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SECTION I
STATE AND NONSTATE ACTORS
IN POWER RELATIONS

NATO COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVES – VECTORS OF EUROATLANTIC SECURITY AND STABILITY	7
<i>Florian CÎRCIUMARU</i>	
CATALYTIC STATE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BASED ON DEMOCRACY AND STATUS OF RIGHT	17
<i>Bogdan ȚONEA</i>	
RUSSIA – NATO HYBRID CLASH: HISTORY AND LEGACIES.....	24
<i>Iulia ANGHEL</i>	
INDIA AND CHINA: TWO EMERGING ACTORS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PERSPECTIVES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THEIR STRATEGIC RELATION, ACCORDING TO THE “ASIAN CENTURY” PARADIGM	36
<i>Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU</i>	
EUPHRATES SHIELD: AN ANALYSIS OF TURKEY’S INTERVENTION IN SYRIA.....	47
<i>Cătălin Alin COSTEA</i>	
FAILED STATES – CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY- GENERATING ACTORS IN THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT.....	59
<i>Marius Vasile MANGA</i>	
TERRORISM AS THE OPPOSITE OF CIVILIZATION AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR.....	66
<i>Alexandru LUCINESCU (MUNTEANU-CASELLA)</i>	
EU APPROACH TO COUNTERING DISINFORMATION AND FAKE NEWS	76
<i>Daniela RĂPAN</i>	
CHINA VERSUS THE US IN THE MIDDLE EAST: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION?	84
<i>Cristina-Florentina DINCĂ</i>	
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE – THE REAL PANDORA’S BOX. LEARNING FROM THE PAST	95
<i>Alexandru HERCIU</i>	
DEVELOPMENTS AND CHANGE IN ASYLUM AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE	104
<i>Magda CRIȘAN</i>	

SECTION II

SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

SECURITY DIMENSIONS IN GLOBALIZATION. WAR METAMORPHOSIS	116
<i>Mirela ATANASIU</i>	
PERCEPTION OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT THROUGH NATO MEMBER STATES' STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS.....	124
<i>Vendula DIVIŠOVÁ</i>	
DEFINING THE EXTENDED BLACK SEA REGION: FROM GEOSTRATEGIC REASONING TO PSYCHOSOCIAL REPRESENTATION	135
<i>Alexandra SARCINSCHI</i>	
TRENDS IN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – DEFENCE EXPENDITURE IN THE BLACK SEA REGION.....	143
<i>Cristian BĂHNĂREANU</i>	
THE HYBRID WARFARE AND THE MILITARY OR BELIGEN NON MILITARY CONTEMPORARY ACTIONS' CHARACTERISTICS	152
<i>Viorel-Cătălin MIHALCEA</i>	
ADDRESSING THE EVALUATION OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETAL SECURITY BASED ON COMPLEXITY CONCEPTS.....	162
<i>Ioan CRĂCIUN, Octavian Victor Mihail DIMA</i>	
DEMOGRAPHICS AND THEIR ROLE IN GLOBAL ECONOMY	170
<i>Doina MUREȘAN</i>	
SECURITY TRANSFORMATIONS DUE TO THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT CHANGES. CASE STUDY: CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS	176
<i>Gheorghe-Alexandru GABROVEANU-GHINEA, Corina-Georgiana STAN</i>	
SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND CONTENT IN STRATEGIC ADAPTATION	185
<i>Iulia-Petronela MOISE (BĂDĂLUȚĂ)</i>	
REFERENCES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND PERMANENT NAVAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY.....	192
<i>Sebastian-Gabriel POPESCU</i>	
WAR REFUGEES – A FORM OF FORCED MIGRATION.....	198
<i>Florin Laurențiu GIUȘCĂ, Tomiță ZĂVOIANU</i>	
WAR REFUGEES – VICTIMS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN SECURITY AND FOOD SAFETY DURING REGIONAL ARMED CONFLICT.....	203
<i>Florin Laurențiu GIUȘCĂ, Tomiță ZĂVOIANU</i>	

SECTION III

EVOLUTIONS IN STRATEGIC THEORY AND PRACTICE

TERRORIST ORGANISATION OR LIBERATION MOVEMENT? THE POLISARIO FRONT’S CLASSIFICATION	209
<i>János BESENYŐ</i>	
RECENT STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTIONS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION	220
<i>Florin DIACONU</i>	
THE CONNECTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WITH THE SOCIAL SYSTEM AND ITS SUBORDINATION WITH REGARD TO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM.....	230
<i>Andreea Rurela CÎRCIUMARU, David Nicolae UNGUREANU</i>	
MAIN PARADIGMS SHAPING THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL WORLD ("THE GREATER EUROPE" AND "THE GREATER EURASIA" RUSSIAN PROJECTS)	236
<i>Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU</i>	
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AND COMBATING TERRORIST THREATS	244
<i>Tudor SÂRBU, Ecaterina HLIHOR</i>	
THE GEOSTRATEGIC CHOKE POINT IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLD GEOPOLITICS	252
<i>Dragoș Ionuț PALĂ</i>	
FROM THE JUST WAR TO THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION	262
<i>David Nicolae UNGUREANU, Andreea Rurela CÎRCIUMARU</i>	
AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA – PROFILE, HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS	271
<i>Alexandru STOICA</i>	
THE STRATEGY FOR EVALUATING THE APPLICATION OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION.....	279
<i>Iulia Mădălina STAIUCU, Viorel ORDEANU, Mihail-Silviu TUDOSIE</i>	
STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES USED FOR SHAPING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.....	287
<i>Silviu-Stelian BORȘA, Visarion NEAGOE</i>	
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND THE ROLE OF EXPERTISE IN CREATING DEFENSE POLICIES AND SECURITY STRATEGIES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.....	297
<i>Tudor SÂRBU</i>	

STRATEGY AND WAR IN KAUTILYA’S VISION. TOPICALITY REFLECTIONS.....	306
<i>Florin STAFI</i>	
AL-QAEDA - A MILLENARY ORGANIZATION	316
<i>Alexandru STOICA</i>	
CONCEPT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGAL MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION	322
<i>Mihail-Silviu TUDOSIE, Iulia Mădălina STAICU, Viorel ORDEANU</i>	
INDEX OF AUTHORS.....	331

NATO COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVES – VECTORS OF EUROATLANTIC SECURITY AND STABILITY

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Abstract: *The 2010 Strategic Concept “Active Engagement, Modern Defence” is a very clear and resolute statement on NATO’s core tasks and principles, its values, the evolving security environment and the Alliance’s strategic objectives for the next decade. Based on its unique capabilities and operational experience, including expertise in civilian-military interaction, NATO can contribute to the efforts of the international community for maintaining peace, security and stability, in full coordination with other actors, such as international security organisation, state actors and non state actors, non-governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations.*

This paper intends to overview the most important areas of interest concerning cooperation and partnership initiatives that NATO established during its history, as well as cooperation’s influence over the Euroatlantic security and stability, based on the latest developments in the field.

Keywords: *security, cooperative security, stability, partnership.*

Introduction

NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Collective defence is at the heart of the Alliance and creates a spirit of solidarity and cohesion among its members. NATO strives to secure a lasting peace in Europe, based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Since the outbreak of crises and conflicts beyond the borders of NATO member countries can jeopardize this objective, the Alliance also contributes to peace and stability through crisis management operations and partnerships. Essentially, NATO not only helps to defend the territory of its members, but engages where possible and when necessary to project its values further afield, prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction. NATO’s fundamental security tasks are laid down in the Washington Treaty. They are sufficiently general and translated into more detail in strategic concepts: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Strategic concepts are the authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives and provide the highest level of guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving these goals; they remain the basis for the implementation of Alliance policy as a whole.

The 2010 Strategic Concept affirms how NATO aims to promote international security through cooperation. It will do this by reinforcing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, emphasizing NATO’s open door policy for all European countries and significantly enhancing its partnerships in the broad sense of the term. Additionally, NATO will continue its reform and transformation process. “The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and

other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door of membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards."¹

At the root of cooperation is the principle of seeking security "at the lowest possible level of forces". NATO states that it will continue to help reinforce efforts in these areas and cites a number of related initiatives. It then recommits to NATO enlargement as the best way of achieving "our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values" (art. 27). A fundamental component of its cooperative approach to security is partnership, understood between NATO and non-NATO countries, as well as with other international organizations and actors. The Strategic Concept depicts a more inclusive, flexible and open relationship with the Alliance's partners across the globe and stresses its desire to strengthen cooperation with the United Nations and the European Union. It also seeks "a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia" and reiterates its commitment to develop relations with countries of the Mediterranean and the Gulf region. Finally, the Strategic Concept describes the means NATO will use to maximise efficiency, improve working Methods and spend its resources more wisely in view of the priorities identified in this concept.

1. NATO partnerships with countries

The road to partnership was opened during the London Summit in 1990, when, inaugurating the historic meeting, the then NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner expressed the significance of the moment: "The Cold War belongs to history. Our Alliance is moving from confrontation to cooperation. [...] Never before has Europe had such a tangible opportunity to overcome the cycle of war and peace that has so bedevilled its past."²

The London Declaration was the Allied leaders' response to the dramatic changes in the security environment that rapidly followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. It set the scene for the transformation of the Cold War NATO and laid the foundations for what NATO has become today. At the 1990 London Conference, Allied leaders recognized that "in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours". They extended a "hand of friendship" across the old East-West divide and proposed a new cooperative relationship with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The London Declaration outlined proposals for developing cooperation with NATO's former Cold War adversaries across a wide spectrum of political and military activities. It emphasized the importance of promoting arms control and confidence building and proposed regular diplomatic and military contacts. This paved the way for the establishment in December 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for bringing together NATO and its new Partner countries to discuss issues of common concern – the first of NATO's formal instruments for pursuing cooperation with non-member countries.

Further on, SG Lord Robertson, stated at the Press Conference following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, in 2002, that "NATO must change radically if it is to be effective.....It must be modernised or be marginalised"³.

On the same line of extending cooperation and partnership, in September 2012, after the Chicago Summit held in May, the former Deputy Secretary General Ambassador

¹ *Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 2010, Core Tasks and Principles, 3. Cooperative security, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm*

² NATO London Summit 1990, available online at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/news_64790.htm?, accessed on October 10, 2018; *NATO Guide*, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Bruxelles, Belgium, 2011.

³ Lord Robertson, Press Conference following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, May 15, 2002, <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020514c.htm>

Alexander Vershbow stated “We need a perspective that is both European and global. [...] And we need partners, both in Europe and around the globe, to expand the community of shared interests, shared values, and shared security that NATO represents”⁴.

1.1. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership

The Alliance seeks to foster security, stability and democratic transformation across the Euro-Atlantic area by engaging in partnership through dialogue and cooperation with non-member countries in Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia⁵. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership is underpinned by two key mechanisms: the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) created 1997 and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, 1994.

The 50-nation EAPC (Figure no.1) brings together the 29 Allies and 21 Partner countries in a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation, and provides the overall political framework for NATO’s cooperation with Partner countries.



Figure no. 1: EAPC membership⁶

The PfP programme facilitates practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO, tailored according to the specific ambitions, needs and abilities of each Partner. Longer-term consultation and cooperation takes place in a wide range of areas within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Programme (EAPWP). These areas include crisis-management and peace-support operations; regional issues; arms control and issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism; defence issues such as planning, budgeting, policy and strategy; civil emergency planning and disaster-preparedness; armaments cooperation; nuclear safety; civil-military coordination of air traffic management; and scientific cooperation⁷.

NATO’s current Strategic Concept, which was approved at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, states that the EAPC and the PfP programme are central to the Allies vision

⁴ Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, former Deputy Secretary General discourse of September 2012, after the Chicago Summit held in May, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_90005.htm.

⁵ According to https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67979.htm.

⁶ Figure no 1 – EAPC Membership, data used were taken from NATO Encyclopaedia, 2015, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Bruxelles, Belgium, 2015, pp. 495 – 513.

⁷ According to NATO website Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49276.htm.

of “a Europe whole, free and at peace”⁸. At Lisbon, Allied leaders reiterated their commitment to further develop the EAPC/PfP as the essential framework for substantive political dialogue and practical cooperation, including enhanced military interoperability, and that they would continue to develop policy initiatives within this framework⁹.

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO (initially 34 countries, out of which 13 have become allies). It allows partners to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. Based on a commitment to the democratic principles that underpin the Alliance itself, the purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries. Activities on offer under the PfP programme touch on virtually every field of NATO activity, including defence-related work, defence reform, defence policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, military-to-military cooperation and exercises, civil emergency planning and disaster-response, and cooperation on science and environmental issues¹⁰.

1.2. Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)

NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council and currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

The Dialogue reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. The Mediterranean Dialogue's overall aim is to: contribute to regional security and stability; achieve better mutual understanding; dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries.

The successful launch of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and its subsequent development has been based upon a number of principles: *non discrimination, self-differentiation, inclusiveness, two-way engagement* (the MD is a *two-way partnership*, in which NATO seeks partners' contribution for its success, through a regular consultation process), *non imposition*, complementarity and mutual reinforcement and diversity.

The areas of practical cooperation range from defence reform to modernization of the armed forces, interoperability, civil emergency planning, up to crisis management, border security and fight against terrorism (info sharing).

The Dialogue is primarily bilateral in structure (NATO+1). Despite the predominantly bilateral character, it nevertheless allows for multilateral meetings on a regular basis (NATO+7), thus activities within the Mediterranean Dialogue take place on a self-funding basis. However, Allies agreed to consider requests for financial assistance in support of Mediterranean partners' participation in the Dialogue¹¹.

1.3. Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the Alliance's Summit in the Turkish city in June 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by

⁸ This words belong to President George H.W. Bush, in a speech delivered in 1989, according to <https://www.cfr.org/interview/natos-milestone-lisbon-summit>

⁹ Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, art. 25, https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm.

¹⁰ For more details, see <https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/partnership-for-peace.aspx>.

¹¹ For more details, see NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_60021.htm?

offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO. ICI focuses on practical cooperation in areas where NATO can add value, notably in the security field. Six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council were initially invited to participate. To date, four of these – Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates – have joined. Saudi Arabia and Oman have also shown an interest in the Initiative. The same principles that govern the MD cooperation are applicable for ICI as well.

The Initiative offers a ‘menu’ of bilateral activities that countries can choose from, which comprises a range of cooperation areas, including – tailored advice on topics such as defence transformation and civil-military relations, military-to-military cooperation and related education and training activities, cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including through intelligence-sharing, cooperation in the Alliance’s work on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, cooperation regarding border security in connection with terrorism, small arms and light weapons and the fight against illegal trafficking, civil emergency planning¹².

1.4. Global Partners/Partners across the Globe (PATG)

NATO cooperates on an individual basis with a number of countries which are not actually part of its formal partnership frameworks. Referred to as “partners across the globe” or simply “global partners”, they include Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. These countries develop cooperation with NATO in areas of mutual interest and actively contribute to NATO operations. Individual global partners choose the areas where they wish to engage in and cooperate with NATO in a spirit of mutual benefit and reciprocity.

The contributions from global partners and other countries to NATO-led operations have a direct, advantageous impact for international peace and security. In the Balkans, Argentinean and Chilean forces have worked alongside NATO Allies to ensure security in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Kosovo, Argentina has helped NATO personnel provide medical and social assistance to the local population and cooperated on peace agreement implementation since 1999. In Afghanistan, a number of global partners such as Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, work alongside the Allies as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Other countries, such as Japan, support ISAF efforts of stabilisation in Afghanistan without being involved in combat, by funding a large number of development projects and dispatching liaison officers¹³.

1.5. Contact countries

On the same principle described earlier, NATO developed individual relations with a lot of countries on bilateral basis such as *China, India, Brazil, Columbia, Singapore, Taiwan and El Salvador*, so well known Contact Countries Initiative. These countries have expressed an interest in deepening relations with NATO, or simply wish to be informed of NATO’s agenda. Some are troop contributors to NATO-led operations or contribute to these operations in other ways. Others simply seek to cooperate with NATO in areas of common interest. Over the recent years, NATO has developed bilateral relations with each of these countries.

Although NATO does not seek a role in Asia, the security situation in the Asia Pacific region cannot be separated from that of the Euro-Atlantic and NATO. For instance, although China is not part of NATO’s official network of partners, it is an essential part of the 360° engagement, having in mind that China is a UN Security Council member and that NATO

¹² For details, see https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_04/20140331_140401-factsheet-ICI_en.pdf

¹³ NATO Encyclopedia 2017, Brussels, Belgium, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_151400.htm, p. 603.

operates under UN mandates. China also shares NATO interests in Afghanistan, especially in terrorism and drug trafficking¹⁴.

2. Special Partnership

2.1. NATO's relations with Russia

For more than two decades, NATO has strived to build a partnership with Russia, developing dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. Cooperation has been suspended in response to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, which the Allies condemn in the strongest terms. Political channels of communication remain open.

Relations started after the end of the Cold War, when Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace Programme (1994). The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act provided the formal basis for relations. Dialogue and cooperation were strengthened in 2002, with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) to serve as a forum for consultation on current security issues and to direct practical cooperation in a wide range of areas¹⁵.

Russia's disproportionate military action in Georgia in August 2008 led to the suspension of formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas, until spring 2009.

In NATO 2010 Strategic Concept, there was stated the intention to build "a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia" (art. 33) that will "enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in shared areas of interest" (art. 34), facing common challenges such as terrorism, narcotics, as well as regarding the Cooperative Airspace Initiative and theatre/ballistic missile defense, Mil to Mil programme, civil emergencies, etc.

All practical civilian and military cooperation under the NRC was suspended in April 2014 in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO leaders condemned Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and demanded that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; withdraw its troops; halt the flow of weapons, equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian border¹⁶.

2.2. Relations with Ukraine

The Allies believe that a sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. Relations date back to the early 1990s and have since developed into one of the most substantive of NATO's partnerships. Since 2014, in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, cooperation has been intensified in critical areas.

Dialogue and cooperation started after the end of the Cold War, when newly independent Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership for Peace programme (1994). Relations were strengthened with the signing of the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, which established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) to take cooperation forward¹⁷.

Consultations and cooperation between NATO and Ukraine cover a wide range of areas including peace-support operations, defence and security sector reform, military-to-

¹⁴ For more details, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_155840.htm.

¹⁵ For details, see NATO Encyclopedia 2017, Brussels, Belgium, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_151400.htm, p. 605.

¹⁶ NATO Encyclopedia 2017, Brussels, Belgium, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_151400.htm, p. 606.

¹⁷ NATO Encyclopedia 2017, Brussels, Belgium, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_151400.htm, p. 644.

military cooperation, armaments, civil emergency planning, science and environment, and public diplomacy. Cooperation in many areas is being intensified to enhance Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security in the wake of the conflict with Russia¹⁸.

Following Russia's military escalation in Crimea and with its independence and territorial integrity under threat, Ukraine invoked Article 14 of the NATO-Ukraine Charter and requested a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, which took place on 2 March 2014. The Allies condemned Russia's military action against Ukraine as a breach of international law, which also contravenes the principles of the NATO-Russia Council and of the Partnership for Peace. In response to Russia's illegal and illegitimate "annexation" of Crimea on 18 March 2014 and the violence and insecurity in eastern Ukraine caused by Russia and Russian-backed separatists, the Allies have continued to express their full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

2.3. Relations with Georgia

Relations between NATO and Georgia started after the end of the Cold War, when newly independent Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1992) and the Partnership for Peace (1994). The dialogue and cooperation deepened after the "Rose Revolution" in 2003, when the new government pushed for reforms.

Allied leaders agreed at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a NATO member, and this decision was reconfirmed at NATO Summits in 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2014. Following the crisis with Russia in August 2008, the Allies continue to support Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders and call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. The NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) provides the framework for close political dialogue and cooperation in support of the country's reform efforts and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. At the Wales Summit in September 2014, a package of measures was launched to strengthen Georgia's ability to defend itself and advance its preparations for membership.

NATO-Georgia cooperation is reflected in some key areas, namely security cooperation, defence and security sector reform, civil emergency planning, security-related scientific cooperation, public information and, last, but not least, the NATO Liaison Office established in Tbilisi, in 2010 to support the country's reform efforts and its programme of cooperation with NATO. Support for Georgia's reform efforts and its goal of integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions is a priority for cooperation.

Aspiring to become a NATO member, the country actively contributes to NATO-led operations (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the counter-terrorist maritime surveillance operation in the Mediterranean) and cooperates with the Allies and other partner countries in many other areas as well¹⁹.

3. Cooperation with organisations

3.1. Cooperation with the European Union

Sharing strategic interests, NATO and the European Union cooperate on issues of common interest and are working side by side in crisis management, capability development and political consultations. The European Union is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members (22), and all members of both

¹⁸ NATO Encyclopedia 2017, Brussels, Belgium, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_151400.htm, p. 646.

¹⁹ For more details, see NATO website, Relations with Georgia, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm

organisations share common values. EU-NATO cooperation constitutes an integral pillar of the EU's work aimed at strengthening European security and defence, as part of the implementation of the EU Global Strategy.

Institutionalised relations between NATO and the European Union (EU)²⁰ were launched in 2001, building on steps taken during the 1990s to promote greater European responsibility in defence matters. The political principles underlying the relationship were set out in the December 2002 NATO-EU Declaration on a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The declaration also reaffirmed EU assured access to NATO's planning capabilities for the EU's own military operations. Later, the so-called "Berlin Plus" arrangements set the basis for the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged. At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the Allies underlined their determination to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership. This was reinforced by NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept which commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with NATO's international partners, most importantly the United Nations and its strategic partner – the EU.

On 8 July 2016, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, together with the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed a Joint Declaration²¹ in Warsaw, with a view to giving new impetus and new substance to the EU-NATO strategic partnership. It outlined seven concrete areas where cooperation between the two organisations should be enhanced: 1. countering hybrid threats; 2. operational cooperation including at sea and on migration; 3. cyber security and defence; 4. defence capabilities; 5. defence industry and research; 6. exercises; 7. supporting Eastern and Southern partners' capacity-building efforts.

On the basis of the mandate by the Joint Declaration, common sets of proposals were endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils in December 2016 and 2017. Altogether, 74 concrete actions are under implementation in the seven areas (see list). Three progress reports have been submitted, highlighting main achievements and added value of EU-NATO cooperation in different areas.

Cooperation between the EU and NATO is now the established norm and daily practice and continues to take place on the basis of key guiding principles: openness, transparency, inclusiveness and reciprocity, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State²².

3.2. NATO relations with the United Nations (UN)

NATO and the United Nations (UN) share a commitment to maintaining international peace and security. The two organisations have been cooperating in this area since the early 1990s. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with NATO's international partners, most importantly the UN and the European Union.

Over the years, NATO-UN cooperation has been extended beyond operations to include consultations between NATO and UN specialised bodies and agencies on issues such

²⁰ *EU-NATO cooperation – Factsheet*, Bruxelles, July 10, 2018, available online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/28286/eu-nato-cooperation-factsheet_en, accessed on September 16, 2018.

²¹ See the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21481/nato-eu-declaration-8-july-en-final.pdf>

²² See EU-NATO Cooperation, ed. Nov. 2018, https://cdn5-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/otambGc7_PZ7cDdMdQqQki4M3aTBIo6-efph8-K1vFI/mtime:1542899750/sites/eeas/files/eu-nato_cooperation_factsheet.pdf

as crisis assessment and management, civil-military cooperation, training and education, logistics, combating human trafficking, mine action, civilian capabilities, women, peace and security, arms control and non-proliferation, and the fight against terrorism. The complexity of today's security challenges is requiring a broader dialogue between NATO and the UN. In 2010, following the signing of the 2008 UN-NATO declaration on cooperation, NATO reinforced its liaison arrangements by establishing the post of NATO Civilian Liaison Officer to the United Nations. This enhanced cooperation is an integral part of NATO's contribution to a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management and operations²³.

3.3. NATO's relations with the OSCE

NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) work together to build security and promote stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. They cooperate at both the political and the operational level in areas such as conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation, crisis management, as well as in addressing new security challenges. At the political level, NATO and the OSCE consult each other on thematic and regional security issues of common interest, such as border security and disarmament. At the operational level, cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation has been particularly active in the Western Balkans. The two organisations complement each other's efforts on the ground. NATO initiatives to support defence reform, including arms control, mine clearance and the destruction of stockpiles of arms and munitions go hand in hand with OSCE efforts aimed at preventing conflict and restoring stability after conflict²⁴.

Conclusions

In the current strategic environment, with unprecedented challenges emanating from the South and the East, cooperation among NATO and all others entities is crucial. The security of EU, UN, OSCE and NATO are inter-connected, they can also mobilise a broad range of tools and make the most efficient use of resources to address those challenges and enhance the security of their citizens. Only by promoting dialogue and cooperation, NATO and its partners can share insights on areas of common security interest, gain access to advice and support as they reform and strengthen defence institutions and capacities, contribute to current NATO-led operations and missions – all those leading to the achievement of NATO's political aim to safeguard peace and stability in the Euroatlantic area.

As the Alliance is shifting from operational engagement to operational readiness, focusing on preparation, interoperability and readiness, NATO needs, in almost all areas, effective partnerships and it also needs to implement a Comprehensive Approach Action Plan to be successful to manage crises, to defend against emerging security challenges and to promote stability worldwide.

²³ For more details, see NATO website, Relations with the United Nations, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50321.htm

²⁴ For more details, see NATO website, Relations with OSCE, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49911.htm

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CATALYTIC STATE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS BASED ON DEMOCRACY AND STATUS OF RIGHT

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Abstract: *Far from giving up their distinctive identity and objectives, states increasingly use power agreements to create greater control over the economy and security. In itself, these coalitions should be seen as apparent disposals aimed at increasing the state's capacity in specific areas, and less diminishing their sovereignty. Strengthening such alliances takes place primarily at the regional level, between nation-states, as is the case with the European Union.*

We are currently witnessing some changes in state power. As external pressures for the homogeneity of economic regimes grow, and large international flows of people and capital threaten domestic fundamentals, more and more states are looking to improve their control over the external environment. In order to adapt to these challenges, some states are seen as catalytic states, meaning states that tend to be indispensable to targeting certain strategic coalitions, while remaining independent of other elements of those alliances.

Keywords: *state, globalization, coalition, catalytic state, sovereignty.*

1. Introduction. The role of the national state in contemporaneity

The word “state” comes from the Latin language – “status rei publicae” which, for magistrates and the roman citizens meant “the status of public works” or “the state of public life”¹.

The state is the main political institution of society. It appeared almost six millennia ago in the ancient East (Sumer, Egypt, or Babylon) and the state continues to be the instrument of social management even today. The state is born through a political and legal act² adopted by a representative body at national level (Congress, Parliament, Diet, National Assembly, etc.). After the creation of a state, its recognition at international level follows.

The role of the state consists, in principle, in securing and defending, through the means provided for in the Constitution and in other normative acts, the “public interest”, the “common good”, the “general interest”.

In classical theories, the state has been studied abstractly, and was elaborated – as C. Dissescu – “a concept based more on what we want him to be than what is in reality”³.

For Kant, for example, the state is “a multitude of people who live under law and associate through a contract”⁴. For it, freedom and law are the two points which civil law is linked. For civil legislation to be effective and not to remain an empty reasoning, it is necessary to intervene here a third term, the public power. The public power has the task of

¹ See Henri Brun, Guy Tremblay, *Droit constitutionnel*, Les Editions Yvon Blais Inv, Quebec, 1990, p. 61.

² The Political and Legal Act may be a statement (US Declaration of Independence), constitution, treaty, pact, law (Law no. 363/1977 on the Constitution of the Romanian State in the RPR), or agreement (Austro-Hungarian Agreement of 17 February 1867 following which the Austro-Hungarian Empire was formed), see also C. Ionescu, *Instituții Politice și Drept Constituțional*, Juridică Publishing house, Bucharest, 2004, p. 90.

³ C. Dissescu, *Drept constituțional*, Socec Publishing house, Bucharest, 1915, p. 429.

⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, edited by Robert B. Loudon, University of Southern Maine, Manfred Kuehn, Boston University, Cambridge University Press, Online publication date: June 2012.

realizing the natural right⁵. In his conception, the state of nature was characterized by *bellum omnium against omnes*, but the end of this war is not realized by force as in Hobbes, but by reason that can fundament the state. Constraint thus transforms the precarious state of liberties from a state of nature into a state of law⁶.

The problem of the state is analyzed from the perspective of three classic approaches - liberalism, Marxism and realism, and these leads to the following considerations:

a. Liberalism has Adam Smith as its main representative, known for his insistence on the idea that the minimal state, the "night watchman" state⁷, provides the best support for economic growth. In this type of state, political power manifests, in particular, through the laws drafted by national parliaments in the form of an abstract, rational system of rules.

