REPORT 2008, p. 32, URL: https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import_efter1114/report-2008-4_the_united_nations_approach.pdf, 04.10.2017.

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 18.

[32] *Ibidem*, pp. 23-30.

[33]NATO, *Lisbon Summit Declaration*, 20 Nov. 2010, URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm, 05.10.2017.

[34] Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *NATO's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations. A Work in Slow Progress*, Diis Report 2008, URL: https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import_efter1114/report_2008-15_nato_comprehensive_approach_crisis_response_operations.pdf, 05.10.2017.

designed to streamline the concept of a comprehensive approach. One of the conclusions of this event is that nearly half a decade after its introduction into the Alliance's documents, it still lacks the internal mechanisms needed to effectively manage this approach. The findings of the Report show that, in order for the comprehensive approach to work, there is a need for the systematic development of civilian capacity and capabilities as part of interinstitutional partnerships, a clear delineation of the competences of institutions and agencies, and the existence of systematic and robust training programs for experts civil and military.[35]

In our days, NATO works with several terms derived from the comprehensive approach, such as: *comprehensive strategy*, *comprehensive governance*, and *comprehensive interoperability*[36]. The need for broadening the theoretical approach on comprehensive security is required by "the confluence of several political, socio-economic and technological trends" that "is redefining the global security context resulting in complexity, disorder and uncertainty that has become the new normal"[37].

European Union is also trying to fully implement a comprehensive approach. The debates on this subject have been introduced on the EU agenda since 1996 as part of the reaction to the conflicts in Africa[38]. For the African countries in conflict at that time, the EU has set as a fundamental goal the achievement of structural stability (a notion of stability but still dynamic that shall adapt to the dynamics of developing societies in the region). In this context, structural stability is defined as a condition involving sustainable economic development, democracy, respect for human rights, viable political structures, healthy social and environmental conditions, combined with the ability to manage change without resorting to violent conflict. Working with this notion implies the need to outline and materialize a comprehensive approach that also implies extending the area of defining the concept of conflict prevention: it should be understood not only as an intervention in a situation in which the outbreak of the conflict is imminent, but also as a prevention of such a situation (peace building)[39].

The comprehensive approach proposed by the EU has become more concrete in 2003 when the "European Security Strategy" was adopted. It clarifies a comprehensive approach to security in which its internal and external aspects are inextricably linked, and the "new threats" are not "purely military" nor can they be managed exclusively by military means, each of them requiring a combination of instruments of a military and non-military nature[40].

The next step in developing this approach was establishing the principles and objectives of the Union's external action under the "Treaty of Lisbon" (agreed in 2007) in order to make external action more effective and strengthen its strategic dimension. However, even the EU's experts acknowledge five years later that the principles governing the comprehensive approach "still have to systematically go a long way until they become the basic principles of the EU's external action in all areas, especially on conflict prevention and crisis resolution"[41]. Still, there are established the benchmarks in setting up such an approach: the need for a mutual relationship between security and development; the answer must be correlated to the specific context and take into account the logic

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[35] Wilton Park, *Conference Report: Operationalizing the comprehensive approach*, 16-19.04.2012, URL: https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/wp1092-report.pdf, 05.10.2017.

[36] NATO, *Strategic Foresight Analysis. 2017 Report*, ACT, 2017, URL: www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/171004_sfa_2017_report_txt.pdf, 02.11.2017.

[37] *Ibidem*, p. 15.

[38] European Commission, *The EU and the issue of conflicts in Africa: peace-building, conflict prevention and beyond*, Brussels, 06.03.1996, URL: http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/theme/prevention/communication-1996.htm, 05.10.2017.

[39] *Idem.*

[40] EU, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, pp. 2-7, URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, 07.10.2017.

[41] Council of the European Union, *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises*, Brussels, 18 December 2013, p. 2, URL: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX %3A52013JC0030, 07.10.2017.

of the actual situations; responsibility lies with all European institutions and Member States, as well as with third countries; respect for the different competencies of the Union institutions and services and the Member States[42]. A few months later, in April 2014, the European Parliament expressed in a Resolution the regret that, despite the huge potential of the "Treaty of Lisbon", the consistency of the EU's external action on security, humanitarian issues, energy, the environment, trade and migration; the European Commission has a restrictive approach, protecting its competences in these areas and minimizing the coordination functions within the European External Action Service[43]. A new set of recommendations is formulated to strengthen the practical dimension of the comprehensive approach: institutional coherence, financial coherence, consistency in practice, partnerships[44]. Two years later, the Center for European Political Studies identified a similar set of shortcomings in the application of the comprehensive approach and underlines the discrepancy between the institutional and bureaucratic evolution of this concept and, on the other hand, its materialization in practice and the impact in the field[45].

Of course, from this analysis, we cannot ignore the last steps taken by the EU in the field of security and defense initiated with the adoption of the "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy" in 2016[46]. In a few sentences, the Strategy captures the contemporary essence of security: "The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory. Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders"[47]. It is noticed that it is also a comprehensive approach covering the geographical dimension, including both internal and external security and the various types of activities, addressing both military and nonmilitary security. In fact, the *global* attribute of the Strategy does not only refer to the geographic dimension, but also to the policies and tools proposed for achieving security, which are specific to the different areas of social life, and moreover to the combination of soft and hard power. The EU's approach to this Strategy includes five priorities: EU security, the resilience of states and society for Eastern and Southern neighborhood, integrated conflict management, regional cooperation systems and global governance for the 21st Century[48]. Each of these priorities includes measures in various areas, thus underlining the option of a multidimensional and comprehensive approach to security. For example, the EU's security priority aims at building a security community, fighting terrorism, building cyber security and energy security, while enhancing strategic communication to "connect EU foreign policy with citizens and communicate it better to partners"[49].

Of the above, one might note that although the cited experts identify the existence of some limits in the NATO and EU comprehensive approach to security, the strategies of these two organizations are more articulate than the national strategies of the Member States. From the list of measures for improving the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's external policy and actions, we note that there are many similarities between the European and NATO approaches, but, more

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[42] *Ibidem*, p. 4.

[43] European Parliament, *European Parliament resolution of 3 April 2014 on the EU comprehensive approach and its implications for the coherence of EU external action (2013/2146(INI))*, 2014, URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-286+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN, 07.10.2017.

[44] *Idem.*

[45] Center for European Policy Studies, *Research Meets Policy Seminar 1 – "Identifying research gaps in the EU's Comprehensive Approach"*, Brussels, October 2016, URL: https://eu-civcap.net/2016/10/25/research-meets-policy-seminar-1/, 07.10.2017.

[46] European Union, *Viziune comună, acțiuni comune: o Europă mai puternică. O strategie globală pentru politica externă și de securitate a Uniunii Europene*, iunie 2016, URL: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_ro_version.pdf, 07.10.2017.

[47] *Ibidem*, pp. 7.

[48] *Ibidem*, pp. 9-11.

[49] *Ibidem*, p. 23.

importantly, is also applicable the criticism raised to UN's comprehensive approach. It is also notable the slow gradual progress of the practical dimension of the comprehensive approach, and, from this point of view, there are similarly similar recommendations to develop this approach for both NATO and the EU.

Brief conclusions

A *comprehensive approach* is a step forward in delivering *comprehensive security* in the sense that it addresses problem solving and effective crisis management: starting from the description of the state to be achieved (comprehensive security), international organizations have developed a range of concepts and tools to be able to act in the areas and levels of comprehensive security. Summarizing, an article published a few years ago in the "CSS Analyses in Security Policy" shows that the need to configure this approach comes from the fact that crisis management has become more complex due to the fact that actors, deadlines and missions have been expanded. Moreover, the success of the crisis response depends on the internal and external coordination of the actors, on their timely deployment in all phases of the conflict, on the use of the right tools for each operation, and finally on "a common, multi-dimensional strategy to co-ordinate the broad range of international crisis responses" [50].

The development and implementation of the *comprehensive security concept* is intended to be part of the response to multidimensional or even hybrid threats, but it must be kept in mind that it represents more than the sum of the sectors/dimensions referred to, with visible or less visible reciprocal relations between those sectors/dimensions which make the entire ensemble difficult to manage. For these reasons, we argue that comprehensive security is not possible without comprehensive structures to manage it, but in reality, intergovernmental cooperation is the optimal solution, although its achievement is not an easy task.

So, comprehensive security is not only about a number of security sectors/domains (as Copenhagen School had stated), the level of analyzing it or implementing policy tools (national or international), but also about social representation of security, as it is the main trigger for broadening the security agenda, and about intergovernmental and interagency cooperation, as the main condition for implementing those tools to achieve security in a comprehensive manner. Thus, the main challenge is to address all of those aspects and to make comprehensive security an achievable goal, not only an ideal for our world.

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[50] Christian MÖLLING, "Comprehensive Approaches to International Crisis Management", in *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 42, October 2008, CSS ETH Zurich, p.1.

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THEORETICAL FILTER RELEVANCE IN ASSESSING
THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: The article intends to uphold the idea that the assessment of the international security environment represents a very difficult and complicated task similar to the academic endeavor to conceptualize the international/global system, theoretical instruments being necessary to be developed in approaching the subject. Theoreticians of the world systems apprehend that,just likethe systemic perspective is created by the analyst, the sameway the assessment of the international security environment depends on an implicit or explicit assumed theoretical filter by the analyst or the security community.

Just as theoreticians of the international systems notice that the systemic perspective is firstly and inevitably a theoretical artifact, the article aims to point out a series of conceptualizations of the international systems that can be used as theoretical grids in the assessment of the international security environment.

Keywords: international system, theoretical filter, theorization, interpretative grid.

Introduction

For an academic discipline the issue of defining theory, its role, and its function represents the most discussed subject par excellence. What theory represents is a fundamental question for any scientific domain[1] and the explanation for that fact resides in the aspect that the meaning of the notion, "theory", may be interpreted in multiple sorts. The implicit assumption of the theorization process is that social facts and phenomena are based on a subsumed order of events and incidents[2] and the issue of assessing the international security environment is based on the assumption that the existence of a substratum or congeries of facts influencing the macro social dynamics have an important impact in conceiving the national or international security policies.

Usually, the Romanian national security strategies are substantiated on an evaluation of the *new* international security environment. The current national defense strategy mentions "the international security environment is characterized by complexity and dynamism as a consequence of the rethinking of the strategic and military posture of some states, as well as outcomes of political, economic and technological interdependencies produced by globalization."[3] The strategy mentions as well that the international security environment transforms itself continuously, emphasizing the unpredictable threats and the difficulty in discriminating between classical and asymmetric or hybrid risks. Beside being mentioned that the security environment requires an extended approach, from our point of view the proposed assessment speaks less about the characteristics of the security environment and more of a new international situation, a brief description, without mentioning for instance the collocation *world order*. In the national security strategy issued in 2006 there are formulations such as "the old global order, based on the bipolar

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[1] Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, "The end of International Relations theory?", *European Journal of International Relations,* 19 (3), 2013, p. 406.
[2] Rosenau, James, "Thinking Theory Throughly", from *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy,* London, Frances Pinter, 1980, în PaulViotti & Mark Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond,* Allyn and Bacon, 1987, pp. 29-37.
[3] *Strategia națională de apărare a țării pentru perioada 2015 – 2019 – O Românie puternică în Europa și în lume –* București, 2015, p. 11, http://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf

logic – characterized by rivalry and mutual assured destruction – have disappeared, and the bi-polar transition has ended,"[4] paradigmatic concepts in defining the world system, respectively the structural realism paradigm in approaching the international relations, insisting on the polarity concept and on the logic of the balance of power, without giving details regarding the phrase "the bipolar transition has reached an end".[5]

In the national security strategy issued in 2010, the assessment of the international security environment is influenced by the obsolescence of the difference between the internal and external dimensions of politics, as well by the fact that some countries are contesting the current rules of managing the international relations, choosing instead to use military force in order to fulfill their objectives[6], the formulation being a vague indication regarding the subsumed order of the current international system.

Those types of evaluations of the international security environments in different temporal contexts are presented as objective descriptions of an international environment, but too simple and not elaborated from a theoretical point of view. Formulations suchas "the international environment is constantly changing," "the security environment is characterized mainly by the following major tendencies" or "the main risks and threats that can put in danger the national security of Romania are as follows…" exploit the assumption of the objectivity of the security environment, which, from different perspectives, depends on the intersubjective understandings of the actors of the legitimate order of the international system.

Those descriptions of the international environment do not offer a clarifying systemic perspective upon the subject in attention, but, on the contrary, leave the impression of nebulosity, or of a too many variables system.

1. The concept of international system as image and representation of the world

The theme of assessment of the international security environment is similar in difficulty with the academic issue of conceptualizing the international system. Being appreciated by some specialists as the most important subject of International Relations, yet the most complicated one, the concept of international system is the most underdeveloped interdisciplinary concept.

Although it has produced a vast specialized literature, the concept of international system has not benefited from a coherent, satisfactory and integrative academic discourse. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, believes that a theory of international politics should be a theory of international system[7] and Barry Buzan & Richard Little think that the international system represents the key to the entire academic subject of International Relations; the purpose of the scientific discipline would be to understand international systems from the perspective oftheir historical aspects, as well those concerning social sciences.[8] In the same spirit, Immanuel Wallerstein insists on the revealing the importance of the concept of world system[9] as being the most efficient unit to be developed for world history or for the specialists in producing a macro analysis of the social reality. The theory of world systems marks a turning point in the evolution of the methodologies used in social sciences as it facilitates reexamining the past in the light of the present, and the central idea would be that the fundamental unit in analyzing social change are notseparate societies or states but the entire world system.

Specialists notice the fact that there is little success in developing a concept of wide scope referring to theinternational system and that the underdevelopment of the concept is undeniable.

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[4] *Strategia de securitate națională a României – România Europeană, România Euro-Atlantică: Pentru o viață mai bună, într-o țară mai sigură, democratică și prosperă,* București, 2006, p. 6, http://old.presidency.ro /static/ordine/CSAT/SSNR.pdf.

[5] *Ibidem,* p. 6.

[6] *Strategia Națională de Apărare. Pentru o Românie care garantează securitatea și prosperitatea generațiilor viitoare,* București, 2010, p. 12, http://ccpic.mai.gov.ro/docs/Strategia_nationala_de_aparare.pdf.

[7] Kenneth Waltz, *Teoria politicii internaționale,* Polirom, Iași, 2006, pp. 70-72.

[8] Barry Buzan și Richard Little, *Sistemele internaționale în istoria lumii,* Polirom, Iași, 2009, p. 15.

[9] Immanuel Wallerstein, *Sistemul mondial modern,* Editura Meridiane, București, 1992.

Buzan & Little stress upon the fact that the researchers in social sciences lack a general perspective on defining theinternational system,special methodological instruments being necessaryin orderto be accomplished.[10]The common feature of these remarks is that they insist on the relevance of the analyst's perception.[11] Kenneth Waltz arguments that the international system has an independent structure which determines states' behavior, yet nothing can be stated about the international structure based on the research regarding the nature or the number of the component states. For Kenneth Waltz the international system is a theoretical concept and, as a consequence, we are not able to find outmore aspects about the structure via empirical means. We cannot say that the system is characterized by homogeneity basedon the fact that all members are democracies and the interactions between states say nothing about the nature of the system. At the same time, the idea that an international system may become more and more complex is based on a theoretical confusion and the accumulation of the empirical data dissimulates the necessity to prior conceptualize the international system, a fact that must precede any empirical investigation.[12]For instance, the peace of Westphalia, considered the cornerstone of the contemporary international system, underlies the principle of the equality of states by a consensus of main actors of that time and the abrogation of the hierarchical medieval order. The Westphalian international system represents a convention agreed by the main international actors of the historical moment. In the line of the argument the discussion concerning the importance of theory in the social sciences resides in perpetuating the vexing question whether the theory derives from the real world or the real world derives from the images preconceived by certain actors?[13]

Mlada Bukovansky[14] introduces the concept of international political culture in order to discuss about the international system. In search of an explanation for the systemic change of the international environment, the author recommends analyzing the cultural dimension of the global politics, emphasizing the close interaction between culture and strategy. The changes of the international system are revealed if we accept the assumption that power politics depends as much on ideas as on military capabilities. The affirmation does not deny the importance of military arsenal but insists on the issue that first the ideas are organizing the people. Bukovansky relies on the notion of legitimacy and states that the way in which a community constructs the political authority represents the central feature of its collective identity.[15]

From another point of view, Richard Ashley has developed his argument on meta-theoretical premises insisting on the fact that conventional theories of international relations are dominated by an *instrumental logic* inseparable by its political effect, more precisely inseparable by the complicity with global power structures that are hierarchical and oppressive. The instrumentalist logic is based on a number of assumptions regarding the nature of reality, the function of theory and the role of the scientist as theoretician. This type of logic speculates an ontological distinction between object and subject which ordinates the reality as a sphere of experience uncontaminated by perception or mediated by language and interpretation. A social objective reality is presumed to exist independentfrom the subjects who observe it, *speak and act*.[16] The author rejects the distinction Karl Popper assumes between theory and practice according to which the epistemological aspects are privileged in relation to the ontological aspects as long as the practice is already imbued with theory.

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[10] *Ibidem,* p. 54.
[11] David Singer, Level-of-Analysis Problem", *World Politics,* 14/1, pp. 77-92, Apud. Barry Buzan şi Richard Little, *Sistemele internaţionale în istoria lumii,* Polirom, Iaşi, 2009, p. 55.
[12] David Singer, Level-of-Analysis Problem", *World Politics,* 14/1, pp. 77-92, Apud. Barry Buzan şi Richard Little, *Sistemele internaţionale în istoria lumii,* Polirom, Iaşi, 2009, p. 55.
[13] Stephen Walt, "The relationship between theory and policy in international relations", *Annual Review of Political Science,* vol. 8, 2005, pp. 23-48; Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski, *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond,* University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, 1996.
[14] Mlada Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture,* New York, Princeton University Press, 2002.
[15] *Ibidem*, p. 1.
[16] Martin Griffiths, *Relaţii internaţionale. Şcoli, curente, gânditori,* Bucureşti, Editura Ziua, 2003, p. 207.

Conceiving a security strategy involves, explicitly or implicitly, taking a position as regards the central assumptions in describing the international security environment. For instance,in the perspective of theoffensive realism prescribed by John Mearsheimer one would assume that the great powers are the main actors of global politics who act in an anarchical environment, that all states have military offensive capabilities, that states are not able to find outwith certainty the intentions of other states, that the main purpose of the state is survival, and that the states are rational actors. On the basis of that description of the international security environment, the realist school recommends an endless competition for power understood as a way for providing security.[17] Structural realism provides as well a reason for the secrecy of some states' activities, more precisely for intelligence activities. From a "realist" point of view, the anarchic feature of the international system implies self-help security policy and recommends an attitude of distrust, although an entire alternative literature in international relations has been developed in the sense of criticizing the realist assumption that anarchy justifies power politics. For instance, the well known representative of the constructivist approach of international relations, Alexander Wendt, has constructed his argument on the idea that anarchy is not the cause of power politics; instead *anarchy is what states make of it;*in his famous saying, Alexander Wendt delegitimizes the realist assumption that the anarchic international environment predisposes to conflict and insists that anarchy may as well predispose to cooperation.[18]

2.The relevance of the systemic image (environment) for the "security practice"

The traditional paradigms of the international relations propose representations and interpretations of the international system/environment, and the idea of complicity between theory (the image of the international environment) and the practice of international relations is not a new one, yet the question reiterates as follows: should the realist paradigm be seen as a theory of international politics or as a theory for a certain type of foreign and security policy? Some authors raise the question, for instance, whether the description ofthe international system and the security environment from a structural realist perspective has the purpose of upholding and assuring US hegemony.[19] The issue has profound implications for the national security policies being in close connection with budgeting and money distribution between different sectors involved in the national security *politics*. The tendency to perceive the world in the light the traditional paradigms of International Relations is commodious; the difficult part would be to imagine the political relevance of the alternative approaches of international relations thatplace human consciousness in the centre of international relations.

The literature in international relations, security studies and intelligence studies offers many possibilities and criteria for comprehending the international security environment or the global order reflecting the plurality of images and interpretations. Richard Little reveals in his book *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Power*that treating the balance of power as a metaphor implies a transformation of the model in which the power is estimated and generates new *schemata*concerning the models the international politics operates.[20] Specialists avoid admitting the profound cognitive complexity of the balance of power, the preconceptions having an important impact upon the way we apprehend the world. Treating the balance of power as a metaphor has the effect of transforming the usual significance associated to power. Correlated to the preconception schemata of the balance of power, the intelligence activities during the Cold War

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[17] Mark Phythian, "Intelligence theory and theories of international relations. Shared world or separate worlds?" în Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin & Mark Phythian, *Intelligence Theory. Key questions and debates,* Routledge, London & New York, 2009, p. 58.

[18] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics', *International Organization,* (46), 391 – 426, 1992, în Paul Viotti & Mark Kauppi, *International Relations Theory. Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond* (3e), Allyn and Bacon, Boston – London – Toronto et, 1999, pp. 434-459.

[19] Mark Phythian, *Op. Cit.,* p. 61.

[20] Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models,* Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 27-30.

was mainly a statistical approach pejorativelybeing dubbed the activity of counting beans and serving the logic of equilibrating the balance of power between the two superpowers.[21]

As some authors recommend, the key in understanding the systemic change lies in developing two disregarding and badly interpreted concepts: political culture and legitimacy in theinternational society.[22] Political legitimacy has an internal dimension, as well as an external one and the international system can be perceived as having a political culture at the systemic level. International political culture represents a set of implicit or explicit propositions shared by the major actors in the system on the nature of legitimate political authority, state identity, and political power; the norms and rules that derive from those prepositions conduct international relations.In other words, we have to use the word culture to refer to shared knowledge of norms and rules which, according to theconstructivist paradigm, are constitutive for the international structure. Those rules and norms are instilled in the conceptions concerning political legitimacy.[23] Ian Clark is one of the authors who develops the idea of legitimacy in international society and perceives it as fundamental in defining international systems. The author believes that one reason not to play with legitimacy relies on the practical preoccupation for the liaison between international legitimacy and international stability that derives from it.[24]Legitimacy is important as it is closely linked with the stability of the security architectureand it is necessary to analyzethe sources of legitimacy and the conditions that generate it.[25]

Similar to any other social organization, the existence of an international system depends on the awareness of it and on its codification through language. The constructivists insist that the social reality exists as long as it is acknowledged at the level of collective social perceptions and communicated through language. The constructivists state that theinternational system, as part of the social reality, "makes" the actors and contributes tothe way the actors define themselves. At the same time, the international system is constructed by the actors and reconstructed by their interaction.[26] As an example, Christian Reus-Smit reveals that the sovereignty of thenational state is based on meta values other than the sovereignty principle in itself. In order to support the idea, Reus-Smit employs the concept of the moral purpose of the state in order to conceptualize its justifiable values and argues that various hegemonic ideas on the moral purpose of the state conveyed various meanings to sovereignty in various historical periods.[27]

In conceptualizing the international system, Alexander Wendt distances himself from the theory proposed by Kenneth Waltz, disagreeing with rationalism, materialism and individualsim that are characteristic to neorealism. According to Alexander Wendt, the material factors cannot be analyzed without taking into account the social structures through which they are given significance. Wendt presents the world politics as a social field whose characteristics are determined through the communication and interaction of its units[28]and builds his theory of the international system in opposition to Waltz's theory, who argued that anarchy is what transforms the world into a self-helping system, where the policy of power is perpetuated and states find themselves in a state of uncertainty. He also pleads for the idea that it is the structure of the international system that limits the potential of cooperation between states and that generates insecurity conditions, phenomena such as the arms race or wars. Kenneth Waltz presupposes that the international system is "systemically dominated", the behaviour of states being dictated by this structure.

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[21] Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence. From Secrets to Policy,* CQ Press, Washington, DC, 2009, p. 235.

[22] Mlada Bukovansky, *Op. Cit.,* pp. 1-2.

[23] *Ibidem,* p. 2.

[24] Ian Clark, *Legitimacy in International Society,* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 15.

[25] *Ibidem,* p. 12.

[26] Olivia Toderean, *Constructivismul în relaţiile internaţionale,* în Andrei Miroiu şi Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, *Manual de relaţii internaţionale,* Iaşi, Polirom, 2006, p. 159.

[27] Cristian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State. Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations,* Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1999, p. 159.

[28] Erik Ringmar, "Alexander Wendt – A Social Scientist Struggling with History", în Iver Neumann & Ole Waever (eds.), *The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making,* London and New York, Routledge, 1997, p. 299.

Alexander Wendt delegitimizes the rationalist assumptions, mainly the fact that anarchy has causal effects. Raising the question of various anarchy models, triggered by the interaction between states, Wendt supports the idea that the anarchic type that prevails depends heavily on how the states construct their identity in relation to each other. The politics of power is the result of such an interpretation, but it is not the only possible one. Drawing on the relation between identity and the security environment, Alexander Wendt appreciates indeed it matters whether and to what extent "the social identities suppose the identification with the fate of the other.[29]

Wendt appreciates that the state of security differs based on the manner and the degree in which the self is cognitively identified with the other; consequently, the significance of anarchy and power also depend on this cognitive variation. A positive identification with the other states will lead to perceiving the threats to security not as a private matter for each state, but a shared responsibility.[30]

According to Rodney Bruce Hall, [31] the way the collective identity is constructed has significant implications for the practice of international relations, since it has the role to place the individual identity in relation with other actors or with the global order. The author starts from the assertion that changing the collective identity of the societal actors will transform their interests. The interests of societal groups are not unchangeable or objectively determined. Group interests are strongly conditioned by the self-identification of the members of these groups, which supposes resorting to other groups inside the society or to the state. Arguing against the will for power of the state, Rodney Bruce Hall postulates the will to manifest identity. [32] The author analyzes the consequences of nationalizing the state actors for the composition of the international system and its political models, since the "nationalization" of the state actors leads to major changes of the international system.[33]

Conclusions

The present article aimed at highlighting the fact that assessing the international security environment is heavily influenced by the theoretical filter used by the analyst, implicitly or explicitly, their construct/image on the international system decisively influencing the manner in which the environment is characterized. It is not by chance that an increasing number of researchers are preoccupied with understanding the way how various specialists construct the images upon the international relations and the methods they use in order to understand this field, as well as their social and political implications. It is equally important to analyze the manner in which the world politics is studied, the process of theorizing becoming a subject itself.[34] It is common sense to suppose that an assessment of the international security environment supposes a distance between the knowledgeable subject and the object of study, but, given the specificity of the object of study, i.e. the international security environment, the assessment is inherently subjective and can be considered an artifact.

The importance of theorizing in understanding international social relations is also proven by the fact that in an academic subject the issue of defining its theory, role and function represents the most disputed topic par excellence. What theory represents is a fundamental question for any

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[29] Alexander Wendt, 'Identity and structural change in international politics', în Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, (eds.) *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory,* Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1996, p. 52 şi Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics,* Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 106.
[30] Alexander Wendt,'Identity and structural change in international politics', în Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds.),*Op. Cit.*, p. 56.
[31] Rodney Bruce Hall, *National Collective Identity. Social Constructs and International Systems,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1999.
[32] *Ibidem*, p. 6.
[33] Ioana Leucea, *Constructivism şi securitate umană,* Editura Institutul European, Iaşi, 2012, pp. 80-81.
[34] Scott Burchill& Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations,* Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 2-3.

academic subject,[35] and this happens also because the meaning of the notion of "theory" can be interpreted in a multitude of ways. The implicit assumption of theorizing is the fact that social phenomena and facts are based on a *subsumed order of happenings and events*.[36] To think theoretically one has to be familiar with abstractions, generalization, one has to be able to distinguish between the subordinated order that links discrete incidents, and this manner of thinking can be supported if any phenomenon observed is understood as an illustration of recurrent sequences, models and patterns.[37]

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[35] Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, "The end of International Relations theory?", *European Journal of International Relations,* 19 (3), 2013, p. 406.
[36] Rosenau, James, "Thinking Theory Thoroughly", from *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy,* London, Frances Pinter, 1980, în PaulViotti & Mark Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond,* Allyn and Bacon, 1987, pp. 29-37.
[37] *Ibidem.*

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THE NEXUS BETWEEN (GOOD) GOVERNANCE
AND NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: The consequences of inefficient governance provided numerous negative examples overtime, highlighting that governance has a major influence on international public policy. The concept of good governance is long-standing and has begun being intensively used especially since the 1990s. This paper brings to the forefront the nexus between good governance and national security. Knowing that this is vital to preventing crises, conflicts and maintaining a climate of peace by developing the socioeconomic conditions of the state, the purpose of this paper is to answer questions such as "What are the main characteristics influencing governance?" and "How do these characteristics influences the security of a state?"

Keywords: governance, good governance, bad governance, national security, democratic governance

Introduction

The 20th century was marked by the two world wars, the rise of nationalism, the Cold War, decolonization and the technological developments without precedent which proved, in the end, that the western liberal democracy is the triumphant model of organizing and leading the state(s). The turning point in acknowledging the success of the liberal democracy and free market was after the demise of the communist regime. Be it 1989, or 1991[1], the idea was general: the West *won* the Cold War; communism was defeated and the end of history had been witnessed[2]. This end of chapter that was translated into the end of the communist rule over the East and Central Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, raised not only to scholars numerous questions but also to the practitioners who underlined the need of a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Given this situation, the attention focused on governance and to the need of good governance which became a synonym of (liberal) democracy.[3]

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[1] We underline the fact that there are different perspectives regarding the demise of the communist regime(s) in Europe given the fact that the *security belt* of the Soviet Union collapsed like in a domino effect in 1989 and in 1991 the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

[2] See for a different perspective on the collapse of the communist regime besides the article of Francis Fukuyama in: Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit. The Errors of Endism" in*: The National Interest*, Summer
1989, available online at: http://www.wesjones.com/eoh_noexit.htm#source&gt last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[3] To be noted that the concept of governance became more popular after 1990 replacing the buzzword of *management* which was considered by some scholars (Dalton S. Lee, „Management Theory and Training", in: *Public Administration Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer, 1990), pp. 245-256; W. Jack Duncan, „Transferring Management Theory to Practice", in: *The Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Dec., 1974), pp. 724-738) as sometimes failing due to the way theory of management is applied to various fields. Given that the "*link between causal variables and desired effects (of management – authors` note) cannot occur unless the program itself has been put into place*" (Dalton S. Lee, p. 246) the attention shifted from *training* the managers into the process of management at administration level, so the focus started to be put on the governance. (See more in: Meetika Srivastava, „Good Governance - Concept, Meaning and Features: A Detailed Study", available online at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1528449 last accessed on October 5th, 2017, p. 2).

The subject of governance caught the interest of international organizations like United Nations, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, or the European Commission, paid attention to the process of governance at the same time underlining that good governance insures a security climate. In front of this perspective, this current paper underlines that good governance is vital to preventing crises, conflicts and maintaining a climate of peace by developing the socio-economic conditions of the state pinpointing that there is a nexus between the process of governance and the national security of a state.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned arguments, this paper tries to answer to questions such as "*What are the main characteristics influencing governance?*" and "*How do these characteristics influences the security of a state?*" by focusing on (1) the meaning of (good) governance, (2) the characteristics of good governance, (3) the effects of good or bad governance on the development of a state, so that in the last part be pinpointed (4) the nexus between good governance and national security.

1. The meaning of (good) governance

With no doubt, the concept of *governance* has become a buzzword being connected with the transparency and responsiveness of the government. The concept which had become the goal seeking for the countries in development[4] but not restricted to, is not a new concept, but rather an old one[5]. The balance between good and bad or inefficient governance marked the path for countries in development, the governments seeking for good governance because it became the equivalent of stability and development. Despite the fact that it became widely researched phenomenon, *governance*[6] does not have a general accepted definition. In simple wording, *governance* represents the actions of authorities of a state, or put it in a pragmatic way "*the decisional process based on which decisions are implemented or not*"[7]. Due to the numerous definitions given to *governance,* the concept has different meanings to different people[8]. Goran Hyden and Julius Court underline that, based on a review of literature, two main categories can observed – the substantive content of governance and its character in practice.[9] This difference can also be observed when analyzing the way in which *governance* is understood; for example public administration sees governance as a process of control, while the agencies see it as a process based on rules[10]. Regardless of the definitions and views on the concept of *governance*, it was underlined that only through good governance a state can develop and maintain and guarantee its security. This

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[4]To be noted that Goran Hyden and Julius Court in their paper "Governance and Development" underline that the field of development underwent several stages of analysis and that after 1990 it was made the shift from *projects, programs and policies* to politics despite the fact that "*development analysts [...] wished to treat 'development' as an apolitical phenomenon*" (in Goran Hyden, Julius Court, "Governance and Development", in: *World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 1, United Nations University,* 2002, available online at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4094.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017, pp. 1-5).

[5] The origins of this concept can be traced both in Latin (*gubernāculum*) and Greek (*kubernaein*) and represented the process of ruling (Theodor Iordănescu, Mariana Diaconescu, Ana Cristina Halichias, *Dicţionar Latin-Român,* Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 286)

[6] To be noted that when using the term *governance* it can refer to several contexts such as corporate governance, local governance, national governance and international governance. In this paper we refer mostly to national governance.

[7]Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Dimensiunile Nonmilitare ale Securităţii,* Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2005, p. 15.

[8] Goran Hyden, Julius Court, "Governance and Development", in: *World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 1, United Nations University,* 2002, available online at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4094.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017, p.7.

[9]This difference is explained by the two authors by drawing a diagram of the different uses of the government concept. See the diagram at: Goran Hyden, Julius Court, "Governance and Development", in: *World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 1, United Nations University,* 2002, available online at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4094.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017, p.8.

[10] Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Dimensiunile Nonmilitare ale Securităţii,* Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2005, p. 16.

idea points up that when analyzing governance a special attention must be given to both the formal and informal actors which are involved the decision-making process. In this regard, government is one of the main actors. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific pinpoints that the actors in governance depend also on the level of government under discussion given that in rural areas can be other influential actors known as part of the *civil society* such as NGOs, cooperatives, farmers` associations, land lords, religious leaders, or even the military making thus the process of governance a complex process[11]. The point of UNESCAP is also sustained through the *World Bank in Governance: The World Banks Experience* where it was underlined that: "Governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development. Good governance is epitomized by, among other things, predictable, open, and enlightened policymaking. Good governance fosters strong, but sharply delimited, states capable of sustained economic and social development and institutional growth."[12]

As it can be noted from the above definition of governance there is a connection between all the actors be them formal or informal who act together for the wellbeing of the country and its social and economic development. This idea is also sustained by OECD countries where development assistance is linked with democratization, human rights and participation to development, meaning that the rule of law has to be respected because good governance calls for a government which is not only representative, but also responsive to the needs of those governed. This can be synthesized to a responsible democratic society. This idea is also sustained by the European Commission. According to the European Commission *"The quality of governance therefore often depends on the state's capacity to provide its citizens with the basic services needed to reduce poverty and promote development"*[13] meaning that the state has to *serve* its citizens.[14]

In this sense it can be seen the nexus between the good governance and national security given that good governance depend on a series of factors[15].

2. Characteristics of Good Governance

Despite the fact that governance does not have a general accepted definition, there had been identified eight determinant characteristics of good governance and based on which it is considered that good governance can be measured. The acceptance of these characteristics is the result of the relation to development and on the experience of international organizations[16]. The eight characteristics that are now general accepted are the result of a number of views on good governance.

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[11] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, "What is Good Governance", UNESCAP, available online at: http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[12] The World Bank, *Governance – The World Bank`s Experience,* A World Bank Publication, Washington D.C., 1994, p. 66 available online at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en /711471468765285964/pdf/multi0page.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[13] European Commission, *Communication on Governance and Development",* European Commission, 2003, available online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r12524 last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[14] Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Dimensiunile Nonmilitare ale Securității,* Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I", București, 2005, p. 17.

[15] Some of the factors of good governance are (1) effective and efficient administration, (2) quality of life, (3) non corrupt and credible institutions, (4) check of balance, (5) citizen-friendly administration and responsive administration, (5) use of IT services, (6) government-citizen friendly interaction through IT programs, (7) quality of public services and employees. These factors were presented in the World Bank document on government and development. See more in: The World Bank, *Government and Development*, A World Bank Publication, Washington D.C., 1992, available online at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/604951468739447676/pdf/multi-page.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[16] Here we refer especially to the OECD, The World Bank, United Nations and European Commission documents on good governance.

Figure no. 1. Characteristics of Good Governance[17]

Goran Hayden and Julius Court underline six characteristics of good governance: (1) participation, (2) decency, (3) fairness, (4) accountability, (5) transparency and (6) efficiency[18]. Their six characteristics *"have a more universal applicability"* to the countries which are *"not necessarily involved in democratization along the lines of the Western model"*[19] meaning that they make a difference between the countries which go for a Western model of development.

In Figure 1 we have presented the eight characteristics of good governance. To be noted that the opposite of good governance is bad governance, but there is no mention on where good governance starts and where it is bad governance given that most of the states cannot fulfill all the eight characteristics.[20]

Going to the characteristics, we can synthesize that they are interconnected.

2.1.   Participation

A key of good governance is insured by the participation of both man and women. This does not mean necessarily participation through representatives or institutions, but it sustains the right of association, of being informed and being part of the civil society[21]. By being part of associations they become a sort of agents of development.

Participation is related to another characteristic of good governance – accountability - given that citizens participate to the electoral process by casting their vote for their considered to be the best representative in the political process. For example, it is considered that the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement was a response to the crises of representation[22]. Furthering on this idea it can be argued that participatory approached can be important for improving policies and reforms of the system, including on assuring a state of security.

2.2.   Rule of law

A requirement for good governance is fair and impartial enforcement of laws[23]. It underlines that correct decisions have to be taken and which are according to the law and that there is a fair and transparent treatment at society`s level.

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[17] This figure can also be found at: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, "What is Good Governance", UNESCAP, available online at: http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[18] Goran Hyden, Julius Court, "Governance and Development", in: *World Governance Survey Discussion Paper 1, United Nations University,* 2002, available online at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/4094.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017, p.25.

[19] Ibidem, pp. 25-26.

[20] Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Dimensiunile Nonmilitare ale Securităţii,* Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2005, p. 22.

[21] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, "What is Good Governance", UNESCAP, available online at: http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[22] For example, Negri and Hardt look at Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement as a proof of a failure of representation and that OWS is a sort of fight for the real-democracy. See more in: Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, "The Fight for 'Real Democracy' at the Heart of Occupy Wall Street", in; *Foreign affairs, a*vailable online at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136399/michael-hardt-and-antonio-negri/the-fight-for-real-democracy-at-the-heart-of-occupy-wall-street last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[23] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, "What is Good Governance", UNESCAP, available online at: http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

2.3. Transparency

Connected to the rule of law, transparency means that decisions taken and the enforcement of them are done by following the rules and regulations[24]. Transparency also underlines the need of government and their decisions are available to the general public and not restricted. The more transparent the decisions are the more correct implementation and enactment will be[25]. Transparency provides timely information on the policies which are vital for the socio-economic development of the state.

2.4. Responsiveness

Responsiveness represents the reasonable timeframe for all shareholders given by the public institutions[26].

2.5. Consensus oriented

Good governance needs a mediation of different views which are present in a society. By consensus can be reached what is in society`s best interest for the well function. It is probably the most important characteristic of good governance given that the decisions which are taken for the development of the state must be on a long-term so that the decisions can be implemented effectively. This characteristic is in direct connection with security which requires a better understanding and acceptance.

2.6. Equity and inclusive

The well-being of the society needs to be understood from the perspective that all its citizens have to be included in society. This means that both the state through its policies and the community must include its citizens regardless of their vulnerability[27].

2.7. Effectiveness and efficiency

Effectiveness and efficiency of both state institutions and the results of the decisions implemented by the state. We can understand effectiveness and efficiency in terms of impact on governance of society. On Figure 2 we have underlined the process of effectiveness and efficiency process given that efficiency usually refers to the sustainable use of natural resources.[28]

Figure no. 2. Effectiveness and efficiency process[29]

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[24] Idem.

[25] At the same time there are restrictive laws that permit officials not to be totally transparent based on the argument of national security and greater public interest.

[26] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, "What is Good Governance", UNESCAP, available online at: http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[27] Here we can also note that European Union has drafted and implemented programs for the inclusions of all people within society, especially the most vulnerable categories – people with disabilities, people with low access to education, sanitation or with low income – by implementing programs for their inclusion.

[28] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, "What is Good Governance", UNESCAP, available online at: http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[29] This figure is done based on the information available on OEE Coach ((http://oeecoach.com/efficiency-effectiveness-productivity/) and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, "What is Good Governance", UNESCAP, available online at: http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

2.8. Accountable

Is one of the main characteristics given that it applies not only to the public sector, but also to private sector. The accountability varies depending on who is taking the decisions and whether they had been taken at national or international level.[30] This underlines again the linkage between the characteristics because in the case of accountability an important aspect is the rule of law given that the decisions which are to be implemented have to respect the rule of law and at the same time the decisions must respect transparency.

All the characteristics prove that good governance depends on all the above mentioned points given that all are in direct connection. These characteristics are mutually supportive and depend one on each other. This linkage can be presented as:

Figure no. 3. Good governance[31]

3. The effects of good or bad governance on the development of a state

As previously mentioned we argue that good governance was put into balance with democracy[32], but at the same time there are countries that are democracies but yet encounter issues on governance. A good governance is a prerequisite especially for economic development which is an essential need for assuring favorable security climate. It is obvious that few countries check all the characteristics of a good governance, but at the same time they are not included in the category of countries with a bad governance. Like mentioned previously, bad governance is the opposite meaning that most of the countries included in this category fail at fulfilling the eight characteristics which we briefly presented. Most of these countries are poor countries. Mick Moore underlines that indicators of a bad governance are despite the poor economic performance which lead to a political regime that is inefficient and not democratic, or it is a political underdeveloped.[33] As noted by the scholar, most of the countries which are underdeveloped and have bad governance are countries located in Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and in some regions of Latin America.[34]

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[30] Idem.

[31] This figure is done based on the bibliography of this paper.

[32] This idea is sustained by authors such as Carlos Santiso in his paper „Good governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality" where the author un underlines that good governance and democracy sustain one another (p. 1) and Adel M. Abdellatif who brings to the forehand that the development of a stat is triggered by a democracy sustained through good governance (p.10) See more in: Carlos Santiso, „Good governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality" in *The Georgetown Public Policy Review,* Volume 7, Number 1 Fall 2001, pp. 1-22 and Adel M. Abdellatif, „Good Governance and Its Relationship to Democracy & Economic Development", in *Governance, Democracy and Economic Development*, Workshop IV. Democracy, Economic Development, and Culture, pp.1-28, available online at: ftp://undp-pogar.org/LocalUser/pogarp/governance/aa/ goodgov.pdf last accessed on October 26, 2017.

[33] Mick Moore, "Political Underdevelopment what causes `bad governance`", *Public Management Review*, Vol. 3 Issue 3, 2001, 385–418, p. 386.

[34] Idem.

Checking all the characteristics of good governance encourages the development of a state especially from the economic perspective. This comes in connection with the wellbeing of the citizens and assuring a climate of security. More to this, through good governance governments *push* the states to acknowledge the main problems which have to be *fixed* within a state. For example, in Romania, in the summer of 2016, one of the main actions taken by Dacian Cioloș government was to request a report from OECD to see the level of the country`s public governance[35]. According to this report it was to (1) assess the country`s reform efforts, (2) to identify the near future priorities, and (3) to support and foster a national debate on the reform of public governance.[36] As per the conclusions of this report the main recommendations for Romania`s government were to categories based on (1) center of government where it was recommended to be done "substantial progress in areas such as strategic planning, policy monitoring and evaluation, etc., line ministries need to be on board with reform initiatives […]to ensure appropriate institutional anchorage and ownership of punctual (project-based) reforms within the C(enter) o(f) G(overnment), to guarantee sustainability"[37]. The second recommendation was referring to the (2) budgetary governance where OECD pointed out that Romania has to (2a) practical adherence to the Fiscal Responsibility Law in Romania, in order to assure (2b) ownership in relation to ongoing reforms, and (2c) meaningful parliamentary engagement in the budget process. It is also underlined the need of a (2d) participative debate on budgetary choices, where (2f) accessible and comprehensive budget documentation are available together with the (2g) flexibility in resources and fiscal space.[38] The other issue pinpointed was the (3) strategic human resources management where had been identified as major issues to be dealt with the competency model which is required by sustained engagement and capacity building activities[39]. On (4) open government OECD discovered that Romania must have an effective implementation of policies[40]. The last point of OECD report for Romania was (5) digital government where Romania improved since 2014 but it still has to "continue pursuing digital government as a priority embedded within the national commitment to modernise the public administration and as a key component of the country's development strategy"[41]. As it can be seen from this report there is no mention on inclusion, human right or the level of corruption in Romania. We pinpoint this given that Romania is lacking the European Union`s absorption of funds for inclusion, developing centers for eradicating domestic violence which are important aspects on European Union`s agenda.[42]

The effects of a good or bad government on the development of a state are important not only for the particular state, but also for the region. Most of scholar analysis on the effects of good or bad governance for the development of a state is focused on the African countries where it was concluded that a rigid government cannot sustain the development of a state. More to this, the characteristics which we underlined in this paper are a necessary must for the development of a state while, a bad governance is characterized by corruption, nondemocratic elections and the human rights are not respected and protected.[43] Probably the best example for a bad governance is Nigeria where despite the fact that it was tried to go on the path of development Nigeria`s failures are due to the frequent change in leadership and weak institutional patterns. A consequence of this

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[35] This report can be found on the following link: https://www.oecd.org/countries/romania/public-governance-review-scan-romania.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[36] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, „OECD Public governance Reviews: Romania 2016", p. 1, available online at: https://www.oecd.org/countries/romania/public-governance-review-scan-romania.pdf last accessed on October 5th, 2017.

[37] Ibidem, p.5.

[38] Ibidem, p. 9.

[39] Ibidem, p. 13.

[40] Ibidem, p. 17.

[41] Ibidem, p. 21.

[42] For European Union 2017 is the year of combating domestic violence against women.

[43] Oluwole Owoye, Nicole Bissessar, „Bad Governance and Corruption in Africa: Symptoms of Leadership and Institutional Failure", available online at: http://www.ameppa.org/upload/Bad%20Governance.pdf last accessed on October 26, 2017, p.1.

bad governance is considered to be also the rise of the insurgent Islamic extremist group Boko Haram[44] that was founded[45] based on the bad governance of the state[46].

As there can be seen a good governance is a necessary must for the development of a state while a bad governance characterized by inefficiency, lack of human rights protection and by lack of transparency keep the state in a phase of *stagnation* which cannot sustain the development of a state.

4. Instead of conclusions: the nexus between good governance and national security

At the beginning of this paper it was argued that there is a direct nexus between good governance and national security. When speaking of national security we have to bear in mind that security is composed of traditional security[47], human security and rule of law[48]. Human security is defined by United Nations as the "needed in response to the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats – from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns"[49]. From this it can be seen that the characteristics of good governance which we presented in this paper can be seen in the above definition. Given this, it can be underlined that good governance encourages the development of a state[50] and the fear of insecurity dissipates. A state of insecurity can generate the possibility of violence and revolt of the people[51]. Beside this, like mentioned before, between good governance and democracy was put a sort of equal mark meaning that as long as the government and the public institutions are responsive and transparent towards its citizens the possibility of conflict arise is limited despite the fact that there is difference between democratic governance and good governance 'in recognizing that political and civil freedoms and participation have basic value as developmental ends in themselves and not just means for achieving socio-economic progress"[52].

At the same time insecurity can be translated through bad governance[53]. The consequences of bad governance can be seen all over throughout history that is why good governance must be translated into decision making that is beneficial for the citizens and through which they feel secure. This could be put as if the citizens of that state would take the best decisions for their wellbeing.

The goals of good governance is to consolidate the political structures and to assure that the public institutions are democratic are respecting the rule of law. Through this it is sustained the *fight* against corruption and power gaining by a number of individuals that can start using the state for

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[44] Mohammed Nuruddeen Suleiman, Karim Mohd, „Cycle of Bad Governanceand Corruption: The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria" in *SAGE Open. 5*. 2015, pp.1-11, p. 1.
[45] We take into consideration as year 2002.
[46] As a response to the Western model of democratization.
[47] In a militarized sense. See: Razia Musarrat, „National Security and Good Governance: Dynamics and Challenges", in *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, vol. 3 nr. 1, 2003, pp. 177-186.
[48] Razia Musarrat, „National Security and Good Governance: Dynamics and Challenges", in *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, vol. 3 nr. 1, 2003, pp. 177-186, p. 179.
[49] United Nations, „Human Security in Theory and Practice", in *United Nations*, available online at: http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/human_security_in_theory_and_practice_english.pdflastaccessed on October 5th, 2017, p. 5.
[50] Carlos Santiso, „Good governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality" în *The Georgetown Public Policy Review,* Volume 7, Number 1 Fall 2001, pp. 1-22, p.3.
[51] Wael Omran Aly underlines the fact that in bad governance in Egypt triggered a series of events which lead to the current situation of the country. Among these events were the revolts and riots of the people. See more in: Wael Omran Aly, „Bad Governance and Failure of Development Progress in Egypt Causes, Consequences and Remedies", in *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2013, pp.39-60.
[52] Adel M. Abdellatif, „Good Governance and Its Relationship to Democracy& Economic Development", in: *Global Forum III on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity* Seoul 20-31 May 2003 workshop IV. Democracy, Economic Development, and Culture, pp. 1-27, p. 11.
[53] Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Dimensiunile Nonmilitare ale Securităţii,* Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2005, p. 24.

their own interests. If the security structures and mechanisms are not working properly they can contribute a bad governance which can be translated into social and political instability. More to this, we can argue that the nexus between good governance and national security is good governance means good government and functional public institutions which all mean security. The reverse is applicable likewise.

In this paper we tried to underline the nexus between good governance and national security by answering to the following questions: "What are the main characteristics influencing governance?" and "How these characteristics do influences the security of a state?" and proving that the main characteristics of good governance sustain a climate of security. Looking at this nexus from a realistic point of view we can argue that good governance can be put as good management of a state. The concept of good governance means the use of wise management of resources for social and economic development. The public authorities are the ones which have the task of distributing the resources of a state for the benefits of its citizens.

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HYBRID WARFARE – AN ANALYSIS
BASED ON THE GENERAL THEORY OF WARFARE

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Abstract: *The way the conflict in Ukraine evolved and the consequences it generated at the regional and global level reopened the debates in the academic circles on the changes of the postmodern war physiognomy.*

This paper highlights the complementarity of various military literature contributions to the development of a theory of hybrid warfare and provides a useful framework for the elimination of confusion and fuzziness that persists in literature on "hybrid warfare" concept by dissociating the meanings assigned to different associated concepts (hybrid actions and hybrid threats). In essence, the comparative analysis conducted explains, from a perspective of the general theory of war, why hybrid war does not represent a new type of war, claiming the omnipresent character of hybridity in the evolutionary stages of this phenomenon.

Keywords: *hybrid warfare, hybrid threat, hybridity, state actor, non-state actor.*

Introduction

Recent developments in the global security environment - such as the crisis in Ukraine and the resurgence of the Islamic-origin terrorism - have reinstated the academic debates on the the emerging changes of international system and the „revolution" of *modern warfare*. After the collapse of the USSR *the new world order* thesis is still largely addressed among the international relations (IR) protrplayers. Additionally, the most recent armed conflicts in the Middle East, Georgia and Ukraine reiterate the need to expand the reflection process on *warfare* and its most advanced form of manifestation (*hybrid*) from a *military science* point of view, to determine whether and to what extent hybrid warfare brings novelty to the general theory of warfare) and *security studies* perspective, to determine the security threats shifting triggers.

Carl von Clausewitz's statement about war contemporary attribute - "every age has its own type of war, its own conditions and limitations and its own unusual preconceptions"[1] is valid and uncontestable. Changes in the practice of warfare have been generated by the historical referential moments with a strong global impact. In recent history two moments proved to be representative with regard to the *hybrid warfare* development as a concept - the South Lebanon war (2006) and the conflict in Ukraine (2014). The first one triggered the emergence of the *non-state hybrid threat approach* by using Hezbollah as a case study while the most popular second one has led to *a distinct framework of the threat which is focused on states' assertiveness*, most of the academic opinions are bringing up to the Russian Federation actions in Ukraine.

There is no doubt that *hybrid warfare* has become very popular as a concept in the context of the events in Ukraine. The Ukrainian crisis "shocked" by the high level of confrontation between the actors involved in a short period of time[2]. The situation in Ukraine has evolved from an internal

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[1] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 593.

[2] Author's note: The social protests in Kiev and the major urban centers (Lvov, Viniţa, Doneţk, Kharkov, Chernovtsy, Krivoy Rog, Ujhorod) were initiated at the end of November 2013 in response to the decision of the Ukrainian government to suspend the preparation process for signing the Association Agreement The European Union and the Free Trade Agreement in the margins of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius on November 28-29. Against the background of worsening social protests, the government resigned and the Ukrainian president was suspended on February 23 2014. Later, on March 11, Crimea self-declared its independence and intent to join the Russian Federation.

conflict, generated by the political and social ideological differences among the Ukrainian political players and society (reflected by the pro-European and pro-Russian antithesis) to a regional conflict, with global consequences (following the annexation of Crimea and the escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine), in which other regional players were involved (e.g. Russian Federation versus US, Germany, France, EU and NATO). Nevertheless, the annexation of Crimea constituted a point of inflection in the evolution of the Ukrainian crisis and at the same time a cornerstone event that contrbuted the noticeable increase of the interest in the concept of *hybrid warfare* and *the Russian model of the hybrid warfare*.

As professor Ofer Fridman argues that, in essence, two factors contributed to the increasing interest in the concept of *hybrid warfare* in both the West and the Russian Federation[3] - *the seeming novelty brought in by the theory of hybrid warfare to the general theory of warfare* (denying the novelty of the hybrid warfare) and *the highly political character attributed to the concept* (both the Western and Russian theories debate the concept from the opponent's perspective, the conflict in Ukraine being associated with a hybrid aggression that the parties involved accuse each other). These particular factors make the concept to be present in academic debates and not yet reflected in the military doctrines.

1. Hybrid warfare - a comparative analysis

Hybrid warfare has conceptually evolved within a theoretical framework in which the academical debate followed successively without too much interaction between the various military schools of thought that otherwise would increase the semantic value of the concept. It was primarily debated in the American literature and adapted afterwards in the European texts (in Ukraine context) and, although not copied *ad litteram*, was also analyzed in Russian literature (before the crisis in Ukraine). We can therefore consider that *the concept followed an atypical development, in which the debate was strictly limited to the level of each school of thought.* Nota bene, hybrid warfare is a concept launched in the US since the 2006 Lebanon conflict but whose conceptual value has been developed in the Arab Spring (the Russian literature capitalized on the "lessons learned" the Western mode of action in Libya, for instance) and Ukraine and the Middle East context of events (the European literature that was mostly reported on the hybrid Russian threat and the terrorist threat). This has facilitated *a confusing, unclear, and fuzzy picture on the meaning assigned to the concept.* In this context, concentrating the analytical effort on those aspects that describe the warfare reality and its up-to-date physical characteristics is more than necessary, contributing to a better understanding and the evolution of *hybrid warfare theory*. Increased understanding of *hybrid warfare* can be achieved through a comparative study of the American, European and Russian schools of thought writings by considering the nature of the aggressor, objectives, tactics, techniques and procedures, the level of confrontation and adaptation strategy.

1.1.   *American School*

Hybrid warfare is a product of the American military literature. However, *the American approaches on the term are largely descriptive and focused on the tactical and operational levels of warfare*. The concept was introduced in 2005 by James N. Mattis and Frank G. Hofmann[4]. The latter developed the concept in his book entitled "Conflict in the 21st Century: The Occurrence of Hybrid Wars" (2007).

Just before describing the essence of the hybrid warfare theory, in its incipient phase, it should be noted that this emerged as a critical reaction to the "obsessive" approaches of the US

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[3] Ofer Fridman, *Hybrid Warfare or Gibridnaya Voyna? Similar, but different*, The Rusi Journal, February / March 2017, Vol. 162, No. 1, p. 46, available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253370, accessed on 23.04.2017.

[4] James N. Mattis; Frank G. Hoffman, *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, US Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, Issue: November 2005, Vol. 132/11/1,233, pp. 30-32, available online at http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFour BlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf, accessed on 03.01.2017

military to highlight the effects of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the expansion of technology at the armed forces and warfare levels. Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts re-experienced the predominant role of the human dimension in warfare and the inadequacy of the US approach, too much based on the exploitation of the RMA products and solutions, to the real conditions of the warfare[5]. US military domination all-over the operational domains (land, air, naval, space and cyberspace) compelled its opponents (both state and non-state actors) to identify hybrid modes of action through the integration of several methods and means of conducting warfare, to provoke the US in the urban "challenged areas"[6].

Changing the US approach to fighting terrorist non-state actors was the foundantional idea of Hoffman's theory back in 2007. His premise does make sense as US Army was engaged in large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan at that time. The subject of Hoffman's study was Hezbollah and its hybrid actions revealed in the clashes with Israel in 2006[7].

As Hofmann states *hybrid warfare does not represent a new type of warfare* or *a unique phenomenon in the evolution of warfare[8]* in a challenging sense of the classical clausewitzian model - which withstands that *war is hybrid by its very nature* because it involves the use by both state and non-state (in the neoclausewitzian approach), of a diverse range of forces, means and tactics against another player in order to constrain the latter to fulfill the will of the former[9].

In essence, Hoffman argues that "hybrid wars can be waged by state or political groups, and incorporate a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and other criminal disorder"[10]. In his view, *hybrid wars are unique in how their constituent elements - players, forces, levels, means, combat - adapt to the new operational context and to the particularities of the existing battlespace*. The notion "hybrid" must also be understood as *the way in which the force is organized* (regular and irregular forces, hierarchical political organization coupled with cell decentralization or network organization of the tactical units) *and the intermodal use of a wide range of modern military means* in combat (encrypted communications, portable missile launchers, armored vehicles, unmanned airplanes, etc.) in a battlespace that encompasses the urban *"challenged areas"*.

Hofmann's theory was developed by other American authors from other perspectives. Thus, John McCuen extended Hoffman's thesis on the battlefield by claiming that the confrontation takes place in an expanded asymmetric battlefield in which the social dimension (in-theatre population, home population and international community) is central in hybrid wars[11]. John McCulloh added the unique cultural context in which confrontation between opponents takes place and the principles that lie behind the formation of hybrid organizations[12]:

• The composition, capabilities and projected effects of the hybrid force are unique and related to the operational context (described by geographic, historical and socio-cultural factors) in which it is intended to act within a certain timeframe.

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[5] Ibidem.

[6] Ibidem.

[7] During the conflict Hezbollah has used conventional warfare means (of Russian and Iranian origin) in the urban operational environment and combined conventional maneuvers (e.g. ambush) with unconventional actions (e.g. abductions, information operations).

[8] Frank. G. Hofmann, *Hybrid wars and challenges*, JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009, available online at www.ndupress.ndu.edu, accessed on 05.01.2017.

[9] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 13.

[10] Frank G. Hofmann, *Conflict in the 21st century: the rise of hybrid wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia, 2007, p. 58 available online at http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications /potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf, accessed on 12.01.2017.

[11] John J. McCuen, *Hybrid Wars*, Military Review, Mar/Apr 2008, 88, 2, p. 107, available online at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/mccuen08marapr.pdf, accessed on 13.03.2017.

[12] Timothy McCulloh; Richard Johnson, *Hybrid Warfare*, JSOU Report 13-4, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, 2013, p. 16, available online at https://www.socom.mil/JSOU/JSOUPublications/JSOU%2013-4_McCulloh,Johnson_Hybrid%20Warfare_final.pdf, accessed on 15.02.2017.

- The hybrid force is influenced by the active ideology and narratives within it. The maratives are adapted to the strategic context and correlated to the socio-cultural and religious particularities of the hybrid force. The final resulting narrative serves to redefine the existing rules in the strategic context by forcing the conduct of force in accordance with the proposed objective by its own foundation.

- A hybrid force perceives an existential threat from a potential adversary. This perceived threat determines the hybrid force to secure its long-term survival, without necessarily waiting for the threat to materialize.

- There is an asymmetry of capabilities between the hybrid force and its opponent. The hybrid force is inferior in terms of conventional capabilities and, for this reason, seeks to identify alternative rebalancing options.

- A hybrid force has conventional and unconventional elements (specific to guerrilla and terrorist groups) which, combined, can generate asymmetric effects in its advantage.

- Hybrid groups carry out primarily defense-related combat actions for reasons related to the inferiority of forces and means and the need for "survival".

- Hybrid groups use wearing tactics. These tactics are manifested both in the physical and cognitive domains, to continuously reduce the opponent's forces and undermine his will.

Christopher O. Bowers proposes *a threat-based approach* and some useful benchmarks in *developing a methodology for identifying an emerging hybrid threat*. In a broad sense, it claims that *a non-state player is not hybrid by default. It develops and evolves in specific and predictable ways to become hybrid*. To meet the hybridity condition, such a player must meet three essential conditions[13]:

(1) *Maturity* - a state that can be assessed by considering some specific indicators: organization and cohesion, leadership, responsiveness to internal leadership and state sponsor, local population support; action-centered actions and strategy effectiveness. The scale of maturity includes unorganized mass demonstrations, street clusters, militias, paramilitary groups, guerrilla groups and insurgents that can operate as stand-alone sub-units up to the company level;

(2) *Conventional capabilities* - whereby the following indicators can be assessed: possession of a specific type of weaponry, ammunition (e.g. antitank grenade launcher, anti-aircraft portable systems) and military equipment (e.g. military uniforms); training activities carried out to improve the ability to use the weapon in use; the ability to maintain a minimum level of sustainability of one's own strength;

(3) *Capacity to operate in a complex environment* by capitalizing both geographic and human dimensions. The lower the complexity of the operational environment, the more a modern military force becomes more efficient in exploiting its own advantages (size of force, equipment and technology, etc.) in relation to its adversary.

The same *threat-based approach* is also supported by David Sadowski and Jeff Becker, who understand by *hybridity a reflection of the unity of cognitive and material capabilities*[14] in a strategy of each one of the players involved in a conflict or confrontation. Future hybrid threats will run into a number of *characteristics* that should guide the process of adapting future capabilities:

- *Adaptability*: the essence of the future threat lies in the ability of a certain player to speedle and agile balance between cognitive and material approach by considering all the factors that influence the battlespace and the opponent's strengths and weaknesses.

- *High capacity to reproduce*: opponents have the ability to learn quickly from one another amid the proliferation of open source information that facilitate the spread of tactics, techniques and procedures globally and reduce the time needed to develop new potential asymmetric capabilities.

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[13] Christopher O. Bowers, *Identifying emerging hybrid adversaries*, U.S. Army War College, Spring 2012, Vol. 42, Issue 1, p. 39, available online at https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Identifying-Emerging-Hybrid-Adversaries-Bowers-Bowers/1e0e5baada1f8fd565fdebfdcaa27abc562c3b6d, accessed on 04.07.2017.

[14] David Sadowski, Jeff Becker, *Beyond the "Hybrid" Threat: Asserting the Essential Unity of Warfare*, pp. 5-7, available online at https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/.../344-sadowski-etal.pdf, accessed on 29.05.2017

- *Reduced operational costs:* opponents will seek to reduce operational costs while generating a reverse effect in advanced societies.

- *Circumvention of international rules and laws (lawfare):* opponents will try to manipulate and redefine the various legal and ethical constructions established and applied internationally to maximize their strategic, operational and tactical advantages over their opponents.

- *Exploitation of the informational environment*: the future threat develops in the informational environment in all three dimensions, cognitive, material / physical and informational. Preference will be given to actions specific to the cognitive dimension by manipulating the informational environment in order to confuse the opponents and / or, as the case may be, discourage them.

1.2. Russian School

In Russian military literature, the interest for *hybrid warfare* (or *gibridnaya voyna*) has grown in the context of the intensified debates in the US military academic circles. Russian researchers focused not only on the understanding the Western (American) theory of *hybrid warfare*, but also on its interpretation in the context of the Russian political and military experience and the conceptual understanding of the postmodern warfare. *Hybrid warfare* in Russian interpretation "involves all the spheres of public life: politics, economy, social development, culture", unlike the American approach[15]. The Russian Military Academy introduced the concept of *hostile activities* as an intermediate stage between *peace* and *war*[16]. These two last concepts are, moreover, defined by the absence or extreme presence of hostile activities. *Hybrid warfare is defined as an expression of hostile activities*, which only sums up some of the specific *full spectrum operations* activities. *Hybrid warfare*, in Russian sense, i*s not a new concept but is part of the operative art*, not associated *sensu stricto* with *war* that involves the mobilization of all the political, economic, social and military resources available to a certain state-owned player[17].

Some elements of *hybrid warfare* reflected in Hofmann's theory have been addressed in the Russian military literature long before the term was publicly consecrated. The *theory of subversive war*, as it was developed by Evgeny Messner (1959), contains elements that can be found in the contemporary theory of the hybrid war[18], such as:

- the absence of a clear boundary between peace and war;
- the end of the military domination of the regular forces and the emerging warfare cooperation between irregular and regular forces;
- the multidimensionality of the inter-state confrontations and the incresingly importance of information operations;
- the absence of a clear boundary between the physical and informational theater of operations. The new theater of war is expanded by incorporating the territories of all parties involved in the conflict and even more by adding the international community;
- increasing the psychological dimension of the war in accordance with operational objectives pursued by affecting the enemy population and discouraging the active component of the enemy (armed forces, partisan organizations and popular movements).

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[15] Pavel Tsygankov (ed.), *'Gibridnyye Voyny' v khaotiziruyushchemsya mire XXI veka* [*'Hybrid Wars' in the Chaotic World of the 21st Century*], Moscow: Moscow University Press, 2015, *apud* Ofer Fridman, *Hybrid Warfare or Gibridnaya Voyna?*, The RUSI Journal,
162:1, 42-49, available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253370, accessed on 23.04.2017.

[16] Vitaly Kabernik's speech at *Hybrid Warfare Conference* hosted by the King's Centre for Strategic Communications (KCSC) at King's College London, which took place over 11-12 January 2017 in London, UK, available online at https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/kcsc/in-conversation/hybridwarfareconference.aspx, accessed on 12.07.2017

[17] Idem

[18] Ofer Fridman, *Hybrid Warfare or Gibridnaya Voyna? Similar, but different*, The Rusi Journal, February / March 2017, Vol. 162, no. 1, p. 43, available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253370, accessed on 23.04.2017.

There are three essential stages[19] in the conceptual development of the hybrid warfare in Russian military thinking: the first, represented by the study of the concept in American literature and the integration of the lessons learned for the Russian Federation, the second, represented by the attestation of the *"new-generation war"* concept (a product of the Russian Military Academy) and the third, consisting of the accreditation of the *"new type of war "*, a product promoted at the level of the Russian Army General Staff.

Valery Gerasimov's article entitled "The value of science in prediction"[20] is cornerstone in the Russian military literature. It highlights the "color revolutions" danger by assigning the responsibility for the Arab Spring protests (2010) to Western states[21] and also signals the warfare changing trends:

- the blurring the line between peace and war - the wars are no longer declared, and once initiated, they are carried out in an unfamiliar pattern;

- the increasing role of non-military means used to achieve political and strategic goals;

- the dissimulated use of military assets, including those specific to information warfare and special operations forces; the use of regular forces - in the most common way, under the pretext of maintaining peace and providing assistance in regulating the crisis - is only possible in certain situations when it is intended to force the proposed strategic objective;

- the increasing the role of mobile and mixed forces operating in an integrated operational environment facilitated by the possibilities offered by advanced command and control systems;

- the elimination of tactical and operational pauses that can be exploited by the opponent for the restoration of combat capacity;

- the significant reduction of space, time and information gaps between forces and command and control systems amid the development of new IT technologies;

- the overcoming the differences between strategic, operational and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations.

Gerasimov ideas were subsequently developed at the level of the Russian Military Academy. The model of the *new-generation war[22]*, presents some similarities with the American hybrid war theory and can be considered a precursor to the *"new type of war" model* sustained and promoted later at the level of the Russian military leadership (by general Andrey Kartapolov)[23]. Although Kartapolov approach must be cautiously considered, given his official quality and the geostrategic context marked by the tensions between the Russian Federation and Western states following the annexation of Crimea, some aspects might prove useful in determining the Russian view of the *"new type of war"*. Broadly speaking, he argues that "the new type of war" is "80-90%, propaganda and 10-20%, violence," and that engaging in specific indirect methods leads to military objectives without necessarily having to, of hiring regular forces. In other words, the *"new type of war"* consists predominantly of indirect actions conducted by a state player on a target-state focused on

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[19] Thimoty Thomas, *The Evolution of Russian Military Thought: Integrating Hybrid, New-Generation, and New-Type Thinking,* The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 29:4, p. 556, available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs /10.1080/13518046.2016.1232541?src=recsys&journalCode=fslv20, accessed on 07.06.2017.

[20] Valery Gerasimov, *The Value of Science is in the Foresight*, translated in Military Review, january – february 2016, available online at http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2016/, accessed on 22.02.2017.

[21] it refers to NATO operations in Libya - the establishment of a no fly zone and a maritime blockade, the use of civilian contrplayers in combat against the armed opposition - which he considers an example of how to lead the modern war

[22] Sergei G. Chekinov, Sergei A. Bogdanov, *The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War,* Military Thought, no. 4, 2013, available online at http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/MT_FROM%20THE%20CURRENT% 20ISSUE_No.4_2013.pdf, accessed on 01.06.2017.

[23] A. V. Kartapalov, *Lessons of Military Conflicts and Prospects for the Development of Means and Methods of Conducting Them, Direct and Indirect Actions in Contemporary International Conflicts*, Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science), No. 2, 2015, pp. 26-36 *apud* Timothy L. Thomas, *On Russia's information war concept*s, March 15, 2017, p. 4, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20170315/105689/HHRG-115-AS26-Wstate-ThomasT-20170315.pdf, accesat la data de 10.06.2017. At that time, he was assigned as the director of the Main Operations Directorate of the Russian General Staff. Later, he was appointed commander of the Western Military District.

the informational dimension of the confrontation – seeking the political, economic, informational, cyber and psychological environment of the target and the international community (where political-diplomatic and propagandistic actions predominate) - the classic military means of military warfare being taken into account only in the phase of escalation.

1.3. European School

European School impact to the development of the concept is, with some exceptions (coming from the British and Swedish schools), late and directly related to the evolution and risks and security threats perception. The Russian threat occupies a central place in European approaches to hybrid warfare[24]. Basically, Russian actions during the Ukrainian crisis are associated with Russian Federation's hybrid behavior.

In a broad sense, unparticularised on the biased model of Russian hybrid warfare, European approaches argue that hybrid aggression is limited to the combined, synchronized, simultaneous and innovative application of several conventional (military) and unconventional (political, diplomatic, economic, informational, cybernetic) means by a state or non-state player to achieve a certain strategic goal proposed in relation to another player whose vulnerabilities are exploited and is confronted in its centers of gravity (political, economic, military, informational social etc.).

The theoretical model of the hybrid warfare, conceived by Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud and Patrick Cullen (2015), is perhaps the most representative for the European approach to hybrid warfare. The two authors claim that "hybrid war is characterized by the tailored use of all instruments of power against the vulnerabilities of the opponent's system "[25]. However, the notion of "hybrid" is not limited to the instruments of power and their combination to achieve the projected objectives. It considers also the way they are used and the coordination and synchronization function to achieve synergistic effects in accordance with the intended purpose. Synchronization enhances the multiplying effect of hybrid aggression and increases its complexity.

In hybrid aggression, escalation and detension periods can succed under strict control of the subject (aggressor). While *vertically escalation*, by increasing the intensity of the actions taken, can lead to an opened armed conflict, *horizontal escalation* can be associated at most with the preparation of an armed confrontation stage because it is based on power instruments synchronization and ambiguity effect on the origin and purpose of the hybrid action.

In a hybrid strategy, the aggressor will pursue his objectives by minimizing related costs (in an approach centered mainly on the economic dimension of the confrontation), the armed conflict being therefore an undesirable scenario from this point of view, but not unlikely if it is required by the political interest (in the case of state players). Military actions have an active detterent predominant role in the *horizontal escalation* phase. The transition from a latent conflict to a military conflict is possible by increasing the intensity of the actions applied horizontally, in which case the active military level translates from detterence to the authentic military operation.

Horizontal escalation, by the simultaneous or short intervals use of power instruments, maintains the *ambiguity* of actions performed by the aggressor. Confusion over the nature of the conflict is maintained on a permanent basis in hybrid warfare practice. The target entity is unable to prove the actions of the aggressor (on all levels, political, economic, military, social, cyber etc.) and, more often, does not clearly perceive he is at "war" with its opponent. This makes it difficult to

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[24] Andras Racz, *Russia Hybrid War in Ukraine*, the Finish Institute of International Affairs, FIIA report 43, available online at http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/514/russia_s_hybrid_war_in_ukraine/, accessed on 03.07.2017; Bettina Renz, Hanna Smith, *Russia and hybrid warfare – going beyond the label*, Contemporary Politics, volume 22, issue 3, p. 283-300, 2016, available online at http://www.tandonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2016.1201316, accessed on03.07.2017; Mark Galeotti, *Hybrid, ambiguous, and non-linear? How new is Russia's 'new way of war'? Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 27:2, p. 282-301, available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170, accessed on 04.07.2017.

[25] Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud; Patrick Cullen, *What is Hybrid Warfare?*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016, p. 3, available online at https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2380867/NUPI _Policy_ Brief_1_Reichborn _Kjennerud_Cullen.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y, accessed on 14.03.2017.

outline a clear perception of the target entity on the initiation and completion of the aggression, as well as on the identification of the stages of the confrontation. Moreover, the prolonged perception of a "gray zone" where peace translates into conflict and vice versa, the conflict in peace, induces the perception of an "ambiguous war" in which the distinction between coercive diplomacy, what is lawful and what is not permitted by the norms of international law is difficult to achieve.

At the level of parties not directly involved in the conflict, an (induced) unclear image persists on the evolution of the conflict determined also by the opposing perspectives / images existing at the level of the conflicting parties. The aggressor prevails on the *plausible deniability principle* to induce his non-involvement in hostile actions towards the targeted-entity[26] while the latter perceives that the state in which it is located is a "permanent war".

The American thesis (Hoffmann) of the uniqueness of the "hybrid war" is developed by the European school. Since the context in which the hybrid confrontation arises and the multitude of causes that determine it are always unique[27], so the way in which the means and instruments of power are combined in hybrid aggression are always unique. This implies there is a conditionality-based relationship between the context and the strategic options of the aggressor.

As an argument supporting the prevalence of non-military instruments in hybrid warfare, the European concept literature reinvented *lawfare*[28], an older American concept. Lawfare is defined as a "strategy of using or circumventing the law that substitutes military means for achieving a particular operational objective"[29]. The Russian Federation's interpretation of its allegations of violation of the Budapest Agreement (1994) governing the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine by annexing Crimea Peninsula is exemplified in this context[30].

Much of the European written articles refer to the role of cyber in hybrid scenarios. Cyber actions can be conducted in support of actions carried out, on a case by case basis, at the political, economic, military and informational level promoted by a particular state or non-state player in his hybrid strategy. The possibility of concealing the origin of the attacker and the multiplier effect of actions on the other levels are dominant characteristics of cyber actions and arguments that support the high frequency of their use in hybrid scenarios.

Conclusion

The approaches and interpretations of hybrid warfare are complementary and reflect the idea of evolution and reproduction of the concept, a process which is far from complete. The differences in literature have contributed to the development of the concept, although in the same context a high level of confusion has been generated around the term.

Reductive approaches are persistent in the literature, either referring to the (American) original theoretical model of hybrid warfare, or stressing the absence of the novelty brought in by hybrid warfare (without arguing why hybrid warfare is not a new type of warfare, even if it is not!). The high degree of generality of the proposed definitions of the term and the lack of a clear demarcation between the concepts associated with it (hybrid actions and hybrid threats) must not discourage the reflection processes of the issue. *Hybridity is an attribute of warfare and an omnipresent feature in the evolutionary stages of this phenomenon. Hybrid warfare is not,*

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[26] Ibidem, p. 2

[27] Andrew Mumford, *The Role of Counter Terrorism in Hybrid Warfare*, Nottingham university, 2016, p. 7, available online at http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/researches/05-TheRoleofCounterTerrorisminHybridWarfare.pdf, accessed on 10.06.2017.

[28] Sascha Dov Bachmann, Andres B Munoz Mosquera, *Lawfare and hybrid warfare – How Russia is using the law as a weapon*, Amicus Curiae, Issue 102, 2015, p. 3-4, available online at http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/24296/1/Lawfare%20Amicus%20Curiae%20FEB%202016%20(Julian%20Harris)(1)%20(2).pdf, accessed on 16.06.2017.

[29] Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., *Lawfare Today: A Perspective*, Yale Journal of International Affairs, p. 146, available online at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5892&context=faculty_scholarship, accessed on 16.07.2017.

[30] John Moore, *Lawfare*, The Three Swords Magazine 31/2017, p. 38, available online at http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/_news_items_/2017/Lawfare_Moore.pdf, accessed on 16.06.2017.

therefore, a new type of warfare and can hardly be framed in a warfare taxonomy, since it exceeds the framework of armed confrontation between two or more players. Indeed, even the classification of armed conflicts, by the use of the means criteria, in conventional and unconventional, does not correspond to reality because warfare is not conducted by purely conventional or unconventional means. We can instead speak of a hybrid confrontation spectrum in which the two conventional and unconventional approaches translate into capabilities and tactics, depending on the strategy applied by the players involved in the conflict. The different context in which the confrontation takes place confers uniqueness to hybrid warfare. The novelty of the concept focuses on the different, inedited and permanently unique way in which the forces, means and tactics are combined and used within the battlespace.

Each of the studied schools addresses the issue of hybrid warfare from a perspective centered on the actions of the opponent, regardless of its nature. By doing so the meaning of *warfare* is restricted to the meaning of *threat*. In this context, in order to eliminate confusion due to inappropriate use of terms, it would be appropriate to differentiate between concepts that can be attributed to the opponent only - hybrid or hybrid threats - and those describing the hybrid nature of the confrontation between two potential players.

In a broad sense, *war* describes a report of armed confrontation / escalation of violence between at least two belligerents, regardless of their nature or profile (state or non-state). The approach of hybrid warfare only from the perspective of the opponent is a reductionist one because it creates the impression that the aggressor / adherent of the hybrid strategy is always on the offensive while his opponent is in a permanent defensive state. But *war* implies a dynamic process in which the two situations, the offensive and the defense, alternate at each of the parties involved. In other words, *the meaning of the hybrid warfare exceeds the potential phase described by the hybrid threat, which essentially describes the possible actions, means and methods of the aggressor in a static and abstractional frame, independent of the reaction of the other party involved in the conflict. Hybrid warfare is nothing less but the materialization / implementation of the intentions of one of the parties involved in the conflict over the other side in relation to which the aggressor is pursuing a strategic objective, intentions which, until the escalation of violence, were perceived by the latter as threats.*

The idea that hybrid actions are carried out by both state and non-state players or a combination of the two (*in which case the latter are called intermediaries or proxy groups*) is overlooked in the literature. However, there are significant differences between the two potential hybrid threat vectors - state and non-state players – related to their capacity to use their means and power instruments. High-complexity hybrid actions can be carried out by those state players that have a broad spectrum of power instruments or that develop a real potential to generate effects in an expanded confrontation space (which can integrate the theater of operations and areas of confrontation / interference of interests at regional and global level).

Increasing the potential to reach the proposed strategic objective is directly proportional to the multitude of power instruments operated by the aggressor. The synchronization of the actions and measures requires a command and control center with a strategic planning and coordination function. The same complex model of action is not always applicable to non-state players such as terrorist groups, which have limited possibilities for action on political, economic and military levels but can develop a significant potential for regional and global influence on the cognitive and informational confrontation by spreading the ideology of radicalism, grounded on the feeding the feelings of hatred between civilizations. Non-state players that reach the level of sub-state or pseudo-state organization (following the recent example of Daesh) can achieve a considerable degree of operational autonomy only by the presence of some environmental factors contributing to their reproduction (such as those specific to failed states unable to provide and secure different social services to the indigenous population, secure control of the force structures and provide security of their own territory), with the mention that their political and military influence is limited or prevails mainly at the level of the theater of operations.

Conventional and asymmetric tactics (which exploit the conventional military capabilities held by irregular force structures, terrorist attacks, suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, sabotage actions, intimidation, and propaganda) combines and interferes in a type of warfare (which is alike with guerrilla warfare) in which one of the players is of a non-state nature.

The operational art in hybrid warfare lies not only in the innovation of military tactics applied by the aggressor on his target but also in the successful influence of his population. Hybrid warfare is dangerous if it is applied to multiethnic or muticonfessional societal models. The individual and the population are in fact the center of gravity targeted by the combination of kinetic and subversive actions, a hypothesis valid in both scenarios of a hybrid threat - when it comes from a state player and a non-state player.

The players involved in the conflict and their inventory of methods and means generate the hybrid character of the confrontation / conflict / warfare. Hybridity exists all over the three levels. At strategic level, it describes an integrated approach of the political, military, economic, social and informational actions directed by the conflicting players. Hybridity is reflected by the combination of regular and irregular forces and different tactics, techniques and procedures at operational and tactical level. The irregular force tends to become critical at the operational level, departing from its traditional role as a conflict protrplayer.

The objectives outlined for the actions associated with the hybrid warfare are described in very general terms in each of the three schools of thought. The bottomline idea is that players conducting hybrid actions are pursuing political objectives. Designing these objectives induces the presence of a strategy that guides the actions of any player using hybrid actions. This specific strategy integrates the methods / courses of action and the means / resources that are usable for the successive achievement of specific / partial / stage objectives that ultimately contribute to the achievement of the proposed policy objectives (an additional argument supporting the hypothesis of hybrid warfare being the instrument of state players).

In a hybrid scenario in which the aggressor is a state player, the military dimension is not the prevailing/predominant, most of the actions are carried out in the cognitive domain of the confrontation. The Russian literature introduces the adaptive approach for the use of military force, which means the gradual exploitation of conventional forces and capabilities under different forms, from the dissimulated use of forces (e.g. training activities of the opposition forces and Special Operations missions) to their direct involvement in military operations (Gerasimov model of warfare proposed certifies the ratio of forces 1 to 4 in favor of the non-military means).

The complexity of hybrid aggression and the fact that the aggressor benefits from a large amount of options for materializing his own strategy are factors that describe its non-linear course and induce a high level of non-determination of associated threats. Most of the contributions in the literature contain descriptions of the concepts and less elements that refer to how to counteract and adapt behavior to hybrid actions. The analysis of the American and Russian theories described previously highlights the predilection for developing the concept of hybrid warfare and hybrid confrontation from a military perspective by emphasizing the implications of changes in the operational environment, mainly at operative and tactical level. Unlike American and Russian approaches, in the European literature, references to hybrid warfare primarily focus on the side of hybrid threats, with the emphasis on informational and cyber features of the threat, generated predominantly by state players, and their means of responding / countering them.

In the effort to counteract the hybrid threat, an approach based on identifying and managing the vulnerabilities (with emphasis on those on the political, social and informational / media level) and increasing the level of knowledge in relation to the opponent's options might be useful. Setting up the principles of hybrid organizations is particularly helpful in steering the effort to counteract the hybrid threat. They can serve as a starting point for the development of preliminary indicators of hybrid threat manifestation, the generation of new ones, and ultimately the completion of the situational knowledge map at the tactical and operative level and the early-warning, analysis and evaluation processes at the strategic level.

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SNATCHING THE VICTORY: ISAF MISSION, 2001-2014

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Abstract: *Contemporary international security architecture depends on the ability of the western democratic countries to maintain stability. Failed and fragile states could become the sources of instability in many regions. In this regard, the power projection capabilities of the United States as the strongest democracy are essential to maintain peace and security in the world. Hence, it is important to study and analyze military campaigns which they have conducted in the recent years. The goal of the research is to explain the reasons which are hindering the achievement of a political success during military campaigns, particularly in the countries like Afghanistan. NATO-led military campaign in Afghanistan had very modest accomplishments. The puzzle is, why the US and Its Allies were unable to succeed in achieving stability in Afghanistan and why did the military campaign result in a long-lasting war. In this work, we will conduct an analysis of the ISAF mission (2001-2014) and will try to explain the reasons behind this conundrum.*

Keywords: *ISAF mission, counterinsurgency, insurgency, terrorism, war on terror, Afghanistan, political elite, regime change.*

Introduction

In this paper we will examine the 2001-2014 ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The goal of the research is to explain the reasons which are hindering the achievement of a political success during a military campaign. Before the start of the research, we asked the following question: Why was it not possible to achieve stability during the ISAF mission (which lasted 13 years) and why Afghanistan remains the center of instability in the Central Asian region?