The classical liberal state is marked by three great structures that will distinctly define the liberal doctrine: strengthening capitalist production relations in the economy; the emergence of individual civil society; the ideological hegemony of Enlightenment rationalism.

Parents of political sociology of the 19th century have placed themselves in the debate on the society-state relationship.

On the one hand were Hegel and his disciples who believed that the solution is lying in subjecting the elements of society under state sovereignty. The essence of the modern state, in Hegel's view, is to reconcile the freedom of individuals with the needs of a coherent political organization capable of acting as a whole⁸.

On the opposite side, on the side of society were Saint-Simon, Proudhon and Marx. For them, society was the structure that had to be strengthened while the state was supposed to be limited, controlled by society or abolished. It is the theory that puts the state at the opposite pole to society⁹.

b. Marxism. In "Communist ideology" - Anton Carpinski shows - the utopia of a future society without state is supported by the claim of Marxism to historical prediction. Marxism gives meaning to history and designs a convenient future for its political option but claims that this is unique and inevitable because it results from the scientific analysis of a certain sequence of production. It is thus trying to legitimize political partisanship by an alleged scientific objectivity obtained by claiming the monopoly to know the logic of history. Thus, the utopia of communist society without state has the appearance of scientific objectivity and historical necessity¹⁰.

c. Realism, like liberalism, looks at the state as a secondary element; the character and strength of the state results from the impact of the forces of society on it. Realists believe, however, that the abolition of the state can lead to a return to the jungle age.

The most important representative of realism, Hobbes, argues that in the "pre-social state", people enjoy absolute personal liberty, but that means they are exposed to the threat of physical violence. In order to overcome this threat, people enter into a social contract with each other, in which they surrender their individual freedom to a third party (state), acting in order to guarantee the social order and stability¹¹.

⁵ The natural law defined by Kant as "the set of conditions through which the will of each may coexist with the will of others, according to a universal law of freedom". See: Immanuel Kant, *Anthropologie*, p. 336 (apud: G. Vrabie, *Drept constituțional și instituții politice contemporane*, Third completed Edition, Team Publishing house, Iași, 1995. p. 48).

⁶ M. Bădescu, *Drept constituțional și instituții juridice*, București, Lumina Lex Publishing House, 2001, p. 82.

⁷ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, online edition, Books, I, II, III, IV, Ed. Metalibri, 27 May 2007.

⁸ D. Collin, *Marile noțiuni filosofice. Societatea, puterea, statul*, European Institute, 1999. p. 56.

⁹ See also M. Bădescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-84.

¹⁰ Anton Carpinski, "Introductory study" on the volume *Life without State*, by Jean William Lapierre, European Institute, Iași, 1997, p. XXV.

¹¹ Thomas Hobbes, *The Great Political Theories*, Avon Books, New York, 1984, pp. 138-141, 151-152.

2. States Function

If we exclude the current period, it is possible to identify at least three main steps in adapting the state institution to social development. Modern States were originally defined as “tax collectors” for the leadership of military affairs, this having priority until the 18th century; Secondly, they have been defined as “protectors of the national economy and agents of industrialization”, especially since the 19th century; Third, states have proved to be “builders of the nation”, through the expansion of social citizenship, largely as a phenomenon of the 20th century¹².

The transfer of objectives did not mean abandoning the old ones, but adding and overlapping new functions and institutions. Military competition, industrialization and nation building constituted three key challenges that modern states have had crystallized in their different functions, gradually increasing their capacities to penetrate society, extract resources and, above all, mobilize and coordinate social evolutions. This being done differently from state to state and from one political regime to another¹³.

The constitutional doctrine admits the existence of three successive phases of the development of the concept of the role and functions of the modern state¹⁴:

a) The Gendarme-State (XIX century) limited itself to the exercise of essential attributes, notably the police, defense and international functions;

b) The Entrepreneurship-State, which occurs with the outbreak of World War I, intervenes in industrial activities by creating industrial and commercial public enterprises (at least in the key economic sectors);

c) The Providence-State, specific to the current period, involves state intervention in all areas - economic field, culture, sports, tourism, etc. In this period, the development of the role of the state necessarily combines with the considerable increase in its means of action (budget, public functions).

d) The guarantor state is a relatively new concept that captures the relationship between the state (law) and civil society. According to this concept, the state has the duty to create a broad framework of citizens' rights and freedoms, to ensure progress in all its dimensions and to guarantee the affirmation of the human condition.

3. The State in the Society of the Future. Catalytic State Model

In the last few decades, the state has experienced a special expansion. The most important areas in which the state has been involved to a large extent are¹⁵: substantially support the general social effort for the development of the economy and the provision of material and financial resources for raising the standard of living of the population; involvement of the state in the education process, both by organizing it towards certain directions of training and qualification of the future cadres, as well as through their effective organization; support for scientific research; the concern to ensure democratic pluralism and respect for human rights; improving the legislation and strengthening the social balance; defense of social order, strengthening of national defense capacity; international collaboration; strengthening military alliances and adapting them to the new international balance; collaboration in outer space, etc. It goes without saying that the degree of state

¹² Linda Weiss, *The myth of the state lacking in power. Governing the economy in the era of globalization*, Editura Trei, 2002, p. 27.

¹³ See also Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and US Foreign Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1978.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ According to C. Ionescu, *op. cit.*, p. 104, sending to another sources.

involvement in these social domains is directly related to the national specificity of each state, and its overall evolution.

It is widespread the idea that national states are going through a new period of adaptation, namely the so-called "globalization". What differentiates globalization at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century is that the process starts from a globally structured environment different from that of the industrialization era, an environment which increasingly accentuates what Michael Mann called "social incarceration". He considered that "the power of the modern state in particular concerns not the elites of the state" exercising power over society but a tightening of the state-society relations, which encumber social relations more on the national rather than the local-regional or transnational level, politicizing more social life than the past nation-states¹⁶.

The key idea conveyed by the notion of "imprisonment of social relations" does not refer to territorial constraint, but to the fact that a large part of the activities and social relations that previously constituted at the level of the local communities came to be regulated by the national states, therefore, depending on it in an ever greater extent.

Globalization, which some authors identify with internationalization¹⁷, is often misunderstood as something imposed by micro-processes such as the revolution in information technology. Globalization has entered the popular lexicon as phenomenon where, beyond borders, flows of goods and services, investment, finance and technology create a single world market where the single price law will prevail. The novelty, magnitude and type of change in the world economy are not enough to support the transnational market idea, where local and institutional constraints are no longer relevant. In such an internationalized society, economic integration is promoted not only by companies, but also by national governments, which is design to demonstrate the adaptability of states, their different capabilities, and the increased importance of state power in the new international environment¹⁸.

The language of globalization implies in essence that the nation-state is no longer important, neither as an actor nor as a place of economic accumulation. The existence of a global economy, as sometimes understood¹⁹, is synonymous with *transnationalism*. It involves an open market, with no institutional or locational constraints; hence replacing the phrase "national networks" with "transnational" networks of economic interaction. The distinction between "globalization" and "internationalization" is defined in a 1996²⁰ study of Cambridge University, which defines more precisely that the economy of modern states is at a stage ahead of globalization, that of internationalization, the stage in which the state retains an essential role, even though the power of the nation-state in administrative and political terms is declining, as the role of the state of economic manager diminishes. However, the authors of the study argue, the nation-state must be viewed as a key source of legitimacy and delegation of authority to sub-national and supra-national power centers. Territorial integrity and

¹⁶ Michael Mann, *The source of Social Power*, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1993, p. 61.

¹⁷ Linda Weiss, *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁸ *Idem*, p. 209.

¹⁹ Kenichi Ohmae, "Putting Global Logic First", *Harvard Business Review*, no. 73(1), 1995, pp. 119-125; *Idem*, *The Bordless World*, Ed. Collins, New York, 1990.

²⁰ "... there is an enormous difference between a strictly global economy and a highly internationalized economy where most companies trade from their bases into distinct national economies. In the first category, national policies are useless since the economic outcomes are determined entirely by the forces of the world market and by the domestic decisions of the transnational companies. In the second, national policies remain viable, being indeed essential to maintaining the distinctive styles and strengths of the national economic base and the companies that trade therein". See: Paul Hirst, Grahame Thompson, *Globalisation in Question*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p.185.

constitutional legitimacy gives the nation-state a distinctive and continuous role in an internationalized world economy, even as conventional sovereignty and economic capabilities are diminished²¹. The same conclusion that the nation-state persists as an important place to accumulate and where the institutions are structuring the economic space, was emphasized by other researchers, such as Michael Mann²², or Robert Wade²³. Therefore, the role of the state in the era that we can consider as a precursor to globalization is not diminishing, as some theorists adhering to “globalization” argue, but making the distinctions revealed by Hirst and Thompson in the era of internationalization, the role of nation-state is one of power, but narrowly defined. This is because change is not new to the state. As we have already shown in this study, throughout history, the state has faced several challenges, has undergone several historical stages, proving that change is the essence of the modern state, by virtue of the fact that it is involved in a dynamic, economic inter-state system.

We are currently witnessing some changes in state power; but these changes do not lead to the diminution but to the re-establishment of power around the consolidation of domestic and international ties. As external pressures for the homogeneity of economic regimes grow, and large international flows of people and capital threaten domestic fundamentals, more and more states are looking to improve their control over the external environment. In order to adapt to these challenges, some states are seen as catalytic states. This type of state is “one that seeks to be indispensable to the success or direction of certain strategic coalitions, while remaining independent of other elements of the coalition, and be it other governments, firms, or even national or foreign populations”²⁴.

Far from giving up their distinctive identity and objectives, states increasingly use power agreements to create greater control over their economy and security. In itself, these coalitions should be seen as apparent disposals aimed at increasing the state’s capacity in specific areas, and less diminishing their sovereignty. Strengthening such alliances takes place primarily at regional level, between nation-states, as is the case with the European Union. From Lind’s point of view, the process of European integration is to a significant extent driven and created after the model of Germany as a catalytic state. In a similar way, Japan operates in the South-East Asia²⁵. So, as we move forward in the 21st century, however, it is likely that the ability of nation-states to adapt to internationalization will continue without diminishing the differences between them in their ability to do so.

Nation states with less consolidated democracies, as is Romania, will always seek to follow within the international organizations states with strengthened democracies, with visible results regarding the concepts of well-being and social comfort, namely the so-called catalytic states able to promote peace and stability.

4. Instead of conclusions

We present on this occasion an idea that must be think of: “Is the concept of a catalytic-State, the idea that led to irreconcilable German-British positions in what the generic process meant BREXIT?”

²¹ “National states should no longer be regarded as powers that “govern” [...] National states are now simply a category of political and power agents in a complex system of power, from a global level to a local level”. See: P. Hirst, G. Thompson, *Op. cit.*, p.190.

²² M. Mann, *The Global Future of the Nation State*, (revised version of „*Direction of Contemporary Capitalism*”) University of Sussex, 1996.

²³ R. Wade, “Globalisation and its Limits: Reports of the Death National Economy are Greatly Exaggerated”, in *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*, edited by S. Berger și R. Dore, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1996.

²⁴ M. Lind, “The Catalytic State”, *National Interest*, 1992, p. 3.

²⁵ L. Weiss, *Op. cit.*, p. 261.

We start to promote this idea since the speech by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1988: "Our goal must not be more and more detailed regulation from the center: it should be deregulation and lifting trade constraints. [...] Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other better, doing more together but enjoying our national identity, not less than our common European endeavor. Let us have a Europe that plays a pivotal role in the broader world, looking outwardly, not inwardly, and preserving the Atlantic community - that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic - which is our noblest heritage and bigger power"²⁶.

The ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in Germany has proven to be a real challenge. The main problem was the take out of the German brand from the landscape, through the creation of the European Monetary and Economic Union. The Bundestag's debate was based on four themes mentioned by Chancellor Kohl in his address to the German Parliament: Justice and Home Affairs, a federal structure of the Union, Common Foreign and Security Policy, an increase in the power of the European Parliament and wider competences of the European Community. There were also criticisms of Kohl, according to which the latter would not have forced the proper imposition of Germany's interests in the negotiations. In large part, the German public opinion does not trust the future support from the European Community²⁷.

And, after twenty years, the two visions of the role of the state in the life of the Union have entered a collision course, which has inevitably led to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU.

The German economic response, following the announcement of BREXIT, emerged through the Franco-German Foreign Ministers' Plan of 2016 presented for negotiations with the Visegrad Group countries.

Germany and France responded to the Brexit-process with a plan for a more united and stronger Europe. A Europe with common security decisions, a Europe with unique measures for the phenomenon of migration. In fact, a strengthening of control and not only economic security and control of migration. Regarding Germany's attitude towards the EU, in terms of deepening the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, in recent years, this is the clear sign of a nation that no longer wants to lead and pay for others. Berlin asks the Greeks, the Portuguese and the other nations austerity measures, but they cannot fix the current crisis - even if they can strengthen their financial discipline in the future. It was not the same reaction in Europe when France and Germany had in fact exceeded the accepted indebtedness of 3% of GDP. But here is the role of the catalytic state acquired by the German model. Other European states have promoted the same system, but not the same discipline. So, was not by accident, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski recently said that he is not afraid of a more German Europe but of German passivity and inaction in the EU²⁸.

The European model of Germany as a catalytic state in the EU will in the foreseeable future be dethroned by another, without visibility yet on the European scene. But the signs that show that the German model has passed the moment of maximum glory are given through the BREXIT process, through the various forms of protest in southern Europe - Greece - and the Euro-skeptic attitude faced by the peoples of Europe at present. No leader can lead forever, and the exercise of this role in history get tired the states that assume it.

²⁶ Speech held in 1988, Belgium, Bruges, at the opening of the College of Europe's academic year.

²⁷ Colette Mazzucelli, *France and Germany at Maastricht. Politics and negotiations to create the European Union*, Garland Publishing, Inc., New York and London, 1997, pp. 243-250.

²⁸ "Ce lecții economice predă Germania Europei", *Adevarul*, May 15, 2012, available online at: adevarul.ro/international/in-lume/ce-lectii-economice-preda-germania-europei-1_50a6c4797c42d5a663a025ee/index.html, accessed on October 02, 2018.

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RUSSIA – NATO HYBRID CLASH: HISTORY AND LEGACIES

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Abstract: *The break out of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 acted as trigger for a major paradigm shift in an ostensibly pacified East European security architecture. Previous signals following a long-term reconciliation of security objectives of the two key regional actors, NATO and Russia, were soon forgotten, East European flank being trapped under siege of new hybrid warfare. Transformed into the key word of new geopolitical and security challenges, hybrid war made the subject of prolific inquiries, mostly highlighting themes as grey propaganda, subversive electoral interventions, cyber terrorism and, last but not least, the weaponization of culture, identities and discourses. Despite the tendency to associate the hybrid mutation to a reinterpretation of Russia’s Cold War security dogma, present ascent of ambiguous and non-linear conflicts could engage a more complex filiation. In this context, the article aims to briefly discuss the implication of Russia vs. NATO long-term hybrid clash, exploring topics as sources of Russian hybrid strategy and consequences generated increasing tendency towards weaponization of globalization.*

Keywords: *Russia, NATO, hybrid warfare, soft power, cultural weaponization.*

Introduction

Subsequent to Moscow’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, previsioned by a long term support for the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, an influential discussion regarding use of non-conventional warfare strategies emerged. Most of Western analyses dedicated to Russia’s actions were denouncing the use of subversion, cyber-attacks, proxies, and cultural propaganda, blended with conventional military interventions¹. Despite the fact that novelty of this mix of regulate and non-regulate warfare tactics was difficult to attest, Western critique has labeled Russia’s intervention in Crimea as an overt act of threat to NATO’s strategic vicinities. The vision on Ukrainian crisis trough the lenses of Russia’s strategists have been quite different. In a mirrored reaction, Moscow sustained that the intervention came as a response to USA attempts in earlier 2013 to install a vassal regime, overthrowing previous government, considered hostile². So, even before officially beginning, hybrid tensions between main security players appealed to a broader evolution context.

Increasingly tensed Russia – NATO relations was seen as confirmation of the reopening of incomplete mechanisms of succession of the Cold War, hybrid confrontation being considered as the essential tool for renegotiating power balance in Eastern Europe. Even if Russia’s ambiguous, asymmetric and non-linear operations in Crimea were labeled as

¹ Samuel Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid War” in *Global Politics and Strategy*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, vol. 57: 6, 2015, p. 53.

² *Idem*, p. 51.

a game-changer strategy, grounded in a historical³ dominative approach, the paradigm shift generated by 2014 landmark could reveal previous historical sources.

In this context, a key hypothesis, concerning the hybrid nature of Russia – NATO confrontation in Eastern Europe, may refer to growing influence of non-state actors and non-sovereign entities. Playing the part of power vectors for main security challengers, non-state stakeholders as international economic structures, media networks, civic entities or political lobbies could engage into a future autonomous dynamic, exploiting diffusion of power from state-governments to more fluid formulas⁴. Detaining the ability to act in the threshold of conflict and exploiting the potential of grey areas of conflict, the new players of the security environment had successfully used means as propaganda, fake news, grey flag insurgency or political proselytism. Russia's partnership with sub-state and non-state structures does not represent a singular option, NATO's propensity to "comprehensive approach"⁵ making the subject of constant criticism. Whether or not Western combination of military and non-military means in order to stabilize countries represents in fact an inspiration source for "dark reflections" of Russia's hybrid response⁶, the Crimea study case still brings into light new background phenomena. An interconnected hypothesis may imply the existence of a "long time span" of hybrid antagonism, amid main regional actors, aggravated by globalization and modernization trends. The outcomes of these non-traditional power conflicts could remain cast in shadow, all the more as the digital technological revolutions and the genesis of tensional modernity changed the very nature of state-hegemons, and may open an age of multi-polarity. The mature stages of globalization offered multiple samples of glocal and vernacular reactions, the militarization and weaponization of culture being responsible for "redistribution of geo-strategic power" and genesis of a new polycentric security architecture⁷.

1. Relevant previous events in Eastern Europe

Russia's successful operations in Crimea started into the boundaries of an independent state actor and ended with annexation of a foreign territory in March 2014, sparked heated debates on the effectiveness and future role of non-military instruments. Russia ability to follow political objectives and strategic influence without the apparent urge to use any combative and coercive tactics fuelled the perception of a new and threatening type of warfare. Also, this Russian victory in its near abroad operation theatre shattered Western forecasts, which still considered Moscow as tributary to an outdated and Cold War inspired strategy⁸. Most of all, the supremacy of non-conventional military means shadowed Russia's previous approaches, used in Chechen and Georgian (1999-2000 and 2008) when classic military campaigns revealed issues as lack of coordination, excessive use of force and outdated kinetic and technological solutions⁹. At that time, Moscow's lack of performance during Chechenia

³ See: 'greatpowerness' [derzhavnost] in: Bettina Renz, Hanna Smith, "Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going beyond the Label", *Aleksanteri Papers*, no. 1, Aleksanteri Institute, Kikumora Publications, University of Helsinki, Finland, 2016, p. 15.

⁴ *The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 Report*, Allied Command Transformation, Virginia, 2017, p. 28.

⁵ Classical critics upon NATO comprehensive approach referred to use of military capabilities "to fill the gaps" in weaker and failing democracies. See: Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "NATO's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations. A Work in Slow Progress", *DIIS REPORT 15*, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2008, p. 4.

⁶ Jens Stoltenberg, 'Keynote Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Opening of the NATO Transformation Seminar', NATO, March 25, 2015, available online at: https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/opinions_118435.htm, accessed on November 12, 2018.

⁷ *The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 Report*, p. 13.

⁸ Bettina Renz, Hanna Smith, *art. cit.*, p. 2.

⁹ *Idem.*

and Georgia's interventions was also fostered by a dysfunctional media response. As an example, even if Georgia has endured a military invasion and a prolonged phase of economic decline, vast majority of population remained supportive to European orientation and media discourse¹⁰. One central question tends to persist. What changed in less than a decade within structural capabilities and foreign policy of Russia?

During the Russia-Georgia short war, burst in August 2008 in the region of South Ossetia, belligerent sides employed significant different strategies in presenting the conflict. While Russia portrayed the clash as an unprovoked attack by an aggressor state, the Georgian media choose to present the August war as a planned invasion against a small nascent democracy, attacked by a huge military power¹¹. However, Russia's tendency to rebuild its former hegemonic map was seen as a more accurate explanation of the case, this sort of "narrative template"¹² remaining dominant in the international media reflection. The explanation for Russia limited influence within media sphere may exceed the Cold War legacy and could engage a more complex spectrum of motivations. In the case of Georgian and Chechen conflicts, NATO response to Russian intervention was rather moderate, due the presence of multiple arguments, as risk of conflict escalation and expansion, and further regional and global security vulnerabilities.

Even if officially the Alliance froze most of political and military cooperation with Moscow after Georgian conflict, the partnership for peace in Afghanistan was continued. Moreover, the development of NATO - Russia relation after the conflict experienced significant expansion in fields as energy security, Afghanistan or political and military cooperation¹³. Taking into account the low intensity of western criticism, the lack of efficiency of Russia media campaign may solicit a different explanation. One subsidiary hypothesis could imply the presence of a background phenomenon, which acted against Russia attempts to reconstruct its image as a complementary security provider. Before 2010, the cultural geography of Eastern Europe was still trapped within the limits of first stages of globalization¹⁴. The representational and identity unity provided by the traditional mass-media was limiting the use of subversive means, assuring also a cohesiveness of multiple social, ethnic and cultural clusters. The dominance of broadcasted agenda and the consumption of similar informational products did not stimulate the separation of antagonist groups or the awakening of separatist or contestation movements, or at least hindered their expression. In order to exploit the cultural affinities of its near abroad, Russia demanded access to a media infrastructure dominated by Western settings agenda and which was refractory to inclusion of vernacular quests. The growing influence of internet after 2010 generated a liberalization of communication spheres of the main actors, challenging Western monopoly upon cultural consumption and identity buildings vectors of Eastern Europe.

By losing the media battle in 2008, Russia could extract lesser benefits from its categorical military victory, which put an end to an uncomfortable territorial dispute. Even if the Georgian and Chechen events are rarely discussed from the perspective of the hybrid aggression, they could be deciphered as a prodromal stage for the militarization and

¹⁰ Niklas Nilsson, *Russian Hybrid Tactics in Georgia*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Stockholm, 2018, p. 10.

¹¹ James Wertsch, "Spinning the past: Russian and Georgian accounts of the war of August 2008", *Memory Studies*, Memory Studies Association, vol. 2(3): 377-391, 2009, p. 378.

¹² *Idem*, p. 381.

¹³ Marcel de Hass, *Russia's Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond*, Routledge, NY, 2010, p. 66.

¹⁴ The cultural diffusion of the western political model within former Soviet space was still incipient, the contestation reactions of the vernacular culture becoming perceptible during the mature stages of democratization and modernization. See: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, NY, 2007, p. 85.

weaponization of media discourses and media culture. No matter whether it was incriminated the lack of tailored narratives, able to stimulate vernacular uprisings, or it denounced the strong Western influence on news agenda, Russia's media defeat outperformed the relevance of the successful military intervention¹⁵. This tournament of the strategic influence exerted by media perception to the detriment of traditional military force will inaugurate a new confrontation paradigm. From a certain point of view, it may be considered that NATO gained a partial advantage during the first round of hybrid confrontation with Russia. This perception could be validated by the presence of a visible affinity of digital media for "westernization"¹⁶ vehicles as English language, popular culture or global justice narratives. The storytelling mechanism employed by main digital channels was at that time advantageous for NATO, even if argumentative agendas promoting themes as key role of Alliance in democratization and expansion of liberal values across the globe were becoming less attractive. Although further development trends of globalization process changed the gravity point of this initial advantage, Russia recovering along with fragmentation and multiplication of public agendas a new soft power hegemony sphere (built around unification concepts as *Russkij Mir / Russian World*¹⁷). Nevertheless, Georgian war plays an essential role for Russia's renewed patronizing influence within the region, but the true reopen of West-East strategic fracture remains connected to the Ukrainian crisis. Yet, it could be important to highlight that amid the two benchmarks, respectively the interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, the main security players as well as the geopolitical environment were influenced by the presence of two synergic movements. First phenomenon concerns the growing influence of national identities and representations, while second process refers to a major reform of political participation and groups identities, as a result of digitalisation.

The evolution of globalization trends after 2010 implied the awakening of national agendas, as result of economic and financial crisis, followed by cultural and associative mutations. In this context new social clusters become active within virtual medium (youth movements, civic networks, peripherals citizens, attracted by radical and traditionalist discourses, gender equality movements), and also the political spectrum become more and more fragmented, (populist and nativist parties were reconfirmed as key players within post-communist countries¹⁸). Concurrently, digitalization of globalization created the presuppositions for a major change within the spatial dimensions of the political orders. Democracy was no longer dependent by a territorial delimitation, citizenship being renegotiated through instrumentality of language identity, common history or social and political values. Overseas citizens and well defined ethnic and religious groups were used in order to bridge former colonial and post-colonial realms, Pan-Slavic argumentation remaining just one sample for this type of post-nation communities. In the same time de-territorialisation of democracy¹⁹ fuelled phenomena as proliferation of civic networks, progressive and disruptive militancy, rise of new international security actors and the renegotiations of states'

¹⁵ Michael Kofman, Matthew Rojansky, "A Closer look at Russia's Hybrid War", *Kenan Cable*, no.7, Kenan Institute, April 2015, p. 5.

¹⁶ Westernization could be defined as "absorption of substantial elements of Western culture", determining a slow progress towards modernization. *Ibidem*, p. 96.

¹⁷ Henrik Praks, „Hybrid or Not: Detering and Defeating Russia's Ways of Warfare in the Baltics – the Case of Estonia", *Research Paper NATO Defense College*, no. 124, Rome, 2015, p. 2.

¹⁸ A Bloomberg Analysis from 2017 revealed that support for populist radical-right parties is higher than any time over the past 30 years, their evolution being fostered by digitalization and liberalization of communication markets. See: Andre Tartar, "How the Populist Right Is Redrawing the Map of Europe" *Bloomberg*, December 12, 2017, accessed October 20, 2018, web. <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-europe-populist-right/>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

¹⁹ Nikos Papastergiadis, *The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2018, p. 6.

monopoly on foreign and domestic affairs policies²⁰. Starting with *Indignatos* movements and ending with Coloured Revolutions wave (whereof the 2008 Ukrainian Orange Revolution embodies the paradigmatic case), Eastern Europe experienced multiple structural changes. The late modernization processes, generating two divergent trends, rediscovery of national identities and projects and ascent of trans-national cultures, resulted in the deepening of cultural and social gaps. Taking into the account Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) classical theory upon essential cleavages of contemporary societies, the last wave of modernity determined major asymmetries in Eastern Europe. The cleavage between the centres and the peripheries was compounding under pressure of grey economy, the cleavage between urban and rural was also aggravated by pauperization of agrarian spaces²¹, while the Church - State cleavage was accentuated by reigniting traditionalism and parochialism. The case of Poland radical drifts towards authoritarianism from 2017 and 2018 was already provisioned by Hungary's far-right effervescence started along with Viktor Orbán's regime in 2010. Difficult legacies of transition toward democracy became perceptible under auspices of digital globalization. The informational revolutions started after 2010, when digitalization became an essential landmark of economic, politic and social life, affected the post-communist democracies through interventions of a double modernization process. The new digital environment offered the grounds for mobilisation of the peripheral spaces, with major political implications regarding recovery of populist and nativist discourses, while the urban clusters chose to associate and promote transnational causes and validate new post-state power structures.

The gain in influence of non-state actors after 2010 originated in a multiple modernization trends. The new panoply of communication tools made available by digitalization enhanced the power of non-sovereign bodies in influencing the political decisions, transforming the media discourses and cultural identities into power instruments, made available for new potential hegemonies. Non-sovereign and non-state actors include "include benign and non-benign entities from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Multinational Corporations (MNCs), advocacy networks, transnational activists, super-empowered or rogue individuals, and terrorist and criminal organizations"²². Repertoires of political legitimation²³ became thus intrinsically linked by cultural discourse, further rise of hybrid conflicts being placed under the influence of new mediatization²⁴ equations. In this context, the genesis of hybrid confrontation paradoxically anticipated future hybrid warfare, the new strategic potential of digitalization, mediatization and globalization being acknowledged by both NATO and Russia. At a first sight, the startling reconversion of Russia geopolitical response was mainly attributed to a military modernization process, whose echoes became perceptible after 2010.