The hypothesis of this research is this: *the risk of a failure of military campaign is directly related to increasing pressure on the ruling political elite and the counter-elite[1] of the host country*. Based on the questions and the hypothesis, the main theme of our study and the dependent variable will be the failure of a military campaign. Political elite and counter-elite will be independent variables. In our opinion, the most important factor that caused the loss of the initiative by the NATO-led ISAF mission was triggered by the pressure on the political elite and the counter-elite of the occupied country and the attempt to radically change the existing socio-political structure within the host nation.

Indicators of the dependent variable are: non-fulfillment of the stated objectives, early withdrawal from the occupied territories, escalation of the situation in the occupied territories, stable increase of the number of insurgents, deterioration of the situation, and loss of effective control over some regions of the country by the host nation government.

Indicators of the independent variables are: the ability to influence the population, resources, high political and administrative positions, and control over a wide network of people both inside and outside the country.

In this paper, we mostly use the method of qualitative research. Methodology is based on the findings and the analysis of the analytical articles, books, official documents, publications, memoirs

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[1] Counter-elites are individuals whose views and goals differ significantly from those of the ruling body of a country and who, by their abilities, by their wealth, and/or by their heritage, occupy positions of influence in a society. (Petros G. Sekeris)

published by the politicians and military commanders, interviews with former high-ranking military officials and experts. To explain and analyze the events presented in our work, we will use the Conceptual Framework of the Fourth Generation War.[2] In the research we used theories for explaining events and ongoing processes. In order to analyze research problem, we have chosen inductive reasoning. Using fourth-generation war conceptual framework we will try to explain the reasons of failure during a military campaign. Additionally, this theoretic approach will support us to clarify the nature of modern war and one of its types, insurgency.

The war was divided into four generations, first by William Lind and a group of American military officers. In 1989, they published an article in the Marine Corps newspaper titled "*The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*".[3] In 2006, Thomas Hammes further developed this concept and meticulously examined it. In his book "The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century", Hammes has thoroughly analyzed the challenges of modern conflicts and the problems of modern armies when fighting rebels, partisans and other unconventionally organized forces.[4] Hammes also formed the theoretical framework of the Fourth Generation Warfare.[5]

Since the fourth generation war basically centers on the phenomenon of war, we will also use the elite theory in order to conduct a comprehensive socio-political study of the events that unfolded during a military campaign in Afghanistan. Additionally, by using the theory of elites we will be able to thoroughly analyze the independent variables. Vilfredo Pareto, one of the founders of the elite theory, divides the highest class (strata) of the society into governing and non-governing elites. Non-governing elite (so called counter-elite) representatives possess all of the characteristics of the ruling elite, although they do not have official authority. Time after time governing elite gets eroded and inefficiently governs population in a given country. At that exact time counter-elite gets active and declares its right for power.[6] We agree with the concept of Pareto, that elite is a minority which rules the majority of the society.

ISAF mission has ended just a few years ago, accordingly, little analytical information is known about its results. Nevertheless, some good analytical work on the given topic could be found even today. Henric Larsen has an interesting analysis. In his work he successfully analyzes military campaign in Afghanistan and emphasizes funding issues.[7] Conversely, we will be focused on analyzing the reasons of a failure.

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[2] The generations of war: the first generation - beginning from 1648 (after Westphalia Treaty, when sovereign states were formed). The second generation begins from 1800-ies (when the rifled guns were invented). The third generation begins with German blitzkrieg and mechanization of war.

[3] William S Lind; Keith Nightengale; John F Schmitt; Joseph W Sutton; Gary I Wilso, *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,* Marine Corps Gazette (Oct 1989). https://www.mca-marines.org/files/The%20Changing%20Face%20of%20War%20-%20Into%20the%20Fourth%20Generation.pdf

[4] According to Hammes, "Fourth generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks - political, economic, social and military – to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.
- Unlike the previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy's political will."

[5] Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, (Zenith Press, 2006), p.2.

[6] Vilfredo Pareto, *the circulation of elites,* in Talcott Parsons, Theories of Society; Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory, 2 Vol., (The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961) pp. 551-558. https://ia802608.us.archive.org/10/items/theoriesofsociet02pars/theoriesofsociet02pars.pdf

[7] Henrik B.L. Larsen, *NATO In Afghanistan: democratization warfare, national narratives and budgetary austerity,* (Harvard Kennedy School, 2013) https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/larsen-dp-2013-10.pdf

Afjan Sajid`s publication is no less interesting.[8] He broadly discusses the military campaign goals and the difficulties it faced. Unalike our research, he argues that stability in Afghanistan will be achieved only after a long period of time. He does not mention the mistakes which delayed the success at the beginning of the military campaign.

In his analytical work - "A Mission Too Far? NATO and Afghanistan, 2001–2014"- Mets Bradley mentions that there were two main reasons of a failure: mistakes made in the development of strategic missions and non-efficient coordination between participant countries. (A Mission Too Far? NATO and Afghanistan, 2001–2014).[9] In our work we will try to show that proper cooperation with the local political elites was by far a more significant issue.

Case Study - ISAF Mission in Afghanistan 2001-2014

The events of September 11, 2001, seemed to be a turning point not only for the US, but they can even be considered a starting point of the global and long-term geopolitical cataclysms. The US wanted to take revenge on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. In order to achieve this goal, America was ready, by using the military force, to remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that controlled almost 90% of the country at that time. Washington also intended to neutralize the future terrorist threat from Afghanistan and to stabilize the situation. It was a very hard mission, given that the war in Afghanistan has been going on for more than 20 years. In the ISAF mission involving 51 states including NATO and partner countries, the US was the main contributor of military forces, hence in our paper we will focus on the Washington's actions.

Except for Taliban, there were several influential factions operating in Afghanistan which consisted primarily of ethnic Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks controlling the northern part of the country. The leaders of these factions joined to stop Taliban's advance that controlled almost all Afghanistan by 2001. The only potent force capable of deterring the Taliban with its own strength was the faction of field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. It must be noted that al-Qaeda terrorists killed Massoud two days before the 2001 terrorist attacks, thus leaving the Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance without a very influential leader. In spite of the fact that Massoud was an ethnic Tajik himself, he had a significant influence among other ethnic groups living in Afghanistan, including the Pashtuns. The Taliban also captured and killed Abdul Haq (one of the allies of Massoud and the most influential leader of Pashtun Mujahids) when he arrived in Afghanistan. With these actions, the Taliban tried to prevent the Afghan Great Council, the so-called Loya Jirga, from electing the strong future leadership of the country.

Terrorists appropriately analyzed the situation within the country. They knew that only leaders like Masoud and Haq would have been able to establish the real control over the country stricken by chaos. The principal mission of the Taliban was to remain as the only alternative authority (the counter-elite) after the inevitable military defeat and to maintain its own influence along these lines.

The Americans were able to quickly and effectively overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. From the US about 100 representatives from Central Intelligence Agency and 350 members of the Special Forces participated in this operation. This action was also supported by the Afghan Northern Alliance that included about 15000 fighters.[10] These troops supported by the US

[8] Afshan Sajid, *NATO mission in Afghanistan: problems and prospects*, in ISSRA_Papers_Vol3 (ISSRA Papers, 2011). http://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/issra-paper/ISSRA_Papers_Vol3_IssueI_2011/05-Afshan-Article.pdf

[9] Mats Berdal. *A Mission too Far ? - NATO and Afghanistan, 2001-14*. In Marston D, Leahy T, editors, War, Strategy and History: Essays in Honour of Professor Robert O'Neill. Canberra: Australian National University Press (ANU Press 2016) p.155-178. http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1879/pdf/ch11.pdf

[10] S. G. Jones, (2008). *The rise of Afghanistan's insurgency: State failure and Jihad*. International Security, 32(4), 7-40 http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3204_pp007-040_Jones.pdf

Air Force, have been able to restore control over almost the entire country and eliminate the terrorists without difficulty in three months. The subsequent events demonstrated that it was not a complete victory that would have brought more or less stability to a war-raged country.

Hamid Karzai was elected the head of the country after the Taliban regime was overthrown and the Great Council (Loya Jirga) was convened in 2002. Other candidates were also involved in the elections, however, none of them had sufficient authority among the population. The only real influential candidate who was not participating in the elections was Zahir Shah, a former king of Afghanistan, who ruled the country in 1933-73. The candidacy of the king was supported by a large number of participants in Loya Jirga, but as a strong and independent leader, he was unacceptable for the US and therefore did not take part in the elections, even though the Great Council itself was formally convened by him. Hamid Karzai declared the king to be the "Father of the Nation", though Zahir Shah said that he did not want to be the head of state. In our opinion, miscalculations made during these elections in the long run caused difficulties in achieving stability in Afghanistan.

In spite of the fact that there is no official evidence to prove that Washington along with its allies put pressure on Zahir Shah, it is a fact that he was removed from the ongoing political process in Afghanistan. As a result Karzai was appointed as a new head of state, even though he had no real powers and was entirely dependent on the Washington's favor.

Karzai was not the leader of any strong military faction, nor did he fight together with the Mujahids during the Soviet occupation. After the Red Army's intervention, his family moved to United States, and Hamid himself went to one of the India's universities, where he pursued the art of politics. He was an ideal leader for the US and Europe since he was good at international relations and diplomacy. At the same time, he was the most undesirable leader for the country devastated by a nearly 20-year war which was still being ruled by the field commanders. The real influence in the country was in the hands of the former rebel leaders, especially the field commanders of the Northern Alliance. Karzai was only supported by the American military force, so he was not a leader of real power for the population, especially for the former Mujahids. At that time the former king of Afghanistan probably would have been a more acceptable leader and could have curbed the ambitions of the field commanders with his own authority and influence.

In the new government the representation of the country's most populous ethnic group, the Pashtuns, was reduced to a minimum. Officially, the country was ruled by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun; though it was clear to everyone that the positions in the new administration were occupied by the former leaders of the Northern Alliance. Among the most influential individuals were the ethnic Tajiks, members of the Shura-e Nazar movement that was created by Ahmad Shah Massoud. For example, Mohammed Qasim Fahim - the Minister of Defense, Yunus Kanun - the Minister of the Internal Affairs, and Abdullah Abdullah - the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were all members of Shura-e Nazar.[11]

On the other hand, Pashtuns which constituted almost a half of the Afghanistan's population had no representative of real power in the government. Moreover, after the Taliban was removed from power, they suffered pressure and harassment from the state. For instance, the Pashtuns living in the north were forced to abandon their homes and settled in other parts of the country.[12]

There are many ethnic groups living in Afghanistan, and there has always been confrontation and intolerance among them; however, the pressures against the most numerous ethnic group were unequivocally the main source of future destabilization. It must be noted that Pakistan has about twice as many (more than 30 million) Pashtuns than in Afghanistan, and they are the second largest ethnic group there (Map no. 1 *Afghanistan and Pakistan Ethnic Groups*). Unsurprisingly, the Taliban movement, which was largely composed of Pashtuns, was mainly

[11] ICG Asia Report N°62 AFGHANISTAN: THE PROBLEM OF PASHTUN ALIENATION 5 August 2003 Kabul/Brussels, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/62-afghanistan-the-problem-of-pashtun-alienation. pdf
[12] Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project (2004).
http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Asia/Afghanistan/pdf/Afghanistan-October-2004.pdf

supported and reinforced by Pakistan.

Figure no. 1. Ethnic map of Afghanistan and Pakistan

Source: Map by The Choices Program, Brown University, www.choices.edu, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/maps/afghanistan-and-pakistan-ethnic-groups/

When Karzai came to power, the local leaders of Taliban tried to reach a political agreement. In 2001 the Taliban had an attempt of surrendering in case the agreement was reached. Abdul Ghani Baradari (later the leader of the insurgents and the 3rd man in the Taliban movement), Mullah Obaidullah - Taliban Defense Minister, Tayeb Agha - Mullah Omar's assistant, and the Minister of Internal affairs - Abdul Razak tried to give Karzai the terms of this agreement in a written form. The letter stated that the Islamic Emirate had no chance of survival and they recognized the authority of Karzai. Their principal demand was that they should not be put on trial and removed from political processes.[13]

It was evident that there was a lack of unity among the Taliban members and everyone was driven by their own ambitions, but Washington didn't take this opportunity.[14] Karzai himself wasn't against peace talks with the Taliban, but Washington considered the movement to be defeated and settling ethnic conflicts wasn't on their agenda at that time. Furthermore, since the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were allies, reaching any kind of agreement with them was unacceptable in the era of global war against terrorism. As a result, the political pressure against Pashtuns encouraged them to keep fighting and stand by the Taliban leaders who would support their interests.

Karzai's security was provided by the US Special Forces. Foreign soldiers providing the security for the president was a clear sign that he couldn't assume control of his own security which meant that he could not have established stabilization in Afghanistan.[15] According to the UN resolution 1386 adopted in 2001, the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) needed to be sent to Afghanistan to ensure the protection of Kabul firstly because as we have already mentioned

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[13] Clark Kate. *The Release of Mullah Baradar: What's next for negotiations?* Afghanistan-analysts (2013). https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-release-of-mullah-baradar-whats next-for-negotiations/

[14] A Gopal, *No Good Men among the living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan eyes* (Metropolitan Books -2014).

[15] Beaumont Peter, *US pulls out Karzai's military bodyguards*, The Guardian (2002), https://www.theguardian.com /world/2002/nov/24/afghanistan.peterbeaumont

Karzai did not have appropriate resources to do it himself. Soon it became clear that only the protection of Kabul was not enough to stabilize the situation and since 2003 the ISAF mandate had been increased to cover all of the Afghanistan and the leadership of the mission had been passed to NATO. The US and its Allies were forced to significantly increase the troop numbers in order to help the local government, which in turn ignited even more tensions within Afghanistan, as the locals considered their country occupied.

Increased intensity of military operations and putting pressure on Pashtun elite had negative effect on military operations conducted by the coalition forces. Removing Taliban from power didn't bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. On the contrary, it had negative impact on the processes and eventually made it possible for the counter-elite to come to power again. Afghan ruling elite had support of the West but it didn't gain enough strength within the country, which encouraged the rise of the other non-governing elite (counter-elite), namely the Taliban with the majority of Pashtuns in it. By the end of ISAF mission, the Taliban had shadow governments in many Afghan provinces and some regions were de facto governed by Taliban.

Americans and their allies tried to establish institutions that would promote democracy in Afghanistan, but they failed to address and consider existing cultural and traditional aspects of the country, especially those that existed in the rural areas.[16] Hamid Karzai was elected as a president of Afghanistan in 2004 which was an unprecedented event in the history of Afghanistan. This kind of elections were alien for Afghan people, since the majority of them were uneducated and most of them couldn't read or write. For centuries in Afghanistan, decisions were made by the Councils of Elders (Jirga). A western model of election, in which men and women were granted equal voting rights, was unacceptable for Afghans who followed Islamic traditions.

2009 election was seen as fraud in most parts of Afghanistan except Kabul, because people voted for the candidates that tribal leaders told them to vote for. There was no freedom of speech. Karzai's actual authority didn't go outside Kabul and few other residential areas. The rest of the country was controlled by former Mujahids and field commanders. Karzai even had a nickname of the 'mayor of Kabul'.[17] Furthermore, the Taliban which was the main opponent of the government, established so called 'shadow governments' throughout Afghanistan and in some cases exercised de facto control over large parts of the country.

In such conditions, stabilizing the situation seemed unrealistic, regardless of the troop numbers in the ISAF mission. Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan was already a failed state when Americans entered it, civil war was raging in the country, the government had been changed forcibly for many times and state institutions were totally destroyed. Americans needed to undertake certain steps to rebuild the country. However, in the beginning of the ISAF, this was not included in Washington's plans as it was primarily focused on the destruction of Al-Qaeda and its commander. Americans and their allies had very little time to ensure more or less organized functioning of the state institutions and create a sense of stability in the country's population, which unfortunately they did not use. Very soon, the population convinced (with the help of Taliban) that Karzai and his administration were the US puppet and corrupt government.

The 2001 strike did not prove to be a fatal blow to the Taliban. In 2002 they started an insurgency against the current government and its allies. By 2006 the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated significantly. The rise of insurgency in Afghanistan was directly proportional to the rise of troop numbers in the ISAF.[18] In 2002-2006, the number of attacks increased by 4 times and the number of victims, as a result of the attacks, increased by 8 times, which was alarming signal for all

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[16] Alicia P.Q. Wittmeyer, *What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?We asked everyone from an ex-president of Pakistan to a former Afghan spy chief to weigh in*. Foreign policy (2013). http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/what-went-wrong-in-afghanistan/

[17] Jackie Northam, *In Afghanistan, U.S. Success Depends On Karzai*, NPR News (2009). http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121509106

[18] DoD, Report to congress on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 2014, p. 19. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf

countries in the coalition, especially the Washington.[19] [20]

In 2011, ISAF exceeded a benchmark of 130 000 and their operations expanded throughout the country, including the most troubled Helmand province.[21] In spite of this, the military campaign could not reach a turning point and the insurgents still remained control over different parts of Afghanistan, especially Southern part and along the Durand Line on a Pakistani border, the control of which was almost impossible.

One of the main missions of the ISAF was to develop and train Afghan National Army and Police, because ultimately it was National forces that would have been responsible for establishing and maintaining order in the country. Based on the official data, approximately 180 000 people were serving in Afghan army and almost 160 000 in Police. Despite the large number of forces, the effectiveness and readiness level was not high. In 2002- 2014 deserting was a common thing in the army (even today it still represents a challenge) and it reached an immense scale. For example, in 2013 the number of deserters amounted approximately 30 percent of the total army strength. The situation was difficult in the Police as well, where corruption was flourishing. In such environment, the security forces could not have guaranteed the security of the country and that is why after the end of the ISAF operations in 2014, a new, small-scale, NATO-led Resolute Support Mission was launched, the aim of which is to support Kabul Administration and provide assistance in solving the problems in security sector. Nevertheless, even today, the real solution is reconciliation with Pashtuns' elite and bringing them back to the political processes.

Conclusion

In the 4th Generation wars the main task of the rebels is not to destroy an enemy, but to influence opponents political will and to achieve victory in that way.[22] In this regard, it is less important how many and how trained are forces that a government dispatches to suppress a rebellion, because for the insurgents it is more important to show continuous effort and to demonstrate to the opponents that it is impossible to succeed. Taliban through its own actions tried to conduct indirect "brain assault" on military-political leadership in ISAF coalition. Modest achievements of the ISAF were caused by various factors, but as we have already mentioned, the most important one was a pressure on the Pashtuns elite. Other reasons, such as Foreign support that Taliban got from Pakistan, or the failure of counter-insurgency military campaign, mostly are caused by the pressure on the Pashtun elite and if not that fact, they would have created a negligible impediment for the ISAF mission.

When intervening into Afghanistan, The United States, like the Soviet Union, tried to eradicate the so called "counter-elite". Despite the fact that unlike the Soviet intervention, US operation in Afghanistan was led by NATO and was largely supported by the International community, a 13 year long ISAF operation failed to achieve stability in Afghanistan. (Map no. 2 *Areas of Taliban presence in Afghanistan*). At this time, both in Washington and Kabul government officials understand that without the process of reconciliation and reintegration of former insurgents into civil society achieving stabilization in Afghanistan will continue to be problematic. Peace agreement which was signed with one of the insurgent groups led by a notorious field commander Gullbuddin Heikmatyar is indicating that new strategy which is aimed towards reconciliation of the Afghan society is already taking shape. Further attempts are being made to convince other insurgent

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[19] S. G. Jones, (2008). *The rise of Afghanistan's insurgency: State failure and Jihad*. International Security, 32(4), 7-40 http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3204_pp007-040_Jones.pdf

[20] Ian S. Livingston and Michael O'Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index Also including selected data on Pakistan*, Brookings (2012). https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/index20120930.pdf

[21] Heidi M. Peters, Moshe Schwartz, Lawrence Kapp, *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2017*, Congressional Research Service, 2017. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf

[22] Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, Zenith Press, 2006, pp. 3-6.

groups (including Taliban) to lay down their arms and reintegrate into Afghan civil society as well. Stemming from this, the new Resolute Support Mission led by NATO will have significant chances of success.

Figure no. 2. Areas of Taliban presence in Afghanistan
Source: Rod NORDLAND and Joseph GOLDSTEINOCT, 11, 2015, https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/12/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-united-nations.html

Currently, none of the armed forces are fully organized, equipped and trained to achieve a victory in 4th Generation Wars and it was proved by the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Van Creveld correctly noted in his book 'The transformation of war' that "A ghost is stalking the corridors of the general staffs and defense departments all over the 'developed world' – the fear of military impotence and even irrelevance".[23]

In this type of wars, especially during the long military campaigns, the armed forces should be used in a secondary role and the focus should be made on proper organization of the local authorities and providing them effective assistance. Placing a pressure on the local elite and eradicating them from the politics leads to escalation of the situation and instigates insurgency. These people have a direct influence over the decision-making processes by manipulating the ordinary citizens. They also cherish their status within the society and if their position is being challenged they will not surrender without a fight.

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[23] Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict since Clausewitz, First edition, Chapter 1 (Free Press, 1991).

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MIGRATION AND THE (IN)SECURITY OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

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Abstract: European and neighboring countries in Europe have been experiencing an intensification of the migration phenomenon in recent years. One of the causes that has led to new migration flows are the crises and conflicts that followed the Arab Spring. Maintaining the security of societies depends on the way states and governments handle the issue of migration. The states response depends on the way migration is perceived either as a burden making states fragile, even destabilizing them, or as a long-term advantage. The states response also comes as a result of securitizing or desecuritizing migration.

Keywords: migration, security, benefits, risk, securitization.

Introduction

We live in an interconnected world with an unprecedented degree of mobility. Information flows rapidly, transport infrastructure and technology have evolved since the beginning of the century, long distance travel has become accessible to a growing number of people. There are factors that have contributed to an increase in unprecedented migration. The opening of the frontiers after the fall of the Iron Curtain contributed to the amplification of the phenomenon. In just 15 years, from 2000 to 2015, the number of migrants in the world has risen by 41%, according to the United Nations statistics. [1]

In 2015, there were 244 million migrants[2]. This means that one in 30 people is a migrant. If we also take into account domestic migrants, the total number of migrants reaches 1 billion, meaning that 1 in 7 people in the world is a migrant[3]. The 2015 refugee crisis, when over the 1 million migrants, most of them Syrians, came to Europe on the Mediterranean and Balkan routes after the conflicts following the Arab Spring, (re)put migration at the top of the political and security agendas in Europe and beyond. Migration, whether voluntary or forced, is closely related to security. The decision to migrate can be determined by the economic or physical insecurity of individuals or groups of individuals in their country of origin.

At the same time, migration can itself become *"a source of risks, dangers and threats when it is not controlled"*[4]. We talk about economic, political, military and social risks for the host state. All these aspects affect the security of human communities as Barry Buzan claims. [5] Migration can also contribute to state security, especially through the economic benefits it brings to host countries.[6] In the present paper the dimensions of migration are discussed and then, using the tools provided by migration and security theories, the link between migration on the one hand and state security, individual and societal security on the other hand is analyzed.

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[1] United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affair*s (UN DESA) –* Trends in International Migrants Stock: The 2015 Revision, see http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/migration/data/estimates2/data/UN_MigrantStockTotal_2015.xlsx, retrieved on 20 May 2017.

[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] UN DESA – Technical Paper No. 2013/1 – *Cross-national comparisons of internal migration: An update on global patterns and trends*, see http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/technical/TP2013-1.pdf, retrieved on 20 May 2017.

[4] Sarcinschi Alexandra, *Migraţie şi securitate*, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Bucureşti, 2008.

[5] Buzan Barry, *Popoarele, statele şi teama. O agendă pentru studii de securitate în epoca de după războiul rece*, Editura Cartier, Chişinău, 2000, p. 31.

[6] Sarcinschi Alexandra*, Migraţie şi securitate, op. cit.*, p. 12.

1. Globalized migration

The global migration map is based on armed conflicts in the world, poverty and famine, the occurrence of natural disasters (earthquakes, floods), overpopulation and last but not least climate change. Among the causes of migration, the following can be mentioned. Out of the 244 million migrants registered in 2015, 21.3 million were refugees – 16.1 million refugees under UNHCR mandate, the rest were Palestinians. The main countries of origin of the refugees are countries where there is a strong conflict or instability: Syria (4.9 million refugees), Afghanistan and Somalia[7]. Although the refugee crisis has only become visible at European level when refugees have flocked across the continent, the heaviest burden of migration has also been borne by three countries outside Europe: Turkey, which hosted 2.5 million refugees, Pakistan and Lebanon In 2016, the number of refugees increased by more than one million to 22.5 million, of whom 17.2 million came under the mandate of UNHCR[8]. Half of the refugees under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees came from only three countries: Syria, Afghanistan and South Sudan.

Given that global resources are limited, the rapid increase in the world's population is a security risk. UN data show that the world population has reached 7.6 billion in 2017. Practically, the world's population has almost doubled in four decades. Estimates from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs show that the Earth will have a population of 9.8 billion in 2050 and 11.2 billion in 2100[9] As for migration caused by climate change, a scenario launched in 2005 by British Professor Norman Myers shows that in 2050 the number of those forced to migrate mainly due to climate change will be between 200 million and 1 billion.[10]

2. Migration and security

Migration theories provide us with tools to analyze the causes of migration, push factors, those that cause a person to migrate, and pull factors, which cause a person to choose a particular host country, for example the chance to find a well-paid job. The sociological perspective also helps us to understand how migration is self-powered even when primary causes disappear (e.g. economic growth in the country of origin) through migration networks. The latter helps to disseminate information on potential destination countries and provides non-institutionalized assistance about the possibilities to travel legally or illegally to different destinations, minimizing the costs and risks of travel.

The same migration networks, made up of family members, friends or acquaintances that have already gone through the migration experience, provide in the destination country information about the possibilities of accommodation, jobs, and even about the benefits offered to host country migrants. *"Networks connect migrants and non-migrants across time and space. Once begun, migration flows often become self-sustaining, reflecting the establishment of networks of information, assistance and obligations which develop between migrants in the host society and friends and relatives in the sending area".*[11]

But what are the effects of migration on host countries and on countries of origin from a security perspective? Professor Jef Huysmans points out that security can be approached in two ways: either *"in strategic terms as a value or condition to be achieved"* or in critical terms as

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[7] *Global Report 2015*, see http://www.unhcr.org/gr15/index.xml, retrieved on 21 July 2017.

[8] *Global Report 2016*, see http://reporting.unhcr.org/publications#tab-global_report, retrieved on 21 July 2017.

[9] *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables.* Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP/248 Department of Economic and Social Affairs UN, see https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf, retrieved on 14 July 2017.

[10] Myers Norman, *Environmental Refugees. An Emerging Security Issue*, May 2005, see http://www.osce.org/eea/14851?download=true, retrieved on 12 July 2017

[11] Boyd Monica, *Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas, International Migration* Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, Special Silver Anniversary Issue: International Migration an Assessment for the 90's ,1989, pp. 638-670, p. 641.

knowledge, security practice and discourse.[12] Following this model, firstly, we will discuss the migration impact on national security from an economic, political, military, social and societal point of view, emphasizing that the society is affected by economic, political and military dimensions of security. Secondly, we will analyze how the migration or asylum policies of the states are transformed, securitizing migration or desecuritizing it.

2.1. Migration and economic security

From an economic point of view, migration can be either a benefit or a disadvantage for both the host country and the country of origin. Migrants, most of them young, can be a source of cheap labor for the countries they reach. If they are quickly integrated into the labor market, they can become contributors to the host state's pension system.

What, however, is the reverse of the medal currently in Germany, where the transformation of migrants into contributors to the state budget seems to be a lasting process. Only 32.7% of the female migrants who arrived in Germany in 2015 were employed in the country of origin, and 74.8% of male asylum seekers were employed in their country of origin. Two years ago, 30% of the migrants graduated up to four school years, and 31.5% of them graduated eight school years. [13] For these reasons economists estimate that the unemployment rate will increase by 1.5% by 2020, and per capita income will fall to 800 euros.[14] Until September 2016, only 50.000 migrants had found a job. Given that 90% of the refugees did not know German at all when they arrived in this country the employment prospects are not good. [15] German Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration, Aydan Özoğuz, said in an interview with the Financial Times that 3 quarters of Germany's refugees will be unemployed for the next 5 years. Others will be in this situation for even 10 years. [16] With it, chances of integration do not grow, isolation, ghettoization and radicalization increase. Between 2015 and 2016 Germany received over 1.2 million refugees for humanitarian reasons. German economists have calculated the benefits and costs in the short and medium term. Income per capita will decrease, the unemployment rate will increase, and state spending will increase. But in the longer term, economists from the Cologne Economic Institute estimate that higher state spending will boost the economy, and a higher occupancy rate among refugees will increase Germany's GDP by 95 billion euro in the period 2016-2020. [17] At the moment, the costs of migration for Germany are greater than its benefits. In fact, the refugee crisis costs for Germany were 21.7 billion euros, in 2016, the sum covering housing, health, language courses and professional training. And for the year 2017 there is a similar amount (21.3 billion euros) allocated[18].

Massive labor migration, either qualified or unskilled, affects the country of origin, which consequently faces labor force shortage, resulting in less contributors to the pension system and specialists. There are also theorists who claim that the aspiration to migrate increases the level of education in the country of origin: Those who want to migrate are more interested in learning for this purpose.[19] Migration can be an advantage for home countries because of the money sent by

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[12] Huysmans Jef , Vicki Squire, *Migration and Security*, Handbook of Security Studies, Routledge, London, 2009, p. 3.

[13] Analysis conducted by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in Germany, see http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Kurzanalysen/kurzanalyse3_sozial-komponenten.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, retrieved on 19 February 2017.

[14] Report of the Economic Institute Cologne, see https://www.iwd.de/artikel/noch-ein-gender-gap-287390/, retrieved on 23 February 2017.

[15] Report of The Institute for Employment Research in Germany, see http://doku.iab.de/forschungsbericht/2016/fb1416.pdf, retrieved on 20 February 2017.

[16] Press Article, *Most Refugees to Be Jobless for Years, German Minister Warns*, Financial Times, 20 June 2017, see https://www.ft.com/content/022de0a4-54f4-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f, retrieved on 21 June 2017.

[17] Hentze Tobias, Galina Kolev, *Gesamtwirtschaftliche Effekte der Flüchtlingsmigration in Deutschland*, IW-Trends, 43 Jg., Nr. 4, Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, 2016.

[18] *Ibidem.*

[19] Böhme Marcus H. , Glaser Toni, *Migration Experience, Aspirations and the Brain Drain Theory and Empirical Evidence*, Kiel Institute for Working Economy, Working Paper, No.1956, August 2014, see https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/migration-experience-aspirations-and-the-brain-drain-theory-and-empirical-evidence/KWP-1556.pdf, retrieved on 17 July 2017.

migrants to those left behind. The so-called remittance to the families left behind is a real vector of development for the countries that provide the workforce. According to a study by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAID), 150 million people worldwide benefited in 2014 from remittances received in Europe. [20] In the same year remittances sent by migrants in Europe amounted to 109.4 billion dollars to low-income countries.[21] Europe is the source of over 25% of the global remittances flow. [22] Migration of the labor force affects the countries of origin when the skilled labor force drains from the country. We speak mainly about doctors, IT specialists, engineers.

2.2 Migration and the political security

Migration can pose a security risk from a political point of view.

"The capacity of social, economic, political and administrative institutions to integrate large numbers of immigrants, and the resistance of some immigrant communities to assimilation, affects the stability of society and therefore the ability of receiving states governments to govern. Over time, it may affect the legitimacy of their regimes and the self/-conception of the nation"[23], Martin Heisler and Zig Layton-Henry argue.

Another risk is the use of migration as a tool of pressure, as a political weapon. Current examples are Turkey's threat to the European Union that it opens the door to migrants it hosts on its territory and Ankara's call for Turkish people in Germany (threat to the German state) to have *"five children, not just three"* as they do in Turkey.[24] Kelly Greenhill argues that such a weapon of migration works especially in the case of liberal democracies, where respect for human rights is state policy and where their violation would awaken the reaction of the population, which in turn would put pressure on governments.

Another possible risk is turning migration into an internal political tool. With the help of politicians, migration has been frequently linked to the public debate of crime, social and ethnic tensions, and after 9/11 attacks to religious fundamentalism. Migration can lead to the flourishment of populist or extremist movements or parties. For example, on account of migrants the populist and far right party Alternative for Germany became the third political force in the Bundestag after the parliamentary elections in September 2017. In addition, the migrants returning home may lead to a political and economic threat to the governments of the country of origin but also for the host state.[25]

2.3. Migration and the military dimension of security

Illegal migration is from the beginning a violation of the state's physical basis, which may entail the need to involve the military structures of the state. Migration flows are often caused by military conflicts in the country of origin, and host states may intervene militarily to stop migratory flows in the countries of origin. Alexandra Sarcinschi mentions that "refugees in the destination countries can create security problems by engaging in oppositional movements against the governments of their countries of origin or even in transnational terrorist networks."[26] The tensions between the host country and the country of origin or the possible terrorist actions of the migrants can reach military dimensions.

2.4. Migration and the social and societal security

The economic, political and military implications of migration have an impact on social security, understood as the physical, financial security of individuals, as well as on the labor market,

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[20] IFAID Report, *Sending Money Home*, 2015, see https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/3594696/money_ europe.pdf/5ac7733f-39e6-4b1b-a1dc-f7038b5caa0b?version=1.2, retrieved on 21 July 2017.

[21] *Idem.*

[22] *Ibidem.*

[23] Heisler O Martin, Layton-Henry Zig în Waever Ole, Buzan Barry, Kelstrup Morten, Lemaitre Pierre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, St. Martin s Press, New York, 1993, p. 162.

[24] Press Article, *Macht funf Kinder, nicht drei*, Die Zeit, March 17th 2017, see http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/ 2017-03/ recep-tayyip-erdogan-kinderkriegen-europa-aufruf, retrieved on 17 March 2017.

[25] Heisler O Martin, Layton-Henry, *op. cit*., p. 162.

[26] Sarcinschi Alexandra, *op. cit*. , p. 24.

the family of individuals, and societal security. 27 Societal security refers to communities and concerns the security of identity, culture and religion, defined as processes between an individual and groups..[28] Barry Buzan argues that migration can be both a threat and an advantage. If it is perceived as beneficial for the economy and culture or rejected as a threat to national identity, it will depend on a number of local conditions.[29] Barry Buzan considers that social security entails the protection of traditional elements of language, culture, identity and cultural and religious behavior.[30] And in this context, human migration is the most complex social threat, especially where the new comers have a different cultural and ethnic background. [31]

Barry Buzan argues that security is *"the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile"*. [32] As the state disappears if it loses its sovereignty, a society is destroyed if it loses its identity. "Societal security concerns 'situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms", argues Ole Waever. [33] Cultural insecurity would mean the loss of material and immaterial cultural values when society undergoes changes.

Professor Majid Tehranian warns that *"when 25% of the population of a relatively homogenous country such as Sweden becomes populated by newly arrived immigrants, the cultural shock to the old inhabitants can be severe"*.[34] This risk exists, for example, in the case of Germany, a country where the demographic structure of the population has changed in recent years. The latest data from the German Institute of Statistics show that there are currently 18.6 million people in the Federal Republic of Germany who have migratory backgrounds, which means 22.5% of the German population, an 8.5% increase in 2015. Over 3 million people have their origins in the Middle East as well as in Africa, which is a 50% increase in 2011. [35] We also take into account Barry Buzan's idea that in the longer term migration can redefine the idea of the state. "Ironically, cultural and ethnic intercourse often operates most often within multinational states, often with the support of the government. (...) This kind of migration can be conceived as part of the nation-building process, although it can also weaken the complex of government-society-territory, leading to secessionism".[36]

3. Securitization of migration

Migration is not a new phenomenon as it has existed since ancient times. In contemporary society, migration after the Second World War was essential to the reconstruction of Europe. From 1955 to 1968 Western European countries recruited workers from Southern Europe, Turkey, Morocco and Yugoslavia, recruited initially by agreements between supplying states and labor beneficiary countries.

According to Peter Stalker[37], between the 1960s and the early 1970s, more than 30 million foreign workers came to the European Economic Community. The period from the mid-1970s to the

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[27] See Funeriu Florentina, *Societate şi Securitate,* Revista Română de Sociologie", new series, year XXII, no. 1–2, pp. 170–184, Bucureşti, 2011.

[28] *Ibidem*.

[29] Buzan Barry, *Popoarele, Statele şi Frica. O agendă pentru studii de securitate internaţională în epoca de după Războiul Rece*, Cartier, Chişinău, new edition 2014, p. 104.

[30] Buzan Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[31] *Ibidem*, pp. 102-103.

[32] *Ibidem*, p. 30.

[33] Waever Ole, Waever Ole, *Security Identities*, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, Nr. 1, March 1996, p. 113.

[34] Tehranian Majid, Tehranian Majid, *Cultural Security and Global Governance: International Migration and negotiations of Identity*, in World on the Move: Globalization, Migration and Cultural Security, I.B. Tauris, London New York, 2004, p. 1.

[35] Data National Institute of Statistics in Germany 2017, see https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2017/08/PD17_261_12511.html, retrieved on 16 August 2017.

[36] Buzan Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

[37] Stalker Peter, *The Work of Strangers: A Survey of International Labour Migration*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1994.

early 1980s was marked by the economic crisis caused by the fall in oil prices. Most countries have imposed restrictions on migrants, but many have decided to stay in the host countries.

Since the 1980s, it has been witnessed a politicization of migration, a political construct of migration[38], as Jef Huysmans calls it. The domestic policy of states has already faced a series of economic and social problems with a revival of right-wing extremist movements, so that the politicization of migration refers to the *"destabilizing effects of migrants on internal integration, to the dangers for public order it implied"*[39], to the risk of increasing crime, the danger of terrorism, and more to the *"challenge to the protection of national identity and welfare provisions"*. [40] Securitizing migration has also taken place at European level by ensuring freedom of movement for European workers but closing the space for citizens outside the European Union.[41]

In 1998, during the Austrian presidency of the European Union, the rule of taking fingerprints of asylum seekers was established, creating a major confusion between asylum seekers, which is a form of calling for protection, and illegal migration. However, the international securitizing process of migration began with the 9/11 attacks, when terrorism and migration were linked directly for the first time. Another step towards securitizing migration at Community level was taken with the establishment of the Third Pillar of the European Union: Justice and Home Affairs under the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). It was one of the measures that had to counterbalance the opening of borders through the establishment of the Schengen Area between five states in 1985.[42] The policies of the European Union are, however, ambivalent. On the one hand, it applies rules that secure migration, says Jef Huysmans in his book, *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU* [43], giving arguments to politicians and anti-immigration movements, on the other hand, it fights with all the means against extremism and anti-immigration movements in Europe. The Dublin Convention, signed in 1990 and entered into force seven years later, which Germany temporarily suspended during the 2015 refugee flow, is a response to the demand for asylum after the collapse of the USSR and the conflicts in the Balkans.

Another step towards securing migration is the current European Migration Agenda designed in response to the wave of migrants coming to Europe since 2015. This plan of Community measures provides for the strengthening of the institutions dealing with border security, in addition to FRONTEX, the strengthening of Europol, the accountability of migrants' countries of origin and transit.[44] But how is the political security of migration reflected at European level and within the Member States of the European Union? We compare two Eurobarometers on citizens' vision of Europe's future, polls made in 2014 – before the refugee crisis, and in 2016 – during the refugee crisis. Thus, to the question of the biggest challenges for the Union, European citizens in all states responded: unemployment, social inequalities and the public debt of the Member States. At the top of the ranking they considered that instability in the EU's neighborhood is a danger. [45] In 2016, one year after the start of the flow of refugees to Europe, citizens in the Member States considered that the greatest challenges for the community were unemployment, social inequalities and migration. [46]

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[38] Huysmans Jef, *The European Union and the Securization of Migration*, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 751–77, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2000, p. 1.

[39] *Idem,* p. 751.

[40] *Ibidem*, p.759.

[41] Council Regulation 1612/68, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex%3A31968R1612, retrieved on 14 June 2017.

[42] Huysmans Jef, *op. cit.*, p.751.

[43] Huysmans Jef, *The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, p. 30

[44] European Commission official site, see https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration_en, retrieved on 17 August 2017.

[45] Eurobarometer 413 Future of Europe2014, see http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_413_en.pdf, retrieved on 20 August 2017.

[46] Eurobarometer 451 Future of Europe 2016, see http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2131, retrieved on 20 August 2017.

Conclusions

Migration is not a phenomenon specific to contemporary society, but an intensification of the phenomenon is observed. One of the causes of unprecedented mobility is globalization. The extremely rapid circulation of information, the improvement of transport infrastructure and the reduction of transport have all contributed to increasing migration.

The rapid growth of the world's population, which leads to overpopulation on Earth, and climate change will result in increasing migration. The struggle for resources will also increase.

Migration and security are inextricably linked. Migration can affect all levels of state security: the economic, political, military, social and societal dimensions. It may also be an economic advantage for the host country.

Social security is influenced by the economic, political and military aspects of security.

Social security, a concept that was given more attention in the post-Cold War era, preserves identity, culture, language, and religion, defined as processes between individuals and groups.

Security can be seen as a condition to be achieved or as speech and security practices. In the latter case, we can talk about securitizing migration in Europe since the 1980s.

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4. ***, IFAID Report, Sending Money Home, 2015, see https://www.ifad.org/ documents/10180/ 3594696/money_europe.pdf/5ac7733f-39e6-4b1b-a1dc-f7038b5caa0b?version=1.2, retrieved on 21 July 2017.

5. ***, *Macht funf Kinder, nicht drei*, Die Zeit, 17 March 2017, see http://www.zeit.de/ politik/ausland/2017-03/recep-tayyip-erdogan-kinderkriegen-europa-aufruf, retrieved on 17 March 2017.

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7. ***, Report of the *Federal Office for Migration and Refugees* see http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/ Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Kurzanalysen/kurzanalyse3_sozial-komponenten.pdf?blob=publicationFile, retrieved on 19 February 2017.

8. ***, Survey 413 Future of Europe2014, see http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/public opinion/archives/ebs/ ebs_413_en.pdf, retrieved 20 August 2017.

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ILLEGAL MIGRATION, THE GORDIAN NODE OF THE ACTUAL GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

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Abstrac*t: Illegal migration has achieved paroxysmal odds in 2015, and even if the amplitude of the phenomenon has decreased it continues to incite, an already largely divided European community, at ample and heated discussions. This "Gordian node", a real challenge for the European Union, is a direct result of the explosive mix between: the attempts of "converting to democracy", globalization phenomenon and the increasing poverty at alarming levels in the deliberately destabilized regions of Middle East and Africa. The interests of the great powers, in order to protect Western multinationals or the race after hydrocarbon, have made vast and prosperous regions to ruin, becoming again pre-modern enclaves characterized by confusion, chaos and despair. Notions as Europe or USA are no longer causing former reverberations in the Arab world and have lost most of its advantages except some corrupt, unfair and abusive "export democracies". These produced imbalances require a redefinition of the concept of sovereignty, and in order to stabilize the situation, the need for concessions and balance is acutely felt.*

Keywords*: illegal migration; the globalization phenomenon; Gordian node; conversion to democracy; Middle East; Africa.*

Introduction

Illegal migration has achieved paroxysmal odds in 2015, and even if the amplitude of the phenomenon has decreased it continues to incite an already largely divided European community, at ample and heated discussions. This "Gordian node", a real challenge for the European Union, is a direct result of the explosive mix between the attempts of "converting to democracy", globalization phenomenon and the increasing poverty at alarming levels in the deliberately destabilized regions of Middle East and Africa. The most relevant description of the migration phenomenon is that of a combined outcome of wars, natural disasters and unprecedented demographic growth in precisely those countries where the economic interests of the great powers have deliberately destabilized the diverse and fragile forms of government, in order to control exclusively the exploitation of natural wealth and protect the post-colonial interests, under the so devalued pretext of "aid" in the name of peace.

The mechanisms by which the Great Powers influence the development of illegal migration phenomenon through the continuous export of democracy and Western values are not extremely complicated and do not require complex analyzes. The export of "good", which today produces more harm than ever before, together with an explosion of the migration phenomenon, indeed began a long time ago.

1. Phenomenon, actors and causes

Many international actors are evolving on this scene, but the transatlantic colossus of USA distinguish oneself through it's in the matter politics, which, after the destruction of the former Soviet Union, becomes, as so plastic emphasize Samuel Huntington, a "solitary superpower". A young state with a past that easily fits in two chapters of the history, since the beginning,

scrupulously looked outside his borders, pretending a multitude of geopolitical considerations. At the level of the speech that supports the armed interventions accompanied, of course, by the "commercialization" of good and civilization for the purpose of strategic supremacy and the protection of economic interests, there is nothing else but the emaciate concept of "defending the democratic values".

USA President George W. Bush in 2002 has included in the so-called "Axis of Evil" the states: Libya, Syria and Cuba, along with those already titled: Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Libya and Syria are currently countries with an impressive migration rate, economically and politically destroyed countries, where the state structures are almost non-existent. It is simple to observe how this phenomena affect each other, for example in Syria, which since before February 2011 was overwhelmingly burdened by a fulminant demographic index, by inflation masked with huge prices and rents due to the influx of Iraq refugees, had all the ingredients needed for a social explosion. From the migration point of view, Afghanistan is also closely associated, where as a response reaction to the September 11, 2001 attack, the United States intervened in force, initially looking for the presumed aggressor in person if Osama Bin Laden, the military half-failure culminating with the establishment of a pro-American regime to Kabul. In Iraq, the bluff[1] of mass destruction weapons, sustained and promoted by Secretary of State Colin Powell, was unveiled, the country completely destroyed and without any hope regarding its rebirth. The recent tensions between the United States and North Korea confirm the adherence to a strict agenda of the American strategy characterized by attack and / or in some situations, hostile interventions in the domestic affairs of many states, or practicing a form of isolation of those states at international level with all negative consequences resulting from this actions, up to the imposition of commercial embargos. The repolarization of the world according to the American strategic visions is a desideratum with the role of premonition for the countries that do not assimilate it thus, this definitively dividing the world in the 21st century between states which are cooperating with the USA in the fight against terrorism and the rest of them. There is no place for concessions, and in this context no middle way can be expected, "promoting democracy" being a basic principle since Clinton administration. What we see most often through the media is almost certainly vitiated by the impact of influential agents or NGOs that have the "good" habit of funding opposition movements capable of bringing to power certain pro-Western or Pro-American majorities, all these actions are carried out on the basis of a methodically designed plan and under strict control of power structures from the shadow. At the origins of such initiatives are organizations[2] created and established by the American Congress itself. Beside this veiled spearhead, the United States dispose of a whole variety of organisms that both together and separately "make bows and bring oblations" to the grandiose messages such as: the spread of democracy, the development of a free market, and the already so used concept of civil society. Thus, precisely in the countries that impress by the migrants quotas, "export democracies" arise and most often are corrupt, unfair and abusive, but they are in a certain relationship of vassalage towards the supreme master. In such a context, it can be unequivocally be stated the fact that an extremely wide range of activities ranging between: the political course to the government of some parties up to the repositioning the national borders of many countries from the Middle East and Africa, having in common Islamic beliefs, are imposed from outward, where NGOs do not yet have the desired power, and from inward with the help of "loyalty" of their friendly governments, and at

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[1] Andrei Luca Popescu, The man whose lies have triggered the war in Iraq declares: "My goal was to tear down the oppressor", available at the following link: http://www.gandul.info/international/omul-ale-carui-minciuni-au-declansat-razboiul-din-irak-se-destainuie-scopul-meu-a-fost-sa-l-daram-pe-tiran-9471342, accessed on 13.10.2017.

[2] The National Democracy Fund is a non-profit organization in the US that was founded in 1983 with the stated purpose of promoting democracy abroad. It is funded through an annual allocation from the US Congress in the form of a grant given through the United States Information Agency. Bipartisan, private and non-profit corporation, which in its turn, acts as a financing foundation. In addition to the grant program, this organization supports and hosts the Democracy Diary, the World Democracy Movement, the International Forum for Democratic Studies, the Reagan-Fascell Fellowship Program, the Network of Democracy Research Institutes and the International Media Assistance Center.

their designation no longer takes into consideration the traditions, the religion or the secular exchange network on which the native populations of these areas have been structured.

Since the conflict in Vietnam, the United States has always been, in the name of democracy, with a lesser or greater frequency, according to interests, in a repetitive form of warfare modes, which occupied a whole range: invasion, occupation, and counterinsurgency. The lethal combination between globalization, increase of poverty and "provoked" general insecurity in vast regions of Africa and Middle East, has done nothing but stimulate armed conflicts under the banner of religion. These factors, related with the lack of vision of the actors with decision rights at international level and in particular at European Union level, regarding the "Gordian node" in the migration issue, will undoubtedly have major consequences on worlds order.

It is not surprising that the revolutions that covered wide regions from the Middle East to North Africa, have their most active foci in exactly the countries mentioned in the "Axis of Evil". The desiderated result in the end, and supported by the inflatable agents with the occasion of presenting on all world's news channels the committed atrocities, is not the contagion with a sense of fear about the Middle East or the Islamic issue? More than 4,000,000 Syrian citizens have left their parental homes definitely since the beginning of the war, generating the largest post-World War II refugee crisis. This phenomenon analyzed in a wider context may create panic attacks for citizens in many countries, the UNO Agency for Refugee estimated that for 2016 at global level a record number of 65.6 million people[3], has been established, which are either refugees, internally displaced or asylum seekers. In just a few years, Jordan managed to administrate an influx of more than 1.5 million Syrian citizens, amid an impressive unemployment rate and an economy that is at light years from the one of some prosperous countries.

In the particular example of Syria, a set of intricate interests are intended to dictate the agenda in which are unfolding the actions of the parties supported by unsuspected state alliances, the outcome being the complete destruction of the country. In March 2011 at the beginning of the war from Syria, over 250,000 people[4] died, dozens of localities were actually ravaged from the ground, acts of a hard-to-describe atrocities were committed, the immediate consequence being that over 4 million Syrians[5] have fled to neighboring countries, especially in Turkey, but also in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq. From there, some of them continue their epic journey to the European Union, so Syrians, Iraqis, Afghans, Libyans, and Africans meet in this exodus, leaving a traditional Islamic region situated in a constant dissolution.

Also in this context of Syrian conflict, the Russian diplomacy returns in a theatrical way in the new stage development of world diplomacy. The moment is of particular importance and highlights the fact that the USA and its allies have eventually understood that it is appropriate to return to the field of international law, whose limitations have so often been violated. It is obvious that the maintenance of the Tartus naval base, the only marginal exit of the Russian navy to the Mediterranean Sea, is an immediate gain for the Russian Federation along with the transport of hydrocarbons through the passages from Syria, which could evolve until new routes are opened from the Persian Gulf to Europe. The overall picture surprises in an unfortunate situation the powerful region buttresses of the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The picture cannot be complete without bringing on stage the European Union, which has asphyxiated Syria with all possible

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[3] Andrei Ionascu, The UNO Refugee Agency announces a new record of over 65 million displaced people worldwide, available at the following link: http://www.zf.ro/business-international/agentia-onu-pentru-refugiati-anunta-un-nou-record-de-peste-65-de-milioane-de-persoane-stramutate-in-lume-16485291, accessed on 13.10.2017;

[4] Sorin Calciu, Syria: US hotline to report violations of the ceasefire suffer due to language barriers, available at the following link: http://www.agerpres.ro/externe/2016/03/03/siria-hotline-ul-sua-pentru-a-anunta-incalcari-ale-incetarii-focului-sufera-din-cauza-barierelor-lingvistice-04-08-49, accessed on 14.10.2017;

[5] UNHCR, More than four million Syrians fled from war and persecution and became refugees in neighboring countries, making the conflict in Syria the largest UNHCR crisis for refugees in the past 25 years, available at the following link: http://www.unhcr.org/ro/2828-rostiri2015peste-patru-milioane-de-sirieni-au-fugit-de-razboi-i-persecuie-html.html, accessed on 13.10.2017.

embargoes[6] supported by Western propaganda, whose prominent voice of France has sustained various scenarios, including the fact that the Islamic State is a Bashar al-Assad construction. In opposition, Russian diplomacy had from the very beginning a purpose in itself in maintaining Syria's sovereignty and upholding the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the state.

It is also unequivocally that Syria remains, whether we want to recognize it or not, a source of jihadist fighters dangerously close to the center of Europe. Also the US "school case" that counted on the "good terrorists" card, or in other words on the radical Islamism from Afghanistan, to make a hell of the Soviet troops lives cantoned there, or the huge responsibility that lies also on Americans regarding the terrorism emergence and the generalized chaos that followed the invasion of Iraq, are not noticed nor acquired by the European democracies.

The Middle East is endemically bounded by the migratory issues and due to the fact that the Mediterranean Sea has been throughout history a natural frontier, that tends to fade, between Western Europe and the Islamic world.

A considerable part of those who arrived in the Greek islands or other European shores, have traveled along the well-known East Mediterranean[7] route. Turkey represents the first refuge place of despair and dissatisfaction for thousands of migrants.

Figure no 1. The Migratory Routes Map

The geostrategic pivot position of Turkey in the region is booming while the European Union, with its delays, evasions and inert approaches that characterize it, postpones finding a concrete solution to this drama. Even less are scenarios designed to bring an end to the Syrian episode that generated this exodus.

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[6] Darius Mureşan, Syria war: EU, official decision, available at the following link: https://www.dcnews.ro/razboi-siria-ue-decizie-oficiala_544297.html, accessed on 11.10.2017;

[7] FRONTEX, Migratory routes map, available at the following link: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map, accessed on 12.10.2017;

2. Jordan snapshot

Of the everyday commodity that surrounds us, we certainly fail to understand the incomparable dramas that millions of refugees have been through for years looking for „the better”. A brief introduction to the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, located less than 10 km from Syria, can help this demarche/approach. The camp, which is gradually developing into a permanent settlement, was first opened on July 28, 2012 to accommodate Syrian citizens fleeing the violence of the civil war from Syria, according to the latest statistics, the refugee population of the camp was estimated at 79 943. Without claiming to produce a documentary that complies with stringent rigidities in the matter, the budget allocated being a modest one, in 2015, directors Zach Ingrasci and Chris Temple actually lived in the Zaatari camp for 30 days, the result was materialized in the disturbing documentary film Salam Neighbor[8]. The young directors' initiative has remained the only one of its kind, it has not been repeated with the participation of established television trusts in the field, aspect which makes us appreciate how much we are interested in the dramatic changes of thousands of people lives, drifting in looking for the minima of dignity and a portion of food. Thirty-two nonprofit organizations are active in the Zaatari camp to ensure the food and products of strict necessity. The settlement located in the desolate landscape of the Jordanian desert houses Syrian citizens deployed from their places of origin and includes a mixture of erudite and simple people, having an overwhelming majority of inhabitants under 18-year-olds.

Figure no. 2. Syrian conflict, Zaatari refugee camp from Jordan - aerian view

The camp is made up of approximately 30,000 tents and shelters, a limited number of administrative buildings, 3 hospitals, 3 schools and a network of over 3,000 improvised stores selling a wide range of food products, household goods and clothes on the so-called „Champs Elysees" street.

Although there are more schools which works in the camp and huge efforts are being made, basic education for school-age children is an extremely difficult one. Medical services are based on international aid and private donations, but only 50% of the money is provided from these funds. Disturbing is also the trip to this destination, the illegal crossing of the border with Syria, a sort of

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[8] The documentary film which had the first run in Washington, DC at the AFI Docs film festival on June 20, 2015, is part of a wider three-part project focused on the Syrian refugees crisis.

„modern golgota", where parents have to sleep their children with the help of sedatives, so that their crying does not to give the suspect to the authorities. Every month, tens of thousands of people leave Syria, some of them seeking refuge in nearby countries: Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey or Jordan. In Syria, about 80% of the major cities' infrastructure is being destroyed by the never-ending armed conflict. Active support, which could save at least one generation and stabilize the fragile region, from the economically prosperous states side for these host countries, is however to be expected. It looks like we do not want to accept this reality. What means of influence has made us so sincerely believe that we are somehow different from our fellow men emerged in the greatest test of their lives? In order to stabilize the situation, the need for concessions and balance is acutely felt, the myth of distrust and the vicious circle of violence can only be destroyed on a sketch of consensus and understanding.

Conclusions

In this tumultuous security context characterized by the inability of powerful nations to solve their problems in areas of interest in a peaceful way, it is clear that we can not isolate and thus barricade in our own or borrowed beliefs, to wait for the providence hand to correct the harm that have been done.

The complex problematic of international migration, forced by armed conflicts with the whole set of atrocities, political or religious persecutions, which are in a fine connection with economic migration, has become a priority of working agendas for most countries of the world, but also for international organizations with expertise and competence in this field.

In Europe, the dramatic decrease in fertility between 1970 and 1980 had direct result in low birth rates, has given rise today to a situation where the number of working-age inhabitants is in absolute decline. On the other hand, the migrants "exporting" countries from the North African and Middle Eastern have had a high fertility, generating booming populations, relatively young people who are now looking for decent-paid jobs on European markets, in their parental countries being affected in the first place by societal destructuralization, deep political and economic revolutions, and in this context the constant lack of jobs and / or modest remunerations. Migrants who managed to escape the military conflicts from Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria cross the Gibraltar Strait, the land and sea borders shared with Turkey and Greece and the narrow Mediterranean passage separating northern Libya and southern Italy. Beside all this, the past or active conflicts from the African states: Chad, Eritrea, Mali and Nigeria are generating a supplement of the migratory wave with young citizens looking for a job and a minimum decency on the old European continent.

These realities are developing under the eyes of a European Union divided between Member States that tempestuously oppose the reception of refugees and states willingly accepting their quotas, and even more by providing the necessary legal framework for social inclusion. Another truth is the fact that in the context of recent elections in many European countries, they have come to light in parliaments and in some governments[9], extreme right-wing political leaders with racist views, which, on exacerbation background of a deformed image of the citizens from the destination country, regarding refugees, asylum seekers or migrants, generates political and administrative measures in the detriment of these people.

Such political attitudes can develop extremely easily and with a domino effect can generate reprehensible behaviors, tensions and even conflicts between the involved parties. It is obvious that this psychosocial climate plays a radiograph role of European society, for which migrants constitute a complex source of political, economic, social and religious issues.

The European Union is surprised in two hypostases, one in which it manifests itself as a medieval fortress facing this new challenge represented by the migration and one that promotes

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[9] AGERPRES, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban intends to oppose through veto the mandatory refugee quota at European Council meeting, available at the following link: http://www.economica.net/viktor-orban-intentioneaza-sa-se-opuna-prin-veto-cotelor-obligatorii-de-refugiati-presa_130245.html, accessed on 13.10.2017.

excessive tolerance in relation with it. In order to stabilize this situation, the need for balance and concessions is acutely felt in order to identify a new framework for the security of a multicultural and cosmopolitan society with openness to humanity.

Clearly, the European Union is facing these challenges has the necessary resources to respond effectively through political will and the renewal of the cooperation commitments between Member States, which are associated with a proactive and cohesive approach of the European institutions with competences in the field, can generate a European security strategy and policies consequently.

Peace in the Islamic world is a sine qua non condition both for the safety of the 500,000 million European citizens and in regards of the predictability of the European Union's policies in migration matter, with its highly sensitive problems related to security, identity, cultural adaptation and economic development.

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27. http://www.economica.net/viktor-orban-intentioneaza-sa-se-opuna-prin-veto-cotelor-obligatorii-de-refugiati-presa_130245.html.

A CHANGE OF PARADIGM IN TERRORIST PRACTICES IN CONTEMPORARY ATTACKS

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Abstract: It is an acknowledged fact that the 9/11 attacks represented a change in the means and tactics used by terrorists in order to achieve their goals. Since then, attacks have been massive in impact and the number of victims, with perpetrators choosing to detonate themselves in crowded areas, hitting symbolic buildings and thus shattering the feelings of comfort and safety that many enjoyed. Moreover, while these attacks were massive in impression, they were also rare in occurrence.

Nowadays, a new pattern has emerged, combining not so massive attacks, with more frequent ones. Additionally, the modus operandi has suffered alterations: detonations in crowded areas, but not crowded enough to provoke thousands of casualties (such as subways, buses), simultaneous detonations in multiple areas (see the Paris bombing of 2015), assassinations (Charlie Hebdo) and the latest pattern: driving vans into crowds/crowded areas.

Keywords: terrorism, vehicular terrorism, paradigm, changes, training.

Introduction

Although terrorism as a practice has been going back in time to centuries before, it was only on the verge of the 21st century that it gathered momentum as a situation-changer. The 9/11 attacks represented a turning point in terrorist practices, marking a move from secluded acts to more visible ones, which can provoke mass casualties, and have a larger impact on the political situation.

The attacks of 9/11 and onwards were characterized through a large degree of organization, had radicalization and fundamentalism at their core and were highly costly in terms of preparation. However, another turning point occurred in attacks post 2014, when the emphasis was no longer on such elaborated attacks, but rather on random ones, more frequent, with a lower degree of preparation and with a non-discriminatory choice of victims. Paradoxically, although the attacks themselves lack preparation and organization (choosing to ram vans into crowded areas, stabbing people at markets, etc.), the choice of such attacks perpetrated in the very heart of Europe – Paris, then Brussels, then Berlin and other European cities, symbolizes, on the one hand, an attempt of the perpetrators to expand to a global level, while on the other it marks a departure from lone attacks in Europe (see Madrid and London), to more coordinated ones[1].

Although the main perpetrator to be referred to in this paper is the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh), there are other terrorist organizations, such Al-Qaeda or Boko Haram, to name just a few, which resort to such practices. However, on account of the lack of space in the present article, as well as the need to further develop this analysis in the future, most references and examples shall include the Islamic State.

The aim of the present article is to investigate the changes occurred in the pattern of terrorist practices in recent years, as well as the motivations lying at their foundation. In this regard, a

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[1] ***, *Changes in modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks*, EUROPOL, 18th January 2016, p. 5, available at https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-in-modus-operandi-of-islamic-state-terrorist-attacks, accessed 20th October 2017.

compare and contrast study shall be performed throughout the article. The first part of the article shall focus on analysing the "new terrorism", as has been named the sum of terrorist practices post 9/11. In the second part, the author shall present an overview of the terrorist attacks of the past years – 2014 onwards, focusing on strengthening the means employed and the frequency. Finally, the third part of this article shall refer to the elements constituting the foundation of these new practices of terrorism, at the same time as launching new directions of research in this regard, as the subject is far from being exhausted.

1. Defining terrorism and the "new terrorism"

From a doctrinaire point of view, terrorism should be defined based on motivations – "terrorism involves political goals and motives. It is violent or threats to use violence. It is conceived in order to induce fear among the target audience, which extends beyond the immediate victims of violence. Acts of violence are developed by an identifiable organization. They involve non-state actors, or actors which are victims of violence, either perpetrators, or both. Eventually, acts of violence are intended to create power in a situation in which there is no such power"[2].

Additionally, terrorism can be defined as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through acts of violence or the threat of resorting to acts of violence with the aim of producing political changes. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat to use it. Another aim of terrorist threats is to generate long-term psychological effects, both for immediate victims, as well as through contagion. Thus, terrorism is meant to generate fear and intimidate a vast "target-audience", consisting of rival ethnical and religious groups, an entire country, a national government, or simply put, the public opinion in general. Moreover, the intention of certain terrorist acts is to create power where it does not exist, or to consolidate it where it is rather weak. Throughout the publicity added to terrorist acts, the perpetrators aim to create leverage, influence and power where they are absent, and especially in those areas where there is lack of possible change to be enacted[3].

After 9/11, more and more researchers and decision-makers started referring to a new form of terrorism. For instance, Tony Blair mentioned the Al-Qaeda attack as a defining element of this new type of terrorism – "This mass terrorism is the new evil in our world today. It is perpetrated by fanatics who are utterly indifferent to the sanctity of human life and we, the democracies of this world, are going to have to come together to fight it together and eradicate this evil completely from our world"[4].

Unlike the previous forms of terrorism, which were more national in manifestation, the new type of terrorism is transnational by manner, and operates within the framework of feebly-organized networks. Other features include: suicide as a modus operandi, the perpetrators are inspired by religion and perceived as fanatics, they intend to achieve access to weapons of mass destruction in order to kill as many people as possible, and the choice of target is a non-discriminatory one[5].

Authors such as Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman and more recently Max Abrams[6], refer to another essential concept in the study of terrorism: the rationale behind these terrorist acts. Although many terrorist organizations, especially average ones do not have very well defined objectives, as well as no virtual connection between goals and means, "a campaign of terrorist

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[2] James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz, *Global Terrorism*, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 9.
[3] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 2 ed., Columbia University Press, 2006, p. 41.
[4] Tony Blair, *Statement at the Trade Union Conference on the 9/11 Attacks*, 11 September 2001, available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/tblair9-11-01.htm, accessed 15 March 2015.
[5] Isabelle Duyvesteyn, "How New is the New Terrorism?", in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 27, No. 5, 2004, p. 444.
[6] Max Abrams, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work?", in *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2006, p. 44.

actions depends on a rational political choice, since the very actions need to be the expression of decision taken by an organization which can become a political means of opposition to the government"[7]. Putting this rational into practice is done through the establishment of motivation and an evaluation of intended political results. Furthermore, resorting to means of terrorism is done through the evaluation of available fighting means.

The previous type of terrorism was justified based on more traditional motivations: nationalism, state-building as an ideology, various doctrines – Marxism, Leninism, Maoism[8], while at the foundation of the "new terrorism", one can find religiously millenarist inspired perceptions, emphasizing the Islamic-fundamentalism fuelled terrorism, followed by the desire of perpetrators to commit acts which can produce a large number of victims[9]. More likely, these are to be achieved through the resort to suicide acts.

Robert Pape performs a precise analysis of suicide terrorists, by introducing the concept of "art of martyrdom"[10], pointing out that beyond those elements pertaining to the individual – religious indoctrination and a psychological predisposition, suicide acts are more thoroughly prepared and organized in advance. Thus, they are strategically thought of and prepared, without leaving anything at chance. Their aim is to force modern democracies to make significant changes in favour of those groups resorting to such practices. Their development as a modus operandi for such groups is based on the fact that states usually succumb to threats of large numbers of civilian casualties[11]. In addition to this, Pape draws a classification of terrorism forms: demonstrative terrorism, meant to draw attention, destructive terrorism, intended to use force in order to gather support for the established aims and suicide terrorism, seen as the most aggressive of them all.

2. Overview of terrorist practices post 2014

In more recent years, there has been an increase in acts of terrorism which have less casualties, and need less resources to provoke havoc.

Since January 2015, it has become obvious that terrorist choose easy means to engage in such attacks, preferring the surprise element, instead of deadly weapons. While before 2015, it was highly difficult to procure the instruments, after 2015, almost anyone can provoke a terrorist attack, but using a gun or a van. Exceptions are the multiple attacks in Paris, in November 2015 and in Brussels, in March 2016, when the attackers resorted to detonating explosive vests (only in some cases in the Paris attack).

However, it is noteworthy that the change of paradigm occurred only in the Western countries, or countries connected to the West. In the Middle East, as well as Africa and Asia, such attacks continue to be performed by resorting to bombings, explosions of various devices, etc. Consequently, the question that needs to be answered is "What changed in the West, in order to require such a change in pattern?". It is difficult to achieve a correct answer; however, the West failed in addressing properly the phenomenon of terrorism, showing itself un-prepared and lacking imagination, as far as prevention is concerned.

Table no. 1 shows the transition from bombing attacks to shooting and driving vans into the crowd.

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[7] Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism", in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1981, p. 386.
[8] *Idem* (ed.), *Terrorism in Context*, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, pp. 13-17.
[9] Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000, p. 15.
[10] Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism", in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003, p. 343.
[11] *Ibidem,* pp. 345-346.

Table 1. List of terrorist attacks in the Trans-Atlantic area since 9/11

No.	Date	Location	Type of attack
1.	September 11, 2001	New York, Washington, etc.	Plane hijacking
2.	March 9, 2004	Madrid	Bomb explosion in several metro trains
3.	July 7, 2005	London	Bus bombing and bomb explosion in a metro station
4.	April 2013	Boston	Bomb explosion during a marathon
5.	December 2014	Dijon	A van hit pedestrians in 5 locations in Dijon
6.	January 2015	Paris	Shootings at the Charlie Hebdo headquarters
7.	November 2015	Paris	6 coordinated attacks in different areas of Paris, combining bomb explosions and shootings
8.	March 2016	Brussels	Bombings at the Zaventem Brussels Airport
9.	July 2016	Nice	Driving a lorry straight into a crowd of people
10.	December 2016	Berlin	Driving a truck in a Berlin Christmas Market
11.	March 2017	London	Driving a car into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge
12.	April 2017	Stockholm	Driving a truck in a crowd in central Stockholm
13.	June 2017	London	Driving a van into pedestrians on London Bridge, followed by a stabbing spree in the area around
14.	June 2017	London	Driving a van into worshippers at a Muslim fair in London
15.	August 2017	Paris	Driving a car into a group of patrolling soldiers
16.	August 2017	Barcelona	Driving a van into a crowded area of Barcelona

There are several tendencies to be observed when studying such attacks. Firstly, there is a reduction in the number of victims. From the massive number of victims of the 9/11 attacks, the latest attacks have resulted in fewer victims. For instance, the Paris attack of August 2017 only produced 3 injured people. On the other hand, there is an increase in frequency of the attacks. As can be seen in the table above, from one attack every several years, the number increased to six attacks only this year.

Furthermore, the change in pattern has only occurred in the Western countries, since a close investigation of terrorist attacks occurring in Middle East and Northern Africa countries shows the same modus operandi that used to be employed in Europe as well – bomb explosions, detonations, suicide bombers, etc. Added to these, there are also massacres and killings (especially in the case of African countries). An explanation for such a change in pattern is the difficulty to procure the needed material to build an explosive device. Whereas in Europe, as of 9/11, a tighter control has

been imposed on arms' regime and the access to explosives, in the case of the Middle East and Northern Africa, access to such weapons is hardly limited due to the remaining weapons of the Cold War period, and their falling into the hands of warlords and insurgent factions. Moreover, the favourite weapon of these perpetrators is the AK-47, which is easily accessible, as well as easy to transport from one neighbouring country to another.

3. Changes in paradigm of attacks after 2015

The attack of Charlie Hebdo, in January 2015, brought a new dimension to terrorist practices. Although the attack does not fit the non-discriminatory pattern, as the case of the Charlie Hebdo magazine was a highly intentional one, it does match the other features: less resources employed, fewer victims (although not negligible), a violent dimension of the crime, etc.

And the Charlie Hebdo attack opened the way for similar attacks, which led to a new perspective on terrorism, a more troubling one, since it is difficult to establish means of reaction and counter-attack. The main features of this new type of terrorism, some of which have been hinted above, shall be presented in greater detail.

Changes in patterns of recruitment and personal modelling. Although the perpetrators come from the very countries they attack, being third or fourth generation citizens or related to, they are no longer involved in the strenuous radicalization process. Previously, and especially in the case of Al-Qaeda, radicalization was the key element in devising an attack. Nowadays, terrorist networks prefer to rely more on individuals having criminal records and in some cases, a history of mental problems[12].

Indiscriminate killings – the choice of target is often based on resources and capabilities. Moreover, a preference for soft targets has been shown, killing randomly pedestrians and people whom are to be found at the scene, instead of highly visible politicians, as one would have thought of to be the target.

Choice of targets – this is to be coupled with the previous feature, as the attacks are focused on people, instead of critical infrastructure or cyber-attacks. This is translated into taking terrorism to a new level, as these organisations have shown their potential through the 9/11 attacks firstly. Currently, it is all reduced to finding new challenges that cannot be foreseen by the authorities in charge with protection.

Choice of weapons – be they AK-47 or vans/cars/lorries, such means provide for spontaneity, lack of excessive costs and no need for previous training. Such weapons of choice are easy to procure and easy to transport. Using AK-47 and vans/cars/vehicles is less conspicuous than attempting CBRN attacks, which require careful preparation and long training as far as their tackling is concerned.

Maximization of effects with minimum efforts and costs – these attacks cost less (acquiring a car/renting it/buying guns/knives, etc.), but the damages they inflict are in the long term: deaths, a feeling of national insecurity, drops in the economy of states, etc. Furthermore, as Don DeLillo put it "terrorism is the language of being noticed"[13]. Thus, these attacks do not necessarily require a large number of victims, since any casualty resulting from such an attack attracts publicity. Even a single victim is sufficient enough to attract attention over the cause, and this attention remains a defining element of terrorism.

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[12] EUROPOL, *op.cit.* p. 6.

[13] Gordon Woo, *Understanding the principles of terrorism risk modelling from the attack in Westminster*, RMS, March 27th, 2017, p. 2, available at http://forms2.rms.com/rs/729-DJX-565/images/TerrorismModeling Principles_Charlie_Hebdo_Gordon_Woo_RMS.pdf, accessed 16th October 2017.

Preference for "vehicular terrorism", relying on the fact that such attacks are spontaneous, imply minimal costs, both in terms of resources and training – "a vehicle ramming plot only requires a licensed driver, no experience or training are required"[14]. As far as vehicular terrorism is concerned, some authors claim that prevention can be achieved by installing bollards and bulwarks[15] in crowded areas. However, this will only take the choice of targets to secondary streets, where it is not possible to install such obstacles[16].

By choosing to act in such a random manner, having as a main advantage the incapacity of authorities to foresee the next attack, as well as the means of perpetrating, the Islamic State shows its tremendous power of striking everywhere, at any time and at any target[17]. Immediately after the November 2015 attacks of Paris, members of EUROPOL established that "(…) IS has developed an external actions command trained for <special forces style> operations abroad, to include the EU and France in particular. This could mean that more attacks such as those that took place in Paris in November are currently being planned and prepared"[18]. The forecast was rather accurate, as can be seen from the table above.

Furthermore, "the nature and structure of the training apparently enables IS operatives to execute terrorist attacks in an emotionally detached manner, as demonstrated in the shootings in Paris"[19]. This pattern remains in line with the martyrdom dimension which characterized the earlier attacks of the 2000s.

Vehicular terrorism is even more difficult to tackle than other form of terrorism, as it combines the element of surprise with the lack of prevention. Apart from the knowledge established that such attacks are prone to happen in Europe, as a form of manifestation of the Islamic State's strategy of going global, it is almost impossible to foresee the next attack, its manner as well as the location.

Conclusions

Taking everything into consideration, it is safe to say that the past years' attacks have taken the asymmetry of terrorism to an entire new level. The change in modus operandi does not mean an abandonment of previous tactics, but rather a complication of them, and implicitly, a complication of the means to counter them.

According to Gordon Woo, "terrorists follow the path of least resistance in their actions"[20], a principle dating back to Sun Tzu's "Art of War". Ergo, the choice of targets with less security elements around. After having demonstrated that they can penetrate through heavy security protocols, as the 9/11, Madrid and London attacks have demonstrated it, a choice of softer targets represents the taking of the game to a new level of challenge, taking advantage of the lack of provision of authorities in securing other targets as well.

As mentioned above, there are particular elements of the new type of terrorism for which scholars have yet to develop means of countering. Furthermore, a close cooperation between decision-makers, national police and intelligence agencies is to be cultivated, given the degree of uncertainty of such attacks, increased also by adjoining elements, such as the criminal record of the

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[14] *Ibidem*, p.7.
[15] ***, *Vehicular Terrorism: The threat behind the wheel*, Corporate Risk Services G4S, 2017, pp. 8-12, available at http://www.g4s.us/en/Learn-More/G4S-Knowledge-Center/Whitepapers/Vehicular-Terrorism-The-Threat-Behind-the-Wheel, accessed 13th October 2017.
[16] Woo, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
[17] EUROPOL, *op. cit.* p. 3
[18] *Ibidem*, p. 5.
[19] *Ibidem*, p. 6.
[20] Woo, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

perpetrators and their history of mental illnesses. Such elements aggravate the dimension of the deed to be performed, but also bring an air of de-sacralization of the deed, since the perpetrator is no longer looking for redemption, but acting on violent impulses which have been ably cultivated by groups such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda.

The aim of the present article has been to launch several research ideas, to be explored in the future, taking into consideration all the variable elements of contemporary acts of terrorism.

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LOW COST TERRORISM OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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Abstract: Always voluntarily, subjectively and extremely brutal, terrorism manifests itself in a multitude of forms, being the most acute form of violence after interstate conflicts and civil wars that accompanies mankind throughout history.

Nowadays, there are more and more attacks that involve lower costs, the attackers choosing to cause as many victims as possible by driving into the crowd or choosing to use a knife in their bloody actions.

Is the knife attack a new form of terrorism? Of course not. History has recorded a series of such acts of violent nature over the centuries, in order create fear and influence mankind, even if at the time they were not called terrorist acts.

Today we are confronted with similar attacks, in which terrorists accept the idea of personal sacrifice, acting for the killing of those considered exponents of their hostile society.

Keywords: terrorism, terrorist attack, low-cost terrorism, European terrorism, new terrorism, knife attack.

Introduction

It is a common fact that in the debates specific to security studies, military science, intelligence studies, politics, criminology, sociology, security culture, etc. terrorism, terror and the terrorist phenomena are complex concepts that have many definitions and meanings, numerous interpretations and meanings, numerous objections.

Terrorism is the antisocial phenomenon that causes anxiety, fear and horror, shock and chaos, civil society disturbances. Of course, there are some special characteristics of terrorism, such as violence, premeditation, being directed at a singular target or a target group and, most importantly, it aims to spread fear and terror and it is antisocial and usually wishes to convey a ideological, political, religious message, to influence the course of history.

Brian Jenkins notes in two of his works *"International terrorism"*[1] and *"The New Global Terrorism"*[2] that *"terrorism is violence or the threat of violence designed to create an atmosphere of fear and panic - in a word, to terrorize - and thereby producing a social or political change"*[3], as the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as *"illicit use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or force a government, the civilian population or any part of them as an element of pursuing political or social goals."*

Both - the threat and the international community's reaction to it - have major consequences and implications for the whole of the social life and, above all, to the way in which military capabilities are engaged and used for all combat operations.[4]

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[1] Brian M. Jenkin*s, "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict"*, in David Carlton & Carlo. Schaerf (eds.), International Terrorism and World Security, Croom Helm, London, 1975.

[2] Brian M. Jenkins, *"The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems"*, The RAND Corp, Santa Monica CA, 1980.

[3] Brian M. Jenkins, *op. cit.*

[4] Mihail Popescu, *"Implicații ale terorismului asupra acțiunilor militare"*, The Military Science Magazine 1, Bucharest, 2002, p.9, *Apud:* Neculai Stoina, *"Evoluția fenomenului terorist și implicații asupra acțiunilor militare"*, available online: http://www.armyacademy.ro/reviste/3_2004/r4.pdf , last accessed on October 8, 2017.

Terrorism relies on power and uses publicity to induce change, deliberately exploiting fear, violence or threat, pursuing political change as well as psychological effects beyond target groups. Fear is disseminated by the media and by our collective and individual responses to acts of terrorism. Much of the power of terrorism is derived from the response to the terrorist act and not because the act itself.[5]

Today's specialized literature defines terrorism as a violent, premeditated act committed by conspiratorial organizations of destructive or individual character against dignitaries, political, economic, scientific, military, cultural, diplomatic institutions for the purpose of revenge, obliging the "target" to adopt a conducive behaviour for the authors, raising awareness of a particular cause, undermining political stability, and satisfying certain claims.

It can be said that terrorism has as its aims: the fear that seeks to destroy the morals of society, to create disorder, anxiety, insecurity, create a climate of panic; the challenge of counteracting actions, as far as possible exaggerated by the state; influencing public opinion; crushing social resistance; raising money for terrorist purposes; liquidation of personalities deemed undesirable; condemning, "terrorizing" others perceived to be guilty of something; to strengthen the moral of terrorists and to keep them as high as possible; the determination of power failures in the direction, for example, of the release of arrested terrorists.[6]

1. Evolutionary Trends of Terrorism in the 21st Century

From 2000 to 2015, there have been 48,000 terrorist attacks, responsible for the loss of 107,000 human lives across the planet.[7] In 2014, 17,958 people were killed in terrorist attacks, an increase of 61% over the previous year.[8] From all, 82% of the victims of the global terrorist attacks were registered in five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. Four groups dominated the initiation of these attacks: the Taliban, Boko Haram, DAESH (ISIS), and Al Qaeda.[9]

According to Warren Chin, terrorist groups can be characterized on the basis of their motivation: religiously inspired terrorism; ethnic and nationalist; far-left extremist; far-right extremist; with a single target; and state terrorism.[10]

In the 21st century, the activity of religiously inspired terrorists is becoming increasingly popular. The Taliban, Boko Haram, DAESH (ISIS) and Al Qaeda are linked groups by joining them to an extreme interpretation of Salafist Islam that strongly relies on the use of violence.[11]

Religion represents faith in sacred, divine, supernatural, but it is also a moral code, part of the culture of each individual, community, society. It is the expression of trust in the existence of an entity above us, the palpable world in which we live. "God invoked as guarantor"[12] promises radical change and a new fundamental configuration of the future, terrorists feeling the need to preserve religious identity, violence being motivated by the necessity of sacrifice to attain the divine goal pursued.[13]

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[5] Bruce Hoffman, *"Inside Terrorism The Changing Meaning of Terrorism"*; 2nd Edition. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. p. 27.

[6] Luminița-Ludmila Cîrnici Anica, *"Terorismul european și impactul asupra securității naționale"*, Topform Publishing House, Geostrategy Collection, Bucharest, 2017.

[7] *** Institute of Economics and Peace, *"Global Terrorism"*, index 2014, p.12.

[8] *Idem.*

[9] James & Brenda Lutz*, "Is Terrorism a Serious Threat to International and National Security?"* in *"Contemporary Debates about Terrorism"*, edited by Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair Abingdon: Routledge, 2012, 61-75.

[9] Warren Chin, *"NATO and the Future of International Terrorism and Counterterrorism"*, NATO Centre of Excellence Defence against terrorism, Ankara, 2015.

[10] Warren Chin, *"NATO and the Future of International Terrorism and Counterterrorism"*, NATO Centre of Excellence Defence against terrorism, Ankara, 2015.

[11] According to Warren Chin, *op. cit.,* p.3.

[12] Magnus Ranstorp, *"Terrorism in the name of Religion"*, in *"Journal of International Affairs"*, vol.50, nr.1, 1996, pp. 41-42, *Apud:* Ion Aurel Stanciu, Vasile Soare, *"Mic tratat de istorie a terorismului"*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, pp.132-133.

[13] Luminița Ludmila Cîrnici Anica, *op. cit.*

The exacerbation of ethnic-religious conflicts in the context of globalization, social and economic inequality, all kinds of repressions, has radically shunned society and has encouraged the unprecedented development of organizations such as Al Qaeda or ISIS (ISIL/DAESH), proving themselves capable to take advantage of the moment to attract more and more followers.

Religious fundamentalism, whether Islamic or not, is just another face of extremist terrorism, circumscribed to cruel, surprising, vengeful, and cold violence.[14] However, it should be stressed that not belonging to a certain religion (or another) leads to terrorism, but only extremism of any kind (including, or especially, religious) can lead to this.

Fundamentalist terrorism has evolved from state terrorism with a strategic target coordinated by Iran that recruits from the Shiite or Middle Shiite environments to marginal terrorism without strategic targets, recruiting from peripheral Sunni elements. This type of terrorism is not very easy to spot, most of the actors have European nationality and join the "Jihad" without being tied to their home country, nourishing their frustration against society.

The religious terrorists we are confronted with now strive at every level: military, economic, psychological, and spiritual. Their arsenal is not only military, as their most dangerous and powerful weapon is spiritual terror.[15] Probably the worst aspect of religious terrorism is that it aims to destroy any moral distinction or distinction in itself.[16] Its purpose is to create confusion, both among the sympathizers, especially among those who should fight against it.[17]

2. "Low cost" terrorism

The Europol report highlights worrying developments on two levels, namely: *"the global terrorist threat is compounded by a substantial number of foreign fighters returned to the Member States as well as a significant increase in nationalist feelings"*,[18] anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia are being highlighted and are triggering far-right acts. Migration also contributes to increased insecurity in states.[19] The terrorist threat to the EU in 2016 emanated from remote individuals who acted alone or in small groups and from those who could only have been inspired by terrorist propaganda. The formers receive personal instructions from a terrorist organization and may be helped by this. The others are individual attackers, possibly, but not necessarily, being helped by family and / or friends or accomplices. They are inspired by jihadist propaganda and messaging, but they do not necessarily receive personal guidance or instructions from any group.[20]

Vehicles were used as weapons for attacks, or individual attackers only used white weapons, knives, machetes.