Exploiting simultaneously the cultural side of identity building vectors of association and mobilization as *sobornost* (defined as togetherness, under auspices of a spiritual and

²⁰The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 Report, p. 33.

²¹ Risk of poverty or social exclusion for significantly higher for rural population of former Soviet states, "Statistics on rural areas in the EU", Eurostat, February 2017, available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_rural_areas_in_the_EU, accessed October 20, 2018.

²² *Idem*, p. 26.

²³ Thomas Hoffmann, Andrey Makarychev (eds.), *Russia and the EU: Spaces of Interaction*, Routledge, NY, 2018, p. 9.

²⁴ The contemporary phase of mediatization implies the growing influence of external forces, as activist chains, economic lobbies or disruptive actors, against political agenda, which results in decrease of political parties' autonomy. Eds. Jesper Stromback, Frank Esser, *Making Sense of Mediatized Politics: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*, Routledge, NY, 2015, p. 68.

historical project of unity²⁵), doubled by a genuine reform of military capabilities, Russia gradually changed the hypothesis of a unipolar East European front. When Russia's defense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov announced in October 2007 the main military reforms objectives, concerning professionalization of personnel and weapons upgrade²⁶, the interactions between Russia and NATO were still dominated by a collaborative perception. As a meaningful sample, the speech held by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, four years after, still mentions the essential "logic of common interest"²⁷ connecting Russia and NATO in their fight against new asymmetric threats as terrorism. Unforeseen, the growing influence of malign non state actors as Daesh, will slowly decompose this initial alliance of main security players, the grounds of this fragmentation and aggravation of geopolitical tensions remaining quite difficult to track. The ingravescence of NATO – Russia relations did not occurred at once, but can be rather seen as an accumulation process. Given the fact that concept of hybrid warfare gained prominence in aftermath of the Ukrainian conflict, in order to decipher the true colours of this grounding breaking event, it could be necessary to operate a short inquiry upon previous development of hybrid tensions amid the two regional hegemon.

2. From hybrid war to hybrid actors. Weaponization of culture and NATO-Russia divide

The hybrid warfare label was employed for the first time in 2007, when seminal work of Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, became a new benchmark in defining modern military operational art. Hoffman defines hybrid war as "multi-modal activities", incorporating "conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, and general use of indiscriminate violence and coercion"²⁸. The main observation made by Hoffman's analysis on new security threats refers to the broadening number of challenges generated by non-state actors, employing asymmetric and irregular tactics against states committed to conventional capabilities²⁹. The extended flexibility and efficiency of non-regular warfare were already confirmed by the chronical conflicts nourished by guerrilla actions and classical insurgency scenarios, but the key trend highlighted after 2005 concerns the simultaneously blend of all forms of war. Quoting the 2007 USA maritime strategy, Hoffman considers that modern conflicts are more and more characterized by hybrid amalgamation of "traditional and irregular tactics", deployed by state and non-state entities³⁰. As distinct from previous uses of irregular and regular components, where nonconventional and traditional operations were successive, the new warfare age prevision a compound movement of the two strategies.

Inspired from Israel – Lebanon war (2006), where Israel's strong defence forces were overwhelmed by Hezbollah's disruptive battlefield tactics and weaponry, the term of hybrid war gained gradually prominence, as an attempt to circumscribe a new warfare paradigm. The essential innovation introduced by Hezbollah victory against Israeli military forces, obtained in short time span (July 12 – August 14, 2006), concerned the potential of a non-state actor to

²⁵ Dima Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2010, p. 87.

²⁶ Jonas Grätz, "Russia's Military Reform: Progress and Hurdles", *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, no. 152, April 2014, p.2.

²⁷ *Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, February 14, 2002*, in *The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest*, vol. 2, nr. 1(2), 2002, p. 7.

²⁸ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p. 8.

²⁹ *Idem*, p. 9.

³⁰ *Idem*, p. 9.

defeat a nation state's armed forces³¹. Even if anterior experiences from 1991 Iraq war or the interventions in Afghanistan in the '80s proved the capacity of para-military forces or local guerrillas to exert pressure against nation states, their victory was envisioned only within boundaries of failed democracies or weak governments.

Hezbollah's success in the Second Lebanon War against a strong military player opened new perspectives for reconstructing the conditions of modern conflicts, in a post-state order. Hezbollah represented more than a military force, its genuine strength being grounded on political, diplomatic, social, cultural and communicational components³². In its clash with Israel state-force, Hezbollah utilized very similar panoply of military and non-military means. In this context, the conflict could not be reduced to the classical formula of an asymmetric war, but rather demonstrated how a non-sovereign entity could imitate the function and roles of a state. The growing complexity of Hezbollah advocated for a transfer of political, strategic and security functions, from Lebanon weak state to a more fluid and efficient power structure. By imitating the role of the state, within fundamental roles as monopoly of legitimate use of force or international negotiations, Hezbollah opened the road for a hybridization of the traditional security stakeholders. In the light of these considerations, one essential observation tends to detach. The hybridization of the failed and weak states may be accepted as a negative scenario, but these tendencies could be replicated within bounds of strong security players? The relevance of the Second Lebanon War experience for further development of hybrid confrontation refers to the presence of new regional power architecture, including for the very first time a non-state security provider.

Even if during the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's regime employed hybrid tactics as guerrilla warfare, use of harassing forces or cultural proselytise upon its indigenous populations, the general perspective remained one of classical military confrontation. Deploying regular troops and assuming yet a direct confrontation type of war, the hybrid dimension remained accessory within the Gulf casuistry. Also, the USA attachment towards advanced technologies and precision weapons, reunited under the label of "network-centric war"³³ limited the conditions of possibility for a total and disruptive form of conflict. Along with the Hezbollah and later Al Qaeda pattern, the network centric theory was abandoned in favour of 4th Generation Warfare³⁴, which was inspired from insurgency tradition. The ascent of non-state actors as equal counterparts of sovereign players marked a new age of hybrid threats, the role of political, cultural, informational and economic networks growing exponentially. The regained symmetry amid the weaker para-military and guerrilla type of entities and the state actors previsions further development of hybrid conflicts. Autonomous play of new non state actors generate major changes within already complicated background of the Middle East, both the Arab Spring revolutions and their lack of democratic sustainability being inextricably linked by actions and growing influence of new civic, insurgency, cultural and social networks. Announcing the development of the 6th Generation Warfare³⁵, the Lebanon scene confirmed the tendency of hybrid actors to replace the role of

³¹ Russell W. Glenn, "Thoughts on "Hybrid" Conflict", *Small Wars Journal*, Small Wars Foundation, 2009, p. 2, available online at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/188-glenn.pdf%3Fq%3Dmag/docs-temp/188-glenn.pdf>, accessed September 17, 2018.

³² *Idem*, p. 3.

³³ Bettina Renz, Hanna Smith, "Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going beyond the Label", p. 8.

³⁴ *Idem*, p. 8.

³⁵ Coined by Vladimir Slipchenko in the early '90, the concept of 6th Generation Warfare concentrates on a broad spectrum of information tools, aiming to replace classical military conflict with hybrid means as disinformation, mobilization of popular support through appropriation of indigenous identities and cultural narratives and destabilization of social, political and economic institutions. Directly related with "Reflexive control theory", the 6th Generation Warfare tends to focus on soft power solution for controlling decision-making processes and general societal equilibriums of target entities. Ekaterina Kalinina, "Narratives of Russia's

states. Yet, the limits of the hybridization phenomena were apparently set far beyond the border of hegemon blocs. The interblend of hybrid structures as insurgency and counter-insurgency forces with classical field operations or sequential use of terrorist actions and cultural diplomacy were associated with dynamic of uncertain or failed states. The hybridization of a major security provider or alliance was considered more than improbable, although the affinity of both NATO and Russia for recovery or recruitment of “false flag” forces was old-established by contexts as Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000.

The unique set of events triggered by Ukrainian case announced however a major reform of the hybrid symptomatology, recovered and utilized as a dominant form of power projection on the ostensibly pacified front of the Cold War. As the regards the Ukrainian intervention from February 2014, Russia employed at least three distinct operational phases, including an informational warfare stage, a grey flag military incursion and a political annexation of foreign territory, through diplomatic, social and military tools³⁶. The fall of Viktor Yanukovich, as a result of Euromaidan street convulsion and the rising tensions amid the European partisans and the pro-Russian opponents, facilitated Russia’s intervention. When soldiers without insignias took control upon critic infrastructure and strategic positions of Crimea territory, the population response was positive. Moreover, the presence of covered military forces, acting as support groups for Russian separatists, contributed to escalation of armed clash between Ukrainian governmental troops and local resistance, in April 2017. The general picture dominating the Crimea topic was one of social instability, ethnic fragmentation and civil war threat. Despite the tendency of the international media to present the cause as an undoubtable prove of Russia’s attempt to regain its hegemony at the Eastern border, further discursive reflections of the Ukrainian conflict were tensional, and less unitary. When in August 2014 Russian military forces, using at that time distinctive marks, crossed the border of Donetsk Oblast, forcing the defeat of governmental troops, the resolution of Ukrainian case become clear. Later in November 2014, Russia continuous development of military troops and equipment reserve into the Ukrainian land sanctified the result of the March referendum, when Crimean’s supposedly voted to join Russian Federation.

Although Russia’s intervention in Ukraine contained two distinctive episodes, beginning with the occupation and annexation of Crimea, developed under uncertain auspices, and continuing with invasion of Donbas industrial region, conducted as a traditional military campaign, the general perspective remained surprisingly unitary. The pre-establishment of a certain cultural affinity and the lack of concerted resistance against Russian interventions fuelled discourses of partial acceptance, even on behalf of pro-western forces. Given the fact that almost one-quarter of oil and gas used in Europe originates in Russia, lack of unity of EU response in deploying sanction policies against Moscow was seen as predictable³⁷. Crimea intervention began as covered military operation³⁸, exploiting elements as ambiguity, disinformation, cultural propaganda, Russian media storytelling and informational and electronic war. This sort of interventionism was previously used especially within foreign military theatres and was limited to a diffuse propagation of hegemonic power. No matter wheatear it was the case of Arab Spring (2010), when NATO democratic snowballing lobby encountered a conservative Russian foreign policy, or more distant Yugoslav war experience (1999), Moscow non-conventional power projection was limited to distant battlefields. In the

Information Wars", *Politics in Central Europe*, vol. 12, n.1, Metropolitan University Prague Press, Czech Republic, 2016, pp. 149-150.

³⁶ Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer look at Russia’s Hybrid War”, p. 3.

³⁷ “Is Europe too dependent on Russian gas to intervene in Crimea?”, *Debating Europe*, March 05, 2014, available online at: <https://www.debatingeurope.eu/2014/03/05/european-union-respond-russian-actions/#.W8sFaHszbDd>, accessed October 20, 2018.

³⁸ Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer look at Russia’s Hybrid War”, *Kennan Cable*, p. 3.

same time, this category of covered military operations, followed by subversive and disinformation campaign were never before ended through traditional kinetic wars. The interblend of grey flag actions, carried by troops in unmarked uniforms, with a traditional state military intervention, reuniting airborne, naval infantry, and motor rifle brigades³⁹ disclosed a new equation of hybrid war. During first phases of Ukrainian conflict, Russia imitated the combative strategy of a para-military entity, using the classical profile of Hezbollah during Lebanon war. Due the fact that failing Ukrainian state offered apparently a fertile ground for Moscow interventions, final stages of traditional military operations were difficult to predict. Yet, here Russia benefited of a range of contextual advantages, as proximity of Sevastopol naval area⁴⁰, or previous distribution of military troops in the area.

The close of Crimea dispute trough the instrumentality of a classical military invasion offered the sign of a change of paradigm. By gliding from a non-state actor type of action towards the reactions of classical sovereign entity, engaged in protection of its own endangered population, Russia assumed the position of a hybrid, multi-modal entity. The new Russian military doctrine released after 2010 described modern war as “the integrated utilization of military force” and of all “resources of a non-military character”, in order to shape and secure a “favourable response from the world community” to the utilization of military interventions⁴¹. In 2013, Russia’s military doctrine gained new semantics, due to the writings of General Valeri Gerasimov. His often cited article, *The value of science in foresight*, analyses the new trends emerged from recent experiences of the 21st century conflicts, concentrating especially on the growing role of “non-military means in achieving political and strategic goals”⁴². Referring to the lessons of the Arab Springs, Gherasimov highlights modern conflicts’ tendency to erase the distinctions between the state of war and peace. Concomitantly, Gherasimov considers that previous states of balance in regional and global security could be exposed to startling reconversions, due to the ability of subversive cultural and information tools to disrupt well balanced state actors. Stating that “*Frontal collisions of large groups of troops (forces) at the strategic and operational level are gradually becoming a thing of the past*”⁴³, new Russian military dogma was pleading for a historical change. However, new hybrid, non-linear and asymmetric equation of conflict defined by Russia’s later 2014 Military Doctrine was labelled as an attempt to adjust older strategies to a more dynamic security environment⁴⁴.

The experiences accumulated during the post-Cold War decades in landscapes as Afghanistan, Iraq or North of Africa by NATO and Russia were directly engraved by hybrid tactics. Nevertheless, the gradual adjustments made to the official strategic orientations of Moscow were aiming to justify further use of non-conventional means of actions, in its near vicinities. Described merely as a mimetic reaction to NATO’s constant expansion towards East, the “Gherasimov Doctrine”⁴⁵ tried to officialise the use of hybrid means, by a hegemon state. The implications of this change of nature, accountability and substance of major security stakeholders were essential for subsequent reconfiguration of the geopolitical arenas. During the Ukrainian crisis Russia played a triple role, acting consecutively as a fluid entity,

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

⁴⁰ *Idem*.

⁴¹ “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on 5 February 2010 (translated), p. 3, available online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf, accessed on September 17, 2018.

⁴² Valeri Gherasimov, “The value of science in foresight”, *Industrial Courier*, February 26, 2013, available online at: <https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>, accessed on September 17, 2018.

⁴³ *Idem*.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

⁴⁵ Mark Galleoti, “The Mythical ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and the Language of Threat”, *Critical Studies on Security*, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2018, p. 2.

engaging asymmetric operations and subversive means, as state-actor, providing security and protection for the Russian-speaking population, at in the end as a regional power, revealing the real borders of its own sphere of influence. The multi-layering of discordant strategic identities allowed Russia to play multiple parts, avoiding the full responsibility and accountability for its grey flag actions, and recovering in the same time a strategic *hinterland*. The genuine innovation instituted by the 2014 events refers to the manifest presence and influence of non-sovereign players, engaged as secondary forces and private contractors. Hybridization of Russia's actions during Crimea episode demonstrated how the presence of a multiple power epicentres can contribute to the decline of the unique voice principle. The first wave of hybrid operations started in the aftermath of Euromaidan movement could be hardly related to a singular power centre. NATO influence on pro-European faction encountered a tensional cultural geography, Russia's hybrid response being grounded on discursive and identity affinities, inherited from Cold War times.

Russia operational flow engaged during the Crimea moment implied a subsidiary privatization and liberalization of the security functions of the state. Usage of information operations, cyber warfare, deterrence, proxy fighters may open the road for a future hybrid identity. Even if Moscow officially accepted to patronize the Ukraine intervention, the true contours and identities of local combative forces remain blurred. Weaponization of culture and identities can be translated in this context as deconstruction of nation-state political orders and up rise of post-state security architecture. Due the fact that mediatized reality became a black box for new and often disruptive security players, the anatomy of contemporary hybrid clash remains under omen of an uncertain legacy. The hybrid fronts are not located only in conflictual realms, but tend to aggregate as well within the boundaries modern and well established democracies. The passing of East-European traditional societies to digital modernity may offer in this context a rhetoric revelation, new sub-state forces, private security stakeholders or nativist and national resistance groups, challenging the supremacy and internal coherence of traditional state hegemons.

Conclusions

Political philosopher Thomas Hobbes entitled his groundbreaking work, *Leviathan* (1651), as homage paid to the image of idealized, strong state. By picturing the state as a body, reuniting in an artificial and yet constraining manner, the identities off all citizens, Hobbes revealed the multiple and contradictory faces of modern political community. The pessimistic scent dominating English philosopher's work may serve nowadays as inspiration for further interrogations upon nature, identity and accountability of contemporary state actors, confronting within geopolitical arena. Moreover, the multiplication of voices and fragmentation of authority within major security entities call for reflection, all the more so as the major forces as NATO and Russia offers the signals for a paradigm change.

For instance, the ongoing tensions sparked by Donald Trump's chronical disputes with Federal Bureau of Investigation offers an interesting sample for state's crisis and decline of unique voice principle in foreign and domestic policy. Meanwhile, the multilayered discourse practiced by Moscow, using selectively state's officials, media influencers or *client states* in order to promote parallel public agendas underpins the presence of several authority epicenters. In this very context, a set of interconnected questions tend to detach: Regime change and snowballing could become an option in reconfirming Russia's invisible hegemonic map? What is the true frontier of democracy in former Soviet space? Ascent of non-state actors could be translated as a grey zone confrontation amid main security blocs, or we truly face the genesis of non-sovereign hegemons, which escape the regulations and sanctions of international law?

The use of non-conventional warfare techniques and employment of para-state entities by influential security actors are not new, as well as militarization of cultures and identities. Nevertheless, globalization fueled and accelerated previous trends, but present degree of autonomy and asymmetrical combative force exerted by non-state, non-sovereign bodies are challenging the security architecture in Balkans and beyond. Economic and political lobbies and malign international structures are using hybrid tools and new technologies in a disruptive manner, power gradually shifting from governments to benign and non-benign entities. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Multinational Corporations (MNCs), advocacy networks, transnational activists, super-empowered individuals, and terrorist and criminal organizations gain greater influence over national governments and international institutions, NATO's 2017 Strategic Foresight Analysis Report⁴⁶ considering that their role is likely to expand.

In the light of these considerations, one essential conclusion tends to detach. The regional and global security environment is confronted with a dual process. Major security actors become hybrid entities, developing grey flag actions and collaborating with non-state actors and structures in order to project their influence within disputed geopolitical realms. Meanwhile a myriad of non-sovereign networks and de-territorialized organizations increase their influence, shadowing government's monopoly upon security strategies or internal affairs. This double movement towards a post-state security order will increase instability in domestic and international politics, requiring new regulation policies and most of all new collaborative frames.

An old quote says that Russia is not a country, but a continent. Recent history may acknowledge instead that Russia and its mirrored counterpart, NATO, become Leviathans, and their tale remains to be told.

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⁴⁶ *The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 Report*, p. 28.

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INDIA AND CHINA: TWO EMERGING ACTORS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PERSPECTIVES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THEIR STRATEGIC RELATION, ACCORDING TO THE "ASIAN CENTURY" PARADIGM

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Abstract: *The global world, at the beginning of 21st century, is continuously shaped by various state and non-state actors. Among them, emerging global actors, such as the two Asiatic giants, India and China, take important strategic actions, implementing essential trans-continental and trans-oceanic visions that cannot be neglected by academic scholars according to a limited conception regarding our world as "a static, Atlantic type of world, non-challenged and non-submitted to transformations". Even the Atlantic powers are beginning to think and to implement different strategic projects regarding an increased presence in the "Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean" expanded area. The paper is focused on two emergent actors, as India and China, and on their perceptions regarding the 21st century dynamic world, according to the "Asian Century" concept. We'll try to identify some of the common strategic conceptual roots, and original elements that each actor adopted within its strategic vision regarding the 21st century as "Asian Century" paradigm.*

Keywords: "Asian Century" paradigm, Asian Community, AGA-AF (America Great Again, America first) paradigm, New American Century, India, China, emergent powers.

1. Introduction. India-China: Resetting the Bilateral Relationship on the Basis of the Trump Administration "New Hard-Line Foreign Policy"

The *Indian strategy regarding India's maritime security/2015¹* sets a clear diplomatic direction, which entails India moving forward towards the East, and South-East Asia, through its "Look East" policy, which also includes a maritime security dimension. *Turning the "Look East" policy into an "Act East" policy²* (including an active commitment for India not only in the Eastern region, but also in the extended Indo-Pacific region)³ also entails assuming certain regional elements of economic cooperation, and security. India has also designed a SAGAR (*Security and Growth for All in the Region*) strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region (IOR), in

¹ *Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy*, Indian Navy, Naval Strategic Publication/NSP, 1.2, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, October 2015, available online at: https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf, accessed on November 12, 2018.

² Ankit Panda, "Modi "Acts Est" at East Asia Summit", *The Diplomat*, November 14, 2014, available online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/modi-acts-east-at-east-asia-summit>. See also Sampa Kundu, "India's ASEAN Approach: Acting East", *The Diplomat*, April 08, 2016, available online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/indias-asean-approach-acting-east> and Prashanth Parameswaran, *India and ASEAN: Beyond Looking East*, August 23, 2014, available online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/indis-and-asean-beyond-looking-east>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

³ *Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy*, Indian Navy, Naval Strategic Publication/NSP, 1.2, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, October 2015, available online at: https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf, accessed on November 12, 2018.

order to strengthen the economic and development relations with the countries in this key-region⁴.

However, India and China have to take into consideration the political changes in the doctrine, occurred in the United States at the end of 2016, i.e. *the new view focused mainly on asserting the economic nationalism and on resetting the current global order*, supported by the new Trump administration⁵. Far from being a doctrine of economic and political isolationism, of rejecting any form of globalism, USA implements *a doctrine of repositioning against a global order dominated by the new hegemony (China), at the same time rejecting a multipolarity which generates international anarchy*.

The “America First” doctrine includes both *immediate and long-term* diplomatic directions, which can be easily misperceived as “irrelevant” or “inexistent”:

- *Resetting the global order*, as consolidated and shaped by the Chinese hegemony (the strategic objective of the Trump administration, based on the perception that there is *a strategic distinction* between *the old globalism* – the one initiated by US, but progressively confiscated by other poles of power, together with the main economic, political, and dialogue mechanisms used – and *the new globalism* – or the radical globalism, initiated by US through its 2017 doctrine, i.e. completely resetting the entire international contemporary order, *in order to match its two strategic objectives* – an order which expresses the strategic concept of “American greatness” and an order which reflects again America’s moment of unipolarity – “America First”). In terms of resetting the international order, these two key-objectives of the post-2017 US clearly entail *initiating extremely powerful waves of change*, from a compromised and confiscated global order (the old globalism) to a new order in process of implementation (the “New American Century”).

- *Rejecting multipolarity* (as an official alternate model, proposed by the emerging powers, for the new international order).

- *Challenging the current form of globalism* (not to be mistaken for isolationism). *Denouncing agreements* seen as “disadvantageous for the US” (because they belong to a form of Chinese globalism) *does not mean abandoning a globalist reset of the world*. In our opinion, through the current series of denouncements, *US is preparing for a new, strengthened form of globalism, because the “America First” doctrine fundamentally refers to a new American hegemony, in an order redefined based on its interests*. It is a vision of *the new globalism, of the “New American Century”*, meant to counter the paradigms of the “Asian Century” and the “Dragon Century”. At the same time, we can talk about *complementarity* between the already established American “*Pacific Century*” paradigm (in which the US administrations continuously acknowledge the enormous geostrategic importance of the Pacific for the entire 21st century)⁶ and the new “*America First*” doctrine.

⁴ *Idem*.

⁵ “*America First Foreign Policy*”, available online at: www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy, accessed on February 27, 2017. See also, Dmitry Suslov, *Contours of the Trump Administration’s Foreign policy: General Principles and Functional Priorities*, Associated Press, December 14, 2016, available online at: www.valdaiclub/a/highlights. See also Prashanth Parameswaran, *What will Donald Trump’s Asia policy look like?* November 10, 2016, available online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2016>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

⁶ *Remarks by National Security Adviser Donilon: “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013”*, speaker Thomas Donilon, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, March 11, 2013, available online at: www.cfr.org, accessed on July 11, 2016 (“when it comes to the Asia-Pacific, the United States is {all in}”). In 1900, the former state secretary of the USA, John Jay, wrote: “the Mediterranean Sea was the ocean of the past, the Atlantic Ocean is the ocean of the present, and the Pacific Ocean is the ocean of the future”. See Patrick M. Cronin, Darshana M. Baruah, *The Modi doctrine for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Region*, December 02, 2014, available online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-modi-doctrine-for-the-indo-pacific-maritime-region>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

Thus, these new diplomatic and strategic trends shown by a thorough analysis of the Trump doctrine reveal that *both India and China are in the position to re-evaluate their basic relations with the USA, considering the strategic lines of "America First"*. We wonder how India and China would respond to this new doctrine.

Firstly, we must consider that *these two emerging powers cannot be placed on the same position*, in USA's new diplomacy. While *India aims to shape a new strategic partnership with the USA*, focusing on the constructive, strategic-bilateral component and on the *foreign affairs/security* key-dimension⁷ (as the USA maintains India as the regional opponent to China's consolidation as a hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in the strategic Indo-Pacific region), China is regarded by the SUA from the perspective of the "America First" doctrine, not as an emerging power, but as *an already established power, which created a global order and which dominates this order politically* (through the UN, which has become China's main multilateral instrument to consolidate the Chinese globalism) and *economically* (through WTO, which has also become an institution of the commercial globalism, reflecting China's commercial and economic dominance⁸).

The "America First" doctrine is therefore a doctrine opposing from the very start the consolidation of a strategic bilateral relation between China and India, because "America First" represents a doctrine which resets the global political world, a doctrine which rejects not only the Chinese globalism, but also *any form of globalism initiated by the emerging powers, together or individually*⁹.

In our opinion, it is a great mistake to claim that the "America First" doctrine refers solely to an economic nationalism, as it is essentially *a complex doctrine: it rejects the post-American global order*¹⁰; *it rejects the compromised multilateralism (WTO, the UN), currently dominated by the rival powers (China) and used as a main lever to establish the Chinese global order*¹¹; *it builds the new American global order (the New American Century)*.

2. Convergent Elements for Activating the "Asian Century" Paradigm. China – the New Dominant Power, into the "Dragon Century" Paradigm?

Concerning the *bilateral relations between India and China*, two emerging powers of the 21st century, both with direct interests in the Asia-Pacific strategic region, *we must mention* the following aspects which, *depending on the USA's policy towards them*, will manage or not to configure a convergent interest of the two Asian powers, in these key-regions:

⁷ Subhayan Chakraborty, *India-US 2+2 talk to give trade issues a miss; defence, policy on agenda. Beginning September 6, the new format of the talks will focus on foreign affairs and defence issues*, New Delhi Last Updated at September 04, 2018, available online at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-us-2-2-talk-to-give-trade-issues-a-miss-defence-policy-on-agenda-118090400506_1.html, accessed on November 12, 2018.

⁸ Michael Selby-Green, *The US intends to break the WTO to deal with the 'multi-trillion dollar problem' that is China*, June 28, 2018, available online at: <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-is-trying-to-break-the-wto-to-deal-with-the-multi-trillion-dollar-problem-that-is-china-2018-6>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

⁹ The doctrine has acknowledged recently that the USA is aware of the fact that there is a risk that it becomes a passive witness to the rise of the "Chinese Globalism Century" and that it is searching for counter-strategies adequate for this paradigm: *"This is all an extension of the idea that the multilateral order is not working out for the United States anymore because you [the US] can no longer change the rules to your advantage or in your own interest"*, said Lee-Makiyama. *"The United States is just taking it to the next level"*, available online at: <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-is-trying-to-break-the-wto-to-deal-with-the-multi-trillion-dollar-problem-that-is-china-2018-6>.

¹⁰ See: Tom Switzer, *A post-America world?* August 03, 2017, available online at: <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/post-america-world/>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

¹¹ Henry Kissinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 409-410.

- the *emerging power* nature of the both actors (India, China) and their *member status within BRICS* (the main opposing block, “established” in the order dominated by the USA);

- the *Asian regional power* status of the both actors (India, China), which allows them to activate a paradigm of the “*Asian Community*” or the “*Asians’ Pacific*” paradigm (both regional paradigms similar to the Monroe doctrine, in the sense that they exclude any USA and *lato sensu* Occidental interference) at a certain point, starting from the regional strategic trilateral agreements;

- the capacity and vision to *use the objective processes of globalization* (interconnectivity among countries, spaces, economies), in order to build together their own types of globalism (Dragon Century, Asian Century¹²);

- the capacity to *transform regional cooperation mechanisms* (ASEAN, EEAS, SAARC, Delhi Dialogue) *into elements incorporated in Asia-centred mega-projects of economic, political integration* (without the participation of the USA and other European powers);

- the capacity to *transform classic multilateral frameworks, such as the UN, into soft tools for the promotion of their own globalist vision* (Dragon Century, Asian Century).

By using these general aspects, enumerated solely for illustrative purposes, as a starting point, the two countries can elaborate diplomatic directions for a *direct or indirect* bilateral relationship (within certain regional mechanisms, trilateral agreements or various cooperation groups), which can pursue the following harmonization interests, cooperation instruments and strategic objectives, as:

- *A diplomatic direction which entails the intensified use of a general India-China cooperation mechanism, by using the framework specific to the emerging countries* (the classic competitors of the American hegemony), i.e. *the BRICS framework*, used to work on the paradigm of international order *still under American domination*, where the BRICS countries are the “classic objectors”. Therefore, in this scenario, India and China would be two Asian emerging powers, with *a priori* converging interests, given *their very political status of USA challengers*. However, with the USA resetting the global paradigm in 2017, the operation of the framework specific for the so-called “official competitors” of the USA (the BRICS)¹³ – mechanism which excludes other types of old and new competitors of the USA (Iran, Turkey) – changes *as it is possible that the BRICS change only in favour of China’s rise* (as the new hegemony¹⁴ of the Chinese global order). Thus, *the BRICS could become an organization fallen under China’s influence and used by it to expand, initiate, consolidate certain grand regional or transcontinental projects, which focus on the vision of Chinese globalism, OBOR-sized or grander than the OBOR*¹⁵ (in China’s case, we cannot exclude from its strategy for the past decades *the fulfilment of a strategic, un-named but clear and*

¹² See F. William Engdahl, *The Eurasian Century is Now Unstoppable*, October 2016, available online at: <http://journal-neo.org>. The author considers that the Eurasian Century, built on the basis of OBOR (being therefore more of a Dragon Century, a type of global order shaped by the Chinese hegemony) is a reality in full process of construction (“OBOR, by linking all the contiguous land areas of Eurasia to the related network of strategic new or enlarged deep-water ports of OBORs Maritime Silk Road, has rendered US geopolitical strategy a devastating blow at a time the hegemony of America is failing as never in its short history”).

¹³ What is BRICS?, available online at: <https://brics2017.org/English/AboutBRICS/BRICS/>

¹⁴ *Within our paper, we use the term “hegemony” with no pejorative connotation, but as to speak about a dominant power in a determinate international system.*

¹⁵ “Connectivity is increasingly seen as a tool for exerting foreign policy influence. This view is reflected at the highest levels of diplomacy by countries like India, Japan, and the United States that have issued strong remarks about connectivity and infrastructure. Clearly, politics and connectivity are entwined in complex ways”. See Darshana Baruch, paper, August 21, 2018, available online at: <https://carnegieindia.org/2018/08/21/india-s-answer-to-belt-and-road-map-for-south-asia-pub-77071>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

implicit objective – such as *China's Greatness*¹⁶, to which the USA provided an international geostrategic response through the “AGA-AF” (“America Great Again” – “America First”) concepts¹⁷ only in 2016, when it perceived the danger of OBOR’s expansion at a global scale.

- *Continuation and consolidation of the cooperation between India and China, through regional mechanisms of Asian cooperation (ASEAN, SCO...)*¹⁸.

- *Strengthening the economic partnership with India (with strategic connotations), by attracting India in regional projects initiated by China (the Bangladesh Economic Corridor, China, India Myanmar/BCIM-EC), connected to OBOR (China's megaproject), i.e. progressively attracting India in the construction of the “Dragon Century” paradigm.*

- *India, maintained as China's strategic partner, directly and specifically for the OBOR project*¹⁹(one of China's diplomatic-strategic objectives, in the bilateral relation with India). China's direct interest is to attract a country such as India, through the benefits of regional cooperation, and to include it in its projects of economic, cultural, political and even military globalism, *in order to create an exclusively Asian region in the Pacific and to subsequently implement a doctrine similar to the Monroe doctrine for Latin America (“Asian powers' Pacific”, by excluding the USA). If the “Dragon Century” (OBOR and other projects implemented by China) would lead to defining such a doctrine (Asians' Pacific, a paradigm clearly opposing the USA), in China's view, India should be in an intensely consolidated relationship of cooperation with China as an Asian power (together in the “Asian Community” paradigm). Similarly, China may be directly interested in initiating a surprising trilateral with India and Japan, as an engine of this new “Asian Pacific” doctrine (the Pacific dominated exclusively by Asian powers, expelling the USA from the region). The fact that India is a strategic participant in China's global project known as OBOR reflects China's constant interest in avoiding the dissensions with India and attract this regional actor to its suite of allies, in order to create the “Dragon Century” (the century of Chinese hegemony, not mentioned of course as a strategic objective in any official doctrine, but resulting indirectly from the combination of a set of specific Chinese paradigms). In our opinion, OBOR is the most representative mechanism used by China to build its own globalism (gradual implementation of the Dragon Century)*²⁰, in a stage-by-stage, direct and assumed manner.

¹⁶ A concept which was not named as such, in order to avoid China being perceived as a global threat to the present order, but which is clearly revealed by corroborating certain concepts such as “China's peaceful rise”, the “Go out” strategy (by Den Xiaoping), “encouraging suitable companies to become international, export, acquire foreign companies, or set up subsidiaries abroad”, available online at: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chinas-strategy-change-world-order-one-belt-road-harald-buchmann/>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

¹⁷ Amy Zegart, “The Self-Inflicted Demise of American Power”, *The Atlantic*, July 12, 2018, available online at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/trump-nato-summit/565034/>; “The Trump Doctrine: Peace Through Strength”, *National Interest*, March 31, 2016, available online at: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-trump-doctrine-peace-through-strength-15631?page=0%2C1>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

¹⁸ India became SCO member in 2017, *The Hindu*, available online at: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-pakistan-become-full-members-of-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-sco/article18912600.ece>

¹⁹ According to the doctrine, *OBOR has been a global project from the very beginning*, meant to transform the global order according to China's vision (next to the UN, OBOR is one of the two pillars for the gradual construction of the Dragon Century, both formally and informally). See Harold Buchmann, Senior Officer for Customer Satisfaction at Volkswagen Group China, *China's strategy to change the world order: One Belt, One Road*, 21 August 2018, original title *One Belt One Road: Rely on economic strength to change the world's rule*, available online at: <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/chinas-strategy-change-world-order-one-belt-road-harald-buchmann/>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

²⁰ As noted by the doctrine, by adhering to the multilateral instruments created by the Westerners, China meant from the very beginning to fully exercise its rights and to play the game from a position of equality (the age of Maoist diplomacy, showing great disdain for the West, which it perceives as imperialistic and colonialist). The second stage of Chinese diplomacy starts with China entering the UN, in 1971, when “China tries to change the

Through the extraordinary prudence of its diplomacy (concepts, methods, and mechanisms used), China manages to become *de facto* the hegemony of the present international order (which no longer matches the USA's vision of its own greatness, undergoing therefore a full reset process), *without being named the "new hegemony" by any of the main powers.*

- Some of the characteristics of OBOR are the following: the obvious expansion and the multi-dimensions of the project (60 countries alongside the route, which announced their intention to participate in the development of OBOR²¹; implementation of 5 routes within OBOR; creation by China of an enormous "region of economic cooperation", expanding from the Western Pacific to the Baltic Sea²²). We see that, in this grand mega-project that shapes the century of Chinese globalism, *India's role is clearly an active and inclusive one, the role of participant in the segments of this mega-project.* One of the most important financial consequences (with direct impact on the economic power of the new hegemony) is the 4th dimension of OBOR, i.e. the financial dimension (manifested through building a transcontinental and transoceanic infrastructure, through the *internationalization of the Chinese currency, the Yuan Renminbi*, following financial integration, of the investments in wide-scale infrastructure, in various OBOR projects, which would result in an increase in the demand for trade in Yuan Renminbi) and the growth perspectives of the Asian consumption economies by 2030, estimated at 59% of the total global consumption in the middle class, considering that 80% of the economic growth is already recorded in the Asian region²³. Given the practically global dimension of OBOR and its mainly economic-commercial focus, it is obvious that the Chinese Yuan challenges the US Dollar (thus replacing the American hegemony from the standpoint of currency power, as well).

- China's strategic objective *to continue the cooperation with India within the established multilateralism (the UN)*, framework already used informally by China, in order to expand its soft influence at global level²⁴.

- The set of regional win-win diplomatic offers, in order to *consolidate the bilateral China-India framework*, as China attempts to *remove the strategic obstacles in the way of the OBOR expansion* (therefore *to avoid having India and Japan on a position of competitors/ opponents to the Chinese century and the expansion of its projects*). China's new diplomatic approach to India may show an interest in *acknowledging India as its "Asian pillar"*, within a regional strategic objective in which, surprisingly, we see China and Japan on the same side of the barricade – an Asian form of regionalism, maybe? – (through the "Asian Community" consolidated project, which should include *exclusively Asian poles of power*, which maintain the strategic Asia-Pacific region within an area of exclusive influence exercised by the emerging powers, which are rivals to the USA). In China's view, *the inclusion of the extended Pacific region, as well as India, in the "Asian Community"*

international system from within, by develop its presence in international organizations". The third stage, "the 1980s", is the stage when "China tries to take the opportunities provided by its participation in the international system, in order to promote its own interests". See Guy Faure, *La Banque Asiatique de Développement et les jeux d'influences chinois et japonais, Transcontinentales*, en ligne, 6/2008, mis en ligne le 13 avril 2011, consulté le 24 octobre 2014. <http://transcontinentales.revues.org/633>. In our opinion, there is a fourth stage during the 2000s, i.e. the initiation of Chinese globalism ("Dragon Century")

²¹Helen Chin, Fong Lau, Winnie He, Timothy Cheung (Fung Business Intelligence Centre), *The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21th Century Maritime Silk Road*, May 2015, Hong Kong, available online at: www.fbicgroup.com, accessed on November 12, 2018.

²² *Idem.*

²³ *Ibidem.*

²⁴Henri Kissinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 409-410.

*paradigm*²⁵ is feasible using different methods: OBOR-type projects, bilateral relations reviewed to focus on extended cooperation, *by initiating strictly Asian trilateral agreements* (India-China-Japan is the most important one). We are talking about *an implicit diplomatic direction assumed by China* (undeclared, but visible through its strategic moves, during the past couple of decades), which attempts to avoid an open or major conflict with the Asian competing countries (India, Japan etc.), in order to attract them in projects of regional cooperation and to turn them into *participants in the regional projects used by China to gradually create its globalism mega-project (the "Dragon Century")*²⁶.

- We must also consider the *China's diplomatic approach the USA, i.e. countering the USA's strategy to surround it* (from the USA bases in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, which represent a belt over the Western China, to the use of ASEAN or India as Asian pillars to surround China)²⁷, through the efforts to minimize the specific differences from India and to emphasize the common interests with this country in the region.

- China initiated certain *regional financial mega-projects, meant to counter economic-financial structures seen as being under the influence of the American globalism* (the World Bank or even the Asian Development Bank – AIIB). The creation of *a regional Asian bank to finance infrastructures (AIIB)*²⁸ is such a project, which also attracts India as a *financially strategic partner*. The protocol signed by China and 20 states, in Beijing, on October 24th 2014 sets the basis for an agreement to create this bank, which is meant to meet the increased needs for infrastructure. It is, however, a matter of initiating *a set of Asian regional institutions, which includes the financial partnership between China and India, two emerging powers, a partnership to be subsequently connected to OBOR* (as of 2013 – the year of OBOR's initiation²⁹) and to other mechanisms of cooperation with India and the Asian countries. Thus, we notice how China gradually implements regional projects *integrated both in the "Asian Community" paradigm* (as projects which reunite *solely Asian countries* and exclude the USA) *and in the "Dragon Century" paradigm* (regional projects, which are segments of the mega-project to build the Chinese global order, with the Yuan as the new global reference currency), in the Asia-Pacific region (and more).

- China's diplomatic direction to continue its cooperation with India, on issues related to *the global agenda* (on climate change) through the Brazil-India-South Africa-China (BASIC) grouping³⁰.

²⁵ Here, as a paradigm initiated by ASEAN, i.e. not by an Asian emerging power, but by a regional organization (ASEAN Community), available online at: <http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/ASEAN-Community-Vision-2025.pdf>.

²⁶ According to academics, "*Connectivity is increasingly seen as a tool for exerting foreign policy influence. This view is reflected at the highest levels of diplomacy by countries like India, Japan, and the United States that have issued strong remarks about connectivity and infrastructure. Clearly, politics and connectivity are entwined in complex ways*". See Darshana Baruch, paper, August 21, 2018, available online at: <https://carnegieindia.org/2018/08/21/india-s-answer-to-belt-and-road-road-map-for-south-asia-pub-77071>.

²⁷ Parasaran Rangarajan, *ASEAN: Analysis of Multilateral Relations*, paper no. 5773, August 21, 2014, available online at: <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1599>

²⁸ Le Figaro, avec AFP, *Création d'une banque régionale d'Asie*, October 24, 2014, available online at: <http://www.lefigaro.fr>

²⁹ See Darshana Baruah, August 21, 2018, paper, available online at: <https://carnegieindia.org/2018/08/21/india-s-answer-to-belt-and-road-road-map-for-south-asia-pub-77071>: "Xi talked about the Silk Road Economic Belt during a visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013. A month later in October 2013, Xi proposed the MSR while speaking at the Indonesian parliament. China's proposal to revive the Silk Road is an ambitious idea based on multilateral cooperation".

³⁰ Aman Thakker, *Beyond Wuhan: India Should Establish A New Framework for Engagement With China. India should aim to establish a new and broader framework, or modus vivendi, in its engagement with China*, May 1, 2018, available online at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/beyond-wuhan-india-should-establish-a-new-framework-for-engagement-with-china/>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

- *Attracting India in trilateral agreements to counter the USA in the Asia-Pacific region (the Russia-India-China trilateral/RIC)*³¹, approach regarded as a method to implement the idea of “Asian Community”, in which even Russia is perceived as an Asian power, even as a global actor. Thus, the trilateral meeting of the three emerging powers took place in New Delhi, in December 2017, meeting followed by a joint statement which presented an agenda of common objectives and interests. This trilateral (which is not an isolated event, *but one in a process of regular trilateral meetings among these countries*, therefore it is based on a *clear geostrategic component of action within an Asian paradigm, which excludes the USA*) highlights a *common and constant* diplomatic direction of the emerging powers, to counter the American power of “Asian pillar” (i.e. “India is the USA’s main Asian strategic partner” and it receives support to build a diplomacy based on restricting China to the Indo-Pacific region). The USA-countering trilateral (with effects in the Asia-Pacific key-region) took place “*after the recent working-level meeting of the so-called ‘Quad’ of countries on the side lines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summits in Manila in November*”³². One of the most important paragraphs of the 2017 joint statement refers to the concept of “*regional connectivity*” which, even though insufficiently detailed, represents a *key political framework for the development of privileged commercial-economic relationships*, through common projects in the Asia-Pacific region, involving the three emerging powers. In our opinion, the trilateral which includes China, India, and Russia becomes a *key mechanism for the implementation of the “Asian Century” and the “Dragon Century” paradigms* (if we consider China’s political-economic dominance, given the amplexness of its transoceanic and transcontinental projects, such as OBOR).

- As of 2018, India is preoccupied with *resetting* its bilateral relationship with China, through the informal summit of presidents, at Wuhan/China. The summit focused on identifying the fields in which the two countries can cooperate and on the will to overcome their blockages (disputes over the common border, disputes over Tibet and Aksai Chin³³), to continue strengthening the cooperation through the bilateral mechanisms for a dialogue about the common borders (Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement/1993; the India-China Expert Group talks; Special Representative Mechanism/2003). However, according to the doctrine “a much more comprehensive diplomatic initiative is necessary, instead of a simple reset of the bilateral relations. Building a new dialogue framework is necessary”³⁴.

3. The Pacific, Key-Point of the “Asian Century” Development. An Oscillating Indian Paradigm post- 2016: India – Renewing the Role as US Pivot in Asia?

Official Chinese discourses regard the Asia-Pacific region as a region open to a type of strategy focused on *a few fundamental pillars*: win-win economic-commercial cooperation, promotion of regional peace and stability, including specific cooperation forums such as ASEAN (according to the Chinese officials, it becomes a structure of great importance, as of 2016, “the first sub-regional community in Asia’s history and a milestone for East Asia

³¹ Ankit Panda, *What the Russia-India-China Trilateral Meeting Means. Trilateralism between Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi produces lengthy statements, but divergences remain*, December 13, 2017, available online at: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/what-the-russia-india-china-trilateral-meeting-means>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

³² “India, along with Japan, the United States, and Australia, participated in that meeting, which was perceived as a coming-together of likeminded Asia-Pacific democracies to balance China”. *Idem*.

³³ “Beyond Wuhan: India Should Establish a New Framework for Engagement with China”, *The Diplomat*, May 1, 2018, available online at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/beyond-wuhan-india-should-establish-a-new-framework-for-engagement-with-china/>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

³⁴ *Idem*.

cooperation")³⁵, as well as the pipeline projects "East Asia Community" and "Asian Community of common future"³⁶.

Regarding India, its regional diplomacy currently (covering China, too) focuses on the objective of regional leadership, by *strengthening the regional connectivity*, through a series of specific policies and initiatives, with the following purposes:

- to *prevent the Asia-Pacific region from entering an area of explicit domination, assumed by China (de facto implementation of a policy to "surround" China)*;

- to *maintain the Indo-Pacific strategic region free and open to all countries* (the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategic concept), through the QUAD mechanism (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a strategic dialogue between India, the US, Australia and Japan)³⁷;

- to reduce the dependence on China, in the field of transports and commerce;

- to *find ways to protect India's interests in territorial integrity and to maintain the "comfort area", by resetting the OBOR segment (CPEC/China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Maritime Silk Road), for the latter to include an improved cooperation with India as a regional actor, directly interested in these segments (CPEC's planned route cuts through Indian-claimed and Pakistan-controlled parts of Kashmir)*³⁸;

- to *continue implementing the regional "Act East"-type projects through which it consolidates its influence in the Asia-Pacific region*, projects such as BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative), project within which the Motor Vehicle Agreement/2015 was signed, as an agreement to strengthen the sub-regional cooperation, in order to counterbalance China's commercial and economic influence in South Asia;

- to strengthen the regional leadership, by consolidating BIMSTEC and the "Neighbourhood first" policy, as well as paying more importance to *the bilateral policy* with Nepal (used as India's pillar in the region, to counterbalance the OBOR) and with other BIMSTEC countries, subsequently;

- to reinforce the currently dysfunctional regional mechanisms, such as SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) or Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Cooperation (BCIM-EC);

- to build *a new framework* for bilateral cooperation with China, which exceeds the diplomatic dimension of *a simple reset* and which finds *concrete cooperation instruments, in the fields prone to divergence* (able to deal with hot-point of bilateral divergences, such as terrorism, connectivity, trade, and nuclear ambitions);

- to reach a level of *consolidated* cooperation with China, for India to receive support from China, in order to become a member of NSG³⁹ (Nuclear Security Group).

Therefore, India's new diplomatic direction in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond is *a proactive one, meant to assert its position as a regional leader*, by implementing certain projects as an alternative to the Chinese project (a network of *functioning* regional or sub-regional mechanisms, such as BBIN).

However, we would be mistaken if we considered that India's diplomacy in 2016 merely aims to counterbalance China (by assuming the active role of "Asian pillar", proposed

³⁵ Liu Zhenmin, vice foreign minister of China, *Uphold win-win cooperation and promote peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, October 17, 2015, available online at: <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mafa>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

³⁶ *Idem*.

³⁷ Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Senior Fellow for South Asia, *Understanding Modi's vision for the Indo-Pacific, Revitalised India is building closer ties with the US, and pro-actively engaging with China*, May 14, 2018, available online at: <https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2018-2623/may-c4af/modis-vision-for-the-indo-pacific-dd0f>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

³⁸ *Idem*. Also see: Aman Thakker, "Beyond Wuhan: India Should Establish A New Framework for Engagement With China", *The Diplomat*, May 01, 2018, available online at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/beyond-wuhan-india-should-establish-a-new-framework-for-engagement-with-china/>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

³⁹ In 2016, China opposed India's membership to the Nuclear Security Group (NSG), available online at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/beyond-wuhan-india-should-establish-a-new-framework-for-engagement-with-china/>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

by the USA to India, back during the Obama administration). We are more likely to characterize India's new foreign policy *post-2016* (influenced by the obvious expansion and consolidation of OBOR and by the strengthening of China's role as global hegemony) *as flexible and oscillating* between two geostrategic paradigms with global impact: India can develop *a diplomacy to counterbalance China*, by activating mechanisms already existing at regional and sub-regional level, as "Asian pivot" (in the "Pacific Century" paradigm, as a geostrategic paradigm initiated and controlled by the USA).

However, India can contribute to the *expansion and consolidation of China's role as global hegemony* (in which case, its entire diplomacy would be based on a privileged partnership with China, possibly starting from the RIC trilateral) in the "Dragon Century" paradigm, in which OBOR would become a truly global project, supported by the Asian countries, on the basis of a new Monroe-type doctrine (the Asian Community, which excludes the USA).

At this point, we cannot consider that India has chosen its diplomatic direction for the following decades, although the US's current diplomatic offer is extremely promising for emerging powers such as India (such as the privileged dialogue in the fields of diplomacy and security, initiated recently, in September 2018)⁴⁰, looking at the matter from the perspective that the new American diplomatic direction is extremely ambitious and visionary, planning to reset the entire post-1945 international system.

Some conclusions

The bilateral relations between the two emerging powers, China and India, are in full process of reset starting 2016 and, with the offensive of the new and tough American diplomatic direction (America First, America Great Again). To this end, we must mention the diplomatic efforts made by the US (successfully), in order to strengthen the line of bilateral cooperation with India, particularly in the field of security, as a method to control and counter the tendencies of the current Indian administration in the vicinity of China, and to implement the Asian Century paradigm (which would exclude the US from the geostrategic game in the Asia-Pacific region, by creating a Sino-Indian condominium).

We note a new strategic hard direction aimed by the USA against China, starting 2016 (offensive diplomacy, economic war with China), and concerning India (by *strengthening the strategic bilateralism* in the relationship with India, which the US declared its strategic partner, in the field of foreign policy and regional security, which has *a direct impact* on India's political and legal obligations, in terms of its geostrategic position in the Asia-Pacific region, which now has to comply with the strategic direction initiated by the US).

This new American strategic offensive is meant to limit China's expansion and the consolidation of its hegemonic role in the Pacific (and in Asia's extended area), in order to maintain the sensitive area of the South China Sea as an area covered by the international legal regime for the freedom of seas and for the interdiction of a domination assumed by any power over this region; to prevent India from drawing closer to the Chinese hegemony and, as a consequence, to prevent the creation of an extended regional condominium, between the two Asian powers, which would irrevocably restrict the US's influence in the Asia-Pacific.

⁴⁰ To this end, we can mention the bilateral dialogue framework between India and the USA, developed according to the new diplomatic direction (the "America First" doctrine, resetting the global order, according to the American model), called "India-US 2+2 talk", which started on September 06, 2018 and focused exclusively on a common agenda for security and foreign policy (technically, through this mechanism of strategic dialogue, the entire Indian diplomacy falls within the American strategic lines regarding the "Indo-Pacific" paradigm). Subhayan Chakraborty, September 04, 2018, available online at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-us-2-2-talk-to-give-trade-issues-a-miss-defence-policy-on-agenda-118090400506_1.html, accessed on November 12, 2018.

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EUPHRATES SHIELD: AN ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S INTERVENTION IN SYRIA

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Abstract: *Starting with the civil war in Syria in 2011, its neighbors, especially Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, faced a series of major issues that had a substantial impact on their security, domestic and foreign affairs. The growing flow of Syrian refugees fleeing the conflict, as well as the border instability generated by the conflict between the various factions on the ground, created tensions at Syria's border with these states and put pressure on the governments of Ankara, Beirut and Amman. Among these, only Turkey decided to intervene decisively by conducting a military operation in Syria to remove threats to national security. Therefore, this article aims to identify the reasons behind Turkey's decision to intervene in Syria on 24 August 2016. The working hypothesis of the article is that the occupation of more territories at the Turkish-Syrian border by the Kurdish forces (YPG) fueled Ankara's concerns about the possibility of creating a Kurdish state at the Turkey's border. Thus, the Turkish president has approved a military intervention in Syria in order to prevent this scenario. At the same time, the article aims to analyze the costs and benefits of Turkish army following this operation.*

Keywords: *Turkey, Syria, the Middle East, Euphrates Shield, military operation, the Kurdish forces, YPG.*

Introduction

In 2011, the echo of the Arab Spring strongly hit Syria where it generated mass protests against Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian regime. Gradually, the events escalated into a civil war that made millions of people to flee to Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and to the EU countries. The civil war in Syria generated a flow of refugees, instability in the region, the emergence of a power vacuum rapidly filled with Daesh, the anti-Assad rebels, and the forces of the Syrian Kurds. For the Syrian Kurds, the conflict was the long-awaited moment to try to create a Kurdish state. The instability from the Turkish-Syrian border had a significant impact on Turkey's security and has become an increasingly difficult problem for Ankara. So, to ensure that the consequences of the civil war in Syria are not against its interests, Turkey decided to get directly involved in resolving the conflict.

In the short term, Ankara is interested in resolving the internal conflict in Syria as soon as possible due to the fact that border instability represents a security issue for Turkey. The 911 km length of Turkey's border with Syria makes it impossible to secure it fully. Thus, the elements that represents threats to national security such as members of terrorist organizations, intelligence agencies of other states, drugs, weapons, etc., can easily infiltrate in Turkey¹. This was noticed since January 2015 when Daesh started to organize terrorist

¹ Constanze Letsch, "Turkish border guards sweep up fuel smugglers and Isis fighters alike", *The Guardian*, 25.09.2014, available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/25/turkey-syria-border-crossing-harder-movement-isis-smugglers>, accessed on September 10, 2018.

attacks in Turkey. On 6 January 2015, Daesh organized the first bomb attack in Turkey². The second was on 5 June in the city of Diyarbakır³ followed by the third on 20 July in Suruç, both located near the border with Syria⁴. These terrorist attacks have led Turkey to agree with Washington on 23 July 2015 on the use of the Incirlik airbase by US planes to bomb Daesh positions⁵. Also, on 26 July in response to terrorist attacks, Turkish aviation bombed Daesh positions in Syria⁶. Although, Turkey was part of the international coalition against Daesh, Ankara refused to allow the United States to use the Incirlik Air Base in October 2014 to bomb Daesh positions in Syria and Iraq⁷. Turkey may have made this decision for fear of possible terrorist attacks on behalf of Daesh. Terrorist attacks on Turkey's territory have prompted Ankara's decision-makers to step up their efforts to eliminate the terrorist threat from its border.

Daesh responded to Turkish bombing in July with another terrorist attack which took place on 10 October 2015 in front of Ankara's central station. Following the attack, 103 people died, being the bloodiest terrorist attack in Turkey's modern history⁸. In 2016, before Turkey's intervention in Syria, Daesh has organized four more bomb attacks, three in Istanbul on 12 January, 19 March and 28 June, and another one on 20 August in Gaziantep, all with casualties, near Syria's border⁹. Turkey's strategy of letting Daesh to fight against pro-government forces and Kurdish forces to weaken or even defeating them had a boomerang effect. The wave of terrorist attacks that hit Turkey "awakened" the political elite in Ankara. Turkey started to make significant efforts at the border with Syria and Iraq to prevent the passing of foreign fighters who wanted to join Daesh¹⁰.

As the forces of the Syrian Kurds, YPG (the military branch of the Democratic Union Party, PYD), massively supported by the United States, conquered more territories at the Turkish border, Turkey become increasingly worried¹¹. On the other hand, Washington saw YPG as the only effective actor in the fight against Daesh, and therefore in 2014 it began to offer tactical and logistical support to the Syrian Kurds¹². Thus, from October 2014¹³ until August 2016, the US-backed Kurd YPG forces succeeded to liberate territories near the Turkish border occupied by Daesh and continued to advance to the northwest of Syria. At the

² "Turkey will not be Europe's firefighter", *Daily Sabah*, 21.08.2016, available online at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/editorial/2016/08/21/turkey-will-not-be-europes-firefighter>, accessed on September 12, 2018.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ "Turkish airstrikes target ISIL in Syria", *Hürriyet*, July 24, 2015, available online at: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-airstrikes-target-isil-in-syria-85853, accessed on September 12, 2018.

⁵ "Turkey lets U.S. strike Islamic State from Incirlik base: U.S.", *Reuters*, 23.07.2015, available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-usa-airbase/turkey-lets-u-s-strike-islamic-state-from-incirlik-base-u-s-idUSKCN0PX2B520150723>, accessed on September 08, 2018.