2.1. Individual attacks in France in 2016
On January 7, 2016, a man wearing what looked like an explosive vest and outside the Goutte d'Or police station in Paris was shot and killed as he tried to force the entrance.[21]

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[14] Gheorghe Văduva, *"Terorismul, dimensiune geopolitică şi geostrategică. Războiul terorist. Războiul împotriva terorismului"*, Center for Strategic Security Studies, UNAP Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, p.31.

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In January 2016, a Jewish teacher, wearing a traditional *Kippa* dress, was attacked and injured with a machete in Marseilles as he went to work. The striker was a 15-year-old boy who arrived in France in 2010.[22]

On June 13, 2016, a French police commander and his wife were stabbed dead by a former convict for terrorist offenses. The officer was attacked when he arrived in front of his home in Magnanville near Paris. Subsequently, the striker entered the house, where the officer's wife and three-year-old son were. After the police put an end to the attack, they found the child's mother dead, the boy surviving. After the woman's murder, the attacker broadcast a live statement on the spot, through the media, on a social networking site, in which he promised loyalty to IS and demanded more attacks. The A'maq News agency published the online video and a statement according to which the attack was carried out by an IS fighter.[23]

On July 26, 2016, two attackers armed with knives entered Saint Etienne-du-Rouvray (near Rouen) during the early prayers and killed a 86-year-old priest and seriously injured a nun. He was one of the five hostages taken by the authors (the others escaped unharmed), while the two attackers, both aged 19, filmed in front of the altar. The terrorists were shot by police at the exit of the church. It is known that one of them had tried to travel to Syria twice in 2015.[24]

On the evening of July 14, 2016, a 31-year-old Tunisian, who lived in France, attacked the crowd at the Bastille in Nice, driving a truck two kilometers away from the crowd of people who participated in a Fireworks show on the Promenade des Anglais. The attacker killed 85 people, including 10 children, and injured a few hundred and shot his gun at police officers before being shot dead. Evidence from mobile phones and computer records suggest that he would have planned his attack a year before.[25]

Vehicles were also used as weapons for attacks in France prior to this attack, including in Valence in January, and in Dijon and Nantes in December 2014. These attacks were, however, relatively small compared to the Nice strike.

2.2. Individual attacks in Germany in 2016

A similar attack to that of Nice was held on December 19 in Berlin, Germany. A truck was driven to a Christmas market downtown located, killing 12 people and injuring 56 others. The incident took place near the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church, an area frequented by both tourists and locals. The IS claimed the attack through a news conference A'maq News, after calling the attacker a "soldier" who "carried out the attack in response to appeals to citizens against the international coalition." The attacker, a 24-year-old Tunisian citizen with a criminal record in Tunisia and Italy, arrived in Europe 5 years earlier on the Italian island of Lampedusa and then he arrived to Germany where he applied for political asylum. Prior to the attack, he made a movie in which he promised to be subject to IS and provided him with A'maq News. Three days later he was shot after attacking a police officer in Sesto San Giovanni, a suburb of Milan (Italy), during a routine check-up.[26]

The Berlin attack was preceded by a series of other attacks that were completed, failed or countered in Germany in 2016.

The first incident with a violent jihadist signature took place on February 26, when a 15-year-old Moroccan girl stabbed and seriously injured a police officer in Hanover with a kitchen knife. The incident took place at the main station after two police officers approached the girl and

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[22] Articles available online:https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/world/europe/teenager-attacks-jewish-teacher-in-marseille-with-a-machete.html,https://www.timesofisrael.com/teen-jihadi-proud-of-attack-on-jewish-man-in-marseille/ accessed on October 9, 2017.

[23] Article *"French jihadist murders police couple at Magnanville"*, BBC News, June 14, 2016, available online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36524094, accessed on October 9, 2017.

[24] *"Europol Report 2017"*, *op. cit.*

[25] *"Europol Report 2017"*, *op. cit.*

[26] *Idem.*

asked her to present identity papers.[27] After police arrested her, they found that she had a second bigger knife. The woman was at the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2015 to join IS, but returned to Germany on January 28, 2016.[28]

On July 18, a 17-year-old Afghan refugee attacked with a machete and a knife the passengers on board a train heading to Würzburg in southern Germany. Five people were seriously injured. The striker ran off the train, but he was followed by officers who shot him dead.[29] The criminal would have travelled to Germany as an unaccompanied minor in 2015. A video released by IS shows him taking a speech in Pashto in front of the camera while holding a knife in his hand. The video calls him a "soldier of the Islamic state who carried out the Würzburg attack".[30]

On July 24, in Ansbach, near Nuremberg, a 27-year-old Syrian committed suicide and injured 12 people - three very seriously - by detonating a bomb placed in his backpack. It seems that the music festival that started in Ansbach was the target. He entered Germany in 2014 and applied for asylum, but his request was denied one year later; however, he was allowed to remain in Germany because of the Syrian war. He was known by the police because he had attempted suicide twice and was in psychiatric care. A'maq News Agency, affiliated with IS, said the attacker was an IS soldier, responding to the group's appeals to sympathizers from target countries participating in the US-led coalition against IS in Syria and Iraq.[31]

2.3. Individual attacks in Belgium in 2016

On March 22, Belgium was hit by two large-scale terrorist attacks. Both attacks were coordinated and carefully prepared with a high level of sophistication and logistical support. In the first attack, two suicide bombers detonated improvised explosive devices in the check-in area at Brussels Zaventem Airport, causing the death of 11 people. In the second attack, about an hour later, an improvised explosive device was detonated by a third suicide terrorist in the middle of a metro train wagon arriving at Maelbeek station (located near several EU institutions). Two surviving attackers were subsequently arrested.

One of the suicide terrorists at the airport had been involved in a robbery at a foreign exchange office and in a police shootout, incidents for which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison, but was released in 2014, provided not to leave the country. The suicide bomber of the subway train had previously been convicted of more car thefts, illegal possession of weapons (more Kalashnikov rifles) and a bank robbery in 2009 and kidnapping. All five terrorists were connected to the network that organized and executed the 2015 Paris attacks. A total of 32 people were killed and 340 people were injured in attacks.[32]

Later, during the year, Belgium faced two more terrorist attacks that took place without the impact and sophistication of the attacks in Brussels (international travel, safe houses, use of fake documents, explosives), but they were still serious.

In August, at Charleroi, two police officers were attacked with a machete in front of a police station. Both officers were seriously injured, but without their life being jeopardized. The suspect was a 33-year-old Algerian who had lived in Belgium since 2012 and was known by the police for other crimes, but without any prior link with terrorist activities. He was shot by a third officer who

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[27] Article BBC News *"German girl jailed for IS attack in Hanover"*, January 26, 2017, available online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38757039, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanover_stabbing, accessed on October 11, 2017.

[28] *"Europol Report 2017"*, op. cit.

[29] The Guardian Article *"Teenager shot dead after attacking passengers on train in Germany"*, July 19, 2016, available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/18/about-20-people-injured-in-axe-attack-on-train-in-germany, last accessed on October 11, 2017.

[30] *"Europol Report 2017"*, op. cit.

[31] *Idem.*

[32] *"Europol Report 2017"*, op. cit.

was nearby and then died.[33] On August 7, IS claimed this attack, describing it as a punishment by one of his "soldiers".[34]

In October, two policemen were stabbed in Schaerbeek, northeast of Brussels, by a 43-year-old Belgian citizen. The striker was stopped by a second police group.[35]

3. The history of the first terrorist manifestations, the source of inspiration for today's low cost terrorism

Is the knife attack a new form of terrorism?

The terrorist phenomenon seems almost as old as the very history of mankind, although the term it designates is not older than 220 years.[36]

Even though the events considered today as part of the history of terrorism were not termed terrorist acts nor were efforts made to define the concept, a whole cortege of facts recorded in the history of human violence are naturally and undoubtedly presented as constitutive episodes of the history of terrorism.[37]

The notion of terrorism, according to the unanimous agreement of modern specialists, is a very controversial one, precisely because most historically evoked facts are not always considered so and a very small percentage amongst those considered as terrorists by self-definition. It often happens that those who encounter in a violent conflict may regard each other as terrorists (or qualify the actions of their opponents as terroristic acts) without, however, considering themselves as terrorists (or qualifying in this category their own deeds).[38]

The roots of the terrorist illness and acts considered to be of a terrorist nature, the traces of the specific phenomenon can be detected in the centuries preceding the Christian era. Two significant examples can be mentioned as representations of terror at origins: the first considering an aspect named later as a struggle for national liberation, but equally of religious radicalism and illustrative of the interpenetration of the two dimensions[39], and the second, focusing on the historical moment of defining the relationship between Christianity and Islam, describing the mechanism by which Islam politically managed to influence the course of history.[40]

Historians believe that the first terrorist organization would have been a Jewish one, known as "zealots," with an aggressive and radical attitude to the Roman occupation and administration in Palestine. According to the historian Josephus Flavius, this organization was founded by Judas Galilean[41] and, for the achievement of its political purpose, has developed a famous radical wing for the terrorist assassinations committed both against officials of the Roman mastery and against collaborators with the occupants of the Jews (wealthy elites or priests of temples) and those who

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[33] Article *"Charles Michel: Early indications Charleroi attack was terrorism"* by Kate Day, published in *"Politico"*, Europe Edition, on August 6, 2016, available online: http://www.politico.eu/article/charles-michel-early-indications-charleroi-attack-was-terrorism/ accessed on October 11, 2017.

[34] *"Europol Report 2017", op. cit.*

[35] Article *"Two Brussels Police Stabbed in 'Terror-Related' Attack in Schaerbeek"*, de The Associated Press, NBC News, on October 5, 2016, available online: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/two-brussels-police-stabbed-terror-related-attack-schaerbeek-n660261, accessed on October 11, 2017.

[36] Walter Laqueur, *"A History of Terrorism"*, Transaction Publishers, Dec 31, 2011, p. 6.

[37] Amy Zalman, *"The History of Terrorism; 1st Century BCE-13th Century: Terrorism in the Pre-Modern World"*, available online: http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm, last accessed on October 11, 2017, *Apud:* Luminița-Ludmila Cîrnici Anica, *"Terorismul european și impactul asupra securității naționale",* Topform Publishing House, Geostrategy Collection, Bucharest, 2017.

[38] Paul Reynolds, *"UN staggers on road to reform"*, BBC News, September 14, 2005, available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4244842.stm, last accessed on October 11, 2017, *Apud:* Luminița-Ludmila Cîrnici Anica, *op. cit.*

[39] Luminița Ludmila Cîrnici Anica, *op. cit.* p.74

[40] Luminița Ludmila Cîrnici Anica, *op. cit.* p.75.

[41] Gerard Chaliand, *"The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to al Qaeda"*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. p.68.

paid taxes established and collected by the Roman administration, arguing that such a payment to a foreign emperor is a betrayal of God, the true emperor of the Jews.[42]

Memory of moral and educational value has survived over the centuries, entering into Jewish heritage, events corresponding to the idea of religious terrorism and social terrorism, both by motivation and way of action, as well as by the persistent militant political dimension, the political purpose (influencing the attitude of the occupant those who are tempted to collaborate) and the publicity sought for the deeds committed.[43]

As a result of the mode of operation, zealous "terrorists" were called "siccari" (daggers), committing assassinations in public[44], by stabbing the target (usually civil) with a sicca dagger, disguised under the worn garments. Thus, the author could take advantage of the panic and disappear produced into the crowd, amplifying the feeling of public fear. We are therefore talking about premeditation, preparation, organization, immediate significant goal, pursued aim, but also the clear assumption of risk.[45]

The second example refers to the actions of the organization known as "Assassins". Against the backdrop of the 11th-century political and religious turmoil in the Persian area, eastern Mediterranean (Near East) and Egyptian region of Levant, a sect with violent actions emerged (among Shiite Muslims) in order to promote a radical Islam, with political, social, moral objectives, and punishment for those who are considered enemies of Islam. This Islamic religious movement, very active in the 13th century, has been known in history under the name of *Hashashin* (smokers of hashish)[46], through the operating mode: *Fedayeen* - accepting the idea of personal sacrifice and acting for the killing of political leaders, military and / or religious considered undesirable and hostile to the true Islamic doctrine (Ismail doctrine) or political interests and against Christians.[47]

The method used against the prominent Turkish rulers (the murder of city governors and military commanders) - remained in public consciousness under the name of assassination - given by the name under which the movement entered history, but also the name of an action that has been integrated by modern political science into the arsenal of actions deemed as acts of terrorism.

Among the methods of recruiting and training militants used to carry out the killings relatively ritually, an important place was taken by the kidnapping of the future assassins by the youth and children who were captured directly from the farms in the region and taken to isolated places in mountain areas and trained in long-term training camps, under social isolation and religious indoctrination. So do some terrorist organizations today.

The Assassin militias also committed some assassinations with the purpose of revenge to punish some political, religious or military leaders who had caused difficulties in the movement. During the Cold War, the memory of this type of terrorism is found in the fedayeen, a form of organization, training and action specific to terrorism[48], present in several Arab political organizations (Palestinian, Egyptian, Iraqi), Iranian, Ethiopian / Eritrean, and so on - terrorist, extremist, guerrilla, and so on.[49]

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[42] Luminița Ludmila Cîrnici Anica, *op. cit.* p.75

[43] Bruce Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p.167.

[44] Amy Zalman, *"Sicari: First Century Terrorists"*, available: http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/p/ Sicarii.htm, last accessed on October 11, 2017.

[45] Mark Burgess, *"A Brief History of Terrorism"*, (first published on July 3, 2003), Center for Defense Information, Straus Military Reform Project, Center for Defence Information POGO, February 13, 2015, available online: http://www.pogo.org/straus/issues/other-items/a-brief-history-of-terrorism.html?referrer=https://www.google.ro/ last accessed on October 10, 2017.

[46] Bernard Lewis, *"The Assassins"*, Oxford University Press, April 1987, *Apud:* Nicu Pârlog, *"Aga Khan şi misterioşii ismailiţi"*, January 9, 2011, available online: .http://www.descopera.ro/cultura/8678627-aga-khan-si-misteriosii-ismailiti, last accessed on Occtober 11, 2017.

[47] Luminița Ludmila Cîrnici Anica, *op. cit.*

[48] Constantin Degeratu, Course support *"Teoria generală a securității și apărării"*, UCDC, 2011, electronic version in the database of the Master of Security and Defence Studies/ Faculty of Political Science /UCDC, Bucharest, 2011

[49] In this regard: Robert Ferrigno, *"Prayers for the Assassin"*, Ed. Charles Scribner s Sons Chapter 1, 2006, p.7.

Revenge - as a motivation for assassinations – was a major factor, an enigmatic ingredient of the Assassins' action, a motivation that had acquired historical perennial.[50] The continuity can be found as an obsessive presence in the context of today's terrorist actions, remembering the January 7, 2015, murder of Charlie Hebdo, a French weekly journalist, under the motives of revenge for the offending of the Prophet Muhhamad.[51]

Undoubtedly, this example of terrorist action, operating as a ritual murder, without the suicide of the terrorist agent, and as a motivation for revenge based on religious fanaticism, has its roots in the way of thinking and operation of the Assassins, the spirit of the sect being still alive amongst groups organized under the banner of religious fanaticism.[52]

Conclusions

The European Union faces a series of terrorist threats and Jihadist violent attacks, both from networking groups and from lonely actors (lone wolves). The attacks in Brussels, Nice and Berlin, in particular, with explosives (Brussels) and vehicles (Nice and Berlin), used to randomly kill and target as many people as possible, once again proved that Jihadist militants are capable and willing to commit them against EU citizens, considering them legitimate by their interpretation of the selective religious texts of the sample.[53]

Jihadist actors can be guided by the Islamic state (IS) or just inspired by IS ideology and rhetoric. Jihadist terrorists have used a wide range of weapons, including white weapons, blades, automatic rifles, explosives, and vehicles, and are expected to continue doing so. Attacks can be carefully prepared or spontaneous. Terrorists acting on behalf of IS have been shown to be able to plan relatively complex attacks - including those with multiple goals - quickly and efficiently.

Targets are both individuals and small groups of people who represent the values they consider to be non-Islamic, but also large groups chosen with the intent to cause mass victims, which are by definition considered to be tacit.

Attacks in international locations such as the Brussels-based metro station (close to EU institutions) and Zaventem Airport (an international airport) have a multiplier effect with a guaranteed impact, attracting media attention from around the world.

The guilty of terrorist attacks in the EU include both foreigners, some of whom may have been living in the EU for a long time, but also citizens who grew up in the countries they attacked.

As noted earlier, terrorism is not a new phenomenon, and current forms of manifestation (such as a knife attack, a machete or other light weapons) are not discovered by terrorists only in the latter years. The same attacks have been found in the history of terrorism since ancient times and we can see that they are a source of inspiration, whether conscious or not, for today's terrorism.

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[50] Illustrative in this sense: Peter Lance, *"1000 Years for Revenge"*, Regan Books, 2003.
[51] BBC News Europe – Article of January 14. 2015*: "Charlie Hebdo attack: Three days of terror"*, available online: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237, last accessed on October 10, 2017.
[52] Luminița Ludmila Cîrnici Anica, *op. cit.*
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INTELLIGENCE FROM OPEN SOURCES.
CASE STUDY: 'DABIQ' MAGAZINE

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Abstract: Open Source Intelligence is by far one of the most useful forms of intelligence used by intelligence services in their fight against terrorism and media publications are the one of the main tools used in this activity. Terrorist organizations have learned to use mass media to spread fear among a target group to attract and mobilize supporters, or to undermine the ability of governments to secure the security of their citizens.

Starting from this reasoning, large terrorist groups have over time managed the publishing aspect of their organizations. This is how Inspire, the magazine of the Al Qaeda, Azan magazine and the newest member of this list, the Dabiq magazine – ISISs publication were born.

This paper aims to analyze the role that Dabiq terrorist publication has in the fight against the terrorist phenomenon. Based on the analysis of the images, the sections of the magazine, the authors, and the tune they use, we can determine the role of Open Source Intelligence in preventing and fighting against terrorism.

Keywords: Open source intelligence, ISIS, Dabiq, terrorism, mass-media.

1. Open source intelligence and the fight against terrorism

1.1 OSINT: key elements

The explosion of information and the technological advances that humanity has recorded over the past decades have led to the emergence and development of new forms and methods of information gathering. Major changes have occurred in identifying, analyzing and managing data and information that can be transformed into strategic intelligence, operational or tactical intelligence.

The end of the Cold War brought an important change of vision in the field of information analysis. Until then, the essential characteristics of security information have long been understood exclusively in terms of confidentiality, shrouded in a mysterious aura. The information was held only by those who were prepared to own it, or perhaps more importantly, by those who managed to collect them. The abundance of information produces a change in the way the specialists are trained and how the information is obtained and how it is used.

To prevent and combat terrorist threats, one of the "wicked children" of globalization, intelligence is more than vital, being a key element. The intelligence services have undergone a profound mutation with the 9/11 tragic moment that has been a catalyst for the changes that took place shortly thereafter. Information services around the world have had to update their methods of gathering information and find out the usefulness of some types of intelligence considered marginal until that date. One of these new types of intelligence is open source intelligence (OSINT).

Open Source Intelligence is one of the most recent INTs in the information communities. Its value and importance is increasingly recognized in almost every intelligence service in the world. The former Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, George Cristian Maior,

appreciated that in the context of globalization of information and means of communication, the so-called OSINT gained increasing importance in the management of current security risks[1].

Open Source Intelligence is the result of a process that involves identifying, validating, collecting, collating and analyzing open sources for the purpose of designing products relevant to national security, products that meet specific intelligence requirements[2]. In short, when talking about OSINT, we talk about a suite of information gathered from so-called open or public sources like newspapers, magazines, TVs, Internet sites that find their usefulness in national security.

Information obtained through open sources is also called in the intelligence communities "white information"[3].

The specialized literature divides open sources into two broad categories: *classical* as periodical publications (newspapers, magazines) books, documentary materials (brochures, studies), radio broadcasts (TV, radio stations), so-called *gray literature* which are available through traditional publishing channels such as: official reports and documents, data and information from academic environments, geospatial data) and *new media* emerged and developed over the past decades as (a) social media-blogs, sites, worlds virtual (Second Life etc.) or already famous (b) social networking sites such as Twitter or Facebook.

Exploitation of open sources has produced mutations in intelligence communities. Today it is estimated that about 80-95% of the total data used by information communities is provided through OSINT. Its importance differs from one community to another from a structural point of view, its support and confidence, or its use of the community along with the capacity to adapt to the new paradigms of the globalization process[4].

Like any other form of information gathering or any other intelligence process, OSINT brings a range of opportunities and challenges to intelligence services that come to use it.

Open Source Intelligence is a cheap, fast, intelligent form of information that does not endanger the life of the collector and adds value to the intelligence process. The disadvantages of this form of intelligence arise from the analysis of collected data. The abundance of information that appears may produce the *paradox of plenty* in which the analyst no longer finds the needle in the haystack. Problems may also arise from overloading networks, the predisposition to manipulation or misinformation, and the possibility of collecting incompletely validated information that may harm the entire intelligence process. The solution that intervenes in this situation is related to the integration of intelligence obtained from open sources in the spectrum of other forms of intelligence such as intelligence obtained from human sources (HUMINT) intelligence obtained from signals (SIGINT) and so on. The success of the information communities in preventing and combating the risks posed by post-modern societies comes from the harmonious blending of all forms of intelligence gathering and analysis and the efficient management of intelligence.

1.2. *OSINT and the fight against terrorism*

The terrorist phenomenon with its multiple causes, with its various forms and the devastating effects it produces, is without any doubt the greatest threats towards the international security. With a history that goes back to Antiquity, the terrorist phenomenon has regained the attention of the entire international community after September 11, 2001. 16 years

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[1] Serviciul Român de Informații, *Ghidul OSINT,* www.sri.ro, p.2.

[2] *Ibidem,* p. 2.

[3] Bean Hamilton, *No more secrets-Open Source Information and the Reshaping of the U.S. Intelligence,* ABC Clio, SUA, 2011, p.6.

[4] Stevyn Gibson, *Open Source Intelligence a contemporary intelligence ligeline,* PhD Thesis, Cranfield University, Defence College of Management and Technology, 2007, p.33.

after the tragic event, terrorist incidents are more and more tragic, and they manage to highlight the inability of intelligence communities to prevent it.

In the context of the abundance of information generated by the technological revolution as part of the globalization process, intelligence services undergo changes in planning, collecting and analyzing information that can contribute to the process of preventing and combating terrorism. The intelligence services fight against the terrorist phenomenon is built on information coming from both classified sources and open sources. The increasing use of the Internet has also changed the way terror groups interact with each other or with the outside world. The information and virtual trails they leave, more or less by chance, become useful information for intelligence services.

Intelligence communities have to get to make the "unknown known" and develop their ability to anticipate the "unknown unknown" in terrorist attacks. Under these circumstances, collecting information on the composition of terrorist groups, their location, plans and ambitions is a real challenge. The encounter with terrorists changes the way information services analyze it. Open sources play an increasingly important role and contribute to supporting agencies responsible for national security in their efforts to determine the characteristics, motivations and intentions of terrorist groups[5].

The importance of open sources for intelligence communities and the fight against terrorism has been highlighted precisely by the terrorist events of the past decade. The US intelligence community passed immediately after 9/11 through a major reorganization process. As part of this process, US authorities have seriously considered the importance of open sources. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act adopted by the US Congress in 2004 underlined the creation of a National Intelligence Director's subordinate structure to deal with open source analysis. The document recognized the importance of the open sources that were considered *a valuable source that must be integrate into the intelligence cycle to ensure that the US policymakers are fully and completely informed*[6] and stipulated the following: *the intelligence community should make effective and efficient use of open source information and analysis*[7].

Intelligence from open sources is an important factor for analyzing and collecting intelligence about terrorist groups. Even though terrorist groups will never declare where they intend to place the next bomb or the way they plan to spread the terror, the information they leave more or less to chance through open sources helps anti-terrorist fighters in understanding their agenda facilitating the process of preventing and combating these destructive manifestations. Intelligence from open sources demonstrates its usefulness in the fight against terrorism because:

✓ *Provides real-time information. Provides clues and work tracks.* The information the analysts can analyze are almost instant. The right information at the right time can generate actions to prevent a terrorist phenomenon.

✓ *It contributes to the ideological understanding of terrorist groups and can identify radicalization processes*. Terrorists understand the importance of the Internet from the perspective of the target group to which they have access and use it not only to disclose the ideology but also for gathering supporters. In this respect, Jihadist sites and forums are a real goldmine for analysts. This category also includes terrorist publications: Inspire magazine, Azan magazine publications of the Al Qaeda or Dabiq magazine ISISs publications.

✓ *Has an early warning function*

✓ *Provides strategic barometers about their intentions and is a source of strategic intelligence regarding strategies to prevent and combat terrorism*

✓ *Increases cooperation among the Allies in the Global War on Terror.*

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[5] Uffe Kock Wiil,*Counterterrorism and Open Source Intelligence*, Springer, Vienna, 2011, p.4.

[6] Richard A.B Jr, Cumming Alfred, *Open Source Intelligence: issues for Congres,* 5 December 2007, p.14.

[7] William Lahruman, *National Intelligence Agencies and Transnational Threats:the need for a new intelligence paradigm,* p. 10.

Thus we see that intelligence from open sources is an essential pillar of the institutional and strategic building of intelligence services and their fight against terrorist. Collecting information about the composition of terrorist groups, their location, plans and ambitions is a real challenge that can be overcome by understanding the role OSINT has in this process and integrating it as a respectable form of intelligence.

2. Classic OSINT: Dabiq magazine

Theoretical conclusions about the importance of intelligence from open sources in the fight against the terrorist phenomenon discussed above can be demonstrated by analyzing one of the newest and most eminent terrorist publications: ISIS group magazine, Dabiq. Filled in the open classical intelligence category, the magazine is a classic example of the effects of the globalization process and the symbiosis relationship that occurs between the media and terrorism.

Media is an important vehicle through which terrorists communicate with the audience. They have seen the value of promoting a media relationship since the 80's. Since then, specialists and analysts have been talking about a true symbiosis relationship between the two. Terrorism can not exist without the media, while the media enjoy the activity of the terrorists. Being mindful of the particularly important role that the media, be it the modern or classical media, terrorists use it following three main objectives: spreading fear within a target group, attracting and mobilizing sympathizers and, last but not least, the undermining of the capacities of governments to ensure the security of citizens[8]. The importance of the media for achieving these goals is also confirmed by Al-Qaeda's former Al-Qaeda terrorist leader Al-Zawahiri, who estimated that more than half of the fight between believers and unbelievers is being played on the "battlefields" of the media[9]. Whether it's televised interventions, whether it's the virtual media or the written press, they reinforce once again the conclusion of researcher Brian Jenkins who at one point stated that terrorism is the result of freedom, particularly, freedom of the press[10].

ISIS is a jihadist group born in 2004 in Iraq. Known at that time as Al-Qaeda group in Mesopotamia, the group acted under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqaw during the American invasion. Immediately after the leader's death, the group knows a new stage in its history. Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia changed its name to ISI-Islamic State in Iraq in 2006 and began to act as an umbrella for several terrorist organizations, continuing the guerrilla war against the United States and the Shiite population. The moment that changed local geopolitics and strengthened the group's position in the region is generated by the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq and the outbreak of the civil war in Syria that opened a new chapter in the history of the group. The real echo of the terrorist group begins when its sensational progress in conquering Iraqi and Syrian territory, a success that culminated in the conquest of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. In June 2014, the leaders of the terrorist group make a unique announcement in the history of any jihadist movement. The proclamation of the Caliphate is the moment that marks ISIS as a separate terrorist group, or rather the first terrorist group that has had the ambition to reach at least at this point in their vision. The proclamation of the Islamic State created metamorphoses of the concept of sovereignty[11] and produces the transition from the vision of a terrorist group to the proto-state of the Islamic State.

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[8] Paul Wilkinson ,"The media and terrorism: a reassessment", in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1997, p. 6.

[9] Original quote is *"more than a half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of media"*, Fawz Gerges, *The war enemy, why jihad went global*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 194 *apud* Transnational Terrorism Security& the Rule of law: *Terrorism and the Media*, http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/ tekst/publications/ WP4%20Del%206.pdf, p. 4.

[10] William Biernatzk, "Terrorism and Mass Media", in *Communications Research Trends*, vol.21, no. 2, 2002, p.5, http://cscc.scu.edu/trends/v21/v21_1.pdf.

[11] Raluca Codruța Luțai, "The Islamic State –aspects of sovereignty", in *International Journal of Humanistic Ideology,* vol.VI, No.2, Autumn-Winter 2015, p.146.

The rudimentary state variant that the Islamic State has come to establish in that geographic area respects some of the rules of organization of an ordinary state on the international scene.

In this geopolitical context, the newest terrorist publication appears: Dabiq Magazine. With a modern look, the terrorist magazine is often compared to Western publications like People or Cosmopolitan. The digital launch of the publication took place one month after the conquest of Mosul on 5 July 2014 and announced the most important moment of the terrorist group: the proclamation of the Caliphate on a symbolic day, the first day of Ramadan. The symbol of the day they chose to make the announcement is very important and loaded with seedlings. The first day of Ramadan is for the entire Muslim world a solemn moment that opens the path of spiritual purification. At this time, the leaders of the ISIS group chose to announce the establishment of Calafat and the Islamic State: *Raise your head high for today, by Allah's grace, you have a state and Khilafan, which will return you dignity, might, rights and leadership[12]*.

For the Islamic State, the Dabiq magazine is not the first foray into the publishing world. Prior to the publication of this publication, the Islamic State was concerned with the printing and popularization of Islamic State News and the Islamic State Report, two publications that kept the reader up to date on the progress the Califat struggled to achieve. From the combination of the two publications and the addition of a strong religious accent, the Dabiq magazine was born [13]. Through the Al Hayat Center, the Dabiq Magazine aims to provide updates on the battlefields of those who fight against the unbelievers, to provide administrative reports on the proclaimed Caliphate, and last but not least, the magazine is a venue for the religious ideology underlying the newly formed state.

The name of the magazine also has a special semnification. Dabiq is a city on Syrian territory, 10 kilometers from the border with Turkey, a place with a historical load full of seeds gained by ISIS fighters. Being a place of military encounter between Muslims and Roman armies, as well as Muslims and Crusaders, Dabiq is seen as the place where confrontation between unbelievers and Allah's troops will take place, a confrontation that will end with the undisputed victory of Caliphate fighters. "The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heart will continue to intensify –by Allah permission-until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq"[14].

The pages of the first issue of the magazine clarify that the Islamic State is not a state only from the perspective of its name but a physical, geographical and institutional reality. The editorial and first articles clarify to the reader that ISIS ceases to represent a terrorist group of cells but represents a real state actor to be recognized: *ISIS no longer exists in small cells that can be neutralized by missiles or small groups of commandos. It is now a real and unrecognized state actor*[15]. This proclamation they are doing is, in their view, the first step in the complete unification of all Muslims under the authority of the Caliphate: *The obligation is now clearer than ever before for all Muslims to raise their voices and pledge their allegiance to the Khilafan and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi[16]*.

The magazine is undoubtedly a tool of religious propaganda. Network leaders are convinced that humanity is at a turning point in which Allah's soldiers will conquer the world: *O soldiers of the Islamic State, o youth of Muhammad… Today we are upon the doorstep for a new era, a turning point for the map of the region, rather the world. Today we witness the end of a lie called western civilization and the rise of the Islam giant[17]*. The articles signed by the great names of religion and by network leaders "call" the faithful back to their own state: *Rush o Muslim to your state. Yes it is your State! Rush, because Syria is not for Syrians and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. (…)The State is a state for all Muslims[18]*. The state portrayed as a Noah's Ark prepared by the "flood" to break out

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[12] Dabiq,*The Return of the Khilafah,* Issue 1,p.4.

[13] Harleen K. Gambhir, "Dabiq:The strategic messaging of the Islamic State" in *Backgrounder*, August 2014, Institute for the study of war, p.2.

[14] Dabiq, *The Return of the Khilafah,* Issue 1, p. 5.

[15] *Ibidem*, p.17.

[16] *Ibidem*, p.40.

[17] Dabiq ,The faild crusade, Issue 4,p.4.

[18] Dabiq, *The Return of the Khilafah,* Issue 1, p. 6.

calls all their supporters to jihad against the world: *The call of jihad has risen, the glad tidings of good is shining. Triumph looms on the horizon. The signs of victory have appeared[19]*.

The magazine presents, besides the military victories that ISIS fighters the progress that the state achieves from an administrative perspective. The Islamic State reveals in the DABIQ magazine that it also has an incipient administrative apparatus that manages not only the social aspects of the new state but also financial aspects. The pages of the magazine note that the Islamic State is preparing a santier system that meets all the requirements. The images show the good treatment both of the orphans and the elderly, but also of the ordinary people traveling on the streets where sanitation services do their job properly[20]. The same category includes news on how the Islamic State is implementing Sharia and the education system. *Islamic State actively works to educate its citizens, enhance their strict adherence to the Islamic obligation, judges the disputes, implements Sharia, incite the people to Jihad and call them to unite behind the Khalifah[21]*.

Like the Al Qaeda terrorist group magazine (Inspire), the Dabiq magazine has sections devoted to anti-Western propaganda. The reader is aware of the group's attitude toward unbelieving Westerners, the Crusaders. The "In the words of the enemy" section portrays important personalities of the international political scene that must be eliminated through the use of violence.

From a visual perspective, the magazine is particularly well-established. Graphics are as modern and Western as possible. The real and uncensored images of the magazine present the portraits of the leaders and the heroes that the state has, but also the violence and disasters that the conquests of the new territories impose.

Through the sections of the ideas promoted by Dabiq magazine, it is surely a means of propagating the ideas and values that the group promotes. By its means, the terrorists hope to touch the minds and hearts of those who choose to complete the ranks of Allah's army, and thus be a good element in the radicalization process. The Occidental who comes into contact with the magazine can understand from her pages the role she may have in the organization and the strategy that this state proposes. The speech that justifies the group's strategy is an integrative one. The Islamic State is a place of diversity that does not rule out where everyone finds their place: *it is a state where the Arab and the non-Arab, the white man and the black man, the easterner and the westerner are all brothers[22]*.

Put on the table of an intelligence analyst Dabiq magazine is a gold mine that can conceal the vision of the terrorist group through the intelligence collected on the ground. The careful analysis of the magazine's numbers gives a general picture of the evolution of the terrorist group and its future strategy. Intelligence from open sources is now an important element in understanding the ideology promoted by the group. The analysis of the journal will not only reveal the religious elements that the Islamic State is building, but also the plans and administrative progress of the organization or the state. Moreover, an exhaustive analysis could understand the mechanisms of radicalization and propaganda that the terrorist group uses to attract new followers, and tracking the way the magazine circulates online can stop or highlight potential people prone to such phenomena. All the findings a intelligence analyst can extract from the Dabiq magazine analysis can be turned into tactical, operational and strategic strategies to help fight the terrorist phenomenon. For this reason, we consider that Dabiq magazine may be a "soldier" in the intelligence service "army."

Conclusions

Metaphorically speaking seeing intelligence services as an "army," with various categories of "soldiers" fighting terrorist threats. In the modern world this "army" enjoys the help of a relatively young "soldier": OSINT. The information it can provide in real time, clues and workplaces can

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[19] *Ibidem*, p. 9.
[20] Dabiq, *The faild crusade*, Issue 4, pp.27-29.
[21] Dabiq,*A call to Hijrah,* Issue 3, p.17.
[22] Dabiq,*The return of the Khilafah,* Issue 1.p.4.

contribute to the ideological understanding of terrorist groups in identifying radicalization processes and preventing terrorist events.

The analysis of newspapers, magazines, television broadcasts of social media sources can be useful in the strategic or operational organization of the intelligence and the fight against the terrorist phenomenon. A brief insight into the ISIS group's magazine demonstrates this. Interaction with the magazine reveals important information about clustering, its ideology, priorities that it considers important and need to be implemented.

Intelligence from open sources is therefore an essential pillar of the institutional and strategic building of intelligence services and their fight against terrorist mines.

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CAPITALIZING ON ROMANIA'S GEOGRAPHIC POSITION IN RELATION TO CURRENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERESTS

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Abstract: *The particularities of Romania's geographic position and the geopolitical context provide both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages will be materialized in a fundamental sense only by wise human action, by strengthening the force elements under certain circumstances, while eliminating the critical inconvenience of being desired, as well as maintaining the traditional values. Political and military interests are subordinated to global national interests and lead to a common goal - a strong and credible state able to ensure the security of its citizens wherever they are.*

Keywords: *security, strategy, geographic position, geopolitics, location, interests.*

1. Romania's location in a European context throughout history

Socio-political and military analysts, for the most part, state that, unlike the geopolitical position of a state, the geographic one is stable. Paradoxically, Romania's geographic position is interpreted in various manners.

After the Second World War and until recently, during its dependence on the Soviet protectorate, Romania was included among the Eastern European bloc, but this location was geopolitical rather than geographic. At the beginning of 1994, the domestic news agencies noted the official statement of the State Department of the United States of America recognizing that *"Romania is no longer considered a country in Eastern Europe"[1]*. Although, over time, Romania has even been considered a Balkan country, the current orientation tends to be among the Central European countries in the north of the Balkan Peninsula, and not in the Balkans. This emphasis is required to mark the detachment of *"Europe's powder barrel"*, renowned, unfortunately, by the events of the last decade of the last century.

Romania's membership in Central Europe is not unanimously recognized. The one who defined the Central European region best was a famous French geographer, Emmanuel de Martonne, a century ago. The most convincing arguments are presented in Volume IV, entitled "L'Europe Centrale", of the "Géographie universelle" treaty, to indicate the middle position of the countries considered to be in Western Europe, *"more articulate"* and Oriental Europe, *"more compact"[2]*. Romania is located between a Europe of peninsulas, bays and seas and a Europe of endless plains, alongside Germany, Poland, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. However, according to the German concept of Mitteleuropa, which means the same thing in translation, the configuration of Central Europe is different from that of Martonne. Romania does not appear in this region, but it includes countries such as Croatia and Slovenia, Balkan countries, but who have gravitated in the sphere of German influence.

There is even a conception that supports a narrower configuration of Central Europe, namely that of the *Visegrad Group*, comprising only in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria, a European region ostensibly contrasted with the Balkans.

However, the versions of the feasible representations of Romania's geographical position do not stop here. The concept of Median Europe also emerged. It was launched in 1995 by French geopolitician Michel Foucher in "Fragments d'Europe". According to him, the concept of Medium

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[1] https://www.roportal.ro/articole/despre/romania_in_context_geopolitic_european_4376/, accessed on 09.10.2017.
[2] http://www.persee.fr/doc/rga_0035-1121_1932_num_20_1_5302_t1_0186_0000_2, accessed on 09.10.2017.

Europe appears in the range of possible geopolitical representations as *"the intermediate geopolitical situation between the West and Russia, the current state of transition between these two poles of organization, the territorial and political legacy imposed by the East, but the impulsive modernization of West"[3]*. The naturally occurring question is, however, the limits of this Europe-wide buffer zone, this median of the ensemble coincides with the space similar to Intermarium's interwar concept, now presented as the Three Seas Initiative, comprising the states of The Visegrad Group, the Baltic States, as well as Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and, ultimately, Romania.

2. Regional News

Hence, even if the geographical position remains unchanged, the paradigm of power, interest, sphere of influence, and perceptions of group membership is still controversial and dynamic due to (geo) political connotations. If the geographic position of a country is determined by the action of the forces of nature and expressed through certain natural features, the geopolitical position is variable over time, being dependent on the modification of certain socio-economic and political factors. The most interesting remark, more than three centuries ago, came from the representation of the humanist chronicler Miron Costin (1633-1691), referring to Moldova, but in fact his statement can be extended to the whole of Romania, as *"in the way of evil"*[4].

Reputable theorists Matei Dogan and Robert Pahre said that *"when researchers are no longer satisfied with paradigms in progress, other social sciences can provide new ideas with which to build alternative solutions. These sub-disciplines constitute the theory of theories, many of which have been tested and whose utility has been proven. New perspectives, new approaches will probably go beyond the disciplinary boundaries"*[5].

In view of the fields involved and the necessary support to explain the related phenomena, geopolitics is in fact an interdisciplinary scientific discipline, at the confluence of geography, history, political science and social sciences, which establishes the relationship between political events and geographical space, as well as distribution of power on Globe.

"Geopolitics is first a reality, a particular type of behavior of the players in the international environment and then a representation of that reality that can become a method / instrument for the analysis of international relations through operationalization"[6].

Over the centuries, geographically, geo-economically and geostrategically, the importance of the Black Sea was mainly based on the role the region played in the intersection of former regional powers and empires (Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Russian)[7]. In addition, the Black Sea represented and represents yet a point of contact for trade and energy-rich regions[8]. The area thrived mostly when it was not isolated and while it was anchored to world trade. At the millennial border, Romania is located geopolitically at the intersection of East-West geo-economic axes (the former Soviet space versus Western Europe) and Northwest - South-East (Great Britain and Germany - Asia Minor and the Near East). At the same time, Romania is at the crossroads of some geo-economic axes under consolidation: the sea axis (Caspian Sea - Black Sea - Mediterranean Sea) and river and canal axis (Rhin - Main - Danube) linking the North Sea with the Black Sea.

Romania is demographically and also by the civilian and military potential, at the intersection of the wider circle of Central Europe - where it holds the second place after Poland -

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[3] http://www.persee.fr/doc/polit_0032-342x_1995_num_60_3_4453_t1_0780_0000_2, accessed on 09.10.2017.

[4] https://www.scribd.com/doc/62432452/Miron-Costin-Letopisetul-Tarii-Moldovei, accessed on 09.10.2017.

[5] Matei Dogan, Robert Pahre, *New social sciences. Interpenetration of disciplines*. Translation from l French language by N. Lotreanu, Second edition, Bucharest, 1997, p. 192.

[6] Constatin Hlihor, *Geopolitics and geostrategy in the analysis of contemporary international relations*, Publishing house UNAp, Bucharest, 2005, p. 14.

[7] R. Bruce Hitchner, *Alien-friendly sea: history and achievement of the Euro-Atlantic Black Sea strategy*, in Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov, Joerg Forbrig (editors), *A new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region*, Publishing house IRSI, Bucharest, 2004, pp. 27-32.

[8] George Cristian Maior, *New allies and security dynamics in the Black Sea area*, in the Military Observatory, no. 9/2004.

with the wider circle of the Balkans, where our country is perceived in the third place, after Turkey and Greece, although as surface and population it ranks second, after Turkey.

3. Romania's political and military interests in the context of regional threats

In such a context, the interest of some European and even non-European powers who want either not to lose their privileges in the area or to regain them, or to become influential factors has increased. Romania and Bulgaria, apparently without aggressive or expansionist attitude, *"pillars and promoters of Euro-Atlantic values, are stabilizing and catalyzing factors of regional cooperation agreements"*[9].

Coordinated geographic or geopolitical bans are, however, not satisfactory. For this reason, as a nation, we must stop believing that the West would hurry to pay historical debts, or that we may be destined for a bright future only through mere presence or geographical location. It is therefore necessary for Romania to proceed in such a way that its geographical coordinates are duplicated by some socio-economic ones, which are indeed a source of attraction and power.

All the indicators and all the logical arguments indicate that we are at the intersection of large lines of interest, possibly a point of connection between major strategic projects being built at this time and rebuilding the planet's power map. As a rational consequence, interests generate conflicting states, tensions, repositioning, or alliances. It is imperative to take advantage of the conjuncture and to maximize the benefits of the remodelings that are now beeing produced and which, I dare to predict, will be very likely completed within a timetable of at most a decade.

Essentially, we can identify four major projects that are all shaping up in our proximity: the Eurasian Union[10], the establishment of the Great Near East, the gigantic Chinese project of the "New Silk Road", and we are also compelled to mention with regret the Caliphate imagined by the Islamic State.

In this prospective framework, having an optimal geostrategic position which, combined with NATO and EU membership, can make Romanian diplomacy a dialogue point and a strategic connection hub. From the point of view of the active player at the negotiating table, depending on the speed and ability we can play with this book, we need to capitalize on the opportunity to get as many key benefits from or out of the power spaces that are now constituted. These are those strategic infrastructures that are essential to us but also so important to our partners that we also get inside the complex surrounding areas of protection.

All reasoning is about what appears to be the center of the next major global power play: controlling, securing and fueling the new transport routes to cross Central Asia, linking the two poles, Europe and the Far East with a region assimilation in the middle, alongside or integrating the Eurasian space dominated by the Russian Federation.

The discussion on this issue is not new, as strategic plans are emerging from the Chancellery of the superpowers who had begun to draft projects in this regard even before the official fall of the Iron Curtain. The first to draw maps in this respect were the Americans from the Institute for National Strategic Studies which used for the first time the phrase "Great Middle East" to designate a possible future area of Western influence in North Africa, the Levant, the Persian Gulf countries, South Asia and Central Asia, an idea almost immediately taken over by the Rand Corporation which set up a Greater Middle East Program[11]. The authors define a "Greater Middle East" that includes the Arab world, Iran, Israel and Turkey, including the Horn of Africa, Transcaucasus, West Central Asia and South Asia. Inclusion of the countries in the energy rich Caspian Basin with the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Turkey and Iraq produces a "strategic energy ellipse", with over 70%

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[9] Alexandra Sarcinschi, Cristian Băhnăreanu, *Redimensions and configurations of the regional security environment (the Black Sea and the Balkans,* Publishing house UNAp, Bucharest, 2005, p. 8.
[10] The Eurasian Union, the eastern alternative of the European Union since 2015, is based on economic cooperation between a part of the former Soviet Union states: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, available on http://www.paginaderusia.ro/tag/uniunea-eurasiatica/, accessed on 11.10.2017.
[11] https://www.csis.org/events/greater-middle-east-initiative, accessed on 09.10.2017.

of proven oil reserves by whom and where will the access to this strategic region be ensured? Finally, the United States through the proximal flank of the North Atlantic Alliance, currently represented by Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. From the perspective of the United States and Western Europe, complications arise from the leaders and access point elements that win without contributing. On the other hand, the indigenous population considers the interference of wild capitalists unfair to their divine blessing.

The opportunity of the project, in the context of the Romanian national interest, depends on us knowing how to look and interpret a map. Equally important, strategically speaking are, on the one hand, the central subject - in this case the New Near East Project - and, on the other hand, the function of each of the players in the vicinity of this space.

In this case, the security definition of this project would be primarily given by the American guarantee, but this proved to be insufficient if it is not really combined with the one that would give us confidence in the proximate space: NATO. Logically, this space needs strategic roads, essential infrastructure for quick connections to allow both commercial and military transfers if needed. And Romania, as an player in the Black Sea, may be the point of connection of this map with the Euro-Atlantic area. This is due to the double terrestrial link to the north and south of the Black Sea, the maritime one, but also the submarine cable.

To become a reality, the map of this project needs central and secondary connection circuits with the peripheral regions that are not part of the project, but they are meant to be strategic supportions, very important because, you take the case Romania, our strategic infrastructure approach is assimilated to the area of primary interest that is already covered by NATO and guaranteed by the EU.

It is precisely the rationale that now makes Ukraine a problem, one that both major projects - the European Union and NATO, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, have to solve and for which, each one is trying different routes. To concentrate traffic and connections at a single "nobody's" point, from the point of no-man's area, from the point of view of security guarantees, I appreciate being at least risky, if not doomed to failure.

The current stake is for the correct reconstruction of the maps, and that is why the geostrategic position of Romania, which is placed on the circuits that are currently projected for the future link in three directions: Northeast, to the Russian space, east to Caspian, Caucasus and much further, then south, at sea through Turkey, at sea through straits to the Mediterranean.

Poor governance, sectarianism, geopolitical disorder, and latent or exacerbated conflicts pose threats to the United States' Middle East security interests in the Middle East. The vulnerability of powerful state institutions that provide borders and provide public services has created conditions in which terrorism, illicit economies and political conflicts develop. These security dilemmas occur at a time when the United States has a limited leverage in the Middle East, has no internal and financial support to engage in widespread and long-term interventions and has improuved the ties with traditional partners such as Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Under these conditions and constraints, the great powers should not try to revitalize the failed states. Nor should it try to resolve prolonged conflicts without the necessary requirements, namely political conditions and regional actors committed to compromise.

Rather, the big regional and global actors should be prepared to design defensive power in the parameters of sustained regional chaos and limited influence. This approach to defensive policy requires a selective and pragmatic involvement in the Middle East, based on a clear commitment to territorial integrity and state sovereignty, no matter how weak they have become, as the traditional regional partnerships. It may include preventive measures to help regional partners counteract refugee flows, develop savings, and use the energy resources needed for internal and external consumption.

The Middle East will be unstable and predisposed to conflicts for the next decade, even after the self-proclaimed Islamic State will be defeated. It is likely that the external borders will remain officially intact, but the nature of the states will be reconstituted in ways that require new security measures and political arrangements at national and local level. These exchanges can foster politically and economically effective partnerships between sub-state and non-state players, but are

also likely to aggravate or deepen conflicts over land and hydrocarbon control. There are not many realistic or viable alternatives to choose from; the decline of a state is not supported by any key regional government and would only lead to a bloodshed and greater instability.

As they attempt to design their defensive power, states in the area of interest should be prepared for events that could trigger dramatic changes that would force them to engage in the Middle East at higher levels. Some key trigger events include, but are not limited to, an official alliance of al-Qaeda and ISIL, the collapse of rebel resistance, civil wars, migration, humanitarian crises, escalation of violence in areas with powerful conflicts, launch of Iranian nuclear or ballistic missiles on Israel and large-scale terrorist attacks inspired by the terrorist group's affiliates.

However, it is true that the Romanian Government is refraining from declaring Russia as a destabilizing factor of the geographical area with the Black Sea center (after all, it is the Government's desire to find a formula for dialogue with it), speaking more about its desire to to manifest itself as a regional player (as the US characterizes), with the tendency to become global (as defined by Russia itself).

The national security interests include, among other things, unequivocally "capitalizing on the resources and geostrategic positioning of our country in order to achieve the welfare level to which citizens are entitled; reducing development gaps and rebuilding large public systems; ensuring the irreversibility of belonging to the transatlantic collective defense system; strengthening the European Union and actively participating in integration processes within it"[12].

Regional conflicts and crises in areas such as Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa tend to interconnect, generating cumulative effects requiring the adaptation of security and defense strategies to regional and international states and organizations. The aggressive attitude of state or non-state actors continues to be manifested by actions generating insecurity and imbalances at regional and global level. The long-term strategies pursued by them are marked by unpredictability and can cause surprises in the strategic plan.

Maintaining frozen conflicts in the wider Black Sea Region and the possibility of emerging new conflicts in the vicinity of Romania have the potential to project negative effects at regional level. At the same time, the existence and perpetuation of interethnic tensions and regional or local imbalances in the proximity and interest areas of Romania may lead to the emergence of conflicts.

Currently, Romania does not face a direct, imminent and explicit terrorist threat. Nevertheless, geographical proximity to the areas where the terrorist phenomenon is manifest and the country's participation in the stabilization / reconstruction actions in some crisis and conflict zones may be factors favoring possible unconventional actions against our country.

Thus, we find that the strategic partnerships with the US and Turkey are on an equal footing, although we have no great expectations from the Turks, especially as a result of the duplicitous behavior of its unique leader. Specialists also notice that they are on the same level as Smart Defense with Pooling & Sharing, although the two programs speak very little about investing as much as possible to the benefits, and moreover, we seem to have the desire (again unquantified in (such as those with Germany), programs where, because there is not much money to be invested, there are no results, but they give a picture of the the desire for cooperation for a Europe of Defense.

The Black Sea Region and the Balkan Peninsula are opening special perspectives for the medium and long-term future. The southern and western shores of the Black Sea are flanked by members of the North Atlantic Alliance, and the rest of the countries in the region are developing close relationships with this organization. At the same time, the "orange revolution" in Ukraine, the change in the status of the Crimeans, the effervescence in the Donbas region, the conflicts on the southern border of Turkey, the "roses revolution" in Georgia, the frayings in Armenia and Azerbaijan opened a new European chapter for the region its role in an "expanded Europe". This role requires more than just co-operation with the European Union. It requires involvement in the

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[12] The White Paper on Defense, approved by the Decision of the Romanian Parliament no. 12 / 11.04.2016, published in the Official Monitor no. 310 / 22.10.2016.

process of achieving and preserving stability and security both in the region and in the Middle East, since proximity to this part of Asia is a risk factor for the Black Sea area.

Also, being the point of intersection of NATO, EU and Russia interests, the region in the proximity of our country needs to develop an identity that will allow it to create a viable partnership relationship with the great powers. The states of the region must take into account both the importance they attach to the fight against terrorism and their status as a trading bridge and transit area between Central Europe, the Middle East and the Far East.

In the Black Sea and the Balkans region, however, there is the risk of creating new lines of demarcation through the simultaneity of two processes taking place in the same space: on the one hand, the integration of these countries into NATO and the EU, and on the other hand, the pressures of the Russian Federation the integration of the former Soviet states into the Commonwealth of Independent States[13]. In this context, multilateral cooperation is a chance to maintain the stability and unity of the region. In the political field, regional cooperation must have as its primary goal the completion of the transition from totalitarianism to the rule of law, to democracy and respect for human rights. In the economic field, it is necessary for the region to pay attention to joint projects that promote the liberalization and privatization of markets and create an attractive investment environment. In the field of security, priority should be given to programs and projects aimed at accelerating the integration of states into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, improving strategies to prevent and combat new risks and threats to the region.

Regarding energy routes, the role of Ukraine and Turkey should not be ignored, requiring more intense engagement with the European community of the two states, both for the purpose of real democratization of the countries concerned and for securing a secure transit of energy resources to the West. Simultaneously, serious Western economic assistance would have beneficial effects in stimulating the process of transforming the economic and social base of the Black Sea.

Regarding energy routes, the role of Romania, as a NATO member and future of the European Union, should be more actively involved in transforming the Black Sea space into a stability region, both through the levers given by its strategic position at the intersection of the Balkans with the Caucasus , as well as through closer cooperation and collaboration with EU and riparian states. Our country must continue its leadership mission in regional efforts to counter dangers and asymmetric threats, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, it can be a gateway to the West, promoting the transatlantic values of democracy, peace and security in the Black Sea and the Middle East.

Due to the dynamics of continental and regional geopolitical transformations, the status of the Black Sea has not yet been finalized, with many controversies over the type of process we are witnessing: clotting or fracture. I appreciate that Romania has the duty to play the role of the catalyst, pole of coagulation of all forces and efforts to connect the region to the European and Euro-Atlantic area.

The variant undergoing the upgrading of the 2017 White Paper[14] on Defense continues on the same trend as the previous one, creating favorable conditions for the development not only of relations and partnerships, but also of the realization of investments which, in turn, will facilitate the realization of the political, economic interests and security in regions of strategic relevance for our country.

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[13] The Commonwealth of Independent States establishes cooperation in political, economic, ecological, humanitarian, cultural and other fields and has been developing since 1991 with the adhesion of 10 of the 15 former Soviet Union federal republics, with the exception of the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Georgia (withdrawn in 2008) and Ukraine (withdrawn in 2014), available on http://www.moldova.ms/?l=en&a=65, accessed on 09.10.2017.

[14] The White Defense Charter 2017, recently adopted by the Romanian Government, in its meeting on 30.06.2017, endorsed by CSAT Decision no. 68/2007, is sent to the Romanian Parliament for approval. In accordance with the provisions of Law no. 203/2015 regarding the defense planning, the White Charter of Defense is submitted for approval to the Parliament, within 6 months after the granting of the Government's trust, after being approved by the Government and endorsed by the CSAT.

Conclusions

The subject of the debate is of great strategic importance and it was not accidental to fulfill the objectives of the national defense policy in the White Paper of Defense, including the version being upgraded, among other things, to take into account mainly the capitalization of the geostrategic position in order to increase the geopolitical role of Romania within NATO and the EU and to exploit the opportunity to promote the status of Romania as a regional stability pillar in the eastern flank of the Alliance.

The way in which our country takes advantage of such a favorable position is a predominantly internal problem and unfortunately generates external interference, as there are negative consequences of our country's geopolitical position. We can neither be ignorant nor naive to believe that natural wealth is sufficient to ensure the well-being of a nation. It is a pressing necessity to investigate one's own history, to decipher what has attracted enemies at the border or how their loyal leaders impose. On the other hand, by returning to contemporary realities, the standard of living does not equally correspond to the resources of a tribe. Undoubtedly, resources are neuralgic points in setting strategic priorities, but they do not guarantee prosperity except in conjunction with performance management, in a favorable diplomatic context.

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ROMANIA'S VULNERABILITIES IN CASE OF POSSIBLE HYBRID AGGRESSION

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Abstract: Hybrid warfare is a form of undeclared and unconventional interstate confrontation, having an open or covered approach, carried out in a smart and effective manner on multiple plans, such as: political, military, diplomatic, economic and also in the field of: energy, finance, propaganda, media, cyber, subversive, as its aim is to attain the political objectives without the widespread use of violence and armed forces. [1] Hybrid warfare links the currently existing security concerns of the EU and NATO, which is why it should be a priority of strategic thinking in Romania, the more so as it is made visible at the eastern border of our country. By strengthening the culture of security nationwide it would be possible to reinforce the defense capability of the country in the context of the new types of vulnerabilities.

Keywords: hybrid war, unconventional war, terrorism, cyber-attacks, turbulence, violent protests, propaganda war, manipulation.

Introduction

Every individual and every human community aims to live safely and secure a worry-free existence. This goal is not easy to be achieved because there are vulnerabilities or weaknesses[2] that can generate insecurity at both individual and community levels. If vulnerabilities are not eliminated or reduced as much as possible they can be exploited by a potential enemy, and can evolve to dangers and even aggression.

Romania's membership of NATO and the EU is an important guarantee for its security. However, the evolution of the security environment in Europe over recent years proves that both NATO and the EU may be the target of unconventional aggressions characterized as hybrid aggressions. As a consequence, the measures taken by our country in both security and defense fields must be credible in order to discourage any aggressor who decides to trigger a hybrid aggression against Romania.

To know which areas of Romanian society can be the targets of a potential hybrid aggressor we need to know how is defined this type of confrontation and what vulnerabilities Romania has.

1. The concept of hybrid war

After the end of the Vietnam War and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Frenchman Andre Beaufre wrote: "The military problems of the modern war are particularly complex, which makes it both difficult to formulate them correctly and to solve them effectively. His forecast was confirmed by the evolution of the armed clashes generated by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989), the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-1988), the Gulf wars (1991 and 2003), the international military intervention under the UN mandate in Afghanistan (2001 - present) and the confrontations in ex-Soviet and ex-Yugoslav space, etc.

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[1] Călin Hentea, *Era Putin şi războiul hibrid*, Historia, https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/general/articol/era-putin-si-razboiul-hibrid, accessed in June 2017.
[2] Jonathan Crowther – editor*, Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, Fifth Edition, 1995, Oxford, United Kingdom, p. 1334.

Andre Beaufre's theme on the future war also concerned American William Lind, who in his "Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," considered that "the primary task of the peacetime soldier is to prepare for the new war. But to do that, he must anticipate how the next war will be. "[3]

Uncertainties about the war of the future persist even today, even if there are authors stating transcendent. Asymmetric, unconventional and hybrid actions will dominate the 21st century on the basis of dissatisfactions, resentments, perceived inequalities and inherited ideologies that constitute the engine of terrorism, insurgency and criminality "[4], respectively:" The classical struggle against brutality was largely replaced by new unconventional strategies and tactics based on methods of intimidation, manipulation, influence of the morale and individual and collective behavior of the opponent. "[5]

Most experts in this field believe that hybrid warfare was launched in the media in 2005 by Frank G. Hoffman and James N. Mattis who published the article "Conflict Armed Confrontations. The emergence of the Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars". These authors consider that "hybrid war is a combination of military and non-military actions (crime, terrorism, guerrilla tactics and manipulation)". In another article, Frank G. Hoffman also states that the technological revolution, globalization and informatisation were some of the most important factors favoring the emergence of hybrid war. [6]

The opinions of the military and political-military experts on the outline of the concept of hybrid war seem to have been most influenced by the way in which the armed clashes between the Gulf and Afghanistan are unfolding, especially the periods after the major military operations. On the other hand, violent events of the second decade of the century, framed in "the Arab Spring", those in Syria and Ukraine, have shown that the physiognomy of the hybrid war is polymorphous, often changing, and covers a vast spectrum of materialized military and non-military actions in, such as:

- "crime, terrorism and an extensive range of hostile actions, in which the military force is less present";[7]

- "a mixture of symmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts, where the forces carry out typical military operations against regular military forces and enemy targets, but at the same time act decisively to gain control of the civilian population in the area of operations";[8]

- "The share of military and non-military actions will fluctuate constantly during operations, and conventional threats and demonstrations of force will be used to model the operational environment";[9]

- "the struggle is not given for the territories but for the minds and attitudes of the citizens of other states, and the means of fighting are very sophisticated";[10]

- "crime, terrorism and guerrilla tactics designed to surprise, frighten and demoralize the opponent";'[11]

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[3] William S. Lind., *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,* Marine Corps Gazette, 1989, p. 22, available on https://www.mca-marines.org/files/The%20Changing%20Face%20of%20War%20-%20Into%20the%20Fourth%20Generation.pdf , accessed in December 2016.

[4] Teodor Frunzeti, T., Impact strategic, nr. 1, *Acţiuni simetrice, neconvenţionale şi hibride în războiul secolului al XXI-lea,* Bucureşti, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare, Carol I", 2013, p.7.

[5] Răzvan Munteanu, Impact strategic, nr. 3, *Războiul hibrid. Noua formă de conflict a începutului de secol*, Bucureşti, Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare,, Carol I", 2015, p.19.

[6] Frank Hoffman., *Conflict in 21st century, The rise of hybrid wars*, Virginia, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p. 37.

[7] Eugen Siteanu, Benone Andronic., *Războiul hibrid, în Univers Strategic nr. 2/2015*, Bucureşti, Editura: Universitatea Creştină „Dimitrie Cantemir", 2015, p. 192.

[8] Jhon McCuen, *Hybrid wars*, Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Kansas, 2008, p. 107.

[9] Idem.

[10] Radio Europa Liberă, *Interviu Yevhen Mahda*, 17.05.2016, available on http://www.europalibera.org/a/27738877.html, accessed in June 2016.

[11] Margaret Bond, *Hybrid war: A new paradigm for stability operations in failing states*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 2007, p.4.

- "The press plays an important role in any type of war, but in a hybrid, undeclared war, its role is even more significant"; The documentary "Silent weapons for a silent war" describes the importance and influence of the media in war: "The public's attention must be distracted and kept away from real issues, captured by false topics. Keep your audience busy and limit your thinking time of it, back to farm and animals ";[12]

- "combining technology with modern mobilization methods";[13]

- the exploitation of the vulnerabilities of the enemy, having the main intention of diminishing its reaction capacity, an objective that is made possible by the limited and masked use of military actions, together with non-military actions; [14]

- "non-military actions are undertaken by individuals, cultural and ethnic groups, non-governmental organizations, etc. and are interdependent (correlated) with military ones"; [15]

- "In the hybrid war, it is not only the military weaknesses, but also the social ones, that is non-militaristic (...) Based on these weaknesses, a hybrid war involves various actions, from terrorism to media propaganda, passing through irregular military actions and unsuspected";[16]

- "combining a wide range of conventional, unconventional, asymmetric and cybernetic strategies, tactics, methods and methods for the achievement of strategic and military objectives";[17]

- "use of conventional and unconventional techniques and methods that are executed in concert as part of a flexible strategy with long-term goals";[18]

- "a combination of military and non-military instruments aimed to achieving the opponent's surprise, taking the initiative and obtaining psychological effects by using a variety of ways such as intelligence operations combined with economic pressures";[19]

- "exploiting the vulnerabilities of the opponent, avoiding direct contact with a stronger enemy, and embracing the entire operational spectrum, found in various forms such as irregular tactics, extremely violent acts of terrorism with a strong impact on society and criminal techniques with devastating effects";[20]

- "The hybrid threat is an umbrella concept that includes a wide variety of hostile circumstances and actions, including terrorism, migration, corruption and interethnic conflicts;" [21]

- "access to modern military capabilities, support for insurgent, terrorist and criminal movements, as well as the intervention of states that can combine high-tech military capabilities with terrorist actions and cyberwar operations against financial targets." [22]

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[12] Operations Research Technical Manual, *Silent weapons for quiet wars*, 1991, Silent Weapons was first published for mass consumption by the late William Cooper in his 1991 underground sensation, Behold a Pale Horse, available on www.syti.net/GB/SilentWeaponsGB.html, accessed in July 2016.

[13] ***Armed Forces Journal, Hybrid vs. Compound War, October 1, 2009, available on http://Armedforcesjournal.Com/Hybrid-Vs-Compound-War/, accessed in March 2016.

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[15] Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Dimensiunile nonmilitare ale securității,* București, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I", 2005, 39.

[16] Camelia Badea, „*Este România într-un război hibrid. Ungaria destabilizatorul NATO*?" Interviu cu Dan Dungaciu, Ziare.com, 24 Februarie 2015.

[17] Cristian Stanciu, *Viitorul conflictualității – Operații asimetrice și hibride*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I", București, 2016, p. 10.

[18] Guillaume Lasconjarias, Jeffrey A. Larsen, coord., *NATO's Response to Hybrid Treaths*, NATO Defense College, Research Division, Italy, 2015, p. 3.

[19] Ruslan Pukhov, *The Moscow Times -"Nothing 'Hybrid' About Russia's War in Ukraine | Opinion.",* May, 2015, available on https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/nothing-hybrid-about-russias-war-in-ukraine-46913, accessed in September 2016.

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[21] Alex Deep, *Hybrid War Old Concept, New Techniques*, Small Wars Journal, March 2, 2015, available on http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/hybrid-war-old-concept-new-techniques , accessed in November 2016.

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The dozens, perhaps hundreds of opinions expressed by experts with different specializations and experiences in the field are quite diverse, as can be seen from the ones previously set out. However, there are commune elements such as: exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities, terrorism, use of combined conventional and unconventional techniques and methods, media propaganda, manipulation, symmetrical and asymmetric conflicts, guerrilla tactics, migration, corruption, interethnic conflicts and so on.

Of all these and other views we have not been able to consult so far, Finnish captain Huovinen Petri, a student at the National Defense University, Department of Military History in Washington DC, has developed a scheme (Fig.1) where he synthesizes the essence of hybrid war.

Figure no. 1. Hybrid war in the context with other forms of war

2. National vulnerabilities in case of hybrid aggression

Knowing the vulnerabilities of the country is a conceptual but also operational necessity. In order to plan the national defense, we must at least know: our weaknesses (vulnerabilities), our strengths (the quantity and quality of human, material, financial and other resources), our allies and enemies and the evolution forecast of the security environment.

The assessment of Romania's potential, defense capacity and Romania's situation in the regional and global context of the National Defense Strategy for the period 2015-2019 revealed that our country is vulnerable in the following areas: absorption of European funds, use of public money, energy, critical infrastructure, agriculture, environmental protection, justice, health, education and scientific research, resource precariousness and incoherence in managing various types of risks, corruption, social exclusion and polarization, poverty, demographic decline, labor migration, disparities socio-economic relations between regions and counties, the fragility of civic spirit and solidarity. [23]

Independent of the Romanian Presidency, a former member of the governing structures of the Romanian Intelligence Service, General Aurel Rogojan, said that after Ukraine and the Republic

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[23] Preşedinţia României, Strategia naţională de apărare a ţării pentru perioada 2015-2019: O Românie puternică în Europa şi în lume, Bucureşti, 2015, p. 14, available at http://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_Nationala _de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf, accessed in October 2017.

of Moldova, Romania seemed to be the expanded theater of hybrid war operations, generated by some political grievances.[24] The opinion coincides with the assessment of the threats of the country's National Defense Strategy for the period 2015-2019, which states "Destabilizing actions in the eastern neighborhood generate major challenges for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, creating regional instability and possible negative phenomena such as: migration, organized crime, but also affecting the potential economic development. "[25]

The assessment of Romania's economy and the World Bank's forecast for its evolution in 2018 indicates a possible rise in inflation and current account deficit due to government fiscal policies. Even though the World Bank estimates GDP growth of 5.5% in 2017, 4.1% in 2018 and 3.6% in 2019, the current account deficit could reach 3.5% in 2018 and 3, 8% in 2019, which translates into increasing the vulnerability of the economy to fluctuations in foreign markets and a possible decrease of the investors' confidence in the Romanian economy.[26]

The current account deficit also increases because we import more than we export[27], and the competitiveness of the national economy is lower than our trading partners, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition, economic performance is undermined by tax evasion, smuggling of petroleum products, tobacco and alcohol, as well as drug trafficking and prostitution.[28]

The human resource of the country is diminishing both because of the negative population growth and the massive emigration of many citizens, most of them young. "According to the latest data, published by the National Institute of Statistics, Romania's resident population on January 1, 2017 was estimated at: 19,310,216, down 163,408 (persons nn) as of January 1, 2016. It is as from the beginning 2016 and until now a city of the size of Braila would have disappeared from the face of the earth. In other words, we dropped at a rate of 19 Romanian / hour or 1 Romanian every 3 minutes and 14 seconds. [29] "As a consequence, both the economy and the Army will have problems with the occupation of vacancies after retirement of the elderly. In addition, because most emigrants are competitive on the European labor market, the level of Romanian society's performance will suffer and the gap between our country and the EU partners and NATO allies may increase or, at best, remain approximately at the same level as the present one.

The country's external debt rose to 37.2% of GDP in the second quarter of this year and amounted to 65.27 billion euros.[30] At this amount, the interest amounts to several billion euros annually. By correlating the external debt situation with the aging of the population, the numerical increase of pensioners and the reduction of the number of active people, we can estimate a possible reduction of the available financial resources for improving people's livelihood, health and education. In other words, there are prerequisites for increasing the dissatisfaction of certain

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[24] Aurel Rogojanu, „*România sub strategia tensiunii – structurile secrete paralele şi marea manipulare a protestelor*", available on https://gandeste.org/adevaruri/aurel-i-rogojan-romania-sub-strategia-tensiunii-structurile-secrete-paralele-si-marea-manipulare-a-protestelor/77414, accessed in June 2017.

[25] Preşedinţia României, Strategia naţională de apărare a ţării pentru perioada 2015-2019: O Românie puternică în Europa şi în lume, Bucureşti, 2015, p. 14, available on http://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_ Nationala_de_Aparare_a_ Tarii_1.pdf, accessed in October 2017.

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[29] Cantemir, Populatia Romaniei la 1 ianuarie 2017, Demograf, 10/02/2017, available on https://demograffiti.wordpress.com/2017/02/10/populatia-romaniei-la-1-ianuarie-2017/, accessed in November 2017.

[30] Romania National Debt, Countryeconomy.com, available on https://countryeconomy.com/national-debt/romania, accessed in November 2017.

categories of citizens, a situation that could be exploited by a possible aggressor who adopts hybrid methods of action against Romania.

Corruption in our country has become a news subject in other countries. On this issue, The Guardian, writes that under the smoke screen of anti-corruption actions there are hidden intentions to weaken democracy and increase authoritarianism. Romania's example seems to be followed by Hungary and Poland. [31]

Conclusions

Even though hybrid war does not have a unanimously recognized definition at the global level, the way this type of confrontation is described by different political and military experts and officials contains enough common elements to estimate the possible way of actions that will be subsumed. In this approach, we draw strong conclusions from the ongoing confrontations in Syria and Ukraine, as well as the violent actions taken by some of the migrants arriving in the EU and the US.

Romania's security vulnerabilities are many and they can be exploited by a possible aggressor who could use hybrid methods to destabilize the country, diminish the confidence of foreign investors in the economy, and use blackmail against those fellow citizens who were involved in illegal activities, to determine them to play the role of "the fifth column" in a possible confrontation.

Avoiding hybrid aggression is possible by increasing the responsibility of all citizens, first of all the decision-makers on all hierarchical levels of the Romanian society, who must understand that the national interest implies the cooperation of all national forces for the fulfillment of the national security and defense objectives.

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SECURITY TRANSFORMATION IN LIGHT
OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL SINGULARITY HYPOTHESIS

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Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of security and the international security environment through the hypothesis of technological singularity. Technological development and its consequences on the future of humanity are topics that have been deeply debated over the last few years in the Western academic world. The advocates of the technological singularity hypothesis, for the most part, believe that the accelerated pace of technological development, especially in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), will lead to a period of such profound changes of society beyond which it is almost impossible to foresee what the future of humanity will look like.

Analyzing a number of issues regarding the technological singularity hypothesis, I have tried to highlight the consequences of accelerated technological development on current security paradigms, as well as the military challenges that come with technological advancement.

Keywords: technological singularity, security, exponential evolution, logistic evolution.

Introduction

The studies conducted in the later years regarding technology's impact on human society have skyrocketed. This can be easily seen whilst looking all around us: each day we see how the environment is being transformed at an increasing pace, and this is without a doubt the result of the arising technologies which have allowed us to alter the natural configuration of the environment so that it will satisfy our needs. The amplitude and the accelerated rhythm with which the technological factors are evolving has found some researchers from a variety of fields (such as futurology or IT) advocating *the technological singularity hypothesis.* This hypothesis is generally defined as *an event or a phase when such major changes in human civilization or even in human nature occur that it is almost impossible to foresee how humanity will look like afterwards.* A lot of studies regarding the technological singularity have placed this unique event either before the first half of the 21st century or before its end.

Before trying to analyze the structure of this concept, we must address its avatars within other domains. For example, in mathematics, the singularity of a function is defined as *"A point on a curve where there is not a unique tangent which is itself differentiable"*[1] or *"A point where a function of real or complex variables is not differentiable or analytic"* [2]. In other words, in the singularity point, a mathematical object (curve, surface etc.), either cannot be defined (Figure no. 1a) or it exhibits an atypical behavior (Figure no. 1b). Thus we can observe the relative resemblance between the two concepts which refer to obtaining a certain value (in the case of mathematical

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[1] Christopher Clapham, James Nicholson, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Mathematics*, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 733. Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.261.2766&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Accessed on 12.08.2017.
[2] Mark D. Licker, *McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Mathematics*, The McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003, p. 277. Available at: https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4925. Accessed on 12.08.2017.

singularity) or achieving a certain level of development (in the case of technological singularity), beyond which it is virtually impossible to determine/analize or anticipate the behavior of the studied object/phenomenon.

a) *b)*

Figure no. 1. Mathematical singularity examples

Another filed where the concept of singularity is present is that of physics, namely the theory of relativity. In this case gravitational singularity depicts a region of space-time (known as *continuum spacetime* or *Minkowski spacetime*) which's volume approaches zero and its density approaches infinity. Gravitational singularity has an attraction force so powerful that not even the electromagnetic radiation cannot escape its area of influence. The Big-Bang and the centre of black holes are considered to be gravitational singularities.

All this cases (mathematical objects, physical phenomena, social phenomena) present common features when reaching their respective singularities. During the quest to apprehend these singularities, knowledge is faced with two ineludible obstacles: *undecidability* and *incomprehensibility*. We tend to think of this two barriers as the limits of gnoseology itself.

These are some of the reasons some people refuse to view singularities ontically. Even though this topic exceeds the purpose of this paper, some of its aspects are relevant when dealing with security from a technological point of view. Human history offers a multitude of examples in which human thought exceeded those which were considered to be singularities (mathematical, physical, social) - *mutatis mutandis* - the introduction of irrational numbers, calculating the square root of a negative number, non-Euclidian geometry, ultraviolet catastrophe, *the end of history* (Georg W. F. Hegel, Francis Fukuyama or Alexandre Kojève) etc. These problems can be dealt with from a kuhnian point of view regarding paradigm change. Thus, singularities of every nature can be thought of as incomplete paintings about the Universe and we can complete them when we will find another pieces from the puzzle of knowledge.

1. A model for technological singularity

Since the beginning of the last century the rate of technology evolution has accelerated in such a way that the promoters of technological singularity employ the so-called *Moore's Law*[3] to

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[3] *"Moore's law"* is not a law of Nature or a mathematical law, but an empirical observation made by American engineer Gordon E. Moore, dating back to 1965, which states that the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit doubles approximately every two years.. These results were presented by the author in „*Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits*", published in *Electronics* on April 19, 1965. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0By83v5TWkGjvQkpBcXJKT1I1TTA/view. Accessed on 20.08.2017.

support the arguments in favor of this concept. John von Neumann was among the first who mentioned technological singularity in a letter addressed to mathematician Stanislaw Ulam in the 1950's, where he noted that the accelerated technological progress will have a great impact on mankind's way of living[4]. The person who endorsed the term of technological singularity was Vernor Vinge, through his paper from 1993 entitled *"The Coming Technological Singularity"*[5] presented at a NASA organized conference. He considered that there are three ways to achieve technological singularity:

- The development of computers that are "awake" and superhumanly intelligent. (To date, most controversy in the area of AI relates to whether we can create human equivalence in a machine. But if the answer is "yes, we can", then there is little doubt that beings more intelligent can be constructed shortly thereafter;

- Large computer networks (and their associated users) may "wake up" as a superhumanly intelligent entity;

- Computer/human interfaces may become so intimate that users may reasonably be considered superhumanly intelligent;

- Biological science may find ways to improve upon the natural human intellect.[6]

To sum up, the three ways to achieve technological singularity, as mentioned by Vernor Vinge, correspond to the emergence of *human level AI* (HLAI) or *artificial general intelligence (AGI)* followed by an intelligence explosion (according to Irving J. Good). The emergence of AGI is considered to be the event which will ensure the transition towards technological singularity. It is generally believed that once AGI is achieved, the period of time until a form of superintelligence shall be extremely short. It is still uncertain though what impact superintelligence will have on human civilization. Philosopher Nick Bostrom had a comprehensive approach regarding this phenomenon (detailed in *Superintelligence: Paths, dangers, strategies*), originated from the concept of *existential risk.* His definition for this concept is: *"An existential risk is one that threatens to cause the extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or to otherwise permanently and drastically destroy its potential for future desirable development."*[7] He developed a series of strategies and methods of designing and controlling AI agents so that they would evolve in a constructive manner through which humanity will achieve its goals. Nowadays, the issue of a robust and beneficial development of AI is regarded as the main objective of prestigious organizations among which we list: *The Future of Humanity Institute* (Oxford University), *The Centre for the Study of Existential Risk* (Cambridge University), *The Future of Life Institute*, *Machine Intelligence and Research Institute*, *OpenAI.* We shall also mention *Partnership on AI,* a consortium formed from the most influential IT companies: *Microsoft, Google, IBM, Facebook, Apple* and *Amazon.*

Next, we present their main objectives.

- *To develop and share best practices:* support research, discussions, identification, sharing, and recommendation of best practices in the research, development, testing, and fielding of AI technologies. Address such areas as fairness and inclusivity, explanation and transparency, security and privacy, values and ethics, collaboration between people and AI systems, interoperability of systems, and of the trustworthiness, reliability, containment, safety, and robustness of the technology.

- *To advance public understanding*: advance public understanding and awareness of AI by multiple constituencies, including writing and other communications on core technologies, potential

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[4] Available at: http://www.ams.org/journals/bull/1958-64-03/S0002-9904-1958-10189-5/S0002-9904-1958-10189-5.pdf. Accessed on 19.08.2017.

[5] The essay was translated into Romanian by Constantin Vlad and appeared in *Almanahul Anticipaţia*, Editura Nemira, 2013, pp. 95-101.

[6] Vernor Vinge, *The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era*, în Vision-21 Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in the Era of Cyberspace, 1993, p. 12. Available at: https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19940022855.pdf. Accessed on 21.08.2017.

[7] Nick Bostrom, *Superinteligenţa: căi, pericole, strategii,* Editura Litera, trad. Doru Căstăian, Bucureşti, 2016, p. 208.

benefits, and costs. Act as a trusted and expert point of contact as questions, concerns, and aspirations arise from the public and others in the area of AI. Regularly update key constituents on the current state of AI progress.

- To *provide an open and inclusive platform for discussion and engagement:* create and support opportunities for AI researchers and key stakeholders, including people in technology, law, policy, government, civil liberties, and the greater public, to communicate directly and openly with each other about relevant issues to AI and its influences on people and society. Ensure that key stakeholders have the knowledge, resources, and overall capacity to participate fully.

- To *identify and foster aspirational efforts in ai for socially beneficial purposes:* seek out, support, celebrate, and highlight aspirational efforts in AI for socially benevolent applications. Identify areas of untapped opportunity, including promising technologies and applications not being explored by academia and industry R&D.[8]

The industrial, economical, social and military progress materialized through the automation of processes which, until lately, could have been accomplished by humans alone (such as automation of production lines, integration of multinational companies into vast networks), the development of military doctrines based on technology (*network centric warfare*) have all determined researchers to define theoretical evolutionary models through which technological singularity can be achieved.[9] Still, the question to be asked remains: "*Is technology actually growing at an exponential pace?*". Keeping this question in mind, two evolutionary models have been developed, both of them having people who support or oppose the concepts. The lack of concurrence regarding these two concepts is proof that we still have insufficient data to promote an unique model. Inasmuch as a common ground between biological and technological evolution exists, we shall use the widely known biological growth models to assess how technological evolution can present a security challenge for humanity.

The first model (Figure no. 2a) is based on the postulate of exponential growth (*"J" curve*) which states that technological evolution presents an exponential growth. The feedback of this process is a positive one, the result of each phase of technological evolution being used during follow on stages to optimize future results, this being due to the fact that technology manifests a feature regarded as ontically irreversible. This feature was highlighted by professor Nick Bostrom by stating the following: "*humanity has the capacity of inventing things, but it doesn't have the capacity of withdraw/remove them once they have been invented*"[10]. The effect of the positive fieedback will be the intelligence explosion, technology shall become a kingdom itself or may be connected to the other kingdoms (e.g. Chromista, Animalia, Fungi), this basically being the scenario proposed by most futurologists.

Ray Kurzweil and Hans Moravec have been two of the promoters of this model since the end of the 1980s. Based on *Moore's law* and the data regarding computing power which he had analyzed, Kurzweil identified a pattern of exponential growth and stated that Moore's law is just one of the paradigms on which this growth tendency of technology is based upon[11].

The model described earlier was criticized by physician Theodore Modis mainly because of the finite resources of the environment in which technology evolves[12]. Simultaneously, Modis is in favor of using the logistics function (*"S" curve* or *Sigmoid curve*) to describe the evolution of technology (Figure no. 2b). In this case we can observe the exponential growth during the first

[8] Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/#s-goals. Accessed on 15.09.2017.
[9] An overview of the most established models of technological singularity is given by Anders Sandberg in *An overview of models of technological singularity*, 2010. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242735810_An_Overview_of_Models_of_Technological_Singularity. Accessed on 14.09.2017.
[10] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jupxhH9mE-g. Accessed on 28.09.2017.
[11] Ray Kurzweil, *Epoca mașinilor spirituale: când computerele depășesc inteligența umană,* Editura Paralela 45, trad. de Bogdan Chircea, Pitești, 2012, p. 52.
[12] Theodore Modis, *Why the Singularity Cannot Happen*, în A. H. Eden et al., *Singularity Hypotheses*, The Frontiers Collection, 2012, pp. 311-339. Disponibil la: http://www.growth-dynamics.com/articles/Singularity.pdf. Accessed on 12.09.2017.

segment of progress, followed by an asymptotic evolution due to resource limitation, market saturation and other factors. The limit of this asymptotic growth is considered to be the environment's sustainability capacity. The logistic model on the other hand shows that technological singularity may be achieved in the inflection point, representing the transition from a pre-technological society to an extremely advanced one.

As Anders Sandberg pointed out, if exponential growth is used to describe the evolution of resource based domains, it will inherently involve limitations. For example, even if we could take into consideration the colonization of outer space by superintelligent entities, these entities could not continuously evolve exponentially due to the fact that the volume of space which can exist at a certain time t, equals:

$$\frac{4 \cdot \pi \cdot c^3 \cdot t^3}{3},\tag{1}$$

where c is the speed of light in a vacuum or, more precisely, the "speed" of causality in Einstein's theory of relativity. Thus, this constrains technology to evolve at a polynomial pace[13]. On second thought, when referring to knowledge, culture or values it is troublesome to identify boundaries because their level of complexity cannot be determined.