⁶ "Turkey's air force hits IS and PKK in Syria and Iraq", *BBC*, 26.07.2015, available online at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33663005>, accessed on September 24, 2018.

⁷ "Turkey denies giving U.S. access to Incirlik airbase", *Al Arabiya*, 13.10.2014, available online at: <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/13/Turkey-approves-U-S-use-of-its-air-base-to-fight-ISIS-.html>, accessed on September 08, 2018.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ Constanze Letsch, "Erdoğan blames Isis for suspected suicide attack at wedding in Turkey", *The Guardian*, August 22, 2016, available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/20/several-dead-in-suspected-terrorist-blast-at-wedding-in-turkey>, accessed on September 09, 2018.

¹¹ Harriet Allsopp, "Kurdish Political Parties and the Syrian Uprising", in Gareth Stansfield, Mohammed SHAREEF, (Eds.), *The Kurdish Question Revisited*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, pp.300-301.

¹² Sherko Kirmanj, "8 Reasons Why America Supports the Syrian Kurds", *The National Interest*, September 13, 2017, available at nationalinterest.org/feature/8-reasons-why-america-supports-the-syrian-kurds-22290, accessed on September 09, 2018.

¹³ "Kobane: Air strikes help Syria town curb IS", *BBC*, 8.10.2014, available online at: www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29526783, accessed on September 09, 2018.

same time, due to the regional context, among the Kurdish elites reappeared a strong current for autonomy and a strong desire to create a Kurdish state in northern Syria. In January 2014, three cantons in Syria where Kurds were the majority population, Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira declared their autonomy¹⁴ and in March 2016 they joined together to form a federal government under the Democratic Federation of North Syria. It controlled about 400 km of the 911 km of the Turkish-Syrian border¹⁵. At the end of June, the Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federation of North Syria met to approve the final form of the constitution providing its own flag, its ability to develop diplomatic ties with other states, and mandatory military service for young people¹⁶. These events created turmoil in Ankara and on the corridors of Ak Saray. Turkey is now faced with a greater threat than Daesh represented by the emergence of a Kurdish state at its southeast border. Therefore, the ground for an intervention by the Turkish army in Syria had to be prepared.

1. Operation Euphrates Shield

As early as July 2015, the Turkish National Security Council, equivalent to the Supreme Council of Defence of the country, announced that the territories in Syria west of the Euphrates River represent a red line for Turkey's national security beyond which Kurdish militias must not pass¹⁷. At the same time, the National Security Council specified that if Kurdish militias try to conquer the Syrian city of Jarabulus, then the Turkish army will intervene¹⁸. Ankara did not want Kurdish militias to occupy even more territories at its border with Syria, especially those between the cities of northwest Syria, Jarabulus and Azaz, which were occupied by Daesh. Although Ankara has clearly warned of a red line that should not be passed, the YPG offensive continued to the west of the Euphrates, not to the city of Jarabulus, but about 30 km down the river, conquering the city of Manbij¹⁹ on August 12, 2016. This, as well as the terrorist attack organised by Daesh on 20 August 2016 in Gaziantep, provided the necessary ground for Turkey to intervene²⁰.

Turkey's diplomatic steps for military intervention in Syria began in the summer of 2016. Ankara focused in particular on re-launching diplomatic relations with Moscow²¹ and strengthening dialogue with Tehran²². The main reason is that Russia and Iran, supporters of

¹⁴ Rodi Said, "Syrian Kurds set to announce federal system in northern Syria", *Reuters*, 16.03.2016, available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-federalism/syrian-kurds-set-to-announce-federal-system-in-northern-syria-idUSKCN0WIOZT>, accessed on September 09, 2018.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ Sardar Mullah Darwish, "After approving constitution, what's next for Syria's Kurds?" *Al-Monitor*, July 22, 2016, available online at: <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/north-syria-rojava-kurdish-federation-constitution.html>, accessed on September 09, 2018.

¹⁷ "Fırat'ın batısı kırmızı çizgi", *Milliyet*, July 01, 2015, available online at: www.milliyet.com.tr/firat-in-batisi-kirmizi-cizgi/siyaset/detay/2081424/default.htm, accessed on September 03, 2018.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Lisa Barrington, "U.S.-backed forces wrest control of Syria's Manbij from Islamic State", *Reuters*, August 12, 2016, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-islamic-state/u-s-backed-forces-wrest-control-of-syrias-manbij-from-islamic-state-idUSKCN10N178>, accessed on January 03, 2018.

²⁰ Tim Hume, Isil Sariyuce, Joe Sterling, "Turkey backtracks on age of wedding bomber", *CNN*, August 23, 2016, available online at: edition.cnn.com/2016/08/22/asia/turkey-gaziantep-blast/index.html, accessed on September 12, 2018.

²¹ Shaun Walker, Jennifer Rankin, "Erdoğan and Putin discuss closer ties in first meeting since jet Downing", *The Guardian*, August 09, 2016, available online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/09/erdogan-meets-putin-leaders-seek-mend-ties-jet-downing-russia-turkey>, accessed on September 12, 2018.

²² „Is Turkey undergoing a shift in foreign policy?" *Al-Jazeera*, August 12, 2016, available online at: www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2016/08/turkey-undergoing-shift-foreign-policy-160812165540441.html, accessed on September 12, 2018.

the Damascus regime, are directly involved with troops in Syria and at the same time they can communicate with Assad²³. Moreover, Russia controlled most of Syria's²⁴ airspace and, for an intervention, Turkey needed Moscow's agreement²⁵. Also, before intervening in Syria, Turkey had to make sure that it would not enter in a direct conflict on the ground with the Russian or Iranian troops that fought alongside the Syrian army. At the same time, Ankara held talks on this issue with the United States which had troops in northeast Syria. Turkey has announced all state actors involved in Syria before intervening to ensure they do not come into conflict.

On 20 August 2016, following the Gaziantep terrorist attack, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım announced that "Turkey will be more active in the Syrian issue in the next six months as a regional actor. This means that Turkey will not allow Syria to be divided on ethnic grounds, for Turkey this is crucial"²⁶. This is a clear message which actually announces that Turkey will no longer stand aside in this conflict. Only four days after this incident, on 24 August at 4:00 am, the Turkish army launched the military operation "Fırat Kalkanı" (Euphrates Shield) in Syria to eliminate Daesh forces from its border²⁷.

According to some analysts and officials from the Turkish army, the name of the Euphrates Shield operation has a special significance. The use of the term "shield" is to emphasize that the operation aims to block the advance of Kurdish militias to the west of the Euphrates River, to the territories from the Turkish-Syrian border occupied by Daesh²⁸. The main mission was to avoid the creation of a Kurdish state and to block the advancement of YPG militias in order to make it impossible for them to unite the Kurdish territories in the northeast and northwest of Syria²⁹. On 24 August, while the Syrian rebels backed by the Turkish army were besieging the city of Jarabulus, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey was determined to protect the territorial integrity of Syria³⁰ and that the operation "is a response to the threat posed by terrorist organizations such as Daesh and PYD (Party of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union)"³¹. Officially, Turkey wanted to eliminate the terrorist elements represented by Daesh and the Kurdish forces from its border with Syria, but the main purpose of Operation "Euphrates Shield" was to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state

²³ "Erdogan travels to Russia to reset relations", *Al-Jazeera*, August 09, 2016, available online at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/erdogan-travels-russia-reset-relations-160809032238975.html>, accessed on September 12, 2018.

²⁴ "US and Russia sign deal to avoid Syria air incidents", *BBC*, October 20, 2015, available online at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34588286>, accessed on September 04, 2018.

²⁵ İlnur Çevik, „Russia emerges as Turkey's friend in a new world”, *Daily Sabah*, April 02, 2018, available online at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/columns/ilnur-cevik/2018/04/03/russia-emerges-as-turkeys-friend-in-a-new-world>, accessed on September 10, 2018.

²⁶ Humeyra Pamuk, "Turkey to take more active role on Syria in next six months, PM says", *Reuters*, August 20, 2016, available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-primeminister-syria/turkey-to-take-more-active-role-on-syria-in-next-six-months-pm-says-idUSKCN10V0AF>, accessed on 04.01.2018.

²⁷ "Fırat Kalkanı" ne anlama geliyor", *Cumhuriyet*, August 24, 2016, available online at: http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/589803/_Firat_Kalkani__ne_anlama_geliyor.html, accessed on September 04, 2018.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ Faysal Itani, "Why Turkey Went to War in Syria", *Foreign Policy*, August 24, 2016, available online at: foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/24/why-turkey-finally-went-to-war-in-syria-jarabulus-invasion-kurds/, accessed on September 12, 2018.

³⁰ "Turkish army-backed rebels advance inside Syria on ISIL", *Hürriyet*, August 24, 2016, available online at: www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-army-backed-rebels-advance-inside-syria-on-isil-103174, accessed on January 03, 2018.

³¹ "Erdoğan to PYD: Those issuing threats should think about what will happen", *Hürriyet*, August 24, 2016, available online at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-to-pyd-those-issuing-threats-should-think-about-what-will-happen-103176>, accessed on January 03, 2018.

at the south-east border of Turkey³². The operation ended on 29 March 2017, seven months after its launch³³, and it managed to achieve several objectives including:

- *Preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish state at the Turkish border*

As I mentioned above, Ankara has been facing the Kurdish issue for decades. This brings great problems to Turkey because of the Kurdish minority desire to obtain autonomy in the east of the country. In the late 1970s representatives of this minority created a paramilitary branch known as PKK, declared as terrorist organization by Turkey, the European Union, the United States and other states³⁴. Since then, the organization has frequently resorted to terrorist attacks in order to show its dissatisfaction with the way the Turkish government treats the Kurdish minority and to support the autonomy movement towards Turkey. Therefore, the emergence of a Kurdish state at the southeast border of Turkey would mean a threat to its national security. Such a problem would cause great headaches for Ankara on medium and long term as it would encourage the secessionist movements of the Kurds on Turkey's territory. At the same time, it would put pressure on the Turkish border in terms of security because they could send arms, money and not only to the Turkish Kurds to support their fight against the government. The fear generated by the emergence of a Kurdish state at the southeast border was the main reason that led Turkey to send its army to Syria. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said 24 on December 2016 that he will not allow the creation of a new state in northern Syria³⁵.

In fact, this has been Turkey's goal since the beginning of the "Euphrates Shield" operation. Following the operation, the Turkish army managed to secure about 90 km of Syrian border from approximately 830 km. At the same time, it made a link between the Syrian cities of Azaz (controlled by the Syrian Free Army) and Jarabulus, controlled by Daesh. This allowed it to create a buffer zone between Kurdish-controlled regions in an attempt to stop them occupying even more territories at Turkey's southeast border. The Turkish army objective was not only to conquer the city of Jarabulus, but also the town of Al-Bab, about 70 km from the border with Turkey. Al-Bab is a strategic hub, which if conquered by the Kurdish forces it would have allowed them to create a supply corridor for the Afrin region and a line of defense that would have blocked a possible advance of the Free Syrian Army and the Turkish army in Syria. Moreover, the unification of the territories on the right bank of the Euphrates with those on its left bank would have allowed the Kurds to create a state that had a common border with Turkey stretching on 650 km. Turkey is interested in avoiding a scenario in which the Syrian territory is divided and the Kurds would have the chance to create a state. It is therefore in Ankara's interest that the territorial integrity of Syria is maintained in order to not allow the emergence of a Kurdish state³⁶.

- *Creation of a buffer zone at the Turkish-Syrian border*

Creating a buffer zone was not a new idea. Turkey has expressed this wish since 2012, together with the creation of a no-fly zone between the Turkish border and the Syrian territory. In that place, Ankara wanted to establish a refugee camp to protect the refugees from

³² Kimberly Kagan *et al*, *Intelligence Estimate and Forecast: The Syrian Theater*, Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project, Washington, 2017, p.35.

³³ Haid, *Post-ISIS Governance in Jarabulus: A Turkish-led Strategy*, Chatham House, 2017, p.20.

³⁴ Lyubov Grigorova Mincheva, Ted Robert Gurr, *Crime-Terror Alliances and the State: Ethnonationalist and Islamist Challenges to Regional Security*, Routledge, 2013, p.41.

³⁵ Emin Avundukluoğlu, "Turkey will never allow a new state in N.Syria: Erdogan", *Anadolu Agency*, available online at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkey-will-never-allow-a-new-state-in-nsyria-erdogan/713335>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

³⁶ "Turkish FM hits back at Macron over 'invasion' remarks", *Anadolu Agency*, 02.02.2018, available online at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/turkish-fm-hits-back-at-macron-over-invasion-remarks/1052669>, accessed on September 03, 2018.

the confrontations between pro and anti-government forces³⁷. For such a scenario, Turkey would have needed first Assad's agreement or, if not, international support. The Damascus regime refused this proposal and Ankara tried to get a UN decision on this issue, but on 30 August 2012, Russia and China blocked this initiative in the Security Council using their right of veto³⁸. Through military operations in Syria in 2016 and 2018, Turkey has succeeded in creating such an area and securing a border section. Also, the operations facilitated the return of thousands of Syrian refugees³⁹. Moreover, after the liberation of these territories occupied by Daesh and PYD (the PKK branch in Syria), the Turkish government helped to the post-conflict reconstruction⁴⁰.

• *Exiting diplomatic isolation and securing a place at the negotiating table*

The presence of Turkish army in Syria brought Turkey out of the diplomatic isolation generated by the failed coup in July 2016 and assured it a place at the Syrian conflict negotiations. By controlling a part of northeast of Syria, Turkey cannot be excluded from negotiations on the Syrian file regardless of developments on the ground. If Assad will remain in power or not, his successor will have to talk with Ankara in order to rejoin the Syrian territories occupied by the Turkish army. Thus, Turkey has the capacity to influence the terms for the end of the civil war and at the same time the future of Syria.

• *Obtaining a sphere of influence in Syria*

At the beginning of the civil conflict in Syria in the spring of 2011, Turkey was among the first states that tried to talk to Assad and to mediate the conflict in order to stop the violence. The Turkish soft power failed and in August 2016 Ankara decided to use the army to intervene in Syria. Turkey wanted to maintain good relations with the Assad regime as part of its foreign policy strategy based on neo-Ottomanism.

Neo-Ottomanism does not aim at rebuilding the borders of the Ottoman Empire, but is based on the idea of strengthening Turkey's sphere of influence in the territories once under Sultan's authority and beyond. The main objective is to promote Turkey's foreign policy both to the east and to the west, focusing on the *soft power* component of Turkish diplomacy⁴¹. It should be noted that neo-Ottomanism is not a new concept, it appears in the first half of the nineteenth century, created by the Ottoman intelligentsia, precisely to save the empire and prevent its break up⁴². This concept was intended to counteract the nationalist feelings that began to take shape in the Ottoman Empire and to give everyone a common identity that would overcome differences in language, ethnicity and faith⁴³.

³⁷ Jonathon Burch, Oliver Holmes, "Syria refugee exodus raises pressure for buffer zone", *Reuters*, August 28, 2012, available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis/syria-refugee-exodus-raises-pressure-for-buffer-zone-idUSBRE8610SH20120828>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

³⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Meeting on Situation in Syria, Shifts Focus to Plight of Externally, Internally Displaced Persons*, August 30, 2012, available online at: www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10752.doc.htm, accessed on September 29, 2018.

³⁹ Umit Bektas, "Syrians refugees head home on foot from Turkey for Eid holiday", *Reuters*, 15.06.2017, available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-syria/syrians-refugees-head-home-on-foot-from-turkey-for-eid-holiday-idUSKBN19623V>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁴⁰ "Thousands back to school in Syria's Aleppo as Turkey rebuilds over 400 war-torn schools", *Daily Sabah*, November 20, 2017, available online at: <https://www.dailysabah.com/education/2017/11/20/thousands-back-to-school-in-syrias-aleppo-as-turkey-rebuilds-over-400-war-torn-schools>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁴¹ Özgür Tüfekçi, "Turkish Eurasianism: Roots and Discourses", in Özgür Tüfekçi, Hüsrev Tabak, Erman Akilli (Eds.), *Eurasian Politics and Society: Issues and Challenges*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, 2017, pp.6-7.

⁴² Özgür Tüfekçi, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, pp. 3-4.

Iraq⁴⁴, Albania⁴⁵, Qatar⁴⁶, Somalia⁴⁷, Sudan⁴⁸, Northern Cyprus, were all under the influence of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey has made efforts to regain its influence on this states. An argument that supports this assertion is that Turkey has managed to place strategic military bases on the territory of these countries as a result of diplomatic efforts.

2. What did the Turkish gain from the operation in Syria?

The Euphrates Shield operation had a significant impact on the Turkish army. Following this operation, the army had several benefits including:

- The mobility of the army at the operational and strategic tactical level⁴⁹ and its effectiveness in real combat conditions could be observed.

- The readiness and the capacity of the army to fight and to conduct a military operation beyond Turkey's borders was tested⁵⁰. Thus, the army gained experience in real war conditions⁵¹.

- Communication and cooperation between the army's regular forces involved in the conflict (the ground and air forces) have been tested. The events from the battlefield can highlight various issues that make more difficult the cooperation and communication between the armed forces and between them and intelligence services. Therefore, problems can be solved to be avoided in the future. Thus, the military operation improved communication and co-operation between the military branches and the intelligence services.

- The intelligence officers' capabilities, especially those from the land, air and from the internal and external security departments, could be evaluated. They had the opportunity to test their abilities to obtain strategic information, to penetrate terrorist organizations, to carry out counter-time missions in crisis tense situations and to conduct missions behind enemy lines. At the same time, the intelligence officers from the strategic analysis departments have gained experience and had the chance to work in wartime tense situations. At the same time, their ability to perform short-term reports on the battleground situation, to provide some insights into possible developments and on the possible risks and threats which the intelligence officers might face during their missions was also tested. It also tested the ability of the intelligence services to process a large amount of information from HUMINT sources (Human intelligence), OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) and SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), to select the most relevant and could correlate them.

⁴⁴ "Türk askeri Irak'ta", *Yeni Şafak*, available online at: <https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/iraktayiz-3213507>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁴⁵ "Adriyatik'te Türk üssü", *Hürriyet*, available online at: www.hurriyet.com.tr/adriyatik-te-turk-ussu-39153966, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁴⁶ "Türk askeri başkent Doha'daki 'El Rayyan Üssü'nde", *Haber Turk*, June 08, 2017, available online at: <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1523169-turk-askeri-baskent-dohadaki-el-rayyan-ussunde>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁴⁷ Abdirahman Hussein, Orhan Coskun, "Turkey opens military base in Mogadishu to train Somali soldiers", *Reuters*, September 30, 2017, available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-turkey-military/turkey-opens-military-base-in-mogadishu-to-train-somali-soldiers-idUSKCN1C50JH?il=0>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁴⁸ "TIKA completes first studies on Sevakin Island", *TRT Haber*, 30.01.2013, available online at: <http://www.trthaber.com/haber/dunya/tika-sevakin-adasindaki-ilk-calismalarini-tamamladi-348297.html>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁴⁹ Murat Yeşiltaş, Merve Seren, Necdet Özçelik, *Operation Euphrates Shield Implementation and Lessons Learned*, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), Turkuvaz Haberleşme ve Yayıncılık A.Ş, İstanbul, 2017, p.11.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ ***, "Meeting with service personnel who took part in the anti-terrorist operation in Syria", *President of Russia website*, December 28, 2017, available online at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56516>, accessed on September 28, 2018.

- Officers and non-commissioned officers from ground and air forces have gained notable experience in real combat conditions⁵². During the operation, officers and non-commissioned officers born in battle were remarked. In the future, they may have a positive impact on the quality of the Turkish army's commanding body. In fact, the quality of the leadership is an extremely important element that can make the difference anytime on the battlefield⁵³.

- The army special forces, maroon berets, had the chance to gain combat experience and to perform clandestine and reconnaissance actions⁵⁴ behind enemy lines⁵⁵.

- The army had the opportunity to test its military capabilities. Thus, north-west of Syria became a testing ground where the Turkish army had the opportunity to test its military capabilities and combat strategies⁵⁶. Also, the army was able to test new attack⁵⁷ drones⁵⁸, anti-tank missiles, anti-personnel and incendiary missiles, all of which were laser-guided⁵⁹ and equipped with high-power thermobaric warhead⁶⁰. High-power fragmentation missiles were also tested against targets such as militants, small buildings, and vehicles⁶¹.

Conclusions

Following the Euphrates Shield operation, Turkey has managed to achieve all of its strategic goals set before the beginning of the mission. The Turkish army succeeded in conquering the strategic city of Al-Bab and thus prevented the occupation of the entire border section of northern Syria by Kurdish forces. Also, the terrorist threat from the border represented by Daesh has been eliminated for a length of 100 km⁶². However, the Turkish army operation also showed that:

⁵² *Ibidem*.

⁵³ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între natiuni. Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, translated by Oana Bosoi, Alina Dragolea, Mihai Zodian, Polirom, Iași, 2007, pp.163-164.

⁵⁴ "Cerablus operasyonunu Zekai Aksakalli yönetiyor!" *Sabah*, August 24, 2016, available online at: <https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2016/08/24/cerablus-operasyonunu-zekai-aksakalli-yonetiyo>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁵⁵ "El Bab Kuşatması Başladı! Bordo Bereliler Sızdı, Türk Jetleri Vurdu", *Haberler*, 14.11.2016, available online at: <https://www.haberler.com/el-bab-kusatmasi-basladi-8957950-haberi/>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁵⁶ "Meeting with service personnel who took part in the anti-terrorist operation in Syria", *President of Russia website*, December 28, 2017, available online at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56516>, accessed on 28.09.2018.

⁵⁷ "Milli gururumuz DAES'i vuruyor", *Akşam*, September 28, 2016, available online at: <https://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/milli-gururumuz-daesi-vuruyor/haber-546352>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁵⁸ Burak Ege Bekdil, "Turkey's First Armed Anka Drone To Be Delivered in 2017", *Defence News*, January 17, 2017, available online at: <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/01/17/turkeys-first-armed-anka-drone-to-be-delivered-in-2017/>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁵⁹ Bleda Kurtarcan, Barın Kayaoğlu, "Turkey is on the Front Lines against ISIS's Bomber Drones", *The National Interest*, October 16, 2016, available online at: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-the-front-lines-against-isiss-bomber-drones-18059?page=0%2C1>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁶⁰ David Donald, "Turkish missiles move forward [IDEX17D2]", *Jane's 360*, February 19, 2017, available online at: <https://www.janes.com/article/67921/turkish-missiles-move-forward-idex17d2>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁶¹ Burak Ege Bekdil, "Turkey's First Armed Anka Drone To Be Delivered in 2017", *Defence News*, January 17, 2017, available online at: <https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/01/17/turkeys-first-armed-anka-drone-to-be-delivered-in-2017/>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁶² Samuel Osborne, "Turkey ends Euphrates Shield military operation in Syria, PM says", *The Independent*, March 29, 2017, available online at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-syria-ends-euphrates-shield-military-operation-binali-yildirim-jarablus-isis-islamic-state-a7657156.html>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

- It is necessary to improve military mobility at tactical, operational and strategic level⁶³. This is evidenced by the fact that the Turkish army took six months to conquer a portion of only 2,000 square km, an area little larger than Ilfov, that was controlled by Daesh⁶⁴. The heavy advance of the army in a small territory controlled by irregular troops shows a need to improve the elements mentioned above.

- The army needs a better cooperation between tanks, light infantry and special troops⁶⁵. During the operation, the Turkish army lost twelve tanks due to the fact that they were not accompanied by a consistent number of infantry troops to form a defensive perimeter⁶⁶. This made them vulnerable to ambushes and significantly contributed to the loss of a large number of tanks⁶⁷. Also, the Turkish army tanks are over 30 years old and thus, they are technologically outdated to fight against a guerrilla army⁶⁸.

- Better training of the leadership and soldiers is needed. The heavy advance of the troops in the enemy territory can also be due to the poor preparation of the commanders and soldiers. This is also evidenced by the large number of losses registered by the Turkish army during the Euphrates Shield operation. The Turkish army lost 71 soldiers in six months of conflict⁶⁹ about as many soldiers as the Russian Federation lost in two years during its campaign in Syria⁷⁰. At the same time, a factor that could have affected the military's performance is the wave of purges from the land, air and naval forces, after which hundreds of officers and non-commissioned officers were arrested⁷¹.

- The army needs specialized units in urban warfare and units specialized in anti-tank combat⁷².

Although the Euphrates Shield operation ended, the Turkish army remained on Syrian territory. Moreover, Turkey launched a second operation in Syria in January 2018, after which it managed to occupy the Afrin region⁷³. Thus, the Turkish army controls an important area in north-west of Syria. On 4 October 2018, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the army would withdraw from Syria only after new elections will be held in Syria⁷⁴.

⁶³ Murat Yeşiltaş, Merve Seren, Necdet Özçelik, *op. cit.*, p.11.

⁶⁴ “Turkey ends 'Euphrates Shield' operation in Syria”, *Al-Jazeera*, March 30, 2017, available online at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/turkey-ends-euphrates-shield-operation-syria-170329211428970.html>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁶⁵ Murat Yeşiltaş, Merve Seren, Necdet Özçelik, *op. cit.*, p.11.

⁶⁶ Sebastien ROBLIN, “Germany’s Leopard 2 Tank Was Considered One of the Best (Until It Went to Syria)”, *The National Interest*, January 27, 2018, available online at: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/germanys-leopard-2-tank-was-considered-one-the-best-until-it-24234?page=0%2C1>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁹ “El Bab'dan acı haber: 2 şehit, 3 yaralı”, *Hürriyet*, February 24, 2017, available online at: www.hurriyet.com.tr/el-babdan-aci-haber-2-sehit-3-yarali-1-40376461, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁷⁰ “Russia lost 112 servicemen over three years of counter-terror operation in Syria – MP”, *TASS*, September 30, 2018, available online at: <http://tass.com/defense/1023714>, accessed on September 30, 2018.

⁷¹ “Turkey seeks arrest of 360 more military personnel in post-coup crackdown”, *Deutsche Welle*, November 29, 2017, available online at: <https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-seeks-arrest-of-360-more-military-personnel-in-post-coup-crackdown/a-41572619>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁷² Murat Yeşiltaş, Merve SEREN, Necdet ÖZÇELİK, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁷³ Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, “The Meaning of Operation Olive Branch”, *Foreign Affairs*, April 05, 2018, available online at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/05/the-meaning-of-operation-olive-branch/>, accessed on October 01, 2018.

⁷⁴ “Turkey will not leave Syria until Syrian people have an election, Erdogan says”, *Reuters*, 04.10.2018, available online at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey/turkey-will-not-leave-syria-until-syrian-people-have-an-election-erdogan-says-idUSKCN1ME24Y?utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social, accessed on October 05, 2018.




Figure no. 1: A map highlighting the situation on the ground in northwest Syria before the launching of the Euphrates Shield operation⁷⁵




Figure no. 2: A map highlighting the changes that took place on the ground following the intervention of the Turkish Army in Syria⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Source: "Syrian regime accused of barrel bombing Turkish-backed rebels", *TRT World*, October 26, 2016, available online at: <https://www.trtworld.com/mea/syrian-regime-accused-of-bombing-turkish-backed-rebels-214711>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

⁷⁶ Source: "Turkey urges air support for assault on IS-held Syria town", *Middle East Eye*, December 26, 2016, available online at: <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-accuses-killing-30-civilians-syria-1412993307>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

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FAILED STATES – CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY – GENERATING ACTORS IN THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: *The role of states in shaping the security environment, regional or global, is essential and defining. Wherever fragile societies, ethnic and religious rifts or an eroded sovereignty concept occur, conflict-generating processes affect the whole region.*

States with such problems often follow an easy-to-understand path: they are becoming weaker, fail to operate at optimal institutional parameters, and then collapse.

In these cases, the role of the international community through international organizations is crucial. They need to find short-term solutions towards the rapid humanitarian recovery, but also to identify those mechanisms that erode the state at the institutional level in order to be able to correct them.

Keywords: *violence, ethnically cleavages, insecurity, fragile societies, failed states, collapse.*

1. Failed state - outbreak of conflict on the international scene. Defining terms

The failed state concept has emerged on the international scene, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. They were perceived as safe places which terrorists used to plan and conduct international terrorist actions, thus proliferating the global message of terrorism. But these countries¹ have become sources of risk and instability not only in terms of terrorism, although this scourge has seen significant increases in the number of victims in conflict areas.

The transformations, sometimes painful, of states such as Libya, Mali, Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic or Yemen show that the resulting instability often leads to humanitarian disasters, civil wars, migrant refugees or homeless people and to illicit arms and drug trafficking. For example, in 2016, the South Sudanese refugee crisis was the fastest growing in the world, South Sudan and the neighboring countries being among the poorest in the region².

At the same time, dangerous neighborhoods are created that drag the entire region into conflict. The phenomenon of globalization determines the interdependence of all aspects of conflicts that have arisen in a certain area, bringing about effects which are difficult to quantify.

Some conflicts are endemic. In areas like the Middle East, history has seen only an endless series of cleavages, religiously or ethnically motivated.

What does "failed state" mean?

¹ According to the Global Terrorism Index 2017, the ten countries most impacted by terrorism in 2016 were: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, India Turkey, Libya. More at Global Terrorism Index 2017 Report of Institute for Economics and Peace, available at <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GlobalTerrorismInde2017.pdf> (accessed on 21 06 2018).

² UNHCR Report, *Global Trends-Forced displacement in 2016*, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf> (accessed on 19 May 2018).

There is no unanimously accepted definition of a failed state term in the literature.

One of the most quoted definitions of the failed state is that of William I. Zartman, who stated that “*a failed state is that state whose basic functions are no longer functioning at all*,”³. Thus, a collapsing state is a state that maintains some (or no) functional institutions that have lost their legitimacy and identity and which, most importantly, can no longer secure the security of their citizens in any way.

Robert H. Bates believes that a state is failing when “*state implosion*” takes place, and actually loses the “*monopoly over the means of force*.”⁴

On the other hand, Ignatieff implies a Weberian connotation of this term, defining it as “*the inability of the state to maintain the monopoly of internal means of violence*”⁵.

The eradication of state institutions substantially increases the risk of violent conflicts in different ways, as follows:

1. Accumulating the security dilemma for predominantly minority groups within the state.
2. Highlighting, within a weak state, elements of ethnic, nationalist, religious fundamentalism. The strong current of ethnic nationalism, emerging in various areas of Central Europe, the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, is very good in supporting the above mentioned.
3. The emergence of regional leaders who are ready to exploit the power vacuum that has emerged through the weakening of state institutions. This is how the so-called “war lords” appeared in Afghanistan, Liberia or Somalia.

The weakness of the institutions of a state is a structural cause for a violent conflict rather than the effect of such a conflict. At the same time, it should be noted that besides the political approach to the failed state concept, we can also talk about an economic approach that focuses less on the violent elements of the conflicts that arise from the collapse of state institutions, and more on the economic and social factors related to indicators such as growth, good governance, development.

Thus, the collapse of the economic and sustainable growth rate compared to other similar level states and its severity can be a relevant clue as to the failure of a state.

Leaders of various countries, under the protection of sovereignty within the borders and taking advantage of the variety of natural resources, had no interest in forming a group of local producers who should pay taxes to the state. Instead, they have increasingly requested the population to provide these services in order to cover the demand for products, thus attracting a popular sense of illegitimacy.

More and more leaders preferred to conserve all the resources that ought to have been intended for the payment of services, but in exchange for the payment of those who showed obedience and submissiveness. The various privatizations of goods and services and their targeting to a certain clientele led to the development of an informal network of shadow-acting agencies based on informal friendships.

However, these leaders have a vital interest in making people's lives uncertain and burdensome, thus encouraging more and more people desire to seek the protection of the powerful and to be exempted from these unbearable conditions.

³ William I. Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, London, 1995, p. 5.

⁴ Robert H. Bates, *State Failure*, Annual Review of Political Science, 2008, v. 11, p. 2.

⁵ Michael Ignatieff, *The American empire; The Burden*, NY Times, January 5, 2003, available online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/magazine/the-american-empire-the-burden.html> (accessed on 19 December 2017).

2. Leading factors to the weakening of a state

The accurate determination of the factors which weaken a state, of some reliable indicators able to effectively measure the fragility of a state which should provide elements of interpretation, predictability and consequences proved to be quite a difficult endeavor, even for the academics.

The factors that determine the fragility of a state by deteriorating the basic characteristics of its functioning may be: *economic factors* (poor or declining economic performance, lack of natural resources, low human development); *political factors* (weak governance, political instability, militarized institutions, precarious international relations); *social factors* (ethnic and social differences, corruption, divided population); *ecological and geographic factors* (low demographic and environmental factors, severe climatic conditions, poor geographical location – having tense relations with neighbors or being landlocked); *historical factors* – (a long history of armed conflicts, colonialism etc.).

The political factor is an important element as an indicator of fragility when it comes to the type and nature of the political regime. It is particularly relevant how governors are elected, as well as the limits of executive power and the degree of involvement of voters in the political process. Failure in such matters may lead to poor governance legitimacy and to a poor commitment to providing citizens with the public services they need. Anyway, weak states are often ruled by despots, elected or not.⁶

Regarding the geographical factor, it can be analyzed in conjunction with other factors, such as economic, social, historical factors. For example, the geographic location of a state (especially if it is open to the sea) and climatic conditions are closely related to economic performance. However, countries that do not benefit from these conditions have a much lower economic performance, a low index of attracting foreign investments and a higher cost of exporting their own products. At the same time, predominantly mountainous countries with hard land conditions, adverse climatic conditions and natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, etc.) may hinder economic growth.

We also believe that social indicators on the protection of human rights, social protection and poverty can be directly linked to the weakening of a state. Based on these indicators, weak states are those where government authority is outside the constitutional framework, with frequent violations of human security⁷, human rights, nonexistence of political legitimacy and very low poverty level of the people.

From an economic point of view, we can identify powerful states that are not willing to offer a high standard of living for their citizens, the political elite being more concerned with their own lives, and weak states focusing solely on the survival of their leading class. Depending on the governance capacity, the risk of internal conflict and neighboring states, natural resources and sovereignty, we can identify fragile, failed states, failed states in crisis.

However, reality in different countries shows us that the deterioration of these indicators in a particular state does not necessarily lead to the weakening of that state. In some cases, economic growth allows states to have sufficient liquidity so they can provide economic stability, but in other cases, economic growth can lead to an unfair and biased distribution of earnings, causing social conflicts and tensions. Thus, the economic downturn,

⁶ Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators”, *Washington Quarterly*, XXV, 2002, p. 4, available at <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/statefailureandstateweaknessinatimeofterror.pdf>, accessed on 25 August 2018.

⁷ Human security is the response for “different threats - persistent poverty, ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, international terrorism...”, More at United Nations, “Human Security in Theory and Practice”, available at <https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/PublicationsandProducts/HumanSecurityTools.pdf>, accessed on 29 August 2017.

in its own right, does not necessarily lead to the fragility of the state, but may, combined with other factors, create the premises of such a result.

Given all these factors that lead to a deterioration in the quality of life, we can say that the concept of security is a fundamental element in the recovery process of such states. Lack of sustainable development favors the emergence of conflict and the growth of criminal violence⁸. An integrated approach is needed to address the causes and consequences of fragile states.

The international order and security of citizens can be promoted simultaneously by improving democratic reforms, by supporting human rights values and norms, participating in the democratic process, transparency and accountability to citizens. Starting from the argument that these neoliberal values are the basis for a stable state-society relationship in any country, this approach demonstrates in a logical manner that the lack of these values leads to the fragility of a state.

3. The role of the international community in the recovery of failed states

As regards the role of the international community, we believe that the efforts of international actors are to prevent and respond to the failure of states, the greatest concern being the lack of security for citizens.

The International Commission on State Intervention and Sovereignty in its *"Responsibility to Protect"* report gives a comprehensive analysis to failed states, stating that *"these failed states are likely to generate situations that the international community simply cannot ignore."*⁹. At least in the last decades, international organizations, and in particular the United Nations, have responded to all these challenges created by the violent conflicts in these failed states to identify those security-generating processes.

Given the serious consequences of the countries in difficulty, the international community has an increased interest in preventing their collapse. To strengthen a weak state in order not to collapse represents, at least at the theoretical level, a better solution than to bring it to life after it collapsed. The causes of state failure have to be identified and risk analysis, early warning methods, as well as capacity-building strategies at state level should be implemented.

For example, modeling the African countries whose political culture fails to conform to the nation-state typology, it is necessary for the international community to continue actively engaging in search for alternatives within the African peoples. Creating a fair pattern for the suffering peoples would be possible by reconfiguring a stable national state with a transparent and legitimate monopoly on leverages that impose force of its citizens. Without the basic institutions of the state, one cannot speak of a democratic state.

Another approach is the assistance provided by the international community to strengthen and develop the civic democratic body through support for non-governmental actors and other civic institutions. We are talking about failing or almost failing states where the voice of civil society has been suppressed, and its revitalization is necessary to impose deep reforms in key areas such as education, health, the economy, etc., and also to encourage as much as possible many citizens to participate in the political process.

Due to the corruption of corrupt governments in directing funds coming as external aid to their own pockets, there has been a trend since the end of the Cold War by international bodies to channel these funds to the private sector to support targeted investments, and this trend is growing. However, much of these external aids also reach governments, but they cannot do much without a commitment of these governments to sustainable development. All these elements lead to skepticism in the fair and well-grounded allocation of these external

⁸ Robert I. Rotberg, *art. cit.*, p. 6.

⁹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *Report on Responsibility to protect*, December 2001, p. 43, available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS_Report.pdf, accessed at 20 August 2017.

aids, poverty and lack of resources being identified as elements leading to the collapse of these states.

That is why any foreign aid can be effective if it is linked to fiscal policy, good governance, land reform, agriculture, etc. All developed countries that are actively involved in these campaigns to support underperforming countries insist on the need to strengthen legal regulations, public institutions, anti-corruption, and to promote free access to information and justice for the public. Still there are states that are not in a hurry to allow outsiders to take action to monitor how aid is being used. That is why designating the staff of international organizations to work directly with government officials in troubled countries, as well as their access to management actions, is going to be rather difficult in many unstable areas of the globe.

The international community, through international organisation, as the United Nations, has a vital interest in developing strategies and instruments to prevent the collapse of states and there are a series of challenges, mainly related to the erosion of the sovereignty concept of the state in danger, and to the lack of political will of other states to act at an early stage.

Article 2 of the UN Charter states that “the United Nations will not intervene in matters pertaining to the domestic jurisdiction of each State”¹⁰. Chapter 7 of the Charter provides, as an exception to the principle of non-interference, coercive measures including military intervention where the Security Council determines the existence of a threat to international security and international peace¹¹. At the same time, it must be said that the international community's response to such crises was often of a humanitarian nature, with high costs, rather than political solutions to solve the institutional collapse.

As Steve Ratner notes in his paper *Saving Failed States*: “Even if the international community were to continue its current ad hoc approach, it would find itself facing mounting costs—for peacekeeping troops, humanitarian aid, and coping with refugees”.¹²

The information provided by the Member States is very useful in making short and medium term forecasts and international organizations that watch for international peace and security are endemically related to them, not having their own information collection system or at least a data fusion center to allow for detailed and real-time analyses. Secondly, it must be stressed that the more eroded the institutions of the state are, the more difficult it is to actually intervene through international organizations without viable diplomatic and political channels (see Libya's case). Although the situation is simpler from a humanitarian point of view, it is clear that diplomatic or economic pressure cannot be applied when we have a vacuum instead of the rule of law.

Conclusions

With regard to the particularly complex process of the failure of states, some conclusions can be drawn.

The first is that state institutions remain the engine of every state, whether we are talking about security, government or economic institutions.

Second, given the outbreak of instability and conflict caused by a failed state, the international community needs to intervene and strengthen such states to prevent them from failure, even if there is not always political consensus on the part of international community. The events of 11 September 2001 and the UN's subsequent response to the actions in

¹⁰ *Carta Națiunilor Unite*, din 26 iunie 1945, publicată în Monitorul Oficial din 26 iunie 1945, p. 3 (UN Charter, 1945), available at http://www.anr.gov.ro/docs/legislatie/internationala/Carta_Organizatiei_Natiunilor_Unite_ONU_.pdf, accessed on 20 January 2018.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

¹² Gerald B. Helman, Steven R. Ratner, *Saving Failed States*, originally published in the Winter 1992-1993 issue of *Foreign Policy*, p. 10.

Afghanistan showed that when there is security- related interest from actors on the international scene, there is also the necessary consensus to intervene in such states and to redress them.

Another conclusion that emerges indicates that an intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state, in order to consolidate the democratic process on the basis of early elements indicating certain slippages, is a controversial approach. Punitive solutions, such as sanctions, or even more intrusive, such as temporary administration or “trusteeship”, are often counterproductive and do not produce palpable results.

History has repeatedly shown us that traditional areas exposed to conflict states (North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans) fail to adopt the Weberian state matrix found in Western Europe. The roots of African peoples, for example, the period of colonialism, ethnic mosaics, tribal relationships, are all elements that need to be considered in order to articulate long-term viable solutions.

Can these failed states find solutions within themselves by identifying those leaders and mechanisms that are needed to redress and enroll on a welfare and security trajectory?

Since the end of the Cold War and implicitly the main threat to international order, the problem of failed states is probably the greatest threat to international stability and long-term development. After the independence of the African states in the 1960s and 1970s, the vacuum of power and authority created failed to be removed by the enthusiasm created among the populations or by charismatics, and later by the bloody African leaders who emerged at the helm of the peoples.

So the international community was forced by the realities of the moment to consider the problem of the states without solution, given that all these failed states produced and exported interethnic, religious, tribal conflicts. Similarly, after September 11, 2001, a unanimously accepted view was that weak states have a high potential for cross-border threats: terrorism, arms proliferation, organized crime, armed attacks, diseases, civil conflicts. “As state structures collapse and borders become more porous, these countries often export violence as well as refugees, political instability and economic dislocation to states in their vicinity”¹³.

Reconstruction of a state, however, is not possible in a short time. There is a need for a process, mainly political, long and difficult. For any social order that is not adapted to this globalized world and to any state where justice is ineffective and totally controlled by the leaders, change must come as slowly as possible and be multifaceted, involving civil society, citizens as well as factors that can bring about change, even if international actors can contribute with assistance and expertise.

We believe that only a holistic approach to the actions taking place in these conflict zones can begin a process of thorough analysis of the failing factors and thus can generate sustainable solutions in the medium and long term. This process will be an effective and sustainable one when respecting the context and elements of individualization of society, be it social, economic, political or religious.

¹³ Stewart Patrick, *Weak States and Global threats: Fact or Fiction*, Washington Quarterly, 2006, p. 44.

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TERRORISM AS THE OPPOSITE OF CIVILIZATION AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

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Abstract: *The terrorist attacks from 9/11 marked the return of the term barbarian conceived in civilizational terms and that of the sharp divide between barbarians and civilization in the forefront of political and international relations scholarly discourse with terrorists being portrayed as the new barbarians. This paper explores in its first section how journalists, academics and politicians linked terrorists with barbarians in the aftermath of the bringing down of the Twin Towers and to this purpose it indicates the connections then established between the Barbary War fought by the US at the beginning of the 19th century and the War on Terror launched by George Bush, pointing out how the linking of these two events was grounded on the evaluative use of the term civilization. In the second section it is described the present day standard of civilization by some landmarks of the beginning of the scholarly reflection of it and by identifying and specifying its constituents. The last section of the paper provides an explanation for the association made between terrorists and barbarians, arguing that some constituents of the contemporary standard of civilization operates as the assumption underpinning it.*

Keywords: *terrorism, standard of civilization, barbarians, failed states, human rights.*

Introduction

The scourge of terrorism that the present day world is confronted with, marks the lives of ordinary people and the fight against it is a priority on the agenda of national authorities and international organizations. An analysis of the contemporary discourse on terrorism, especially of the one emerging after the 9/11 attacks, reveals that terrorists are depicted as barbarians fighting to destroy the civilized states and such a reading of their aims and nature recalls the concept of the standard of civilization which fell into disrepute shortly after the end of the World War II. However, this standard has to be revisited and the content attributed to it after the Cold War should be considered in order to explain the perspective on terrorists that is widely shared today. For this purpose, in the first section it is proved that today terrorists are portrayed as barbarians by journalists, scholars, politicians and artists and that failed states are now considered as the land of terrorists. Moreover, the section this paper begins with shows that, especially after the 9/11 attacks, the word *barbarian* used in connection with terrorists does not convey only the ordinary idea of an extremely cruel and merciless person, which does not entail the evaluative meaning of *civilization*, but also the idea of a person acting against the established norms of civilised world and thus of someone holding an inferior civilization¹ status which brings to the fore the culturally charged meaning of *barbarian* which is grounded on the so called standard of civilization that first emerged in the XIX century as a symbol of Western world superiority; this latter meaning of *barbarian* is

¹ This idea we do not agree with, as civilizations are not inferior or superior but different.

necessarily correlated with an evaluative meaning attributed to *civilization*. The argument in support of this reading of the link between terrorists and barbarians is further developed in the second section which is devoted to the description of the new standard of civilization that emerged after the end of the Cold War and which could be said to encapsulate, albeit in a more diluted way, the idea of civilizational superiority which this time is considered to be almost universally shared with the whole world, except some areas lacking political authority (the failed states), adhering to it.

The last section elaborates on the final piece of the argument developed in this paper by identifying the characteristics attributed to terrorism in official documents of the United Nations and of the European Union and by comparing them with the constituents of the current standard of civilization in order to prove that terrorists severely violate this standard and consequently that they are conceived as barbarians in civilizational terms.

1. Terrorists as the barbarians of today

After the end of the Cold War, the discourse of civilization in international relations emerged with a great force as a result of the new world that was supposed to arise after the defeat of communism being understood in civilizational terms, namely either as a harmonization of different civilizations under the impact of globalization which provides opportunities for the Western values to be promoted worldwide, or as a conflict among civilizations which fuels their separation and which thus prevents the Western civilization from being accepted by the whole world; one of the most influential theoreticians of the civilizational harmonisation was Francis Fukuyama, while Samuel Huntington provided a widely read argument for the disharmony among civilizations². However, it is to be mentioned that Huntington is not concerned with the clash between civilization and barbarity, but between various civilizations so that he does not attribute to the concept of civilization, that he uses in the plural form, an evaluative meaning encapsulating a sense of superiority³; Huntington operates with the non-evaluative definition of civilization provided by Adda Bruemmer Bozeman which reads that it represents the “values, norm, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance”⁴.

According to Huntington, the evaluative and the non-evaluative meanings of civilization could logically coexist with the effect that some civilizations unlike others are considered civilized⁵. The evaluative meaning of civilization underpins the idea of the standard of civilization, which, from the of the 19th century and up to the aftermath of the World War II, operated as a political and legal criterion for deciding membership in international society and thus for separating the civilized from barbarian states⁶; this standard embodied Western values and was the mark of their superiority. After 1945, the term

² David P. Fidler, “The Return of the Standard of Civilization”, *Chicago Journal of international law*, no. 2(1), The University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, 2001, pp. 138-139.

³ Samuel January P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1996, p. 41.

⁴ Adda Bruemmer Bozeman, *Civilizations under Stress: Reflections on Cultural Borrowing and Survival*, p. 1 (*apud*: Samuel Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 41).

⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁶ Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 14-15; Alexis Heraclides, Ada Dialla, *Humanitarian Intervention in the long Nineteenth Century*, Manchester University Press, England, 2015, p. 33.

standard of civilization was removed from the field of both international law and international relations with the effect that its correlative term *barbarian* equally felt into disuse⁷.

The post-Cold War period also marked the re-emergence in the public discourse, be it political, historical, cultural, or journalistic, as well as in the language of ordinary people of the term *barbarian* and of its word family (e.g. *barbarism*, *barbaric*) but also of the antinomy barbarism-civilization which is used in relation with failed states and terrorism⁸ and which retains the evaluative meaning attributed to it prior to 1945. The attacks from 11/09/2001 and the ensuing war on terror proclaimed by the Bush administration gave prominence to the civilized-barbarian divide with George Bush Jr. designating terrorists as barbarians and maintaining that the international coalition build-up against their facilities from Afghanistan brought together the civilized world⁹. Moreover, the US National Security Strategy from 2002 characterised terrorists as being the “enemies of civilization”, Colin Powell, then the US Secretary of State, argued that the war against terrorism was aiming at those who attack the civilization and Rudy Giuliani who at the time of the attacks was the mayor of New York, established an opposition between civilization and terrorists by saying that “you’re either with civilization or the terrorists”¹⁰; in the same vein but on the other side of the Atlantic, Gerhard Schröder, the German Chancellor back in 2001, called the terrorist attacks a “declaration of war against all of civilization”¹¹. These statements could be read as operating with an evaluative meaning of *civilization* and thus of going beyond the meaning of *barbarian* as just an unusual cruel person.

If in the wake of these attacks, American journalist first associated them with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour from 1941 and the subsequent war against Japan, but shortly afterwards the analogy with the war waged by the US at the beginning of the 19th century against the barbarian pirates from the Northern Africa Muslim states of Algiers, Tripoli, Morocco and Tunis (the so called Barbary/Tripolitan War from 1801-1805) gained currency among both journalists and scholars and grounded the connection between barbarians and terrorists¹². For example, the journalist Chris Mooney considered the terrorists from Al Qaeda as a perfect equivalent of the barbarian pirates and argued that, similar to those terrorists, they held fundamentalist Islamic beliefs; moreover, for Mooney, the Barbary War, like the war fought by the US against Afghanistan, was a war against terrorism¹³. Another journalist, Richard Leiby, wrote for *The Washington Post* that the war against terrorism launched by the Bush administration after 09/11, albeit presented as a totally new type of war never to be previously fought, had been already waged by the US against barbarian pirates 200 years before¹⁴. Leiby pointed out that at the time the Barbary War took place, terrorists were called pirates and he identified some important similarities between those targeted by the war against terror and those targeted by the Barbary War: perpetration of atrocities against

⁷ See Barry Buzan, *The Standard of Civilization as an English School Concept*, Millennium Journal of International Studies, Sage Journals, 2014, vol. 43, no. 3, 2014, p. 577, Alexis Heraclides, Ada Diaila, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 38 and David P. Fidler, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

⁸ Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 592 and Maria Boletsi, *Barbarism and its Discontents*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2013, p.1.

⁹ Mark B. Salter, *Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations*, Pluto Press, London, 2002, p. 163.

¹⁰ Mark Neocleous, “The Police of Civilization: the War on Terror as Civilizing Offensive”, *International Political Sociology*, no. 5, Willey Online Library, 2011, p. 144.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² Paul A. Silverstein, “The New Barbarians. Piracy and Terrorism on the North African Frontier”, *The New Centennial Review*, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, p. 180.

¹³ Chris Mooney, *The Barbary Analogy*, The American Prospect, 19 December 2001, available online at: <http://prospect.org/article/barbary-analogy>, accessed on September 13, 2018. See also: Paul A. Silverstein, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

¹⁴ Richard Leiby, *Terrorists by Another Name: the Barbary Pirates*, The Washington Post, 15 October 2001, available online at: <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-484839.html>, accessed on September 13, 2018.

innocent American people, fanaticism, hostility towards modern civilization and Christianity, adherence to the idea of imposing Islam by force, the use of means designed to instil terror and the lack of qualities indispensable for someone to be ranked among human beings.

One could also cite the suggestive title of an article from 2002 by the historian Thomas Jewett: *Terrorism in Early America. The U.S. Wages War against the Barbary States to End International Blackmail and Terrorism*¹⁵. Also writing from a scholarly perspective, K. Lee Lerner and Brenda Wilmoth Learner maintain that the first war in the history of the United States, the Barbary War, was a war fought against terrorism which implies that for the two mentioned authors the barbarian pirates have to be regarded as terrorists¹⁶. It follows that the above mentioned authors do not refer to the Barbary States only or primarily as to a geographic region, but also and especially as to an area where there was an inferior civilization. Therefore, by connecting the Barbary Wars with the 9/11 attacks, they imply that the terrorists who conducted them shared beliefs which ran counter to the central values of the civilized world and that they came from a geographic area that was similar the Barbary States from the point of view of the civilization existing therein.

However, the reading of the Barbarian War as a war against terrorism is considered by Mikkel Thorup to be generally predominantly political and less analytical and consequently he suggests a more critical consideration of this connection on grounds that it is partly marred by anachronism¹⁷. His criticism refers to the pirates from the Barbary states being often presented as the only ones to practice piracy in the Mediterranean Sea, to the usually overstatement of their religious motivation and it also refers to the strong blaming of European states which agreed to pay tribute to the Barbary states in exchange for protection against piracy. It is to be emphasised that Thorup's objections correct and do not repeal the link between barbarity and terrorism which means that it can be considered viable within certain limits.

The connection between terrorism and barbarity was also made in the world of cinema. The Canadian director Denys Arcand won in 2004 two prestigious awards, Oscar and César, for the movie *Les Invasions Barbares* where it is developed an analogy between a disease that destroys the human organism and the invasion of the United States by the new barbarians symbolised by the terrorists who attacked the Twin Towers¹⁸. In 2013, *The Hurt Locker*, a movie by Kathryn Bigelow that won the Oscar in 2010, portrayed as barbarians the Iraqi fighting against the American forces deployed in Iraq after the overturn of Saddam Hussein¹⁹. Both movies depict the terrorists as the enemies of the Western civilization which is conceived in evaluative terms so that by calling them barbarians it is expressed the idea that they symbolize a different and less valuable civilization²⁰.

June Edmunds argues that, following the terrorist attacks from 09/11, the Muslims from Western states have been increasingly associated with barbarians threatening civilization and this image echoed colonial ideas²¹.

Today, as back in the 19th century, it is possible to talk about barbarian states which presently are the so called failed states because they are closely associated with terrorism, a

¹⁵ See Mikkel Thorup, *An Intellectual History of Terror: War, Violence and the State*, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 137-138.

¹⁶ K. Lee Lerner and Brenda Wilmoth Learner, *Terrorism. Essential Primary Sources* (apud: Mikkel Thorup, *op. cit.*, p. 137).

¹⁷ Mikkel Thorup, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.

¹⁸ June Edmunds, "The `New` Barbarians: Governmentality, Securitization and Islam in Western Europe", *Contemporary Islam*, vol. 6, Harvard, 2012, pp. 67-68.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 68.

²⁰ This idea we do not agree with, as civilizations cannot be categorized as more or less valuable, but different and thus incompatibilities and conflict can rise from this difference.

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 73, 82.

connection that was firmly established especially after the attacks from 09/11. Thus, in 2006, the *Strategy for Winning the War on Terror* which was released by The National Security Council, the primary source of expertise and advice on security issues for the President of the United States, characterises failed states as being “safe havens for terrorists”²². This assessment was confirmed by a pioneering empirical test on 197 countries covering the period from 1973 to 2003 that was conducted two years later by James A. Pizza who proved that failed states attract transnational terrorist groups and provide a favourable environment for their development²³.

2. The new standard of civilization

As Barry Buzan remarks, the end of the Cold War led to the resurgence of the word family for *civilization* and *barbarity* but this failed yet to be accompanied by the re-emergence in the political vocabulary and in the scholarly analysis of international relations of the term *standard of civilization* which underpins the civilized-barbarian opposition²⁴; however, according to Buzan, the substance of the standard of civilization is captured today by terms like *conditionality*, *good governance* and *development* which do not convey the idea of barbarity²⁵.

Buzan alongside other scholars endeavoured to reintroduce the standard of civilization in the academic language and for this purpose they attempted to identify the elements of the standard of civilization peculiar to the configuration of the post-Cold War international relations which is usually referred to as the new standard of civilization in order to distinguish it from the one that operated prior to 1945. Given that the portrayal of terrorists as barbarians is grounded on the new standard of civilization, the latter has to be considered in order to understand which of its constituents underpins this perspective on terrorists.

Already in 1993, Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky argued that the world was divided into what they called “zones of peace, wealth, and democracy” and “zones of turmoil, war, and development” and maintained that the former ones encompassed Western Europe, United States, Canada as well as Japan, Australia and New Zealand while the rest of the world, including the states from the former Soviet Union and those from South-eastern and Eastern Europe which had been under Soviet influence, belonged to the second type of zones²⁶. Singer and Wildavsky were of the opinion that in around one hundred years’ time the majority of states will enjoy peace, democracy and wealth and thus that the current limits of the first type of zones will be extended²⁷. For Benedict Kingsbury, this enlargement process is regulated by a standard of civilization that any state must comply with in order for being admitted therein and which underpins up to a certain point the hierarchical world order from the end of the 19th century that gave rise to the civilized-barbarian divide with the civilized states being those ones that enjoy peace, democracy and wealth²⁸.

Jack Donnelly, writing in 1998, argued that human rights are close of being included within the contemporary standard of civilization alongside sovereign equality and self-

²² The National Security Council cited in James A. Pizza, *Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?*, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 52, Wiley Online Library, 2008, p. 469.

²³ James A. Pizza, *art. cit.*

²⁴ Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 592.