Figure no. 2. Models for biological/technoloical evolution

Based on simplified working hypothesis we have realized a complementary evolution model which embodies both logistic and exponential features. This model was proposed by Ray Kurzweil in his paper *The Singularity is near: When Humans Transcend Biology* as an answer to Modis's critiques. [14]

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[13] Anders Sandberg, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
[14] Theodore Modis, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

Maple 2017 was the software chosen to develop the model, together with the option of using the generalized logistic function due to its higher parameter number which allow modeling various scenarios. The chosen function is the following:

$$f(x) = A - \frac{K - A}{\left(C + Q \cdot e^{B \cdot (x-M)^{\frac{1}{v}}} \right)} \tag{2}$$

Setting values to the parameters arbitrarily, we have calculated the inflection for various x domains and used the curve fitting process to construct the plot. It is quite remarkable to note that by using this model we may obtain either a polynomial function or a exponential one, both being valid for the proposed scenarios. For example, the exponential function which best interpolates the values can be presented as:

$$y = a + b \cdot e^{c \cdot x + d} \tag{3}$$

a)

b)

Figure no. 3. Logistic-exponential-polinomial growth models for technological evolution

The cascading Sigmoid curve model describes technological progress as being cyclical and having a single direction. The curve obtained by interpolating inflection points of logistic curves notes the possibility that technological progress will continue to grow exponentially given the emergence of organisms and institutions which operate as anticipative systems. [15] There already are numerous corporations which implement strategies embodying leaps of technology once the previous generation has reached the inflection point of its logistic curve. One of the promoters of these strategies was *Apple Inc.* cofounder Steve Jobs, known for revolutionizing personal computers. [16]

The model proposed within this paper is far from being a panacea for technological singularity problem solving, but instead it smoothes the way for complementary approaches to technological progress. So far, the gathered information do not allow for an indefeasible conclusion regarding the environment in which technology exists. In other words, in is still uncertain if we will

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[15] Aron Jinaru, *Întreprinderea anticipativă*, in Almanah Anticipația 2013, Editura Nemira, 2012, pp. 39-43.
[16] Available at: https://www.engadget.com/2007/01/09/live-from-macworld-2007-steve-jobs-keynote/. Accessed on 14.09.2017.

deal with a **technosphere** where the **technotope** and **technocoenosis** will be in a stable and sustainable equilibrium. Furthermore, probably the most meaningful problem humanity is facing refers to the connection between a growing technosphere and a biosphere which is growingly dependent on natural resources and technological evolution. This is the stage of our analysis in which the subject of security arises.

2. Technological revolutions and security

We consider that the most relevant aspects regarding the technological singularity hypothesis do not account neither the moment when it will take place (say the development of artificial agents with AGI followed by the intelligence explosion) nor the ways it shall come to emerge (artificial superintelligence, human brain emulation etc.) nor the configuration of post-human civilization (the civilization beyond the technological singularity horizon). These aspects lay second in our analysis but the need not be ignored or underestimated. Altogether the relevance of the technological singularity hypothesis lies in the fact that it brings up the subject of human security, even at a planetary scale, in the context of technological evolution. The path to achieving technological singularity is itself more important than the technological progress. In light of these various problems await to be tampered with.

To understand security's transformation in light of technological progress we need to approach it in a way which transcends its traditional definition - *the absence of danger*. In this sense we are proposing a conceptual apparatus which focuses on some features which have been omitted by other authors. For example, the *perceptual-conscious* dimension of security is based on the traditional definition model. By identifying risks and threats, living organisms develop mechanisms designed to counter them. By living organisms we refer to both biological entities (plants, animals) and social entities (communities, states, organizations, alliances etc.)

The second feature of security refers to the unperceivable - non- conscientious aspect, namely risks and threats which transcend organisms' perceptions. The following example is conclusive: plants develop numerous defense mechanisms (emanating strong smells to attract caterpillars' natural predators or emanating smells which repel caterpillars; plants also "sweat" intensely during drought periods to prevent protoplasm coagulation thus preserving physiological functions; but when it comes to pesticides, plants have no natural mechanism for defending their selves).

The same rules apply to animals. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution men have massively altered the animals dominated ecosystems, the effect being the extinction of numerous species. This imbalance is the symbol of risks and threats which transcend the defense mechanisms employed by those who confront them. These cases can be extrapolated to the relationship between AI, nanotechnologies and humanity.

If left unsupervised technological progress may led to the appearance of risk and threats we would not perceive in order develop effective and efficient ways of fighting them. Therefore, when defining security one must include the perceptual horizon of risks and threats. For example, a prosperous community which resides at the base of a volcano will never be risk free, if it doesn't include onto its list of threats the possibility that the volcano may be active and erupt and develop the mechanisms needed to counter that specific threat or to diminish the effects once they materialize. Thus, even though the people considered themselves to be safe until the volcano's eruption, the community had never truly been safe. The aspects mentioned earlier lead us to

Hence the need to overcome the framework of classical security definition and to adopt a broader meaning of this concept. The only way we can extend the horizons of the risks and threats derived from accelerated technological progress and we can design predictive countermeasures to ensure the use of future technologies in humanity's benefit.

An analysis of the impact of technological development on human security must be done on organizational levels, starting from the individual level and ending with the planetary one. We saw

that a step in this direction was taken, among others, by Nick Bostrom, who considered that the destructive potential posed by AI-based technologies sholud be introduced in the inventory of existential risks (planetary level). Also in another paper, he drew attention to the fact that the lack of adequate policies and ethical-axiological framework, all our actions regarding these phenomena are doomed to *"wandering in the dark".*[17] First law of technology technology as it was formulated by Melvin Kranzberg states: *"Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral."* [18] As such, the directions in which technology evolves depend on our ability to direct technological progress and to discern between the short-term priorities of each state and the sustainable development of whole humanity. In order to ensure that technological progress is not accidental and destructive, we need to build a legal, ethical and axiological framework. This framework is meant to assure us that the technological progress does not exceed our ability to control it.

This goal requires a consensus among nations and its implementation should become a global priority. In this regard the efforts to achieve and implement policies and measures to control the way in which the research and development of potentially harmful technologies is conducted should be the prerogative of the highest forum, the United Nations (UN). Currently, this organization does not have the tools to apply regulatory measures in a wide range of areas related to technological activities. Although the security architecture on the fabric of which the UN was built is considered to be overwhelmed by the new geopolitical realities and the new problems faced by mankind, this security body has not been properly reformed. It is therefore unlikely that in the current working formula, the UN will be able to develop and apply that political-ethical-axiological framework to prevent the emergence of existential risks or threats caused by technological matters.

The second level of analysis of the security issue addresses the state actors and the relevant non-state actors in the realm of international relations. Entering a competitive spiral between states, such as the Cold War arms race, aimed to develope weapons based on AI, is of greatest concern to AI researchers and other public figures.[19] It would seem that the advantage gained by possessing such weapons has been seized by some state leaders. These include the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, who stated: *"Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world."*[20] Other actors that are striving for developing AI weapons are the United States and China. [21] The two states have the infrastructure and also the needed resources in order to become leaders in this field. Currently, the most powerful supercomputer, *Sunway TaihuLight*, is owned by China's National Research Center of Parallel Computer Engineering & Technology (NRCPC). Silicon Valley US companies are recognized as world leaders in IT, and their achievements in this area are well-known.

Another challenge to global security, generated by uncontrolled technological progress, is the placement of weapons of mass destruction or intelligent weapons in Earth's orbit or in outer space. On the other hand, developing technologies capable of exploring and exploiting the resources of other celestial bodies will represent a strategic asset in the race for resources. If the colonization of other planets from the solar system is feasible, the expectation for mankind to survive in case of a large natural disasters will increase considerably.

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[17] Nick Bstrom, *Technological Revolutions: Ethics and Policy in the Dark*, published in *Nanoscale: Issues and Perspectives for the Nano Century*, eds. Nigel M. de S.Cameron and M. Ellen Mitchell (John Wiley, 2007): pp. 129- 152. Available at: https://nickbostrom.com/revolutions.pdf. Accessed on 05.09.2017.

[18] Available at: http://www.centennialofflight.net/essay/Evolution_of_Technology/Tech-OV1.htm. Accessed on 07.09.2017.

[19] Among the personalities who have warned of the threats posed by the advancements in artificial intelligence are the physicist Stephen Hawking and the entrepreneur Elon Musk. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/20/elon-musk-killer-robots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-war. Accesat la data de 25.09.2017.

[20] Available at: https://www.rt.com/news/401731-ai-rule-world-putin/. Accessed on 02.09.2017.

[21] Available at: https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/3/16007736/china-us-ai-artificial-intelligence. Accessed on 10.08.2017.

At the level of small communities and individuals, the technological factor makes its presence felt in everyday life. The challenges faced by individuals are among the most diverse, from the pressure to keep pace with new technologies to losing jobs in favor of intelligent machines. At the same time, technology facilitates the development of social networks, creates new economic ties and and closes the gaps of between different regions from the globe. An important component that we overlook when looking at the impact of technologies on society is the ethics of research and development, but also the ethics of AI systems.[22] It seems quite difficult to achieve intelligent machines that borrow only what is valueable and ethically correct from the human being, when the whole history of humanity is built on attempts to comprehend this things.

Conclusions

The importance of the technological singularity hypothesis lies in the fact that it opens up an extended perspective on security metamorphosis in the context of the emergence of the new technologies whose destructive potential can threaten the humanity's destiny.

Accelerated technological progress forces society to evolve at the same pace. In trying to keep up with technologies, we often omit some issues concerning our security. The carrying capacity of our environment is limited. Under these circumstances, uncontrolled resource exploitation, coupled with the lack of political and ethical framework that guides and focuses on the world-wide *R&D* directions towards sustainable development, can mitigate technological progress. Capping technological developments may be synonymous with our inability to preserve the security of future generations.

An assessment of the impact of technological development on security should take into account the risk of launching an arms race for weapons development based on AI technologies. With all the warnings coming form specialists, there are signs that some states are making efforts to obtain such weapons. If this happens, the state that will hold such weapons, will have an unprecedented strategic advantage over its competitors, much higher than the advantage the United States had through the development of the nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War. This is true only if we assume that the state in question manages to create and implement effective control measures over AI.

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DESIGNING AND DEVELOPING MILITARY SCENARIOS WITH THE USE OF COMPUTER APPLICATIONS

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Abstract: *Creating scenario is the art of creating futures rationally. It involves imagination, it requires expertise, it demands effort and dedication and, above all, it makes use of a lot of information. When it comes with the military scenarios, the situation evolves to the next level because it addresses "a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life and death, the road either to survival or ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be studied thoroughly"[1]. In modern days, computers serve as very important and powerful tools but their use lays on human intelligence and his ability to program them in order to achieve the success. In this article I will present some of the best solution for using computer to analyse the operational situation and generate informational products meant to create scenarios, as outstanding tools in planning the future actions.*

Keywords: *Micmac, Mactor, Multipol, Delphy, military scenario, prospective.*

Introduction

The process of designing and developing scenarios is extremely complex and requires considerable effort on the part of all involved. "The art of the long view" requires sacrifices, but the results obtained, which are also proportional to the effort made in terms of accuracy and efficiency, have a significant contribution to identifying the solutions for the different operational situations, to determining the strategies for putting these solutions into practice and to the coherent and effective development of plans and procedures. The effort put forward by scriptwriters can be significantly diminished by the use of the computer and computer applications, both as high-power repetitive computing tools and as a means of efficient organization and management of information.

At present, IT applications that are strictly suited to running the scenario design and development process are not a very well represented segment in the world of virtual space users. The situation is somewhat justified, as the main features of this process can be fraught with uncertainties, forecasts and estimates, probabilities and dynamic flexibility that are often difficult to quantify or fit into concrete and accurate laws and principles. Unfortunately, these characteristics unambiguously correspond to the current and future operational environment, which is highly dynamic in terms of diversified actions from the point of view of the actors involved, their strategies, but also of the means, processes and methods used. The goals and objectives pursued by the actors, as well as their priorities and the power relations between them are often difficult to understand and therefore the course of action is probably ambiguous and extremely flexible becoming problematic to identify.

In spite of the above, some possibilities of using the computer can be highlighted in order to increase the efficiency of the process of military scenarios development.

In the process of designing and developing scenarios, the use of computer applications is closely linked to two basic issues.

The first is to identify concrete methods, taken over from exact, even mathematical sciences, to go through sequences within the process that would result in data which in turn would be arguments for further developments. The whole process has a profoundly participatory character and is also based on analytical, logical, inductive or deductive, empirical or scientific mechanisms,

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[1] Sun Tzu, *The art of war.*

which are the hallmark of human thinking. In this sense, the basic idea is that, up to a certain level, all these actions of human thinking, which can be included in the sphere of reasoning, are based on operations or models that can be carried out much faster by computers. Applying the cause-effect principle, mathematical mechanisms of compounding effects, processing causal inference between events, or statistical data processing are operations that can be carried out by computers or computer applications up to a certain level at a rate and accuracy far above human capacity.

The second aspect is to identify the tolerance that makes the products of the exact science-based methods, representative instruments for the prospective thinking phenomena. The situation is similar to the *subjective-objective* paradigm or *the universal reference system* concept. The first analogy refers to the possibility of objectively describing or presenting an idea by means that are undoubtedly subjective, since they express personal appreciation, even if only at the level of collective consensus. As a rule, the solution is to find those arguments that are generally valid or within the limits accepted by the receiver. Regarding the second analogy, the concept of a universal reference system here refers to the necessity of assigning some coordinates to the idea or concept presented which correspond to the tolerances of the community or, at least, of the receiver.

Next, we will present some of the computer applications that can implement mathematical and logical reasoning that contributes to the process of developing military scenarios.

1. Micmac's structural analysis software[2]

Structural analysis is a tool that is based on the consensus of ideas and whose algorithm uses a matrix that combines all constituent components of the system, called operational variables. The method identifies the main operational variables that are both influential and dependent on the other variables in significant proportions. This feature gives them an essential importance for the evolution of the system and they are therefore called *key variables*.

The *Micmac* sofware was developed by the French Institute for Computer Innovation 3IE[3], Laboratory for Investigation in Prospective Strategy and Organization (LIPSOR), under the supervision of the creators[4] of the method. Based on the software standards developed for *Windows*, it provides the user with an intuitive interface, including project development windows and comprehensive menus. The user also benefits from a coherent and detailed support module that contains all the information required for effective use. It is important to note that Micmac, in the original version, is developed for the civilian economic environment, but it can be adapted to the structural analysis field of the military operational environment.

Each study is initiated in the form of a project containing all the data and analyses it involves. The operations performed during application use can be grouped into four sequences, shown below.

The first sequence refers to the registration of the study participants (expert group). As a computerized implementation of a participatory type, the application allows the input of data on each of the participating experts, such as: *name, surname, origin (structure) and function*, so that during the analysis process and especially, after its conclusion, the core of the scriptwriters could follow the options and synthesize each participant's comments.

A second important sequence of the application is to enter the data. Here is a record of variables (full name, abbreviated name, domain of belonging and description), as well as calculation parameters (the number of iterations wanted to power the matrix of direct influences to obtain indirect relationships). Also, in this sequence, the data about the direct relations between the variables (with their intensity) are introduced, in the form of the direct relationship matrix.

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[2] The *Micmac* freeware is available at http://en.laprospective.fr/methods-of-prospective/ accesed on 08.10.2017.

[3] Institut d'Inovation Informatique pour l'Entreprise.

[4] The MICMAC method was created in 1973 by Michel Godet and J.C.P. Duperrin. It is presented in Godet M., *From anticipation to action – a handbook of strategic prospective*, UNESCO, Paris, 1994, available at unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0009/000970/097082eb.pdf, accesed on 10.10.2017.

Additionally, the app allows parallel study of potential influence relationships (which may occur during the development of the situation). Participants have the opportunity to introduce the potential value of the relationship between two variables (by equating the value of the direct relation to the direct potential relationship).

The third sequence is the result. The results of the study on current relations are first represented by the two charts of influences and dependencies (one for direct relations and the other for indirect relations) and the two graphs associated with them. A similar set is also provided for potential relationships so that we can compare the potential evolution of the relationship of influence and dependence between variables during the future development of the situation. Finally, the application provides a classification of the variables according to the influence and their dependence, as well as a graphical representation of the change of each variable's position in the causal relationship graph, from the coordinates of the direct values to the indirect values.

First of all, the last sequence gives the user the ability to generate a report on structural analysis results in text format compatible with *Microsoft Word*. This report may be supplemented by the comments made by the participating experts. Secondly, the application allows the export and import of data and results into *Word* and *Excel* applications, thus offering the ability to improve graphs and create complete reports, and run a simulation that highlights how the results change when the variables' input values vary. Once the analysis has been completed and the results are brought to light, a general synthesis of the entire activity can be provided to deliver useful information for further phases of the scenario development process.

2. The computer application for analyzing relationships between actors, Mactor[5]

Another method that is applied in the scenario development process is the *MACTOR* method. This is used in the study of relationships between actors by analyzing the influences that are generated between them in the operational environment, taking into account the convergences and divergences that arise when faced with different actions and the associated goals each one pursues, as well as the balance of power that is established and evolves as the situation changes. Through this analysis, *MACTOR* aims to facilitate decision-making through the study of strategies that substantiate alliance policies and conflicts between actors.

Like *Micmac*, the *Mactor* software was developed by the French Institute for Computer Innovation 3IE, Laboratory for Investigation in Prospective Strategy and Organization (LIPSOR), under the supervision of the method creators, and is based on the standards implemented in Windows. Also, the support module is well represented, giving even the uninitiated enough support (including algorithm description) to be able to use the application effectively.

To start a new study, as in the case of *Micmac*, it is necessary to create a new project that can be saved and modified both in point of its name as well as of its content. With respect to the sequences, they are similar in name to those in the previous application, so that, once the project has been created, the participants' identification data registration begins. Subsequently, the data entry step is completed. By using the *Data* menu, the actors and objectives are entered, with the possibility of adding the full and abbreviated name, as well as a brief description. For actors, it is possible to associate information that characterizes them, such as strengths and weaknesses, as well as results from interviews organized with their representatives. As far as the objectives are concerned, they specify the field to which each of them belongs. Other inputs are information about direct influences between actors (*MDI* matrix) and relationships between actors and objectives after they have been hierarchized (*MAO2* matrix).

With initial data introduced, the application provides, in the third sequence, all the products that were described in the presentation of the method, as well as others, resulting from analyses performed according to different criteria. Thus, the *MDI* shows the matrix of direct and indirect relationships, the hierarchy of actors within the power balance, as well as the comparison, within

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[5] The *Mactor* freeware is available at http://en.laprospective.fr/methods-of-prospective/ accesed on 08.10.2017.

each pair of actors, between the degree of influence and the degree of dependence that exists between them. For a better understanding, each of these products (on the actors' influence) is associated with a graphic representation in the form of a histogram or graph, as the case may be. From the *actors-objectives* data, the *MAO* and *MAO3* matrix, as well as the matrices of convergence and divergence between the associated actors, arise. Each of these products is also accompanied by graphic representations in the most suggestive forms. Also, the ambivalence between actors is calculated by analyzing the composition of convergences and divergences among actors with respect to common goals. From this product one can determine whether two actors will give up their divergences in order to pursue the objectives for which they have convergent relations (thus establishing an alliance) or not, in which case a conflict arises between them. We need to point out that this analysis is as sensitive and important as its results are of major importance in establishing each actor's strategy in the further development of the situation. The sequence also provides an analysis of the actors' objectives and positions towards them, allowing the identification of target groups towards which actors have a strong convergent or divergent position.

As with *Micmac*, the fourth sequence gives you the ability to produce a final report compatible with the *Word* application, as well as the *Mactor* interface with *Excel* for importing or exporting data. In addition, changes to the entire analysis process caused by variations in some initial data values can be tracked through the simulation action accessed from the *File* menu. Once the analysis has been completed, an overall summary of the entire activity can be provided in this application that provides the information needed to carry out further stages of the scenario development process.

3. Joint Exercise Scenario Tool (JEST)

Joint Exercise Scenario Tool is a database web application developed by NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (*N3CA*) and used by NATO to develop military scenarios used in computer-assisted exercises (CAX). The application allows for the development, distribution and control in a structured form of the scenarios databases and the operational framework. The main entities with which they operate are: actors, military structures, persons, equipment and facilities.

One of the most important advantages of this application is, besides the many acceptable parameters (such as: the area of development of the situation, the names and characteristics of the actors, the characteristics of the forces that constitute the military instrument, etc.), the fact that their changes can be dynamically controlled. This allows the database to be updated promptly and thoroughly. Another advantage offered by the application is that it can generate complete or specific domains oriented country books or country-specific reports in **.pdf* format or *web* pages, as desired by the user. A significant addition is that it can be interfaced with other applications from the point of view of importing / exporting information (e.g. *ORBAT*), such as command & control (C2), geographic information systems or simulation systems, with a view to extending the functionality and the short-term integration of the information contained in the generated products.

The information introduced into the application is structured by domains as follows: general information, organizational information at the level of actors (state, nonstate, alliances), information on important persons and information on the organization of the military power instrument (*ORBAT*).

The general information firsty refers to the general description of the scenario and the geographic description of the crisis area. Maps and different information on geographic aspects, such as coordinates of targets or important areas, can be added. The application also allows the input of important documents into the scenario, such as resolutions of policy makers, agreements, memoranda, force activation documents, scheduling documents issued by different echelons, or descriptions of the crisis situation history.

The organizational sequence at the actors' level allows the introduction of information on general and historical features, administrative organization, geographic, climate, demographic,

political, economic, demographic and information environment, infrastructure, etc. All this information can be geographically connected, the user being able to refer to areas, directions and places on the map.

Information on key individuals in the scenario can be highly detailed. Thus, descriptive aspects of personal details, such as biography, profession, family, friends, but also character traits or hobbies, including images, can be introduced. In doing so, it is possible to carry out detailed analyses of the profile of the personalities involved in the crisis development in order to identify their strengths or weaknesses and to estimate the aspects of the strategies and decisions taken in different situations.

The sequence on the organization of forces participant in crisis situations offers the possibility to introduce detailed information on their structure, personnel and military systems. It is possible to achieve a coherent detailing of the structures in the composition of the participating forces as well as the C2 architecture for each of the participating actors. They can also be provided with information and images on the military systems of each structure, including the specification of the technical and tactical features of the different armament systems and equipment.

Taking into account the menu structure and the products that this application provides, we consider it useful to use in the development and management of the scenario information framework. Through this, the realization of the scenario module *The overall situation* is rendered more efficient with respect to the timeliness and structure of the activities undertaken. Also, country reports and surveys generated by the application can be used during the scenario implementation by the planning structure to produce the necessary documents during the operational planning process (*OPP*), especially the operational estimates.

4. The Delphi software

The well-known *Delphi* method was designed to identify solutions to some issues in a participative manner (through expert consensus). The main tool is the questionnaire set that is applied iteratively until results fall within the range set by the organizers. The software implementation of this method has been done by several developers[6] who offer *stand-alone* or *on-line* support to increase process efficiency. The applications usually contain a sequence of participants registration, a questionnaire generation sequence, a sequence for monitoring and processing the results, and a sequence for generating the final report.

5. The Multipol software

Multipol (MULTI-criteria POLicy) implements the multicriteria decision-making method of the same name. It was also developed by the French Institute of Computer Science (*3IE*), according to the technical specifications of the LIPSOR Laboratory. Like *Micmac* and *Mactor*, it runs under the Windows operating system and contains an exhaustive and well-structured support module. It is also possible to interface with *Word*, *Excel* and *PowerPoint* from *Microsoft Office* to export and import data, and to generate and present results in reports. In addition, comments from participants during use can be included and added to the final report.

Like all other multicriteria analysis methods, *Multipol* compares different actions or solutions to a problem, according to multiple criteria and policies. The purpose of using the method is to help users in the decision-making process by creating a simple and evolutionary matrix to analyze the actions and solutions available. Although it is one of the simplest existing multicriteria applications, it is very useful. The decision-making mechanism is based on the evaluation of the actions (solutions) through the weighted average, similar to the assessment of the students in a class, calculated according to the results recorded for each subject, weighted by the coefficients of importance for each subject.

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[6] *Sky Tech Systems*, available at http://armstrong.wharton.upenn.edu/delphi2/, accesed on 15.10.2017.

Once the project has been created, the user has to go through the four standard sequences, namely *the registration of the participants, the data input, the calculation itself* and *the generation of the results*.

The registration sequence of the participants involves entering each person's data: *name, first name, role, occupational data* and *contact data*.

Entry data is input in tabular form (actions, criteria, policies, scenarios) and matrix (*actions × criteria, policies × criteria, scenarios × criteria*).

The calculation sequence consists of two aspects: *policy-relevant actions / solutions evaluation* and *scenario-based policy assessment*. The results that policy-relevant actions / solutions evaluation makes available to the user are: the *actions × policies table*, the *action × policies graph*, the *sensitivity grading chart* and the *decision timetable*. A similar configuration has the results of policy assessment according to scenarios.

The result generation sequence allows for a final **.doc* report, which includes all the results of the multicriteria assessment as well as the participants' comments and justifies the choice of action (solution).

6. Interconnection of computer applications

The difficulty of the uncertain, complex and even ambiguous dynamics of the operational environment often exceeds the human ability to estimate its *quo-vadis* with acceptable precision. In order to make a detailed and verifiable description of a crisis situation likely evolution, it is necessary to process a huge amount of information using a well-founded procedural instrument. The process of designing and developing scenarios is extremely complex, and its deployment requires major efforts and significant resource consumption, especially human and time. In addition, the knowledge and level of competence required to effectively participate in the process is of a very high level. During this, participants must estimate the value of the input data with an accuracy that exceeds the empirical or intuitive level. Their processing by scenario developers sometimes involves performing mathematical operations whose complexity is greatly amplified by the amount of information included. In addition, quantification of input data is not always possible while preserving their actual value so that the mathematical device used can introduce system errors which, amplified, lead to false results. No less true is that, although military scenarios are used for early planning (so the crisis is not in progress), events or situations may be occurring during the entire process of their designing and developing thus generating the need to introduce changes in the data input. The process being sequential and recursive, this affects all subsequent results, complicating substantially its deployment.

All of these reasons create the need to conduct the development of military scenarios by using an IT application developed by software developers. This would have a major impact on the process, with scenario developers having a powerful enough tool to manage the immense amount of information involved in creating a set of complex scenarios applicable to the contemporary operational environment.

The main software application must be able to centrally manage, integrate and dynamically manage databases, computing modules that implement the methods used in the process, input data, information products with related data fields, and scenario editing module. The databases are of two types: *administrative and operational*. *Administrative* databases refer to participants' records with their personal data and tools used in the process. The *operational* ones mainly target the informational database that includes all data related to the operational environment: actors, military structures, people, equipment and facilities, as well as other parameters (such as issues on the area of the situation development, names and characteristics of actors, characteristics of the forces constituting the military instrument, geographic, climatic, demographic, political, economic, demographic and informational aspects, infrastructure etc.). An example is provided by *JEST*.

Computational modules that implement the methods used in the process (*Delphi, MICMAC, MACTOR, MULTIPOL* etc.) must be functionally interconnected so that their products can be cross-linked.

The editing module must achieve the efficient organization of the scenario parts and the simultaneous and interactive compilation of the scenarios. It also needs to be able to display the changes and annotations made during the scenario evaluation and refining sequence.

The main application must be able to be interfaced with other applications from the point of view of importing / exporting information (e.g. *ORBAT*), such as command & control, geographic information systems or simulation systems, in order to extend the functionality and short-term integration of the information contained in the generated products. It should allow the addition of maps and information on geographic aspects, such as the coordinates of targets or important areas. The application should also allow important documents to be entered into the scenario, such as political decision-makers' resolutions, agreements, memoranda, force activation documents, planning documents issued by different echelons, or descriptions of the crisis history.

Conclusions

The process of designing and developing scenarios supports various models and, consequently, can consist in different manners of approaching this issue, according to the developers (e.g. Sellamna Nour, John S. Ratcliffe, David Stout, Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Sascha Meinert, Michel Godet etc.). In all cases, it is very complex, laborious and, above all, involves a lot of information that can be managed efficiently only by using modern tools such as the software applications presented above. All models created so far include an anlysis sequence of the environment and the actors participating and the stage of choosing between different solutions to the problem. The logic mechanisms endorsing each of these processes can be successfully implemented only by using methods like those described above and when efficiency and interconnectivity is required, computer is the perfect means. Above all, military scenarios involve much more information, much more need for efficiency, coherence, speed and accuracy, just because the result (scenario) can influence the victory acquiring on the battlefield.

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THE CZECH REPUBLIC DEFENCE STRATEGIES:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND QULITATIVE ASSESSMENT

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Abstract: For almost three decades the Czech Republic (CZR) has been facing various challenges in defence stemming both from evolving strategic environment and national context. Objective of this contribution is to assess quality of key strategic level defence policy documents. In theory, strategy is one of the main strategic management instruments for addressing defence challenges by defining defence policy objectives (ends), outlining framework (ways) for defence provision (main principles and initiatives) and resources (means) available for their successful implementation. This paper is based on comparative analysis of selected strategic level documents in area of defence adopted by the government of the CZR since 1997. Critical findings:(1) the CZR Government adopted strategies frequently; (2) main impetus for that effort provided NATO integration, slushing resources and gradual deterioration of security environment; (3) the CZR strategies might be characterised rather as reactive, short-term looking concepts communicating general statements and principles, outlining mainly strategic level objectives and initiatives, not providing sufficient and stable resourcing (with exception of 2017 Strategy), not delegating responsibilities and not setting biding implementation framework. Improvement of the CZR strategies requires more political commitments to turn them in real strategic management tools and enhanced expertise of all stakeholders involved in their elaboration.

Keywords: vision, strategy, defence policy, defence policy adaptation, security environment, armed forces, plans.

Introduction

Since 1989, defence policy of the CZR had to deal with three major challenges. Firstly, defence policy has been trying to address adequately the pattern of change in country´s security environment and unprecedent internal political, economic and social transformation. Secondly, defence policy implementation for most of the time has been facing significant underfinancing resulting in defence sector insufficient performance and deteriorating of armed forces capabilities. Third, the way the defence provision and use of armed forces as an instrument of defence policy has also been evolving. Namely, the role of armed forces has been changing from purely territorial defence force in early '90s, to the collective defence contributor, expeditionary warfare firefighter in the framework of international crisis management and know-how provider of collaborative security.

This paper is based on comparative analysis of selected strategic level documents (strategies) in area of defence adopted by the government of the CZR since 1997. These documents are namely: National Defence Strategy of the CZR (1997), Military Strategy of the CZR (1999, 2002, 2008), Defence Strategy of the CZR (2012, 2017).

In theory, strategies usually serve as one of the main strategic management tools for addressing country's security and defence challenges.[1] They are supposed to define defence policy objectives, outline ways for country's defence provision (main principles and initiatives) and make resources available for successful objectives implementation. Based on that conceptual construct, the aim of this contribution is to assess the extent the strategies of the CZR have been responding to the dynamics of country´s security environment and its internal developments.

The comparison analysis itself is based on a set of criteria which were selected after structured discussion with the experts of Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies (CSMSS). These criteria embrace: (1) strategic context (challenges and opportunities); (2) expected outcomes (objectives, initiatives, political-military ambitions); (3) principles for development and application of military power; (4) available resources; (5) and implementation and evaluation framework.

Furthermore, the paper tries to answer following questions: (1) Is the strategy reactive (short-term in focus, reflecting on rather present developments than future trends) or proactive (long-term in focus, assessing future trends and their implications)? (2) Does the strategy provide general vision (general objectives and principles, conceptual ideas) or sound strategy (well defined set of specific objectives and initiatives to meet them)? (3) Is the strategy complex (embracing all instruments of national power and overall functions and structure of defence system) or rather narrow in its content (focusing on armed forces as the main tool of defence policy implementation). (4) Is the strategy supported by sufficient resources (financial, material, personnel) and contents sound implementation framework (responsibility, validity, feedback mechanisms, timeline).

The outcome of comparative analysis is based on qualitative assessment and expert judgement. It takes in consideration strategic management theory and best practice for strategy formulation.[2] Relevant benchmark provide Russian National Security Strategy (2015) [3] and US National Military Strategy (2015)[4] as highly elaborated strategies. Both documents outline clear and strategic level objectives with the ambition to shape future security environment. They reflect comprehensive approach to security and defence provision and provide clear guidance for successful implementation. Additionally, both strategies helped authors to define criteria for qualitative assessment of chosen CZR strategies.

Before the comparison itself, it is practical to define several terms used frequently in this study. *Security (strategic) environment* is an external environment influencing security policy of a state. Also, it is an external space where interests of other states or international entities meets and where processes with significant influence on security and defence take place.[5] *Defence policy* is an organic part of state policy which creates precondition and set the goals and priorities to deter and defend any country against external threat. Defence policy requires multinational and multiagency approach, it is durable and depends on definition of protected values and national interests. Its implementation counts with all citizens.[6] *Strategy* is in broader term understood as one of the strategic management tools outlining course of action to accomplish mission, vision and long-term objectives of an organisation or in a specific functional area (training, resource management, acquisition etc. Strategy is a plan for future security and defence provision.[7] Strategy elaboration

[1] Elitsa Petrova, *Genesis of Strategic Management*, Copenhagen, Bookboon.com. 2017. ISBN 978-87-403-1843-2.
[2] Vlastimil Galatík, Antonín Krásný a Karel Zetocha, ed. *Military Strategy*. Prague: Ministry of Defence of the CZR-Press and Information Centre, 2008, pp. 15,ISBN 978-80-7278-475-2.
[3] Russian National Security Strategy. 2015. (cit. 25.6.2017) Available online: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf
[4] The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015, (cit. 25.6.2017) Available online: http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf
[5] Libor Frank, Security Environment, in: *Czech Security Terminology: Basic Terms.* Ed: Zeman, Petr et al. Brno: Institute for Strategic Studies of Military Academy, 2002, pp. 24-27.
[6] Libor Frank, Defence Policy. In: *Czech Security Terminology: Basic Terms.* Ed: Zeman, Petr et al. Brno: Institute for Strategic Studies of Military Academy, 2002, pp. 86-87.
[7] Colin S. Gray, *Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting The Challenge of Uncertainty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. p.2. ISBN 978-0-19-870184-2.

has become a narrow-minded exercise rooted in the concepts of ends, ways, and means[8] and the whole-of-government approach. Strategy can be improved by defining as a theory of success and understanding that the purpose of strategy is to create advantage, generate new sources of power, and exploit weaknesses of the opponent.[9]

1.   Comparison of Czech defence strategies

National Defence Strategy of the CZR (1997)

The strategy[10] was adopted by coalition government one year after parliamentary elections won by Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The Minister of Defence became Miloslav Výborný from Cristian Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL).

Strategic context. The defence policy was shaped by continues military involvement of the CZR Armed Forces (CZAF) in NATO led stabilisation operation (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Strategy assumes that probability of a global conflict has been substantially diminished during last years and the CZR is not threatened with an opened armed aggression at present. Nevertheless, new non-military threats are emerging and there still is potential source of instability in Eastern Europe resulting from historical problems in territorial, ethnic and religious context. It assumes that regional conflict in Eastern Europe with limited objectives cannot be excluded.

Expected outcomes. The strategy provides thoughtful conceptual framework for the development of complex defence system embracing all instruments of national power. It outlines principles, values, goals and clearly delineates responsibilities for resolute activities to ensure security of the state, avert an armed conflict and use of force if national interests are endangered both by external and internal factors. The strategic and ultimate objective of the country is NATO membership and integration in EU structures. These two steps are considered as a necessity both for strengthening country´s security and its economic prosperity as well as for ensuring social and political stability.

Principles for development and use of military power. There are two guiding principles for defence provision. First one is *prevention*. It means to avoid or minimise military conflict by negotiations and diplomacy. Second one is *deterrence* supported by credible defence thus sending message to the potential aggressor that consequences of coercion would outweight the potential gains.

The CZAF are designed to defend the country against threats occurring outside or inside the borders, as well as fulfil international commitments.

Available resources. Peace time establishment of the CZAF is set for approximately 0,5-0,6 % of the overall population (between 50 to 60 thousand of military personnel). In war time the strength of the CZAF may grow 5-6 times. Material resources are secured by the system of economic mobilisation. However, modernisation programs or priority for capability development are not explicitly outlined. Financial resources are specified rather in vague manner. There is not given any fix number or percentage of GDP to ensure sufficient and stable financing.

Implementation and evaluation framework is not established and responsibility for its implementation is not assigned to any specific entity.

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[8] Arthur F. Lykke Jr., Defining Military Strategy, *Military Review* 69, no. 5 (May 1989). Strategy equals *ends* (objectives toward which one strives) plus *ways* (courses of action) plus *means* (instruments by which some end can be achieved).

[9] Jeffrey W. Meiser, *Are Our Strategic Models Flawed?: Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy* [online]. Carlisle, Pensilvania, USA, 2017 [cit. 2017-10-11]. Dostupné z: https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2016-17/10_Meiser.pdf. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

[10] The National Defence Strategy. Mnistry of Defence of The CZR. Prague. 1997. (cit. 8.7.2017). Available online: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156842/Czech_Republic_English-1997.pdf

Military Strategy of the CZR (1999)

The 1999 strategy[11] is elaborated in the wake of NATO membership. It is adopted by Government led by social democrats who assigned Mr. Vladimir Vetchý to the position of defence minister.

Strategic context. Strategy embraces complex overview of principles and rules for security and defence provision. It emphasises that defence against external military threat is the CZAF primary mission and government responsibility. As the 1997 strategy, also this document echoes the rather low probability of global conflict outbreak.

Expected outcomes. Defence is ensured by own credible military capability within collective defence framework. The CZAF may fulfil wider spectrum of military or non-military tasks in framework of national or multinational crisis response operations (CRO). Evolving CZAF mission requires different capabilities (mobility, strategic deployability, interoperability). Rather lighter than high-end-weapons and heavy equipment credential is on demand. The ambition is to deploy up to 1000 military personnel to NATO peacekeeping operations in various operational conditions.

Principles for development and use of military power. Forces are divided into two categories. First group consist of forces under NATO command and forces earmarked and assigned to NATO. Second group embraces forces under national command. Forces are kept in tree levels of readiness: (1) Rapid Reaction Forces - reaction time 10 days; (2) Reaction Forces – reaction time 20 days; and (3) Main Defence Forces - reaction time 30 days. The CZAF consists of Army of the CZR, Castle Guard and Military Office of the President. Strategy underlines the creation of two different level of forces: First echelon is assigned for international deployments with forces in higher level of readiness. Second one is created by territorial defence forces supposed to operate on national territory.

Available resources. Strategy stipulates importance of quality over quantity of human resources and implementation of semi-professional armed forces. The number of military personnel is set for approximately 0,6 % of the overall population. The war time establishment foresees its 4 times increase via mobilisation. The amount and structure of supplies are to be maintain according to NATO standards. In terms of financial resources, there is only general statement that financing of defence is ensured via national budget.

Implementation and evaluation framework. In comparison to previous strategy the responsibility for tasks fulfilment is not explicitly defined and overall implementation framework refers to defence planning or operational planning processes in rather general terms.

Military Strategy of the CZR (2002)

Strategic context. This document[12] is shaped by the aftermath of September 9, 2001 terrorist attack on the US which rapidly changed the perception of global security environment. It also addresses the lessons learned in operational deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo. Additionally, Minister of Defence social democratic and former military officer Jaroslav Tvrdík introduces the idea of fully professional armed forces.[13] Major change is also seen in threats listing where the open aggression is still not expected, however, in long term it should be involved as a part of planning. Non-state terrorist actors became urgent enemies. In the agenda of non-armed threats, the potential harm from economical, ethnical, religion instability or natural disasters is still the one that might be faced in a future.

Expected outcomes. Strategy emphasizes the importance of collective defence and responsible fulfilment of international commitments. The strategic assumption is the existence of

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[11] The Military Strategy. 1999. (cit. 8.7.2017). Available online: http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/CSD/1999%20Vojenska%20strategie%20CR.pdf

[12] The Military Strategy. 2002. (cit. 8.7.2017). Available online: http://www.army.cz/assets/files/5819/Military_Strategy_of_the_Czech_Republic_-_2002.pdf

[13] Miroslav Tůma, Josef Janošec a Josef Procházka. *Obranná politika Československé a České republiky (1989-2009).* Ministerstvo obrany. Praha: MO ČR - PIC MO, 2009. ISBN 978-80-7278-522-3.

reliable transatlantic link. The challenges that the CZR and NATO are facing lead to accentuation and shifting of some priorities and to widening of the spectrum of the tasks to be dealt with. The objectives are linked to NATO Strategic Concept and to the needs of NATO itself.

Principles for development and use of military power. Compare to the 1999 strategy, the CZAF structure is not specified. There are mentioned additional institutions participating on defence. The CZAF tasks are to defend the state, fulfil NATO commitments and provide support to non-military operations. The strategy stands on the CZAF and three-pillar structure. First, the ability to deploy the CZAF outside of the country territory. Second pillar stands on a protection of the airspace and third is the preparation for reinforcement of NATO forces on the ground of the CZR (host nation support).

Available resources. Strategy does not outline any significant change in the CZAF structure. However, personnel should be reduced due to upcoming professionalization of the CZAF to the level of 34-36 thousand. In case of war, the number of the CZAF should beef up on 1,8 % of overall country population (ambition is lower against 1999 benchmark). Significant change is the commitment to allocate not less than 2,2% of GDP to defence provision (commitment valid till 2005).

Implementation and evaluation framework does not provide any guidance for the way ahead.

Military Strategy of the CZR (2008)

Strategic context. The Government formed by liberal Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the MOD controlled by Vlasta Parkanová (KDU-ČSL) had once again a difficult task to establish equilibrium between defence policy objectives (challenging international deployments − mainly Afghanistan) and resources available (slushing budget). Since 2005 defence budget was on decline, the CZAF were intensively involved in NATO operations (Afghanistan predominantly), modernization of equipment and infrastructure refurbishment become even more urgent and personnel expenditure of fully professional armed forces climbing. The strategy put aside consideration of the potential outbreak of *"big war"*. Strategy is built on the assumption that a large-scale conventional conflict in the territories of NATO or EU member states is still highly unlikely in a foreseeable future; such a threat would be identified well in advance and therefore met with effective countermeasures. Extremism, terrorism and instability are put as the major concerns.[14]

Expected outcomes. Strategy[15] provides an essential set of principles for defence policy and CZAF development.[16] Despite financial constrains the level of political-military ambitions remains rather high to meet collective defence obligations and provide adequate support to foreign missions under NATO, EU or UN flag. Active participation in such operations is essential for safeguarding of security interests of the CZR.

Principles for development and use of military power. Strategy highlights the need for effective and efficient prevention of military conflicts and international cooperation to face any future threats. Therefore, strategy is based on active participation in activities of organizations the CZR is a member of, particularly NATO and the EU. Emphasize is put on light and multifunctional armed forces with expeditionary capability without geographic caveats and creation of reserve force for the professional armed forces. Functionality of wartime replenishment and reinforcement of the CZAF is almost derailed. It shall be resting exclusively on conceptual measures (in terms of planning, training, operational, mobilisation, economic, legal, and organizational measures).

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[14] Strategy 2008 was approved by the Government of the CZR in July. Russia – Georgian war erupted in August of the same year and set a path towards the steadily worsening relations between Russia and the West.

[15] The Military Strategy. 2008. (cit. 8.7.2017). Available online: https://www.vlada.cz/assets/ppov/brs/dokumenty/The-Military-Strategy-of-the-Czech-Republic-2008.pdf

[16] The CZAF are understood as the Army of CZR, Military Police Service and Military Intelligence. According the law, the CZAF are divided into three institutions: the Army, Castle Guard and Military Office of the President of the Republic.

Available resources. Resources are not specified explicitly. Nevertheless, it states that defence of the CZR necessitates adequate and unfluctuating funding appropriated especially for the development of those elements of the CZAF that are to be utilized in the most likely operations. Over the coming years the defence budget will have to correspond to the level adequate to fulfil the declared political-military ambitions, solve the urgent needs of modernization of obsolete equipment, cover training requirements and infrastructure investments, and enable the CZR to actively participate in NATO and EU activities.

Implementation and evaluation framework is nearly missing. Strategy will be updated should fundamental changes or factors influencing security and defence of the CZR emerge. Strategy, however, advocates even stronger support to NATO initiatives and fair burden sharing, the supersonic capability and participation in ballistic missile defence under NATO umbrella.

Defence Strategy of the CZR (2012)

Strategy[17] is logically – after years of rather relaxed political attitude to defence – a strong reminder of national responsibility for defence provision. The essential prerequisite for meeting the legal obligations and commitments to Allies is building an effective national defence system and national defence capabilities in accordance with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which binds the Allies, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.[18]

Strategic context. Strategy does not specifically identify any direct military threat to the territory, citizens or interests of the CZR and its Allies, nor does it preclude it. Nevertheless, international situation is influenced by so called Arab spring. Security situation is rather unstable – Middle East (Syria) and Nord Africa (Libya) in deep crisis. Global economy is in slow recovery after financial crisis. Defence budgets of NATO Allies are at minimum levels. As the US rebalances its geopolitical interests towards Pacific region, there is a need for stronger self-defence within Europe. The CZR MOD tries to do more with less. Nevertheless, defence cuts and long-term underfinancing impact functionality of the CZAF and readiness.

Expected outcomes. The intent is to develop broader strategy in respect with the CZR legal framework and existing institutional arrangement. Defence should be built once again on all instruments of national power not only on the potential of the CZAF.[19] The ambition to support international CRO was lowered from brigade to battalion size task force.

Principles for development and use of military power. Defence of the CZR stands on three pillars: (1) state; (2) the CZAF; (3) and citizens. States (Government) develops and maintains credible defence system, collective defence arrangements, effective defence planning, sufficient intelligence services, relevant defence industry and suitable regional cooperation. The CZAF role is to defend the homeland in NATO collective defence context, provide forces to foreign mission and support crises management at national level. The citizen duty is to participate on defence policy as required e.g. development of active reserve force. To maintain and develop balanced defence capabilities, multinational solutions can be sought through NATO's *Smart Defence,* the EU's *Pooling and Sharing* initiatives and within the framework of regional cooperation. Maintanance of niche military capabilities, however, cannot substitute for the primary responsibility of the state for national defence and development of its own defence potential.

Available resources. Strategy provides obligatory statement that the amount of the money from the state budget should be adequate to maintain defensive capacities which are effective,

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[17] The Defence Strategy. 2012. (cit. 8.7.2017). Available online: http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/STRATEGIE_an.pdf

[18] Dyčka, Lukáš; Mičánek, František. Challenges in the process of creating long-term strategic documents within the CZR's defence sector. In: The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment. Buchurest: "Carol I" National Defence University, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, Bucurest, Romania, 2013, p. 167-173. ISSN 2285-8415.

[19] Sources of national power: diplomacy, information, military, economy, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL).

useful and economical. Economic reality of the CZR calls for greater efficiency in spending the resources and for streamlining the organisational structures. The preparation for mobilisation consists mainly of conceptual measures and it maintains only the necessary and minimum level of supplies in line with the principle of deferred requirement.

Implementation and evaluation framework. Strategy is implemented by decisions of the Government of the CZR and by further documents provided by MOD. *S*trategy provides the basis for updating the *National Defence Plan*. The Government is informed, normally on a biennial basis, about its implementation by the *Report on the CZR Defence*, which is also considered by the relevant committees of the Parliament. Strategy will be updated after ten years. In case of major changes to the security environment, the Government may choose to review it earlier.

Defence Strategy of the CZR (2017)

Addressing the dynamics of security situation in Europe and mitigation of impact of defence long-term underfinancing is the major task for social democrats in charge of the Government and newly formed coalition partner (ANO) responsible for the MOD.

Strategic context. The empowered revisionist states, increasing number of terrorist attacks in Europe, influx of refugees from unstable Middle East and Africa and new challenges in cyber space shape the security environment in unfavorable direction. Return of real power into politics and application of hybrid warfare practices underline these trends. While the likelihood of a direct military attack against the territory of the CZR remains low, it cannot be ruled out that the security and/or territorial integrity of some NATO nations or EU Member States may be threatened in such a way as to require the engagement of the CZAF in collective operations to ensure the defence of Allies.

Expected outcomes. Strategy 2017[20] reinforce the strategy 2012 in two areas (ambitions, resources). It aims at rectification of deficiencies stemming from the long-lasting neglect of maintenance and development of defence capabilities. Strategy provides unifying framework necessary for enhancing the overall resilience of the government bodies and agencies, local administrations and citizens against the negative impacts of the unstable security environment and support their ability to withstand them. The ambition to support international CRO was once again assigned to the brigade level task force without rotation.

Principles for development and use of military power. In response to these adverse developments, the CZR actively support measures taken by the NATO and the EU to help strengthen the security of their member countries. Specific military measures being adopted include the enhancement of the NATO Response Force (NRF), including the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), and the development of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the east and the tailored Forward Presence (tFP) in the southeast border of the Alliance. Citizens preparing for national defence activities do so on a voluntary basis, and it only becomes compulsory in a state of national emergency, or in a state of war. Given the intermixture of internal and external security threats, preparing citizens for national defence calls for a combination of military and civilian approaches. In a state of national emergency, the MOD may order a selective augmentation of specific military units by calling up the Reserve Forces personnel earmarked to perform extraordinary duties.[21]

Available resources. There is a plan to increase defence expenditure on 1,4 % of GDP by 2020 and by 2024 to reach the NATO recommended benchmark of 2 % of GDP from which at least 20 % should be given on technology modernisation. There is a need to recruit 5 000 more soldiers for the enhancement of the CZAF and built-up Active Reserves Forces connecting the CZAF with

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[20] The Defence Strategy. 2017. (cit. 8.7.2017). Available online: http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/ 8503/DefenceStrategy2017.pdf

[21] Lukáš Dyčka, Josef Procházka, Jakub Landovský, *Czech Defence Policy Response to Dynamics in its Security Environment - Assessment and Recommendations.* Vojenské rozhledy. (Czech Military Review.), 2016, vol. 25 (57), no. Mimořádné číslo, pp. 3-17. ISSN 1210-3292.

public. Strategy outline new approach to the industry as one of the cornerstones of the national security structure. Defence industry ensures the highest possible degree of security for military materiel supplies and services, procurement and maintenance of crucial weapon systems to support the operational requirements of the CZAF. The Government supports the preservation of specific military and otherwise irreplaceable capabilities in industrial production, research and development.

Implementation and evaluation framework. The Czech Government will rigorously oversee the effectiveness of national defence spending and the rationality of the organisational structure of the MOD. Strategy provides the basis for updating state defence plans. The Government is kept informed on the implementation by *the Report on the CZR Defence* submitted on an annual basis.

2.   Assessment of Czech defence strategies

In following steps strategies will be assessed through qualitative criteria while providing answers to questions 1 to 4 in introduction chapter.

National Defence Strategy of the CZR (1997)

Strategy is resource driven and short-term in focus (integration towards western structures as NATO and EU), reflecting on rather present developments than future trends in security environment. It provides solid strategic framework for defence provision by set of strategic level objectives (self defence). It is a complex document embracing all instruments of national power and addresses overall functions and structure of defence system. It sets limits of the CZAF personnel strength. Financial resources and modernisation are not communicated. Implementation framework is missing.

Military Strategy of the CZR (1999)

It is resource driven and opportunity based strategy (NATO membership). It is reactive with short-term focus reflecting on rather present developments than future long-term trends. It outlines strategic level objectives and basic principles for defence provision (collective defence) and capability development. It is narrowly focused on military instrument of national power namely the CZAF. It communicates limitations for personnel strength. Financial aspects are not addressed. Implementation framework is missing.

Military Strategy of the CZR (2002)

It is threat driven strategy (war on terror). It is reactive, short-term in focus strategy reflecting on rather present developments than future trends. It provides vision and strategic objectives (crisis response operations) and principles for defence provision and capability development (expeditionary warfare). It includes also conceptual ideas (full-professional armed forces). It set guidance mainly for the development of military instruments of national power. It outlines clear framework for resource allocation (2,2 % of GDP). Implementation framework is week.

Military Strategy of the CZR (2008)

Strategy is resource driven, reactive and short-term in focus (Afghanistan), reflecting present developments than future trends. It underscores importance of fulfilment of international commitments and fair burden sharing. It embraces strategic objectives and principles (expeditionary warfare). It deals with military instrument of power and minimize activities not supporting international deployments. Resources and implementation framework is missing.

Defence Strategy of the CZR (2012)

Strategy proactively assesses future trends and their long-term implications. It is threat aware (instability in Middle East and Africa) and resource driven strategy (economic recession and cuts in defence budget). It provides general vision and conceptual framework (reiterate collective defence obligations). It contains quantitative and qualitative criteria for the CZAF development in form of well communicated political military ambitions. It applies holistic approach to defence provision and balance responsibilities of all instruments of national power and overall functions and structure of defence system (state, armed force and citizen). Strategy outlines measures to ensure

efficiency rather than clear guidance for resources allocation. It contains basic implementation framework (responsibility, validity, feedback mechanisms, timeline).

Defence Strategy of the CZR (2017)

It is threat based and reactive strategy addressing developments in the past (recent changes in security environment, hybrid warfare and impact of long-term underfinancing of defence). It provides general vision in combination with set of strategic level objectives (back to the roots - balanced forces and article 3 of Washington treaty, resilience of all society, security of supply). It deals in some extent with defence provision in holistic manner by embracing all instruments of national power and overall functions and structure of defence system. It outlines allocation of financial resources to defence in a long-term outlook and ambition to mitigate the relics of defence underfinancing in the past (undermanned structures, obsolete equipment and altered infrastructure). It provides basic implementation framework.

The summary of the CZR defence strategies qualitative assessment is depicted in Figure 1.

Horizontal Axis

Generic – strategic level objectives, conceptualisation, general commitments to resource allocation, missing implementation framework

Specific – specific tasks or measures too specific, transparent resources and sound implementation framework

Level of Complexity – Diametr of Cyrcle

Smaller-diametr cyrcle represent lower level of complexity, focus on military instruments of national power

Bigger-diametr cyrcle represent higher level of complexity, guidance to all instruments of national power

Vertical Axis

Preemptive – long-term focus beyond horizon, shaping environment

Reactive – short-term focus reflecting presence or development in past

Level of Complexity – Color of Cyrcle

Green – well defined endstate

Amber – generic definition of endstate

Red – too generic (vague) definition of endstate

Figure no. 1. Qualitative Assessment of the CZR Defence Strategies

Positioning of each strategy in matrix and allocation of size and colour of the circle is the outcome of qualitative assessment of each strategy through criteria defined in the introduction chapter. In this process authors answered four questions based on the strategy content evaluation. In order to validate authors´ assessment and enhance correctness additional six subject matter experts (SME) from the CSMSS (each SME assesses only one of six analysed strategies) were tasked to put each document in the matrix and choose the most adequate size and colour of the circle

demonstrating the respective strategy. Accordingly, corrections were made when these two assessments (authors and SMEs) did not corelate.

Conclusion

Strategic level documents are important tool of strategic management. Nevertheless, their impact should not be overestimated. The Government of the CZR adopted many strategies – allegedly there are 120 still in-power strategies – that are neither monitored nor implemented.[22] More important is the ability of the Government institutions to translate vision in to action, alocated adequate resources to manageable programs and spent money in effective, efficient and transparent way.

This study analysis six strategies adopted by the Government from 1997 to 2017 that aimed at adapting the CZAF and the overall defence system to evolving external and internal circumstances. These documents provide high-level political guidance for defence policy implementation. Strategies are rather reactive and short-term in focus than proactive and forward looking beyond the horizon by anticipating alternative futures development. Strategies 1997, 1999, 2008 and 2012 are resource driven. They seek balance between constrained resource and objectives. Strategies 2002 and 2017 outline financial resources to defence in order to meet the NATO recommended benchmark (2% of GDP) and provide predictability of defence budgets to defence planners. The chronology of resource driven strategies (1997, 1999, 2008, 2012) is interrupted by the strategies of 2002 and 2017. Willingness to allocate more resources for defence is driven by responsible political attitude to fair burden sharing of collective defence within NATO and by rapidly deteriorating security environment (in 2002 it is the response to "war on terror" and 2017 it is the reaction to revisionistic Russia). Strategies are elaborated in different level of complexity. In this regard the most advanced are strategies 1997, 2012 and 2017 that set guidance to all critical elements of defence system. All strategies offer insufficient implementation framework including responsibility, evaluation criteria and timeliness. That fact corelates with the questionable success to translate strategies in to enhanced functioning of defence system, effective and efficient capability delivery and adequate posture and readiness of the CZAF. Improvement of the CZR strategies requires more political commitments to turn them in real strategic management tool and enhanced expertise of all stakeholders involved in their elaboration.

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[22] Antonín Novotný, Strategic Documents of the CZR and Ministry of Defence Acquisitions. *Military Review*. 2016, 25 (3), 21-32. ISSN 1210-3292 (print), 2336-2995 (on-line). Available at: www.vojenskerozhledy.cz

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MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN ARMED CONFLICTS

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Abstract: Within the framework of this paper I will try to offer a definition of the military objectives, by showing a classification of them. I will present the military objectives encountered in International Humanitarian Law, presenting the objectives specific to land, naval and air operations. In the last part of this article I will address a subject that is causing some dissension at the theoretical and doctrinaire level, namely disguising military targets in civilian objects, focusing on differentiation of military rues of war and acts of perfidy.

Keywords: military objectives, civilian objectives, war stratagems, acts of perfidy, legal targets.

Introduction

The military objectives have been the subject of much research, many authors have tried to define them and the second article of the Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War[1] identifies, for the first time, in an international convention, an enumeration of the elements that can be legally engaged in an armed conflict. They were military buildings, barracks, munitions warehouses or ammunitions factories, or other assets supporting the war effort.

1. Classification of military objectives

Article 43 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), defines the armed forces as follows:

"1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, ' inter alia ', shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.

2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 [Link] of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.

3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the conflict."

The same Convention, article (Art.) 52 paragraph (par.) (2) states that: "2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

We can see that international conventions do not provide a direct definition of military objectives, it results indirectly. In the specialized literature, there is a definition accepted by most international actors, to which we also rally, as follows:

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[1] Hague, 18th October 1907.

"The military objectives are:

a) Armed forces with the exception of the sanitary service, the personnel and the religious goods;

(b) Establishments, constructions and positions where armed forces and military material are located (example: positions, barracks, warehouses);

c) Other goods:

− Which by their nature, location, purpose, or usefulness contribute effectively to the military action;

− Whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances of the moment, offers a secure military advantage."[2]

The expression "effective contribution to military action" raised questions in the application of this principle at the international level; the United States of America (USA)[3] thought that it must be replaced by the term „supporting the war efforts or the capacity to wage war". In the view of the US-backed theory, civilian objectives, economic by nature and which have, even indirectly, the ability to support the conduct the war, are military objectives and can be attacked. The example presented by the USA is one of the Secession War, in which Unionist forces attacked and destroyed the cotton crops of the Confederate forces, arguing that the proceeds of the sale of cotton would be used to buy weapons and ammunition. We believe that such argumentation can not be accepted at international level, as it could give rise to abuses and civil objectives, which should be protected, will be considered legitimate military objectives.

Considering the definition given by art. 52 par. (2) of the Additional Protocol I, we will provide a classification of military objectives, taking into account the nature, location, purpose or use.

To be a military object by its very nature, an object or a being, must provide an effective contribution to the military action, a direct participation in hostilities.

In international law, we do not find a list of military objectives, either declarative or exhaustive, but in our opinion they could be divided as follows:

-    fixed military fortifications, bases, barracks, including instruction and training facilities for combatants;
-    temporary military bases, trenches, waiting areas, departure and embarkation points;
-    military units and members of the armed forces, whether stationed or on the move;
-    weapons systems, military equipment, ammunition and military vehicles of all kinds;
-    military aircraft and missiles of all types;
-    military airports and missile launch locations;
-    warships (both surface and submarine) of all types;
-    ports and military docks;
-    warehouses for weapons, ammunition, military equipment and supplies (including warehouses containing raw materials used for military purposes such as oil);
-    factories engaged in the production of weapons, ammunition and military supplies;
-    laboratories or other locations for the research and development of new arms and military equipment;
-    locations for military repairs;
-    transport arteries of strategic importance;
-    The Ministries of Defense and any command or control places existing at national, regional, local or operational level used in military operations;
-    collection points.

Although it is difficult to obtain a classification based on the destination of the objective, without taking account of its nature and use, we believe that since the „destination" has been

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[2] Frederic de Mulinen, *Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces*, ICRC, p. 33-34.
[3] State which did not accede to the Additional Protocol I, but states that within its operations keeps in mind its rules.

mentioned as a distinct element, alongside the nature and use, it must be analyzed independently of them.

In order to be able to identify whether an object is a legal target, taking into account only its destination, it should be analyzed, taking into account the future use of that object.

Establishing a target, as legal, based only on the „future destination" criterion of the object, is a method that can cause problems in day to day. Such an object, which normally has civilian use, can not be considered a military objective, only on the basis of summary information. When the target is engaged, there must be sufficient evidence that the target is used for military purposes; otherwise we can find ourselves in a case similar to that of the Monte Cassino Abbey of 1944[4].

A classification based on the use of the objective does not take into account its original nature or its future purpose in this sense an objective that by its nature and purpose is of a civil character if it is requisitioned and used for military purposes, becomes a military objective at that time. When the armed forces cease to use it, it becomes a civil objective.

In order to be able to identify as clearly as possible a military objective, by reference to the way in which it is used, we must also take into account the provisions of art. 52 par. (3) of Additional Protocol I, according to which:" In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used. „

These stipulate a prevention, namely that if a good has a current civil use, in the absence of clear evidence, it must be considered a civil objective. For example, if there is an information that a church tower is used as a „nest for snipers", the church can not be attacked before identifying evidence to support that information; if the information is confirmed, then the civil objective becomes a military objective – until the annihilation of enemy forces.

Establishing a military target, considering only where it is „located", raises some issues in the analysis. Among USA backed theory, if a civilian object (a supermarket) is located in a military base it can be considered a military objective and attacked. We believe that such an opinion can not be accepted for the reasons outlined above, as long as there is no direct participation in hostilities.

Regarding the location of an objective, both in doctrine and in practice it was considered that certain geographical areas due to the qualities they possess may be considered military objectives. We consider these areas not to be seen as large stretches, but as individual points of strategic importance, such as: bridges, gorges, an area that controls entry into a port.

2. Military objectives in the Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts

The legitimacy of attacking military targets was first set out in the 1923 Hague Air Force Rules[5], it can be indirectly identified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, but, as mentioned previously, we identify a clear definition in art. 52 par. (2) of Additional Protocol I.

Starting from the definition of military attacks provided in art. 49 of Additional Protocol I, we conclude that military attack means any hostile act taken by an armed force, regardless of its magnitude, whether they are made in the offensive or defensive.

Accordingly, to what we have previously shown, we will present a series of objectives, which are considered military targets in the land conflict.

Bridges – can be classified as military objectives, they meet the criteria of nature, location, purpose and use. There is a minority opinion[6] that bridges can be attacked only in the event of their

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[4] On February 15, 1944, the Abbey was bombed by the Allied Forces on the basis of insufficiently documented information, suggesting that it had been used by the German forces, the abbey being located on a strategic point. The bombing resulted in the murder of 230 Italian civilians who had fled to safety in the monastery.

[5] Rules which were never put in use.

[6] Michael Bothe, *The protection of the Civilian Population and NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia: Comment son a Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY*, 12 European Journal of International Law, 2001, pp. 531-534.

use at the time by military forces. This is to state that bridges become military targets only by use. Instead, the majority opinion, to which we are rallying, states that bridges can be military objectives, both by their nature (there may be bridges created exclusively to obtain a military advantage) and by location (strategic, operational or tactical points) or destination (the destruction of a bridge may interrupt or block the advancement of enemy troops, or may result in blocking or disrupting the enemy's supply logistics lines).

Below we will present a number of objectives that can raise some issues before being declared military objectives.

Withdrawing military forces − their attack raises some questions. There are opinions that these troops would not be military targets and should not be attacked when they retreat, but the retreating enemy forces can regroup and attack again, we believe that the retreating military forces can not be considered to be „out of the battle"[7], the only way, that is acceptable at an international level, to „get out of combat" is surrendering and only troops who surrender may not be considered the subject of military attacks.

Individualization of certain enemies − the assassination, as a method of warfare, is prohibited, but we consider that a commander or other military personnel may be designated as a legal target if the target is a combatant and its engaging is carried out by combatants, respecting rules of the Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts (LOAC).

The police forces − we consider that to become a military objective, it is imperative that the police should be officially incorporated among fighting forces or they directly participate in hostilities. Otherwise, if the police forces only maintain public order, then they can not be considered military targets.

Industry, mines, oil fields, public utility networks − in our opinion they should not be considered military objectives if they are not under strict coordination and use of military forces. The possibility that these may be used by the armed forces do not gives the right to attack them, as long as they are not involved in generating benefits for the military.

The same status must be granted to ports and civil airports, in the event that they are not used by the armed forces they should not be attacked, but if there are created military bases in their perimeter, then they can be considered legitimate military objectives.

In our opinion buses and passenger's trains shall enjoy the same protection, meaning that if there are not serious indications that they are used to transport military forces, they can not be considered military targets, although according to the doctrine of the USA, they may be considered military targets if the forces that attack do not observe the civilian or military character of the occupants of the means of transport. We assume that such an interpretation produces a direct violation of the provisions of art. 52 par. (3) of Additional Protocol I.

Regarding radio and television, we appreciate that they may be military targets only if they are under the control of the armed forces, they are involved in the act of command and control, or if they are used in propaganda actions.

Offices of public institutions and political figures - the fact that the Ministry of Defense is a military target was previously discussed, but referring to the premises of other public institutions being considered military objectives, we consider that if they are not used for military activities then they can not be objective military[8]. The same idea can be expressed for political people, as long as the functions they occupy does not place them on a chain of command, then they can not be considered military objectives.

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[7] Hors de combat.

[8] For example: The White House from the USA can be considered a military target, because in it the President of the USA conduct his activities and he is the supreme commander of the USA military force, while the Buckingham Palace , can not be considered a military objective, considering that the Queen of Great Britain has no military attribute.

Locations protected and unprotected – regarding settlements, we find in the Hague Conventions[9], art. 25, the following provisions: "It is prohibited to attack or bombard by any means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are not defended." Similar regulations identified in the Statute of the Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 3 letter (c) and the Statute of the International Criminal Court, which defines as a war crime, „other serious violations of laws and customs applicable to international armed conflict within the framework of international law, namely one of the following actions: ... (v) the act of attacking or bombing by any means cities, villages, dwellings or constructions that are not protected and which are not military objectives.[10]

The same rule outlined above is also found in Additional Protocol I, Art. 59, par.1[11]. From a per a contrario interpretation of these provisions, a first conclusion would lead to the following statement: attacking protected localities is allowed. We believe that such an interpretation may be one that has some misinterpretation, and therefore deem that the rules should result from a per a contrario interpretation is as follows: the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings that are protected and which are military objectives is permitted.

In the following, we will present some peculiarities encountered in the naval warfare:

Deployment areas of maritime operations – in an armed conflict, military operations may be carried out in international waters, the territorial seas, in the continental shelf, exclusive economic zones belonging to the belligerent states. Maritime military objectives are not limited to enemy ships, but can refer to constructions placed on the surface or on the seabed, if they produce any military advantage to the enemy.

Warships – by definition they are military objectives, in this category we also include submarines. These military objectives can be engaged without warning or summons.

Merchant ships of an enemy state – as a general rule, these are civilian objectives and attacks on them are prohibited. However, LOAC provides for a number of situations in which they may be engaged:
- when they are effectively involved in the conduct of military operations;
- when carrying out activities in support of enemy forces;
- when conducting reconnaissance activities or providing information about enemy locations;
- when they refuse to execute a stop command or oppose boarding;
- when they have weapons with which they can destroy enemy ships;
- when traveling in a convoy, alongside warships;
- when conducting combat acts.

The merchant ships of neutral states - can not be considered military targets unless the activities of the kind mentioned above, one of the Warring States.

Bombing of areas on the coast – The Hague Convention (IX) of 1907 provides in art. 1: „The bombing of the undefended naval ports, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings is prohibited" so they can not be considered military targets unless they are equipped with tools that could harm enemy forces even if need be, they can be attacked.

Due to the particularities of the air warfare, we present some specific military objectives to this kind of armed conflict:

Military aircraft – are considered legitimate military objectives, military aircraft category includes: gliders, drone, hot air balloons, airships. It seems appropriate to mention that air combat

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[9] Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899 and Hague Convention (IV) on War on Land and its Annexed Regulations of 1907.
[10] Statute of International Criminal Court, art. 8, par. (2), letter (b), point v, Rome, 1998.
[11] „*It is prohibited for the Parties to the conflict to attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities.*"

shows features that are not found in other forms of armed conflict, given that between combatants there is not a communication possibility, the actions take place in a very fast pace and there is not a form in which they can be surrender, so it has been ruled that people who parachute to save themselves, must not be attacked during parachute, and when in contact with the ground, if they reach a territory controlled by the enemy, they should be given the opportunity to surrender.

Civil aircraft – normally they are not military objectives. The 1923 Hague Air Force Rules, although not mandatory, provide, in art. 33 that" civilian aircrafts, public or private, flying within their territory may be attacked if they do not land at the nearest airport when encountering enemy military aircraft." Article 34 states that they become military targets if they enter the enemy state or are in the vicinity of the enemy state or in the vicinity of military operations carried out by the enemy. These rules have been deeply criticized, and nowadays there are declared areas for military operations, where civil aircraft do not penetrate, and even if they enter a restricted area, they can not be attacked without prior notice.

3. Disguising military targets into civilian targets

In the specialty literature, the question arises whether the disguise of military objectives in civilian objectives constitutes perfidy or whether they fall into wartime stratagems.

We find that both the prohibition of perfidy and the rues of war are defined in art. 37 of the Additional Protocol I, as follows:

„Prohibition of perfidy

1. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy:

(a) feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender;

(b) feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;

(c) feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and

(d) feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neutral or other States Not Parties to the conflict.

2. Ruses of war are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation."

It is easily noticeable that both the deed of perfidy and the use of warlike stratagems are similar; the treaty does not provide a clear classification, with only an enumeration.

In the following we will present a series of military actions and activities, recognized and accepted in the LOAC as ruse of war: the use of camouflage, ambush, booby-traps and mines.

The use of camouflage is a method that was widely used during the Second World War, both the Axis and the Allied ships were painted in various patterns, using specific colors to make them seem „invisible". For example, the USA, during the Second World War, edited a manual, recommending that the roofs of factories should be disguised so as to resemble residential assemblies[12].

Considering the definition given by art. 37 paragraph (2) of Additional Protocol I, which states that camouflaging military troops and objectives is legal, it is our believe that a line between camouflage and perfidy should be established, as there is a risk, that by invoking the protection provided by art. 37 paragraph (2), to commit acts of perfidy.

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[12] The roofs of the Boeing Factory were designed and painted, in order to look la small neighborhoods, with houses, courtyards, streets; there were some structures that war disguised to look like a church.

As an example, we present the following hypothesis: a combatant that is in a military objective, disguised in a civilian objective, kills an enemy, can be justified so as to be within both sentences of art. 37 of the Additional Protocol I.

A first argument would be that this action is a ruse of war that was intended to mislead the opponent so that he produced the imprudence, which eventually led to its killing. All this leads us to the conclusion that the hypothesis falls within the provisions of art. 37 paragraph 2).

Another interpretation would be the following:
- by making the military object a civil object, camouflage seems to create a sense of security for the opponent, that he will not be attacked by or from the object, and therefore he will not attack that object;
- the enemy soldier exposes himself to an attack by approaching the military object without firing at it;
- the attacker deliberately takes advantage of the exposure of the enemy soldier and kills him.

Thus we find that this argumentation leads us to the idea that the aforementioned hypothesis was committed by an act of perfidy, being violated the provisions of art. 37 paragraph 1.

Given that it is widely accepted that a combatant dressed in civilian clothes that kills an enemy is committing a deed of perfidy, we believe that the killing of enemies by a tank, which is camouflaged in a house, should be considered the same.

It is clearly observed in the military art of all states that a double measure is used – it is considered that only the „camouflage" of a civilian combatant gives the enemy the right to receive the protection provided by the rules of the LOAC. Instead, the camouflage of a military vehicle, in a civilian object, is just a ruse of war and the enemy has no reason to believe that they have a right to protection provided by LOAC.

The use of ambushes – is another military stratagem, in which a military objective is transformed into a civilian one. The ambuscade is a military tactic used since ancient times, which will operate as long as the enemy does not realize that what appears to be a civil objective is in fact a military objective.

The Law of War Manual, of the USA states that the "laws of war do not prohibit the surprise conduct of attacks, such as the use of surprise in ambush ... because there is no regulation stating that an enemy combatant be warned before being attacked. Rather, the requirements of warning only apply regarding the civilian population"[13].

An opinion, which was supported by Rogier Bartels, which states that the use of natural environment for camouflage and ambush is allowed, but the use of man-made environment would lead to perfidy. We consider this an erroneous interpretation because the environment is not a military object by its nature, but becomes by purpose or use, just like the civilian objectives created by man, so the natural environment should enjoy the same protection as the environment created by man, according to LOAC standards.

It can be noticed that the distinction between ruse of war and perfidy in terms of ambush refers to the status the combatant simulates, if he simulates a non-combatant status then the deed is perfidy, and if a military object is masked in a civilian one the deed is a military stratagem.

The use of shelters. Shelter is any "natural or man-made object that protects a person, vehicle or group, from observation by enemy, from being fire fired upon, or from air attack"[14]. The use of shelters is similar to the use of camouflage, meaning that objects that are civil by nature, when are used by combatants, they become military objectives. The enemy, unaware of the current use of the object, does not attack it because it believes that it benefits from LOAC protection.

Although the use of this practice for offensive purposes could be argued as an act of perfidy, using the same reasoning as the above, the emergence of firearms made this method indispensable

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[13] The Law of War Manual, Department of Defense, USA, 2015, p. 200.
[14] James Brandford, *International Encyclopedia of Military History*, 2004, p. 342.

in modern military operations, in order to protect own forces. Thus, it is not surprising that at the state level it is considered that the use of shelters is a ruse of war.

The state-level practice of modern conflict rules is that the presence of civilian objects should not give the enemy the certainty that they will not be attacked.

The use of booby-traps requires to succeed the guise of military objects in civilian objects. "Booby-trap means any device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act."[15]

Studying the general conventions of LOAC, it can be observed that none prohibited, specifically, the use of booby-traps. Nor does the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices of 1996 (Protocol II), but only establishes that they should be used with some limitations[16].

Of these limitations, we mention that it is forbidden to disguise them with internationally recognized emblems or signs, sick, injured or deceased persons, children's toys or food, objectives regarding religion, health, hygiene, clothing or children's education.

If they are located in areas where they are civilians, they must be located as close as possible to military objectives, so that the civilian population is protected from their effects, and areas must be marked or fenced to protect the population civil.

The International Committee of the Red Cross affirms that the LOAC allows states to use booby-traps in certain conditions: "Both the practice of the treaties and practices of other states support the premise that the use of booby-traps is forbidden if, by their nature or place of use, their use infringes the legal protection accorded to a protected person or an object by another common rule of the International Humanitarian Law ... The list of prohibited booby-traps, by both Protocol II and the amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, can be found in the Military Manuals and the Legislation of Certain States Parties to these Treaties. Other military manuals are more general in describing and stresses that the association of booby-trap with everyday objects, civilian, is prohibited and that booby-traps should not be used in conjunction with people enjoying protection objects (such as medical equipment, cemeteries and cultural or religious goods) or internationally recognized protection signs or signs (such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent)."[17]

We can see that the use of booby-traps can be an act of perfidy if it violates the rules set by Protocol II.

"Mine means a munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle."[18] Placing a mine involves disguising a military object in a civilian one, whether it is a natural one (a field) or an artificial one (placing it under a bridge or a road), thus creating a false sense of security for the enemy, and when contacted, he is killed.

The use of this type of weapon requires states that use it to undertake all the measures they have in order to minimize excessive traumatic effects or destruction without discrimination. Please note that this rule LOAC is generally valid for both anti-vehicle mines and anti-personnel mines for countries that have not yet adopted a total ban on their use.

The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention of 1997 was ratified by 162 de states, but states like the USA, China, Finland, India, South Korea, Pakistan or Russia did not and sustain they have the right to use anti-personnel mines.

The rules set out in Protocol II seek to limit the excessive traumatic effects and destruction without discrimination caused by such weapons. Their use must be made taking into account the

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[15] Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, art. 2, Apr. 4, 1996.
[16] Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Protocol establishes that states are responsible for the mines they are installing, using, and are also responsible for cleaning the sites after the conflict.
[17] Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, *International Humanitarian Law, Volume I: Rules*, p. 278–279.
[18] Protocol II art. 2 point 1.

principles of distinction, proportionality and the obligation to take all necessary measures to ensure that an attack complies with the LOAC rules.

Protocol II also establishes a number of restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines, other than those that can be detonated remotely, so they can not be used unless they are in accordance with the provisions of the Technical Annex to the Protocol. However, two exceptions are foreseen:

1. Their use in a well-defined perimeter, marked and placed under the supervision of the military state, so that civilian personnel do not enter the area;

2. Remove these weapons before leaving the area.

We believe that the use of mines, under conditions other than those set out above, would constitute an act of perfidy, not a ruse of war. From what we have shown above, there is not a de facto norm and no customary rule which expressly states that the attack launched from a military object disguised as a civilian is an act of perfidy.

This situation should not lead to the idea that any attack in which a military object is disguised in a civilian one is a military ruse and can not be considered an act of perfidy in any situation. As we have shown above, there are provisions that unequivocally state that the masking of military objects in civilian objects belonging to internationally recognized institutions (such as the Red Cross or the United Nations) or the use of special goods that enjoy international protection (markings that identify cultural goods or protect the civilian population, hospital markings) are acts of perfidy, being forbidden by the LOAC. The Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction of the Use of Certain Classical Weapons offers special protection to other categories: corpses, cemeteries, toys, food and drink, household equipment, animals and portable objects, which are apparently harmless.

Conclusions

From what is presented in this article, we can conclude that the establishment and identification of military objectives in modern military conflicts has become an activity with clearly defined algorithms, the LOAC rules identify the characteristics that an objective (nature, location, destination or use) must have to be considered a legitimate military objective.

As we have seen, we think that the phrase „precise military advantage" is the one to be used, to the detriment of the one proposed by the United States, „efforts to support the war / combat capability", because the purpose of international norms was to protect a larger area of people and goods that do not have a direct involvement in a conflict. By considering the second phrase as necessary or sufficient, a reversal of the passive subject of the stated protection rules could be created, and it is considered to be the primary objective of the military pursued to the detriment of protected humans and civilian property.

We hope that we have made an enumeration, as complex as possible, regarding the military objectives and the conditions under which they can be legally engaged.

Regarding the differentiation of ruse of war from acts of perfidy, we consider that the interpretation of the LOAC rules should be done in good faith, and the actions must be interpreted and analyzed individually, with the possibility that certain type of actions, considered rules of war, in a certain circumstance, in another context, may be classified as acts of perfidy.

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MODERN CONFLICTS
AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES' EFFICIENCY
IN THE NEW OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: Through a careful analysis, after defining the new operational environment as close to reality as possible, we have identified the necessity of employing strongly adaptive forces due to its permanently changing nature. Subsequently, we have made a comparison from this point of view between the conventional forces and the special operations forces, taking into account the new trends in the evolution of the global conflicts.

At the end of this scientific communication, we have put forward arguments to support the idea that special operations forces are identified as necessary and effective in a regional context which is characterized by an increasing instability that tends to become normality. Special operations forces are not only efficient, they are highlighted as effective and the only ones which, with the appropriate support, are able to achieve the established strategic goal.

Keywords: unconventional war, special forces, counterinsurgency, security, host nation, relevant population.

Introduction

Typically, the SOFs (Special Operations Forces) are considered to be tactical level formations intended to carry out missions of strategic importance for national interest. The current combat environment has proven the need for synergic effects as a result of integrating conventional and special operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels. SOFs, by their definition, play a pivotal role in the hybrid combat environment and are the force that can react immediately, with maximum efficiency, to unconventional threats.

With the 21st century, the means of understanding and representing the warfare have changed in the most profound way. In order to support the conventional forces and to maximize the efficiency of their actions, it is necessary to solve the aspects of the challenges that arise in the joint operations as well. Familiarizing the SOF with the joint operations and the characteristics of the irregular or hybrid warfare may simplify the transition to this new state of affairs. The linear battlefield/ the conventional warfare can be considered as belonging to the past. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) must prepare for action in a new type of battlefield that is marked by a great complexity of military, political, economic, diplomatic and informational features.

1.   Trends of the contemporary conflict environment

In the new security context, NATO faces new challenges from its traditional opponent, the Soviet Union, which was initially gradually replaced by transnational terrorist organizations, criminal networks and countless other entities of this kind focused on changing the balance of power in their regions followed by the resurrection of the Russian Federation orchestrated by the

Putin-Medvedev couple. In order to counteract these actions, indirect strategies were brought to discussion and the term "Irregular Warfare-IW", and then the "Hybrid Warfare - HW" were introduced to characterize these new operating environments.

In fact, the concept of IW/HW has gained popularity, but its misunderstanding has led to confusion. As evidence, IW/HW was freely used as a synonym for the unconventional, asymmetric, guerrilla, partisan, non-traditional, low-intensity warfare, insurgency, revolt, civil war, insurrection, revolutionary war, internal war, counterinsurgency, subversive war, inter-state warfare, peacekeeping, Fourth Generation Warfare-4GW[1], the Global War on Terrorism[2].

The unified definition of IW is: "... a violent confrontation between states or non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a relevant population. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, so it can engage the entire the military spectrum and other capabilities to weaken the opponent's power, influence and will"[3]. Hybrid is "the diverse and dynamic combination of regular, irregular forces and/or criminal elements, unified to generate mutual beneficial effects"[4]. The common factor of the ratio is the population and the support it grants to one of the belligerent parties, be them state or non-state.

With the term, the definition itself has led the skeptics to assert that it should identify *who* is executing, *how* it is done, or *why* it is engaged[5]. In addition as a controversial subject, the term "warfare" indicates a certain level of violence that is not favorable to the operational environment of the security services community. USSOCOM (US Special Operations Command) warned the partner security services that irregular/hybrid does not necessarily mean "combat"[6]. It is important that the definitions should ease the general understanding, and therefore the critical concept is defined at the operational and the strategic levels: IW/HW uses indirect methods to gain or maintain the support of a relevant population.

IW/HW is the environment in which population-centered operations are conducted in order to achieve the objectives. This reinforces the acceptance and the understanding of the differences between the *points* of concentration of the operations, as described in the figure below.

Figure no 1. Contrast between Conventional Warfare and Irregular/Hybrid Warfare[7]

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[1] Fourth Generation Warfare-4GW: conflict is characterized by eliminating the boundaries between war and politics, militaries and civilians.

[2] United States Joint Forces Command, *Irregular Warfare Special Study.* Washington D.C.: Joint Warfighting Center, 2006.

[3] United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 2008.

[4] U.S. Department of the Army, Hybrid Threat, Training Circular 7-100 (Washington DC, November 26, 2010), 1-1.

[5] Coons, K. C., &Harned, G. M. (2009). Irregular warfare is warfare. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (52), 97–103.

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[7] USSOCOM; USMCCDC, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) V1.0.* Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2007, p. 8.

"Focusing on the relevant population is what differentiates IW/HW from the traditional, "conventional" approach to warfare. In the IW/HW environment, "indirect" refers to the approach: ... which focuses on the initial basic, economic, political, cultural or security conditions that constitute the fuel for the resentment of a population ... that destroys, dislocates and defeats the adversaries by physically and psychologically attacking them in the most vulnerable areas and where they least expect it ... that authorizes, activates, supports, or influences the security services or other partners to attack military or non-military adversaries ... that triggers actions with or against the states or the armed groups involved in order to influence the opponents ... and which undermines the power and the influence of the opponents on a relevant population.

Many types of operations are performed in the IW/HW environment. The following five are considered essential for IW/HW:
- Foreign Internal Defence (FID);
- Counterinsurgency (COIN);
- Counterterrorism (CT);
- Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR);
- Unconventional Warfare (UW).

The first four operations (FID, COIN, CT, and SSTR) are ways in which the involving actor activates the Host Nation to track an existing or potential insurgent threat. These operations seek to maintain a low imprint of the troops, which protect and highlight the legitimacy of the Host Nation. Unconventional Warfare (UW) is the only operation that does not seek to protect or to highlight the legitimacy of the existing government among the Host Nation. It is conducted "to intimidate, destroy or overthrow a government or occupation force." In the IW/HW environment, Foreign Internal Defence (FID), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Counterterrorism (CT), Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) are used to track an enemy actor performing an unconventional Warfare (UW) against another nation.

The doctrinal understanding allows us to introduce the critical operational and organizational environment success factors to be taken into account when conducting operations in the IW/HW environment. Developing and implementing successful strategies to address the IW/HW threats in the theater of operations (TO) require a good understanding of the situation as a whole. There are four laws of success in the COIN warfare, which must be understood and implemented:
- Support of the population is neccessary both for the counter-insurgent and for the insurgent;
- Support is provided through an active minority;
- Support of the population is subjective/ dependent on a condition;
- The intensity of efforts and the vastness of the intentions/goals are essential.

Analyzing the works of numerous counterinsurgency theorists, during his time at RAND Corporation, Gordon McCormick emphasizes the importance of securing the population above all, in order to overcome the initial informational disadvantage (who and where the insurgents are) before they are able to overcome the initial disadvantage of the force. All this, complemented by works on the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and combined with the personal experience, have led to the identification of the critical success factors in IW/HW: seven belonging to the operational environment and ten to the organizational environment. These factors are summarized in Table 1.

Table no. 1. Critical success factors in IW[8]

Operational factors	Organizational Factors
The political situation of the host nation	Focusing on improving the legitimacy of the host nation
Promoting solutions for the host nation	Focusing on regional development

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[8] David J. Painter, Mark C. Weaver, Scott C. White, Reorganizing For Irregular Warfare, 2009, p. 39

Developing a population-centered approach	Strengthening the relationship building process
The need for long-term commitment in the region	Maintaining long-term focus
Developing the capabilities of the host nation's security forces	Influencing by multiple methods
Developing the capabilities of the host nation's essential services	Operating with and through the host nation's forces
Do not rely solely on the armed forces for achieving success	Enhancing small subunits operations
	Decentralizing the decision-making process
	Focusing the remuneration system on long-term effects

In terms of the operational factors, the operational environment is defined as "A compound of conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities, and weigh in the commander's decision-making." The above-mentioned success factors highlight the differences of these conditions, circumstances and influences which affect the commander's decision making process in the IW/HW environment. Those operating in the IW/HW environment need to understand and integrate these factors into their operations in order to achieve success.

2. The action framework for risk management in post-conflict areas

Developing a population-centered approach shows us that the relevant population needs to be understood at a level appropriate for supporting the internal change, with due respect for their own governance. Understanding the population is the key to developing control. Without the population's support, insurgents will be less able to operate in a particular area for a long time. That is why, as already mentioned, the support of the population is vital for achieving success.

The political sensitivity associated with maintaining the will of the people for the one involved in solving a crisis is essential when the costs of the war have to be paid. Instead, it is not given the proper consideration to the political sensitivity of the population that supports the opponent's actions. On the contrary, in IW/HW, both political sensitivities, of the actor and of the host nation must be taken into account, as the support of both parties must be achieved and maintained throughout the intervention in order to ensure success. Also, considering his own and the host nation's political situation, the IW/HW activities should be approached as an empowerment of the host nation, of the local population to find solutions that will allow them to be confident in their own forces. As long as IW/HW activities focus on long-term commitment through indirect approaches, the capabilities of the military and civilian services will be strengthened, and the solutions will most certainly be effective. On the other hand, if the solutions and their implementation seem to be taken over or even worse, imposed by the one involved, without taking into account the desires of the local population, they will be condemned to failure.

From another point of view, the development of the capabilities of the host nations's security forces supports the legitimacy of the host nation in the eyes of its own citizens and of the international community; it is imperative to use its security forces to safeguard the physical boundaries and the population. Fulfilling this security mission is vital to long-term success. The development of the host nation's essential services capability refers to the fact that each society requires a certain level of essential services and its government is expected to provide the population with an acceptable standard of living. This includes food, drinking water, electricity, sanitation/waste disposal management, health care, education, maintaining public order, etc. If the state fails to provide adequate essential services, it gives insurgents the opportunity to exploit and gain support or even legitimacy over the population (the key terrain).

From another angle, that of the efficiency combined with associated costs, proposes a strategic option to use minimal force in a long-term approach with a minimum risk, but the domestic pressure can make the political decision maker to use increased pressure in the hope of a "quick solution". It is a pattern determined by the experience of the traditional war that seeks to defeat an adversary in the shortest possible time by using an overwhelming military power. Success in the traditional warfare usually comes from attacking the enemy directly in order to destroy it or to force it to surrender. The approach and the final status differ in the IW/HW *field*, since threats are best countered by indirectly using the host nation's own solutions and a population-centered approach that does not give the enemy the required support. This indirect approach requires long-term commitment on the basis of which relationships are built, cooperation is encouraged and success is achieved.

One of the important recommendations addressed to the decision-maker in the military operations is that it should not rely solely on the military forces for achieving success, which means that IW/HW is the environment in which "the decisive effort is seldom the military one." The biggest challenge for the militaries is to achieve the original goals and to transfer the authority to the host nation as soon as possible. This critical change of power, if done wrong, can be seen as an externally manipulated arrangement instead of a solution.

Identifying the key organizational environmental factors required for achieving success in the IW environment requires a thorough analysis because countering threats in the IW/HW environment is different from the conventional warfare environment. Focusing on enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation directs the primary effort on the non-military forces supporting both the one who engages and the host nation's interests. Focusing on the regional development is reflected on the region-based organizations that are best able to identify solutions by understanding and integrating the local or regional norms. "There are many forms and the choice of intervention - ideally so as to minimize local regression - is just as critical as the initial intervention decision." In terms of the human relationships, they can provide the way for implementing a strategy. As an example, the local leaders who have spheres of influence in multiple areas (religious, tribal, business, government, crime, police) are much more capable to help than those who have fewer spheres of influence.

In the IW/HW environment, the creation and the development of the capabilities to use force by the security forces of the host nation are of paramount importance to the internal security. The use of military force to establish/restore security is necessary at first but not sufficient for long-term stability. The intensification of the small subunits operations leads to an increase in the need to develop close trust-based working relationships with the host nation's forces for security and support. A low force increases the credibility of the assertion that assistance is "with and through". However, this force should be more than enough when, along the host nation's forces, it can provide the necessary security. This force (of the host nation) must be able to thrive in a minimal support environment and to operate specifically and continuously without the guidance and the protection provided by the assisting forces.

Another aspect is related to a certain decentralization of the decision making process, where those who act should be able to change the operational control in order to increase efficiency. While it can be difficult to let them "fly", many discuss the issue of flexibility and adaptability of the forces combined with "a thin and decentralized command and control structure." Allowing the support forces to make key decisions changes the organization's template from a "top to bottom" one in a more decentralized "bottom-up" one. The small units operating in a decentralized manner and dependent on the host nation for the protection of the force or the provision of the logistical capabilities are promptly successful. In this respect, they should use the concept of "out of box" thinking to identify problems and determine viable solutions without relying on the traditional support of the US military organizations and capabilities. This means that small units have to show creativity and innovation in solving problems.

Last but not least, one of the most important organizational environmental factors is that of implementing a promotional and rewarding system for the host nation forces, which must be based

on the recognition and remuneration of the efforts made, the results of which can not be completely identified but in the medium and long term. While this change is necessary to achieve success in the IW/HW environment, it is only sufficient by adapting the organization's rewarding system. This focus on the long-term effects is in direct contradiction with the military promotion and rewarding system. It is intended to highlight the individual and organization efficiency in "fulfilling the mission" and ensures that only the most qualified and efficient individuals are promoted in rank or function. The current organizational culture of the army translates this into a list of quantifiable tasks that does not reflect the long-term qualitative nature of the actions.

The efficiency measure used by the military tends to be focused on the enemy and directed to readily quantifiable measurement units. This approach is not in line with the IW/HW environment requirements. By understanding this aspect, commanders need to study the effects of the operations in relation to the population. A greater attention paid to the way in which the operations are perceived and governed by the population can be the key to success.

Measuring the operational effects is a step forward in the right direction. This should be considered a breakthrough. Rewarding and evaluating the staff performing operations in this environment should be done in such a way as to reward and lay the foundations for these practices as part of the organizational culture.

IW/HW is a complex, time-consuming, population-centered environment that requires forces specially trained to carry out missions with a real chance of success. The differences between the traditional, linear and irregular or hybrid warfare, combined with focusing on the enemy's military defeat vs. gaining support from the relevant population, trigger a comparison between the conventional forces (CF) and the SOF.

The CF and SOF comparison in the light of the current and future conflicts confirms that the special operations forces would be the most appropriate but not sufficient for the conditions of the current conflicts, and especially of the future ones. From this perspective, giving up on conventional capabilities can create a new vulnerability that it is impossible to be covered by SOF actions. There is, therefore, an acute need to maintain both capabilities and to develop adequate efficient responses to the current and future threats. In addition, the common approach to the capabilities of the two categories generates more effective decisions, especially when all those involved in the decision-making process correctly understand how to use them in the operations.

On the other hand, we must understand that the dynamics of the operating environment, of warfare in general, is a rapid and continuous one. Although conceptually speaking, the need for integrated operation arises from a rather brief analysis, it calls for a coherent adaptation of both categories of forces to the full range of current and future needs. The conventional forces must be more like the special forces, must become more adaptable to changes in the operating environment, and the special forces must be closer to the secret services, capable of executing the entire range of missions in a highly changing and challenging environment. In addition to what has been said, the Special Operations units are the only ones that have the most adaptable action components able to act efficiently in the newly created urban environment and in the irregular or hybrid one. The nominated attributes directly imply the adoption of a flexible command structure, with decision-makers who have all the physical resources, the moral authority and the commanding skills to carry out the mission assigned in a context of customized independence. This important conceptual aspect requires a high degree of competence, individual and collective morality, a certain operative level in an effective and trustworthy communication framework. Both categories of conventional and Special Forces identify their place in the current conflicts and will most likely do the same in the future. But unequivocally, special operations forces play an important role in the period before the outbreak of the conflict (when it becomes visible to the international public opinion) and then in maintaining it until the established strategic goals have been achieved.

As we have mentioned above, the conventional force operations are characterized by high firepower, robust support, extensive command and control capabilities (C2), and a relatively large number of staff. SOF operations are characterized by small units with specially selected and trained personnel who carry out high-risk missions in hostile, banned and politically sensitive

environments. Certain challenges can occur while the conventional forces and the SOF operate together, and it is likely to exploit some high-value opportunities. By integrating conventional forces with SOF, not only unique capabilities are created, but otherwise unattainable goals can be met. Integration and Interoperability allows a Joint Forces Command (JFC) to take advantage of the CF's main competencies and systems for the benefit of the SOF. CF operations integrated with SOF actions can produce a greater effect at a faster rate and with a much diminished fratricide level relative to actions taken independently.

"The current and future conflicts require, unequivocally, the maintenance of both capabilities. But it is true that in the current conflicts, there is a much higher efficiency of the special operations forces. These are forces with a strong ability to adapt to new challenges and threats, which have a certain level of training necessary to carry out the assigned tasks, with an operational independence needed to achieve goals on the short run and in time-sensitive situations.

Conclusions and proposals

In the Throughout this paper, we have drawn up a series of opinions on the position of the special operations forces in the irregular/hybrid conflict and we have underlined the understanding of the importance of the critical factors of the operational and organizational environment whose introduction in the planning and conduct of operations can be considered a success generating condition.

We also acknowledge the need to adapt the structures to the new conditions of employing the forces, in the context of the new threats and of the alliance standards, by clearly defining the structures of forces on different echelons. In addition, the need to work at a joint level or to provide the joint formations with the specific action elements requires that the structures involved are operationalized to act specifically and readily at this level.

The study of the integration means from the point of view of the interoperability of the forces can identify these needs and, furthermore, on the basis of the constructive scenarios, we can design new structures of forces for more efficient special operations in a hybrid environment. In this respect, identifying the special needs of the interoperability for the forces' capability to operate smoothly on a joint level and to be able to do so at an interdepartmental/interagency level becomes a necessity. We consider this to be so not only at the level of the armed forces, but also for the other partners within the National System of Safety, Defence and Public Order.

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THE NEED TO ADAPT THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES STRUCTURE IN RESPONSE TO PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CHALLENGES

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Abstract: *After decoding the realities of the geostrategic environment, we have noticed the necessity of analyzing the effects of its transformations, on the forces in general and on the special operations forces in particular. The expected effects we have referred to require a series of urgent measures, some of which are already developed and implemented at the level of the alliance, which have been listed and analyzed in light of the complexity and the effectiveness of this special category of forces facing new threats and challenges.*

At the end of the scientific communication, based on the analysis, we tried to draw up some pertinent proposals regarding the new research areas, which by their approach will be the foundation of the future decisions at the level of performance for the organization we are part of.

Keywords*: special forces, security environment, threats.*

Introduction

The changes in the operating environment affect the entire military mechanism, not essentially, since it is a resilient system, but they lead, especially in the absence of a thorough understanding of the issue, to decisions that may have dramatic effects on the entire organization in the long run.

The experience gained in the Theaters of Operations (TOs), combined with a misunderstanding of the operating environment, led to the desire to "lift" the Irregular Warfare (IW)/Hybrid Warfare (HW) to become "as strategically important as Conventional Warfare"[1] (CW). This has led to an attempt to tailor the expenditures in order to maintain the balance between capabilities. By understanding the differences between IW/HW and the conventional one and the key factors that achieve success in both, it has become obvious for the alliance that an organization which is appropriate for one is inappropriate for the other. The initiative to transform the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s Special Operations Forces (SOF) has attempted to lay the foundations for a multinational and interoperable SOF structure that has already existent capabilities that may become more appropriate for the successful execution of the operations, especially in the TO, where there have already been commitments, but more importantly, for the benefit of the alliance states in case of aggression generated by potential state or non-state opponents.

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[1] United States Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Directive 3000.07: Irregular Warfare (IW).* Washington D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2008, p. 2.

1.   Special Operations Forces in the new security environment context

For the benefit of the above-mentioned issues, and following a thorough analysis, we have identified new aspects of the security environment, for which we restated concepts and redefined the usefulness and the tasks of certain structures in order to be able to draw up the most effective measures.

The multiple approaches of the phrases security and security environment, conducted by prestigious institutions, convince us of the objective necessity of achieving a common vision in the two cases but can only be achieved by realizing that many of the current challenges are also the result of certain common risks, threats and vulnerabilities that require solutions of the same nature[2]. This implies that the approach of identifying the changes in the security environment should be a rigorous analysis of the security issues, bounded and based on the certainty of the existence of three constants in the international environment: the state, as the main actor, the state of anarchy through the absence of a world government and the power, in all its aspects. In the sense of the above, we can assume that currently, at the global level, the major source of instability with the greatest belligerent potential lies either in the imbalances created by the systemic liability of the human society in a period of profound transformations, or in the desire to immediately materialize the acquired power.

Identifying an optimal solving formula in the context of the security environment is considered to be of the utmost importance and of a crucial priority. Generally, these factors provide a deeper understanding of what the operational environment seems to be in IW/HW and that SOF is one of the organizations able to operate successfully in such a conflict. The operational environment is defined as "a combination of conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the engagement of capabilities and weigh in the commander's decision-making process"[3]. The success factors highlight the differences in these conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the decision making by the military leaders. Those who have to operate in such an environment need to understand and to integrate these external factors with the internal variables of the organization in the reorganization hypotheses and also in planning the operations, which can make possible to achieve the success of the structure in the newly created environment.

The operational ambient is an extremely complex one, which generally requires a long-term approach and which has as a center of gravity obtaining and maintaining the support of the relevant population, for which it follows and analyzes the way to respond and the possible tendencies in the whole range of actions performed by the military. Hence, the need to use another type of structure to be able to act efficiently and effectively. HW is extremely different from the conventional one, for which the army is currently organized and designed to conduct successful operations. Focusing on the support of a relevant population versus focusing on the military defeat of the enemy creates major differences and is the starting point for any kind of analysis. The successful execution of missions while maintaining control over a relevant percentage of the population in the operation area can be extremely difficult and represents the basis or the starting point for creating valuable hypotheses.

However, this situation of a particular complexity is constantly changing and requires to adapt the management mode considered to be effective, especially in the case of long-term approaches. Thus, a number of possible variables must be taken into account in order to be able to change, in a short - but especially useful - term the forms of response that are being employed, or the actions aimed at preventing and eliminating possible tensions generated by hostile actors.

For this reason, it is imperative to constantly follow and analyze the contextual picture and to take urgent new measures or methods of action as needed.

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[2] Frunzeti, T., Zodian, V., coord, *Lumea 2007, Enciclopedie Politică şi Militară*, Army Technical-Editorial Center Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007.
[3] United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2008, p. 398.

2. Directions and perspectives of the special operations forces in response to the new challenges to contemporary security

"The war whose operations are focused on the population requires different thinking and capabilities than the war that focuses on the military defeat of the opponent[4]. That's why the organizations designed for CW are not necessarily effective in the hybrid environment as those specially designed and specifically organized - SOF.

However, the Conventional Forces (CF) have proven their ability to perform a certain type of mission in IW/HW, such as: stability, assistance and support operations, but the organizational culture aimed at destroying the enemy force, the high imprint, the essence of the skills and the reward system reduce their efficiency. There are organizational issues that fundamentally limit the ability to make the necessary changes to become effective in IW/HW environments. This environment requires a dynamic organization where indirect and long-term approaches favour the host nation's help in gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant population. In such an environment, an increase of the military dimension and force will have a rapid and counterproductive effect.

Even if the CFs prove a low efficiency in the hybrid or irregular environment, with relatively small capabilities to efficiently perform the entire range of missions for which they are created, any major change in their organization to make them more efficient in IW/HW can reduce their efficiency in CW. The credible conventional capability is, however, an extremely important one, without which, even with a strong special structure, achieving success can be a far-off goal. There is substantial non-SOF support backing up SOF's success, efficiency and accuracy[5]. In most cases, it can only come from the conventional area. In support of the above-mentioned assertions, SOF can not be massly produced, their selection and training being a long and very demanding process. CFs are therefore the main pillar on which the entire military spectrum is based, on whose existence depend all other more or less specialized categories.

However, from a different perspective, the new operational environment identified in the latest conflicts along with its evolutionary trends requires profound changes to the structure of the special operations forces, primarily to make it more flexible and adaptive.

Understanding that there is an institutional resilience to any change, these proposals prepare us better for the future. "Throughout history, the large military organizations have stood out through their resilience to change. The army shares the resilience to change which is inherent in the military profession."[6] In this respect, we consider that, following the analysis of the operational framework of how the SOFs carry out their missions in general, we can identify those necessary changes which, when proposed for implementation can lead to increasing the efficiency of this type of force in the new security context.

We have to admit that the overwhelming majority of the human resource has not been committed based on certain requirements needed for carrying out activities or missions. Focusing attention on training, specializing, retraining or recalibrating, resizing the forms of organization the militaries are part of is imperative. Generally, the giant structures with large numbers of personnel, but with a mediocre level of training, are managed with greater difficulty and more expenditures than a versatile, dynamic component ready to make decisions and take actions in real time. Everyone's desire, from the highest function to the first military rank, is efficiency and professional satisfaction.

The change process starts with a better understanding of the operating environment. It contains not only the knowledge of the definition but also the understanding of the nuances of the

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[4] United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3–0, Joint Operations.* Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2008, p. I-6.

[5] http://www.socom.mil/pages/SOFTruths.aspx, accessed on 27.10.2017.

[6] United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services. (1985, October). Staff report, 99th Cong., 1st sess. Defense Organization: The Need for Change . S. Prt. 99–86, http://www.worldcat.org/title/defense-organization-the-need-for-change-staff-report-to-the-committee-on-armed-services-united-states-senate/oclc/15245347, 26.09.2016.

hybrid warfare and the means in which it differs from the traditional conflict. Admitting that IW/HW requires different thinking and different capabilities for achieving success points out that some organizations are more suitable for IW/HW than others. This forces military and civilian leaders to understand that achieving success does not mean making everyone equally capable of doing everything but rather adjusting our organizations to develop a better and more balanced approach to counteract future threats. Creating an element for the research and development in the branch, with clear tasks to analyze the security environment trends can turn us from reactive into proactive, with a slight advantage over potential adversaries.

Secondly, it is necessary for the Ministry of National Defense to fulfill its role as an arbitrator in the process of leveling the balance between the capabilities designed for CW and those for the Irregular/Hybrid one. Even if not everyone is profficiently equal in conducting the five core IW/HW activities, and the engagement in the TO is mostly directed towards IW, the SOF percentage of the total armed forces should not exceed the NATO average. SOF cannot replace CF.

Thirdly, the core of the new organization must include those elements that increase the efficiency of SOF in performing the basic missions of the irregular and/or hybrid environment and enable them to successfully integrate all the critical factors. These elements can be: SOF, Psychological Operations, Military-Civilian Affairs. The solidification of this nucleus has multiple variants, either by bringing under a sole command some components of the already existing specific structures or by creating some specific elements for conducting these types of missions. The second variant is time-consuming and resource-intensive until these elements can successfully perform missions, and the first challenges the institution's resilience to change. The Alliance's recommendations to have these elements under sole command, and, at the same time, the support of the other institutions outside the Ministry of National Defense to ensure the successful fulfillment of the entire spectrum of missions in the national and allied interest obliges our decision-makers to make a decision that can only be to our advantage.

Tailoring our own human resources management elements should be a priority in the near future. In order to strengthen a positive behavior and to establish a new organizational culture based on study and performance, this measure becomes significant through its purpose, although it has a minor impact in terms of the actual change of the structure. The changes, the adjustments that must be made to the mentality of all soldiers in the SOF are essential to the health of the organization and to its future. The health of the structure comes precisely from redirecting the performance analysis criteria on long-term effects. The quantifiable criteria currently used in the performance analysis generally have beneficial effects in the short term. They should be maintained, but the balance should be tilted to those with long-term effects. For example, it would be beneficial to assess the participation to the training of future operators, a long-term investment, with a coefficient higher than that used to assess the very good individual firing. None of them is to be neglected, but the benefits over time are to the advantage of the first example.

In support of the aforementioned, becoming a category of armed forces and having its own budget, gives SOF the opportunity to be properly equipped and be able to plan and conduct a high level training, based on the "train as you fight" principle, which can turn this structure into an elite one, capable of responding to any challenge, be it current or potential.

What it is desired actually is the creation of a flexible structure with a strong adaptive nature, able to cope with all the challenges generated by such a malleable and evolving environment as the hybrid one, but, at the same time, fulfilling all the tasks assigned in all the other situations. Therefore, without a proper control of the assigned resources, for their well-balanced planning according to the requirements, such an organization cannot become efficient as long as the administrative control is executed by a structure centered on another type of conflict and whose priorities do not overlap with those listed above.

The structural reorganization of the forces, belonging to any category, requires the support of political and military decision-makers. Their support also depends, to a certain extent, on the current legislation that regulates all unclear and confusing aspects and which demands the structural change.

The intense and difficult research and analysis can be a response to the difficult issue of the newly created operating environment. Adopting certain changes based on a thorough study minimizes the occurrence of an error in addressing the future reorganization.

Conclusions

Throughout this paper, we have drawn up a series of views on the security situation of a state, either individual or part of an alliance, and we have tried to emphasize the role and importance of the special operations forces in terms of a potential conflict, outlined as an extremely challenging one, mainly from the point of view of employing the forces. The newly created security environment dramatically limits the possibility of using the forces of the ministry of the defense until the appropriate state of affairs is declared. It is precisely this challenge that generates the idea of reassessing the situations in which the forces, either armed or interagency, can be used in relation to their destination but above all with the efficiency and experience accumulated so far.

In order to support the assertions on the need to reconsider and rethink the involvement of the responsible structures in the security environment, we have approached particularly the specificity of the current conflicts. We have also identified some key areas, which are still not covered, whose careful approach in the near future may be an effective means of development in the field.

The first of these areas concerns the human resource management for the military personnel, which obviously requires a change in terms of the remuneration system and the career development. From the point of view of the risks it must undertake, the elitist training must prevail over the remuneration. On the other hand, the wisdom derived from patriotism is a remuneration that the Romanian state benefits from, and the Ministry of Defense has to appealingly balance the investments in training and career development.

The second area which should be researched in the future refers to the possibility of cooperating, at the level of the alliance and the union, on counter-terrorism. A common information system, based on national sensors, but with a cross-border analysis system, can be very efficient, with multiple possibilities of creating target packages, easily engaged by the forces that have authority in the field. In support of what has been said, the issue of the immigrants comes into the forefront as a factor generating terrorism risks.

The third area requiring careful research proves to have two important aspects. The first refers to the changes needed to make all the available interagency forces efficient in the hybrid environment and the second to what should be done to improve the cooperation between the SOF and the other security agencies towards achieving the desired effects. The issue and the challenges generated by the hybrid conflict in the vicinity of the national territory require a reassessment of the response options. Additionally, simply being reactive to these problems through responses or measures generated by various stimuli can prove to be overwhelming. Active measures and close cooperation, under the sole command of all forces capable of operating efficiently under these conditions, may be the solution to counteract the adversary's actions or to mitigate their effects.

In an increasingly passive society, acknowledging the shortcomings, no matter how serious they might be, is imperative for triggering an effective analysis, but it is not enough without undertaking the necessary measures to eliminate them. The change must be based on the results of this analysis and the new structure must be tested under the most difficult circumstances. Subsequently, even if there is a need for small adjustments resulting from practice, their implementation completes a process which is as troublesome and painful as vital.

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SMART CITY – NEW CONCEPT
IN CIVIL-MILITARY PLANNING

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Abstract: Within history, armed clashes have dramatically affected the urban localities, where there were strategic objectives, but also a significant population. Nowadays, the city has become a target by attacks which destroy the urban area and irreversibly affect the population. City's resistance is in great difficulty, involving within defensive actions not only its own community, but also the international organizations whose mission is to maintain peace.

In present days, the "smart city" term generates ample debates and polemics. The defense of intelligent cities should be positioned into an offensive area, based on the configuration of this new type of city.

Defense actions in the smart city have to respect the particularities of the battle within urban terrain, analyzing the dimensions of the kinetic territory and taking into consideration the intensity of the aerial actions, targeting not only the actual attack, but also collecting data with drones. In this context, synergy is the essential condition for success in the civil-military planning process of a smart city.

Keywords: smart city, offensive city, civil-military planning, urban security, resilience.

1. Foreword

Currently, more than 50% of the world's population lives in urban settlements, but according to UNDP[1], by 2030, this percentage will increase by 10%, reaching 60%. This galloping development has forced the urban development agenda around the world to focus on a few fundamental elements: *sustainability, inclusiveness* and *flexibility*, thus coming up with solutions to solve the great challenges of the contemporary world.

The economic progress is obviously boosted by the urban environment. Air pollution is an effect of economic progress, especially under the conditions of greenhouse gas emissions; this phenomenon is directly proportional to the significant overall energy consumption. The urban development perspective for the next 20-30 years will also be reflected in a major expansion of the built-up areas, reaching up to 1.2 million square kilometres by 2030. The estimated energy consumption for 2040 favours pollution and faces the specialists with the issue of widening the area of energy resources and discovering renewable energy sources capable of meeting the needs of an estimated 9 billion people. The same indicator marks 6.3 billion people living in the urban area by 2050[2], confirming the inevitable prospect of crowding the urban environment, a phenomenon that will raise difficult problems in *managing the city of the future*. In this global context, smart city functionality is a priority that should also aim at protecting residents from possible armed aggression. This comes to answer the question of why we need civil-military planning in the smart city?

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[1] United Nations Development Programme, available on: http://www.undp.org/, accessed on: 21.01.2017.
[2] Acc. to https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf, accessed on 21.01.2017.

At a simple search on Google for the phrase "smart city", we get 37,400,000 million results[3]. The term *smart city* generates ample debates and polemics to set up a smart city that has as its essential component its defense capability.

The beginnings of the history of the smart cities as an expression of civilization are linked to the year 1914 when the first electric traffic light in the world, invented by James Hoge, was installed in Cleveland, at the crossroad of Euclid Avenue and 47 East 105th Street. Today, the companies selling innovative technologies are promoting their products through promising solutions for better city management, translating the concept of intelligence into the image of a robot city. The intelligence referred to when talking about "smart city" is meant to include new technologies in the governance of cities, which forces such urban settlements to alternate between adaptation and experiment. But, in our opinion, a smart city means much more than the simple incorporation of technologies into its operation: "Since there are several types of intelligence, we believe that in order to make sense, the smart city concept should be related to the ability to detect, understand and solve the problems, corresponding to the three levels of organization: material, living structures (non-verbalized) and the socio-human (verbalised). Thus, real physical space - virtual space dependence creates the ability to sense the link between the elements of a situation (inter-legere), and to find and communicate the correlated solution to these relationships through IT technologies. Although difficult to realize, this physical manifestation of the real space- virtual space connection can give consistency to the smart city concept, and it can produce operationalization, removing it from the paradigm of the ideal or utopian city of the Renaissance"[4]

Why do we need smart, resilient and secure cities? Natural and anthropic hazards can cause significant, irreversible damage to any city, stopping or disrupting the proper functioning of urban life. The experience of recent years has shown that armed attacks and terrorist attacks[5] in major cities are on the rise, and natural disasters[6] have felt their presence in more and more urban areas. The fact that some natural disasters occur almost simultaneously with armed threats or terrorist attacks strengthens the conviction that cities of the future must be prepared for mixed challenges both natural and anthropic. More research is needed to prepare, prevent, protect, respond and recover smart cities.

2. Evolution of urban localities in the predicted conditions of the armed confrontations of the future

The brain of the decision, through the political, but also economic and cultural role, the city is the symbol of power, and therefore any attack on such an urban settlement involves not only important material loss but also loss of human life, thus giving the signal of the result of the enemy attack. Over time, armed conflicts have involved the city, thus revealing both the constants and the changes suffered over time by this category of urban settlement. From the old city, with walls and shelters (*city-fortress, fortress*) physically besieged, today we face the city without walls, but strongly besieged by the media, economics and imagology, and the aimed results are to surrender them not to the assailants but to their agents and their people, aiming at the acquisition of an important geographic area for the economy, resources, but also for capturing the symbolic geography of power.

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[3] Accessed Google on 8.10.2017.

[4] Sorina, Rusu, *The Relationship between Military Objectives and the Urban Settlements*, Proceedings The 11th International Conference "Strategies XXI" - Technologies - Military Applications, Simulations and Resources, p. 291.

[5] Only in the last year there have been eight terrorist car bombings in Europe (Spain, Germany, Great Britain, France and Sweden). These attacks could have been prevented by designing public spaces to prevent access to machines or to allow it under certain security conditions.

[6] Hurricanes Katrina, Harvey, Irma, the earthquakes in Mexico, etc.

In turn, the city without walls has shelters against weapons of mass destruction, blows of enemy aviation, etc. In this sense, the conquered city can impose a social-political leadership favorable to ideas, attitudes towards economy and resources, political, economic and financial alliances and orientations. The facilities enjoyed by the modern city solve some of the security problems of the person but may also have some vulnerabilities resulting from the possibility of interruption or conditioning of gas, water, sewerage, terrestrial communications, radio, television, fiber etc.

The stages of urban development have been marked by population growth, reconfiguration of cultural and civilization development, as well as by the demands of armed conflicts in urban areas. Thus, any urban design activity destined to the modern city had to consider the development of protected wall-type military constructions, the provision of independent water supply to the network of the locality, appropriate positioning with respect to the communication area, the evacuation areas, treatment and rehabilitation of forces and combat means. All decisions on the reconfiguration of the city by developing defensive elements have taken into account the experience of new military technologies, which has placed it in a permanent defensive state against attackers.

Under the III millennium war conditions, we believe that defense will have to be positioned in an *offensive area* articulated on the smart city configuration. The concept we propose, that of the offensive city, will have to be designed so that to capitalize on building techniques and landscape elements, to obtain optimal protective effects against the destructive actions of military technologies (for example, the techniques of communications shielding).

In the construction of dwelling spaces, it is necessary to use non-inflammable materials, self-extinguishing shirts, intended for the storage of fuels or their transport. The modern, smart city could benefit from civil protection areas (shelters for the population) in which oxygen-producing plants can be grown, able to grow in semi-security or even in the dark. Concerned about this, in the late 1970s, NASA launched an experiment to build an eco-friendly life-support system that could be applied even in those survival units Skylab used in the mission of sending human crews to the moon. Through this experiment, the ability of some plants to refresh the air even in that hermetically sealed space laboratory has been demonstrated.

In a millennium in which humanity faces the catastrophic effects of pollution, the exploitation of the results of Skylab's[7] work by the NASA researchers materialized in the realization of the *ideal hous*e (bio home), which demonstrated that the plants have the huge ability to regenerate and purify the air. NASA's experiment has shown that carefully selected plants can refresh the air while also exerting an aesthetic role on the environment.

In order to provide people with vegetarian food in the event of a food crisis that occurring during war, it is necessary to prepare, from time to time, some places for the cultivation of plants of the category of vegetal foods, but also with a natural medicine role, from mushrooms to algae of different types. These initiatives could prevent the starvation of the population during armed conflicts in the urban environment, as is the case, for example, of the civilian population in the urban bombed settlements in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Creating alternative water sources is a priority of the smart city in conflict. For example, building deep-water wells and using condensing water from air conditioners (dehumidifiers) could at least partially solve this vital human problem. To this we can add the plants that keep large amounts of water in leaves, which can be used as needed.

3. Specific elements of defense planning in smart cities

The future of the smart city depends both on the dominance of activities such as information and communication technology, but also on the creation of new services for citizens, designed to stimulate economic development. The World Council for Urban Data (WCCD) and the Global Cities Institute (GCI) at the University of Toronto (Canada) have developed urban indicators

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[7] https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/skylab, accessed on 18.03.2017.

that are applied in urban projects around the world, an important global initiative on smart cities built on an international standard. The ISO Technical Management Office defines the concept in question as such: a city is smart when it accelerates the pace of its social, economic and sustainable development in the face of challenges such as climate disruption, demographic momentum and political and economic instability, improving its relationship with society, its leadership methods, the cross-cutting nature of its approach beyond urban disciplines and systems) and the use of modern data and technologies to deliver better services and higher quality of life for those living in them as well as for future generations without compromising other communities and without degrading the environment[8]. By detailing these people's desires from around the world, the executive director of the United Nations Program for Human Habitat (UNO Habitat[9]), Joan Clos, argues that the Cities and the effects of urbanization on people's quality of life must now be dealt with as a science. This city science uses urban environments as sites of analysis and compares them to determine urbanization patterns. Climate change, the explosion of the world's population and the combined rural exodus means that human development will take place in cities[10]. Applying these standards, Amsterdam has become one of the first cities certified according to ISO 37120 because investments in equipment and communication structures have stimulated sustainable economic development through which it has been able to ensure a superior quality of life through the efficient use of natural resources. At the Global Cities Institute of the University of Toronto and at the World Council for Urban Data, which coordinates the use of ISO 37120, we notice that most of the WCCD Foundation's cities are today a pioneering work in the field. The top 20 cities that have adopted the standard also have national centres in the field: London (Urban Innovation Center), Dubai (Urban Innovation Hub), Boston (Innovation District), Barcelona (@ 22 Barcelona Lab) and Los Angeles (Civic Innovation Lab).

Both terrorist threats and climate change put more and more pressure on civilian or military urban planners, prompting them to find new city-based solutions to be resilient to current and future security challenges. That is why we believe that the fight against these threats must start from the conception and design phase of the buildings, infrastructure and all the elements that make up both the real urban ensemble and the virtual one. This involves smart city planning through anticipation and prevention, but also response and adaptation to new conditions due to natural or man-made hazards. Defense actions in the smart city have to follow the specificities of the battle in the localities, analyzing the pedestrian/terrestrial kinetic dimensions and taking into account the intense aerial actions not only for the actual attack, but also for collecting data using the drones.

Under the conditions of the war today, the forces in conflict have technical facilities whose quality depends on the end of the attacks. If all sophisticated technical facilities have operating vulnerabilities (such as shielding, jamming that can seriously affect data collection), the conflicting city must have alternatives to the means of communication. In the smart city, sensors will be embedded in the streets, buildings will be connected to the internet, the property will be supervised by cameras and drones, the urban system will be recalibrated by using real-time primary data on energy, water, climate, waste and crime.

4. Civil-military cooperation for the planning of defense objectives in urban areas

Appropriate, functional and effective planning of military objectives in urban areas must be the result of good cooperation between civil society and military authority. The presence in a locality of military objectives has caused civilian population a discomfort due to several factors. Firstly, the closed-circuit character of the military objectives has kept the civilian population away and cre-

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[8] Jean-Claude, Tourneur, *Oraşe inteligente şi durabile,* available on: http://www.standardizarea.ro/revista_standardizarea, accessed on: 7.01.2017.

[9] Acc. to http://www.worldsmartcity.org/ and http://www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=9, accessed on 3.03.2017.

[10] http://www.standardizarea.ro/revista_standardizarea/2017/Revista_2017_01.pdf, accessed on 2.03.2017.

ated a forbidden area, although geographically it belonged to the community. Restrictions - going as far as banning photography in the area of the objective - they accentuated the barrier between military authority and civilians. On the other hand, the presence of military objectives on the territory of an urban settlement creates a high degree of vulnerability for the population, because in the event of an armed attack, the basic targets are the military objectives, the destruction of which can speed up the conquest of the city.

Another aspect of urban planning in relation to military objectives is camouflage as a way of protecting buildings and, implicitly, people in case of armed attack on the locality. The presence of military interest objectives in a locality makes it vulnerable to attacks and affects the life of the community. For this reason, camouflage of the locality by means other than using the ones applied so far is an important research theme in order to identify new and effective solutions with multiple functionality.

Another aspect of the perspective of optimizing the collaboration between civil society and military authority in the planning of urban space has as a starting point civil engineering techniques with a high potential for *self-defense*. In this sense, we consider it necessary to reconfigure the concept of smart city in the context of continuous war.[11] From this new perspective, the virtues of the advanced technology underlying the smart city should develop an *offensive component* with defense and retaliation function only in case of attack, thus ensuring the protection of the population and the material values of the community. Applying this new concept will lead to the reconfiguration of the city and will create difficulties for enemy action to attack the localities. In the same context, it is necessary to rethink research in the field of offensive weapons, capable of attacking even the offensive, smart and safe city.

Conclusions

We believe that the involvement of military power in the smart city must take into account the new smart *offensive* concept of the city, by taking peaceful actions of a preventive nature in relation to potential armed attacks. Changing the status of this type of settlement by assuming *offensive, peaceful and preventive* character in relation to potential internal or external threats requires the opening of new research projects within a fair partnership founded between the military authority as a factor of power and civil society, as a beneficiary of defense actions.

A vulnerability of the smart city equipped with advanced techniques is that the human resource is conditional on functioning in an algorithm of technology, ignoring the possibility that smart man-city interactions can uncontrollably defeat the city's defense capability. At the same time, a challenge for the smart city is to ensure the defense of citizens without jeopardizing the right to privacy.

In order to put the new concept into the work, we consider it necessary for the military specialist (operations officer) to be present in mixed urban design working groups, so that the future urban intentions to have the endorsement and guarantee of the smart, safe, harmless defense mode on the citizens, prepared at any time to defend them, in response to attacks from outside. The prevention of terrorist attacks and natural disasters must be an essential part of the smart city, regulated by the conception and design phase, materializing the phrase that is increasingly used in the assessment of urban space, that of a safe city.

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[11] Acc. Mihail, Orzeață, *Războiul continuu*, Editura Militară, 2011

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THE IMPACT OF INNOVATIVE POLITICAL POWER ON MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

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Abstract: Managerial flexibility is a key factor in strategic management that facilitates the organization's rapid adaptation to environmental turmoil. Implementing managerial flexibility, both intra-and extra-organizational, can lead to risk control and mitigation and occasional benefits or progress in a developed strategy. Innovative political power is the factor that decisively influences the cultivation and manifestation of managerial flexibility at the organizational level, being able to limit or expand it, depending on the established objective.

Keywords: economic security, innovation, innovative political power, managerial flexibility, organizational flexibility, strategic management, political impact.

Introduction

The decision-makers of the nation are the holders of political power as a result of a vote of confidence by citizens to accede to the top positions in the state power. A French scholar appreciated that the governors holding political power may decide on behalf of the entire nation, having the legitimate right to lead, by their own decisions, all the other social powers without the obligation to obey any of them. Rarely, political decision-makers accept changes, being used to remain faithful to their own dogmas, ignoring the consequences that can result from the long practice of rigid thinking. [1,2].

Political decision-makers rarely accept changes, being accustomed to remai faithful to their own dogmas, ignoring the consequences that can result from the long practice of *rigid thinking.*

1. Political power

Political power is the only type of power invested with the force necessary to use coercion in the event of force majeure. Regarding the responsibility of politicians, the sovereignty of power must not allow them to evade social control as needed, the power being finally held by the people.[3]

Some of the functions of the political power are:

- creating laws, pursuing their implementation;
- ensuring a climate of peace and order;
- supporting and facilitating economic progress;
- strengthening organizations for them to adapt to current requirements;
- halting economic and social inequalities;
- organization and running of the whole society;

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[1] Jean-William Lapierre, *Essai sur le fondement du pouvoir politique*, ASIN: B0014UJXHG, Editeur: Éditions Ophrys, France, 1968.

[2] Guy Godin "*Jean-William Lapierre, Essai sur le fondement du pouvoir politique*, Publication des Annales de la Faculté des lettres, Aix-En-Provence, Ophrys, 1968, Laval théologique et philosophique 291 (1973): 98– 104. DOI: 10.7202/1020343ar website: https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/ltp/1973-v29-n1-ltp0987/1020343ar.pdf, available on 28.09.2017.

[3] Idem 1.

- other actions and interventions necessary for the overall development of society.

In the post-December period, research was carried out on the birth and functioning of the political power in Romania. For the development of such a model, responses were collected to dilemmas such as[4]:

- Who and how do they gain power?
- How does the electoral mechanism that fills the decision-making positions at the top of the Romanian state function?
- Who leads us, which is the social profile of those who hold positions at the top of state apparatus at central and local level, as well as in political parties?
- Who benefits most from the distribution of wealth created in the economy?
- Who are the main beneficiaries of the political power?

An analysis of political power over government issues has even addressed some arguments against an overstatement of the state authority in political debates and social theory. Also, various conceptual tools have been developed to analyze the various alliances between political authorities and other authorities that have tried to regulate economic activity, social life and individual behavior as efficiently as possible[5].

Regardless of when they are invested in and take over political power, governors and legislators have an obligation to protect, by the decisions they take, the territory under their influence.

In a secure economic area, all organizations have a chance of rapid development or, on the contrary, they can regress if they cannot find the resources to survive. The impact of innovative political power on the organization is shown in Figure no. 1. *Influence of political power on organizations in a territory (author's contribution).*

Figure no. 1. Influence of innovative political power on organizations in a territory

A strong economy builds itself into an adaptive environment. A country, although rich in natural resources, if it does not adapt to global trends, risks not having the ability to generate value-added goods and services from its own resources.

If the environment does not have resources or holds them in a limited amount, then the political power, the state, must find solutions to obtain them at a fair price. Securing economic space means, among other things, securing resources and organizations that invest to produce and export added value products. Only in this way can the economic environment develop in line with long-term national strategies. Direct capitalization of available resources leads temporarily to economic gains, but these are minimal. Over time, the effect of such a practice may be the loss of strategic advantage due to the possession of resources, some rare and perhaps impossible to recover.

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[4] Stănescu, Iulian, *Puterea politica in Romania. De la comunism la noul capitalism*, Editura: Universul Juridic, ISBN: 978-606-26-0083-9, 2014.

[5] Rose, Nikolas, and Peter Miller. "*Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government*." The British Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (1992): 173-205, doi: 10.2307/591464.

In such a hypothetical situation, the leaders of the political power will also lose the few strengths that could be invoked at the time of possible negotiations, which can take place internationally, according to the globalization tendencies.

The concept of "innovative political power" is defined as a specific feature of the power holders who can use their creativity to innovate for the benefit of the state they represent and in whose name they decide. Creativity is the determining factor that allows for the emergence of innovation. Innovation involves transforming a situation, method, or resource into a new, superior value that can be used with increased performance regardless of the scope.

A innovative product or system does not always have the ability to ensure the adoption and dissemination of an innovation.[6] The American Management Consulting Company Boston Consulting Group believes that "innovation is the process of making improvements by introducing something new. An organization's ability to innovate has become one of the most important skills needed in the new knowledge-based economy. Knowing the innovative culture of an organization, structures, power can predict the type of innovation that exists in several areas of activity or industries.[7] The result of innovation can be a new invented product, a new government law or simply a new idea that encourages new thinking[8]. In another direction, innovation is also the adoption of a device, system, program, process, product, service, or policy that is new to the organization that adopts them[9]. Relative to the analysis of political power, innovation gains positive valence when it is used to increase welfare at the social level. An innovative political power can have the capacity to develop and implement viable social and economic policies that realistically support economic growth and make a significant contribution to improving the quality of life. Innovative political power can also take the form of new organizational methods at the level of international trade relations for increasing exports or diminishing the trade deficit, in helping small entrepreneurs to develop a sustainable local economic environment in R & D for Romania to have competitive technologies and so on.

Unfortunately, experience shows us that the political power actors have used their capacity to use their power innovating, especially for personal purposes or in the interest of the organizations they have represented. The situation can be addressed if politicians, science, technology and innovation work together to reconfigure the system of domestic political power in the context of a growing pressure of globalization manifested through a digital capitalism without frontiers, creating new paradigms and paradoxes. [10] In Romania, to support the innovative projects for 2014 (according to Eurostat), 4,060 thousand Euro were allocated. The situation is presented in detail in Table no. 1. *Total innovation activities and expenditure in organizations (Eurostat, S2014).*

Table no. 1. Total innovation activities and expenditure in organizations
Source: (Eurostat, 2014)

1.Italy	114,581	6.Poland	31,396	11.Belgium	26,632
2.France	110,273	7.Sweden	31,037	12.Portugal	25,646
3.Turkey	107,460	8.Austria	29,766	13.Finland	19,057
4.Germany	80,696	9.Czech Republic	28,372	14.Greece	18,210
5.Netherlands	52,086	10.Spain	27,583	15.Norway	16,880

6 Frost, Peter J., Egri, Carolyn P., *"Influence of Political Action on Innovation: Part I"*, Leadership & Organization Development Journal, Vol. 11 Issue: 1, 1990, pp.17-25, https://doi.org/10.1108/01437739010142512.

7 Danks, Shelby; RAO, Jay; Allen, Jeff M. *Measuring Culture of Innovation: A Validation Study of the Innovation Quotient Instrument* (Part 2). *Performance Improvement Quarterly*, 2017, 30.1: 29-53.

8 The Boston Consulting Group, site web: https://www.bcg.com/, disponibil la data de 15.09.2017.

9 Damanpour, F. (1991) *Organisational Innovation: A Meta-Analysis of Effects of Determinants and Moderators*, Academy of management Journal, 34, No.3, 1991, p. 555-590.

10 Mashelkar, Raghunath Anant. *Impact of science, technology and innovation on the economic and political power. AI & society*, 2017, 32.2: 243-251.

16.Switzerland	15,356	21.Slovenia	6,006	26.FYR of Macedonia	2,840
17.Hungary	8,778	22.Bulgaria	5,576	27.Denmark	2,742
18.Croatia	7,144	23.Slovakia	4,843	28.Latvia	2,496
19.Lithuania	7,084	24.Romania	4,060	29.Cyprus	2,287
20.Ireland	6,067	25.Estonia	3,526	30.Iceland	1,940
EU Average – 26,681 thousand Euro					

2. Managerial flexibility - the intangible asset of organizational strategy

By the term *Managerial Flexibility (Fm)* we understand a managerial process adaptive to the requirements and turbulence of the environment in which the organization operates. How flexible a managerial process can be depending on certain factors such as the security of the economic and socio-political environment, military capability, education level and the quality of leadership knowledge, political vision, availability and value of resources, vision and managerial thinking, other contextual opportunities.

3. Change, the precursor of managerial flexibility

A managerial process becomes flexible when the idea of change is accepted. Managerial flexibility can be both an effect and a cause of change.

It is usually an adaptive process or a method of optimizing the results obtained from the change. Depending on the context applied, the managerial flexibility equation can take the following form (equation 1, author's contribution):

$$F = C + D + Fo \qquad (1)$$

Where,
F = managerial flexibility;
C = change;
D = decision;
Fo = capitalizing on opportunities.

Managerial flexibility is essential in targeting an organization (civil or military) to achieve its goals and success. If specialized literature gives extended spaces to change management, managerial flexibility is rarely remembered. If change is analyzed from the perspective of change management, managerial flexibility is researched from the perspective of opportunity management, according to figure no. 2. *The difference between change and managerial flexibility (author's contribution).*

Figure no. 2. Difference between change and managerial flexibility

Naturally, some questions arise, such as: What are the effects of change? How many benefits have we brought? From the perspective of the managerial flexibility theory, here comes the big advantage that is precisely improving the management capacity of the organization in order to achieve the expected benefits. These results are then managed to allow continuous improvement of the activities, processes and procedures involved.

4. Predictability and globalization

4.1. Predictability

Predictability is the "recommendation" that shows the organization the way it is about to go. Predictability targets in practice the decision to allocate and direct a pool of resources to achieve a certain type of performance. Resource allocation is made following an internal risk analysis. The conclusions of this analysis are aimed at providing certainty that resources will not be invested in loss. If the political environment is unstable, then the economic environment is uncertain and insecure. Investors follow with interest the evolution of the political actors, respectively the level of stability of the economic environment targeted for investments in the medium and long term.

In order to create such an environment conducive to economic development, political power holders have to create early the levers of economic development that they can sustain in the long run, in order for the economy to recover. Otherwise, the economy will not have the power to regenerate, as organizations will produce little, expensive and average quality. This way, you cannot be competitive in an ultra-technological world where production costs have fallen sharply without giving up the quality of products and services.

Therefore, Romania will also suffer in the coming years if the economic changes do not happen. The welfare of a state is reflected in the level of exports. The experience of recent years shows that imports are larger than exports. The economic deficit has other side effects, such as the poor funding of institutions and force organizations that support the good functioning of the state.

4.2. Globalization

Achieving managerial flexibility within an organization depends on a mix of internal and external factors. If internal factors can be known and controlled, external ones can not always be either known or controlled. A special responsibility for the management of the external factors of a civilian and / or military organization is also the political power. Political decision-makers can draft laws and finance projects that can help improve the external environment, under the influence of globalization, so that they can create a climate conducive to economic development.

Globalization, through its mobilizing effects, has the ability to make a better world. In addition, the proper integration of national economies into a global economy and opening up to other cultures offers the most direct way to achieve better global security. On the other hand, for the time being, some economic policies that have accelerated globalization have led to less favorable consequences: increased unemployment, consumption of natural resources and environmental damage, disparities between states, winding up of certain industries, etc.

Achieving the beneficial effects of globalization and minimizing those that are unfavorable requires concerted efforts of actors at national, regional and international level.[11]

Globalization can be conceived as a set of processes that embody a transformation, a stretch of social, political, cultural and economic activities. It can be considered an increase in width, intensity, speed and the impact of global interconnection.[12]

Also from the perspective of globalization, we bring to the forefront the role that multinational corporations should play in the development of global governance, creating a

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[11] Tătaru, Irina; Jianu, Florin. *Globalizarea şi efectele ei asupra dezvoltării economice*. Journal: Impact strategic, Published by: Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I", Issue Year: 38/2011;

[12] Held, David, et al. *Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture*. In: Politics at the Edge. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000. p. 14-28;

framework of rules and regulations for national and global economies[13]. Other issues generated by globalization are those that affect the relationship between public organizations (civilian and military) and private firms. Then we take into account the economic and management theories about the social responsibility of an organization that survives with great difficulty in a competitive environment, as an effect of globalization.

From the point of view of managerial flexibility, the orientation of an enterprise must be made according to the purpose for which it was created, but in a favorable environment in which it finds resources to develop and be competitive. From this perspective, innovative political power could support their orientation by providing them with the protective environment they need.

If a budget organization is primarily oriented to solving the set goals, a private organization will take into account the needs of the clients with the declared purpose of making profit Figure no. 3. *Managing the organization according to priorities (author's contribution).*

Figure no. 3. Managing the organization according to priorities

4.3. Implementing managerial flexibility

The question arises whether a public organization (civilian or military, considered rigid through construction and mission) can become flexible, knowing that no deviation from the rules of operation is allowed. Managerial flexibility is the assumed freedom to decide optimally, not the freedom to de

Thus, where the legislator allows, some adaptive measures may be used in accordance with their duties of service, with the stated purpose of solving a problem or of achieving superior performance. In this case, creativity and the ability to innovate are the basic ingredients for finding the best solutions for fulfilling plans.

Instead, policy-makers can secure and improve the social, political and economic environment, from a legislative and financial perspective, so as to allow for the cultivation and implementation of decision-making flexibility among managers at the level of the desired structures.

Regarding the understanding of the concept of *innovative political power i*n Romania, respectively the cultivation of managerial flexibility, we can analyze the percentage of funds that is allocated for the Romanian innovative activities and projects.

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[13] Scherer, A., Palazzo, G., & Baumann, D. (2006). *Global Rules and Private Actors: Toward a New Role of the Transnational Corporation in Global Governance*. Business Ethics Quarterly, 16(4), 505-532. doi: 10.5840/beq200616446.

We find that only 15.22% of the total European Union average funding of 26,681 thousand Euros was spent in Romania. The analysis is based on data available from Eurostat for the year 2014 and is presented in the chart *no. 1, Romania compared to the EU average for innovation activities, respectively the expenses in organizations.*

Table no 1. Romania in relation to the EU average for innovation activities respectively the expenses in organizations
Source: Eurostat, 2014

The level of education, but also individual experience determine the ability of each person to innovate. This ability can be developed. Through the cultivation of innovation, a determinant of managerial flexibility in all fields of activity, know-how can be generated, which in the course of time can contribute to the increase of the volume of goods exported minimizing the national deficit, 2016, according to Eurostat *(Chart 2 General government deficit / government surplus% of GDP and million EUR, 2005 - 2016).*

Table no. 2. General government deficit/government surplus % of GDP and million EUR, 2005-2016.
Source: Eurostat

Conclusions

The theoretical concepts proposed, *"innovative political power"* and *"managerial flexibility"* presented in this analysis have some practical limitations due to the difficulty of understanding the new concepts, but they can represent, for the analysts and researchers interested, real research tools of the political, management and organizational climate in the near future.

Applications of the relationship between the innovative political power and the cultivation of *managerial flexibility* consist primarily in the realization of a constructive policy, whose fundamental feature for a functioning society is the adaptability to unfavorable internal and external conditions. This feature - *flexibility* - is also the result of the ability of managers (managers) to learn from previous experiences.

Strengthening the level of flexibility of the domestic and foreign policy of our country could have as a starting point the management of the institutional feed-back (as a useful and not "hostile"! tool) to achieve long-term country strategies. On the other hand, the development of an organization is not possible without the allocation of the necessary resources for the proper functioning. Also, funding innovation and growing managerial flexibility in public institutions could help boost the country's prestige through competitive technologies produced in Romania, which can honor the country as true "technology ambassadors." Public institutions may have as internal strategy established under the legal framework to produce basic resources (food, clothing and raw materials), which are significant annual costs for the budget apparatus. Their surplus could be traded on the free market, thus supporting the state budget.

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METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT

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Abstract: The article offers a methodological framework for systematic and rigorous risk assessment in an environment with high uncertainty while applying capability based planning. The article focuses on determining risks inherent to the defence planning process and offers tools and techniques suitable for implementing operational risk assessment.

The Operational Risks Assessment Methodological Framework (ORAMF) represents a Framework for use of a proven protocol for writing risk statement – a "Condition-If-Then" construct. The article discusses utility of the "Common approach" and the "Impact averse approach" to the risk assessment and risk rank-ordering as a basis for risk prioritization.

Utilizing the ORAMF and the given protocol for producing risk statement together with the Impact averse approach to ordering risks represent a toolset for reinforcement of the defence planning.

Keywords: risk assessment, impact, probability, impact area, risk identification, risk prioritization, capability gap.

Introduction

Methodological framework for risk assessment is one of the outputs of the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies within the University of Defence in Brno. The institutional research project called "STRATAL" – Strategic Alternatives for the Development of the Czech Armed Forces was launched for the timeframe 2016-2020. The author offers an innovative methodology for further discussion and best practices for development of sound risk assessment process and its analytical support.

Every strategic (long term) plan is saturated with risks, defined as the effect of uncertainty on objectives. Indeed, there is considerable interest in both defence and non-defence organisations to include risk management in their strategic planning processes.[1]

The author provides a framework for how risk management (as defined in ISO 31000:2009) can be systematically integrated into defence planning processes. This Framework depicts risk assessment procedures as part of risk management process and helps analysts to apply risk assessment in order to perform a thorough and rigorous capability analysis. The framework places specific emphasis on the definition of risk: the effect of uncertainty on the (organisation's) objectives.

The article's ambition is to offer sound methodological framework for defence planners and stakeholders involved in capability development, defence planning and decision making. The ORAMF is designed from the defence planner's point of view since it is the defence planner who must ensure that the intellectual effort carried out in support of a planning process and inherent risk assessment is valid, verifiable, consistent, and rigorous.

The author offers in the article a methodology and best practices in risk assessment as incentives for further discussion and for development of sound risk assessment process and its analytical support.

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[1] Analysis Support Guide for Risk-Based Strategic Planning. Scienece and Technology Organisation, Technical Report *STO-TR-SAS-093-Part-I.2017.*

1. Scenario context for assessing risks

Scenarios describe plausible futures that represent a tool for dealing with uncertainty and offer a chance to be better prepared for the uncertain future. Scenarios related to planning capabilities for future security environment may work with different time-frames that are considered by the government and by the defence planners relevant for ensuring defence of the country in a long term. Scenarios should reflect threats that will remain relevant in the future as well as the considered time-frames should reflect a life-cycle of major weapon platforms (usually 25-30 years). Mike Strain and Kevin Hassett for example work in their study[2] with time horizon 25 years, describing scenarios of possible future. Scenarios that describe possible future crises related to the security threats play a vital role in determining capabilities requirements and provide a „playground" for risk assessment related to capability gaps.

When generating capability requirements and specifically when assessing risks related to the identified capability gaps, the possibility that some of the scenarios, or all of them, might occur simultaniously or in a sequence, should be considered. Set of govermnent approved scenarios represents an effective tool for assessing risks related to the identified capability gaps. It provides a foundation for a subsequent formulation of recommendations for prioritizing capability gaps and Force Development Options (FDOs). This way scenarios support the decisions that have an impact long into future.

Clear understanding to the term „risk" and an agreed and well understood risk statement make a foundation for a sound risk assessment, that enables the analysts to deliver defensible risk prioritization.

"Risk is an event that, if it occurs, adversely affects the ability of a project to achieve its outcome objectives",[3] Contemporary understanding to the term "Risk" relates this term to a possibility of damage occurence, loss, destruction or failure.[4] "Risk is defined as a cumulative effect of the probability of uncertain occurences that may positively or negatively affect project objectives"[5]

There is an understanding to the risk, based on the "risk" definitions, as the level of danger that the threat will materialize, causing an undesired result, in turn leading to a damage (undesired consequence or impact). The volume of risk is expressed as risk level.

Each risk event has two major atributes stemming from risk definitions. Impact on Impact Areas (IA) and its occurence probability. In scenario context, IAs are related to the assets that embrace protected interrests of the country (security interests), the objectives described in each scenario and own forces. Scenarios describe crises, in which identified security threats might materialize, causing a damage to the security interests and other impact areas. Scenarios, in their normative part,[6] describe the objectives that are necessary to be achieved in order to protect the assets. IAs for the purpose of risk assessment in scenario context are considered to be as follows: (1) the objectives described in scenarios, (2) key tasks (KT) and (3) own force, and represent the three basic IAs to be considered during the risk assessment.

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[2] M. Strain, K Hasset, *4 possible futures for US workers in 2040*, https://www.aei.org/publication/4-possible-futures-for-us-workers-in-2040/.

[3] Paul R. Garvey, Analytical methods for risk management: a system engineering perspective, Chapman and Hall/CRC; 1st edition (1601), Bedford, Massachusets, USA, 2008, ISBN 978-1-58488-637-2.

[4] V. SmejkaL, K. Rais, *Řízení rizik ve firmách a jiných organizacích*. 4. vydání. Praha: Grada Publishing, 2013, 488 s. Expert. ISBN 978-80-247-4644-9.

[5] Carl L. Pitchard, Risk Management: Concepts and Guidance, Fifth edition, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis group, USA, 2015, ISBN 978-1-4822-5845-5.

[6] Josef Melichar, Scénáře – tvorba, vnitřní struktura, scénáře a bezpečnostní hrozby. *Vojenské rozhledy*. 2017, 26 (2), 18-32, DOI: 10.3849/2336- 2995.26.2017.02.018-032. ISSN 1210-3292 (print), 2336-2995 (on-line), available at: www.vojenskerozhledy.cz.

Equation: Risk = F (Probability, Impact), serves then as a general expression of risk with the two above mentioned atributes (probability and impact).

As the IAs, the objectives and key tasks might differ in each scenario significantly, according to the scenario type. Own force will differ in volume and type of force applied. Scenarios e.g. *"Strategic Assault"* will typically embrace objectives as IAs like e.g. *"Freedom of movement for Humanitarian assistance in conflict zone", "Border area x-y of a country ZU secure"; "Eliminate the adversary forces from the border area" as key tasks. "Own force" as an IA* will embrace own personnel and own materiel. A *"Hybrid conflict"* scenario then might have different IAs: *"Own people don't follow themes advertised by adversary propaganda "*(objective); *"Protect social media network in own country from adversary propaganda"* (KT). *"Own force", "Own citizens" represent* additional category of IAs.

In order to work with risks sensibly, expressing them by an agreed and proven protocol is a necessity. Best practice for writing risks[7] is expressing them in a form of „*Risk Statement".* Risk Statement provides information and clarity about the risk, so that the risk assessment embracing probability of risk occurence and its impact or consequence, as the two risk attributes, is defensible.

The *Condition-If-Then* construct is the appropriate and proven protocol for writing a risk statement. The **Condition** reflects what is known today, it represents identified capability gap, that can cause a risk event to occur with certain probability. **If** represents a risk event that, if it occurs, it has negative impact (conseqences). **Then** represents the impact (consequence) event, that means if the risk event occurs, then it impacts on IAs (it has consequences for IAs).

Hybrid conflict is here given as an illustrative scenario and context for risk assessment.
IAs in this illustrative scenario will be as follows:
- IA 1 - Objective: *"Own people don't follow themes advertised by adversary propaganda"*
- IA 2 – Key Task: *"Protect social media network in own country from adversary propaganda"*
- IA 3 – Own force: *"Own force (ability to act effectively"*

Condition (Capability Gap) A – STRATCOM capabilities (capabilities for strategic communication).
If (the risk event) AA – Adversary propaganda has entered media with global and local reach (internet based media, adversary media, own media).
Then (the Impact/Consequence event):
- 111 Own people percieve adversary propaganda themes attractive
- 112 Social media network in own country flooded with adversary propaganda attractive themes
- 113 Inability to act effectively

The *Condition-If* part of the risk statement reflects probability of risk event to occur if the Capability gap exists. The *Then* part of the risk statement describes the risk event's consequences (Impact on IAs). Impact of risk events is assessed against the IAs in each scenario. Hybrid conflict scenario illustrative example of risk statement is portrayed in Figure bellow.

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[7] Paul R. Garvey, Analytical methods for risk management: a system engineering perspective, Chapman and Hall/CRC; 1st edition (1601), Bedford, Massachusets, USA, 2008, ISBN 978-1-58488-637-2.

Figure no. 1. Illustrative example of Condition-If-Then
construct of a risk statement in scenario context

2. Setting up the process

The ORAMF is drafted as a process encompassing six steps: (1) Impact Areas (IA) review; (2) Risk identification; (3) Impact assessment; (4) Probability estimate; (5) Risk prioritization; (6) Risk mitigation.

The ORAMF answers the questions:
What assets (Impact Areas) will be impacted?
What are the risks to IAs in each scenario?
What is the impact (consequence) of a risk event on the assets, if it occurs?
What is the probability of risk occurrence?
What is the risk priority order?
What is the mitigation of the impact of identified risks on the assets?

Figure no 2. Risk Assessment Framework

Impact Areas Review

First step of the ORAMF is IA review. During this step the IAs that stem from the security interests described in The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic and from each Scenario considered, should be reviewed. Based on the outcomes of the scenario review, IAs may change, reflecting the changes in the security environment and specific changes in the scenario objectives and key tasks. Up to date set of IAs provides a firm foundation for risk assessment criteria. Set of IAs will typically include scenario objectives, key tasks and own force. IAs in each scenario will differ, based on scenario characteristic, *Strategic assault* scenario will embrace different objectives, different key tasks and will require different force package then *Cyber defence scenario or Disaster relief scenario*. Clearly described set of IAs makes risk identification focused and sets conditions for comprehensive risk identification.

Risk Identification

Identifying risks is a critical step of risk assessment process. The objective of this step is an early and continuous identification of operational risks stemming from capability gaps to ensure that all the potential operational risks could be managed proactively instead of reacting on risk event on its occurency in operations. Risks related to capability gaps have to be identified for each scenario and clearly described. Failure to identify risks relevant to the identified IAs and to the respective scenario may cause undesired consequences. Perhaps the key failing that appears over time is an incorrect description of a risk event.

Elaborating scenarios into appropriate level of detail is necessary for achieving rigorous risk identification. That implies using specific scenarios for this purpose. Specific scenarios provide sufficient information and details so that the risk identification can proceed with required level of granularity. Risks are then identified using steps of operations planning process and applying wargaming techniques.

Impact Assessment

Impact Assessment is related to IAs, that means it is necessary to have a clear list of IAs identified and up to date for each scenario at the beginning of the process. The IAs considered within ORAMF consist generally of three broad areas, own force (own human assests, own non-human assets), scenario objectives and key tasks, against which the impact is assessed. Risk event may have different impact on achieving the objectives, on key tasks, on human assets (casualties), or on non-human assets (weapon systems, equipment, etc. damages or losses). Impact can be expressed in numbers (number of casualties, number of destroyed weapon systems, etc.), or described qualitatively when numbers are not relevant (achieving the objectives delayed, objective not achieved, etc.). It is recommended to combine qualitative and quantitative approach to the Impact assessment to avoid the trap of „expressing uncountable facts in numbers." It is also reccomended to assess the impact of each risk event in context of the overal scenario end-state in order to get the overal picture.

Probability Estimate

Once the Impact assessment has been done, probability occurence of each risk event can be estimated. The risk events are events that may or may not occur with probability „P" falling into interval 0 − 1. In scenario context the probability of risk occurence will depend on number of factors: objectives of the source of threat/potential opponent, willigness of the potential opponent to seize the opportunity given by capability gaps, rapid changes in nature or unforseen technological advances, to name just a few. These are some of the factors that make difficult to arrive to an exact level of probability, it will typically be an informed and qualified estimate at best. Probability interval 0 - 1 should be scaled (3 to 5 levels of probability with set boundaries for each probability level). A probability can be expressed as percentage (e.g. 60%), as a value statement (e.g. extremely likely), as a comparison (e.g. D1 highway congested at rush hours), or as a frequency level (in at least four or five instances per week). Probability boudaries can be set as for example: 1 − 30% - low probability with the threshold 30% for maximum value accepted for a low probability, 31 − 60% - medium probability with the threshold 60% for maximum value accepted for medium probability etc. Risk events with probability estimated as 0 − 1% should not be taken out of further assessment only for extremely low probability, as some risk events may have catastrophic impact (consequences) if they occur, and it is not possible to say with certainty that these risk events will not occur in the future.

Risk Prioritization

Based on the Impact assessment and Probability estimate, identified risks can be rank-ordered according to their importance. Potential impact on given scenario IAs (objectives, key tasks and own forces) should be the driving factor for rank-ordering risks. There are two approaches to rank-ordering risks discussed in the article, „common approach" and „risk averse approach", both of which use ordinal scale. The „common approach" is based on grouping the risk events into probability and impact categories. That requires developing ordinal scales that are a measurement scales in which attributes are assigned a number representing order. The ordinal risk matrix is widely used approach for ordering risks into priority or criticality categories. Figure bellow represents an illustrative example 3 x 3 ordinal risk matrix.

Figure no. 3. 3 x 3 ordinal risk matrix – Common approach

Two ordinal scales define this matrix. Scale for probability level is distributed along the vertical side of the matrix, scale for the impact (consequence) level along its horizontal side. The probability level 3 represents the highest likelihood of the risk event occurence, the probability level 1 represents the lowest likelihood of the risk event occurence, probability level 3 represents the highest level the risk event occurence. This rule is valid likewise for the impact levels.

Common approach to prioritizing risk events distributed across the risk matrix works with multiplying the impact and probability levels attributed to each square and uses the results to define each square's score. The square's score defines the risk event priority order. The higher the score, the higher the priority. Problem with this approach is that arithmetical operations with ordinal numbers are not permissible.[8] This results in squares with different probability and different impact values having the same score. That requires additional assessment of risk events and adding additional attribute to them in order to prioritize events with the same score. Adding weight to the impact provides more granularity to common approach.

In order to eliminate the „equal scores" trap, common approach can be modified. Applying risk rank ordering by the level of impact offers a possibility to eliminate those trap. That implies assigning the highest priority to all the risk events within the highest impact column, and priority ordering within that column to be based on the Impact criticality. This approach is called Impact Averse approach as the risks are prioritized strictly by the level of Impact.

Figure no. 4. 3 x 3 ordinal matrix Impact averse approach

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[8] Paul R. Garvey, Analytical methods for risk management: a system engineering perspective, Chapman and Hall/CRC; 1st edition (1601), Bedford, Massachusets, USA, 2008, ISBN 978-1-58488-637-2.

The risk events priority ordering in risk averse approach is different then priority ordering in common approach, as shown on Figure 5. Probability receives a supporting role, vice the impact is a driving factor when assigning priority order to the risk events. To support decision making when selecting an FDO for implementing, an agreed threshold for acceptable risk level of each capability gap should be in place. That implies assessing risk acceptability for each risk event related to the respective capability gap individually and based on the results, group the risk events into risk priority groups. (Group 1 – unacceptable risk, Group 2 – conditionally acceptable risk, Group 3 – acceptable risk).

Risk Mitigation

Risk mitigation means that options to fill the capability gaps based on the risk prioritization results are identified. Capability gaps with unacceptable risks are the prioritized options for force development. Capability gaps with associated conditionally acceptable risks require carefull assessment of the conditions that have to exist in order to accept the risks. Capability gaps with associated acceptable risks are not further considered for risk mitigation.

There are different options for proceeding with Risk Mitigation. (1) new capability might be added to the existing or planned forces (modernisation). (2) the assets that will deliver required capability might be acquired through an acquisition proces (new system). (3) capability gap might be mitigated by capability sharing based on multinational arrangements (Pooling and Sharing, Smart Defence, outsourcing in private sector etc). The result of the risk assessment may as well be resulting in a proposition to lower the Level of Ambitions as a risk mitigation measure, if the set objectives are unattainable within specific timeframe, budget or due to technical immaturity.

Risk mitigation measures are projected into prioritized set of FDOs. Once an FDO has been selected and approved for implementation, it represents risk mitigation measures for the identified capability gaps.

Conclusions

The Operational Risk Analytical Framework for Defence Planning was developed with the aim to provide defence planners with a tool for integrating risk assessment systematically and explicitly into defence planning. The resulting framework uses the ISO 31000:2009 standard as the basis to describe the risk assessment processes.

Meaningful risk assesment in the defence planning process requires scenarios to be elaborated to the level of detail such that is necessary in operations planning. Scenarios must allow proper mission-to-task decomposition as required capabilities are identified based on tasks to be fullfiled and objectives to be achieved.

Additionally, the ORAMF accommodates procedures for identification of main impact areas and risks relevant for each scenario, and for rigorous risk assessment in terms of probability estimate and impact assessment.

Comparison of common approach (risk equals impact multiplied by probability) and impact averse approach (Impact as a driving factor for risk priority ordering) generates possibilities for applying ordinal risk ranking within risk assessment and risk prioritization in scenario context.

Thoroughly implemented risk assessment and risk prioritization provides a solid and defensible arguments for capability development propositions, that reflect criticality of particular capability gaps and allow for neccessary argumentation framework to justify military needs.

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GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ROMANIAN
ARMED FORCES' TRANSFORMATION

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Abstract: *The military system and army by default, is a basic element of the social structure, being part of a complex set of interactions with other systems and subsystems in achieving specific tasks and missions.*

In Romania, the army is an essential institution of the state, assigned with complex missions to defend independence, sovereignty, integrity and territorial unit of the country, securing the constitutional democracy of country's territory. Therefore, the basic function of the army remains the planning of the military strategy, by depressing and conducting warfare according to the Military Strategy and the Romanian state specific military policies.

Once with Romania's accession to NATO and EU, its responsibilities in security and mutual defence increased, together with its duties and commitments to other security organisations, including its active presence in several international military operations.

In conclusion, we are witnessing not only a vast transformation process of the Romanian Armed Forces, but also a wide openness to civil society.

Keywords: *army; defence; commitments; transformation; society.*

Introduction

The countenance of the society at the beginning of 21st Century requires to identify future directions of evolution and to find its own opportunities for each system or subsystem in order to meet the challenges of the quick changing international environment, sometimes predictable as a result of political, strategic actions, sometimes unpredictable and accompanied by a dose of uncertainty in nature, purpose and time.

The 21st Century started violently and continued to hit the democratic symbols trough a series of bloody attacks that haven`t been ended until now. Furthermore, these attacks have increased in intensity and they are weakening the democratic values. Both, the terrorist attacks and the conversion generated by technological progress and military anomaly, by a different kind of war – economic and informational – have led to a deep transformation which affects the states security.

Within the Nord Atlantic Treaty Organization and at European Union level, the capacity to intervene in crisis situation is increasing. Although the danger of a large and conventional type of aggression is unlikely in the current context as regards Romania and its allies, we have to consider the possibility of such a treat.

In this regard, a general restructuring trend is noted. We could define this reorganization and professionalization of the armies in the modern age as the process through which the organizational structure, the size, resources and missions of the armed forces are adjusting to the changing social needs[1].

The transformation process of Armed Forces in the present context is not only an important goal but also an indispensable necessity. In order to achieve the interoperability and compatibility of the Romanian Armed Forces with those of the European Union and NATO, the modernization process it was based on the establishment of a small army, characterized by flexibility and

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[1] Ionel Nicu Sava, Gheorghe Tibil, Marian Zulean, *Armata şi societatea – military sociology text collection,* Bucharest, Info-Team Publishing House, 1998, p. 13.

professionalism, capable to ensuring a climate of peace and security as well as meeting high standards of each specific mission.

Geopolitically and geostrategically, we are experiencing fundamental changes that will have a decisive impact on how the armed forces will operate in the future. The ever-changing elements, both internal and external, have caused a series of global events, generating new challenges[2]. These challenges instills the need of adapt in all nations in respect both the military system and the security environment, cooperation and crisis response.

The military system, implicit the Army*, is a basic component of the social system and is in a complex set of relationships with other systems and subsystems in the execution of their tasks and missions.

1. Internal factors of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation

In Romania, the army is an important institution of the state, invested with complex missions in order to defend the country's independence, sovereignty, integrity and territorial unity, and to ensure democracy, across the country[3]. Thus, the primary function of the army remains the preparation, the discouragement and the taking of the war in accordance with the Military Strategy and the military doctrines. By joining NATO and the EU, Romania increases its responsibilities in the field of collective security and defense, as well as those related to other commitments, such as participation in a wide range of international missions – from humanitarian to those on crisis management and the fight against international terrorism.

Basically, the army is a subsystem that obeys the political power, determined by the nature of the political regime (democratic, totalitarian, transitional etc.) and which represents the core around which all the other subsystems of power are organized. The military institution is invested with specific prerogatives and skills, but it also carries a restraint system which restrict de freedom and makes it dependent on political power.

In order to deepen the relationship with NATO and UE, Romania must take actions to ensure its allies, partners, but also the civil society, that its armed forces will serve to protect and democratic development of the state.

Therefore, assumption of the commitment to build viable capacity in order to ensure national and collective security and defense has been and is possible through the transformation of the legislative framework and exercising democratic control over the armed forces*, awareness of civil society`s role in controlling the army – civil control and adaptation security and defense policy to those of NATO and the EU.

In order to clarify the concepts of democratic and civil control, first we need to understand the concept of control[4], who do not hold necessarily an imperative meaning, but relates rather to the permanent or periodic analysis, to follow the training and to improve the management process of relations between the army and other state authorities.

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[2] Mihai Floca, *Forţele de elită – Armata secolului XXI,* Bucharest, Editura Militară Publishing House, 2002, p. 12.

* The army represents the system of central structures, structures an forces subordinated to the Ministry of Defense (Law 346/2006 on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Defense, article no. 1) or "group of armed men, organized and maintained by the state for war" (*Military Lexicon*, Chisinau, Saka Publishing House, 1994, p.41).

* The armed forces includes the army, the units and the large units subordinated to the Ministry of Administration and Interior, those of the state intelligence service (the Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service, the Security and Protection Service and the Special Transmission Service) an other armed defense formations organized by law (law 45/1994 on Romania`s national defense, article 11).

[3] ***, *Constituţia României,* Bucharest, C.H.Beck Publishing House, 2011, p. 19

[4] The control, but more precisely, social control, is the result of relationships of interdependence between elements of a system and the determination of components by the system which they belong. Cătălin Zamfir, Lazăr Vlăsceanu, *Dicţionar de sociologie*, Bucharest, Babel Publishing House, 1993, p. 138, Apud. Marian Zulean, *Armata şi societatea în tranziţie*, Bucureşti, Editura Tritonic, 2003, p. 37.

The notion of democratic control (on the army) refer to the control exercised by political authorities, democratically elected, and the assessment of its transformation, in our opinion, should be done in terms of legality and legitimacy trough some basic rules:

- The soldiers must remain apolitical and not get involved in politics, fulfilling their tasks according to the constitution;
- The design and development of security policy have to be done under the control of government authorities, and military structures just fallowing these decisions.
- The decision of the political institutions, to promote cooperation in internal crisis situations or in missions outside the national territory, shall comply with the previsions of the laws In force and the use of lethal force should only be performed according to very clear rules.

Thus, the democratic control over the army can be define as the set of prerogatives granted by the constitution and laws, to institutions and political authorities (democratically elected or legally established) to establish the normative and doctrinal framework regarding the organization, operation and responsibilities of military system, to set its action limits, and to check the way in which its activity complies with the law and the decisions of the competent authorities.

The legislative framework on the civil democratic control of the army is rooted in the Romanian Constitution and in Law no.45/1994 – regarding the national defense. Article 118 of the Constitution states that the army is exclusively subordinated to the will of the people in order to guarantee the sovereignty, independence and state unity, the territorial integrity of the country and constitutional democracy. The law of national defense complement the Constitution and defines the fundamental principles of the way in which national defense is exercised, the structure of the national defense system and the power of public authorities in terms of defense.

Other organic laws, such as: Law no. 473/2003 – regarding the training of the population for defense, Law no. 477/2003 on the preparation of the economy and territory for defense, Law no. 415/2002 on the organization and functioning of the Supreme Council of Defense, Law no. 346/2006 on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Defense, and after long delays, Law no. 453/2004 for the approval (with modifications) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 1/1999 regarding the state of siege and emergency regime, as well as others, are complementing the existing legislative framework with regard to the relations between army and society, the planning and organization of defense.

According to the Romanian Constitution, all three public powers, executive, legislative and judicial are in charge of army monitoring and surveillance.

The institution of parliamentary control in Romania is the most comprehensive, complex and incisive, given the size and its role. The first dimension of Parliament`s role is justified by the preeminence of this institution in relation with other state authorities and by the prerogatives of of ensuring the balance of power and guaranteeing functioning state. The second dimension of Parliament`s role refer to its legislative function, being the only authority that has the right to establish primary legal norms as regards national security and defense, organization and conduct of the Ministry of Defense`s specific activities and other military forces.

Other form of control, without further details, are made by the President of the country, the Supreme Council of Defense, the Government, the Prime Minister, the Constitutional Court, the Court of Justice, the Court of Accounts.
Thus, the state political institutions exercise formal control over the army, but a democratic society also requires the existence of some informal mechanisms and non-state institutions in achieving indirectly civil control. The purpose of this control is to ensure that and the armed forces retains, in all circumstances, the place and the constitutional role in securing national security and defense[5].

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[5] Conf. Gheorghe Diaconescu, Floarea Şerban, Nicolae Pavel, *Controlul democratic asupra armatei în România*, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedică, 1996, p. 185.

2. The adaptation of the Romanian Army to NATO and EU standard

Another important element of the general and doctrinal framework regarding the Romanian Armed Forces transforming process is the adaptation of the security and defense policy to those of NATO and EU.

Romania`s accession to the EU and NATO, determines the enrollment of the national security policy in the European and Euro-Atlantic security policy course, in order to acquire a pronounced proactive doctrinal character. Although this scenario did in fact materialize in National Security Strategy – 2007, directed more quickly towards a policy based on the prevention of security risks and threats: "the security of each country, as well as the security of the international community as a whole, are based not only on the ability to react and adapt, but also on proactive anticipation and action[6]".

As a consequence, Romania`s responsibilities are no longer confined to policies that safeguard the national territory but also pursue policies that boldly promote national interests in order to play a role in maintaining pace and stability in regions where NATO and EU have interests. The proactive employment framework also calls for the combination of policies, legal-diplomatic instruments, actions etc., to be achieved both through doctrinal, normative and organizational efforts, as well as through the work carried out under international security structures, having the ability to anticipate, prevent and combat the new risks and threats.

In fact, security, without going into semantic details, it means "being sheltered from any danger; the feeling of trust and peace that the absence of any danger is giving"[7].

On how the definition of the security, as it is assumed by NATO, it should be mentioned that security is intended to "provide one of the indispensable foundation for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the development of democratic institutions and the peaceful settlement of disputes, in which no country can intimidate or forcing any other country through the threat of violence"[8].

Allies security policy typically aims to increase the capabilities of each of the partners and to achieve a common potential trough participation, engagement and common doctrinal-strategic and operational concepts. The alliance policy is found at the intersection of Member State`s security policies. After all, the main interest must contain the interests of all member, but also a plus at the Alliance level, which fully justifies the reason for its existence.

This risks and threats to security cam be amplified by the existence of some vulnerabilities regarding some hard-to-reach vital resources, computerization of the society, illegal migration, chronic poverty in some regions and social differences widening, environmental degradation as a result of accidents and including dangerous, harmful or irresponsible human activities, natural disasters or other geophysical or meteorological phenomena (flood, strong storms, landslides, earthquakes or extreme global warming).

Together, these issues represents a more complex security challenge for NATO and EU members than the classical threat from another state (military alliance), by military means. The response to this complex and interconnected security environment provides a great importance as regards the need of a security policies and strategic conversion, analytical capabilities in political and military areas, real possibilities of collecting and processing the information, and prompt response based of common doctrines. The most conclusive form to finalise such a concept is collective security (collective defense), namely the common security (common defense).

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[6] ***, *Strategia de securitate naţională*, Bucharest, 2007, p. 5.

[7] Dexonline Site, available at https://dexonline.ro/definitie/securitate, accessed at 07.10.2017.

[8] ***, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Washington D.C., 23-24 of April 1999, Article 10, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natoh q/official_texts_27433.htm, accessed at 07.10.2017.

The collective defense will remain the primary target of the Alliance, the essence of the security strategy and policy expressed by article no. 5 of the Washington Treaty which represents the commitment of all states to defend each other against any kind of aggression.

However, the North Atlantic Alliance continues to pursue a comprehensive security and defense policy, laid down in Strategic Concept and General Policy Directive, and to undertake the fundamental security missions, namely collective defense, stability and support, crisis, partnership and consultancy.

The European Union, trough the Maastricht Treaty (1992), completed by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), has set itself the objective of asserting itself as a serious international actor, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy. Thus, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is the second pillar of the EU, alongside the European Economic Community (pillar one) and Justice and Home Affairs (third pillar).

The objective of this policy is to respect the fundamental interests of its members in matters of foreign policy, independence and security. From a European perspective, security represents the systematic architecture, designed and institutionalized, specific to the global and regional commitment of the democratic nations to strengthen multilateral co-operation designed to exclude the possibility of any threats or aggressions of any nature against one or against all European countries.

In accordance with article J. 4 of the Maastricht Treaty and article 11 of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007)m the Common Foreign and Security Policy took into consideration all the aspects of the Union security, including timely definition of defense policy, that can lead, at the right time, to a common defense. Article 27 of the Lisbon Treaty as well, takes on particular relevance, because, same as article 5 of the Washington Treaty, is forcing all the members to do everything possible to help and support a state member whose territory has been attacked, but is not explicitly mentioned "by military means".

As regards the defense policy – defense concept – in any of its operational hypostases – at national or allied level – it is increasingly associated and consequently subsumed to the security state (collective/common). In case of organizations which we look at, NATO and EU, the concept is most of the time used in relation to security policy and the common foreign and security policy.