²⁵ Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

²⁶ Max Singer, Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil*, Chatham House Publishers, New York, 1993, p. 3.

²⁷ *Ibidem.*

²⁸ Benedict Kingsbury, “Sovereignty and Inequality”, in: Andrew Hurrell, Ngaire Woods, (eds.), *Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 90-91.

determination and he considered that this development is a beneficial one because it has the potential of ending and preventing the forms of barbarity, such as the Cambodian genocide, that the world witnessed during the Cold War²⁹. Donnelly identified the prohibition against genocide, considered an extreme form of barbarity, as the key element of the emerging constituent of the standard of civilization and he grounds his view on the international reactions to the tragic events from Bosnia and Rwanda³⁰.

A few years later, in 2001, David P. Fidler maintained that human rights had become part of the standard of civilization and he considered that human rights were very well represented within human rights law by the political and civil rights which applied for all human beings and which expresses a relationship between the individual and the state³¹. In 2014, Barry Buzan had no doubt that human rights had become a constituent of the new standard of civilization and he argued that the prominent role played by them after the end of the Cold War results from them providing a justification for the right of non-intervention to be set aside in case of those states were considered to violate severely these rights³².

However, both Fidler and Buzan are of the opinion that, apart from human rights, the new standard of civilization includes other constituents as well. Fidler maintains that the new standard of civilization encompasses also the relationship between the market and the state, that between states and that between states and the international society³³. The first relationship includes international trade law relating to the liberalization of trade with both goods and services and also to provision of protection for the rights associated with intellectual property, as well as international law against corruption and the structural adjustment policies promoted by international financial institutions. The second relationship contains international law norms which link the legitimacy of a government with it being a democratic one, while the last type of relationship covers the interests and values defining international society.

As for Buzan, he identifies four more components of the contemporary standard of civilization, namely democracy, capitalism, development, and environmental stewardship³⁴. With respect to democracy he argues that it is the only form of government accepted today by a large number of international intergovernmental organizations and it was an important tool used by the Western states, particularly by the United States, during the Cold War against the Soviet Union and, even after its demise, it remained very important for them because it supports an international hierarchy which benefits them and because they conceive it as indispensable for assuring the respect of human rights and for achieving international peace³⁵. Buzan argues that there is a broad agreement among a large number of international intergovernmental organizations that democracy necessary presupposes multiparty elections held on a regular basis and the existence of voting procedures that are free and fair ones and he indicates that civilization is more and more identified with democracy and barbarity with non-democratic political regimes.

Buzan mentions that capitalism is a constituent of the standard of civilization that is imposed by international financial institutions dominated by Western states (e.g. International Monetary Fund, World Bank) that prescribe economic policies to developing countries and that it is used to rank states as more or less economically developed³⁶. Buzan indicates that

²⁹ Jack Donnelly, *Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?*, International Affairs, vol. 74, no. 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, pp. 15-16.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 16-17.

³¹ David P. Fidler, *art. cit.*, pp. 148, 150.

³² Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, pp. 587-588.

³³ David P. Fidler, *op. cit.*, pp. 148, 150.

³⁴ Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 586.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 588-589.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 589.

the relationship between capitalism and both democracy and human rights is not straightforward; there are arguments supporting the view that capitalism promotes human rights and democracy, but there are also arguments proving that capitalism favours the violation of human rights and that it is compatible with authoritarian regimes³⁷.

With respect to development, Buzan indicates that it brings together the obligation of the rich countries to provide assistance for the less developed countries and the right of the latter to receive this assistance; development is conceived today as an indispensable condition for people enjoying both some basic human rights and human security³⁸.

If human rights, democracy, capitalism and development are considered by Buzan to be fully flagged components of the standard of civilization, the environmental stewardship is for him only a potential such component³⁹. Buzan argues that environmental stewardship is not yet part of the contemporary standard of civilization because it was formulated quite recently, that is in the 1970s, because it entails profound changes of the global economy, because it generates deep controversies regarding the adequate means for achieving it, because it is insufficiently developed in the field of political philosophy and also as a result of the magnitude of the negative impact that human activity has on environment still failing to be widely recognized⁴⁰. However, according to Buzan, the gradual incorporation of environmental stewardship into international law and it becoming a topic of important international conferences are contributing factors that, in case of a serious environmental crisis, will most certainly turn environmental stewardship into a constituent of the standard of civilization with the consequence that those states which will violate it will be labelled barbarian while those ones complying to it will be praised as civilized⁴¹.

Based on how Jack Donnelly, Barry Buzan and David P. Fidler describe the new standard of civilization it is possible to maintain that it encompasses human rights, democracy, capitalism and development and, moreover, that it is not confined to the values shared only among the Western world, as it was the case with its predecessor from the XIX century, but that it is made up of virtually universally shared values.

3. Explaining the portrayal of terrorists as barbarians

Based on the description of the new standard of civilization provided above, it is to be decided which of its constituents are violated by acts of terrorism and thus justify the labelling of terrorists as barbarians. A possible starting point of this investigation is *The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action*⁴² from 1993 which specified that the purpose of terrorist acts is to destroy human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy.

Resolution 1997/42 Human rights and terrorism that was adopted by the Commission on Human Rights on 11 April 1997⁴³ in which the acts of terrorism are characterised as aiming at destroying the human rights, the fundamental freedoms, and democracy and equally as negatively affecting the development of states in the sphere of economy and society (paragraph 2) which are all included in the new standard of civilization.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 590.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 591.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 590.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 591.

⁴² United Nations, World Conference on Human Rights, *Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action*, paragraph 17, Vienna, 23 June 1993.

⁴³ Commission on Human Rights, *Resolution 1997/42 Human rights and terrorism*, 11 April 1997, available online at: <http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/cn4/res/ecn4res199742.htm>, accessed on September 2, 2018.

Three years later, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 54/164 bearing the title of *Human Rights and Terrorism*⁴⁴ in which it assumed the description of the acts of terrorism contained in *Resolution 1997/42* of the Commission of Human Rights (paragraph 3).

The same year, the European Parliament adopted the resolution *Human Rights in the European Union*⁴⁵ in which it is mentioned that terrorism represents a violation of human rights.

In 2001, prior to the terrorist attacks from 9/11, it was released a report elaborated at the request of the Commission on Human Rights by the special rapporteur Kalliopi K. Koufa which was entitled *Terrorism and Human Rights*⁴⁶. Here it is maintained that the terrorist acts could affect any human rights thus having a severe impact on them (paragraph 102). Based on this assessment and on a review of other relevant documents adopted by various international organizations, Sabine von Schorlemer concludes that it is possible to maintain that there is a broad agreement at international level on the idea that “terrorism aims at the denial of human rights”⁴⁷.

The General Assembly of the United Nations continues to hold the perspective on terrorism that it had put forward in its Resolution 54/164 as proved by Resolution 60/288 entitled *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* adopted on 8 September 2006⁴⁸ and by the latest review of this strategy that it conducted in 2018 and which took the form of Resolution 72/284 *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review*⁴⁹.

By comparing the understanding of terrorism by the Human Rights Commission, the European Parliament, and the General Assembly of the United Nations with the new standard of civilization, one remarks that it could be linked with some constituents of this standard, namely human rights, democracy and development which further on proves that the term *barbarian* as associated with terrorists is correlated with the evaluative meaning of the term *civilization*, between these two terms being established a clear opposition which is operated in civilizational terms. It equally follows that this opposition grounds the description of failed states as barbarian states that is as non-civilized states.

Conclusion

The findings of this paper enable one to maintain that terrorists are considered barbarians today because they act contrary to the western standard of civilization that is currently more or less explicitly used to assess them and the failed states they are in control of. Bringing to the fore the intellectual assumptions that underpin the process of turning the terrorists into the modern barbarians contributes to the understanding of its deep cultural roots and of the characteristics and the boundaries of the present day international society and stimulates the academic preoccupation for the study of the successive transformations in both content and scope that the standard of civilization went through. Moreover, the argument

⁴⁴ United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/54/164 *Human Rights and Terrorism*, 24 February 2000.

⁴⁵ European Parliament, *Human Rights in the European Union*, paragraph 41, 16 March 2000.

⁴⁶ E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31, *Terrorism and Human Rights. Progress report prepared by Ms. Kalliopi K. Koufa, Special Rapporteur*, UN Commission on Human Rights, 27 June 2001, available online at: http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/demo/Koufa_TerrorismHumanRights.pdf accessed on November 02, 2018.

⁴⁷ Sabine von Schorlemer, *Human Rights: Substantive and Institutional Implications of the War against Terrorism*, p. 269.

⁴⁸ United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/RES/60/288, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, preambular paragraph 6, 8 September 2006.

⁴⁹ United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/Res/72/284, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review*, preamble paragraph 13, 26 June 2018.

developed herein allows for the ordinary meaning of *barbarian*, which refers to someone behaving extremely cruel and which is not grounded on an evaluative meaning of *civilization*, to be told apart from its civilizational meaning which designates a person who does not belong to the civilized world as it is defined today and thus which is built upon an evaluative meaning of *civilization*.

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EU APPROACH TO COUNTERING DISINFORMATION AND FAKE NEWS

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Abstract: *Fake news, disinformation and propaganda are not new phenomena but, in the last years, they have acquired an enhanced dimension, in the context of the information war between Russia and the West. That is why the present paper investigates the way in which international organisations, and in particular, the EU, approach these phenomena. In this respect, we are going to overview the steps taken in this direction and analyse the Report of the Independent High level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation published in March 2018, under the aegis of European Commission.*

Keywords: *fake news; disinformation; propaganda; freedom of expression; social media; media literacy; online platforms.*

1. General context

Information security has always played a prominent role, but especially so in the past few years. It has been noted that «Russia has long been a powerhouse of information warfare, and it's "something we haven't gotten our heads around" in the West.»¹ Since 2014, it was acknowledged that the Russian Federation has been waging a disinformation war with the Occident. In this way, Russia makes use of weaponized information, as opposed to most Western countries' open and non-militarized information space. The Russian Federation has two major state-run news and broadcast agencies: ITAR-TASS or simply TASS and *Rossiya Segodnya* (in English *Russia Today*) that launched *Sputnik* multimedia platform, replacing former *RIA Novosti* agency and *Voice of Russia* radio, which continue to be known internally under the old name². Their aim is to promote Russian Federation's position on international politics, to influence the public opinion in third countries and to discredit international organisations.

As a consequence, it was decided at the level of international organisations that measures are needed to counter fake news, disinformation and propaganda and to protect freedom of expression, journalists and workers in the media and, in this regard, there were elaborated programmatic documents.

In March 2017, four international entities, among which UN and OSCE, elaborated a five page *Joint Declaration on Fake News, Disinformation and Propaganda*³.

¹ Ken Geers, *apud* Alex Lockie, *How the US and Russia are fighting an information war – and why the US is losing*, Mar. 14, 2017, <https://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-us-and-russia-are-fighting-an-information-war-2017-3>.

² ***, *Media of Russia*, Wikipedia Encyclopedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_of_Russia#News_agencies.

³ The four parties are United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and

The Council of Europe has elaborated a number of dedicated documents, namely the *Recommendation on Internet freedom in 2015*, a *Draft recommendation on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership* in 2016 and in the same year, a 350 pages long publication comprising all *Recommendations and Declarations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in the field of media and information society* ever delivered⁴.

In turn, NATO Parliamentary Assembly issued in October 2017 a Report entitled *The Social Media Revolution: Political and Security Implications*⁵.

The EU, more specifically the European Commission, published in March 2018 the Report of the Independent High level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation entitled *A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation*⁶. The current research is focused on this particular document.

1.1. Landmarks of EU actions meant to counter disinformation and fake news

In this chapter we overview, in short, the steps⁷ taken at EU level in the past four years in regard to acknowledging and countering the fake news and disinformation phenomena.

In March 2015, European Council launched the EEAS East Strategic Communication Task Force with a view “to identify, analyse, and raise awareness of Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns on a daily basis”⁸.

About one year later, in May 2016, there was released a Presentation of the Communication on Online Platforms, which encouraged the industry to increase voluntary endeavours to find out and deal with practices such as fake or misleading online reviews.

Towards the end of the following year, mid November 2017, the Commission launched a public consultation on fake news and online disinformation and decided to establish a High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) whose mission was to give advice on policy initiatives to counter fake news and disinformation spread online. There were selected 39 members⁹ with different backgrounds, representing academics, online platforms, news media and civil society organisations. The HLEG held its first meeting at the beginning of this year (January 2018).

Access to Information, *Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda*, <https://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true>.

⁴ Recommendation CM/Rec (2016) of the Committee of Ministers to member states on Internet Freedom (13 April 2015) (calling on member states to create an enabling environment for Internet freedom, including inter alia the provision of media and digital literacy programmes), https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016806415fa; Draft Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on media pluralism and the transparency of media ownership, MSI-MED (2016) 09rev6 (Sixth revised draft as of 7 December 2017) (reaffirming and supplementing existing COE standards on media pluralism and media transparency), <http://rm.coe.int/draft-recommendation-on-media-pluralism-and-transparency-of-media-owne/168077351e>; Media and Internet Division, Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Council of Europe, *Recommendations and Declarations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in the field of media and information society, 2016*, <https://rm.coe.int/1680645b44>.

⁵ Jane Cordy, *Report: The Social Media Revolution: Political and Security Implications*, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, October 2017, <https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2017-11/2017%20-%20158%20CDSGD%2017%20E%20bis%20-%20SOCIAL%20MEDIA%20REVOLUTION%20-%20CORDY%20REPORT.pdf>.

⁶ European Commission, *Report of the Independent High level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation*, March 2018, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation>.

⁷ The data were taken from European Commission Press release: *Next steps against fake news: Commission sets up High-Level Expert Group and launches public consultation*, Brussels, 13 November 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-4481_en.htm, accessed on August 25, 2018.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ The list is available here: <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/experts-appointed-high-level-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation>. A.N. Note that Romania is represented by PhD. Prof. Alina Bargoanu, National School of Political Science and Public Administration (NSPSPA).

After two months (in March) they delivered a five chapter Report of about 40 pages which aimed “to review best practices in the light of fundamental principles, and suitable responses stemming from such principles.”¹⁰ Referring to its structure, the document logically starts by defining the problem and specifying the scope, then going on to present measures already taken by various stakeholders and to specify key principles as well as general, short- and long-term objectives. The central part of the document is dedicated to responses and actions and last, there are the conclusions, presenting a summary of actions.

1.2. Fake news and disinformation – conceptual differences

In the document, the term “disinformation” was chosen over “fake news”. This is, on the one hand, because the term “fake news” was considered inadequate and misleading, as it has been used by some politicians and supporters, “to dismiss coverage that they find disagreeable, and has thus become a weapon with which powerful actors can interfere in circulation of information and attack and undermine independent news media”¹¹.

On the other hand, claim the experts of the Group, the term “fake news” “is inadequate to capture the complex problem of disinformation, which involves content that is not actually or completely “fake” but fabricated information blended with facts, and practices that go well beyond anything resembling “news” to include some forms of automated accounts used for astroturfing¹², networks of fake followers, fabricated or manipulated videos, targeted advertising, organized trolling, visual memes, and much more. It can also involve a whole array of digital behaviour that is more about circulation of disinformation than about production of disinformation, spanning from posting, commenting, sharing, tweeting and re-tweeting etc.”¹³. From this derives the idea that “disinformation” goes well beyond “fake news”, the former being about blending manufactured information with facts, and also referring to other practices that help propagating disinformation in the online environment. This is why disinformation poses a bigger threat than fake news.

Disinformation is defined in the text to include “all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit.”¹⁴ The key word of this definition is “intention” – as opposed to fake news, which is often associated with “partisan political debate and poor journalism broadly” disinformation is made on purpose, and with malicious purpose¹⁵.

It is also acknowledged that “problems of disinformation are deeply intertwined with the development of digital media” and that they are driven by different types of actors and by “manipulative uses of communication infrastructures that have been harnessed to produce, circulate and amplify disinformation on a larger scale”¹⁶ than any time before. Also, it is shown that disinformation can pose risks “for our democratic processes, national security,

¹⁰ European Commission, *Report of the Independent High level Group ...*, p. 5.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

¹² *Astroturfing* is an organized activity that is intended to create a false impression of a widespread, spontaneously arising, grassroots movement in support of or in opposition to something (such as a political policy) but that is in reality initiated and controlled by a concealed group or organization (such as a corporation), according to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/astroturfing>.

¹³ Wardle, C. & Derakhshan, H. (2017) Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making. Report to the Council of Europe, <https://shorensteincenter.org/information-disorder-framework-for-research-and-policy-making/>, apud HLEG Report, p. 10.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis, and Lucas Graves, 2017, ““News You Don’t Believe”: Audience Perspectives on Fake News”, Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, apud HLEG Report, p. 10.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

social fabric, and can undermine trust in the information society and confidence in the digital single market.”¹⁷

2. Solutions to counter disinformation

2.1. *What kind of measures are suitable for countering disinformation in the EU?*

As it was shown that disinformation is multifaceted and it does not have “one single root cause”, it was concluded that there cannot be given a single solution for it.

It was deemed that in order to find suitable responses, there is required “a regularly updated and evidence-based understanding of the scale, scope and impact of the problem”, because of the “evolving nature of disinformation, dissemination patterns and techniques”.¹⁸

Moreover, any responses taken should be within the framework provided by EU main documents on human rights – the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Human Rights Convention, “as well as more broadly joint frameworks, directives, and regulations dealing with hybrid threats, the digital single market, and European and Member States media regulation”¹⁹. The Charter, as well as the Convention state the EU’s “constitutional commitment to freedom of expression and the right to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”²⁰

Having this in mind – that democracy and freedom are two main values of the EU –, the Report does not recommend censorship, online surveillance or fragmentation of the Internet. On the contrary, they are seen as bad practices and it is clearly stated that these kind of simplistic solutions should be avoided. In exchange, there is advanced an “overarching, multi-dimensional approach”, consisting in a set of inter-dependent actions, representing “specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-framed responses”.²¹

As far as general objectives²², it is stated that on the one hand, responses should aim to increase resilience on the long-term of EU citizens, communities, news organisations, Member States and the EU as a whole, to empower Europeans and help them proactively recognize disinformation in its various forms²³. On the other hand, there is underlined that responses should always be up-to-date, this aspect requiring constant monitoring and continuous innovation. Then, the general objectives are dissected into several specific objectives²⁴, in the light of the best practices implemented by various stakeholders.

Furthermore, it is considered essential that responses should be “framed within a binding roadmap for implementation including monitoring and reporting requirements in order to make them effective in practise”²⁵.

2.2. *An overview of implemented measures*

The second chapter of the Report, entitled “Measures already taken by various stakeholders” speaks about good practices, grouping them into three major categories, in short, *transparency, trust-enhancement, and media and information literacy*.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

²⁰ Article 11(1), Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN>, *apud* HLEG Report, p. 18.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

²² A.N. Even if the general objectives are mentioned in the third Chapter of the Report, we consider best fit for our argumentation to place them in this part of our paper, and to expose implemented measures (retrievable in the second Chapter) further on in the paper.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

²⁴ For details, see pp. 20-21 of the HLEG Report.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

The stakeholders that applied one or more of these strategies are various online platforms, news publishers, such as print press organisations, Public Service Media (PSM) and broadcasters, independent source and fact-checkers, and last, but not least, civil society organisations.

In the following, let us outline some of the measures taken in the first category - *transparency and accountability-enhancing practices*. In this respect, we mention four main directions of efforts taken up by online platforms in some of the Member States of the EU:

1. steps for identifying and removing illegitimate accounts; 2. steps for integrating signals for credibility and trustworthiness in ranking algorithms and including recommendations of alternative content to increase the “findability” of credible content; 3. attempts for de-monetizing for-profit fabrication of false information and 4. collaboration with independent source and fact-checking organisations²⁶.

Other measures online platforms have taken involve tackling disinformation by breaking up the business model for its production and amplification, applying the strategy “follow-the-money” in three ways: not placing ads on websites identified as provider of disinformation, thus reducing their incomes, advertising suppliers not publishing ads from disinformation and advertisers not paying money to sites before making sure they work within relevant terms and conditions.

It is a known fact that press publishers, as well as broadcasters are accountable by law for any inaccurate news reporting subject and they also have the right of reply and as an additional measure, they are consolidating their fact-checking capabilities.

Second category refers to *trust-enhancing practices and algorithm changes*. Enforcing trust-enhancing practices includes “media curation pointing to good public sources in the digital environment”²⁷. This means abiding by journalism guidelines, be they issued by individual news media, national bodies or international organisations (International Federation of Journalists), as well as national bodies. These guidelines include “deontological codes, ethics and standards to guarantee quality in the methods in which news is produced”²⁸.

Both print press and broadcasting organisations have to abide codes of conduct, and have to guarantee a ‘right of reply’ to third parties. Also, broadcasters are obliged to be transparent on media ownership, among other known measures that we are not going to enumerate here.

One last aspect that we would like to mention for this category is the existence of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) Code of Principles, signed by most major fact-checkers in the world, this involving a through accreditation process.

The third category - *media and information literacy* is achieved though and is a way to enhance resilience. Project for increasing media literacy are dedicated both to younger population, in cooperation with educational institutions, but also to older population.

However, it is shown that, in order to be effective, all these measures should be applied massively and there should be methods on the one hand, for evaluating their success and, on the other hand, of cross-country comparison.

2.3. Responses and operational recommendations

The fourth Chapter of the Report advances some possible solutions in the form of operational recommendations, addressed both to public, as well as to private stakeholders.

These are focused on five pillars or intervention areas and involve actions meant to:

1) enhance *transparency* of the online digital ecosystem, involving an adequate and privacy-compliant sharing of data about the systems that enable their circulation online;

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

2) promote *media and information literacy* to counter disinformation and help users navigate the media environment,

3) develop tools for *empowering users and journalists* to tackle disinformation and foster a positive engagement with fast-evolving information technologies,

4) safeguard the *diversity and sustainability* of the European news media ecosystem, and

5) adjust the effectiveness of the responses through continuous research on the impact of disinformation in Europe and constantly monitoring and *evaluating the measures taken* by different actors.

Among all stakeholders involved in media, online platforms are considered a key actor that could, by taking appropriate measures, limit the spread of disinformation on the one hand and improve the visibility of trusted news sources, on the other. These measures refer to sorting, selecting and ranking news and information through their algorithms.

The HLEG considers that there should be established a Coalition representing relevant actors in order to elaborate a Code of Practices for several categories of stakeholders, on the basis of 10 Key Principles stated in the Report, and to ensure not only its implementation, but also continuous monitoring and review.

The Report also establishes an agenda of tasks and objectives to be implemented in the following period (after March 2018). Among these steps, we mention: a Progress Assessment Report (PAR) to be commissioned in July 2018, to be made public and be submitted to the HLEG by October/November 2018; by end September 2018, the Coalition should register the intention of the stakeholders that would undersign the Code and be able to implement it, starting with 1 January 2019; for March 2019 (ahead of the elections for the EU Parliament) a new Communication is due to be issued, examining available options at the time and for 1 July 2019, a second PAR is due.

One very important recommendations of the HLEG Report is that the Commission establishes a *permanent review mechanism* by an independent expert body which should analyse thoroughly progress made as far as countering disinformation.

This mechanism calls for “periodical reviews and includes elements of continuity, accountability and transparency factors such as progress reports, communications and timeframes”.²⁹

Conclusions

A first idea that can be drawn from the ideas exposed is that disinformation has grown significantly in the past few years, in direct connection, on the one hand, with the fast development of digital media and, on the other hand, with some changes in the global security context, determining international institutions to take attitude. This was done in the form of official documents advancing principles of good practices for online platforms, news media and fact-checking organisations.

From the analysis of the Report advanced by the HLEG established by the European Commission, there derive a set of conclusions.

The main aim of the Report was to find ways of increasing resilience towards disinformation in the EU, while maintaining an open environment that enables circulation of ideas and information.

The HLEG recommendations intend to offer short-term responses to the most pressing aspects and longer-term responses in order to increase resilience to disinformation, as well as a framework for certifying that the efficiency of these solutions is continuously evaluated, at the same time with developing new answers.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 34.

The Report advances a multi-dimensional approach, founded on a series of interconnected and mutually reinforcing responses.

The HLEG makes appeal both to EU and national authorities – be they public or private actors – to step up their efforts and take actions, according to their responsibilities, as disinformation can be handled efficiently, and in compliance with freedom of expression, only through collaboration of all major stakeholders.

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CHINA VERSUS THE US IN THE MIDDLE EAST: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION?

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Abstract: *Over the last years, People's Republic of China (PRC) has surpassed the United States of America (U.S.) as the world's leading energy consumer and importer of oil. China's relations with the Middle East become an important issue with global implications. This paper examines China's interests in and its strategy towards the Middle East and what are the consequences for the U.S.. The aim is to find out to what extent China's expanding presence in the Middle East poses a threat to the US security partnerships with Arab countries and the US military posture in the region. Even if China influence in the region has largely been economic, growing trade and investment also gives Beijing increased geopolitical stature. To achieve the intended purpose, the research framework will consist on a qualitative analysis based on case study method.*

Keywords: *security dynamics, Middle East, Chinese strategy, soft power, energy security.*

1. Introduction

Nowadays, the Middle East is becoming more and more important for the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although Beijing focuses primarily on its internal security, as well as on the stability of its immediate periphery, especially the Asia Pacific region and Central Asia, it is increasingly thinking of behaving in global terms. The reasons why the Middle East is becoming an important region in China's calculations lie in China's insecurity over the energy sector, the internal instability that characterizes this geographical area, and the perception that the Middle East is a key geostrategic region of the world and an extension of the Chinese west frontier.

Under Xi Jinping's presidency, China adopts a more balanced foreign and security policy and is heading westward in order to correct what was a tendency to place a special emphasis on the East in terms of developing cooperation in the economic sector. As the official Arab policy paper outlines, China's approach in the Middle East focuses on a new type of relations based on development and win-win cooperation¹. China is projecting and promoting its interests in the region by turning to account its relations with one of the main regional powers. Iran is perceived as a close associate of China, which, although under international sanctions and pressure, can serve as an economic and geostrategic partner (given the long-standing economic, military and nuclear cooperation between the two actors)². Belt

¹ *China's Arab Policy Paper*, January 2016, available online at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-01/13/c_135006619.htm, accessed on October 30, 2018.

² Mohsen Shariatinia, Hamidreza Azizi, *Iran – China Cooperation in the Silk Road Economic Belt: From Strategic Understanding to Operational Understanding*, China and World Economy, Vol. 25, No, 5, 2007, pp. 46-47, available online at: http://en.iwep.org.cn/papers/papers_papers/201711/W020171109398565093931.pdf, accessed on October 30, 2018.

and Road initiative will gradually become the key factor shaping Iran – China relations, in term of economic integration, but also at geopolitical and strategic level.

This research paper examines the role China plays in shaping the economic, political and security environment in the Middle East, focusing on the relationship between China and Iran. The study explores China's interests in the Middle East, once a relatively insignificant region in the great stake of China national security. Beijing's increased attention to this region raises question about the consideration and key interests of China, as well as the implications for the US, which since the end of the World War II has had an expansive policy in the Middle East, replacing European powers and becoming the main player in the region.

1.1. What is at stake?

Middle East has never been a simple place. Yet nowadays, the region is especially turbulent. There is Islamic extremism, political turnover, sectarian tensions, reluctant oil prices and delicate political and human rights situation. These issues are transposed in civil wars in Yemen, Syria and Iraq, fragmentation within the Islamic community, tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims which have often resulted in clashes between the sects, conflict between different factions claiming to constitute the legitimate governments (e.g. Yemeni civil war), the spread of the Islamic fundamentalism, and the development of a nuclear program in Iran. But the overarching problem in the Middle East is the Israeli-Arab conflict. US has long been a supporter and protector of Israel and it is seen, from the Arab perspective, on the other side of the Arab-Israeli divide and cannot be impartial in mediating the conflict³. Taking into account the fact that the new US Administration backed away from the official and traditional two state solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, and China has steadily developed relations with Israel and it is enormously interested in Israeli expertise in high technology, US could include it as an important component in its approach towards the Middle East issues. This new strategy might have an interesting outcome, but its feasibility depends on the future relations between US and China and on the US commitment towards the Middle East conflicts.

1.2. Theoretical approach

China's approach towards the Middle East will be explored based on soft power assumptions coined by Joseph Nye in 1990 in his book *Bound to Lead*. The concept provides a perspective on China's current foreign and security policy. There is an ongoing debate about China's soft power and its implications for the rest of the world. According to Nye's conceptualization, soft power is *the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments*⁴..., *it is the ability to get desired outcomes because the others want what you want*⁵. Nye says that the soft power of a country has three primary sources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policy (seen as legitimate and having moral authority), and includes the ability to shape international institutions and agendas. Soft power is based on attraction, persuasion and appeal, while hard power is demonstrated in coercion, sanction and payment. In Nye's view the two *sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other* and he refers to the distinction between them as a difference in how a country uses its power resources⁶.