In fact, in the context of the assertion of Romania`s national security and defense, as part of the defense promoted by the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, we find the embodiment of this project in direct correlation with the collective security/collective defense in the political-military framework promoted by NATO and with the Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defense Policy, within the EU.

The foundation of the paternity, only seemingly dual, is found in Romania`s belonging to the same system of values and the same system of institutional organization as well as in the context of risks, threats and challenges faced by each of the European and Euro-Atlantic states. Thus, "collective defense means collective security, just like common defense is conceptually and operationally subsumed to common security"[9].

The national security and defense policy is based on a unitary set of principles, directions of action and ways of achieving the strategic objectives, in order to promote the national values and interests stipulated in the National Security Strategy of Romania – 2007, document that provides doctrinal groundwork for the systematic collaboration with the allied, partner and friendly states. It should be pointed out that, for the first time, this strategy outlines, at a really minimal level, the institutional structure involved in the implementation of the provisions from the security policy perspective, which should give a real impact, a true substance, but also a careful consideration from the political institutional system, which has not happened so far.

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[9] Emil Cheţe, Aurelian Raţiu, "Readjustment of Romania's Security and Defense Policy to NATO's and the European Union Ones", in the volume of the international *Provocări ale globalizării la începutul mileniului III*, organized by The Faculty of Political Science, International Relations and European Studies, Sibiu, 29-31 of May 2009, p. 156.

The guidelines established by the National Security Strategy of Romania, national interest and national security objectives particularly, are developed through the national defense strategy of the country. The document is also based on the provisions of the Romanian Constitution and the national legislation in force and is "harmonized with the European Security Strategy, the NATO Strategic Concept, together with the relevant defense documents of the two organizations"[10].

The Romanian armed forces are already part of NATO and the EU, but the process of adapting policies, transforming and full doctrinal and operational integration will take time. Therefore, on the basis of these documents, the doctrinal-strategic objectives of the national defense are elaborated, as follows[11]: consolidation of Romania`s profile within NATO, development of Romania`s contribution to the European Security and Defense Policy, as a member of the European Union, engagement in the struggle against terrorism and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increasing the contribution in order to ensure regional security and stability, conversion of Romania`s defense capability.

In our opinion, the general objectives of reforming and achieving in time a structure of interoperable forces whit the armies of NATO`s member states, were, among others: the revision of the legislative framework in accordance with the status and role of the army in a democracy; developing a new doctrinal-conceptual system about the organization, endowment, development, training and use of forces in peace, in crisis situation and in armed conflicts; restructuring and modernization of military education and training system; the gradual reduction of the number of staff, together with the increase of professionalism and, at the same time, the achievement of balanced staff structures and the efficiency of the ways of social protection; the fundamental structure review to meet the requirements of the new security environment as well as NATO and EU membership; achieving an optimal level of compatibility within NATO`s military system and the armed forces of its members, so that the forces of the Romanian army to be able to carry out multinational and collective defense missions, in accordance with article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and to actively participate in crisis response operations; increasing the capacity to intervene in crisis situations and expanding the possibilities of designing force in areas of interest etc.

Conclusions

In reshaping of the Romanian military system, have been taken into account the national interest of Romania, the geopolitical and geostrategic transformations in the European and international space and its possible evolutions, the proliferation of the risk factors in the area of strategic interest, the need to connect to the values and the results of the Revolution in Military Affairs, as well as fitting in the provisions of the Treaty regarding conventional armed forces in Europe.

We think it`s important to point that the reform process of the Romanian Armed Forces was carried out in parallel with Romania`s accession to NATO and EU, the achievement of the restructuring and modernization objectives being some of the important conditions for joining the elite group of member countries of these organizations and to become credible for other security bodies.

Thus, the international openness, dialogue and military cooperation have led to the identification of the main requirements for assistance from NATO and EU institutions and member states in the field of restructuring, interoperability, standardized training and continuous training of professional military in general, and officers in particular.

The restructuring and reform process of the Romanian Army is not necessarily the reason for its integration into NATO and European Union, but primarily, by its own needs in this field, philosophy of transformation that is still maintained.

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[10] ***, *Strategia națională de apărare a țării*, published in Monitorul Oficial, Part no 1, no. 799 from 28.11.2008, chapter 1, paragraph 1.
[11] *Ibidem*, chapter 2.

In conclusion, we are witnessing not only an important transforming process of the Romanian Army into a wide openness to the security and defense policies of the two organizations, but also an openness to civil society, which is a basic condition for ensuring the transparency of the body with the aim and consequence, the progressive building of a trust and cooperation climate, which should dominate the relationship between Romania and the other allied states, as well as between the military and the society.

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THE HUMAN POTENTIAL AND THE SYNTHESIS
OF FIGHTING CAPABILITIES' OPTIMISATION

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Abstract: *The art of war can be linked to the whole complex of social evolutions, not only to the structuring of the models of authority, or to the influence of material interests, but also to the impact of the interests regarding the nature of identity. The evolution of the human factor and the specificity of its attributes engaged in the systemic fields, which project conflict at a cultural, religious, ideological, political, economic and military level, have important aspects that can not be separated from the theoretical and practical areas of the war.*
The purpose of this approach is to highlight the potential resources conjoined in the acts of war development and operation, and in particular to identify the influences, connections and mechanisms of inter-conditioning that outline the relationship between the armed power and human nature, understood as the integral resource of all other defence resources.

Keywords: *social evolution, global equilibrium, the condition of complexity, optimisation, candidate solutions, moral force.*

Introduction

The knowledge of the war environment implies the correct assessment of the conflictual climate, circumstantial factors, capabilities, logistic support and resources, predictable responses, mobility of systems, as well as the assessment of configuration data of the territory in which deployments take place. All these elements give the integrated coordinates for understanding the philosophy of conflict, offering the possibility to decrypt the central idea or the concept around which the armed conflict is predicted and positioned. Beyond the need to highlight the goals and objectives, a particular important aspect in shaping the philosophy of conflict is to identify the pivotal idea, the doctrine or the underlying motives which drive the belligerent behaviour.

In the epicentre of social evolutions, that generates the flux of aggregation or destruction of institutional systems, cultures, ideologies or policies — the human nature is a dynamic factor of the processes of continuous renewal and adequacy. The link between the social dynamic, on the one hand, and the influences and relationships that are meant to determine the state of rivalry, conflict and war, on the other hand – is in fact one of causality. Regarding the design, initiation, or the coordination of war, we can assume that the human footprint of these identity metamorphoses requires an investigation of the phenomenon of war from the broad perspective of social sciences, and from an anthropological point of view in particular.

The human conviviality - consumed at the level of a restricted circle, mainly affected by the causal encounter between the freedom of adequacy and the freedom of exclusion, between allowed freedoms and imposed restrictions - is transferred to an extended social anchor area. It generates the market for confronting contradictory interests, influences, games and strategies that evolve over time, demanding the emergence of rules of convenience, meaning marks, lines and angles of view and approach. Society, which has come to an extent of over-saturation of force connections, needs time to fit and synthesise boundaries of restraint, as well as the sense of affirmation of the survival interests. The very balance of states, relationships and conditionings proves to be a macro-visionary result of extremely complex phenomena that constantly germinate the entropic order of the social system. In today's multiple society we can speak about a state of global equilibrium or the lack of it

resulting from the states of balance or imbalance respectively, harmony or dissonance of some efficiency systems involved in the sum of their competing, convergent or dissipative dispositions. This is the fabulous side of human individuality, to generate order in the multiple connection of factors and conditionings, an order that can not be the generative function of a single human mind, but the synthesis of the interaction of creative freedoms and rationales of genius that shape the result of the global suitability of human nature.

1. The condition of complexity and the combinatorial optimisation

The condition of complexity requires a certain type of memory capable of managing algorithms specific to the interconnection of social, political, diplomatic, military, and of any other nature. Each of these systems has a control architecture created to counter the accumulation of tasks and the need to solve tasks based on reliable calculations. The whole situation becomes a computational issue that is subject to probabilistic measures. The researchers of systems theory have developed various computational solutions applicable to interconnection issues, such as the Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCP) - a theorem to overcome the obstacles of approximation[1].

An example of random algorithm can be that of combinatorial optimisation that we can encounter in nature in the case of an ant colony organising and building access to resources. "The combinatorial optimisation involves finding values for the discrete variables so that the optimal solution can be found in relation to a given objective function." (ACO Algorithm - Ant Colony Optimisation)[2].

This algorithm, as well as others based on swarm intelligence systems (SI), brings substantial improvements to the metaheuristic thinking built in the sense of generating and selecting the search formulas for the best solution in a system. The metaheuristic thinking selects a sample of solutions, then introduces assumptions regarding the optimisation in relation to the variety of issues encountered. Thus, based on possible iterations, amended by probabilistic optimisation paths, one can derive the overall optimal solution for a particular problem category.

Speaking about the random algorithm regarding the optimisation of finding out the best route, this phenomenon was observed in experiments involving certain colonies of ants forced to navigate in search for food on versions of roads with different lengths. Over time, they chose the shortest route possible coordinating themselves thanks to their chemical signals based on pheromones.

Figure no. 1. The optimisation algorithm of the configuration mechanisms in finding out the best and most efficient route identified by ant colonies[3]

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[1] Ingo Wegener, *Complexity Theory, Exploring the Limits of Efficient Algoritms*, translated from German by Randall Pruim, Printed in Germany, Berlin - Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag Publishing House, 2005, p. 8.
[2] Marco Dorigo, Thomas Stutzle, *Ant Colony Optimizaţion*, Ed. by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, London, A Bradford Book – The MIT Press, 2004, p. 25.
[3] *Wikibooks*, https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Robotics/Computer_Control/Control_Architectures/ Swarm _Robotics, accessed on 22/08/2017.

The figure above shows given route alternatives of different lengths. If an ant discovers the food, it begins to emit a semiochemical, a pheromone of orientation – in an attempt to go back to its mansion. This can happen with several ants at the same time, spread on several random routes, until they arrive back to the mansion and all the colony is notified. In this state, all ants begin to emit pheromones and chemically impregnate the round-trip access routes. The secreted semiochemical substance determines a behavioural response of general mobilisation, being not only a warning signal, but also a way of identifying the routes which will be used by the entire colony to coordinate its power of supplying. If the ants initially describe through their pheromones different ways of navigating between the mansion and the place of food supply, later they will follow the most efficient path based on the received signals. The shortest route will also be the most chemically impregnated. As the navigation time needed to cover it is shorter, it does not allow the volatilisation of pheromones to the same degree of volatilisation that longer paths record. Consequently, based on the identification of the most resolvent or least volatile signal, they will synthesise the shortest path to feed and abandon the other variants.

Therefore, the more optimal the route, the greater the signal strength on that route will be. The shortest path used in the random streams will be more crowded, with ants indicating the best supply solution. This type of experiment demonstrates coherence and coordination within the colony, but also the fact that the order of combining the solutions, and in particular, the ability of individual synthesis of the chemical signal, extrapolated to the size of the entire colony — leads to optimisation.

The model of combinatorial optimisation highlights the method of finding the best applicable decision in various areas of human life, but especially in the field of strategic games. The combinatorial concept based on the synthesis of a pivotal strategy, designed to guide the entire heuristic of the optimisation game — produces unexpected solutions that, otherwise, can not occur in a linear-non-reactive process of identifying the best way. This fact has attracted much attention from research, prompting them to focus their attention on the role of metaheuristic algorithms in the dynamic of optimisation system. Experiments such as the one referring to the synthesis of optimal feeding paths in an ant colony have led to the development of metaheuristic algorithms that can be used to define, in a relatively short time, highly effective optimisation answers, dedicated to solving various compatibilisation issues. The use of metaheuristics has significantly increased the ability to find appropriate solutions to the combinatorial optimisation problem[4].

"The formal synthesis of the combinatorial optimisation problem *Π* involves creating a conditioning relation between the *set of candidate solution Σ* and an *objective function Φ* - which assigns functional value to each one of the candidate solutions in relation to a resolvent *set of constraints Ω*. The solutions inclusive to the set which preserve the elements of the function, but also satisfy the constraints *Ω* are called *feasible solutions*"[5].

The course of historical events adapted to the creative impact, achieved at the meeting point between atrocity and the human need to embody the genius - imprints to the civilising confrontation the sense of resistance against evil as a *resolutive constraint (Ω)*. To one extent in which we can quantify the socio-cultural stratification of an area as a result of this kind of impact, or as a response of the synthesis of the games of interests involved to provide resilience to the system – to the same extent we are shown that *the synthesis of the sum of optimisation solutions (Σ)* of the whole relation is profoundly modulated by the mission of perpetual assertion of the meaning of survival, or by the *moral force* of the meaning of immutability, whose role here is that of an *objective function (Φ)*. In other words, the relation that gives a system the synthesis of optimisation — precisely converted to the measure of the relations configured at the level of the state of war — demonstrates that not even in this case the moral vocation, as an objective-constitutive function of human nature, can not be

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[4] Marco Dorigo, Thomas Stutzle, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[5] *Idem*, p. 26.

neglected. From this perspective, we can assume that the inviolable force of the state of security of a political and social system resides in the moral force able to characterise the social and cultural relations which act as an incentive to that environment.

2. The human potential and the exponential resources involved in the synthesis of optimisation

In the case of war, we can not limit our analysis strictly to the nature of computational complexity annexed to the combinatoric of battle situations, but we are determined to address in more detail the significant sphere of mechanisms which codify the exponential task of systemic optimisation that is capable of characterising such a connection.

The war can not be strictly reduced to the succession of operations that cover the strategic, operative and tactical battle spheres, because the state of war assumes the commitment, which is pre-existing to the confrontation, and includes not only the course of maximising the logistic resources, but also the whole course of training and optimising of troops, starting with forming the character and continuing with the specific military training. From this point of view, it is necessary to see that, in the entire training effort, an essential part is taken by the ability to see and understand human nature as an intelligent weapon used in the field of armed conflict.

It is the human element that attributes to the entire system the specific functional value, because the human potential is the integral resource of all other defence resources. In the efforts to represent and recognise this potential, we can see that the human resource practically controls the entire spectrum of defence resources. However, independently of the synthesised options at the decision-making level, supported by the attributes of competence, professionalism, experience and exercise, the optimal-resolutive functionality of the whole complex of factors appears as a valorisation of the algorithm of time. Ultimately, the state of war employs not only the time resource as an exponential resource and as an object of empowerment, but also the human resource as its subject. By linking the two dimensions, the human potential and the time resource which potentiates the empowerment of the former, we actually understand that together they are the resolving constraint element that positively or negatively affects the synthesis of optimisation in the domain of warfare.

Certainly, these elements are not the only ones involved in the strategic, operative and tactical optimisation strategy. Below, I have identified four categories of potential resources conjoined in the acts of war development and operation:

- *Tangible resources:* material, financial, technological;
- *Intelligible resources:* informational, cultural, diplomatic, ideological;
- *Integrative resources:* the human - human attributes and capabilities and its psychosomatic background - being an intelligent weapon system in itself, highly reliable, able to generate complexity;
- *Projective resources:* the time resource; the ability to organise time; the contextualisation that validates opportunities expressed over a certain amount of time, etc.

The first two categories of resources indirectly involve human ability at the material and intellectual level, being regenerative, indirect resources. The focus is mainly on the last two categories, which are generative, direct resources, some of which can modulate reality to the extent of converting it into the most precious capital: contextualising the best human abilities in an optimal time. In my opinion, this is the supreme weapon of any time, and its integrative quality has the roots in the field of military anthropology.

The war, understood as an extreme phenomenon, represents in particular the direct encounter between the subsidiary forces of human nature that, in fact, build the way of optimising the generative potential. In a general sense, the armed confrontation is the functional result of a

regenerative investment, situated in the exponential acceleration of resource combinations engaged in the confrontations of all forms. From this point of view, it can be appreciated that the war is a platform for the validation and employment of these categories of resources that primarily involve the human abilities, the nature and the functions of the human condition. For this reason, the armed conflict can only be studied and understood from an anthropological perspective, such an undertaking leading to the configuration of a military anthropology that addresses the social human specificity, cultural-identity and religious personality, as well as the psychological and psychoanalytical side.

The human nature, with its multiple characteristics and attributes, is the synthesis of an educational base acquired in time, as well as the result of a complex state of psychosomatic processes, emotional and cognitive accumulations that reach the stage of reflecting characteristics and various reactive forms, in relation to the cursive or projective reality of the world.

3. Anchoring the abilitation of human nature in the process of configuring the warfare behaviour

Belonging to a certain system of values, to a certain ethnic, social, cultural or religious category — opens to the human nature a field of manifestation specific to educational accumulations, and also to those of a traditional-customary nature. The social cohabitation has the characteristic of perpetuating successive generations in a relation of identity accumulation and exchange. In the educational mechanism specific to each culture, the role of the cultural and social integration is essential to ensure the sustainability of these processes of accumulation and exchange, which will prevail over time. In this regard, the theorist Thomas Sowell had said: *"In the constrained vision, each new generation born is in effect an invasion of civilisation by little barbarians, who must be civilised before it is too late"*[6].

The impact of cultural acquisitions, religious traditions and mental attitudes towards social mechanisms, decisively shapes the educational-formative future of succeeding generations. The functional sense of this succession being, in fact, the work of accumulation processes which are dynamically transferred from those who come out of the sphere of the public manifestation exercise, to those who enter it. Within the complex mechanisms of accumulation and formative transfer, there might occur states of imbalance or disharmony, or, on the contrary, states of educational and social cohesion and convergence. To draw a parallel regarding these dynamics we can think of what David Robertson, the American conductor, has said: *"When looking at strife in the world, and for examples of overcoming it, just think of the orchestra. All the instruments you see originated in different parts of the world. They have different histories and modifications. They look different and produce different sounds. But here they are playing together in harmony"*[7].

The idea of using solutions to optimise the social, political and diplomatic environment is restricted to the logic of a situational management, based on methodologies and procedures of managing the educational-formative impact on various social, ethnic, religious, traditional or non-traditional categories and the groups, populations or nations. The whole effort must be related to the sense of belonging to various categories of identity, or in coordination with the projections of symbols, feelings, states, aspirations or creative capacities that support the identity of the human genius. This inner determination, as a constitutive power of the human nature, has produced not only material values, but also a complex of meaningful relations with diverse influences in the area of human cohabitation.

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[6] Thomas Sowell, *A Conflict of Vision*, Published by Basic Books / Perseus Books Group, 2007, p. 166.
[7] Ramin Jahanbegloo, "The Pursuit of Excellence and the Role of Philosophy", in *Co-herencia*, vol.10, no. 20/2014, p. 179.

In the concept of social equilibrium systems, the sum of the particularly disposition of the roles of professional efficiency, of various competences conjugated around common motives or, contrarily, situated at the border between contradictory demarcations — intensely provokes the human creative freedoms, in order to leave room for the optimisation of excellence or for the genius. Nonetheless, the highly motivating commands of the intelligent cultural background will be caught up by various states of inadequacy and insufficiency, of material or educational nature — as well as by implacable encounter with the brutal-regressive limit of some immediate aspirations which might be of a bad nature and recurring aggression.

In this encounter, the confrontation is, in fact, between adverse typologies of the same condition, or typologies of unequal conditions. The military confrontation, however, represents the rapport of authority which is determined not so much on the basis of educational efficiency, but on the basis of force instrumentation. From this perspective, the exercise of force is the one that has the last word in a conflict — the forms of armed confrontation and war, such as armed confrontations or last generation wars, have actually had incorporated the dynamics of some development stages of the human condition. This proves that the features of the conflict manifested at an individual level or at a social, economic, political, informational or military level represent, in fact, the expression of the dynamic stages of an evolutive society[8].

Regarding the dynamic instrumentation of the force exercise, it is worth noting the distinction that some military scientists have established between war and armed conflict. If war is the form of maximum engagement of forces, means and resources to support the consolidation or defence of vital interests — this being the implementation of designed force based on the elaboration of a complex strategic concept — the armed conflict is a form of spontaneous amplification of tensions and a violent aggravation of crisis situations[9].

Therefore , it is understood that the definition of one or the other form of conflict approach is related to the nature of the conflict project and, in particular, to the complexity and amplitude of the concept which stays at the basis of its initiation. The second distinctive element that separates the meaning of the two notions is the element that imposes the degree of planning or the degree of engagement spontaneity. The limit to which we can speak about armed conflict — beyond which we can iterate the concept of war — is an extremely fluid one. This is because, within war, many elements of unpredictability appear, unplanned situations that require reconfiguration and re-adaptation of the strategic vision, as well as the proper reconfiguration of the decision to put it into action.

As for the consolidated vision of expressing the exercise of force, in the sense of configuring that type of strategic concept which precisely reflects the sociopolitical vision of an administration system, there must be taken into account not only the conception of life of the human factors involved systemically, but also the following: their social motivations, the political, religious, cultural and civilisational dimensions, the psychoanalytic background of the entire engagement, as well as the professional, physical, intellectual and volitional human abilities that can shape the coherent project of expressing the force.

The human capital abilities have, in this case, the role of an objective function capable of assigning the confrontational system the decisive functional value. From this perspective, war represents not only the way of asserting the armed force, but also the way of asserting the moral force called to defend the values of civilisation.

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[8] Constantin Degeratu, Mihai Tudose, Gheorghe Văduva, *Război, cunoaștere, adevăr, (War, knowledge, truth)*, Bucharest, Nemira Publishing House, 2012, p. 46.
[9] *Idem*, p.43.

Conclusions

When configuring a war, the cultural and civilisational dimensions dictate the outcome of the long-term confrontation. However, the success in fight of a civilisation will have implications not only in the spiritual dimension, but moreover in the material work that gives expression to the transactional flow of ideas and goods. In history, the human creative genius has a strong civilisational impact on the appeal to resilience, peace and civility. To achieve these goals, there has been an immeasurable contribution coming not only from the works of spiritual and intellectual effusions such as literature, fine arts, music, scientific or academic studies, discovery and innovation, monuments of civilisation, the architectural configurations, but also from the ensemble of institutional, administrative, legal and political synthesis et al. If, in this dynamics, the human nature finds itself in the role of that catalysing, civilising factor — demonstrating the supremacy of its power to constructively survive over time — it necessarily depends on its spiritual condition and the intellectual and moral accumulations.

From this perspective, the phenomenon of war involves the participation of the genius and not necessarily the participation of the aggression. The relation imposed by the war in its configurations — which are of a particular complexity and of a structural social commitment from each and every cell in the territories of the theatre of operations — is the expression of the human conditioning, of frustrations or heights of spirit.

Therefore, the war represents a platform for the amendment of the properties of the genius, for the stimulation and reactivation of dormant functions – subsequent to the self-preservation effort which materialises in the area of the civilisation progress immediately after the end of a conflagration. On a global scale, the particular or local accents of the state of armed conflict are, in fact, expressions of the moral inadequacy of a world that fails in its relations with the overflow of goals that it raises - legitimately or illegitimately - to which it aspires, without being able to reach them in their deeper meaning.

On the one hand, this demonstrates the fact that the waiting horizon represents the area of aggregation of intelligent, superfine valences, and on the other hand, that this horizon succeeds in assigning the field lines of an overwhelming frustration.

In an identitarian sense, the game of interests – the confrontation, competition, rivalry – represent hypostases of the encounter between the man and his own nature expressed in the alterity level. War is the culmination of this encounter in which the risk of self-denial univocally projects the conflict correlative to human nature towards its connection with opposing natures, which are found, more or less, in belated or advanced states of moral progress.

The fact that war appears as a human reality might come not as a proof of the state of excellence of human nature, but a proof that the temptation of the barbarism of the same nature has an impact on the existence.

This territory of confrontation on an intentional level virtually places the difference of alterity in the life of the individual. Man perceives himself in relation to others, validates through others, synthesises the impressions and opinions of others about himself and about what represents his whole set of values. This is a form of essentialising culturally and socially the rapports of alterity that the person establishes in relation to others, in the subsidiary of his own existence.

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SPECIFIC LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR TRAINING AND EVALUATION IN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT SECURITY CHALLENGES

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Abstract: In this paper we want to analyze the legality and legitimacy of the operating of the Romanian Army training and evaluation system by identifying the legal framework that fundaments the functioning of the military organization. The legislative framework ensures the legality of the functioning of a system through existing rules, principles and laws and the analysis of current conflicts and threats on the security environment determines us to find new viable legislative solutions for Romanian Army forces training and evaluation.

Keywords: legislative framework, training-evaluation programs, interoperability, training, military laws, military rules.

Introduction

The term "*system*" as defined in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language, represents "*an ensemble of elements, principles, rules, forces, dependent on each other, and forming an organized whole that puts order in a theoretical field of thought or makes a practical activity to function according to the intended purpose*"[1]. A system highlights some of the same features and some behaviors associated with processes or phenomena from different domains, and analyze them in a systemic, unitary way. The notion of system is often found in the field of science and technology, but also in the fields of human thinking and action. By the notion of "*training-evaluation system*"[2] we will understand the whole of the elements that interact with each other within the Romanian military system and with other elements outside it, respecting the provisions of a legal framework consisting of rules, principles and laws. By its content, the legal framework bases the functioning of a system so that the elements of the system can accomplish certain goals or objectives and go through certain paths, directions or courses of action.

Starting from the definition of the term system in the context of "*System Theory*"[3], we will analyze the functioning of the Romanian Human Resources training and evaluation system in order to be able to elaborate an optimized version for a training-evaluation system adapted to certain standards performance and ranking hierarchical competences.

System Theory uses *the abstract system concept* for a system that operates according to a mathematical model that has the characteristics and dynamic behavior corresponding to the laws of

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[1] *Dicţionarul explicativ al limbii române*, ediţia a II-a, Academia Română, Institutul de Lingvistică "Iorgu Iordan - Alexandru Rosetti", Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 2009, p. 867.

[2] *i.e. System of training-evaluation* = all the elements that interact with each other within the military system and with other elements outside it, respecting the provisions of a legal framework consisting of rules, laws and principles.

[3] *** Luhmann Niklas, *Introduction to Systems Theory*, Polity Press, Cambridge CB2 1UR, United Kingdom, 2013, available at https://www.amazon.de/Introduction-Systems-Theory-Niklas-Luhmann/dp/0745645712, accessed at Apr., 3rd, 2017.

physics. System theory has been scientifically deepened by "*Niklas Luhmann*"[4] who built his theory using the concept of *autopoiesis* as the starting point, meaning the origin and evolution of life from a purely biological point of view. The general features of a system are determined by the individual property of each component of the system. Niklas Luhmann argues that the society is composed of *autopoietic* systems that reproduce and organize according to intrinsic principles being *allopoietic* that is not controlled externally.

The brief presentation of system theory in the present paper is an analogy of this concept seen from the perspective of the role played by the training and evaluation system in the functioning of the entire organizational system of the Romanian Army, such as the role of the central neuronal system composed of the Brodmann areas for the functioning of the human body. A Brodmann area is a region of the cerebral cortex of the brains of human beings and primates, defined by its "*cytoarchitecture*"[5] or by the "*histology*"[6] structure and cell organization. The need to compare Brodmann areas as an example of a perfectly functional system with a social system such as training and assessment as a fully functional system is a scientific approach that demonstrates the necessity, effectiveness and efficiency of each component of the training and evaluation system of the Romanian Army.

The operation of a system is possible if there is a legal framework composed of certain laws, rules or customs, which by their content are able to give *legitimacy* to its functioning. In the democratic sense of the term, the *legality* of functioning of a system implies the existence of a legal framework appropriate to the demands of the social order. The interdependence between legality and legitimacy lies in the fact that the existence of a legal framework contributes to the legitimacy of the functioning of a system within the organization. Thus, the organization will comply with the legal provisions and, in order to achieve its objectives, will be able to draw up, issue or adopt administrative acts specific to its field of activity, respecting the principle of legality. The legality of the functioning of a system compels the respect of the hierarchy of the existing legal framework in a rule of law. An organization has the freedom to decide and choose a legislative solution between several variants, a solution that responds in the closest way to the collective needs and general interest of the organization. The organization's opportunity to choose the appropriate framework for optimal operation is a decision-making element of the organization's strategic management. The organization's freedom to apply the provisions of a legislative framework in its work is subject to administrative control and is subject to judicial review. The legislative framework necessary for the optimal functioning of military organizations must be correlated with the needs that society, as a whole has.

1. Conflicts and threats on the actual security environment

Since ancient times, the main concern of military organizations has been training, regarded as a disciplinary and, implicitly, decisive factor in the struggle. Over time, training has gained increasingly complex valences, undergoing a process of transformation and adaptation to emerging technologies and battlefield features. It can be easily noticed that military technologies and equipment are developing rapidly and information and communication technology has a wide applicability in the military field, which generates a new training algorithm for the future soldier.

"*The Arab Spring*"[7] brought to power in the Middle East a politico-military class with different visions, creating an extremist current, generating military, religious and ethnic conflicts,

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[4] *** *i.e. Niklas Luhmann* (December 8, 1927 - November 6, 1998) was a German sociologist, and a prominent thinker in systems theory, who is increasingly recognized as one of the most important social theorists of the 20th century, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Niklas_Luhmann, accessed at Apr., 4th, 2017.

[5] *** *i.e. Cytoarchitecture* = the arrangement of cells in a tissue; *e.g.* the arrangement of nerve in the brain, especially the cerebral cortex, available at http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/cytoarchitecture, accessed at Apr., 4th, 2017.

[6] *** *i.e. Hystology* = the science concerned with the minute structure of cells, tissues, and organs in relation to their function, available at http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/hystology, accessed at Apr., 4th, 2017.

[7] *** *i.e. The Arab Spring* also referred to as Arab revolutions, was a revolutionary wave of both violent and non-violent demonstrations, protests, riots, coups and civil wars in North Africa and the Middle East that began on 17 December 2010, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring, accessed at Dec., 10th, 2016.

and the migration towards Occident, especially towards European countries, of the civilian population. In the wave of immigrants who entered Europe in 2015 there was a large number of refugees who had to flee extreme extremist phenomena, but there were also people who were adepts to ideologies promoted in conflict zones. Not the refugees but the "*European Citizens*"[8] executed the terrorist attacks in France on November 13, 2015, and these citizens were militants and followers of the "*Islamic State*"[9].

In the context of the beginning of the third millennium, training is the basic element of the military actions, enabling them to cope with the challenges posed by the social and political events taking that took place swiftly across the globe. Also, it is now imperative to achieve full interoperability at all levels of allied military structures, including joint training programs to counteract the effects of actions and challenges made against Alliance countries.

The impact of the actions carry out by the international terrorist organizations requires an effective response mechanisms, and political and military strategies assumed by all states in order to counter asymmetric risks. "*Romanian citizens may be affected by the consequences of terrorist acts. The economic and financial crisis, in turn, has contributed to this paradigm shift, and its effects are felt in the long run*"[10]. Equally, we can observe regional phenomena such as the "*hybrid warfare*"[11] that unfolds in Eastern Europe, a war in which "*big military powers*"[12] "*encloses /annex territories*"[13], developed and maintained conflicts in "*democratic states*"[14] under the pretext of new forms for state integrity defense.

The interethnic situation in Europe and particularly in the Balkan Peninsula is reflected in the "*OSCE*"[15] and "*UN*"[16] Security Reports. The demise of "*The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*"[17], launched in 1990, was accomplished by wars involving the great economic powers of the moment, namely the United States of America and Russia, and the military powers supported by them, namely the military forces of "*NATO*"[18] member states and the military forces of the former the "*S.F.R.Y.*"[19]. Following the dissolution of the former the S.F.R.Y., they proclaimed the independence of Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Macedonia of the former S.F.R.Y. In 2008, the former autonomous province of Kosovo proclaimed its independence and became the Republic of Kosovo, a state that is currently not recognized by all European countries, including by Romania.

The rise of Turkey's "*excessive statements*"[20] in "*disputes with the Netherlands*"[21] and

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[8] *i.e. The terrorist attacks in France* on November 13, 2015, have been carried out by French and Belgian citizens.

[9] *i.e. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State (IS), and by its Arabic language acronym Daesh is a Salafi jihadist militant group and unrecognised proto-state that follows a fundamentalist, Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant, accessed at Oct., 1st, 2017.

[10] Romanian Precidency, *Strategia naţională de apărare a ţării pentru perioada 2015-2019 - O Românie puternică în Europa şi în lume*, Bucureşti, 2015, p. 6.

[11] *** http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-18014446-este-razboiul-hibrid-dus-rusia-ucraina-cum-fost-pregatit-zece-ani-sub-ochii-permisivi-occidentului.htm, accesată la data de 10 dec. 2015.

[12] *i.e. Russian Federation* = Russia.

[13] *i.e. Peninsula Crimea* = Crimea.

[14] *Ukraine.*

[15] *** *i.e. OSCE* = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, available at www.osce.org, accessed at Fe., 15th, 2017.

[16] *** *i.e. UN* = United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/en/index.html, accessed at Feb., 18th, 2017.

[17] *** *i.e. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* was the Yugoslav state in southeastern Europe that existed from its foundation in the aftermath of World War II until its dissolution in 1992 amid the Yugoslav Wars, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia, accessed at Oct., 1st, 2017.

[18] *** *i.e. NATO* = OTAN, acronym of North Atlantic Treaty Organization(english) and L`Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord(french), available at www.nato.int, accessed at Feb., 28th, 2017.

[19] *i.e. S.F.R.Y.* = The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

[20] *** *Uniunea Europeană îndeamnă Ankara să se abţină de la orice declaraţie excesivă şi de la acţiuni care riscă să conducă la exacerbarea situaţiei*, available at http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/uniunea-europeana-recomanda-turciei-sa-evite-declaratiile-excesive-in-disputele-cu-olanda-si-germania-16193126, accessed at Mar., 13th, 2017.

[21] *** *Interzicerea accesului Ministrului turc al Familiei în Olanda*, available at http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/international/culisele-razboiului-diplomatic-dus-de-turcia-in-ue-erdogan-ameninta-ca-a-va-merge-la-curtea-europeana-a-drepturilor-omului.html, accessed at Mar., 13th, 2017.

"*Germany*"[22] has generated new tensions between Turkey and the European Union, tensions that can escalate to a state of conflict in Europe. The regional threats also come from the Russian Federation, whose recent actions in the Black Sea region cause "*violation of international law, international ordering, frozen conflict preservation and the annexation of the Crimea*"[23]. All these actions have brought to NATO's attention both the fulfillment of its fundamental mission and the collective defense, as well as the "*validity of the security arrangements concluded with Russia at the end of the 20th century*"[24].

Europe's security is threatened by ongoing crisis and conflicts, in "*the Eastern Neighborhood, the Middle East and North Africa generates a multitude of challenges to the security of the EU, and the need to revise and strengthen European Union policies on security, common defense and internal affairs*"[25].

2. National documents and normative acts specific to doctrines and military manuals specific to training and evaluation

The legal framework contains the rules, principles and laws enshrined in international documents, national documents and organization`s documents that provide legality for the functioning of a system, and by its content bases the functioning of a system in such a way that its elements can fulfill certain goals or objectives and go through certain directions or ways of action. The legislative framework underlying the operation of a system is graphically represented in Figure no. 1.

INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS:
- Laws, Treaties, Commitments, Agreements, negotiations, Memoranda, Partnerships, Convention Initiatives Rules, Pacts.

NATIONAL DOCUMENTS:
- The Constitution, Laws, Emergency ordinances, Judgments, Decisions, Decrees.

ORGANIZATION`S DOCUMENTS:
- Doctrines, orders, regulations, decisions, programs, plans, projects, decisions, instructions, methodologies, procedures, technological processes, standards, norms and manuals.

Figure no. 1. Legislative framework required for the operation of a system

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[22] *** *Recep Tayyip Erdogan acuză Occidentul că sprijină gruparea Stat Islamic*, available at https://www.agerpres.ro/externe /2016/12/27/siria-recep-tayyip-erdogan-acuza-occidentul-ca-sprijina-gruparea-stat-islamic-22-08-53, accessed at Jan., 18th, 2017.

[23] *** *i.e. Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation* = The Ukrainian territory of Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation in early 2014, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annexation_of_Crimea_by_the_Russian _Federation, accessed at Dec., 1st, 2017.

[24] Romanian Presidency, *Strategia naţională de apărare a ţării pentru perioada 2015-2019 - O Românie puternică în Europa şi în lume*, Bucureşti, 2015, pp. 12-13.

[25] *ibidem*, p.13.

International documents are international laws, treaties, commitments, agreements, negotiations, memoranda, partnerships, conventions, initiatives, pacts and norms that Romania has signed, to which it has joined, and to which it is a party. *The national documents* are documents elaborated by the "*legislative power*"[26] of Romania, respectively by the Parliament and the Government of Romania. National documents are the Constitution of the country, national laws, presidential decrees, government resolutions and decrees, and decisions made by law enforcement authorities. *The organization's documents* are doctrines, orders, regulations, decisions, programs, plans, projects, resolutions, instructions, methodologies, procedures, technological processes, standards, norms and manuals.

We consider that the essential element of our debate is to identify the lawfulness of a system's functioning, and the fundamental element of the democratic system in our country is the Constitution of Romania. In the content of the "*Romanian Constitution*"[27], amended and supplemented by "*Law on the Revision of the Romanian Constitution*"[28], contains legislative provisions describing the importance of the Romanian Army. Thus, in Chapter III of Romanian Constitution, articles 54 and 55 set out the general duties of Romanian citizens regarding loyalty to and defense of the country. Fidelity to the country is sacred and Romanian soldiers and citizens performing public functions are responsible for fulfilling faithfully their obligations by filing an oath established by law. All Romanian citizens have the right and duty to defend Romania, and to meet national defense obligations, Romanian citizens can be incorporated from the age of 20 until the age of 35. Starting January 1, 2017, "*volunteer reserve soldiers and other ranks*"[29] will be eligible to be selected if they are between the ages of 18 and 51.

The legitimacy of the activities, actions and operations carried out by the Romanian Army are the constitutional result of the two articles mentioned above and are reflected in the content of "*Law of organizing and functioning of the Ministry of Defense*"[30].

The Ministry of National Defense is a specialized organization operating in the field of national security, it is part of the central public administration and is subordinated to the Government of Romania. Through the activity of the Ministry of National Defense "*the activity in the field of national defense is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Law and Strategy, in order to guarantee the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, territorial integrity of the country and constitutional democracy*"[31].

According to the provisions of the Romanian Constitution, the Ministry of National Defense is responsible for the work carried out before the *Romanian Parliament,* before the *Government of Romania* and, the *Supreme Council for National Defense,* for the implementation of the provisions of the Constitution, the other normative acts in force, a decision of the Government and the Supreme Defense Council of the country, as well as of the international treaties to which Romania is a party. The provisions on the armed forces and the Supreme Council of National Defense are contained in Articles 118 and 119 of the Romanian Constitution. "*The army is subordinated exclusively to the will of the people to guarantee sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, territorial integrity of the country and constitutional democracy*" and contributes to collective defense in military alliance systems. The Romanian army participates in peacekeeping, peace forcing and peacemaking operations under the conditions established by Romanian national law and

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[26] *** *Romanian Constitution of 31 October 2003*, art. 76, available at http://www.presidency.ro/ro/presedinte/ constitutia-romaniei, accessed at Jun., 18th, 2017.

[27] *** *Constituţia României din 31.10.2003*, available at http://www.presidency.ro/ro/presedinte/constitutia-romaniei, accessed at Mar. 28th, 2017.

[28] *** *Law of Romanian Constitution Review no. 429/2003*, available at http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?id=340, accessed at Mar., 28th, 2017.

[29] *** *Law no. 270/2015 on the status of volunteer reserve soldiers,* available at http://www.dreptonline.ro/legislatie/ legea_270_2015_statutul_rezervistilor_voluntari.php, accessed at Oct., 1st, 2017.

[30] *** *Law no. 346/2006 of organizing and functioning of the Ministry of Defense*, available at http://www.mapn.ro/despre_mapn/informatii_generale/documente/legea346.pdf, accessed at Apr., 2nd, 2017.

[31] *** *Romanian Ministry of National Defense,* available at http://www.mapn.ro/despre_mapn/informatii_generale /index.php, accessed at Apr., 2nd, 2017.

the provisions of the international treaties to which Romania is a party. Structure of the national defense system organization of the army and powers of the public authorities regarding the national defense are established by the *"National Defense Law No. 45/1994"*[32] and other organic laws issued by the Parliament of Romania, which establish the framework legislation for the preparation of population, economy and defense territory. The status of military personnel is regulated by *"Law No. 80/1995 on the status of military personnel"*[33].

The Romanian Constitution creates the starting point for EU integration and accession to the North Atlantic Treaty through the content of Euro-Atlantic integration. *"As a result of accession, the provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Union and other binding Community regulations shall take precedence over the contrary provisions of national laws, in compliance with the provisions of the Act of Accession"*[34]. This constitutional text establishes respect for the European and Euro-Atlantic legal framework, taking precedence over the provisions of national legislation.

Regarding the legitimacy of the human resources training and evaluation system, this is based on the constitutional provisions by which Romanian citizens are given the right to education which is ensured through general compulsory education, through high school and vocational education, through higher education, as well as other forms of instruction and training. According to the Romanian Constitution, education is a national priority, the Romanian State exercising its authority to guarantee the right to lifelong learning through the *"National Education Law no. 1/2011"*[35] which regulates the structure, functions, organization and functioning of the national state, private and confessional education system. The vision of the national education law promotes a value-oriented, creativity, cognitive, volunteer and action capacities education, basic knowledge, skills and abilities with direct utility in the profession and in society.

By its content, the National Education Law no. 1/2011 regulates the training through education of the Romanian society and aims to ensure that the human resources in Romania are competitive and able to function now and in the future, in conditions of maximum efficiency in the context of globalization and the new requirements existing at the level of the European Union. The purpose of Romanian education is to build competences based on the knowledge, skills and abilities necessary for the personal fulfillment and development of the Romanian citizens, by realizing their personal goals in life, by employing them, by educating themselves in the spirit of dignity, integration and active participation in society's activities.

Education in Romania is organized in forms of: frequency and low frequency- education. Pre-school education takes place in nurseries, kindergartens and day centers; these could be regular, extended and weekly kindergartens. Primary and secondary education is organized in schools, high schools or colleges. Vocational education is organized in state or private vocational schools.

Pre-university military education in the defense system, public order and national security is state education. Pre-university military education includes military high school education and post-secondary education for the formation of warrant officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and their equivalent inside police forces.

Higher education is organized in universities, higher education academies, institutes and higher education schools of state or confessional state. Higher education in Romania has the mission to support the personal development of the individual for his / her professional insertion into the socio-economic environment through initial and continuous training. Higher education programs are organized in short term learning, long term learning and distance e-learning. Higher education comprises higher education and postgraduate higher education. Higher education has

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[32] *** *Romanian National Defense Law No. 45/1994*, art. 6-25, available at http://legeaz.net/legea-45-1994-legea-apararii-nationale-a-romaniei/art-11-structura-sistemului-national-de-aparare, accessed at Apr., 4th, 2017.
[33] *** *Law No. 80/1995 on the status of military personnel*, available at https://dmru.mapn.ro/app/webroot/fileslib/upload/files/documente/LEGE%20nr%2080.pdf, accessed at Apr., 4th, 2017.
[34] *Ibidem*, art. 148, alin. (2).
[35] *** *Romanian National Education Law no. 1/2011*, available at http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/geztsobvgi/legea-educatiei-nationale-nr-1-2011, accessed at Mar., 28th, 2017.

three levels of university studies, namely license, masters and doctoral degrees. Postgraduate higher education includes advanced postdoctoral research programs and continuing vocational training and development programs.

In accordance with the provisions of the Romanian Constitution, military higher education institutions can benefit from university autonomy so that they can permanently adapt their structure and curricula according to the requirements and needs of the national system. In 2015, the "*University consortium of the military higher education institutions*"[36] was established, which contributes significantly to the development of the military university education in Romania. The university consortium includes National Defense University "*Carol I*", Military Technical Academy, Land Forces Academy, "*Nicolae Balcescu*", Air Force Academy "*Henri Coanda*", Naval Academy "*Mircea cel Batran*". Through the existence of the university consortium, undergraduate, master, doctoral and postgraduate university studies will be planned so that human resource training is correlated with the personnel requirements of the Romanian Army and with the need for skills to carry out any mission on national territory, and in theaters of operations.

The training and improvement of human resources skills used by the Romanian Army is obtained through courses organized by specialized institutions, respectively by the National Defense University "*Carol I*", academies of the Land, Air and, Naval Forces for the university courses, by the military schools of warrant officers and non-commissioned officers for postgraduate education, by national military colleges for high school education and in application schools, centers, bases and training battalions for vocational education. To participate at courses inside military organizations, specialized in training and education of troops; human resources must go through a selection, training and evaluation phases. The work is carried out by specialized institutions, is the result of accumulated experience and social demands resulting, from the need to answer to the challenges of the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and current information environment.

Human resources are the most important resources that the Romanian Army uses to carry out its activities. In order to be used at the optimum parameters required by the national defense system human resources have to fulfill functional attributions. Taking a position in the Romanian Army's organizational chart implies the fulfillment of certain criteria, standards and skills specific to the field of activity. In order to identify the complexity of the human resources activities that need to be carried out within the organization's training and evaluation system, we will further analyze the requirements of the functional attributions of some positions in the Romanian Army's organization chart.

In "*Order no. M. 92/2008 of the Minister of Defense, for the approval of R.G.-1, Regulation of internal order in the unit*"[37], in Article 6 provides that relations between commanders and subordinates are established by the system of interconnections imposed by the specificity of the military body and are based on discipline, respect and trust, crystallize and strengthen by instruction and performing the duties.

The commander of a military unit must ensure the operational capacity of the unit, plan and conduct training, alert, mobilization and intervention activities. The commander of the organization manages the human resources, constant professional training; he organizes, conducts and directs the activities of the subordinated military structures regarding the planning, execution and evaluation of the instruction and exercises.

The unit commander is in command of all subordinate personnel and is responsible for organizing and executing instruction and exercises, education, and military discipline. The commander plans, guides and conducts the instruction of the subordinate forces, based on the subunit instruction plan, conducts training sessions with the commanders of subordinate units directly, ensures and controls the performance of the activities according to the hour program of the

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[36] *** *University consortium of military higher education institutions*, available at https://www.agerpres.ro/social /2015/07/17/academiile-militare-reunite-intr-un-consortiu-universitar-11-31-37, accessed at Apr., 4th, 2017.
[37] *** *Order no. M. 92/2008 of the Romanian Minister of Defense*, available at http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/gmztkojsgy/ regulamentul-de-ordine-interioara-in-unitate-din-17092008, accessed at Apr., 18th, 2017.

unit.

The complexity of the activities carried out by the human resources of the Romanian Army, determines us to look with particular interest in the way in which they go through the processes of preparation, training, skills development and evaluation. The current legislative framework offers strategic management for the training-evaluation system in the Romanian Army functionality, legitimacy and legality.

Training management is a process that aims to focus instruction onto achieving performance and interoperability with other military structures of NATO, respectively microstructures with attributions in the field of regional and international security. The stages of the training are set so that it contributes to the personal development of the soldiers. Training is a continuous and progressive process, a process in which knowledge, abilities and, skills are acquired logically and naturally and the stages of training and refinement go from simple to complex. The training must be standardized to generalize the most effective training models or variants, and must implement the tactics, techniques and procedures resulting from the experience gained in the international missions and from the lessons learned after the exercises. The continuity of the training process is the result of the steps taken by the military organization according to the graphical representation in Figure no. 2.


Figure no. 2. Stages of the training process

Conclusions

At the end of this paper we will formulate a series of conclusions, designed to synthesize our approach to demonstrate the legality and legitimacy of the functioning of the Romanian Army training and assessment system. Thus, we can state that within the national defense system, the Romanian Army has a legitimate, well-defined role, is an organization anchored in social needs and benefits from human resources prepared to fulfill the duties established by law.

The Romanian Army's motto is *"Train as you fight!"*[38], which demonstrates that the desire of the society is that peacetime instruction corresponds to the mission requirements that army structures must fulfill in crisis situations or in war , and this dictum must guide the process of planning, conducting and evaluating the instruction.

The perspectives of the forces' training will result from a careful analysis of all conflicts and threats in the current security environment and subsequently by identifying the essential tasks of the Romanian Army, and through discipline and seriousness the instruction becomes the essential element for fulfilling these tasks. In the current security environment action must be taken, the training must go through a process of transformation and adaptation to emerging technologies and to the particularities of the battlefield. Also, all military technologies and equipment that have developed over the last period of time, coupled with the technological explosion in information and communications, have a bearing on future military activities. The process of training the future soldier, the third millennium cyber-soldier, must be conducted in an algorithm that meets the challenges of current social and political events. The soldier of the future has to act individually and will carry out collective tasks. For this, the future soldier must be interoperable and must benefit

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[38] *** *Train as you fight!*, available at http://www.revista.forter.ro/2010_1_t/01-trsf/01.htm, accessed at Dec., 1st, 2016.

from the latest resources in order to carry out his actions.

Through his action, the future soldier will contribute to the following missions of the organization:

- Fighting against extremist currents that generated the latest military, religious and ethnic conflicts;
- Combating the phenomenon of cross-border migration of the civilian population;
- Helping refugees in the face of extremist phenomena;
- participating at the process of identifications of advocates for ideologies promoted in conflict zones,
- Fighting against terrorist acts carried out by militants and adherents of extremist organizations;
- Fighting against maritime piracy;
- Fighting against the proliferation of nuclear weapons,
- Participating in counteracting the asymmetric risks;
- Performing combat missions in the hybrid war;
- Observing and obeying the norms of international laws and orders;
- Eradication the effects of poverty;
- Fighting against cyber-attacks;
- Knowing the threats posed by religious fanaticism.

As it emerges from the new missions, the future soldier must accomplished and complement the existing legislative framework as well as the emergence of some organization`s documents that underpin the optimal strategic management for the training-evaluation system, a system that is geared towards achieving performance and interoperability with Euro-Atlantic structures in the current, future-oriented international, regional and national context that set effective rules and provide the solutions that are appropriate to the new challenges through the content of the training. The development of new organization`s documents starts from the elaboration of a general list of current requirements of the Romanian Army missions.

In conclusion, the military specialists from the Romanian Army must develop new training tasks tailored to the potential missions that the Romanian Army will fulfill, and the motto *"Train as you fight!"* will further demonstrate the desire of the Romanian Army's human resources to fulfill missions in war, in crisis or in peacetime.

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INCREASING INTEROPERABILITY OF MILITARY STRUCTURES THROUGH TRAINING STANDARDIZATION AND LESSONS LEARNED

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Abstract: In this paper we present the importance of the standardization of training and lessons learned, in order to increase the interoperability of military structures. The standardization of training involves the conduct of an individual and collective training process based on common standards, and through lessons learned or past experience, military actions can be planned, in order to eliminate the challenges to current security environment. Since interoperability depicts the ability of military structures to act together and efficiently to achieve common goals, through effects of lessons learned and standardization of training, the Romanian Army will be able to carry out joint actions with all the military structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Keywords: military structures, standardization, lesson learned, interoperability, military personnel, training, individual training, collective training.

Introduction

An analysis of the current security environment reveals that all of the world's states efforts are focused on maintaining a climate of normality, but the international political, military, economic, social and diplomatic situation is seriously affected by events, incidents and accidents that happened, surprisingly and quickly, all over the world. The world's responses to the management of these undesirable states of conflict generate a particularly great impact on the military, social and economic environment, and each state, through organizations with responsibilities in the areas of security, safety and security, has to carry out a series of specific actions in order to prevent, defense and counteract these conditions.

Hybrid war, asymmetric threats, international terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, migration, poverty, religious war, cyber war and organized crime are new threats to the current security environment, threats that came from unpredictable actors, often individuals or individual groups, belonging to social structures that do not respect neither universally applicable laws nor social rules. The non-conformism of actors involved in threats to the current security environment shows us that the democratic rules of states and world peace depend on events that took place around the globe and not just within a state or its neighborhood.

In the era of globalization and in the century of artificial intelligence, international communities and countries of the world cannot make a clear distinction between external and internal risk, in addition a single state or a single organization, operating in a specific sphere of activity can not face these threats alone, independently and/or using only conventional methods of action. Through interoperability, the military forces, structures and/or systems belonging to many organizations can communicate, act together, use the same action and doctrine procedures, infrastructure and technology. Interoperability and multinational cooperation is necessary and is achieved through the improvement of conventional methods of action and, implicitly, by the standardization of effective and universally valid actions.

Standardization represents the action of establishing and applying a set of rules that regulate

regardless of their type and size, to design, implement and effectively conduct their management quality system. Because the superior quality of the standardized activities carried out by the military organization, these can counteract subversive actions and eliminate the negative effects addressed, more lessons learned or past experience significantly contribute to addressing the future, respectively imminent events, incidents and accidents.

1. Standardization and performance standards

1.1. Standardization - conceptual delimitations

Starting from one of the many definitions of the standardization term applicable in civil society, *it is a voluntary cooperation between industry, consumers, public authorities and other actors involved in developing consensus-based standards*, we can extrapolate this representation of standardization to the specific of the military organization claiming that this "voluntary cooperation" is done between military system as an industry, military structures as consumers, military microstructures that elaborate "normative acts specific to military doctrines and manuals" as public authorities and collaborating structures that work in safety, security and protection domain as actors involved in standards development.

The international standardization body is represented by the International Organization for Standardization (*e.g. ISO - International Organization for Standardization*) and in Romania the specialized body for national standardization is the Romanian Standardization Association (*e.g. ASRO*). Standards are being developed at international, regional and national level, and coordination of activities at these three levels is ensured by cooperative arrangements assigned by structures with common competencies. In Romania, the national standardization activity is regulated by "*Law 163/2015, on national standardization*"[1], and inside the Romanian Army the organization`s documents are developed by competent organizations in the standardization activity domains.

"*Military standardization includes all actions aimed for developing, accepting and implementing of standards, in order to achieve and maintain an optimal level of standardization in the fields of activity necessary to achieve the interoperability of the forces, thus facilitating the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted*"[2].

In the military organization, through the way of preparing and carrying out the individual and collective actions, the standardization process implements the norms and standards corresponding to the conditions imposed by the current reality, resulting both from the actions performed in theaters of operations and from the accumulated experience gained after performing activities in military field. The standardization process involves observing and enforcing the provisions of the laws, regulations, orders, instructions, stipulations and norms at organization level. The existence of specific organization`s documents based on standards contributes significantly to achieving effective results in the training process.

Standardization supports the work of the Romanian Army in order to achieve its enhanced interoperability with allied structures, to mitigate the risks associated with the full spectrum of activities carried on, namely in the areas of operational, technical and information exchange. Increasing interoperability ensures the Romanian Army training and cooperation with other members of the Alliance to perform the tasks and objectives assumed by the Alliance. Standardization in the military field is aimed both at establishing a common basis consisting of the standards used in the fields of activity, as well as increasing the degree of interoperability, maintaining the compatibility, interchangeability and community of concepts, doctrines, procedures, equipment, design and cost reduction acquisition.

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[1] *Law 163/2015 on Romanian standardization*, available at http://www.dreptonline.ro/legislatie/legea_163_2015_privind_standardizarea_nationala.php, accesed at Oct 2nd 2017.

[2] *** Major Gligor Văidean, article „*Standardization and lessons learned, the objective of streamlining of military structures*", Infantry magazine, no. 1, 2011, pp. 33-35, available at http://www.revista.forter.ro/_wsn/01_biblioteca/htm /p-007a.htm, accessed at Dec 10th 2016.

At "*NATO*"[3] level, standardization is the process of designing and implementing the concepts, doctrines, procedures and projects required to achieve an optimal level of interoperability and to maintain compatibility, interchangeability and commonality of activities. The primary products of this process and the North Atlantic Alliance's tools to improve interoperability are NATO standards set by member nations through standardization agreements.

The NATO Standardization Areas are managed by the "*NSO*"[4](*e.g. **NATO S**tandardization Office*) in the operational, technical and administrative fields. NATO Standards, abbreviated as "*STANAG*"[5](*e.g. the **stan**dardization **ag**reement*), are developed following recommendations made by Member States on the content of recommended standards to be accepted, "*STANREC*"(*e.g. **stan**dard **rec**ommendation*). The content of STANAG and STANREC are applicable throughout the organization. The military standards common to all members of the NATO are initially proposed for analysis, subsequently analyzed, endorsed, approved, and finally posted in the database of the NATO Standardization Office.

The NATO Standardization Office, under the command of the "*CS*"[6](*e.g. Committee for Standardization)* initiates, supports, coordinates, and manages the standardization work of alliance members and, under the command of the "*MC*"[7](*e.g. Standardization Policy and Management and to the Military Committee*), develops, coordinates and evaluates the operational standardization process.

The policy and strategic management of the NATO standardization office are geared towards:
- organizing the NATO standardization activities;
- complaining with the rules for drafting, ratifying, promulgating and implementing NATO standards;
- supporting the activities carried out by the structures responsible for military standardization;
- establishing the terminology used for cooperation with civilian standardization bodies;
- publishing of NATO standards;
- promoting the activities of the NATO standardization office.

The work of NATO's standardization bureau is led by a director, who is staffed by personnel specialized in standardization policies, defense planning, civilian standards, military terminology, and international relations. NATO's standardization office has direct competencies in operational-related standards for joint, land, naval, maritime, air, logistics and medical operations. Specialized working groups composed of national experts and delegates develop doctrines and procedures that are published as NATO-STANAG standards and allied publications. The Standardization Assistance Structure is responsible for publishing standards, linguistic support, administrative support and information management.

Standardization of the Romanian Army activities is done in the operational, technical and administrative fields.

The operational domain includes NATO standards that have a direct impact on planning, organizing, managing, controlling and evaluating military actions. NATO standards for the operational domain are implemented in the Romanian Army through existing doctrines, tactics, techniques, procedures and technological processes, the way the military instruction is carried out, terminology used and the reporting mode, also by using maps, abbreviations and graphic signs in current activity. Standards specific to the operational domain are applied to the activities of force categories, namely land, air and naval forces, as well as in the joint activities of several categories of forces.

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[3] *** *i.e. NATO* = OTAN, acronym of **N**orth **A**tlantic **T**reaty **O**rganization(english) and L`**O**rganisation du **t**raité de l'**A**tlantique **n**ord(french)*, available at www.nato.int, accessed at Feb., 28th, 2017.

[4] *** *i.e. NATO Standardization Office* - NSO, available at https://nso.nato.int/nso/, accesed at May 15th 2017.

[5] *** *i.e. STANAG - standardization agreement*, available at https://www.unap.ro/en/docunap/stanag_aap-6.pdf, accessed at May 16th 2017.

[6] *** *NATO Standardization Office`s mission*, available at http://nso.nato.int/nso/SOSite/default.html, accessed at May 17th 2017.

[7] *** *The NSO today*, available at http://nso.nato.int/nso/nso_today.html, accessed at May17th 2017.

The technical domain includes NATO standards describing the technical requirements of the materials used by the Romanian Army during their lifetime. NATO Technical Standards are implemented in the Romanian Army through complete systems, such as Command, Control and Communications systems, Armament Systems and Subsystems, Interfaces, Assemblies, Components, Spare Parts and Components consumables, fuels, lubricants and ammunition. In the technical domain, the dissemination of the contents of NATO documents, containing unclassified information and, the national documents generated by them to the economic operators with which the Romanian Army has partnership relations is made through the *Armaments Department*.

The administrative field includes NATO standards that ensure the management of the activities carried out by the Romanian Army in various stages. NATO standards for the administrative field are implemented in the Romanian Army through the organization`s documents applicable in the fields of finance, human resources and the military hierarchy. In the administrative field, the standardization process analyzes, elaborates, modifies and implements national standards and NATO standards applicable to all echelons. In the Romanian Army, the organization`s documents are elaborated on hierarchical levels of competence for standardization of activities. For example, orders of the Ministry of National Defense are issued following a proposal made by members of the Superior Commission for Specific Normative Acts of "*Minister of National Defense*"[8], are approved by the Minister of National Defense and, depending on the nature of the content, are published in the Official Gazette of Romania or are distributed only within the organization. In the Official Gazette of Romania are published the orders of the Minister of National Defense which contain unclassified information. The orders issued by the Heads of Structures that have competence in the development of the organization`s documents in the Ministry of National Defense are analyzed inside the Commissions of normative acts specific to military doctrines and manuals, approved by the heads of the respective structures and, after approval, distributed within the organization.

NATO Standards - STANAG, are analyzed in the working groups by national delegates and are accepted, implemented or not accepted for implementation in the Romanian Army. Decisions on the acceptance, implementation or non-acceptance of NATO standards in the Romanian Army are made on hierarchical levels and by field of activity within the Standards and Interoperability Council of the central structures of the Minister of National Defense and within the Standards and Interoperability Commissions, for the other structures of the Romanian Army.

1.2. Standardization of military education by performance standards and training levels

The standardization of the military education is aimed for achieving interoperability between Romanian Army structures and the partner structures through a process of individual and collective training based on common NATO standards. The standardization of the instruction is achieved through a modular training system that can be improved without restrictions or limitations and which is adapted to the specifics of the missions of each weapon or military specialty. Through standardized instruction, the assessment of human resource skills is objective and provides an overview of both individual and collective competencies and how the military organization is acting as a result of the fulfillment of individual tasks or collective missions by human resources and structures of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Through the participation of the Romanian Army in joint training exercises with NATO and European Union structures and the participation of military structures in multinational exercises the training planning process has been improved and human resources training and education methods have been developed so that they should be adapted to the new training requirements, according to the standards existing at NATO level.

Regarding the correlation of the human resources competences, formed within the military system with the civilian ones, the military education must be adapted to the social requirements, so that the graduates fulfill specific attributions according to the "*Classification of Occupations in*

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[8] *** *Romanian Ministry of National Defense,* available at http://www.mapn.ro/despre_mapn/informatii_generale /index.php, accessed at Apr., 2nd, 2017.

Romania". The military career path is guided by the legislation in force and the military education, through the existing training and education system, is adapted to the training of all human resources categories that the Romanian Army needs namely officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, professional soldiers and other ranks, civilian staff.

The military career for the human resources of the Romanian Armed Forces begins at the base level and finishes according to the acquired skills, the degree of involvement in the military system and the desire of each individual. For example, for infantry branch no matter what degree they have, human resources go through the training stages from the level of *the warrior* and continue to *the specialist* levels, *the leader* and *the manager*. The individual tasks related to each category of staff and the common areas where the human resources for the infantry branch can be trained, according to the category of human resources they belong to, are presented in Figure no 1.


Figure no. 1. Individual training tasks for the infantry branch

In order to fulfill the functional attributions by professional soldiers and other ranks, the main training activities are directed to human resources training, following the warrior's training flow and, subsequently, the training of the specialist. NCOs traverse training courses flow for gaining warrior, specialist and leader competences, and officers go through training courses in order to obtain warrior, specialist, leader or /and manager competencies.

The bibliographic sources that support the human resources training of the Romanian Army are the manuals and training programs. The manuals used at this time in the training-assessment system are manuals for combat, training, knowledge and weaponry exploitation. The training programs used in the Romanian Army for training are individual and collective training programs. The training-evaluation system is differentiated on the basis of human resources; each category of human resources must perform curricula and training programs tailored to the competencies needed to be formed.

Even if the same skills are formed, the training program used to train future officers is different from the training programs used to train NCOs or professional soldiers. The current training programs aim is passing all the necessary knowledge in the career from the first course, to a single level that has a very high degree of difficulty, corresponding to the representation in Figure no. 2.

Competencies / Human resources	Warrior	Specialist	Leader	Manager
Proffesional soldiers and other ranks	1	1		
Warrant officers and NCOs	1	1	1	
Officers	1	1	1	1

Figure no. 2. Individual training levels for the infantry branch

2. Interoperability and lessons learned

2.1. Lessons learned - role and usage

The concept of lessons learned is defined in several variants but, in essence, the "*lessons learned*"[9] are the most eloquent experiences of a project and should be taken into account for the development of future projects. To take over and use intelligently the experience of the past, building on solid, validated life grounds, is the logic of evolution, it is useful for the generations that come and is a proof of respect for the former.

We can define the lesson learned as the result of knowledge or understanding gained from the experience of our own deeds. Experience can be positive when an action has ended with a success or negative if the action has ended with a failure. Any lesson learned has to be significant because it has a real impact on future actions. The lessons learned highlight strengths or weaknesses in the preparation, design and implementation of an action, depending on how performance is affected, what are the results obtained, and what impact has the action.

In military organizations, the lessons learned require the commanders of the military structures to analyze how to conduct their own actions and subsequently apply the results of the analysis to the organizing of standard actions. The analysis of the data resulting from the military exercises, missions and operations conducted by the Romanian Army formed the database of the experience gained, needed for the further development of the activities. The lessons learned are not just a balance sheet but on the one hand, represents the need to achieve interoperability with the allied structures and on the other hand, the tendency to align the Romanian Army with the requirements of the international security environment.

At NATO level, the analysis of the lessons learned is carried out by the "*JALLC*"[10](*e.g. Joint Lessons Learned Center*). JALLC's mission is to analyze how operations, training, exercises and experiments are organized jointly under NATO's strategic command. JALLC supports the exchange of lessons learned and contributes to their development, thus enhancing the ongoing alliance transformation, NATO's modernization of forces and capabilities. JALLC manages and distributes the lessons learned throughout the alliance, advises on their implementation, and facilitates the knowledge of the content of the lessons learned by all NATO member states.

JALLC's work is materialized in its products, which are subject to public debate inside the "*NATO Lesson Learned Conference*"[11].

The lessons learned show both the strengths and weaknesses of an activity, and the ultimate result of the lesson learning activity is generating of rules, regulations and processes that will continue, in order to develop what is good, and correct or eliminate what it was wrong. In order to be objective and generate an optimal result, the collection of the lessons identified involves a large number of mechanisms that move around and inside the entire organization. Lessons learned include data and observations about the organization's activities, and the process of collecting them is coordinated by the organization's commander. Every participant in the activities carried out by the Romanian Army must be able to identify what was good and what was wrong in his work. Thus, the mechanism for collecting the data and observations needed to develop the lessons learned becomes a tool that helps the organization's commander to rectify the deficiencies and improve the interaction between the military components of the organization by involving specialists on areas of activity in the analysis of collected data and observations.

The collection of data and observations needed to develop the lessons learned is done *actively* or *passively*. *The active data collection process* takes place on the training ground and the field specialist is in direct contact with military structures or microstructures. *The passive process* involves the use of articles, conclusions, reports and analyzes made by participants in exercises,

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[9] *** *Lessons learned*, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lessons_learned, accessed at Jun 6t[h] 2017.
[10] *** *Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre- JALLC*, available at http://www.jallc.nato.int/organization/mission_role_tasks.asp, accessed at May 15th 2017.
[11] *** *NATO Lessons Learned Conference*, available at http://www.jallc.nato.int/products/nllp.asp#mnllp, accessed at May 17th 2017.

missions or operations. The data collection process for lessons learned must be a simple process, based on logic, and it is a process adjacent to the activities of the organization. The data and observations are collected from the field, analyzed and then validated. The collection of data and field observations is done by analyzing the way an activity is carried out and by completing a form with the resulting analysis elements. The defining elements for the elaboration of a learned lesson are included in the "*form for the recording of the lesson identified, observation, and data collected*", drawn up according to the Order of the Chief of the General Staff no. SMG-12/2015, Manual of Lessons Learned.

The data and comments written in *the form for recording the lesson identified, the observation, the date collected* are analyzed by the best field practitioners and have a solid practical experience so they can identify the malfunctions or the positive aspects. Validation of collected data and observations is materialized by elaborating the lessons identified in which proposals and recommendations are presented. An identified lesson becomes a lesson learned if sufficient arguments have been put forward to demonstrate that the recommendations are effective and can be used as a standard used throughout the organization. In order to be accepted as valid or inapplicable an identified lesson has to be put into practice, and if the results are similar with the one expected, it becomes a lesson learned and archived.

A lesson identified by a structure does not become a lesson learned unless, after analysis, validation and emphasis, proposals are made to amend, supplement or repeal the regulations, provisions, instructions or other normative acts specific to military doctrines and regulations, and thus the lesson learned to be applicable to the work of other structures. A lesson identified by the specialists of a structure could be lesson learned, applicable only to this structure; or could became a lesson learned applicable to the entire organization To become a lesson learned valid and applicable to the entire organization or other structures of the organization, the identified lessons are send by the microstructures and military structures to the upper echelon. The human resources responsible for the identified lessons are the specialists designated at the level of each military microstructure inside the military organization. The designated specialists send the identified lessons to the specialized structures, hierarchically. The lessons learned sections of the Romanian Armed Forces' categories receive quarterly the synthesis of the lessons learned from the subordinate structures and analyze their content. Since the categories of forces of the General Staff are organizations that develop organization`s documents, they transform into learned lessons those identified lessons that are applicable throughout the organization. The identified lessons that by their content are applicable to all structures of the Romanian Army are transmitted to the Office of Lessons Learned from the Directorate of Training and Doctrine of the General Staff, are analyzed and can be or not, considered as lessons learned.

For example, if a Land Force Division transmits an identified lesson, and if specialists in lessons learned from the Land Forces Staff consider it applicable to other Divisions or subordinate structures, it transforms the lesson identified in lesson learned and can elaborate those normative acts specific to military doctrines and manuals, in order to implement the content of lesson learned in the work of all the structures of the Land Forces.

Dissemination of the lessons learned is done by drafting proposals to modify, supplement or repeal the regulations, provisions, instructions or other organization`s documents applicable within the organization, or by publishing the content of lessons learned in journals, lectures, lessons, courses or guides. For example, in 2006, the Training Center for EOD "Panait Donici" elaborated the work "*Acquired Experience - EOD Operations*", a paper edited and published by the Land Forces Staff, which is a guide for all activities specific to the identification and removal of improvised explosive devices/IED. This guide includes some of the lessons learned from the work of the Center, based on the data and observations, collected by the staff participating at the "*Operation Ancient Babylon*"[12], and are useful for training "*EOD*"(*e.g. explosive ordnance disposal*) military structures performing missions in theaters of operations independent or in

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[12] *** *Operation Ancient Babylon*, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ancient_Babylon, accessed at Oct 5th, 2017.

cooperation with other military structures of the alliance. Subsequently, other structures of the Romanian Army also developed collections of lessons learned and until 2014 the dissemination of the lessons learned at the Land Forces Staff was made by publishing in the "*Lessons Learned Collection*" of all lessons identified by the subordinate structures. The purpose of drawing up the lessons learned of the Land Forces Staff was to provide the data and information identified in its work so that they could be used by the Land Forces structures in the education and training process.

The process of elaborating the lessons learned is not an easy one, and the personnel involved are not just a group of field specialists, database managers for data and observations, lessons learned, and organization`s documents but also commanders of military structures who, through their position in the chain of command, can decide what the measures, recommendations and solutions for capitalizing on a lesson learned, are necessarily.

Creating databases with lessons learned in printed or in digital format is a very important step that contributes to the development of the organization, and because those who cannot learn from history are condemned to repeat it, the organization must not forget both the positive actions and the actions with deficiencies.

The process of collecting, analyzing, synthesizing and centralizing data and observations, lessons learned during the activities of the Romanian Army in the country or in theaters of operations has provided the opportunity to improve the techniques, tactics and procedures needed for operating in the operational environment, in order to develop individual combat equipment with the same technical tactical parameters as those of Alliance partners, and to correlate the requirements for the Romanian Army mission with those of other states of the NATO. We can say that, through the lessons learned and by the standardization in the military field, significant steps were taken regarding the transformation of the Romanian Army in order to achieve its interoperability with members of the NATO.

2.2. Interoperability by standardization and learned lessons

Contemporary society is constantly on the move and transforms under the impact of inventions and technological innovations from all fields, which leads the major industrial powers to focus on satisfying their own economic interests and repositioning themselves against the insistent military power manifestation. This need for stronger industrialized states' power is also visible in alliances created by them, which influence the stability, safe and security of the international military, social and economic environment.

Maintaining a climate of normality in the world is difficult due to international events, incidents and accidents, the states of the world trying to manage these conflicts and to take specific actions to counteract actions directed towards their national security. New threats to the current security environment come from unpredictable actors, individuals belonging to groups that do not respect universally valid laws or rules, and these threats are manifested in the form of hybrid war, asymmetric threats, international terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons, migration, poverty, religious war, cyber war and organized crime.

In the era of alliances and international communities, no distinction can be made between external and internal risks, and a single state or a single organization cannot cope with threats alone, independently and using only conventional methods. Since the establishment of the alliance in 1949, NATO has made permanent efforts to achieve co-operation and collaboration between the military forces. Since 1990, the Alliance has increased the pace of operations outside the area of responsibility, making interoperability becoming very important. As of June, 2017, the acceptance of the state of Montenegro as a NATO member, the North Atlantic Alliance becomes an organization of 29 nations that can only function effectively if common arrangements exist to ensure permanent cooperation between these nations.

Interoperability is the ability to act together, coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic allied objectives. Interoperability in the military field is achieved by respecting the principles of *compatibility*, *interchangeability* and *community*.

The principle of compatibility means the ability to use processes, products or services in the

same activity without having a critical or unacceptable interaction with it. *The principle of interchangeability* means the ability to replace a process, product or service in the same activity to achieve the same purpose. *The community principle* means the ability of a system to use the same legislative framework to manage a process, product or service.

The term "*interoperability*"[13] is defined by NATO as the ability of the Allies to act together, coherently, efficiently and effectively, to meet tactical, operational, and strategic objective of Alliances. The interoperability of components of the military organization mean that they can communicate, work together, use the same doctrine and the same action procedures, use the infrastructure and training ground of each Member State. Interoperability reduces duplication, allows accounting of resources, and produces synergies between the 29 allies and, as far as possible, with other partner countries.

Interoperability is not necessarily achieved by the existence of common military equipment, instead the equipment used has common features and is capable of interacting, connecting, communicating, exchanging data and services with other equipment of the other Member States. By forming human resources, by the technical characteristics of hardware, equipment, weaponry and systems, the existence of common doctrines and procedures, as well as common information, the interoperability makes NATO become an intelligent security force that interconnects all its military components.

Conclusions

The experience gained in theaters of operations, participation of Romanian Army at multinational exercises, in actions under multinational command, the participation of military structures of other states in military actions under Romanian command, and last but not least, the participation of national delegations in the working groups of the Alliance for the analysis, acceptance and implementation of NATO standards, offers the opportunity to issue a real feed-back for the development of lessons learned in the form of recommended standards - STANREC.

Given the fact that the current security environment is changing permanently and rapidly, the way in which the lessons are identified and learned has gaining new valences, forcing us to look at lessons learned as an element of particular importance in the organization's functioning. In the future, it is necessary to create a unitary database, applicable to the Romanian Army, which includes not only the lesson learned itself, but also its implications on organization`s documents standardization as well as the correlation of organization`s documents content with an accepted NATO standard. The individual and collective training programs are adapted to the formation of all the human resources categories that the Romanian Army needs and through a standardized process of individual and collective training, an objective reflection of the skills level obtained.

The contents of the lessons learned databases should be reviewed periodically, and the identified lessons underlying the database development should be consulted and implemented. As presented in the paper, there is interdependence between the lessons identified and the lessons learned, and development of new organization`s documents provides the base for standardization of activities throughout the organization, implicitly of individual and collective training programs.

With the help of the data and observations made during the organization's activities, lessons learned can be developed, their content can be modified the organization`s documents, so that by standardizing the activities carried out by the Romanian Army it becomes interoperable with NATO`s forces.

The mechanisms through which interoperability is achieved are the effective achievement of standardization, human resource training, the conduct of exercises, demonstrations, tests, joint studies by all allied states, and the dissemination of lessons learned. By strengthening relations with the external environment, defense industry and security organizations, and using well-defined standards, NATO makes interoperability a factor in the development of the military forces of each nation.

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[13] *** *Interoperability*, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/nl/natohq/topics_84112.htm, accessed at Jun 6th 2017.

The high level of interoperability achieved by the NATO member countries' military forces has been achieved through several stages of planning, training and joint exercises. Recent actions made by Alliance members, during joint operations and missions in the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, Afghanistan, Libya and other countries, demonstrated that interoperability has achieved a higher level and that it can be further developed.

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MULTINATIONAL DIVISION SOUTH-EAST HEADQUARTERS – IMPACT ON TRAINING THROUGH SIMULATION PROCESS USED BY ROMANIAN LAND FORCES UNITS

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Abstract: In the military system, the simulation represents the most important tool in training because it can be used from tactical level to the strategic one. Military training is nothing else but training for fight. Basically is the military's continuous training in dealing with crisis management. For every state is essential to have a well trained and equipped army. This end state can only be achieved by training in conditions as close to the reality as they can get, using the minimum of resources. If for individual training the costs of using simulated systems are not justified, the headquarters training cannot be done using real simulation systems. Taking into consideration the security issues from all over the world, a real multinational exercise taking place in Romania's territory will be perceived as a declaration of war. Nevertheless, the units, headquarters, general staff and Multinational Division South-East headquarters need to be trained in both national and NATO exercises. Taking all those facts into consideration, the only safe solution to provide them the proper training by using limited resources, is the training through constructive simulation. The challenge of Multinational Division South-East Headquarters is to prove its full capability during a computer assisted exercise.

Keywords: training; training through simulation; constructive simulation; the planning process for simulation exercises; Multinational Division South-East Headquarters.

Introduction – General aspects regarding training through simulation

Simulation is one of the most powerful tools used by decision maker factors responsible for the development and operation of complex systems and processes. It is used not only as an analysis and assessment tool, but also for the situational awareness studies. In a world based on competition development, simulation becomes an indispensable method for solving problems, being mostly used in engineer and management domains. In the military environment, simulation is usually needed for the training process. It gives the chance to military personnel to develop their skills, knowledge and to optimize the decision making process by using war games and computer assisted exercises.

"Train as you fight" concept turned gradually into the training process objective. The capabilities, technical and financial capacities of each structure, combined with the level of training of the military personnel represent important problems that Romanian Army faces on its way for accomplishing NATO standards.

The idea of training in safe and close to reality conditions using minimum costs, impacts the training process and puts it in a different and complex level. This is the starting point in making the distinction between individual and collective training. In this way can be observed the step-by-step transition from forming military's basics skills to training them in the decision making process. If the costs for individual training are not that high, when it comes to collective training the costs increase directly in line with the level of training (tactical, operational or strategic). In collective training, simulation represents a cheaper and more viable alternative for classic training. The simulation systems are in a continuously development, trying to transpose the user from a virtual environment into one as real as possible. This permanent upgrade of simulation systems has also an impact on the training process. Take for instance the action of planning an exercise which became

an individual, complex and very well structured process. This study refers to the impact that Multinational Division South-East Headquarters have on the processes of training through simulation and exercise planning. It speaks about the changes that were or are about to be made in Romanian Army regarding training through simulation process and in the simulation centers in order to be able to support the Division's exercises.

Starting from the "Everything except war is simulation" motto and from the implementation of NATO's readiness action plan, I want to emphasize the main idea of this article: the importance of computer assisted exercises and simulation systems for NATO training process.

A new concept appears in the simulation environment, called distributed simulation. This is the most complex simulation system and is used in combined training. It means that units equipped according to their mission, being situated in different locations, can train together in a virtual environment. Without this system, NATO computer assisted exercises would be impossible to be executed.

In order to have an optimal military training at Alliance level, Science and Technology Organization developed and published standards which helped increasing the efficient use of modeling and simulation and the cooperation between NATO members and partnership states in this domain.

1. Constructive simulation systems used in Multinational Division South-East Headquarters training process

It is already known that the main constructive simulation systems used in NATO computer assisted exercises are JCATS (Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation) and JTLS (Joint Theater Level Simulation). Those both software programs are designed for collective training, being used for headquarters and General Staff training. The first one applies to tactical level, while JTLS suits for operational and strategic levels. The Romanian Simulation Centers have only JCATS, as result this is the only constructive simulation system used in Romanian Land Forces training. JTLS is used by Multinational Division South-East Headquarters (MND-SE HQ) during international missions, in NATO exercises. The Division is supported on its own exercises by the Romanian Simulation Centers from Cincu – Joint National Training Center "Getica" and Simulation Training Center from Bucharest. As a result, the simulation program used for division's exercises is JCATS.

Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation is a multi-level high-resolution constructive simulation system used in headquarters and General Staff training. It is designed for tactical and operational level where the operator can play either a single entity or a unit. This system can also be an excellent tool for data collection and data management. Based on the data collected, it allows the operator to analyze the training process which helps in developing lessons learned.

Simulation Centers from Cincu and Bucharest play the 13.0 version of JCATS simulation program, being able to conduct exercises up to brigade level. This program is used by MND-SE HQ in exercises where primary training audience is the lower echelon, the Multinational Brigade from Craiova. In order for the Division to be trained as a NATO unit, under the command of JFCNP (Joint Force Command Naples), from technical perspective JCATS program is not enough. In order to accomplish this kind of training requirements, for operational and strategic level, in NATO is used JTLS constructive simulation system.

Joint Theatre Level Simulation is a high-aggregated, low-resolution constructive simulation program, mostly used in training for operational and strategic level. Roland & Associates Corporation Company designed JTLS as a simulation system able to assess, at macroscopic level, the result of force engagement. Common Operational Picture (COP) is accessible to users. This increases the exercise's realism because the information held by the personnel from the command posts at the operational and strategic levels match the information provided by the simulation system to the users. JTLS is used in training units from the Division level and above, which, from the technical perspective, means that the operators can work only with units and sub-units, not with

individual entities. Both programs, JCATS and JTLS, are used in NATO to conduct CAX (Computer Assisted Exercise)/ CPX (Command Post Exercise) exercises.

The way that MND-SE HQ influenced the training process concept refers exactly to training through simulation. The Multinational Headquarters replaces the classic training process with software systems able to integrate in exercises both Divisions' lower and higher echelons. It is also emphasized in this way the challenge that Romanian Simulation Centers have to face. In order to support MND-SE and to help it to accomplish its training objectives, the simulation centers from Cincu and Bucharest need to coordinate with NATO simulation centers from Poland and Norway. Another conclusion that can be pulled out from the previous chapter regards the need for Romanian Army to purchase a new simulation system, JTLS. The topics that will be touched during the next chapter of this paper will speak about MND-SE exercises, the simulation systems used during training and the simulation centers that support the Division.

2. Training through simulation executed by Multinational Division South-East Headquarters

Based on 2014 Wales Summit, where was established the implementation of NATO Readiness Action Plan, at 1st of December 2015 was celebrated the activation ceremony of Multinational Division South-East Headquarters. This official ceremony represented the integration of HQ MND-SE into the NATO Force Structure (NFS). In June 2015 was published the Decision 32/2015 which approved the establishment of NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) and Multinational Division South-East Headquarters (MND-SE HQ) on Romania's territory. At 1st of September 2015 the Order of the Romanian Ministry of Defense, Mister Mircea Dușa, transformed the 1st Infantry Division „DACICA" into HQ MND-SE, and at 1st of July 2015 was held Initial Capability Declaration Ceremony. This was the way how MND-SE HQ was established in Romania. Now the Division coordinates the two NFIUs from Bulgaria and Romania and the Multinational Brigade South-East.

"HQ MND – SE, under Joint Force Command Naples (JFCNP) operational control (OPCON), is to be prepared to command and control an Article 5 operation - Collective Defence, as a divisional headquarters in the south-east region based on NATO advance planning, as authorized by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and directed by SACEUR, in order to contribute to the security of the Alliance territory and populations"[1].

In order to accomplish its fighting mission, the Division needs to be certified by NATO and has to reach final capability by the end of 2018. These suppose an intense training by taking part to different NATO and multinational exercises. Due to the fact that the classic training is more expensive, HQ MND-SE uses training through simulation. In 2017 the Division takes part in three CAX and one RSOM (Reception, Staging and Onward Movement) exercises.

After conducting Dacian Lynx 16 (DALX16), Dacian Lance 16 (DALE16) and after taking part as a Response Cell at Saber Guardian 16 (SAGN16) exercise, in 2017 MND-SE personnel is getting ready to plan their own CPX exercise, a annex to Saber Guardian series. In the same year the Headquarters supports as Response Cell the computer assisted exercises Trident Joust 17 (TRJT17) and Trident Javelin 17 (TRJN17), the last one being known as the biggest CAX exercise held by NATO. In this exercise are played units from tactical, operational and strategic level. The first mentioned exercises were played at tactical and operational level, which means from technical perspective that was used JCATS as a simulation system, while for the multi-level TRJN17 exercise will be used JTLS system. For all these exercises HQ MND-SE cooperates not only with the simulation centers from Romania, but also with JFTC (Joint Force Tactical Centre) from Poland and JWC (Joint Warfare Centre) from Stavanger, Norway.

The first HQ MND-SE exercise on 2017 was *Noble Jump 2017 (NOJP17).* The general framework of NOJP17 exercise starts from the Wales Summit, more exactly from the

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[1] Headquarters Multinational Division South – East (HQ MND-SE), http://www.en.mndse.ro/about.

implementation of Readiness Action Plan (RAP) which articulated how the Alliance should adapt to improve its readiness and responsiveness, including enhancement of the NATO Response Force (NRF), to better meet the new security paradigm both within Europe and on the Alliance's boundaries.

Any deployment of the VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) is the clearest signal of NATO's political will, and intent of defend member nations in accordance with the articles of the Washington Treaty. Exercise NOJP17 delivered significant strategic communication to a wide array of audiences and potential adversaries, as the VJTF epitomizes Alliance cohesion and resolve. The aim of NOJP was to demonstrate that VJTF(L) and lead elements of NCS (NATO Command Structures) and NFS (NATO Force Structure) HQs are trained, exercised and usable. The focus was on readiness, ability to deploy and interaction with regional HQs and NFIUs. This necessitated collaborative planning and information exchange across NCS HQs and the NRF 17 force package and was conducted against a realistic setting to confirm NATO's ability to respond to crisis.

For NOJP17, VJTF(L) represented primary training audience, and as secondary training audience near ARRC HQ were MND-SE HQ with the Romanian and Bulgarian NFIUs. It was a TTX (Table Top Exercise)/ CPX (Command Post Exercise)/ FTX (Field Training Exercise) played at the three levels: tactical, operational and strategic and was divided in two parts: NOJP1 and NOJP2. NOJP17 exercise took place from February till end of July 2017. The geo-data were based on real world data in order to facilitate the planning and deployment of the forces, and the scenario played by MND-SE was based on HISTRIA 15 settings.

NOJP1 was an AlertEx which demonstrated NATO's ability to activate the VJTF(L). This exercise was conducted within the home bases of the designated VJTF forces. Its main training objective was "Alerting Process".

The second part of the exercise, NOJP2, was a DeployEx where the selected forces trained and tested the deployment functions and the interoperability of the VJTF in cooperation with MND-SE, NFIUs and the HMCC (Hellenic Movement and Coordination Centre). It was divided into a TTX (sub-phase I), a deployment exercise (sub-phase II) and a LIVEX (sub-phase III). The TTX which took place at HQ MND-SE aimed to develop interaction and interoperability between VJTF(L) force elements, to train VJTF commanders in deployment procedures and to conduct detailed deployment planning for VJTF force elements in conjunction with Regional HQs and NFIUs. What I want to underline is the importance of a deployment exercise because it involved unit's movement on water, air and land (the units crossed three countries: Greece, Bulgaria and Romania-till Cincu training area). Sub-phase II was based on the deployment and redeployment of units to and from Cincu area. Besides the fact that during NOJP17 was trained VJTFs C2 (command and control), HQ MND-SE had the opportunity to support and coordinate the VJTF units movement on Romania and Bulgaria territory. MND-SE purpose was to support the planning and preparation for setup of deployment and sustainment of the participating units according to RSOM plan, in close coordination with Host Nations and NFIUs. Sub-phase III, LIVEX, was designed to assure regional actors of NATO commitment to Romania and Bulgaria and to demonstrate VJTF capability and readiness. At that point, MND-SE was in charge with the coordination, development and command of the integrated national exercise.

NOJP17 was for MND-SE and the NFIUs the first NATO RSOM exercise.

Exercise SABER GUARDIAN 2017 (SAGN17) was part of the SABER series, a big exercise which took place at Cincu simulation center. Participated over 20 000 military personnel from 11 Troop Contributing Nations. Under SAGN17 umbrella also took place MND-SE exercise, called DACIAN GUARDIAN 2017 (DAGN17). The commander of HQ MND-SE was the exercise director and the Simulation Training Center from Bucharest was in charge with the CAX support. DAGN17 was a CPX/CAX exercise based on SKOLKAN settings, planned and executed as a separate event from SAGN 17 exercise, in which HQ MND-SE commanded three Romanian brigades and a Bulgarian one in order to reach the interoperability level and to prove its capability. It was a multinational exercise played at tactical level, in which primary training audience was the

Bulgarian brigade and the Slovenian Battalion, while the secondary training audience was HQ MNDS-SE, a Romanian Mechanized Infantry Brigade and a Portuguese Battalion. As Response Cells were two Romanian Mechanized Brigades and the higher echelon for this exercise was LANDCOM (Land Command). This exercise aimed to train participants in conducting Article 5 operations at division and brigade level, and had the main objective to evaluate Division's operability and capability in conducting operations within Bleak Sea Region.

The scenario speaks about BOTHANIA's (enemy forces) actions. They wanted to monopolize the economic area of Black Sea Region by seizing and securing Constanța Harbor. The enemy's intention was to penetrate Romania's and Bulgaria's borders through Ukraine in order to secure Varna, Burgas and Constanța Harbors. The end state that BOTHNIAN forces wanted to achieve was gaining favorable conditions in order to start negotiations at political level for them to obtain full control of Black Sea Region. By seizing the harbors, securing the zone and destroying NATO's cohesion, the enemy forces would have had managed to reduce the Alliance ability to conduct a counterattack on BOTHNIAN forces. In response to BOTHNIA's aggressions and on demand of affected states (including Romania and Bulgaria), NATO approved an Article 5 operation, which was the legal framework for conducting military operations. A MJO+ (Major Operations) action was supposed to take place.

DAGN17 was played in four different locations in the same time: Cincu, Bucharest, Novo Selo and Postonja. This means that distributed simulation was used during this computer assisted exercise. Version 12.0.1 of JCATS constructive simulation system was played, and the events and the incidents were injected in the system with JEMM tool. The local network used for the simulation is presented in figure.1. It was developed by the Simulation Training Center from Bucharest in close coordination with the simulation centers from Cincu, Bulgaria and Slovenia.

It is crystal clear that even if we speak about a deployment exercise or about a computer assisted exercise meant to train the decision making process, it is only one major and common training objective that the Division should reach. Conducting Article 5 operations within the area of responsibility in order to secure Alliance's borders is the mission of HQ MND-SE and its main training objective. The scenarios for those exercises are developed in order to support the training of every NATO structure, from the multinational brigade level up to SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) level.

Figure no. 1. Simulation network used in DAGN17
Source: EXPLAN DAGN17, Annex G, p. G-1, https://community.apan.org/ex/saberguardian/saberguardian2017/ m/documents?folderId=a1e458df-e51d-e711-823f-40a8f0226517&parentId=31a58e67-8bf3-e611-8c30-40a8f0226517.

The most important CAX/CPX NATO exercise from 2017 in which MND-SE is involved is TRIDENT JAVELIN 2017 (TRJN17). The importance of this exercise is given by the level of playing. We speak about a multi-level exercise in which HQ MND-SE alongside structures from Land Component Command, Maritime Component Command and Air Component Command will

play Response Cells in order to support training audience to achieve their training objectives. Based on SKOLKAN 3 scenario, the exercise serves as an evaluation venue for LANDCOM as a Land Component Command and MARCOM as a Maritime Component Command in MJO+. The simulation center conducting the exercise will be JWC from Stavanger, while JTLS 5.0 is going to be played as the simulation system for TRJN17.

The aim of the exercise is to train and verify C2 of NCS (NATO Command Structures) in conducting a MJO+, in a multi- dimensional environment and to confirm that NATO can execute a large- Euro-centric war. MND-SE will be a response cell under LANDCOM and in the simulated environment it will have as lower echelons, four mechanized infantry brigades and a logistic base, all of them located in Denmark.

The role of HQ MND-SE is to defend its area of responsibility from hybrid threats. Even though MND-SE is not part of training audience for this exercise, TRJN17 represents a good opportunity for the Division to train with other NATO HQs in conducting Article 5 operations under LANDCOM's command.

Conclusions

Reviewing 2017, MND-SEs exercises aims to emphasize the importance and the need of moving from classical training to training through simulation. This is also the effect felt on the training process after HQ MND-SE establishment. It is obvious that multi-level exercises as TRJN17 or SABER GUARDIAN cannot be conducted through classical methods due to the high costs and to the political environment. The instability and all the political games played at world level underline the need of a well trained army, ready to deploy and to conduct operations in its area of responsibility in order to secure Alliance's borders. The establishment of MND-SE, NFIU and Multinational Brigade Headquarters on Romania's territory represents another step made by NATO in its attempt of securing the borders. Multinational Division together with the Corps and Component Commands are training in conducting MJO+ Article 5 operations in order to improve their crises response time.

CAX/CPX exercises alongside VJTF deployment exercises offers training for both the commanders in the decision making process and for the units by developing their ability to coordinate with Host Nations and NFIUs during the deployment process. In this way is evaluated the command and control process from the tactical to operational and strategic level. From training perspective, the establishment of MND-SE in Romania represents a new opportunity for Romanian military personnel to get trained close to reality conditions, together with their partners from NATO countries.

The Romanian documents updates regarding training through simulation and their alignment to NATO standards, together with the proposal of buying JTLS constructive simulation system represents the proof of development for modeling and simulation domain in Romanian Army. The challenges faced by Romanian Simulation Centers while supporting MND-SE through their exercises refers to the necessity of a new simulation program in order to support training at operational and strategic level and to create new gateways which allows the simulation system to speak with the functional area services used in day by day work at the Division's headquarters.

The simulation programs proved their efficiency in developing users' capacity in decision making process and their reaction time in order to successfully accomplish their missions. Training through simulation is the modern, efficient and less expensive method used both in Romanian Army and in NATO.

Planning and conducting computer assisted exercises like SABER GUARDIAN on Romania's territory where MND-SE can train together with Host Nation units and NATO units shows us that the training process used in Romanian Army is going to reach its end state.

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APPLICATION OF THE METHOD OF COVERING ZEROS IN DECISION-MAKING FUNDAMENTS

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Abstract: Adopting effective, viable decisions in conducting and executing military actions implies, in the content of the diversity of situations imposed by the requirements of the modern combat space, the approach and solving of operative problems on the basis of the mathematical methods offered by the operational research, which makes quantitative data in order to make an optimal decision available to the commander and his staff.

Keywords: operational research, linear programming.

Mathematical programming, also called optimization theory by specialists, closely related to the theory and practice of decision making, is part of the operational research that incorporates the following mathematical disciplines: linear programming, quadrature programming, nonlinear programming, dynamic programming, stochastic programming, integer prorgamming.

From a mathematical point of view, the purpose of linear programming is to solve the problems of looking for the extreme (maximum or minimum) of a linear function of n variables, of the form:

$$f = c_1x_1 + c_2x_2 + \ldots + c_jx_j + \ldots c_nx_n \tag{1}$$

provided that *n* variables x_j, j=1,2,3...,n, to satisfy a system of m inecuations or equations of the form:

$$a_{11}x_1 + a_{12}x_2 + \ldots + a_{1j}x_j + \ldots + a_{1n}x_n \geq b_1$$
$$a_{21}x_1 + a_{22}x_2 + \ldots + a_{2j}x_j + \ldots + a_{2n}x_n \leq b_2$$

$$\tag{2}$$

$$a_{i1}x_1 + a_{i2}x_2 + \ldots + a_{2ij}x_j + \ldots + a_{in}x_{n=}b_i$$
$$\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots$$
$$a_{m1}x_1 + a_{m2}x_2 + \ldots + a_{mj}x_j + \ldots + a_{mn}x_n \geq b_m$$

The values of the unknown must be non-negative, $x_j \geq 0$, j=1,2,3.....,n. Coefficients a_{ij}, i=1,2,3.....,m; j=1,2,3.....,n that appear in the system (2) are constant, planned or statistically determined coefficients. Unknowns x_j are the sizes to be determined, and the coefficients b_i, i=1,2,3.....,m constant data quantities, determined by the specific conditions of the process being studied; they are the restriction factors of the analyzed process.

Problems of linear programming usually impose variables x_j and the condition of non-negativity, because the unknowns x_j represent the sizes actually used in the realization of a plan and as such can not take negative values. From mathematical expression we find that the process being analyzed is subordinated to the achievement of a certain goal, expressed mathematically by the form of the function (1), called objective function (goal). The coefficients of this function are characteristic constants c_j, j=1,2,3.....,n. As a rule, it is required to perform an activity in optimal conditions, which leads to determining the optimal (maximum or minimum) values of the objective function (purpose). When such optimal solutions to the linear programming problem exist, then it is necessary to determine the unknown values for the optimal execution of the respective activity x_j.

The algorithm of the zeros covering method has been developed to find the minimum of a linear function of the form:

$$f = \sum_{i=1}^{m}\sum_{j=1}^{n}c_{ij}x_{ij} \tag{3}$$

on the set of non-competitive solutions of the system: $\displaystyle\sum_{j=1}^{n}x_{ij} = a_i, \quad i = 1,2,...m$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m}x_{ij} = b_i, \quad j = 1,2,...n \tag{4}$$

$$x_{ij} \geq 0, \quad i = 1,2,....,m; \quad j = 1,2,...,n \tag{5}$$

where $a_i > 0$ and $b_j > 0$.

The method applies both to the case $\displaystyle\sum_{i=1}^{m}a_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n}b_j$ as well as when $\displaystyle\sum_{i=1}^{m}a_i \neq \sum_{j=1}^{n}b_j$.

This algorithm can also be applied in very good conditions to solve linear programming problems in which the maximum of a linear function is sought, provided that the problem has the mathematical model similar to that of a transport problem, that is to say:

$$\max \varphi = \sum_{i=1}^{m}\sum_{j=1}^{n}c_{ij}x_{ij} \tag{6}$$

on the set of non-competitive solutions of the system:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n}x_{ij} = a_i, \quad i = 1,2,...m, \quad \sum_{i=1}^{m}x_{ij} = b_i, \quad j = 1,2,...n \tag{7}$$

$$x_{ij} \geq 0, \quad i = 1,2,....,m; \quad j = 1,2,...,n \tag{8}$$

Applying the algorithm of the zeros covering method for calculating the maximum of a linear function of form (4) can be done by several procedures.

The initial data of the problem to be searched for will be transformed so as to make it possible to apply the algorithm of the zeros covering method to determine the minimum of a linear function of the same shape.

The transformation applied to the initial data in (4) only refers to the coefficients c_{ij} and consists in subtracting them from a number M whose value is taken with an order of magnitude greater than the highest value c_{ij}. For example, if the highest c_{ij} has the value 80, it can be taken for M value 100.

New coefficients are thus obtained c'_{ij}, give the relationship:

$$c'_{ij} = M - c_{ij}, \quad (M > \max c_{ij}) \tag{9}$$

With these coefficients a matrix is formed with the new data of the problem, which is applied for solving the algorithm of the zeros covering method, thus determining the minimum of the function:

$$\min \psi = \sum_{i=1}^{m}\sum_{j=1}^{n}c'_{ij}x_{ij} \tag{10}$$

on the multitude of non-competitive solutions of the system:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n}x_{ij} = a_i, \quad i = 1,2,...m$$

and

$$\sum_{i=1}^{m} x_{ij} = b_i, \quad j = 1,2,...n \tag{11}$$

$$x_{ij} \geq 0, \quad i = 1,2,....,m; \quad j = 1,2,...,n \tag{12}$$

After determining its values x_{ij} and its minimum ψ by applying the algorithm of the zeros covering method, it goes to determine its maximum φ, by entering its values x_{ij} in relation (4).

Application

The conduct of combat operations of a tactical unit requires intervention with amphibious armored vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery and missiles G_i, $i = \overline{1,3}$ on the ray of targets O_j, $j = \overline{1,4}$.

In table *1* the surfaces of the targets are given O_j and possibilities g_i of the means of fire G_i in hectares, as well as the effectiveness of the intervention c_{ij} (hit rate) in number of targets per hectare, destroyed or removed from the battlefiels, for example, $c_{11} = 0,5$.

Table 1

O_j G_i	O_1	O_2	O_3	O_4	g_i
G_1	0,5	0,3	0,4	0,2	80
G_2	0,6	0,4	0,3	0,5	40
G_3	0,7	0,4	0,3	0,6	20
O_j	20	30	50	40	140

Determine the means of intervention G_i objectives O_j, so that, overall, the losses to the enemy are maximum. It is marked with x_{ij} the surfaces in the objectives O_j the surfaces in the objectives G_i.

In this case, the mathematical model of the problem is to determine the values x_{ij} so the function:

$$\varphi = \sum_{i=1}^{3} \sum_{j=1}^{4} c_{ij} x_{ij}$$

be maximum, subject to the following conditions:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{4} x_{ij} = g_i, \quad i = 1,2,3$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{3} x_{ij} = O_j, \quad j = 1,2,3,4$$

$$x_{ij} \geq 0, \quad i = 1,2,3; \quad j = 1,2,3,4$$

In order to apply the zeros covering method, an M number, for example M=1, whose value is greater than the highest value c_{ij} from the table *1*.

The coefficients are obtained $c'_{ij} = M - c_{ij} = 1 - c_{ij}$ as shown in the table *2*.

Table no 2

O_j G_i	O_1	O_2	O_3	O_4	g_i
G_1	0,5	0,7	0,6	0,8	**80**
G_2	0,4	0,6	0,7	0,5	**40**
G_3	0,3	0,6	0,7	0,4	**20**
O_j	**20**	**30**	**50**	**40**	**140**

The algorithm of the zeros covering method is applied.

Zones are obtained on the lines. In the matrix with the initial data (Table 2), it is sought to obtain at least one 0 (zero) on each line. For this, the minimum value element within each line is subtracted from the other elements, including itself, yielding the data presented in Table 3.

Table no. 3

O_j G_i	O_1	O_2	O_3	O_4	g_i
G_1	0	0,2	0,1	0,3	**80**
G_2	0	0,2	0,3	0,1	**40**
G_3	0	0,3	0,4	0,1	**20**
O_j	**20**	**30**	**50**	**40**	**140**

Collecting zeros on the column. In Columns where no zeros are obtained, the minimum value element in each element of that column is subtracted. The resulting data are shown in Table 4.

Table no. 4

O_j G_i	O_1	O_2	O_3	O_4	g_i
G_1	0	0	0	0,2	**80**
G_2	0	0	0,2	0	**40**
G_3	0	0,1	0,3	0	**20**
O_j	**20**	**30**	**50**	**40**	**140**

At least one zero is obtained for each line and column. The elements in the matrix obtained (Table nr. 4) can be considered as data to move to finding a first solution to the problem.

Check that the solution is optimal. Note in Table 4 with I_K lines that suppress (cover), with the lines that suppress (covers), J_K columns where there are zeros when the lines are suppressed, $S_k = \sum g_i + \sum O_j$ corresponding to the suppressed lines and zeros when the lines are suppressed, for each situation. From the data of the problem, g_i represents the possibilities of the means of fire G_i in hectares, and O_j the surfaces of the objectives.

If there are a number of m lines (means of fire) then the number of sums S_k that need to be calculated will be given by the relationship $N_{S_k} = 2^m - 1 = 2^3 - 1 = 7$.

In the case of the analyzed problem, it is obtained:

$I_1=1$ $\quad$ $J_1=1,2,4$ $\quad$ $S_1=80+20+30+40=170$

$I_2=2$ $\quad$ $J_2=1,2,3,4$ $\quad$ $S_2=180$

$I_3=3$ $\quad$ $J_3=1,2,3,4$ $\quad$ $S_3=160$

$I_4=1,2$ $\quad$ $J_4=1,4$ $\quad$ $S_4=180$

$I_5=1,3$ $\quad$ $J_5=1,2,4$ $\quad$ $S_5=190$

$I_6=2,3$ $\quad$ $J_6=1,2,3$ $\quad$ $S_6=160$

$I_7=1,2,3$ $\quad$ $J_7=0$ $\quad$ $S_7=140$

Because all the amounts $S_k \geq 140$, the method is no longer applicable and the distribution to be made is the optimal one.

Make a distribution. Table 4 lists the unknowns x_{ij} in places occupied with zero and zero in places where c_{ij} is different from zero (Table no. 5).

Table no. 5

O_j G_i	O_1	O_2	O_3	O_4	g_i
G_1	x_{11}	x_{12}	x_{13}	0	80
G_2	x_{21}	x_{22}	0	x_{23}	40
G_3	x_{31}	0	0	x_{34}	20
O_j	20	30	50	40	140

- fill in the columns in which there is only one unknown, by dividing the required quantity indicated by b_j, means $x_{13} = \min\{a_1,b_3\} = \min\{80,50\} = 50$.

- complete the lines where there is only one unknown (not applicable);

- determine the values of the other unknown, taking into account those already determined. It results: $x_{12} = 30$, $x_{24} = 40$, $x_{31} = 20$.

The values of unknown unknowns (bold data) are passed to the table with the initial data (Table 1) and the distribution in Table no. 6 is obtained which will give the enemy the maximum loss.

Table no. 6

O_j G_i	O_1	O_2	O_3	O_4	g_i
G_1	0,5	**30** 0,3	**50** 0,4	0,2	80
G_2	0,6	0,4	0,3	**40** 0,5	40
G_3	**20** 0,7	0,4	0,3	0,6	20
O_j	20	30	50	40	140

The value of the objective function is:

$$f_{max} = 30 \cdot 0,3 + 50 \cdot 0,4 + 40 \cdot 0,5 + 20 \cdot 0,7 = 63 \quad \text{destroyed targets}$$

The distribution shown in Table no. 6 is not unique. By way of assigning the unknown values in Table 5, other variants may be obtained, as shown, for example, in Table 7.

Table no. 7

O_j G_i	O_1	O_2	O_3	O_4	g_i
G_1	**20** 0,5	**10** 0,3	**50** 0,4	0,2	**80**
G_2	0,6	**20** 0,4	0,3	**20** 0,5	**40**
G_3	0,7	0,4	0,3	**20** 0,6	**20**
O_j	**20**	**30**	**50**	**40**	**140**

The value of the objective function is:

$$f_{max} = 20 \cdot 0,5 + 10 \cdot 0,3 + 50 \cdot 0,4 + 20 \cdot 0,4 + 20 \cdot 0,5 + 20 \cdot 0,6 = 63 \quad \text{destroyed targets.}$$

Note that the value of the objective function is the same for the two distributions.

Conclusions

Of all branches of mathematical programming, linear programming is the most widespread method of solving some military problems, on the one hand because of the relatively simple nature of the mathematical apparatus used in modeling and solving, and on the other hand, because it is easily accessible for mathematical representation and analysis of the military phenomena. In the military field, linear programming methods allow, following the mathematical model, to choose without determining and possibly compute all possible variants, the best way to use forces and means in military action.

The mathematical model of a linear programming problem used in the representation of a military system consists of a set of equations, inequalities or combining them. The name for linear programming derives from the fact that the variables that are part of the objective function (purpose) and the system of conditions are first degree.

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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE USE OF FORCES AND MEANS OF FIGHTING

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Abstract: In the study of military problems, combat devices and their elements can be considered as networks or service systems and can be analyzed by the theory of expectation theory, since each element of the fighting device can be defined as a purpose and type of service to ensure it.

The essential characteristic of all service systems is the random nature of the phenomena analyzed.

Keywords: *service theory, operational research.*

Optimizing the planning of military actions in the conditions of the modern battlefield has been and is a priority concern of the military specialists, and not only of them.

The preparation of the decision, regarded as a fundamental process, is a complex act involving the succession of conscious methods, capable of carefully analyzing the criteria for choosing possible variants of action and appreciating the scientifically substantiated effects of the proposed judgment, including the risks following the adopted solution. The introduction of modern methods of analysis and decision making, meant to increase the quality of decision making and its execution, represents a continuous action and, at the same time, a natural consequence of the training of specialists in the field.

The scientific substantiation of the decision requires a great deal of complex calculations using mathematical models and methods that take into account the random factors that may occur in the course of combat activities.

In researching phenomena, it is necessary not only to understand the essence of the different elements and their interdependence, but also to study the quantitative relationships between them. To do this, mathematical research methods are used. However, the use of mathematics should not be understood as an abstract, broken by objective reality. In concrete cases that are studied using the mathematical apparatus, the qualitative content of the phenomenon must be taken into account as it defines the very nature of the quantitative relations. The transition from the phenomenon itself to the mathematical relations that characterize the interdependence between its components as well as with other phenomena is mathematical modeling, and the mathematical relations that mirror the quantitative relations from the phenomenon are the mathematical model. Modeling is a method of researching systems, processes, or phenomena by substituting the real object, based on identifying physical or mathematical similarities between two systems in relation to certain established features. On the basis of mathematical modeling, we try to obtain optimal solutions or at least close to the optimal aspect, which in fact is the main objective of mathematical modeling. In order to achieve this goal, three methods can be used: optimization, heuristic and approximate. Methods of optimization, in the most direct sense of the word, which in fact implies obtaining a solution which, from the point of view of a formulated formula, would be the best; this assumes in the alternative that there are no better solutions. In this case the error is null.

Heuristic methods lead to satisfactory, good or even very good solutions, which does not assume the optimal certainty or the possibility of estimating the deviation from optimal. For this reason, the model error can't be controlled.

Approximate methods imply obtaining a solution close to optimal through successive iterations. In this case, the error can be controlled.

The theory of expectation is part of the operational research, which finds a wider scope in different fields of activity. This part of the operational research finds its applicability in almost all categories of armed forces such as[1]:

- Calculation of the average time required to hit a shoe based on some conditions such as a certain probability of hit, of the type of fire.
- Calculating the average value of the number of messages arriving at a command point, these being necessary to determine the number of channels needed.
- Possibility to analyze fuel supply requests for airplane or armor supply in order to know the need for service personnel.
- Determining the indicators of a firing system, knowing the number of batteries, the firing cycle, or the average flow of targets in the fire area.
- Determining the need for communication channels for conducting combat actions, their quality, as well as the reliability of communication channels, as well as fighting techniques.

The main purpose of any model is to describe the internal structure, the input and output elements (flows), the relationships, the types of links between the constituents, the restrictions and the disturbances that define a real system or phenomenon. Model behavior is evaluated in state of output variables that is logically determined by input variables and parameters, as well as internal structure and restrictions imposed on model operation. As a rule, dependence of output variables on input variables is determined by the logical structure of the adopted model. When organizing a service system, it will be first and foremost to ensure maximum satisfaction of the requirements, and secondly, to carry out the service with minimum consumption of forces and means as short as possible.

Therefore, in order to meet this goal, the quantitative side of the service processes needs to be studied[2].

The theory of expectation deals with the analysis of the quantitative aspects of the servicing processes and highlights the organizational side of the adopted solution, which often has a determining role. It does not deal with the qualitative aspect of the servicing devices, with the technical conditions in which the actual service channels take place, the aspect being considered as a complementary side, understood.

In most general terms, the operation of any service system can be described as follows: at the entrance of a system there is a stacked sequence of units called input stream. After these units have undergone operations specific to the service system, output is a succession of serviced units that make up the output stream.

The division of units into units served and unsecured in the output stream is determined by the conditions in which the system is put to work. If there are no restrictions on the stay of a unit once entered into the system, it is assumed that it is waiting for its turn as long as it is necessary to satisfy the units that precede it. However, there are situations when restrictions such as an air target can only be fought over the time it takes to fly in the fire area, and a transmitted and received message is valid for a certain amount of time. If the plane was not shot down and the message was not transmitted in the appropriate time intervals, then it becomes a loss for those systems.

The air defense system is usually organized on two or three belts (close defense and remote defense). Such a system of service is called, in service theory, a staggered system in which case the means of attacking the enemy, before reaching the object of attack, must pass through all the defense areas, in each zone there are a number of means (anti-aircraft artillery batteries, anti-aircraft rockets, etc.).

In the following, the effectiveness of such a defense system consisting of homogeneous plants will be analyzed. For this, it is considered, as in the previous examples, that the means of attack by the enemy that come to attack the target form an elementary flow having the parameter λ. The target

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combat time by the air defense means is allocated according to an exponential law with the μ parameter, and a target can be fought at the same time by a single batter. It is also believed that the enemy does not react. Under the conditions imposed, in order to penetrate the first defense belt, in order to be able to pass through the means of attack, it would be necessary for all batteries to be occupied with the combat of other targets arrived previously. The probability of occurrence of this event is determined by the relationship:

$$P_{\rho_1} = \frac{\frac{\alpha^n}{n!}}{\sum_{k=0}^{n}\frac{\alpha^k}{k!}} \tag{1}$$

In order for the means of attack to pass through and the second defense area, it is necessary that all the batteries in this area get busy. The probability of this event is deduced from the relationship:

$$P_{p_2} = \frac{\frac{\alpha_1^{n_1}\alpha_2^{n_2}}{(n_1+n_2)!}}{\sum_{k=0}^{n_1+n_2}\frac{\alpha^k}{k!}} \tag{2}$$

Where:
n_1- the number of anti-aircraft batteries in the first defense area;
n_2 - the number of anti-aircraft batteries in the second defense zone.
If there are belts of defense, then the likelihood of passing the means of attack over all of these areas to attack the target is calculated using the relationship:

$$P_i = \frac{\frac{\alpha^{n_1}\alpha^{n_2}...\alpha^{n_i}}{(n_1+n_2+\cdots n_i)!}}{\sum_{k=0}^{n_1+n_2+\cdots n_i}\frac{\alpha^k}{k!}} \tag{3}$$

An enemy convoy organizes the two-zone air defense. In the first there are three anti-aircraft artillery batteries, and in the second area, there are anti-aircraft missile batteries (the two structures realize likelihood of similar combat and destruction).

All means of defense they have the same weapon (guns or missiles). The time required to combat each airplane arriving at the attack is allocated according to an exponential law of parameter $\lambda = 2$ aircraft (targets) / min.

It is required to appreciate the effectiveness of the defense system and the probability of airplanes entering the defense.

The probability of penetrating the first defense zone by air targets is calculated by:

$$P_1 = \frac{\frac{2^2}{2!}}{1 + 2 + \frac{2^2}{2!}} = 0,4$$

It follows that out of 100 attacks 16 air targets will be able to break through the entire defense system.

Efficiency of non-homogeneous service systems on different echelons

For the purpose of analyzing such a service system, it is considered that a ship dispersion raion is defended against the attack of torpedo stars on two areas: close and distant. Ships in defense areas are so arranged that during the torpedo stars attack, the artillery of each ship in the two defense zones can only shoot one of the stars. It is required to determine the effectiveness of such a defense system against torpedo stars who come to attack with the λ intensity. The state probabilities of the defense system are noted as follows:
P_{00}- the ships in the first and second defense zones do not fire the stars;

P_{01}- the ship in the first zone is free, and the second area is in combat with the attacking stars;

P_{10}- the ship in the first area is fighting the stars, and the ship in the second area is free;

P_{11}- both ships in both areas are busy fighting the attacking stars.

The winning vets are initially fought by the artillery in the first area ships and then by the artillery on the ships in the second zone. If the artillery in the first area ships is busy fighting other targets then the star moves further towards the goal, reaching the second defense zone. If the star was fought with the artillery in the first area but was not destroyed in the second area it can not be countered. If the artillery in the second area is occupied, then the star passes through this area without being fought. Considering the above, we will write the system status probabilities as follows:

$$P_{11} = \frac{\lambda^2}{\lambda^2 + \lambda(\mu_1 + \mu_2) + \frac{\mu_1\mu_2}{\lambda + \mu_1}(2\lambda + \mu_1 + \mu_2)} \tag{4}$$

For example, the defense system of a convoy of ships against torpedo stars will be analyzed, organized on two circular zones, knowing that the intensity of the stars attack is $\lambda = 3$ stars / minute for the second zone.

The average combat time for stars is $\mu_1 = 3$ stars / minute for the first zone and $\mu_2 = 5$ stars / minute for the second zone.

The likelihood of crossing the stars through the two unconfirmed areas using formula (4) is:

$$P_{11} = \frac{3^2}{23^2 + 3 \cdot (3 + 5) + \frac{3 \cdot 5}{3 + 3}(2 \cdot 3 + 3 + 5)} = 0,1323$$

If vessels with a higher cadence fall into the first zone ($\mu = 4$ stars / minute) and those with lower cadence in the second zone, then the probability P_{11} will be

$$P_{12} = \frac{3^2}{32^2 + 3 \cdot (3 + 5) + \frac{15}{3 + 5}(6 + 3 + 5)} = 0,1518$$

From here it can be seen that through a more judicious organization of the defense system its effectiveness increases.

Conclusions

Armed struggle, as a phenomenon, is a process of mutual opposition between the conflicting parties, and can be studied only by revealing the laws governing this complex process of great intensity, in which mathematics has a fundamental role to play. Mathematics can provide a continuous and profound development of the military domain. As a tool for analysis and optimization, mathematics allows a detailed analysis of the essence of armed struggle processes, the disclosure of its quantitative laws and, therefore, the finding of optimal solutions and variants of combat actions. The purpose of applying mathematical methods in the process of conducting combat actions of troops is that, by using knowledge of the laws, principles and principles of the armed struggle, it allows to shorten the length of the preparation of the decisions taken and the increase of their quality so that with existing forces and means to obtain the best results of combat action. Decision-making refers to the organization and way of working during decision-making, the development of thinking methodology in this process, and the consideration of such qualities of human character, such as the initiative and the creative spirit. Improving the process of leading and substantiating decisions is inconceivable without formalizing the various actions of struggle, without establishing the quantitative dependence between the elements of the combat situation. In other words, it is about formalizing the armed struggle processes, highlighting the main dependencies of the outcome of the armed struggle, linking the elements of this process in the form of mathematical models. Mathematics studies, as any science, objective realities, no matter how it goes in the field of abstraction.

Abstraction is necessary for the development of mathematics as a science, but what constitutes the necessary condition for the development of mathematics as a state is not allowed in its concrete use. So ignoring the specific quality of the phenomenon can only lead to deformation of reality.

Mathematicians have the task of determining whether the choice of the optimal use of forces and means has been done with appropriate procedures, ie it is possible to check the validity of how the required quantitative result was obtained. Therefore, mathematical research refers not to the purely mathematical aspect of the problem but to its content. This shows that the results of research using the mathematical apparatus in studying different problems in various fields should be analyzed in the light of the determinants of the field. Thus, in the military field the application of mathematical methods will have to reflect the requirements of military science and art, the economic requirements of the economy, etc. It follows that the application of mathematics in various fields must be based on the understanding of the qualitative essence of the phenomenon, according to which the solution is to be solved; only the resulting mathematical results have a meaning. In order to make a fair and timely decision, the master must be as well informed as possible and given real data that takes into account the quantitative factors: the amount of forces, the technical and tactical possibilities of the units, the degree of technical and material insurance, etc. Characteristic of quantitative factors is that they can be expressed numerically and can therefore be introduced into mathematical relationships. Obviously, in making a decision, the commander will also take into account the qualitative factors: the moral state, the degree of training, etc. In this case, these factors can fine-tune the results obtained following the application of operational research methods.

In the military field, the theory of expectation methods allow, following the mathematical model, to be chosen without determining and possibly calculating all possible variants, the best way to use forces and means in military action.

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CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION FOR MEDICAL LOGISTICS IN CASE OF ANTHRAX ATTACK

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Abstract: The analysis of the current risks and threats on the European continent requires the establishment of an infrastructure capable of reacting quickly and effectively to a bioterrorist attack. In this context, any action aimed at increasing the reaction and response capacity in the event of a biological incident is welcome.

Medical protection in regards to the attack with biological weapons is considered to be a specific activity, which is primarily the responsibility of the military medical service. Intervention in the biological crisis must be supported by adequate medical logistics that is essential for managing the biological crisis. The training of the structures with attributions in this field, the development of viable intervention plans and their testing, require the creation of a research tool that will help to improve the intervention procedures of the specialized teams. Therefore, building an experimental model with constructive simulation can represent a very useful means of training and training for real situations.

Keywords: constructive simulation, medical logistics, bioterrorist attack.

Introduction

Medical countermeasures to liquidate the consequences of a biological attack involve medical support for both the military forces and the civilian population, as far as possible. The medical support under the *Joint Logistics Operations Regulation/ 2008* also includes the provision of preventive and curative medicine services, the re-supply of medicines, medical supplies, medical protection against biological weapons, as well as the evacuation of wounded and sick people in order to minimize the losses of human forces.[1]

Because of the variability in factors that are related to the health system, the population, the biological agent and to the logistics capabilities, the situations that can occur in practice are very complex and difficult to predict, and their implementation seems to be random.

The analysis of the situation, with the currently existing risks and threats on the European continent and beyond, imposes the need to create an infrastructure capable of reacting quickly and effectively to a bioterrorist attack[2]. In this context, any action aimed at increasing the reaction and

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response capacity in the event of a biological incident is welcome. In order to make an informed and substantiated decision on how to respond to bioterrorist threats and to resolve situations dynamically, we used constructive computer simulations in collaboration with "war games" specialists. Collaboration activities between the *Wargaming and Doctrinal Experimentations Center CJRED / the General Staff and the Military Medical Research Center* started in 2015 when the **„BIOAG 15"** experiment was executed and implemented using modeling and constructive simulation[3], which aimed at developing the experimental model of the constructive simulation computer system for the medical protection against infectious diseases caused by biological agents of war and bioterrorism[4].

The research in this project aimed at estimating the number of victims in the various *fictional scenarios of anthrax biological attack* on different types of strategic objectives in the context of the *hybrid war*. The results showed a surprisingly large number of victims (civilians and military), far exceeding the forces and means we have. As a result of the information we have obtained, we continued the research for the logistics ensuring aspects of the medical countermeasures after the bio-terrorist attack with anthrax[5].

2. Logistics in the biological attack with anthrax spores[6]

The issue of logistics in the biological attack should be approached on at least 3 levels:

I. *The pharmaceutical logistics* with the existent at the time of the biological attack, the supply of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies according to the therapeutic guide.

II. *The intendance logistics*, which is the task of the army's intelligence services, etc.

III. *The strategic logistics* that addresses the modeling of logistic response in the biological attack.

Biological, military or terrorist attacks can cause a very large number of sick individuals and, implicitly, deceased persons. If you consider the hypothesis that of the total population of Romania, of approx. 20 million people, 10% would be exposed to the attack, and only 10% of them are contaminated, there are 200,000 people at risk of contracting the disease. We need to administer prophylactic treatment for 10 days, 15 days or 60 days, depending on the biological agent identified. If appropriate medication is available immediately and supplies can be made and replenished in a timely fashion, the vast majority of contaminants will not become ill. Considering the same relatively low rate, we will have 20,000 patients, with 2,000 sick patients with serious illness and about 200 deaths. But if these drugs are not available in place, at the moment and in the quantities needed, almost all the contaminants will become sicker, worse or less severe, and many of them will die.

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
Figure no. 1. Estimating the effects of the biological attack with anthrax by hazard categories

In order to be able to efficiently intervention, at least an informal knowledge of the main hospital units with beds for infectious and contagious patients (Figure no. 2), as well as the main suppliers of medical and pharmaceutical materials in Romania (Figure no. 3), is needed.

Figure no. 2. Hospital units with beds for infectious and contagious patients in Romania
Main hospital units with beds for infectious and contagious patients (x41)
University Medical Centre / with Infectious Diseases Section

Figure no. 3. Main suppliers of medical and pharmaceutical materials in Romania
▲Drugs Factory ●Farmaceutical Counties Deposits ●Unifarm Deposit

3. Possible situations in the biological attack with anthrax spores[7]

For a medical support for victims of biological attack (unprotected exposed population), it is necessary to anticipate the needs of medical care and logistics. From this point of view, we can identify the following possible situations:

a) Well organized medical service: if there is enough stock of medication, the number of cases of illness is small

b) Poorly organized medical service: - there are no antibiotic and reagents stocks for rapid diagnosis, but they can be brought in 24 hours.

c) Lack of reagents for diagnosis: it leads to the obligation to carry out antibiotic prophylaxis at all exposed population.

d) The lack of needed antibiotic will lead to an increased number of illnesses from all contaminated and many deaths.

4. Medical countermeasures in the biological attack with anthrax spores[8]

4.1 Medical countermeasures for those exposed
Required: field laboratory vehicles for displacement of mobile biological intervention teams (EMI-BIO)[9]; kits for sampling air, water, soil, individual objects, biological samples (nasal and pharyngeal exudate, skin, mucosae, excretions, sputum); quick diagnostic kits for biological agents.

4.2 Medical countermeasures for those contaminated: antibiotic prophylactic treatment, according to the EMEA[10]

4.3 Medical countermeasures for the sick:
Necessary: on-site quarantine with medical supervision; antibiotic therapy, according to the EMEA; hospitalization of patients with respiratory symptoms; ambulances for evacuation specially equipped disinfected after each shipment.

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4.4 Medical countermeasures for those seriously ill:

Necessary: antibiotic treatment and adjuvant medication depending on the type of infection (cutaneous, digestive, pulmonary, meningeal, septicemia); association of 2/3 antibiotics; injectable treatment associated with adjuvant treatment depending on the condition of the patient (O$_2$, anti-inflammatory, antalgics, antitussive IV, etc.) if the patient is seriously ill.

4.5 Medical countermeasures for the deceased:

Necessary: declaring the death; autopsy and sampling, if applicable; disinfecting corpses; packing in mortuary bags and takeover by Logistics for burial, as incineration in the case of multiple deaths is contraindicated; staff to do so.

The stocks of drugs will be provided by the Ministry of Health for civilians and by the Ministry of National Defense for the military.

5. The drugs needed for medical and paramedical countermeasures in the anthrax attack

5.1 The need for pre-exposure anthrax prophylaxis: anti-anthrax vaccine for human use (the supply must be provided by the Medical Direction from External Sources).

5.2 The need for intra-exposure anthrax prophylaxis for the attacked population:
- individual CBRN protection equipment, it is up to CBRN defense;
- collective CBRN protection equipment, it is up to CBRN defense;
- CBRN warning equipment, it is up to CBRN defense.

5.3 The need for post-exposure anthrax prophylaxis:
- it is up to the Medical services;
- rapid diagnostic microbiological means - it is up to CBRN defense;
- partial or total sanitary decontamination - it is up to CBRN defense;
- decontamination of objects and soil - it is up to CBRN defense.

5.4 The need for the treatment of anthrax (hospitalized / contacted patients):
- antibiotics – EMEA accordingly - it is up to the Medical / Logistic services;
- anti-inflammatory drugs – it is up to the Medical services

5.4 Medical countermeasures for patients:
- immunomodulatory – it is up to the Medical services;
- sanitary-pharmaceutical materials - it is up to the Medical services.

5.5 The need for the treatment of anthrax for serious cases hospitalized in hospitals' ICUs, in ROL 3 or civilian hospitals:
- oxygen, perfusions, insulating means for specialized treatment.

5.6 The need for the deceased:
- mortary bags – it is up to the Logistic services;
- disinfection – it is up to the Medical services.

6. Sanitary discharge for the anthrax sick people

6.1 Sorting:
6.1.1. Seriously sick people:
- pulmonary anthrax with respiratory failure;
- digestive anthrax with hemorrhagic diarrhea;
- meningeal anthrax;
- septicemic anthrax.
6.1.2. Serious ill people:
- cutaneous anthrax;
- pulmonary anthrax without respiratory manifestations;
- digestive anthrax without hemorrhagic diarrhea.

6.1.3. Sick patients with mild impairment
- cutaneous anthrax
6.1.4. Contacted / exposed / contaminated
6.1.5. Suspects
6.2 Airborne discharges of severely ill patients: are made to the major medical centers in Bucharest, as soon as possible with MEDEVAC type air transport[11].
6.3 Terrestrial evacuation of the severely ill patients is carried out by air, SMURD, DSJ ambulances and private ambulances.
- *"by itself"* from the outbreak to the local sanitary facilities, in the respective county;
- *"to self,"* in the neighboring counties.
Aerial and terrestrial means of transport can leave with additional health care staff, medicines, disinfectants and pharmaceutical medical supplies and can return with the sick patients, after which they have to be decontaminated and can resume the intervention procedure.
6.4 Quarantine is done by:
- curative treatment for patients with mild manifestations;
- prophylactic treatment for contact / exposed / contaminated;
- medical surveillance for suspects.

Conclusions

This paper presents the characteristics of the logistic response in the biological attack with anthrax spores, based on the data provided by the constructive simulation experiments.
The elements identified by us can help to estimate the antibiotics demand, necessary medical countermeasures and the need for anthrax patients to evacuate, etc. following a biological attack.
Knowledge and awareness of situations that may arise in such a hypothesis is extremely important for assessing the evolution and accurately estimating the need for forces and means for intervention before and after the biological attack.
Computer simulation exercises of fictional scenarios of biological attack with anthrax spores can be an extremely useful tool for training and instruction programs.
The information obtained as a result of constructive simulation experiments demonstrates their usefulness for understanding and solving complex situations in the field of military medicine and CBRN protection.

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THE ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSECURITY

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Abstract: *The focus on the impact of malicious actions or cyberattacks makes of minimal significance evaluating the root causes of incidents affecting electronic communication services or determining indicators. This fact underlies the hypothesis that the ontology of cybersecurity is still incomplete and more investigation is needed in order to achieve the full picture. The present article aims to bring to attention an alternative system of security concepts, where cyberattacks are replaced by security incidents and where cybersecurity becomes network security. To do so, I will introduce three studies published by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), whom outcomes contest the essence of cybersecurity. In the end, I will draw the conclusions to support the need to deepen the research regarding the ontology of cybersecurity.*

Keywords: *ontology, network security, cybersecurity, incidents.*

Introduction

The focus on the impact of malicious actions or cyberattacks makes of minimal significance evaluating the root causes of incidents affecting electronic communication services or determining indicators. This fact underlies the hypothesis that the ontology of cybersecurity is still incomplete and more investigation is needed in order to achieve the full picture. The present article aims, on the one side, to bring to attention an alternative system of security concepts as proposed by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), where cyberattacks are replaced by security incidents and where cybersecurity becomes network security, and, on the other side, to consolidate the understanding of what is the nature of cybersecurity. To do so, I will present three studies published by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). The Annual Incident Report 2015 published in September 2016[1] has revealing results which contest the essence of cybersecurity. In the end, I will draw the conclusions to support the need to deepen the research regarding the ontology of cybersecurity.

What is at stake of claiming to complete the cybersecurity by network security and cyberattacks by network security incidents? The quick answer is that this has not only normative but also epistemological and ontological implications. Presenting the differences between cybersecurity and network security becomes more relevant when addressing the following questions: what we investigate - cybersecurity or network security? What is the nature of cybersecurity? Is cybersecurity a concrete and observable phenomenon?[2] Is the cybersecurity term rigorous enough?[3] These are

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[1] ENISA, *The Annual Incident Reports 2015 – Analysis of Article 13a annual incident reports in the telecom sector,* September 2016, available at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/annual-incident-reports-2015, accessed on 1 September 2017.

[2] For a detailed presentation regarding the duality concrete-abstract in computer science, see Turner, Raymond and Angius, Nicola, "The Philosophy of Computer Science", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Spring 2017 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/computer-science/>.

[3] Stanley Hoffmann provides in his volume *The State of War* a presentation of the problems of theories in international relations. As a first problem, the conceptualization can be insufficient because the basic concepts are not rigorous enough. According Hoffmann, this is due because the analysis has not been fully carried out. Stanley, Hoffmann, *The state of war: essays on the theory and practice of international politics*, New York-Washington-London: Praeger, 1965, repr. 1968, p. 5.

relevant questions since in the most studies about cybersecurity, the ontological, epistemological and methodological questions are avoided.

The normative aspect refers to the inescapable dimension of network security that every national cybersecurity strategy should include it and to the dialog and cooperation opportunities between states in the realm of security that network security can bring. In the following section, I will present the base of the network security approach as proposed by ENISA.

1. The European network security approach

"Our work is our word, but our words do not work anymore."[4]
1999, Francis Pisani writes in *Le monde diplomatique* "the network, the nervous system of information flow, becomes an organisational paradigm" and that perturbing the command structures of a state would precede the physical destruction.[5] In the article, he mentions John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt as the inventors of «cyberwar» and «netwar» terms, the last being "the result of the rise of network forms of organization, which in turn is part of the computerized information revolution."[6]

The European network security approach can be pinned down to the essential questions posed by ENISA by addressing the definition gaps and overlaps for the definition of cybersecurity: does this term consider only the protection of virtual assets within the cyberspace, are the physical assets covered by the term. These questions lead to a contestation of what cybersecurity means and to recall the discussion over "essentially contested"[7] or "contingently contested"[8] concept of security.

Ken Booth underlies that security was never difficult to define, he is citing the standard dictionary definition - absence of threats -, "but how is conceptualised and operationalised in the contingent contexts of world politics is not."[9] By breaking down into components the security, we discover the referent objects, the danger and the "desire to escape harmful possibilities." The security become complex when "the layers of politics are wrapped around it"[10] and the core elements are addressed in terms of selection of the referents, priority assignment and solutions agreement.

The consequence of contesting cybersecurity is reshaping words and content, as Ken Booth states "Words are all we have. Consequently, we want the key ones to be though enough for generalization and sharp enough to cut through the blizzard of information."[11] But reshaping words requires a critical approach of the content – "Security has been one of the common-sense, pre-defined terms in international relations orthodoxy that appear to be unproblematic until examined with a critical eye."[12] This is what the report written by the expert group formed by members of the ETSI/CEN/CENELEC[13] Cybersecurity Coordination Group (CSCG) and ENISA regarding the definition gaps and overlaps of cybersecurity definition is aiming: clarifying the understanding of the term cybersecurity, in the scope of standardisation of and communication.

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[4] Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation", in Review of International Studies, 17(4), 1991, 313-326.

[5] Francis Pisani, "Penser la cyberguerre", in Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1999, pp. 4-5. In French: "le réseau, système nerveux par lequel circule l'information, se fait paradigme organisationnel", "il suffirait de perturber ses structures de commandement, de communication et de pensée, plutôt que d'entreprendre sa destruction physique".

[6] John Arquilla, and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The future of terror, crime and militancy*, Rand, Santa Monica, 2001, p. 10.

[7] The term has been first coined by W.B., Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, Vol. 56 (1955-1956), pp. 167-198.

[8] According to Ken Booth, the term has been coined by Terence Ball. Terence Ball, "Power", in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds.), *A Companion to the Contemporary Political Philosophy,* Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, pp. 553-554, cited in Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, p. 100.

[9] Booth, ibid, p. 101

[10] Booth, ibid, p. 100

[11] Booth, op. cit., Ref. 3, p. 314.

[12] Booth, op. cit., ref. 7, p. 96.

[13] European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), European Committee for Standardization (CEN), European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC).

As Ken Booth does, the ENISA report starts from the definition of cybersecurity by the Oxford English Dictionary, but comes to the following definition in the scope of terminology: "Cybersecurity shall refer to security of cyberspace, where cyberspace itself refers to the set of links and relationships between objects that are accessible through a generalised telecommunications network, and to the set of objects themselves where they present interfaces allowing their remote control, remote access to data, or their participation in control actions within that Cyberspace."[14]

enisa

Definition of Cybersecurity – Gaps and overlaps in standardisation
v1.0 | December 2015

3.4 Summary of the usage of the Term Cybersecurity

The following table provides an overview of the identified definitions based on the criteria specified above:

Origin	Document	Spelling	Organization	Type	CIA	Meaning	Motivation	Threat
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27	27032	Cybersecurity	SDO	V	YES	Only assets intended for the Internet	No differentiation between malicious or unintentional	Only virtual assets connected to the Internet, no physical assets
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27	27000	Information security	SDO	O[8]	YES	Any Risk origination in the Cyber Space	No differentiation between malicious or unintentional	Any asset
ITU-T	X.1205	cybersecurity	Inter-gov	???	YES	Any Risk origination in the Cyber Space	No differentiation between malicious or unintentional	Any asset

Figure no. 1. Summary of the usage of the term cybersecurity (part).
Source: ENISA[15]

As detailed described below, the practice of reporting the security incidents consolidates the empirical evidence by revealing different domains within the term of cybersecurity: communications security, operations security, information security, military security, physical security and public/national security. By differentiating among these different types of security, new objects are added as referents of the cybersecurity.

2. Measuring the impact of incidents affecting electronic communications

The study published by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) – "Security incidents indicators – measuring the impact of incidents affecting electronic communications"[16] (2015) – was designed to be a practical tool to assist the EU member states, especially the policy making area, in evaluating the impact of security incidents and designing better security policies.

The study contained three research stages – a desktop research phase, an online survey completed by selected national regulations authorities, and a telephone interview. The first finding is linked to the different approaches taken by the national authorities to measure the impact of the incidents. In this regard, the study introduced two main categories – the cooperative one, where the

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[14] ENISA, *Definition of Cybersecurity, Gaps and overlaps in standardization*, December 2015, available at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/definition-of-cybersecurity, accessed on 14 September 2017.
[15] ENISA, ibid p. 19, SDO – Standards Developing Organizations.
[16] ENISA, *Security incidents indicators – measuring the impact of incidents affecting electronic communications*, 2015, available at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/security-incidents-indicators, accessed on 10 September 2017.

national authorities are dynamically engaged in a collaborative approach with the provider to design measuring methods and determine indicators. In the second category, the providers are dealing with the national authorities by complying the requirements of the last, taking into consideration that the providers and the national authorities are using different measurement methodologies. This image is hiding the problematic task of identifying appropriate indicators and accurately measuring them. On the part of the national authorities, correctly identifying the indicators helps improving the risk assessment and the security measures, but also understanding how insecurity (expressed in security incidents) impacts the citizens.

On the other side, the approaches taken by the providers are also different, depending on theirs "level of maturity"[17]. The term refers to business maturity, collaboration level to the national authorities, local legislation and day-to-day practices. A mature service provider would have adopted a day-to-day practice of incident reporting based on indicators. Despite the advantages, measuring the impact of the incidents is considered a time consuming and expensive process, given that sometimes the provider should present two reports, one for the own purpose and the second one to the national authorities. Where the reporting procedure is not transparent and easy to implement, there is for sure a wasting time to write the reports. In some cases, the reporting activity is overlapping the troubleshooting process and delaying the solution delivery.

Among the commonly used indicators by the national authorities are the duration of an incident, the number of users impacted, the impact on interconnections, the impact on emergency services, networks and assets impacted, geographical area and the services affected. But the interesting fact about the above list is that every indicator could be measured by formulating and tracing the presence of more detailed indicators. The geographical area related indicators would allow many possibilities to measure the effects: based on the affected location(s), the infrastructure coverage, the number of affected customers and services in a determined geographic area. Nevertheless, the measurement of this indicators is becoming more complex, when different types of services are available and should be taken into consideration: fixed internet access, fixed telephony, mobile telephony and mobile internet access, among the most popular.

A different and revealing approach available for countries and service providers is determining the root cause of the incidents. If the former method to analyse the incidents seems to be more suitable for maintaining statistics and improving the incident reporting process, the second one allows the states to achieve more practical goals and benefits: the first gain is a better evaluation of whether investments in stronger infrastructure are needed, a better human resources management in the incident response process, identification of the cause of failure and proposing a tailored security policy depending on the most predominant incident types. Among the mostly used root causes dependent indicators are the human errors, the system failures, the natural phenomena, the internal and third-party failure and malicious actions or cyberattacks. The technical complexity has been reported as an impediment to provide an accurate description of the root cause of the incidents.

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[17] ENISA, ibidem, p. 11.

Figure no. 2. Indicators used by National Reporting Authorities and providers
Source: ENISA[18]

Other two methods to evaluate and asses the incidents are based on the economic impact indicators and impact on confidentiality, availability and integrity (CIA). The study is reporting that availability was the mostly used indicator among the national authorities. The CIA-method to assess the impact of an incident is also relevant due to be used to tailor policies within an organization for information security.

The purpose to introduce the ENISA study was to put in front the significance of the security incidents in the cybersecurity debate and the diversity of the root causes of the incidents and the need for an indicator based approach in the cyber realm. In the next part, I will present the findings of the incidents report for 2015 based on root-cause indicators, as released by the same European Agency.

3. The annual incident reports

For the past five years, ENISA publishes regularly the annual incident report, where significant incidents across the European Union. The last report[19] has been released in 2016 and covers the significant outage incidents for 2015. The report is essential in better understanding the percentage of the root causes of major incidents.

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[18] ENISA, Security incidents indicators, p. 22.

[19] ENISA, *The Annual Incident Reports 2015 – Analysis of Article 13a annual incident reports in the telecom sector*, September 2016, available at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/annual-incident-reports-2015, accessed on 1 September 2017.

B.1 Incidents per root cause category (percentage)

Incidents per root cause category (percentage)

- Malicious actions
- Natural phenomena
- Human errors
- System failures

Figure no. 3. Incidents per root cause category.
Source: ENISA[20]

The study analysed 138 major incidents reported by 21 countries including two EFTA[21] countries. The mobile internet has been the most affected service: 44% of all reported incidents affected mobile internet. By comparison, the two types of services – mobile internet and mobile telephony were the predominant affected services in the previous years too, except for 2014 where fixed telephony was the most affected. A further finding of the report is that the system failures are the dominant root cause of incidents. Most incidents were caused by system failures or technical failures (70 % of the incidents) as a root cause. The system failure remains, according the report, the dominant root cause for all the reporting years so far. The software bugs and hardware failures were the most common root causes affecting network elements.

Figure 35: Assets affected by the incidents (percentage).

Figure no. 4. Overall assets affected by the incidents.
Source: ENISA[22]

The human errors affected on average more user connections per incident -around 2.6 million user connections on average per incident. The second place was taken by system failures with 2.4 million user connections on average per incident. The total number of incidents caused by malicious

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[20] ENISA, ibid, p. 42.

[21] European Free Trade Association.

[22] ENISA, ibid, p. 30, PSTN - Public Switched Telephone Network.

actions dropped to 2.5% from higher previous values (9.6% in 2014). This may indicate that the malicious actions are not necessarily aiming at causing unavailability of services, but might have other objectives. By comparison with the other root causes, the malicious actions started causing long lasting incidents: Although the volume was not high, the incidents caused by malicious actions had most impact in terms of duration, on average almost two days per incident.

Conclusion

The root causes of incidents affecting electronic communication services or determining indicators in this regard have minimal significance for the security agenda of the states, which underlies the hypothesis that the ontology of cybersecurity is still incomplete and more investigation is needed in order to achieve the full picture. The present article aimed to bring to attention an alternative system of security concepts, where cyberattacks are replaced by security incidents and where cybersecurity becomes network security. In this context, I recalled the "essentially contested security term" and "contingency contested security term" and I presented the ENISA Annual Incident Report 2015 published, whom results contest contingently and the essence of cybersecurity.

Other two ENISA studies have been introduced in this article to consolidate the understanding of cybersecurity as an observable, concrete phenomenon. By revealing different domains within the term of cybersecurity – communications security, operations security, information security, military security, physical security and public/national security – new objects are added as referents of the cybersecurity.

The practice of reporting security incidents by applying indicators leads to a complete overview of what is covered by the term cybersecurity: not only cyberattacks, but also human errors, system failures, natural phenomena, internal and third-party failure. As we know now that cybersecurity is more than cyber threats, the epistemological and methodological question are open: how and where should we look for knowledge regarding network security and how we integrate the comprehensive understanding of the interconnected networks in the social sciences field.

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WORLD'S GREAT MILITARY POWERS' STRATEGIES ON CYBER WARFARE

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Abstract: With a budget of over 600 billion dollars and almost 1.5 million active employees, the US Army is considered to be the most powerful and best-equipped army in the world. Russia, on the other hand, allocates 5.4% of its gross domestic product for defense, more than any other NATO member, the armed forces being made up of 845.000 people. About China we know for certain that it has the largest army in the world, somewhere around 2.3 million combatants.

The way in which the three most important military forces in the world manage cyberspace, both from the doctrinal and legislative point of view and from a practical perspective (how they responded to certain cyber aggressions, tactics adopted in offensive cyber operations and the examination of authorities with attributions in cyberspace) is a source of inspiration in trying to find the "antidote" for the vulnerabilities of Romanian cyber infrastructures.

Keywords: strategy, cyber security, cyberspace, cyber operations.

Introduction

Information and communication technology is the branch of technology with the fastest pace of development. This rising pace was more or less present throughout the world. In order for Romania and the Ministry of National Defense implicitly to keep pace with this evolution, it is necessary to constantly review how to approach the cyberspace. An analysis of how this issue is managed by the three largest armed forces in the world can help to improve the process of developing, promoting and implementing military regulations with implications in the field.

1. United States of America

Despite the perception of the United States as a force in technology and innovation, it continues to remain behind many other nations in terms of Internet access and connectivity. In a study available on the International Telecommunication Union website, the US ranks 49th in a top of the states whose citizens use the internet with 74.45%, following countries such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates or Taiwan[1]. According to the same study, last updated on May 16, 2017, Romania ranks 92 with 55.76%, Russia 62 with 70.1% and China ranks 104 with 50.3%.

However, with regard to the development of cyber security policy and strategy, the US has always been at the forefront of the world. The first national cyber security strategy was developed by the US Government in February 2003 – The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace[2]. In the European Union, for example, the first countries that adopted similar strategies were Germany in 2005 and Sweden in 2006.

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[1] ***, The percentage of individuals using the Internet. Data from the International Telecommunication Unit, 16 May 2017, available at: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=emi9ik86jcuic_&ctype=l&strail=false& bcs=d&nsel m=h&met_y=i992&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=world&idim=world:Earth&idim=country:JP:KR:FR:DE&ifdim= world&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false&icfg#!ctype=c&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=s&met_y=i99H&scale_y=lin&ind_y =false&idim=country:CN:RO:RU:US&ifdim=country&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false accessed on October 13, 2017.

[2] ***, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003, available at: https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

The US Cyber Security Strategy has set three strategic objectives: preventing cyber-attacks against national critical infrastructure, reducing vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks, and minimizing cyber-attacks, while reducing recovery time after such attacks.

To achieve the three objectives, five directions of action have been established: ensuring the security of federal networks and systems, developing a cyber-incidents response system, developing a program to reduce cyber threats, risks and vulnerabilities, initiating awareness and training program in the field of cyber security, as well as the development of an international cooperation system.

Until now, the US cyber security policy has been made up of segmental measures. Thus, there is no framework legislation on cyber security, being rather fragmented on different "plots" of the entire cyber spectrum. At the end of 2014, there were over 50 normative acts that regulated, directly or indirectly, various aspects of cyber security[3]. The absence of a framework document to synthesize these documents, coupled with a lack of description of how normative acts fall within the national cyber security strategy, makes it difficult to clearly set the objectives and strategic priorities set for cyber security.

The National Defense Strategy from 2008[4] acknowledged, among others, the use of cyber space for malicious operations as a strategic vulnerability. Subsequently, through the Internal Security Review Report of February 2010[5], a document prepared by the Department of Homeland Security every four years, "cyber-protection and security" has been identified as one of the five priority missions on internal security of the US. Three months later, the National Security Strategy of May 2010[6] saw a special focus on cyber threats. It also represented a new approach to the characterization of cyber threats, emphasizing the shift from non-state terrorism to state-sponsored activities and from a predominantly political concern to an economic one.

In order to implement the National Security Strategy and meet the objectives set out in the Internal Security Review Report, in November 2011, the Department of Homeland Security drew up an action plan[7] that included and delimitated at the same time two lines of action: critical information infrastructures and the strengthening of cyber ecosystems.

Respecting the chronology of the emergence of cyber-related documents requires mentioning another very important act – the International Strategy for Cyberspace[8] published in May 2011. The document reflects the US's willingness to engage in international partnerships and share national priorities. The main objective of the strategy is to promote an open, interoperable and secure infrastructure for communications and information to support international trade, strengthen international security and promote freedom of expression and innovation.

The Internal Security Review Report of June 2014[9] reiterated the need to continue to fulfill the five fundamental missions set in 2010, including the protection and security of the cyberspace, with the remark that they will be redefined and updated according to the evolution of threats to national security. The report has clarified the Department of Defense's responsibility to develop and

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[3] According to a report by Eric A. Fischer, *Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview of Major Issues, Current Laws, and Proposed Legislation*, 12 December 2014, available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[4] ***, National Defence Strategy, Department of Defence, United States of America, June 2008, available at http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2008NationalDefenseStrategy.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

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[8] ***, International Strategy for Cyberspace. Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, May 2011, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[9] 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

expand cyber capabilities for US defense and support for international military missions. The Department of Cyber Defense has also been found in the March 2014 Defense Review Report[10]: to defend the integrity of its own IT systems and networks, as well as those of other national authorities, to conduct cyber operations outside of the US and, last but not least, to defend the United States against cyber-attacks that could harm the vital interests of the country. It should be noted that the 2014 report has developed one of the departmental goals set out four years ago - "to operate effectively in the virtual environment"[11].

The current National Security Strategy[12], adopted in February 2015, recognizes the increasing threat of cyber-attacks with disruptive or even destructive effects, announcing the US intention to strengthen the cyber security of critical infrastructures, supplement cyber investment, and hold accountability cyber actors with hostile intentions. The document focuses on the United States' goal of promoting international rules that regulate activity in the virtual environment.

The priorities set out in the National Security Strategy are also backed up in the national Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America[13] setting out one of the four intelligence community missions: detecting and analyzing cyber threats in a timely manner to facilitate cyber operations. The strategy reaffirms objectives such as the development of partnerships and the exchange of information, along with the expansion of technological capabilities.

On the military side, the National Military Strategy for Cyber Operations[14], developed in 2006, was the first document describing the approach of cyber operations from a military perspective. The document identified the role of the armed forces in protecting US interests by engaging cyber operations in the virtual environment. According to the strategy, the Department of Defense will focus on cyber space to meet national military objectives in the fields of military operations, information and business.

In 2011, the US National Military Strategy[15] was launched in which the evolution of cyberspace was invoked in a new warfare environment. This document focuses primarily on goals such as network defense and resilience.

The Information Operations Doctrine[16], elaborated on November 27, 2012 and revised on November 20, 2014, details the planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of information operations across the range of military operations.

The US Army's cyber electromagnetic activities (2014)[17] provide doctrinal guidance and action directions for conducting electromagnetic activities, with emphasis on tactics, planning, integration, and synchronization procedures. Doctrine combines cyber operations with electronic warfare elements and electromagnetic spectrum management. In addition to this document, Cyberspace Operations[18], released on February 5, 2013, addresses the uniqueness of military operations in cyberspace, clarifies cyber operations, and includes operational lessons learned.

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[10] Document prepared by the Defense Department every four years (similar to the one prepared by the Department of Homeland Security) available at http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[11] February 2010 defense review report, available at https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[12] ***, National Security Strategy, May 2010, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[13] ***, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 2014, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[14] ***, National Military Strategy for Cyber Operations, 2006, available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-023.pdf> accessed on October 13, 2017.

[15] ***, US National Military Strategy, 2011, available at https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/NMS_Feb2011.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[16] ***, The Information Operations Doctrine, 27 November 2012, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[17] ***, US Army's cyber electromagnetic activities, 2014, available at https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-38.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[18] ***, Cyberspace Operation, 5 February 2013, available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf> accessed on October 13, 2017.

The US Department of Defense's current approach to the virtual environment is detailed in the 2015 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy[19], which provides more transparency when it comes to offensive and operational capabilities of the department.

Last but not least, the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) war program should also be mentioned called Plan X which develops US Defense Department platforms to plan, deploy and evaluate cyber war in a way similar to traditional warfare.

We note, therefore, that the US pays special attention to cyberspace, addressing it in a comprehensive and transparent manner.

2. The Russian Federation

Russia's cyber capabilities are extremely advanced, with Moscow demonstrating its willingness to use it in a wide range of situations, often other than war, with the aim of influencing political and economic scenarios, especially in neighboring countries, but also to discourage traditional opponents.

Russia has a different approach to the whole cyber domain compared to the West, from defining cyber war to its strategic use.

Russians generally do not use terms such as "cyber" or "cyber war", except when they refer to Western or foreign works on the subject. Instead, like the Chinese, they tend to use the term "informatization" including cyber operations in the wider area of the informational war. The term, as used by Russian military theorists, is an all-encompassing concept that includes operations in computer networks, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and information operations. In other words, cyber is seen as a mechanism that allows the state to dominate the informational landscape, which is regarded as an area of independent warfare. Ideally, cyber should be engaged as part of an effort, alongside somewhat "traditional" weapons of informational warfare that would be familiar to any student of Russian military doctrine, including information operations, psychological operations, electronic war and political subversion.

The ramifications of this conceptual distinction, both for the way the Russians use the term "cyber" and under what conditions, are considerable. According to the Russian Military Doctrine[20] issued on February 5, 2010, a feature of the modern military conflict is the prior implementation of information warfare measures to achieve political goals without the use of military force and, in the alternative, the development of a favorable response from the community for the use of force. By default, the tools of the warfare should be used before military operations are triggered to achieve the state's goals without the need to use force, and if its use is inevitable, disorienting and demoralizing the enemy but also securing justifying state actions in the eyes of society. Thus, the informational war and the extension, the cyber war, become legitimate instruments of the state, both in peacetime and in war.

Russian military specialists in areas such as information operations and asymmetric military tactics have noticed that information can be used to destabilize government, organize anti-government protests, influence public opinion, but especially to diminish the opponent's will to oppose. Information operations provide the Russian government with the perfect "camouflage" to achieve these goals, allowing Russia to maintain a plausible degree of denial in organizing misinformation campaigns[21]. The Russians also noted that information operations must be triggered before traditional military operations, with the role of preparing the potential battlefield.

So the role of the cyber offensive is somewhat downgraded, being a supportive, though significant, way of supporting the state towards informational domination at all stages of the conflict.

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[19] ***, The DoD Cyber Strategy, April 2015, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/dod_cyber_2015.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.
[20] "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on 5 February 2010, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.
[21] See the details of the conflict in Ukraine.

According to the Russians, according to traditional Leninist notions[22] to fight against constant foreign and internal threats, confrontation in the "information space" is more or less constant but endless – it does not know physical or temporal limits, cyber war being basically part of the information. I do not agree with such an approach; indeed, the West in general and the US in particular, as can be seen from the analysis that I have developed in the previous chapter, regard cyber war as a separate field, distinct from the informational warfare and psychological aspects associated. This may be a not surprising explanation, given the broad conception of the information warfare in Russian theory, the concentration of Russian cyber operations at strategic and long-term rather than operational or tactical levels.

While Russian theorists are discussing what they call information operations against the enemy forces highlighted in the 2008 war with Georgia, most of the real uses of information weapons were not directed against combat forces or military commandments, but aimed at nerve centers of governments or society.

Indeed, the "information-psychological" aspect of using press and media against the information space of a target is a key, as many others in Russian definitions given to information operations and information warfare.

The strategic focus has influenced, or in turn was influenced, how Russia has organized cyber forces. In the cyber arena, the Russian army appeared with some delay. For many years, cyberspace management has been attributed to state security services. For example, the Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB) appears to be the main actor of the Russian Federation in coordinating the misinformation and propaganda campaigns conducted in the virtual environment. The FSB also maintains and operates the STORM[23] internal system of oversight.

The Federal Office for Telecommunications, Information Technology and Mass Communication (Roskomnadzor), which is responsible for media surveillance, including electronic, information technology, telecommunications and mass communications, controls and regulates the media.

Cybercrime is managed by the K Department of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del).

Following the dismantling of the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti – State Security Committee) at the end of 1991 and its division into several independent departments, the Federal Agency for Communications and Governmental Information (through the merger of the 8th Headquarters – Communications Government with 16th Directorate – Electronic Information) which until 2003 functioned as a separate agency for information security. On March 11, 2003, this agency turned into the FSB's Communications and Special Information Service, a year later, the service was incorporated as a sub-unit of the Federal Service for Protection of the Russian Federation (Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrany).

Together, all the agencies listed above have established the Russian doctrinal bases in the cyber field, and are also responsible for coordinating and executing cyber operations inside and outside Russia.

From a military point of view, cyber operations were limited to those areas where the cyber domain overlapped with the electronic warfare. This situation has changed somewhat following the 2008 conflict with Georgia. Although the conflict has ended victoriously for the Russian forces, it has also exposed serious operational and organizational deficiencies, including in conducting information operations.

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[22] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin believed that only through the efforts of a communist party the proletariat can attain the revolutionary consciousness.

[23] *The system for operative investigative activities* was created and implemented in 1996, initially to monitor telephone communications. Subsequently, the system was replaced by a better version that allowed monitoring of Internet activity in addition to telephone communications. Thus, Russian internet service providers have to install on the servers they own, also bearing the related costs, a special device that allows the FSB to monitor credit card transactions, emails or web activity.

As a result, the Russian Defense Ministry announced, together with other military reforms, the establishment of an army structure responsible for conducting information operations, consisting of specially trained staff. It was meant to be made up of specialists in varied fields ranging from linguists and journalists to psychological operations or even hackers. This combination of specializations and skills would have allowed information teams to engage the target audience on an ample front because, in an informational war, the use of "mass informational armies" to develop a direct dialogue with people on the Internet is much more effective than the mediation dialogues between the leaders of the states and the peoples. However, the Russian Defense Ministry failed to put into practice the way he wanted this project for several reasons. One of them is the FSB's rejection of military intrusion on its land, implicitly opposed to the initiative. Another reason, a situation our country faces unfortunately, is that computer science graduates are hard to lure because of the more advantageous options in the private sector. In-term militaries, on the other hand, are not a viable solution because of the too short period, only one year being insufficient to be trained and used in an effective manner.

The idea did not disappear; in 2013 the Russian government announced that it was planning to set up a cyber unit whose responsibilities would include the engagement of defensive and offensive cybernetic operations. Another important milestone was the establishment of a research and development agency – the Advanced Military Research Foundation that wants to be the "counterpart" of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the US. From an investment point of view, it is a rival to be taken into account by the Americans and not only because that, for example, in 2014 had a budget of about 100 million dollars[24]. Russia tried to complete the establishment and operational of these military structures with attributions in cyberspace until the current year[25], but the exact stage is not known yet because they have encountered problems as I have presented above, the biggest ones being related to the weighting of specialists IT due to competition with the private sector.

In the long run, however, if the Russian army were to succeed in developing its own cyber capabilities, the result would be more intense use of cyber operations, both in support of conventional operations, but also as stand-alone actions.

3. People's Republic of China

China's cyber strategy focuses on the use of information warfare, as well as on the surveillance, exploitation and even attacking foreign sites.

China's cyber capabilities have become more and more visible lately, with the Chinese launching extensive offensive operations, in particular intelligence gathering, but not limited to, several countries, such as Japan[26], because of its interpretation historical events to the detriment of China, Taiwan[27] due to claims of independence or US[28] more for economic reasons.

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[24] ***, *"Military Research Foundation to Receive $100M in 2014"*, in *The Moscow Times,* 21 January 2014, available at https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/military-research-foundation-to-receive-100m-in-2014-31257, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[25] ***, "Russia to Create Cyberwarfare Units by 2017", in *Sputnik News*, 30 January 2014, available at https://sputniknews.com/military/20140130187047301-Russia-to-Create-Cyberwarfare-Units-by-2017/, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[26] Following a disagreement between the two countries about the collision of a Chinese trawler and two Japanese coastguard vessels on September 7, 2010, Japanese officials announced two weeks later that the sites of the Ministry of Defense and the National Police Agency have been the victims of a DDoS attack – according to a news available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2010/09/19/2003483219, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[27] Michael Gold, "Taiwan a 'testing ground' for Chinese cyber army", in *Reuters*, 19 July 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-taiwan-cyber-idUSBRE96H1C120130719, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[28] The most significant being the 2003 APT Titan Rain campaign allegedly deployed by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Armed Forces of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China) over a period of three years, as well as attacks on the US Naval War College in 2006, which resulted in the website and emails of the college being shut down for several weeks, and the replacement of affected computer systems – according to Josh Rogin in *"China is suspected of hacking into Navy site"* available at https://fcw.com/articles/2006/12/04/china-is-suspected-of-hacking-into-navy-site.aspx, accessed on October 13, 2017.

In analyzing China's cyberspace approach is very important how cyber was embedded in the Chinese armed forces' strategic activities in peacetime, but also in China's potential to use cyber force as a preventive strategy.

As in the case of Russia, the term "cyber" is not widely used in China, generally being the word "informatization", which, according to the explanatory dictionary of the Romanian language means "to use computer science in solving problems". By analyzing the definition, we observe that the term "computerization" is related to "cyber", so that the use of the phrase "informatized war", depending on the context, could be considered synonymous with the term "cyber war". In the Chinese sense, the word informatization includes both space capabilities and cyber operations, where the latter cover the cyberspace of the vast computerization term.

On March 19, 2006, China adopts the National Informatization Development Strategy[29] for 2006-2020. Even if it is not specifically a military document, the strategic objectives outlined also have implications in this area as it was aimed at: developing an informatized[30] national infrastructure, strengthening the native capacity of innovation in information technology, general optimization of structures within the IT industry, substantial improvement of computer security, etc. Two years later, in China's National Defense Document in 2008[31] it was already said at that time that the increase of the armed forces through informatization, as the main criterion for evaluation, is an important objective of the national defense policy.

China's White Paper on Defense, in both editions 2010[32] and 2013[33], contains references to the fact that the great powers of the globe vigorously develop new and sophisticated military technologies to ensure they can maintain their strategic superiority in outer space and in the virtual space. This is one of the objectives of the Chinese armed forces, namely to protect the interests of national security in space, but especially in the virtual environment.

The concept of information has always been extremely important in China's military strategies, and the contemporary emphasis does not deviate too much from the lines drawn in ancient Chinese strategies. Consequently, it is necessary to become aware of the guiding principles of the Chinese army's activities before engaging ourselves in examining actions with implications for the cyberspace.

The Academy of Military Sciences, China's most prestigious research institute, published in 2013 the Science of Military Strategy[34], which is in the third edition after 1987 and 2001. Puts a great emphasis on cyber conflict and elaborates developments of the high technology warfare, providing guidance on how to behave in such circumstances. It is very important to mention that in the paper it is shown that the area of military operations is no longer limited to the three classic terrestrial, air and maritime environments, adding two more: outer space and the virtual environment. Also, in the information warfare section, it is very clear that the People's Republic of China has specialized network warfare units operating both on military and civilian levels, performing both offensive and defensive cyber operations.

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[29] ***, 2006-2020 National Informatization Development Strategy, 19 March 2006, available at https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2006/03/19/2006-2020-national-informatization-development-strategy/, # accessed on October 13, 2017.

[30] For this section we will use the term "informatization" as it appears in the official documents of China, but it can be easily replaced by the word "cyber".

[31] Written by Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China and available at https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[32] ***, China's National Defense in 2010, March 2011, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/1_1a.pdf?_=1316627912, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[33] ***, The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces Information Office of the State Council The People's Republic of China April 2013, Beijing, available at http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/China_Defense_White_Paper_ 2013.pdf, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[34] Analyzed by Mingda's Qiu, *China's Science of Military Strategy: Cross-Domain Concepts in the 2013 Edition*, available at http://deterrence.ucsd.edu/_files/Chinas%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy%20Cross-Domain%20 Concepts%20in%20the%202013%20Edition%20Qiu2015.pdf> accessed on October 13, 2017.

In October 2014, China's President Xi Jingping approved the publication of the Opinion on further enhancement of military information security[35], which lists the basic principles and priorities of the Chinese armed forces, as well as directives for military intelligence officers.

In mid-2015, the Chinese defense ministry issued China's Military Strategy[36], which is in fact the latest version of the White Charter on Defense. Emphasis is placed on war computerization, declaring China's intention to further develop its cyber force, cyber defense, and international cooperation on virtual environments. It is worth noting that the document reaffirms China's goal of building a computerized army to secure its success in the upcoming computerized wars.

China's ambition to achieve excellence in cyberspace is linked to the belief that dismantling networks and computer systems, as well as operating systems of the opponent in the early phases of the war, would lead to a quick victory. By examining carefully the official documents available, we can affirm without mistaking that the Chinese People's Republic is heading towards an approach that converges cyber operations to traditional ones.

Conclusions

Romania is on a good track in developing and implementing strategies that regulate or interfere with the virtual environment. However, taking into account the constantly evolving field, as well as the obligations assumed at the alliances of which the Romanian state is still part, certain measures must be taken. These could include: improving and stepping up the level of inter-institutional and multinational cooperation in the field of cyber defense through training, information exchange and exercises; developing the cyber security capabilities of all cyber infrastructures it manages to ensure a prompt response to any form of virtual aggression; improving investigation capabilities in the virtual environment, analysis and monitoring; strengthening cyber infrastructures.

It should also be noted that the adoption by the European Union of Directive 2016/1148 of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union requires Member States and, implicitly, Romania to adopt a national strategy for network and information security. It will form the framework that provides strategic objectives and priorities for network and information security at national level.

This paper can contribute to the way in which the problem of cyberspace is managed in Romania, especially from a military perspective. The strategic approaches of the world's three most powerful armies to the virtual environment can be examples for Romania in general and the Ministry of National Defense in particular.

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[35] ***, Opinion on further enhancement of military information security, available at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/ 2014-10/08/content_4541948.htm, accessed on October 13, 2017.

[36] ***, China's Military Strategy The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China May 2015, Beijing, available at http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2015/150526_Chinaxs_ Military_Strategy.pdf accessed on October 13, 2017.

6. Website of Chinese Ministry of National Defense, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/ FM 3-38, Cyber electromagnetic activities, Department of the Army, Washington DC, February 12, 2014.

7. Website of President Barack Obama Administration, https://Obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/

8. Website of Russian Ministry of Defence, http://eng.mil.ru/.

9. Website of U.S. Army, https://www.army.mil/

10. Website of U.S. Defense Technical Information Center, http://dtic.mil/dtic/.

11. Website of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/.

ACTUAL CYBER DEFENCE CHALLENGES
FOR THE CZECH ARMED FORCES

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Abstract: The paper deals with cyber threats and their implications for the Czech Ministry of Defence and the Czech Armed Forces. System causes of cyber threats, trends and the concept of cyberspace as a new warfighting domain are discussed. NATO, EU and the Czech Republic's strategic documents dealing with cyber threats and strategies are analysed from the point of view of required capabilities within the framework of roles and responsibilities of bodies dealing with cyber security and cyber defence. Required capabilities are deducted from the tasks specified from legislation, implied from NATO and EU membership, and from created strategic and operational scenarios. Based on comparison of required capabilities and current state, the paper proposes solutions for the future. The proposed solutions enable harmonization of defence in cyberspace with the defence of the Czech Republic, ensure defence of cyberspace and integrate cyber capabilities into joint conduct of operations.

Keywords: Cyberspace, Cyber Security, Cyber Defence, Cyberspace Operations.

Introduction

A "Cyber" terminology is widely used in security discussions. Cyberspace, cyber threats, cyber crimes, cyber security and cyber defence are widely used but not all of them have full recognition and accepted definitions. Concerning the Czech Republic, cyber security law was issued in 2015, assurance of cyber security and cyber defence are enlisted among the Czech Republic strategic interests. A law dealing with Military Intelligence is being modified with defining specific role of Military Intelligence towards Cyber Defence. During North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, NATO recognised „cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land, and at sea".

Understanding of the cyber defence term is not common in the Czech Republic and in the Czech Army. The Army lacks a doctrine for cyberspace operations, as well as experts who would work on the topic systemic.

The threat the Czech Republic (and other states) faces up is not hypothetical. Understanding, identification and elimination of threats in peace time or utilization of all operation domains during operations are crucial capabilities required to protect state's national interests in cyberspace.[1]

There are many definitions of cyberspace in use. In the context of the paper, we use cyberspace as "a global domain within the information environment, consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers."[2]

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[1] Dyčka, Lukáš; Procházka, Josef; Landovský, Jakub, „Czech Defence Policy Response to Dynamics in its Security Environment – Assessment and Recommendations", in *Czech Military Review,* vol. 25 (57), Special Volume, 2016, p. 15.
[2] *Joint Publication 3-12 (R)*, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf.

Due to technological and social development, "cyberspace is expanding, becoming increasingly vulnerable, and hosting increasingly vast amounts of (sometimes critical) data.[3] The assets[4] that can be reached through cyberspace foster the number of bad actors seeking to exploit cyberspace for criminal or malicious purposes. These trends are, if we do not suppose a collapse of our civilization, irreversible so the cyber dimension is a crucial factor of security environment.

1. System causes of cyber threats and factor analysis

Growing value of assets in cyberspace attracts potential attackers.

It is almost impossible to develop fully secured applications and systems without any vulnerability which can be used for cyberattacks.

Even physical separation of networks or systems does not ensure protection from cyber attack.[5]

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems (SCADA) controlling technical systems use computers that are not updated regularly (minimal intervention to a functioning system). Installing of security patches is not a priority from the point of view of production or operation.

Availability of software and hardware for cyber attacks grows up. Computer power becomes cheaper, malware and botnets can be bought in Internet. The availability of these resources increases the range of potential attackers. On the other hand, the development of a sophisticated cyber attack requires considerable resources and expertise.[6]

It is difficult to uncover perpetrators of cyber attacks and bring them to criminal responsibility (attacks are usually conducted through third party hacked computers), reducing the possibility of effective deterrence. Both state and non-state actors make use of it.

Macro-environmental factors were analysed in political, economic, technological, legislative, and military areas.

Political: Public cyberspace is primarily linked to the Internet, environment for e-government services, media, social networks, and other communication and information exchange tools. This part of cyberspace provides means of influencing public opinion and propaganda. The Internet is under control in totalitarian or authoritarian states such as China, Iran, and partly the Russian Federation. These states have tried to regulate the Internet within the International Telecommunication Union, while states sharing Euro-Atlantic values stand for the opinion that the Internet should remain a free space.

Economic: Cyberspace is an enabling environment for the advanced economy (exchange and sharing of information, trade). It is also environment where assets exist - information, electronic money (economic espionage, electronic accounts, payments), and cyberspace is the domain in which assets and values are directly generated (software applications, games, multimedia, etc.). This make, as noted above, the cyberspace environment attractive for illegal activities.

Technological: The rapid development of technology allows the increase of the volume of data and information that is shared in cyberspace. This leads to expansion of the "attack zone", as new vulnerabilities are emerging, both in infrastructure controlling systems and in terminal equipment (computers, mobile phones, etc.)

Legal: The applicability of international law in cyberspace is addressed in the Tallinn Manual.[7] It deals with cyberwar in a framework of international and other armed conflicts. Rules that are the result of the work of an expert team have emerged as a consensus, but not all areas are

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[3] Emerging Cyber Threats and Implications, available at http://1url.cz/9tIgU.

[4] Also in negative meaning, i.e damage that can be caused through cyberspace.

[5] De Falco, Marco, Stuxnet Facts Report. A Technical and Strategic Analysis, April 2012, available at https://ccdcoe. org/multimedia/stuxnet-facts-report-technical-and-strategic-analysis.html.

[6] Ibidem, pp. 20, 26.

[7] Schmitt, Michael N., *Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare*, Cambridge University Press, 2013, available at https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/356296245.pdf.

covered by clearly defined rules. At the Czech Republic level, the legislative standard is the Cyber Security Law and the related laws (Cyber Security Act) and regulations. The law focuses on cyber security and critical information infrastructure protection, implementing regulations, then defines critical and important information systems and imposes obligations on operators. The nature of cyberspace makes it harder to enforce laws, because of these facts:

- Control over cyberspace is not related to the control of the territory according to internationally recognized borders.
- It is almost impossible to assign an attacker to the attack (attribution problem).
- In cyberspace counterattacks, it is difficult to determine the adequacy of the response and the possible consequences in advance, especially because the source of the attack (the infected computer, the network) may be hacked too and used by a hidden attacker.
- Military: actual operations are unimaginable without adequate information systems. Modern weapon systems include control computers connected to command and control systems. This makes them targets of cyber-attacks, because the disruption of these information systems or the weapon systems prevents an opponent from using them. The cyberspace dimension, i.e. the protection of own systems against attacks and conducting offensive operations against enemy systems, must be considered in a capability development process.

Discussion whether cyberspace is or is not a warfighting domain is quite interesting. Pros[8] and cons[9] have both practical implications, because from military point of view it leads to changes in force structures and resource allocation. From the Czech Army point of view the recognition of cyberspace as a warfighting domain by NATO[10] implies a challenge for capability development in that domain.

2. Tasks for cyber defence

The tasks for cyber defence were deducted from sources shown in Figure No. 1.

Figure no. 1. Sources of Cyber Defence tasks.
Source: Aktuální úkoly kybernetické obrany rezortu Ministerstva obrany [11]

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[8] Welch, Larry D. *Cyberspace – the Fifth Operational Domain*, available at https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate /Files/Publications/ResearchNotes/RN2011/2011%20Cyberspace%20-%20The%20Fifth%20Operational%20Domain.pdf.

[9] Libicki, Martin, „Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain", *in A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society*, volume 8, no. 2, Fall 2012, pp. 325-340, available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP5 1077.html.

[10] ***, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, available online at http://1url.cz/MtQEy.

[11] Feix, Miroslav a Dalbor Procházka, „Aktuální úkoly kybernetické obrany rezortu Ministerstva obrany", in Czech Military Review, no. 3/2017, available at http://www.vojenskerozhledy.cz/kategorie/aktualni-ukoly-kyberneticke.

Analysing NATO and EU politics, concepts and capability targets, the following tasks were identified:

- responsibility for own networks protection,
- resilience and information assurance,
- interoperability of networks and cyber defence,
- information sharing,
- common education,
- cooperation with industry,
- cooperation with academia, incorporation of Cyber Defence into operation planning and conducting,
- incorporation of Cyber Defence into military exercises,
- transparent command and control structure in cyber domain,
- capability to create a common picture of own networks and cyberspace states.

Tasks given by the national cyber security laws and concepts:

- protection of own unclassified and classified networks (the law does not explicitly deal with the classified networks) and critical infrastructure,
- cyber defence,
- meeting established standards for systems embedded in major information systems and critical infrastructure,
- the obligation to share information,
- implementing measures to protect networks and infrastructure,
- coordination system,
- command and control system.

To identify other cyber defence relevant tasks, four basic scenarios were developed. The first two scenarios addressed a strategic level. The first one dealt with massive technical attack on the state interests, the second scenario focused on information attack through and in cyberspace.

The other two scenarios addressed the role of cyber domain in operations. The first one developed activities and tasks during JOINT operations, the second one dealt with national tasks in case of kidnaped Czech citizens abroad.

The structure of all scenarios was as follows:

- the reasons for the scenario,
- the story that describes the situation and its possible developments
- the situation description in the PMESII[12] structure,
- the end state relevant to the scenario,
- the tasks that must be performed.

Analysing the possible tasks required in the scenarios, it is possible to summarize the tasks in several large groups.

1) Resilience and Information Assurance.
2) Cyberspace Information Acquisition.
3) Cyberspace Operations.
4) Cyberspace Information Operations.
5) Command, Control and Coordination.

Resilience and Information Assurance. A set of tasks involving two concepts, resilience and information assurance, overlapping each other. Resilience is the "*capability of an organization, system or network to resist threats and brace itself against the influence of outages.*"[13] From the military point of view, it has to be said that these are activities on own systems. From a non-military

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[12] PMESII - political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems.
[13] Jirásek, Petr, Luděk Novák a Josef Požár, *Výkladový slovník kybernetické bezpečnosti*, Česká pobočka AFCEA, Praha, 2013, available at http://afcea.cz/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Slovnik_Final_screen_v2_0.pdf.

point of view, interference with other outside systems is illegal, and therefore it is not even considered. Information assurance is rather a view of the state authorities. The Cyber Security Act[14] defines information assurance as a "security of information means ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability of information". Resilience and security of information are thus tasks related to building, security and protection of infrastructure and information of own systems. From the military point of view, it is still necessary to divide this area into critical infrastructure, military critical infrastructure and deployable infrastructure.

Cyberspace Information Acquisition. The intelligence services are responsible for obtaining, collecting and evaluating important information for constitutional system protection, important economic interests, security and defence of the Czech Republic. Basically, it is either gaining information from open sources or cyber spying. At the strategic level, information directly relates to a country life interests. Other kind of information, namely operational and tactical information, is required for own activities or conducting of operation. Information can be related to matters outside cyberspace, about cyberspace or activities in cyberspace.

Cyberspace Operations. This set of tasks creates the core of actions in cyberspace from the defence point of view. It consists of measures, preparation and use of cyber means in an offensive or a defensive manner.

Cyberspace Information Operations. Information activities are the widest concept of all ones in cyberspace. From the state point of view, the creation of an information-resistant society, strategic communication and, within its framework, the information operations are the most important tasks. The importance is given by impact of social media and information from the Internet on society and individuals.

Command, Control and Coordination The future operating environment is characterized by wiping of the boundaries between the external and internal threats, by the uncertainty of hostile military activity or cybercrime. It is impossible to prepare for threats and face them in some separate bubbles, according to organizational structures, without mutual co-operation or worse with rivalry. Tasks include management and coordination of the forces. In purely military terms, the tasks require to incorporate the cyber domain into operation planning and execution, into the joint effort of all forces to gain predominance over the enemy.

3. Required capabilities

According to analysis of cyber defence tasks, required capabilities are identified. A general view on capabilities is presented here focussing on what kind of capability should be created. A discussion about who should be the capability owner (specific unit, body, etc.) and capability quantitative characteristics should follow later. The required capabilities are divided by standard military classification in Main Capability Areas.[15]

Prepare. The defence department must be able to:
- develop and deploy capabilities to conduct operations in cyberspace,
- prepare fighter-specialist to conduct operations in cyberspace,
- prepare soldiers[16] to conduct operations in cyberspace,
- adapt the training system to support cooperation, research and innovation, flexibility and critical thinking.

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[14]   *Act No. 181 of 23 July 2014 On Cyber Security and Change of Related Acts*, available online at https://www.govcert.cz/download/legislation/container-nodeid-1122/actoncybersecuritypopsp.pdf.
[15]   SHAPE/ACT, Bi-SC Capability Hierarchy.
[16] The requiremets on specialists and soldiers are different.

The imperative of the time is to develop and enhance capabilities to conduct cyber operations in conceptual, doctrinal and practical ways. Nowadays, it is no longer possible to conduct cyberspace operations as a side affair, without proper military expertise. This is related to the creation of educational programs and studies at the University of Defence in Brno and to support this area at civilian universities. The specificity of cyberspace also implies the need to select suitable personnel to conduct operations. The complete system of preparation must form a future professional soldier who is able to cooperate and is flexible. The only certainty of the future environment is its change dynamics which requires adaptation, innovative approaches and solutions. In cyberspace, as a human-made and malleable domain, the rate of change is more pronounced and crucial for fighter-specialists.

Future operations will be a common, intertwined and integrated effort of all forces, the army services, state components in all domains and environments. Forces and resources for cyberspace operations cannot be built separately from others. Operations which use and utilize cyberspace must become a common part of the training and action of forces and the cybernetic theme must be included into all levels of career education.

Project. The Defence Department must develop following capabilities:
- infrastructure capabilities,
- deployable capabilities,
- reachback.

The projection of force in cyberspace has its own specifics. Projection as a physical move loses its relevance in cyberspace. On the contrary, there is a projection of force without the need for physical presence in cyberspace. The role of engagement without physical deployment of forces will be extended concurrently with use of reachback support. It is necessary to have the capabilities to ensure the functionality of own infrastructure and to conduct operations on own stationary networks. To act, connectivity of cyberspace will be used, so physical move is not necessary.

Despite the interconnectedness and high degree of physical location independence, it is necessary to create deployable capabilities that can quickly move into the area of operation, quickly deploy forces, create safe areas within cyberspace, and integrate cyber forces and resources (whether physically present, or remote) into a joint action.

Engage. The Defence Department must be able to operate in cyberspace and conduct the following operations:
- resilience of information assurance,
- defensive cyberspace operations,
- offensive cyberspace operations,
- strategic communication in cyberspace,
- information operations in cyberspace.

The first three operations are predominantly technical in nature and with impact on the physical world (networks, hardware, data), while the latter two primarily focus on the information environment.

Resilience and information assurance is a set of measures to design, build, configure, secure, manage, maintain and run communications and information systems to maintain data availability, integrity, credibility as well as authenticity and undeniability. This is the basic and necessary capability that every communication and information network operator must have. It is based both on the national requirements of cyber security, where such capability is sometimes referred to, as well as on the requirements and objectives of NATO's capabilities. These activities are always performed within own networks.

Defensive cyber operations are operations to protect and defend own, friendly and neutral networks. They ensure freedom of access and manoeuvre in cyberspace. These are a set of active and passive measures to transform the internal structure and character of cyberspace and

communication channels in it, such as "re-establish, re-secure, reroute, reconstitute, or isolate degraded or compromised local networks."[17] Defensive operations include active detection (e.g. using honeypot and trapping) of an intrusion and other enemy activities.

Offensive cyber operations are characterized by the active application of force in cyberspace. The goal is either to destroy infrastructure, communications routes, data and information channels, or to damage, manipulate and modify data and information. In the latter case, it is possible to see the possible interconnection with information operations.

Strategic communication and information operations in cyberspace. The actual and future operation environment will be characterized by information interconnection. Acting on information and decision making of an opponent will be a key element of success. It is true even in an actual operation environment, thus the armed forces must be capable to conduct information operations as well as defend against enemy actions in information environment. Cyberspace is an important part of the information environment with an ever-increasing share of influence. Mastery of methods and forms of strategic communication and information operations in cyberspace is a must.

Sustain. The Defence Department must build up:
- an appropriate acquisition system,
- a sufficiently robust structure,
- active reserves.

The development of IT technologies, methods and practices is much faster than in other relevant areas of procurement of materials and services for defence. The material becomes obsolete and, in many cases, unusable even after a very short time. The acquisition system where the investment is planned for five years ahead is completely inadequate for some of the tools needed. Another possible obstacle may be the openness of the acquisition process, where the precise knowledge of the cyber tools used also means that they are inapplicable. The acquisition process must be flexible, fast and secure.

Cyberspace operations run continuously even in peacetime. Therefore, it is necessary to build a sufficiently robust force structure and resources with required quantity and quality to ensure the fulfilment of the tasks. The advantage and drawback at the same time is the partial overlapping of defence activities with the civil sector. These are, in particular, IT specialists labour market, where government hardly compete with business for financial limitations or incompatibility of organizational cultures. It is possible to use the institute of active reserves in case of conducting a long-term operation or the need of one-time assistance.

Consult, command and control. The Defence Department must be capable of:
- coordination,
- unified command,
- international cooperation.

This area connects all other capabilities. Achieving the stated objectives requires the coordination and cooperation of all stakeholders including the private sphere, governmental and non-governmental organizations, intelligence services and the armed forces. Each actor has often different interests and goals. The solution is to create a platform for coordination, information sharing, deconflict and conformity-building mechanism in a peaceful time. Within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Army of the Czech Republic[18] (ACR) it supposes integration and compatibility of the all command and control systems.

Finally, the system must support international cooperation, fulfilment of commitments and mutual assistance. Cyberspace with non-clear and changing boundaries cannot be secured without a high degree of international cooperation, interoperability, and information sharing.

Protect. The MoD must be able to ensure:

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[17] *Joint Publication 3-12 (R)*, available online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_12R.pdf.
[18] Military Intelligence is under command of Ministry of Defence and it is not a part of ACR.

- protection of the individuals in cyberspace,
- operational safety,
- counter-intelligence protection,
- deception in cyberspace,
- security of the chain supply.

Protection of troops in cyberspace begins with the protection of each combatant and his identity, localization and affiliation to the armed forces during the course of actions. Shared personal information on social networks can be used to plan and manage operations and targeted campaigns. All measures and activities must support operational security and contributing to the fulfilment of tasks. Security includes also counter-intelligence protection. The digital footprint or its absence, left behind by an individual or organization, carries a lot of operationally useful information. "Radio silence" may not be the best solution; on the contrary, cyberspace can be used for deceptive operations to disrupt the opponent's perceptions and decisions and to force him to act against his interests.

In addition, it is necessary to protect the troops to ensure a secure supply chain, considering the requirements for cyber security. The risks of compromising not only cyber tools but also all "plug-in" techniques and devices need to be eliminated.

Inform. The Defence Department must be able to:

- collect intelligence – strategic, operational and tactical,
- information sharing.

It covers intelligence cyber operations aiming at collecting information on or through cyberspace on physical domains and from the information environment. Information serves to complement the common operational picture and to support own activities within cyberspace.

Intelligence tasks at several levels correspond to the standard division of intelligence tasks. Information from the cyberspace for strategic intelligence provides information for strategic state decision-making, long-term analysis, and trends.

Operational reports provide information for operation execution, primarily for intelligence preparation of the battlefield area (IPB). At the lowest level, tactical intelligence provides information to support tactical tasks. In cyberspace, activities related information collection will be widely intertwined, the techniques used in the tactical activity will be the same as for the strategic level. The difference is therefore in the goal and purpose of collecting information. Sufficiently robust force structures and their integration are necessary at all levels.

Sharing information about threats and how to deal with them is also important. Without a system that strikes a balance between security and the need for synergy, there will be duplicates and gaps in defence capabilities.

4. Proposed solution

At the level of Ministry of Defence. This level is covered by proposal of MoD Strategy and Action Plan. The gap is caused by different capability requirements of Information Assurance (Security Department) and Cyber Defence (Military Intelligence) areas. The solution is to join both concepts at strategic and operational levels. The proposed roles are in Table No 1.

Table no 1. System view on cyber security and cyber defence

Cyber Security Board under Ministry of Defence			
	Military Intelligence	Army of the Czech Republic	Security Department
Role in Cyber Security	Executive	Executive	Responsibility, conceptual, normative acts
Role in Cyber Defence	Responsibility, conceptual, normative acts, executive	Executive	Integration
	Strategic Intelligence Cyberspace operations Resilience and Information Assurance within own CIS	Operational and tactical intelligence Integration into operations Information operations in cyberspace Resilience and Information Assurance within own and MoD	

At the level of the Army of the Czech Republic – enabling Cyber Security and cyberspace operations execution. The army must concentrate primarily on an executive part of cyber security and the integration of cyber capabilities into joint operations. Below is a suggestion on what is to be done in each area, and what structures are needed.

Information operations in cyberspace. Information operations are in NATO's understanding staff coordination functions, using different capabilities, tools or techniques.[19] Therefore, cyberspace operations will need to be included in the tools used within the ACR. Other tools will need to be prepared and adapted to work in cyberspace. For example, psychological operations, deception, or operational security have specific features in cyberspace. Cyberspace is an important part of the information environment and its importance is constantly growing and ACR must adapt to this trend. Research and development of effective methods of information activity, detection of hostilities, and increasing resilience will require close cooperation with civilian universities and research institutes.

Operational and tactical intelligence. Within the framework of the Czech Armed Forces, it is necessary to create capabilities for gaining information from cyberspace at the operational and tactical levels. Army intelligence tasks would include:

- capabilities in open source reporting,
- developing and incorporating appropriate tools for information analysis,
- the use of advanced methods of data and information processing,
- monitoring and evaluation of open sources, especially social networks,
- geolocation of motion,

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[19] MC 0422/5. NATO Military Policy for Information Operations. Brussels: NATO Military Committee, 2014.

all without security break (intrusion). The capability to overcome enemy security during operation execution should be provided by Military Intelligence. Information from and about cyberspace must be part of the Common Operational Picture (COP).

Integrating cyberspace operations into joint operations. According to the assignment of roles and competences in cyberspace, the capability of cyber defence (as a part of cyberspace operations) is assigned to the Military Intelligence (MI). The MI already supports the operations of the forces abroad already, provides information and specific capabilities within the National Intelligence Cell (NIC) and the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST), or individuals within task forces. To accomplish operation's needs, it is possible to provide it in the same way.

MI needs to build capabilities deployable within task forces, i.e. teams that can conduct cyberspace operations at expert level and their integration into joint operations, planning and command. To efficiently conduct cyberspace operations, a joint command staff training and understanding of the capabilities in cyberspace are also prerequisites.

Resilience and Information Assurance within own and MoD CIS. The capability to protect own networks is well-designed at the conceptual level. It is necessary to "pursue" the intentions in the design of a cyber security sector strategy, implement technical measures, recruit enough experts, and educate users at all levels.

For tactical units, a deployable portion of capabilities must be built up to ensure resilience and information assurance while deployed in operations, as well as structures implementing and enforcing CIS security measures during daily business.

Conclusions

The paper deals with the issue of security and defence in the cyberspace with emphasis on the Czech Republic's Ministry of Defence and the Army of the Czech Republic. It identifies the tasks incoming from the national legislation, obligations given by memberships in NATO and EU, future operational environment and developed scenarios to identify required capabilities. A proposal of roles and responsibilities and how to distribute them to build missing capabilities is given. The proposal focuses on the qualitative part of the capabilities.

To ensure security and defence in cyberspace, however, it is not enough just to fulfil the proposed solutions, but many other goals set in the MoD cyber security strategy and action plan need to be met.

Cybernetic space has become a domain for soldiers, and conducting operations there is not a matter of choice, but a necessity. Activities in cyberspace are a new area within the Ministry of Defence the ACR. Finding and developing concepts to be followed, operational and tactical procedures and, of course, training of soldiers at all levels will require a lot of effort.

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SOCIETAL SECURITY THROUGH COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE

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Abstract: Starting from the politologist Arnold O. Wolfers's definition: "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked"; we can view societal security as an idea of the human communities of survival and continuity of the collective identity and values. If security means the absence of threats, and more than that, the absence of fear, communities need predictible analysis to manage the vulnerabilities they are facing, to overcome challenges and to resist possible threats.

Therefore, it is essential to have a detailed data collection (information) process. And this activity is the competence of the Competitive Intelligence (C.I.) structures, which creates a relevant data gathering, transforming them into intelligence, and then it creates analysis and proposes solutions and pertinent approaching methods, depending on the conjuncture and facts.

Keywords: social security, societal threats, competitive intelligence.

1. Social security, distinct sector of the vast field of security

In his paper *People, State and Fear* (1993), Barry Buzan the founder of the Copenhagen Academic School, redefines the well-known concept of "security", seeing it as being not only a function of the military power, but a function of the preservation of societies. Although within the society the sectors in which it is divided and functions: economical, political, military, etc. cannot be absolutely divided, using this type of analysis makes the research work and analysis easier and more comprehensive.

So, the analytical method of the sectors begins with fragmentation, but it must be completed with the reconstruction of the whole. Fragmentation is done only to simplify and clarify. But, in order to achieve a good level of understanding, the reunification of the parties and studying the way they relate are necessary.[1]

The sectors to which reference is made and which are detailed in the quoted paper are: military (which is, according to the tradition of traditional thinking, the only one entitled to approach the security paradigm), economical, political, environmental and societal.

Ole Wæver (1993) delimits the concept of social security like this: if the nation is a "community searching for a state", we cannot say that the security of the nation is the same as the social security, because social security refers to the security from outside the state or "with the state". In this case, the security of the nation would refer to political security. It includes the sense of identity, community- that the nation ensures in the context of societal security; if we reduce it to the group security, we operate a fragmentation of it; if we reduce security to the individual one, we go back to the atomistic concept of security, from where one of the approaches of "national security" (understood as the aggregate of group and individual security) was inspired from.[2]

At the same time, the Romanian Association for Social Security (established in 2007 as a collegiate, cultural-scientific and non-governmental community) defines social security as being a particular type of security of human communities in the absence of which their survival in history

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[1] Barry Buzan ,Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, CA Publishing House, 2010, p. 23.
[2] Ionel Nicu Sava, *Security studies*, Bucharest, Romanien Center of Regional Studies, 2005, p. 49.

would not be possible, protecting the memory and collective identity, maintaining social and cultural-symbolic cohesion in a society. Although the phonetic difference between societal and social terms is small, the semantic difference is significant. In the first case, we refer to the way of identification of the collectivities (culture, religion etc.) and in the second case -to individuals (physical, economic, financial etc.). At the same time, the lexhem society cannot always be defined as a population of a state, because it may be composed of several distinct societal communities.

The founder of the Romanian sociology, Dimitrie Gusti, defines the notion of community as "the total autonomy of the individuals who live together and submit as manifestations of will an economic and a spiritual activity, ethically and juridically regulated and politically-administratively organized, conditioned by the cosmic framework, biological framework, psychological and historical frameworks " [3]

Culture is also translated as civilization, that "cultural entity" an ensemble of cultural features and phenomena, "a specific chain of visions over the world, structures and culture that make a historical whole", while creating "the largest cultural group of people and the widest level of cultural identity, apart from other common characteristics that differentiate them from other species."[4].

In his paper *Introduction to Sociology. Spirituality, nation and capitalism,* Radu Baltasiu *(2007)* observes that the elements of culture are collective and are often related to the collective unconscious, being the source of the phenomenon called *sociality* and sociability orientation frameworks. This means that the collective memory of individuals is a living element of the common vision of the world and of the experiences.

Ilie Bădescu, in his work *Noologia (2002)* speaks about the religious consciousness and about the communities' power to withstand the threats in which this consciousness has strong roots. The distinguished professor appreciates that communities can only be dissolved when faith and religious manifestations end.

Who wants the destruction of a collectivity fights against its ideality, to weaken it and the feelings that people share, embedded in its value system.[5]

2. Threats to societal security

According to B. Buzan, the social security agenda is set by different actors in certain regions over certain periods of time. He identifies four threats against the social security; 3 important ones: migration, horizontal competition (influences from the expansion of a neighboring culture), vertical competition (the existence of integration or secessionist systems) and a secondary one: depopulation (caused by natural disasters or by human actions - war, extermination policies etc.). If the societal and political sectors are connected, the community's reaction against the threats is to add the problem they are facing on the national agenda. Another way to take action against the threat is through actions taken within the community concerned.

In order to be able to observe the potential problems that may endanger a social group, it is important to take into consideration the civilization that has created the respective culture, with its values and social norms, traditions, symbols, linguistics and art.

"Societal identity" can be threatened by a large number of factors, from suppression of one's own expression to the interference or lack of ability to reproduce through generations.

Examples of societal threats can include:

• cultural purification - the systemic approach to destroying or limiting important institutions and/or cultural symbols that are important for the group identity;

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[3] Dimitrie Gusti, *Opere*, Vol. I, Bucharest, The Romanian Academy Publishing House, 1968.
[4] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,* (trad.) de Liana Stan, Bucharest, Litera Publishing House, 2012.
[5] Ilie Bădescu, *Sociology noologica. The order of the spiritual society*, Bucharest, Mica Valahie Publishing House, 2007, p. 139.

• ethnic cleansing - deliberate or voluntary harassment, violence, crimes and/or deportation of members of a society by another society[6].

Therefore, threats can be divided into: threats to identity and threats to society's cohesion, according to the Scheme 1[7]:

Table no. 1. Typology of threat

Threats to identity	-Rights of the minorities -Extremism / nationalism -Cultural Identity -Religious identity -Background history -Language
Threats to the cohesion of society	-Changes of the demographic models -Separatism -Regionalization -Anarchy -Poverty / economic status -Migration -Family and family patterns

Some of the threats presented relate exclusively to the social security (those primarily related to identity and history) and others are threats to the state (regionalization, separatism, migration). How can societies manifest themselves for the sake of their own protection, if they lack the resources that the states have?

"The use of social security provides an analytical leverage when we evaluate what kind of developments can become threats and potential causes for a violent conflict. The use of the societal security makes it possible to explain how migration, television and radio broadcasts, election results, and linguistic education can contribute to a violent conflict between societies or between the state and the society."[8]

Another important issue is the one related to the *positive discrimination*. A bad and vicious understanding of the human rights concepts can lead to the creation of excessively advantaged minority entities / groups and through this, to the discrimination of the majority.

"When the collective rights overcome the cultural autonomy, moving to the political, administrative or territorial autonomy - without a concrete basis to sustain such an intermediate alternative administration based on the principles of the minority between the state and the local government and individuals - there is a clear basis for manifestation of some threats to the social security and even a first step for threatening national security."[9]

In contrast to these, the ideas of multiculturalism and social cohesion, that have been discussed more and more lately, are considering a harmonious existence, the coexistence of several different cultures.

"Societal Cohesion represents the other side of the reality and an existence of communities and represents the sum of values, norms, actions, behaviors, determining the confluence, coexistence and the unity vector of the society."[10]

Thus, the dilemma of social security is clearly linked to feelings of belonging and of culture, subjective perceptions regarding globalization and integrationism.

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[6] Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi, Oleksandr Sushko, *Societal Security in the trilateral region Romania -Ukraine, The Republic of Moldova,* Bucharest, Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2008, p. 168.

[7] *Idem*, pp. 169-170.

[8] *Idem*, pp. 170-171.

[9] *Idem*, p. 172.

[10] Iulian Chifu, "Bosnia –Herzegovina: Societal cohesion, the scene of the national reconstruction and the road towards European integration", *Europa XXI*, nr.6, 2008, p.17.

3.   Managing Threats and Changes

"It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change." – Charles Darwin

Under these conditions, how do societies manage the vulnerabilities they are facing and overcome challenges and resist threats?

One possible starting point might be to look at the principles of economic security, where it is assumed that the economic agents work more competitively on an uncertain market. It can be understood that in the economic field we cannot speak of perfect safety and balance. Therefore, the uncertainty increases competitiveness, stimulates the creative spirit and the analytical and predictable capabilities.

By keeping the proportions, certain strategies in the economic security environment can be applied within societies, allowing an analysis of the place, moment, influences, threats etc. The best way to do this belongs to the Competitive Intelligence field.

"*When the rhythm of change outside of your organization is greater than the one inside it, the end is near*" Jack Welch, former CEO, General Electric.

The quote above converges towards the Competitive Intelligence Division's mission, namely the one to create a decisive advantage for the beneficiary. In sports or politics, in war and in business, we cannot work efficiently if we don't know what the others are doing. In order to understand as complexly and correctly as possible the environment in which we operate (internal vs external), we have to realize a detailed process of data collection (information); but turning this information into intelligence is the most problematic part. Like in the case of business strategies, the members of a community don't lack statistical, economic data etc; the difficulty consists of analyzing and linking a large number of data, indicators, news, open sources, and formulating forecasts and solutions based on these relevant analyzes.

4.   Ensuring societal security through Competitive Intelligence

Can a societal actor be the beneficiary of competitive intelligence analyzes?

In the paper *Competitive Intelligence Gathering, Analyzing and Putting it to Work*, Christopher Murphy (2005) argues that ″[...] any factor that poses a risk for the opportunities or profitability is given to the CI department. By extrapolating, an analysis of some CI experts is useful in order to avoid any sensitive / problematic situations that could appear and the sphere of competence of this activity outweighs the economic one.

A close link between the CI department and the beneficiary allows his involvement in real time and clarification or detailing the needs.

In order to involve the beneficiary in an effective way, complex techniques must be used to identify needs and also to evaluate their own performance. The question we are asking isn't: "What are your priorities in terms of information?", but "What do you want to achieve?", starting from the premise that the support provided is in the form of a relationship rather than of an event.

Therefore, the resulting analytic products transform into adapted services, focusing on utility rather than simple propagation, working in analytical networks centered on the mission. The CI specialist must be technologically and analytically trained, to be an expert when it comes to the political and business environment, to be able to understand geopolitics and to adapt the security policy to the changing demands of the beneficiaries.

He must impose to the beneficiary for whom he works three fundamental principles: adaptability, alignment and flexibility.

1. *Adaptability:*
    - is the success in anticipating and successfully responding to environmental changes.
    - is a process that requires constant supervision of the external environment, the identification of threats, vulnerabilities but also opportunities
    - success through adaptability requires an active involvement and openness to external and openness to learn from experience

2. *Alignment:*
- adjusting all the system's components to ensure good operation
- ensuring the unity of effort, but without falling into the thought conformism.
- the degree of consistency and coherence between strategy, systems, processes and communication

3. *Flexibility*:
- is the skill to reconfigure the working processes in a short time and with minimal effort and minimal resources to take advantage of opportunities and overcome risks
- the response to unpredictable events must have a good speed and accuracy

Besides the obvious differences between the beneficiary and the CI specialist, the latter one must have the ability to detach emotionally from the environment they are analyzing. If in a company it is indicated that the IC department is absolutely distinct, when we talk about the analysis of societal security, the analyst should know in detail the culture to the advantage of which he works. This means that there is a significant possibility that the person (people) in cause to be from within the community. However, an objective overview is needed, also an alternative point of view, a reality check on his own perceptions.[11]

Just like in the business field, the business-competitive intelligence activities shouldn't be confused, no confusion should be made in this research for a societal security analyze through CI with the spying activity. This belongs to the state and not to the society. Competitiveness through information is one within the limits of legality and ethical principles.[12]

Robert Steel, a US finance minister and official, *said "Information costs money ... intelligence makes money".*

So the transformation of the raw information in intelligence brings added net value, superior to the investment. And this transformation of data into analyses, solutions and strategies is the value of intelligence science.

"Business Intelligence has two basic components:
• Competitive Intelligence (CI)
• Competitive Counterintelligence (CCI)

If the CI field involves getting information about the business field in the beneficiary's interest, the CCI is supposed to ensure its own security against external attempts to obtain information, transformed then into intelligence. The CCI wants to ensure physical, documents', information systems and communications security."[13]

Conclusions

Douglas Bernhardt, an economic analyst and CI, said in a paper published in the Financial Times that "a strategy that is not based on intelligence is not a strategy but a guess".
CI specialists work with a wide range of data with different representations and importance, from the moment of collecting them to turning them into intelligence, this latter stage being the most difficult but most important part. Generic data is filtered bysifting relevant information, moving from quantity to quality. According to Figure 2 below, we can represent the IC analysts' concern in the form of a pyramid in which we see, as we move to the top, how information is processed and filtered more and more, depending on relevance.

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[11] Murphy, Christopher, *Competitive Intelligence.Gathering, Analysing and Putting it to Work.* England, Gower Publishing House, 2005, pp.15-16.
[12] In the US, "*The Economic Espionage and Protection of Proprietary Information Act* " has taken out the offense of violating the business secret and the one of stealing private information from under the jurisdiction of the local and state authorities and passed them under the jurisdiction of the federal authorities. There is no equivalent of this law in Romania's legislation nor in the European Union's law. However, there are more laws that incriminate the economic espionage.".
[13] Medar, Sergiu, "Why business intelligence?", in *Business-Competitive Intelligence Journal*, no. 1, 2012.

Figure no. 1. Pyramid of information
Source: Gia White Paper, 2007- adaptation

Communities, for their own benefit need not only raw information but a summary and analysis of them, predictions and opinions about the future instead of simple information about present or past situations.[14]

So, the need to ensure the societal security can be achieved through the specific techniques of Competitive Intelligence. The goal is obtaining a complete vision of the issue, to develop a basic strategy on long-term and the tactics to take. Through intelligence and counterintelligence work (like in the private environment), the positioning of the analyzed society/group, internally and externally and is protected against possible destabilizing factors.

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A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF CYBER OPERATIONS

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Abstract: Discussions on the importance of the virtual environment for us, individuals, private companies, or for states or international organizations are superfluous.The presence of virtual reality in the daily life of humanity has already become a certainty. As a result, states have had to rethink their national strategies, allocate additional funds and revise their policies by taking into account this true leitmotiv of 21st century – the cyberspace.

On a military level, what a few years ago seemed utopian now it is as plausible as it may be necessary: the emergence of a new category of forces in the composition of any modern army - the cyber forces. Thus, I consider that a detailed analysis of the actions in the virtual environment from the perspective of the types of cyber operations, their planning and deployment, the management of the targets in such actions, and the importance of the human being in the context is a natural step in the attempt to understand the whole phenomenon.

Keywords: cyber space, cyber operations, planning, target management.

Introduction

"As you well know, there will be two new commandments at the level of the Romanian Armed Forces, one for special operations and one for cyber defense. There are two new areas that come to complete, practically, everything that means our attempt at the end of the planning cycle,to come to clarify everything that this doctrinal part of the Romanian Army means" said on October 2, 2017, the Chief of Staff, four-star general Nicolae Ciucă, at the opening ceremony of the academic year organized at the National Defense University "Carol I"[1].We therefore notice that the virtual environment, in general, and cyber operations in particular are being given special attention, confirming at the highest military level the impact that they will have on the present and the future of the Romanian Army.

1. Types of cyber operations

Operations in cyberspace are the engagement of cyber capabilities in missions whose goals will be met in or through the virtual environment.These can directly contribute to the commander's vision of the operational approach and desired effects, conditions, and end-state objectives.The success of cyber operations depends on the convergence of a three-dimensional approach:integrating and synchronizing *measures on own cyber infrastructures* with *defensive cyber operations* and *offensive cyber operations*.

1.1.*Measures on own cyber infrastructures*

Measures on own cyber infrastructures are actions taken to design, build, configure, secure, maneuver, maintain and support own cyber infrastructure, in order to ensure the availability, integrity, confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiation of data and information generated and / or managed in the virtual environment.These include pro-active measures addressing the full

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[1] Daniel Florea, "Şeful SMG: Partea iniţială a comandamentelor pentru operaţii speciale şi apărarea cibernetică, declarată operaţională nu mai târziu de 2018", *Agerpres*, 02.10.2017, available at: https://www.agerpres.ro/social/2017/10/02/seful-smg-partea-initiala-a-comandamentelor-pentru-operatii-speciale-si-apararea-cibernetica-declarata-operationala-nu-mai-tarziu-de-2018-11-24-29, accessed on 03.10.2017.

spectrum of cyber infrastructures on: physical protection, logical security[2], updating and configuring antivirus programs, antispyware[3], firewall[4], patch[5], encrypting data, providing information flow, and training users.

Even though most of the aforementioned activities are scheduled and executed on a regular basis, becoming routine, should not be disregarded or regarded as irrelevant, because their status determines the security framework upon which the armed forces missions ultimately depend.

1.2. Defensive cyber operations

Defensive cyber operations are designed to protect own cyber infrastructures, to ensure that they remain in control, so as to forbid or delay the achievement of opponent's objectives. Specifically, these are active and passive cyber defense actions that have the role of preserving the ability to use cyberspace and to protect data, networks and systems. To ensure the success of defensive cyber operations, a comprehensive approach is needed, with the inclusion of mutually supportive physical and digital protection elements.

Defensive cyber operations respond to threats and unauthorized actions directed against own cyber infrastructures. Defensive cyber operations include circumventing offensive actions initiated or to be initiated by the opponent. Defensive cyber operations also involve active surveillance and counteraction of advanced internal threats that have the potential to avoid routine security measures. Defensive cyber operations can be developed in response to attacks exploits, intrusions, or malware[6] directed against the army's cyber infrastructures or against those whose defense is in the responsibility of the army.

A fundamental characteristic of the potential defensive cyber operations that can be carried out by the Romanian armed forces is the development of an active defense in the virtual environment. A definition of active defense would be: the ability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate, synchronized and real-time, threats and vulnerabilities to own cyber infrastructures in order to defend them.

Using the full range of cyber-defensive operations, the active defense of cyberspace is based on traditional approaches to protect own cyber infrastructure. The defense of cyber infrastructures requires situational awareness, together with an automated, agile and synchronized defensive.

Most defensive cyber operations take place within own cyber infrastructure. However, some of the opponent's actions can trigger cyber-defensive reaction operations needed to defend own cyber infrastructures and whose effects will materialize out of them.

Thus, defensive cyber operations are divided into two broad categories: *defensive cyber operations developed through internal defense measures* and *cyber defensive reaction operations.*

Defensive cyber operations developed through internal defense measures are those actions that take place within own cyber infrastructure. Internal defense measures include actions to restore, re-secure, redirect, re-establish or isolate of degraded or compromised cyber infrastructures, so as to ensure optimal exploitation of the virtual environment by own forces.

Defensive cyber reaction operations are those actions to defend own cyber infrastructures engaged outside of them to detect, counteract and mitigate the effects of cyber attacks that are in progress or are about to materialize. Defensive cyber reaction operations must be authorized according to the rules of engagement and in accordance with the provisions of any other rules applicable to that situation, being able to rise to the level of use of force. In some cases countermeasures are sufficient but, as in physical environments, their effects are limited, producing only the destabilization of the opponent's actions, not his defeat.

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[2] Software methods that control the access to information systems and services.

[3] Software that captures hidden data about the user by analyzing activity in its cyberspace.

[4] A device or set of devices with a configuration designed to filter, encrypt or mediate traffic between different security domains based on predefined rules.

[5] A program that updates another program, fixes some operating errors, or resolves some computer security issues.

[6] Is software designed to access and / or damage a computer and / or a computer network without the consent of the owner.

1.3. Offensive cyber operations

Offensive cyber operations are the use of cyber infrastructures to disturb, restrict, degrade or even destroy resident information in opposing cyber infrastructures or to facilitate the development of future offensive operations in order to meet the objectives and achieve the desired final state of affairs in the shortest possible time. Offensive cyber operations will be authorized just like offensive military operations performed in physical fields by an action order. Offensive cyber operations require engaging on various capabilities to create specific effects in cyberspace. To plan, authorize, execute and evaluate such actions, it is important that both the commander and subordinates understand how they are distinguished from one another. Thus, in my opinion, offensive cyber operations are divided into two major categories: *collecting intelligence from cyberspace* and the *cyber-attacks* themselves.

Collecting intelligence from cyberspace is an extension of the entire intelligence gathering process itself the distinctive attribute compared to other information gathering disciplines[7] being the ability to facilitate cyber operations, primarily through reconnaissance and surveillance activities ofcyber infrastructures belonging to opponents, as well as other types of activities, including access to and take control of these infrastructures in and through the virtual environment.

Intelligence gathering in cyberspace includes specific activities that can support future actions and which would allow for the development of planning and preparation for all types of subsequent military operations, not just cyber.

The activity of collecting intelligence in the cyber space is carried out on two levels: *Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance* – ISR[8] *in the virtual environment* and *preparing the cyber operational environment.*

The concept of ISR in cyberspace encompasses activities designed to gather the information needed to support future operations, including defensive cyber operations or cyber-attacks. These activities synchronize and integrate the planning and operation of cyber infrastructures in direct support of ongoing and future operations.

ISR in the virtual environment focuses on tactical and operational intelligence and mapping of cyberspace to support military planning. ISR in the cyber space requires the elimination of antagonisms, and forces operating in the virtual environment must be trained and certified to a standard applicable to the entire intelligence community. ISR in the virtual space is carried out according to the strategies of the military authorities, coordinating with other authorities / institutions is absolutely necessary in order to avoid the parallelism of the actions.

*Preparation of the cyber operational environment*consists of non-intelligence activities for the planning and preparation of military operations to be engaged. This includes identifying data, software, and configuration of opposing cyber infrastructures, as well as all identifiers or related physical structures or related infrastructure, the purpose being to determine vulnerabilities of any kind. Also included are actions taken to ensure access to and / or future control of cyber infrastructures during hostilities.

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[7] Acoustic Intelligence / ACINT – information from sounds through signals or emissions; Human Intelligence / HUMINT – gathering information through human sources; Imagery Intelligence / IMINT – information obtained from images acquired by sensors that can be placed on the ground, on water or transported by air or on space platforms; Measurement and Signature Intelligence / MASINT – information obtained from the scientific and technical analysis of the data obtained by means of detection instruments, in order to identify any distinctive features associated with the source, the transmitter or the sender, to facilitate identification and analysis thereof; Open Source Intelligence / OSINT – information obtained from public space as well as from the category of unclassified ones, whose access and distribution are limited; Signals Intelligence / SIGINT – information obtained by collecting and operating signals or foreign electromagnetic emissions. It is the generic term used when it is not necessary to differentiate or represent the fusion between Communications Intelligence / COMINT (e.g. interception of verbal messages transmitted by radio stations) and Electronic Intelligence / ELINT (e.g. information obtained from radar or missile guidance systems).

[8] "The ISR concept is a set of information and operations capabilities which synchronizes and integrates the planning and operations of all collection capabilities with the processing, exploitation and dissemination of information resulting directly from the planning, preparation and execution of operations" – Marius Melenciuc, Ionel Irimia, Adrian Tonea, "The ISR Concept in the Romanian Armed Forces", in the *Romanian Military Thinking* magazine no. 2/2015, pp. 11-23.

Cyber-attacks are operations that directly affect the security of the cyber space through actions of disruption, degradation, destruction, or manipulation of opposing cyber infrastructures. Disruption is the temporary, but total, restriction of theopponent's ability to operate, access, or operate its own cyber infrastructure. Degradation is the ultimate, but not total, restriction of the opponent's ability to operate, access, or operate its own cyber infrastructures. Destruction is the ultimate, total and irreparable restriction of the opponent's ability to operate, access, or operate its own cyber infrastructures. Manipulation takes place by taking control or changing the information and / or configuration of the adverse cyber infrastructure in a way that contributes to the commander's objectives.

2. Planning and engaging operations in the virtual environment

The process of planning operations implies the activities of commanders and military staff at all levels – strategic, operational and tactical – to prepare and conduct operations.

In order to generate effects in the virtual environment it is necessary to integrate cyberspace capabilities with terrestrial, aerial, naval and even space capabilities. The limits of the cyber operations, as well as the priorities and restrictions in their course, must be identified in close coordination between the state authorities. In Romania, for example, the competent institutions would be: Parliament, President, Government, Supreme Council of Defense of the Country – at political level, Ministry of National Defence – at the politico-military level and the entire armed forces – at military level. As effects in cyberspace have the potential to influence efforts in areas such as intelligence, diplomacy or law enforcement, will often require international cooperation.

Planners of cyber operations encounter the same challenges that are present in planning other types of operations but at the same time they must also take into account certain unique aspects specific to the virtual environment. Target management, avoidance of parallelism, commander's intent, political-military assessment, and considerations of collateral effects are found in the calculations of people who plan for cyber operations.

However, one of the specific considerations for the engagement of operations in the cyber environment is the evaluation of the side effects whose prediction can be an extremely difficult task. Moreover, although many elements of virtual space can be mapped geographically in physical environments, a full understanding of the position and capabilities of the opponent in the cyber space implies the detailed knowledge of the infrastructure, capabilities and forces that can be affected, along with the classification the limits of internal, external and international legislation and policies.

Cyber-space adversaries can be individuals, factions within a state, non-state actors or nations, and the parts of the virtual environment they control do not necessarily fall within the geographic boundaries associated with them, nor are they directly proportional to their influence. A politically motivated group or even an individual can carry out actions whose effects in the virtual environment are more worthy of consideration than those of some states.

Regardless of the operational phase in progress, it is always important to determine what authorizations / approvals are needed to execute cyber operations. Thus, in the planning of cyber operations, the time required to obtain the necessary authorizations to implement the desired cyber capabilities has to be taken into account. This does not radically change the commander's planning but highlights the importance of coordination with inter-institutional partners whose authorizations / approvals may differ from those of the military authorities.

Despite the additional considerations and challenges of integrating cyber operations into the commander's vision, several elements of traditional processes can be used in the planning of this type of operation.

Capabilities and functions of cyber operations will be integrated into the operational planning process just like all other capabilities and functions. The cyber planning process will consist of several stages: initiating of planning; mission analysis; developing, analyzing, validating,

comparing and approving the course of action; development of the operation concept and the operation plan; evaluating and reviewing the operations plan; execution – the operations order.

Stage one – Initiating cyber operations planning. Planning begins when a competent authority recognizes the potential of using military capabilities in response to a potential or actual crisis[9]. During the mission, cyber-planners participate in the commander's initial evaluation actions and gather the resources needed to analyze the mission. Specific to cyber space, some of the initial assessment will determine whether resources can be delivered to the mission within a reasonable time or context, through reaction and support processes.

Stage two – Mission Analysis. At this stage the assigned tasks are studied and all the other tasks necessary for the fulfillment of the mission are identified. Planners of cyber operations contribute to mission analysis by helping commanders understand the operational environment and figure out the problem. An effective mission analysis takes into account the potential impact of cyberspace in an operational environment. This can only be done through close cooperation between cyber-planners with the information structure, the operations structure, the communications structure, the legal adviser, and other staff in terms of issues such as mission critical systems, risk assessments, defense position, operational requirements or legal implications. Cyber-planners are analyzing from a cyber point of view commander's intent and mission, determining whether all cyber capabilities are available to perform the identified tasks.

Stage three– Developing the course of action. The aim of this stage is to provide commander options, all aimed at achieving the desired final military status. The cyber squad planning team contributes to developing the course of action by establishing the potential cyber operations of allies and opponents, and what allied cyber capabilities can support their own operations. Cyber planners concentrate their efforts on achieving an operational advantage at the decision point of each course of action. At the end of this stage, cyber-planners will generate a list of cyber actions that will achieve the commander's goals and desired effects, along with a list of information and capabilities required to perform the tasks provided for each course of action.

Stage four – Analysis, validation, comparison and approval of the course of action. This stage requires a careful examination of each course of action in order to identify details that allow the master and subordinates to establish valid courses and compare them. During the course of action analysis, the cyber operations team cooperates with other planning teams to integrate and synchronize cyber operations in each course of action, identifying the course that best meets the objectives of the mission. Cyber planners focus on how cyber capabilities support each course of action and implement them on deadlines, critical events, and decision points. During the course comparison, all staff assesses the advantages and disadvantages of each of them, from a specific perspective. Cyber planners present their conclusions, and at the end of the comparison of courses, they present a list of pros and cons for each course in relation to the virtual environment. The cyber planning team will also develop a list of priority action courses from the cyber space perspective. At the end of this stage, the commander will choose and approve the action course.

Stage five – Development of the concept and operations plan. At this stage, the commander, the cyber squad planning team and the other teams, along with the subordinate and support structures, extend the approved course of action into a detailed operations plan, first developing an operations concept – the central element of the operations plan.

Stage six – Evaluating and reviewing the operations plan. The purpose of the evaluation of the operation is to verify its effectiveness. The review of the plan is a permanent activity, and is executed until the enforcement order is received.

Stage seven – Execution: operation order. When the assumptions on which the operation plan was based have turned into concrete data, when the start of the operation was established and

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[9] As the term "crisis" is not defined in our legislation, we will regard the crisis as any event that threatens the defense of the country and national security through actions / inactions directed against sovereignty, independence, unity of state or territorial integrity of Romania, as well as actions involving the Romanian Armed Forces in maintaining international security, collective defense in military alliance systems, maintaining or restoring peace.

known to all the participants who were identified and nominated, the cyber operation could pass to the execution stage, the operation plan transforming into an operations order.

As regards the conduct of cyber operations, it continues on the basis of an order issued by a competent authority until the established objectives are reached or new tasks are drawn up. During execution, progress will be monitored and measured to achieve the commander's intention and successful completion of tasks, while introducing new data and information to facilitate decision-making. Execution of a plan does not end the planning process, its continuous character being given the possibility to be revised and modified at any time to decide whether and when to perform certain stages, as well as the possibility to effectively interrupt the cyber operation.

3. Target management in cyber operations

The targeting process is theselection and hierarchy of targets, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities. In the evolution of the target management process in cyber operations, two aspects have to be taken into account: the admission of cyber capabilities as a viable option for engaging designated targets, while understanding and assuming the risk that the effects of cyber operations on enemy targets will also affect their own or allies cyber infrastructures.

Each target has distinct features, be it intrinsic or acquired. These characteristics are the basis for the detection, localization, identification, assessment and classification of the target for further surveillance, analysis, hitting and evaluation.

The virtual environment is made up of three components: physical, logical, and, of course, human. The major challenge of the target management process in cyber operations is to identify, coordinate, and avoid overlapping activities that focus on multiple components, sometimes even on all three.

The physical component of the cyberspace is formed by the environment in which the data moves. This includes cable, terrestrial or submarine data transmissions, as well as wireless (radio, radio-relay, cellular, satellite). It is the first point of reference in the target management process because, depending on the physical component, it will be determined which authority has the power to carry out that cyber operation. It is also the main cornerstone of geospatial information that can be used to contribute useful data to the entire targeting process.

The logical component of the virtual environment consists of those abstract elements that are linked to each other, forming entities in cyberspace. A simple example is any site that is hosted on servers in multiple physical locations where content can be accessed through a single point.

The human component of the cyberspace is made up of people in the network. Uses the rules that apply to the logical component to develop a digital representation of the identity of an individual or entity in the virtual environment. This component has important implications for our own forces in identifying the target and assigning it to a specific activity. Cyber characters can be complex with elements in many virtual locations. Significant analytical capability and intelligence gathering is needed for our own forces themselves to form a comprehensive picture of a cyber character, so that the target management process is carried out with maximum efficiency and the desired effects of the commander.

Targeting in cyber operations is a process that should be initiated much earlier than similar to traditional physical objectives, and should be focused on the long run. To reach a complete vision of a target in cyberspace can take weeks, months or even years. This situation is caused by the additional time necessary to assess the effects of any offensive cyber operation. While the selection of a target to be engaged by traditional means is reviewed periodically, during the review of the plan, without spending additional resources to maintain access to it, the designation of an objective to be engaged by offensive cyber operations initiates the allocation immediately and the use of additional resources.

Once the target hiring approval has been obtained, the team performing operations in the cyber environment will attempt to gain access to the target system. Without physical or electronic access to the target, it is impossible to carry out offensive cyber operations. An Internet-connected

system is easier to access, although access to its actual parts targeted to be attacked may be hampered by the opponent's network security system. Once obtained, access to the target system must be maintained at least until the actual engagement of the target. Updates or periodic changes made to system maintenance make it difficult to maintain or regain access.

The next step after getting access is to familiarize with the unique attributes of the target system. The cyber-executing team may need to purchase the software of the target system if it is different from the one with which it operates or not have had to deal with it until that time in order to determine its vulnerabilities. If the team does not have a technical view of the software of the system they are about to attack, then the offensive cyber-action cannot be executed because an adequate determination of the effects of the operation cannot be performed. The commander should consider these specific attributes to offensive cyber operations when setting priorities during planning.

Once the cyber operations team has developed a permanent access method and learned the target system, they must coordinate the acquisition or development of the cyber weapon[10] to attack. Some cyber weapons designed to attack common operating systems like Windows are commercially available. However, systems produced and used only in certain states require the development of weapons from scratch. Developing a cyber weapon is an extremely complex and sensitive operation.

Once the cyber weapon has been developed, the cyber operations team must constantly maintain and monitor the access to the target. It has to make sure that routine security checks do not cancel their work. All these actions require a significant amount of time, weeks, or even months before running an attack with a presumption of success. At the same time, consideration should be given to the possibility that the cyber weapon can navigate through several networks on their way to the target.

The next phase, after the development of the cyber weapon, is the analysis of offensive cyber operations from a legal perspective and possible collateral damage. Since the same cyber infrastructures are often used simultaneously in military, governmental, civil or private activities, the assessment of collateral or cascade effects is particularly important.

Because of political concerns, rules of engagement can limit cyber operations, only to those actions that do not have collateral effects or their level is low. We note that the analysis of the collateral effects from a political perspective is separate from the analysis of proportionality imposed by the law of armed conflicts, the observance of the latter being an obligation. So even if a cyber operation is allowed after an analysis of the collateral effects from a political perspective, it will have to be subject to the analysis required by the armed conflict law, and will only be allowed if it fully complies with national and international rules.

After going through the "filters" of political and legal analysis, the targets will be included on a list alongside other targets in the other operational environments. After entering this list, the targets can be selected to be engaged.

In the conduct of cyber operations, collaboration at international level plays a particularly important role. As mentioned above, both during joint cyber operations and offensive cyber operations only by own armed forces, their effects may have implications for allied and coalition partners' cyber infrastructures. For this reason it is imperative to inform about, co-operate and coordinate offensive cyber operations.

4. The military in cyber operations – the combatant of the future

Much of the discussion on security and defense issues focuses on autonomous systems and cyber weapons. From these discussions, issues such as "the place and role of people on the battlefield" began to be missed or appeared as rarely as possible. The emergence of current technologies could induce the idea that the importance of man in future wars is no longer decisive. I

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[10] A cyber weapon is a malware used for military, economic or political purposes.

have to say that I do not agree with such an approach, moreover, I think that man and computer can be hopeful comrades in a possible conflict.

A first-ever notorious "encounter" man vs. computer took place in a 1996-1997 chess game between Deep Blue – an IBM super computer of that time and Garry Kimovich Kasparov – one of the world's biggest chess players. In the first game, Kasparov won, but the next year he had to admit himself to being defeated by the computer, but it was also a premiere: it was the first defeat of a world chess champion in front of a computer in tournament conditions. Kasparov then began a tour[11] of mixed teams of people and computers where, even if computer technology advanced, people using relatively simple chess programs dominated super computers specially built for this game. So as long as people have a clear edge in judgment and creativity, they will continue to play a major role in all areas where technology is present, but especially in conflict.

Areas such as operational planning, information analysis or exercise of the commandment will be actions exclusively conducted by people, precisely because judgment and creativity play a decisive role.

An example of a man's judgment most likely avoided a global catastrophe was that of Stanislav Evgrafovici Petrov who on September 26, 1983, was a Soviet Air Force officer responsible for a nuclear monitoring center, noted that the center's system indicated that inter-continental ballistic missiles were launched from the US. In the Cold War, a period of tension and political and ideological confrontation, this scenario did not seem impossible at all, but human judgment made the difference. As the ground radar did not confirm satellite and computer data but also because of the small number of missiles launched, Petrov figured out immediately that there was a system error, realizing that in the first attack case, the US would resort to a much larger number of missiles. With a little exercise of imagination, we can think of what would have happened if the whole system had been automated and the human side would have played no role.

Analyzing technological progress, we can see that at present the great majority of activities that were carried out only by people in the past are now executed by systems, a trend that seems to continue in the future. However, even if there is no pilot in a drone's cabin, there are tens or maybe even hundreds of people who contribute to its missions, from information analysis to the physical maintenance of the drones.

We cannot address a subject related to the role and place of people in modern war without taking into account the ethical, legal and political implications of emerging technologies. For example, in the case of a military operation conducted exclusively by autonomous weapons systems that can independently select targets in an area where targets are surrounded by civilians, we ask the natural question: who assumes responsibility for a possible system error which leads to the loss of life among civilians? Of course, that does not mean that people are flawless, but mankind has developed a system based on ethical, legal and political constructions to deal with human errors.

Regarding the conduct of cyber operations, I believe that the human-computer relationship is decisive in the success of the missions, the lack or the limited involvement of one of the two actors, making it impossible to develop military actions in the virtual environment.

Once we have determined how important a person is in the development of cyber operations, we must move on to the next step: cyber combat analysis. First of all, in order for an army to have performing cyber operations teams, they must be strongly motivated.

Beyond the classical motivation tools, such as pursuing the commander's achievement of interests in order to gain the subordinate's trust, the relevance of his or her career, career development or stability, the material part should not be disregarded. Here, the Ministry of National Defence and other state institutions and authorities have a very delicate problem: the pay of IT staff. The private sector, probably because of the fierce competition over the last decade, has greatly raised the bar in the pay of IT staff, while the public payroll system is lagging behind. This has led

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[11] Advanced Chess – each human player uses a chess program that helps him explore the possible results of the moves. People, despite this computerized assistance, have full control over team movements.

to the inevitable situation where, for example, graduates of the Military Technical Academy end termination of contracts before their expiration to find jobs in the private sector.

The legislative lever by which the Ministry of National Defence obliges the graduates of military education institutions, military officers, to conclude contracts with 8 years of appointment in the first position, is somewhat obsolete for the graduates of the Military Technical Academy. Private sector remuneration allows them to pay all maintenance and training costs during schooling in a very short time. It is a very delicate situation that the country's leadership needs to solve in a short time by linking the payroll system of all staff working in the IT sectors of all budgetary institutions, especially those in the defense system, public order and national security, to the realities of this field.

I do not want to induce the idea that the work of the other categories of combatants in the Romanian air force, naval or Terrestrial structures is less important than the IT staff, but if we want to use high performance cyber teams, we have to ensure conditions if not better, at least close to those offered by major companies in the industry.

In the cyber combat analysis, a very important quality must be brought into discussion: to think exactly like a hacker. Though this may seem a little exaggerated, I will simply argue that such an approach can anticipate the next move of the opponent, just as with prosecutors who have to think like criminals. Thus, a cyber-combatant must know and understand all stages of an attack in order to be able to counteract it, from the vulnerability identification phase, through scanning and testing the system, obtaining and maintaining access to the system and up to the actual attack.

Therefore, a confluence of technical, tactical, operational, strategic, ethical, legal and political reasons suggests that people will play essential roles in all aspects of the war in the future. Next, we need to pay close attention to the nonlinear advances in science and technology that could radically change, as they have done in the past, how states and non-state actors are conducting military operations. Thus, it is necessary to know and acquire the developing tools to directly enhance human-computer "comradeship", with emphasis on human performance.

Conclusions

Mankind of the 21st century is, beyond any doubt, dependent on technology, in general, and the virtual environment in particular. The influence of cyber space on the events that followed in recent years is obvious. A notable example of this is the US elections in 2016. According to a report[12] by the National Cyber security and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) of the US Department of Homeland Security Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) of the US Department of Justice, Russian intelligence services through hacker groups have been involved in the 2016 presidential election, being possible the influence of their outcome. Accepting the likelihood that the current president of the world's most important actor has been chosen as a result of third-party action in the virtual environment, it emphasizes once again how important and influential the cyber space for humanity is.

The fact that world states have not yet found the "remedy" of eliminating the vulnerabilities of their own cyber infrastructures has been highlighted by the latest security incident – the already famous *WannaCry*. On May 12, 2017, in just one day, not less than 230.00 computers from over 150 countries were infected with a ransomware[13] that affected, among other things, public health services, hindering medical acts and endangering integrity of the patients.

In order for Romania to rise to the challenges of the virtual environment and to implement the political commitment assumed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to strengthen national efforts in the field of cyber defense, the Ministry of National Defence needs to integrate cyber

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[12] ***, *GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber Activity*, Joint Analysis Report (JAR) of *NCCIC* and *FBI*, 29 December 2016, available at https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE-2016-1229.pdf, accessed on October 12, 2017.

[13] Malicious software that, once installed on the target computer, encrypts data, and then requests a ransom to decrypt it.

defense in planning and conducting military operations. Thus, the establishment of the cyber defense commandment, a structure specialized in the planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of cyber operations, is an important step.

The next step, in my opinion, is that the specialized structures of Ministry of National Defenceto undertake, as a matter of urgency, measures to amend the Law of unitary salaries for public servants no. 153/2017 so that people who will be assigned to positions with responsibilities related to the planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of cyber operations will be paid higher. At present, as mentioned in the paper, the Ministry of National Defence cannot compete with the private sector in terms of the pay of IT staff. However, in order to carry out high-quality cyber operations, graduates of engineering sciences[14], future cyber combatants of the Romanian Army, need to be strongly motivated.

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[14]Computers and Information Technology, Electronics and Telecommunications, Electrical Engineering, Systems Engineering.

COMBATING CYBERNETIC OFFENSES – A NEED FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

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Abstract: The shift from Europe to the information society is characterized by great progress in all aspects of human life: labor, education and leisure, government, industry and commerce. New information and communication technologies have a revolutionary and fundamental impact on our economies and societies. The success of the information society is important for economic growth, competitiveness and employment opportunities in Europe and has far-reaching economic, social and legal repercussions.

The European Union has already taken various measures in order to combat illicit and harmful content on the Internet, to protect intellectual property and personal data, to promote e-commerce and the use of electronic signatures, as well as to enhance transaction security.

The purpose of this paper is to present both the theoretical demonstration of the concept of cyber security and the identification of potential preventive measures against the various ways of penetrating the cyber space, raised in time to perfection by "virtual terrorists".

Keywords: European Cybercrime Center, Europol, partnership, cybercrime, global threat.

Introduction

The transmission of information has undergone a strong transformation progressing greatly in the area of digitization. When analyzing the phenomenon of convergence of communication channels, the most representative example is the Internet platform, which supports the transmission of various types of data: text, audio, photo, video, electronic format[1] What was fairly difficult to anticipate in the 1990s, but nowadays has become a certainty, refers to the symbiosis relationship between the emergence and development of the Internet, on the one hand, and the revolution of information and communication technologies, on the other[2].

Personal computers have become indispensable in everyday life, and the rapid development of modern information and communications technologies has had a major impact on the social fabric[3], has led to the creation of a new socio-professional category, the one of people with computer activities. This group is not part of the economic elites. The behavior and the way this group treats the uninitiated can lead to certain manifestations of people who want to collaborate with the group or even become an integral part of it, so that the activities carried out can sometimes be classified as criminal ones.

The development of virtual existence, in addition to the benefits of computerization in modern society, has created the premises of the emergence of vulnerabilities, which requires the security of the cyberspace. The increase in cybercrime, the involvement of organized crime groups in this field highlights the need to coordinate efforts in order to combat these acts, prevent, detect and hold those concerned.

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[1] Dragoş Claudiu Fulea, Gabriel Angelo Muşătoiu, *The Vulnerability of Social Action in the Virtual Space,* Romanian Journal of Intelligence Studies, no. 8/December 2012, Publishing House of the National Intelligence Studies Institute, Bucharest, 2012, p. 129.

[2] Ibidem, p. 130.

[3] Corneliu Alexandru, *Internal Security Strategy of the European Union,* M.A.I. Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, p. 118.

Computer abuse is any illegal behavior, contrary to unauthorized ethics, which concerns automatic data processing and/or data transmission is computer crime. At the same time, any computer related incident in which a victim has suffered or could have suffered damage and from which the author has or could have intentionally obtained a profit is cybercrime[4].

Organized cybercrime will not be able to track a state's Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) attack as long as criminals are busy generating financial damages, but under certain conditions, these damage can reach a size that affects the stability of financial markets or economies, context in which it becomes of great interest for the national security of a state[5].

Cybercrime is a global, technical, cross-border and anonymous threat to our IT systems and therefore involves many additional challenges for law enforcement authorities[6].

1. Legislation in the field of fighting cybercrime at the European Union level

In order to combat cybercrime, the European Union has implemented legislation and supported operational cooperation as part of the Union's strategy on IT security.

The Communication "Resilience, discouragement and defending: Building a strong cyber security for the European Union" builds on and further develops the EU Strategy on Information Security. As outlined in the Communication, the European Commission continues to work, among other actions, for effective cyber-deterrence of the EU, facilitating cross-border access to electronic evidence for criminal investigations.

In order to better understand this phenomenon, we have selected the relevant legislation in the field of cybercrime at the European Union level, which is a reference document when it comes to computer science:

- 2013 – The IT System Directive, which aims to address widespread cyber attacks, urging Member States to reinforce national cybercrime legislation and to introduce more severe criminal sanctions[7].

- 2011 – The directive on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography online, which better addresses new developments in the online environment such as identity sharing (people hiding under the identity of children to attract minors for sexual abuse)[8].

- 2002 – The Privacy Directive, through which providers of electronic communications services must ensure the security of their own services and maintain the confidentiality of the customer's information[9].

- 2001 – The Framework Directive on combating fraud and counterfeiting of electronic payment instruments, which defines the fraudulent behaviors which EU Member States must take into account in defining offenses punishable by law[10].

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[4] Dumitru Dumbravă, *Aggression in Cyber Space,* Romanian Journal of Intelligence Studies, no. 6 / December 2011, Publishing House of the National Intelligence Studies Institute, Bucharest, 2011, p. 171

[5] Ibidem, pp. 171-172.

[6] The European Union's Internal Security Strategy, *Towards a European Security Model*, adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council at its meeting of February 25th-26th, 2010, endorsed at the same date by the European Council.

[7] Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, A7-0103/2014, *Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security in the Union* (COM (2013) 0048- C7-0035/2013 -2013/0027 (COD)), April 12th, 2014.

[8] *Directive 2011/192/EU on combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.*

[9] *Directive 2002/58/EC on the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector* (Directive on privacy and electronic communications).

[10] *Council Framework Decision 2001/413/JHA* of May 28th, 2008 on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment.

2. Trends and Risk Factors in the Cyber Sector[11]

In the cyber sector, one can see a series of trends and risk factors, that we are going to present below.
- The emergence of new, increasingly complex operating modes, which include most cybercrime crimes;
- The use of computer camouflage and the rapid movement of the perpetrators of cybercrime are some of the most common methods used by criminals to lead to their non-identification and prosecution;
- Increase in the number of crimes with bank cards committed on the Romanian territory and those committed abroad by Romanian citizens, by making and using the equipment for skimming/fraud of ATMs and POS transactions or by launching computer attacks targeting clients some banking institutions in order to devalue their bank accounts and to transfer the amounts of money stolen to bank accounts from other states;
- Increasing the number of crimes committed by Romanian citizens in non-EU states, where personal identification codes for bank cards have not been implemented yet;
- Increase in the number of unauthorized access to private e-mail addresses, public institutions, or private businesses for the purpose of committing cyber-fraud.

Obstacles to cybercrime and prosecution investigations [12] : jurisdictional boundaries, insufficient information sharing capacities, technical difficulties in locating the origin of the perpetrators of cybercrime, differences in investigative capabilities and legal expertise, lack of qualified staff.

3. Ensuring an optimal security environment in cyberspace[13]

The fight against cybercrime, whose main legal instrument is the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime[14], remains an absolute priority.[15]

In the view of the different ways in which attacks and rapid developments in hardware and software can be made, Directive No. 2013/40/EU refers to 'instruments' that can be used for the purpose of committing offenses. These tools could represent, for example, malicious programs, including those capable of creating botnets[16], used to commit cyberattacks. Motivated by the need to avoid incrimination where such instruments are produced and placed on the market for legitimate purposes, such as to test the reliability of certain information technology products or the security of computer systems, in addition to the requirement of general intention, the requirement of direct intention to use those instruments to commit one or more of the offenses provided for in the Directive must also be met[17].

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[11] *National Strategy on Public Order and Safety 2015-2020,* Ministry of Internal Affairs.

[12] 52012DC0140: *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Combating crime in the current digital age*: establishment of a European Cybercrime Center, COM/2012/0140, March 28th, 2012, p. 2.

[13] http://eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed on October 2nd, 2017.

[14] *Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime*, Budapest, November 23th, 2001, also known as the *Budapest Convention*. The Convention is accompanied by an Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems.

[15] 52012DC0140: *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Combating crime in the current digital age*: establishment of a European Cybercrime Center, COM / 2012/0140, March 28th, 2012, p. 3.

[16] Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on attacks against information systems, COM (2010) 517, September 2010. Botnets are computer virus networks infected with hostile software that can be remotely enabled to perform specific operations , including computer attacks.

[17] *Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of August 12th, 2013 concerning attacks against information systems and the replacement of Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, par. (16).*

The establishment of the European Center for Combating Cybercrime (EC3)[18] is a benchmark in the EU's fight against cybercrime. This Center has the ability to provide governments, businesses and citizens across the Union with the tools to address cybercrime[19]. The Center has been operating within Europol since January 2013[20].

The mandate of the European Center for Cybercrime covers the following areas of cybercrime[21]:

- cybercrime committed by organized crime groups, in particular those that generate significant profits from crime, such as online fraud;
- acts of cybercrime that cause serious harm to their victims, such as the sexual exploitation of children on the Internet, as well as
- cybercrime (including computer attacks) directed against the critical infrastructure and information systems of the Union.

The basic functions of the European Center for Cybercrime are as follows[22]:

- it is the point of convergence, at EU level, of information on cybercrime;
- it represents an expertise resource to strengthen its own capabilities in order to combat cybercrime in the Member States;
- it provides support to Member States in cybercrime investigations;
- it represents the collective voice, becomes the spokesman for European investigators on cybercrime at the level of law enforcement and judiciary authorities[23].

3.1.Priorities and strategic actions

The European Union should safeguard an online environment that offers the highest possible level of freedom and security for the benefit of all. Recognizing that tackling cyber security challenges is primarily a matter for the Member States, the strategy proposes specific actions that can improve the overall performance of the EU. These actions are planned for both short and long term[24]. They include a wide range of political instruments[25] and involve different actors, from EU institutions, Member States and industry.

The EU vision is articulated on five strategic priorities:

- achieving cyber resilience;
- the drastic reduction of cybercrime;
- development of cyber defense policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP);
- developing industrial and technological resources in the field of cyber security;

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[18] 52012DC0140: *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Combating crime in the current digital age*: establishment of a European Cybercrime Center, COM/2012/0140, March 28th, 2012, p. 5.

[19] Corneliu Alexandru, *Internal Security Strategy of the European Union,* M.A.I. Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 122-123.

[20] 52013PC0173: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the European Union Agency for Law-making Training (Europol) and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA /* COM/2013/0173 - 2013/0091 (COD).

[21] 52012DC0140: *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Combating crime in the current digital age*: establishment of a European Cybercrime Center, COM/2012/0140, March 28th, 2012, p. 7.

[22] Ibidem, p. 8.

[23] As defined in *Council Directive 2008/114/EC* of 8 December 2008. This Directive is being revised; EC3 will take account of further developments.

[24] 52013JC0001: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *The EU's cyber security strategy: an open, secure and secure cyber space*, February 7th, 2013.

[25] Actions relating to the exchange of information when personal data are at stake should comply with EU data protection law.

- the establishment of a coherent European Union policy on cyberspace and the promotion of the EU's core values[26].

3.2. Directions for action, according to the National Public Order and Safety Strategy 2015-2020

a. Development of implementation plans for the Cyber Security Strategy of Romania (approved by the Supreme Defense Council of the country on 05.02.2013).
b. Development of technical tools (IT searches, access and data processing) and Internet investigation and monitoring tools for cybercrime investigation.
c. Ensure, at national level, the unitary nature of procedures for the protection of cyber infrastructures of national interest.
d. Collaboration with other Member States in order to promote the active use of counter terrorism, early warning and information platforms that facilitate mutual exchange of information in the event of explosion, chemical, biological and nuclear incidents.
e. Enhance IT infrastructure security.
f. Improving the capacity to prevent, investigate and combat cybercrime.
g. Active participation and contribution to the European Crime Center at Europol level.
h. Strengthen cooperation in the field, especially for the Black Sea region and the Eastern Partnership[27].

3.3. Focal Points at the European Center for Cybercrime

Cybercrime is the domain of EC3's competence and includes offenses against computer and network infrastructures, as well as offenses committed online [28] (malware, hacking, phishing, intrusion, manipulation, identity theft, fraud and online sexual exploitation of children).

With regard to online child sexual exploitation, the EC3 aims to identify authors, establish cross-links between Member States and identify victims to stop a potential crime and to notify competent authorities to take action under the law.

Payment card fraud is combated by collecting information and supporting law enforcement within the EU. EC3 offers a number of services[29] in the fight against organized crime through the 24/7 Helpdesk and Coordination Center, data processing capabilities, internal network security monitoring and the ability to scan all available resources and extract information.

3.4. The European Group on Cybercrime Training and Education (EGCTE)

The European Commission has supported the launching and running of the Falcone project[30] in 2011. This project was aiming to train cybercrime investigators by creating a platform and suite of European cybercrime training courses at an introductory and advanced level.

In 2007, Europol created the "Europol Working Group on the Harmonization of the Training of Experts on Cybercrime Investigation". At the 2009 meeting, the group was renamed the "European Group on Training and Education to Combat Cybercrime" (EGCTE).

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[26] 52013JC0001: Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, *The EU's cyber security strategy: an open, secure and secure cyber space*, February 7th, 2013.
[27] *National Strategy on Public Order and Safety 2015-2020,* Ministry of Internal Affairs.
[28] Corneliu Alexandru, *Internal Security Strategy of the European Union,* M.A.I. Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, p. 124.
[29] Corneliu Alexandru, *Internal Security Strategy of the European Union,* M.A.I. Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, p. 125.
[30] http://falcon.project.eu, accessed on October 5th, 2017.

European Cybercrime Training and Education Group contributes to cybercrime training[31], cooperation and knowledge sharing, finding solutions to working with academic and with private partners[32].

3.5. Centers of Excellence

The world is increasingly dependent on electronic networks and information systems. Law enforcement agencies are confronted with insufficient training in the field of IT forensics, but also in the field of IT investigations.

The European Commission's project started in the year 2010, completed in the year of training in the fight against cybercrime, led to the creation of two national centers in France and Ireland, but also a coordination center whose activity includes the development of common procedures. Thus, the private environment, law enforcement agencies and academia have the opportunity to participate in training programs, the development of training programs and training modules.

Conclusions

The technical complexity required in order to combat cybercrime denotes that traditional methods of investigating this type of crime are not sufficient[33]. It is imperative that there is a high level of training of law enforcement services in the IT field.

The complexity of the technology used, the new landscape of digital forensic means, the rapidly changing technology, the *modus operandi* of criminals operating in the virtual environment call for suitable approaches, constant efforts in order to strengthen the EU's ability to fight cybercrime adequately and to remove existing shortcomings. There is a need for staff capable of adapting, capitalizing on previous knowledge and expertise, but also of appropriate technology to current and future challenges.

The universe of organized crime extends its activities to the virtual space, law enforcement authorities having to keep pace with these developments. The EU can provide the Member States and industry with the necessary tools in order to combat cybercrime, which is a constantly evolving modern threat and which, by definition, has no borders.

Provided that the necessary human and financial resources can be achieved, the European Cybercrime Center will become the focal point of Europe's fight against cybercrime by pooling its skills, supporting criminal investigations and promoting EU-level solutions, at the same time, raising awareness among European citizens on issues related to cybercrime.

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[31] 52013PC0173: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the European Union Agency for Law-making Training (Europol) and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA.

[32] Corneliu Alexandru, *Internal Security Strategy of the European Union,* M.A.I. Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015, p. 129.

[33] 52013PC0173: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the European Union Agency for Law-making Training (Europol) and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA / * COM/2013/0173 - 2013/0091 (COD), March 27th, 2013.

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11. *National Strategy on Public Order and Safety 2015-2020, Ministry of Internal Affairs*.

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13. http://eur-lex.europa.eu

14. http://falcon.project.eu

HUMINT- INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION TOOL

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Abstract: HUMINT uses human resources as a tool and a variety of collection, passive or active methods for gathering information in accordance with commander information requirements and in conjunction with other information disciplines.

The role of HUMINT's structures is to contribute with intelligence products, obtained from human sources, in the planning, preparation and execution of military operations.

Keywords: HUMINT, intelligence, human sources, information, HUMINT operator.

Introduction

Intelligence has a very important role in supporting operations, always aiming to ensure the informational superiority in knowledge and visualization of the battlefield, in determining the symmetries and asymmetries between the forces and the enemy in order to provide a complete, precise and anticipative information support for decision making.

Intelligence – *are the product resulting from the processing of primary data on foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces, real or potential operations or elements. The term also applies to activities that generates this product as well as to organizations / structures dealing with such activities.*[1]

The quality of decision making is given by the value of the information available. It is the decision making that moves the force to fulfill the purpose, and can be characterized by a high or a low risk in terms of success or cost of operation. The decision based on timely information, both in terms of quality and time, ensures victory at minimal risk and at minimal cost.

Methods and sources of information are very diverse, with more criteria depending on possibilities, degree of legality and level of detail.

In NATO doctrine, sources are grouped into the following areas[2]: SIGINT (*Signal Intelligence*), IMINT (*Imagery Intelligence*), HUMINT (*Human Intelligence*), and OSINT (*Open Source Intelligence*).

In the following, I will present a series of considerations on HUMINT as an *intelligence collection tool* with purpose to highlight the importance of HUMINT operators in providing decision-makers with information.

1. The HUMINT concept

HUMINT uses human resources as a tool and a variety of collection, passive or active methods for gathering information in accordance with commander information requirements and in conjunction with other information disciplines.

The role of HUMINT's structures is to contribute with intelligence products, obtained from human sources, in the planning, preparation and execution of military operations.

Depending on the missions, HUMINT is defined as *"offensive measures to collect data and information that cannot be gathered by means other than from human sources"*.[3]

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[1] ***, *AAP-6 Edition 2013- NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, NATO, 2013, available at http://passthrough.fw-notify.net/download/512602/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/other/aap6.pdf, accessed on 20.10.2017.

[2] ***, AJP 2.0 *NATO Doctrine for intelligence, counterintelligence and security*, pp. 1-5;

[3] ***, FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, Washington, DC, USA, September 2006, p. 18.

According to the NATO Intelligence Doctrine, "*Any person - friendly, enemy or neutral can be a potential human source".[4]*

Human resource activity is the establishment of a relationship, with the specific purpose of exploiting the source, in a confidential, systematic and controlled manner, in order to obtain valuable information for our own forces.

2. The HUMINT sources

A HUMINT source or contact can be any person from whom information is obtained or which originates the information. The source or contact has the information, usually heard or seen, from its own experience or from another secondary source.

Potential sources or HUMINT contacts include military or civilian personnel, neutral or active, friendly or enemy forces, etc., traitors or anyone who wants to collaborate with hostile or disagreeable behavior towards the target, people of any age and occupation, ethnicity, religion, social category, political orientation, etc.

Figure no. 1. Potential human sources for HUMINT operators

3. The HUMINT architecture

According with USA intelligence specialists the architecture[5] of HUMINT structures is:
- Coordination and management of HUMINT structures elements:
    a) the * 2X compartment (J2X, G2X, S2X), which will function as a subordinate structure within J2 / G2 / S2;
    b) the HUMINT-HOC operation cell;
    c) the HUMINT - OMT (Operations Management Team).
- HUMINT execution elements:
    a) the HUMINT-HIC operator (Human Intelligence Collector);
    b) the HUMINT - THT (Tactical HUMINT Team) or FHT (Field HUMINT Team) detachment / group / team.

The personnel of *2X is responsible for the management of missions and tasks of HUMINT /CI structures and security, ensuring:
    - collecting, analyzing and disseminating the data and information provided by CCIR;
    - develops specific tasks and orders based on the Information Collection Plan;
    - cooperates with similar structures from the upper echelons.

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[4] ***, AJP-2.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Human Intelligence (HUMINT),* SUA, July 2008, p.3.
[5] ***, FM 2-22.3, *Human Intelligence Collector Operations*, Washington, DC, USA, September 2006, 2-1.

Figure no. 2. A *2X organization structure

4. HUMINT collection methods

In order to collect information, the HUMINT structures have to go through five phases/stages:

1. Screening - the process of evaluating and selecting human sources, based on the likelihood that a particular source, identified to meet certain requirements, will have access to information of interest;

2. planning and preparation - each HUMINT mission must be planned in detail on the basis of a document (OPLAN) and requires preparation prior to its execution, depending on the importance of the source and the environment of the organization;

3. Approach and termination strategies - this phase will vary depending on the type of operation, the operational environment, the importance of the source, the personality and experience of HUMINT operators as well as the time available for the meeting;

4. questioning - HUMINT operators must prepare before a meeting with a source, a variety of questions that once applied will allow accurate and complete information to be obtained in a shorter period of time;

5. Reporting - a vital step in the collection process in which information is accurately reported and in as short a time as possible.

They generally go in this order. However, reporting can be performed at any time of the cycle when vital information is obtained.

HUMINT information about the enemy or a target is of the active type, being mainly harvested through a human source, thus assuming the personal contact between the operator and the source (the one who collects or the one providing the information).

This human interface allows:

a. early, near-instinctual, real-time assessment of the source in terms of capacity and credibility (the ability of the operator to grasp the strengths and weaknesses of the information provider is a vital aspect of HUMINT);

b. the flexibility to pursue proactively (to have the initiative) and in-depth information requirements - additional questions can be addressed as information gains progress;

c. the ability to direct a source to more information needed;

d. using a source to identify others;

e. using the source as a "human trigger" to provide predictive evidence of enemy activity.

The information obtained by the HUMINT structures in operations is usually operative or tactical, but sometimes they can also target the strategic field.

The techniques for collecting information used by HUMINT staff in direct relationship with a source or multiple sources at the same time are:

- passive listening;
- interactive listening;
- induction;
- interviewing;
- interrogation.

Passive Listening: It is a technique that can be easily engaged with minimal impact on the sources, without realizing that they are listened. The HUMINT operator turns into a "sponge" that absorbs all the information from any voice in the room. You will be surprised to see how much information people can escape without realizing, generally, to meet their unconscious need to appear strong and informed. They will expose their networks, associations and knowledge, especially when they boast about how well they know an important political figure or attending an event with carefully chosen guests.

Interactive listening: It is a little more elaborate than passive listening, in which the listener (HUMINT operator) will ask questions, react to what he hears or will empathize with the source to get her to get into the details. The operator's reaction to the information transmitted to him indicates the human source that he is interested in what he hears and empathizes with it.

Interactive listening must not be hostile at any moment because there is a danger that the source will "exhaust" its information. Capitalizing on the source and understanding its needs is the best way to engage and continue to exploit the source. Interactive listening has no constraints on the topics being approached, the conversation can be directed in what direction the operator wants.

Induction: is a more advanced form of interactive listening, with the difference that in this case the purpose is to move the conversation in a delicate way in the direction the HUMINT operator desires without the source being aware of it. Using this technique information that could not be obtained by other methods can be deduced.

Interviewing: The interview removes the induction mask and the source is aware that questions are being asked and answers are expected. This process is similar to what a journalist would do to tell a story or an event. Although some questions may make the source feel uncomfortable and may be unresponsive, the role of an interview is to randomly place pieces in their place. An unintentional answer may be trying to cover facts or information that have been obtained from other sources and need only confirmation from this source.

Interrogation: represents the HUMINT action with the greatest impact. The task of the interviewer is to conduct an interview in a calm and determined manner. However, the content of the questions is directly aimed at the inconsistencies. Not just the questioning of the interrogator who seeks to confirm or negate facts or to discover the inconsistencies, but also the nature of the direct questions will reveal that the source was not honest.

Initial interrogations for information are short and on the subject. The operator who runs the interrogator must be pre-prepared with 3 to 5 questions, starting from simple to complex. The entire operation should not last longer than 3 to 5 minutes, with enough time to be given to the source to be crushed by thoughts and to try to bypass the subject. As this action is short, many will not realize that the interrogation has taken place.\\

HUMINT operators have to be specialized in space orientation techniques, decision-making, observation, information verification, undercover and discreet techniques, compliance with procedures and legislation, the use of any military and improvised technology, in order to fulfill his mission.

HUMINT is a unique capability because, although conventional information gathering techniques respond too many of the requests for information, they cannot provide details about intentions, morals, and relationships between individuals and organizations.

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