³ Michael Singh, "Chinese Policy in the Middle East in the Awake of the Arab Uprisings" in S. Yao and S. Tsang, *Towards Well-Oiled Relations? China's Presence in the Middle East*, Palgrave Macmillan, Washington DC, 2016, pp. 10-11.

⁴ Robert Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence in the Information Age*, Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5, 1998, p. 86.

⁵ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power*, Foreign Policy, no. 80, September 1990, pp. 153-171.

⁶ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, pp. x-xi.

China has acted according to soft power assumptions in international affairs in general and in Middle East in particular. In Joshua Kurlantzick's book, *Charm offensive - How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*, China's strategy is titled *charm offensive* and it is portrayed as extremely skilful in the diplomacy field to seriously challenge the United States. China affectively mobilize its soft power to promote its interests and cultivate its influence in the Middle East, and to develop strong international alliances. This way of wooing the world was called by the author *charm offensive*. It includes a wide range of tools that are referred to as *cultural diplomacy* or *economic diplomacy*. Kurlantzick suggests that the current Chinese forays into Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America reflect China's soft power⁷.

Acting according to principle of *non-intervention*, building trust and conditions for inclusive economic development, China has taken advantage of American policy mistakes and its approach is very attractive to authoritarian elites, as China does not get involved in domestic affairs and does not push for more democratization and respect for human rights. China offers an alternative development model to the economic sector of other countries. Its *Beijing Consensus* strategy – the model of development that has contributed to the Chinese high level of economic growth – provides an example for developing countries and it is viewed as an alternative to *Washington Consensus* which demands for a free market system together with liberal democratic reforms. China's economic achievements under the leadership of the Communist party has proven that the development is possible even without changes in political system⁸. The American-model is ideologically driven to spread democratization and impose on other countries the liberal economic system and democracy before rule of law and other regulatory frameworks were established, and it uses the military power as a tool for spreading democracy (the war in Iraq is a conclusive example). China, instead, developed friendly relations with many developing countries without any preconditions demanded by the Western countries, and applying the principle of non-intervention it does not bother the authoritarian regimes. Even if *China is far from America's equal in soft power* (as Nye said), *the United States cannot ignore the rise of its soft power*⁹.

Martin Jacques, in his book *When China Rules the World, the End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (2012) provides information about China's history, economy, society and its growing influence on most emerging economies in the world. Jacques asserts that China's pragmatic approach is economically oriented, unlike the current European and American foreign policy, governed by political ideology and the need to establish Western models of democracy, even though these patterns lead to disconnection and religious and cultural conflicts. Thereby, the US has been stuck in various international conflicts while China has made progress in South America, the Middle East (where it is focused on oil-producing countries), and Africa, where it has already emerged as a dominant power¹⁰.

2. China – Middle East Legacies

Since the 1950s, China has not established a zone of influence and presence in the Middle East which played a marginal role in its calculations. China's communist leader, Mao Zedong, regarded the Middle East as the essence of post-war competition between the

⁷ Joshua Kurlantzick, *Charm offensive - How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*, Yale University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 61-67, available online at: <http://www.nicoravanilla.com/uploads/2/4/1/1/24114923/kurlantzick2007.pdf>, accessed on August 20, 2018.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 256.

⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 258-259.

¹⁰ Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World. The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, Penguin Books Ltd., London, 2009, pp. 385-387.

superpowers in a context in which the traditional old colonist powers such as Germany, Britain, Italy and France, began to decline. In the 1940s and 1950s, the US started its aggressive expansion in an attempt to fill the gap created by the withdrawal of the traditional powers. In the 1960s, the post-Stalin leadership began to extend and compete with the US over the control of the area. In the 1970, the Soviet Union started to gain ground in the Middle East, US being forced to retreat under the pressure of the national liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America¹¹.

China active policy in the Middle East is linked to the Bandung Conference (1955) when diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between several Arab countries and Peking were established, China's interests in the area being related to its diplomatic recognition by the Arab states, and political support. Rejected by the United Nations, China was offered full diplomatic relation by two Middle Eastern countries, Egypt and Syria in 1956¹². Following the PRC's admission into the United Nations in 1971, Iran, Kuwait and Lebanon switched recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in 1971, followed by Jordan (1977), Libya and Oman (1978), United Arab Emirates (1984), Qatar (1988), Bahrain (1989), Saudi Arabia (1990) and Israel (1992)¹³.

China's strategy in the Middle East acted to urge the local governments and national movements to resist foreign intervention and occupation, in this avoiding that one of the superpowers to gain supremacy¹⁴. Peking has never sought direct involvement and presence in the Middle East, nor economic or other gains. Its interests were confined to supporting the national liberation movements, but under some circumstances it became more careful and selective and less committed in its support of national liberation movements, and in some cases, it withdrew such support entirely. China supported and had relations with two main liberation movements in the Middle East: Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). From 1971, China began to reconsider its strategy and regarded the Persian Gulf governments, particularly Iran and Kuwait as a potential and effective obstacle to Soviet expansion, and a balance against Iraq. By establishing diplomatic relation with these states, China also rejected the PFLOAG plans to dominate the entire Gulf area¹⁵.

China opposed to any superpower-controlled settlement in the Middle East and steadily encouraged the armed struggle, as a symbol of independence and a reaction to outside powers. Chinese governments rejected any attempt of the superpowers to reach a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the United Nation Security Council because according to them, the settlements were manufactured by the superpowers to prolong their presence and influence, and not to settle the Middle East conflict¹⁶. On the other hand, China motivations were framed based on the *principal contradiction*. China rejected the settlements established through outside intervention because they were primary interested in the withdrawal of foreign powers, rather than in the settlements of Middle East problems¹⁷.

Since the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decay of Cold War architecture, China's interests in the Middle East skyrocketed and continue to grow. In 2014, China had emerged as the Middle East's dominant trading partner, as its oil imports have increased dramatically over the past decade, reaching record highs in 2014. Many of the

¹¹ Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 1-3.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 5.

¹³ Andrew Scobell, Alireza Nader, *China in the Middle East - The Wary Dragon*, RAND Corporation, 2016, p. 4, available online at: http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html, accessed on August 15, 2018.

¹⁴ Yitzhak Shichor, *op. cit.*, pp.12-13.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 180-181.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 170.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

region's oil producers are highly dependent on oil export income from China, as they are the largest sources of China's crude oil imports¹⁸.

The most significant event in the Middle East region, with implication for both the US and China is represented by the Arab Spring, a turning point which unwoven the post-Cold War architecture built and upheld for two decades by the United States. The Arab Spring was perceived in different ways, for China, it brought concern over the oil supplies and the changes of the established order, while the Americans were enthusiastic about the possible changes¹⁹. The Arab Spring took place in an environment which accelerated the US disengagement from the region. First of all, the financial crises of 2008 led to shortcut of the American defence budget and increasing oil and gas production. Second, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars warned about the overseas intervention and third, President Obama seemed to have a sceptical approach towards the American traditional allies such as Israel and Gulf Arab states²⁰. As the US's disengagement left a leadership vacuum in the region, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states looked eastwards for new partners (they wanted to stop the spread of the democratic regimes after Arab Spring), China raised as a potential one.

3. China – Iran Economic and Energetic Cooperation

Middle East accounts for a substantial 43% of China's crude oil supplies, with Saudi Arabia serving as China's single largest oil-trading partner (supplying 15% of the country total annual imports) followed by Russia 13%, Oman 12%, Angola 12%, Iraq 9.5, Iran 8% and Kuwait 4.3%²¹.

The largest communist country in the world and the largest theocracy in the world find common ground in trade, investment, and strategic interests. Even if the economic ties between China and Iran are very robust as China is the top importer (\$17.8B), as well as exporter destination of Iran (\$14.5B), and Iran is in the top ten China's oil suppliers²², their cooperative relation is far more than economic or oil. Both are ambitious emerging powers which view each other as sharing common perspectives (both are unhappy with the US dominance of world affairs).

As the U.S withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran would check in first with the country that is currently its most consistent, reliable and trading partner: China. Beijing's support for Iran was motivated by its faith that imposing sanctions represents an oppressive politics and cause injustice even more when Iran has *a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy*. During the last years of negotiations, China was a supporter of Tehran, and it is seen by the Iranian leaders as an influential power which can play a significant role in mitigating the nuclear issue²³. The Chinese's approach in Iran nuclear issues can be seen as a strategy to limit the American conventional military superiority in the region, to contribute to the strengthening of the Iran influence in the Middle East which would

¹⁸US Energy Information Administration, "China – International energy and data analysis", May 14, 2015, available online at: <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN>, accessed on July 20, 2018.

¹⁹ Niv Horesh, Ruike Xu, "China's Growing Presence in the Middle East" in Niv Horesh, *Towards Well-Oiled Relations? China's Presence in the Middle East following the Arab Spring*, Palgrave Macmillan, Washington DC, 2016, pp. 218-219.

²⁰ Geoffrey Kemp, *The East Moves West - India, China, and Asia's Growing Presence in the Middle East*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 2010, pp. 17-18.

²¹Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Where does China import Crude Petroleum from?", 2015, available at: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/show/2709/2015/, accessed July 28, 2018.

²² "Iran – Trade Balance", *Observatory of Economic Complexity*, 2015, available online at: <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/irn/#Exports>, accessed on August 22, 2018.

²³ W. John Garver, "China and Iran: Expanding Cooperation under Conditions of US Domination" in S. Yao and S. Tsang, *Towards Well-Oiled Relations? China's Presence in the Middle East following the Arab Uprisings*, Palgrave Macmillan, Washington DC, 2016, pp. 190-192.

better serve the Chinese interest and very important to push forward The Belt and Road initiative (even if China supports P-5 work and declares its opposition to Iranian development of acquisition of nuclear weapons). Iran, on the other side, appeals to have several reasons for its strong relations with China. First, the regime views China as a potential ally against its main enemy, the United States. As Iran emerges as a regional power, China could contribute to offset US's power in the Middle East. For Iran, China is also a strong economic partner and provide of technology necessary for Iran's modernization and development (especially when Iran has faced international sanctions)²⁴.

Iran offers the prospects of a strategic partner for China in Asia in a context in which the US's role and involvement would be more reduced. But the cultivation of a strategic alliance with Iran could appear at directly limiting the US power in the region, as Iran is the US inveterate enemy and it is expanding its influence in the Persian Gulf at the expense of the American domination. Even if Iran regards China as an ally against the US, China is reluctant to keep Iran closely for fear of arousing American hostility. There are some areas of common interest for the US and China. From an economic and strategic point of view, both powers are interested in keeping the sea lanes opened for oil flows, in avoiding rivalry between Iran and Israel and Arab states and in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons (as China and the US are two of the five recognized nuclear weapons states under the Treaty of Non-Proliferation)²⁵. The prospects for building a long-term partnership between China and Iran while not embittering US- Sino ties are difficult, even more when it threatens the relations between China and other Arab states (whose relations with Iran are antagonistic). But the new international context is changing. US are not as engaged as they were thirty years ago. At that time, Washington has attempted to impose security in the Gulf, in order to secure the energy of the region via direct military presence because of its dependency on the energy resources needed to fuel its economic growth²⁶. Now, US is less vulnerable to interruption in foreign energy supplies, as it is now emerging as a major producer of natural gas²⁷. With the US disengagement from the Middle East, a closer relation between China and Iran could be possible as well as an Iran with the status of the most powerful country in the region. Sino – Iran ties seem to comprise the characteristics of a strategic partnership, rather than a commercial one.

China's new vision Belt and Road was announced in 2013 by the Chinese President Xi Jinping and it represents the key action plan for China's future foreign policy and economic strategy. The project was thought as a network of infrastructure projects across the Asian continent as well as a tool for promoting trade liberalization and financial integration. The plan is made up of two initiatives the *Silk Road Economic Belt* and the *21st Century Maritime Silk Road* which will guide the national investment strategy from 2016 to 2020. It is a plan to build a network of infrastructure projects (road and rai routes, oil and gas pipelines) from central Asia to Africa and Mediterranean Sea²⁸. During his visit in Tehran, in January 2016, Xi Jinping signed a 17 multi-billion-dollar agreements with the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, in areas including energy, finance, investment, communications, culture, science and technology, and politics. Both countries established a broad cooperation plan for the next

²⁴ Scott Harold and Alireza Nader, *China and Iran – Economic, Political, and Military Relations*, RAND Corporation, 2012, pp. 5-6, available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP351.html, accessed September 6, 2018.

²⁵ John W. Garver, *op cit.*, pp. 182-183.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 186-188.

²⁷ According to the “Annual Energy outlook 2017 with projections to 2050”, the natural gas production will account for nearly 40% of the US energy production by 2040. The US is projected to become a net energy exporter by 2026 in the Reference case projections. Source: *US Energy Information Administration*, January 5, 2017, available online at: [https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383\(2017\).pdf](https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2017).pdf), accessed September 7, 2018.

²⁸ Scott Kennedy, *Building China's “One Belt, One Road*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 3, 2015, available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-china%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cone-belt-one-road%E2%80%9D>, accessed September 10, 2018.

10 years. This proves that China has actively engaged Iran into its foreign policy project. On the other side, Rouhani reiterated his interest in joining China's Belt and Road many times mentioning that the new Silk Road can be beneficial for economic interests of all countries part of this road²⁹.

4. Sino – American Convergences in the Middle East

Despite the perception of mutual hostility between the US and China in the Middle East, there is high convergence between their policies in some areas of common interest for both: energy, commerce, non-proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction and counter terrorism.

As one can be seen, the energy sector is a common ground of interest for the US and China in the Middle East. Both powers are the world's two largest energy consumers³⁰ and the two largest importers of crude oil, and the Middle East is the home to many of the world's top oil exporters³¹. American oil consumption is forecast to continue rising slowly in the coming even as US domestic production increases rapidly. China demand, in contrast, is forecast to rise rapidly along with its growth and urbanization. Flow of the commerce is another important zone of interests for the US – China relations. Even if the Middle East countries are not major trading partners for either the US³² or China³³ their economies are both dependent on global seaborne trade flows, a large portion of which flow through the sea lanes of the Middle East that they try to safeguard³⁴.

Arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East is another sector in which US and China can cooperate. Both countries supported a number of UN Security Council Resolutions aimed to peacefully resolving the Iran nuclear crises, and other initiatives to dismantle Syria's chemical weapons. (Beijing voted for 11 UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanction on Iran). China and U.S along with the other members of the UN Security Council and Germany established a work group (P5+1) as part

²⁹ Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available online at: <http://en.mfa.ir/index.aspx?fkeyid=&siteid=3&pageid=1997&newsview=475644>, accessed on September 12, 2018.

³⁰According to "Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2016", China's consumptions counts 3.101 Mtoe and the US's consumption counts 2.196 Mtoe. Total Energy Consumption Crude oil balance of trade shown that the U.S crude oil imports (339.3 Mt in 2015) reduced since 2010 (513.3 in 2010, 442.4 in 2012, and 358.4 in 2014) with the development of non-conventional domestic production. China, on the other side, increased steadily its crude oil imports over time (333.9 in 2015, and 251.3 in 2011, 198.8 in 2008, 60.0 in 2000), Source: *Enerdata intelligence +consulting*, available online at: <https://yearbook.enerdata.net/>, accessed on September 10, 2018.

³¹ According to *World's Top Exports*, Middle Eastern countries accounted for the highest dollar venue worth of crude oil exports during the 2015, with Saudi Arabia first ranked (17% of total crude oil exports), followed by Russia (11%), Iraq (6.6), United Arab Emirates (6.5), Canada (6.4), Nigeria 4.8%), Kuwait (4.3), Iran (2.6), Oman (2.2). Source: Daniel Workman, *Crude Oil Exports by Country* [March 9, 2017], available online at: <http://www.worldstopexports.com/worlds-top-oil-exports-country/>, accessed on September 15, 2018.

³² No Middle East country accounts for one of the 15 top US trade partners. Source: *Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, Economic Indicators Division*, "Top US Trade Partners", 2016, available online at: http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf, accessed on September 13, 2018.

³³ In the 15 China's top partners in terms of export sales no Middle East country is included. Five of the China's top trading partners in terms of export sales are: United States (18.3% of total Chinese exports), Hong Kong (13.8%), Japan (6.1%), South Korea (4.5%) and Germany (3.1%). Source: *China's Top Trading Partners*, *World's Top Exports*, April 9, 2017, available online at: <http://www.worldstopexports.com/chinas-top-import-partners/>, accessed on September 14, 2018.

³⁴ In 2016, China seaborne imports reached a massive 2.1 billion tons, but the growth eased 1% from an average of 9% in 2011-2014. Source: "UNTAD Review of Maritime Transport". *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, 2016, available online at: http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2016_en.pdf, accessed on September 20, 2018.

of their diplomatic effort to deal with Iran's nuclear program³⁵. Sometimes, China tried to dilute Washington's attempts to impose sanctions on countries such as Syria and Iran, because in its view the imposition of sanctions represents an oppressive politics and cause injustice. However, it voted the most part of the resolutions concerning the Middle Eastern affairs, complaining with the U.S demand to become a *responsible stakeholder*³⁶.

In counter terrorism affairs, both powers have expressed grow concerns regarding the spread of extremist ideologies and terrorism. After 9/11 attacks, China supported American-led military action in Afghanistan, even if its contribution was limited and mainly stimulated by its concern about the spread of Islamism in Central Asia. Another obstacle in Chinese – American cooperation was represented by Beijing's suspicion that such efforts serve to project American power in the Middle East. On the other side, Americans concerns about the Chinese's tendency to confuse political dissent with violent extremism³⁷. Despite China's sensitivity about intervention and its reluctance to support interventionist actions, even against authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) poses a particularly grave threat to the security and stability of the region . Although Beijing appears less than enthusiastic about joining the US coalition against the Islamic State, there are multiple incentives for the Chinese government to join in. If China fights against ISIS, it will strengthen its engagement in Middle East affairs. This would be a very important step, given that Beijing has national and economic interests in the region³⁸.

Both powers have had to promote and advance their interest in the region, but they have been acting differently. Even if the main goal is to build regional stability, China has sought to cultivate cordial relations with all governments in the region, and to promote trade and investment ties, eschewing from providing any significant diplomatic or military involvement. U.S, on the other side, has promoted the policy of intervention through a robust military presence, economic and military aid for its allies³⁹.

Changing the role of the United States in the Middle Eastern affairs possess some opportunities for China as well as challenges. China has benefited from the American efforts to provide regional security and safeguard shipping lanes, and to some extent it is still dependent on the security provided by the Americans (conflicts threaten China's economic interest and increase the energy prices). US's disengagement will open up a political and security vacuum which could be exploited by China. This may open further opportunities for developing trade and investments for Chinese. But the question that arises in this hypothetical context is if China is willing to become more involved in Middle Eastern affairs and if it could provide the same diplomatic, military and technological benefits as the US.

China's engagement in the Middle East could be perceived either as an attempt to geo-strategically balance the foreign and security policy in a context in which the US has followed a more caution approach towards the region (especially during the Obama Administration) or as a strategy to preserve its economic interest, given the instability created by conflicts and the risk of increasing energy prices. Thus, China is interested in consolidating relationships with key regional actors, and this implies some consequences for both, the United States and the Middle East broadly. Despite the improvement in the energy sector, the US still has

³⁵ Kelsey Devenport, *UN Security Council resolutions on Iran*, Arms Control Association, August 6, 2015, available online at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran>, accessed on September 14, 2018.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ Michael Singh, "Chinese Policy in the Middle East in the Awake of the Arab Uprisings" in S. Yao and S. Tsang, *Towards Well-Oiled Relations? China's Presence in the Middle East*, Palgrave Macmillan, Washington DC, 2016, p. 165.

³⁸ Mordechai Chaziza, *China's Middle East Policy: The ISIS Factor*, Middle East Policy Council, No. 1, Vol. XXIII, 2016, available online at: <https://www.mepc.org/journal/chinas-middle-east-policy-isis-factor>, accessed on September 18, 2018.

³⁹ Michael Singh, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

reasons to actively engage in the Middle Eastern affairs to pursue its economic and strategic objectives: counter terrorism, assuring steady oil supplies, Israel – Palestine peace, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are some of them. Strong economic ties between China and Middle Eastern countries represent an opportunity for expanding the cooperation in the security area and for contributing towards a more stable region. Such a scenario is not necessary a cause for US alarm as a peaceful environment is a condition for Chinese economic growth and Beijing still counts on US to provide regional security.

China is becoming more engaged in Middle Eastern security and policy and its approach is well welcomed by Arab countries as the US's security commitment towards the region rises uncertainties. In the short and medium term, it seems more probably that China won't replace US as the region's main security player and Washington does not indicate intentions to withdraw from the Middle East.

China's security relationships with Arab world lack the military allies and partners the Americans have. For this reason, it is difficult to conduct a major multilateral undertaking to counter ISIS forces in Syria and Iraq. China is reluctant to become more engaged in the Middle East military affairs. Its strategy is to benefit from the US security and too remain on good terms with all states in the region. But, in the same time, Beijing feels the pressure from Washington and from Arab countries to play a more active role in the region.

Conclusions

The study found that PRC leadership cannot be portrayed as seeking to undermine American hegemony in the Middle East even if it becomes more dependent on oil and expands the relations with Middle Eastern countries. China is still grounding its policy on the security architecture provided by the United States. On the other side, U.S, despite the significant improvement in energy sector, has reasons to continue engaging in the Middle Eastern affairs, as it is the only global power willing to project military capabilities in order to maintain regional stability.

Within the broader context, the analysis points out that China is gradually changing its policy from one of non-intervention to what is often termed *active mediation* or *creative involvement*, as it has significant economic and security interests to protect outside its own borders⁴⁰. The Belt and Road Initiative is giving another boost to relations between China and Middle East and involves it in both terrestrial and maritime routes as both important points of connectivity and economic partners.

Even if the current Chinese foreign and security policy constitutes a more flexible and pragmatic interpretation of the principle on non-intervention, as China becomes more actively involved in conflict mediation in the Middle East, it is still playing a small albeit growing role in regional politics and security in contrast to its presence in regional commerce.

As Noah Feldman noticed, *the US and China are on the verge of not a "Cold War", but a "Cool War" in which the economic cooperation is becoming deeper and more fundamental*⁴¹. The analysis suggests that the US should promote China's engagement, along with other Asian countries, in efforts to improve regional security in the Middle East. Having the growing economic and energy interests in the region, each state can cooperate each other and make security contributions. A problematic aspect is the cooperation with Iran, as it is discussed above, but China is still eager to keep on good terms with United States. In turn, US should remain committed in its leading security role in the Middle East, especially now when

⁴⁰ Camilla Sorensen, "China in search of 'legitimate' great-power intervention" in *China and the challenges in Greater Middle East*, Danish Institute for International Studies, November 10, 2015, p. 33.

⁴¹ Noah Feldman, *Cool War: The Future of Global Competition*, Random House, New York, 2013, p. xii.

the region is confronting many threats from hybrid forces, religion fundamentalism, nuclear proliferation.

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BIOLOGICAL WARFARE – THE REAL PANDORA’S BOX. LEARNING FROM THE PAST

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Abstract: *It is necessary to assess the risks generated by various microorganisms that can be used as biological weapons and to understand the process of their development and the use of biological agents over time. Biological agents used for military purposes may be more powerful than conventional weapons and chemical weapons. Over the past century, advances in biotechnology and biochemistry have simplified the development and production of such weapons, and genetic engineering probably holds the most dangerous potential for making biological weapons. Ease of production, broad availability of biological agents and technical knowledge have led to the proliferation of biological weapons and a growing desire among developing countries to hold them.*

Keywords: *biologic warfare, biological agents, Biological Weapons Convention, bioterrorism.*

Introduction

The biological weapon is the means of mass destruction, sometimes difficult to control, which, through the harmful effect of pathogens (viruses, bacteria, rickettsia, and microbial toxins) can cause large losses among troops, populations and animals, as well as the destruction (contamination) of crops. Also called the nuclear bomb of the poor or the dirty bomb, it is an invisible weapon. It can be transported without being detected, even across borders, in sufficient quantities for a major attack.

Micro-organisms can be released without noise and without causing immediate effects. The disease cannot be determined until the symptoms of the infection and the biological agent are identified. If the biological agent can be easily spread from one person to another, the number of victims can easily reach tens of thousands of cases.

Since September 11, 2001, the danger of large-scale terrorist attacks against the population of any part of the world no longer seems to be an unimaginable scenario. Biological terrorism is no longer in the field of science fiction. There are opinions that the possibilities of a terrorist attack with biological weapons are very low, but there may be disastrous consequences if no immediate action is taken.

Biological attacks represent the evolution of the etiological agents of infectious diseases (natural or genetically engineered) spread to the environment with two purposes: to produce a catastrophic effect on the civilian population (a large number of serious illnesses and deaths) which sometimes outweighs the responsiveness of medical units and to induce the fear and terror within the population, what is known as “bioterrorism”.

It is certain that most of the world’s states hold the economic and military potential to acquire or manufacture biological weapons, and this fact has been proven many times throughout history.

1. Historical references

The impact of infectious diseases on humans has been used from military perspective since 600 BC. The use of human and animal dead bodies to spread contagious diseases during battles, and especially during siege of cities, has proven to be a very effective and devastating effect on enemy forces. The poisoning of fountains and other sources of water has been a military strategy of biological warfare for hundreds of years, continuing to be used even during the world wars of the 20th century.

Military leaders of the Middle Ages observed that the victims of infectious diseases can turn into biological weapons that could be successfully used against the enemy. In 1346, during the siege of Caffa, a maritime port on the Crimean Peninsula controlled by the Genoese (now Feodosia, Ukraine), the Tartars catapulted the victims of the plague over the walls of the city, triggering an epidemic of plague in the city. Thus, the outbreak of plague forced the withdrawal of Genoese forces and the conquest of the city by the Tartars¹.

The Caffa incident was described in 1348 by Gabriel de Mussis, a notary from Genoa, who came up with an important hypothesis in the fact that the plague was passed on to Caffa citizens by throwing diseased bodies into the besieged town, and the Italians fleeing from Caffa brought the plague into the Mediterranean ports². More specifically, the ships that carried the plague-infected refugees sailed to Constantinople, Genoa, Venice and other Mediterranean ports and are believed to have greatly contributed to the outbreak of the greatest biological disaster in human history, the pestilence of the 14th century plague who killed over 25 million people only in Europe.

The plague pandemic, also known as “black death”, passed through Europe, the East Asia and North Africa in the 14th century and was the most devastating public health disaster in history. The initial origin of the plague remains uncertain, as several countries in the Far East, including China, Mongolia and India, have been suggested.

However, considering the complex environmental causes and epidemiology of the plague, the assumption that a single biological attack was the cause of the pestilence pandemic in Europe in the 14th century may have been exaggerated, but the Caffa biological attack despite its historical importance, reminds us of the terrible consequences of diseases when used as weapons.

It is also argued that the Russian troops have used a similar procedure against the Swedes in 1710. It is also known the struggle of the Romanian Countries for liberation from the foreign occupation in the Middle Ages when, during the wars different means were used for defense like poisoning of fountains with “banewort broth”.

In the 15th century, Pizzaro offered smallpox infected clothes to South American natives, and during the Anglo-French war in North America in the 16th century, the English distributed infected blankets to the American tribes that helped the French, led to the withdrawal of indigenous support for them.³

The biological weapon had a fast development at the end of the 19th century and throughout the 20th century, given by the new findings in biochemistry. Thus, at the start of World War I, anthrax was used on animals but it proved to be inefficient. Subsequently,

¹ Mark Wheelis, *Biological warfare at the 1346 siege of Caffa*, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Volume 8, Number 9, 2002, available online at: <https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/8/9/01-0536> accessed on October 25, 2018.

² Vincent J. Derbes, *De Mussis and the Great Plague of 1348*, Journal of the American Medical Association, 1966, pp. 59-62, available online at: <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/658907>, accessed on October 26, 2018.

³ George W. Christopher, Theodore J. Cieslak, Julie A. Pavlin, *Biological warfare. A historical perspective*, Journal of the American Medical Association, 1997, p. 412-417, available online at: <https://books.google.ro/books?> accessed on October 26, 2018.

during the same confrontation, there were epidemics of almost all kinds: *measles*, *influenza*, *typhoid fever*, various *pneumonia* types that produced a significant loss of human lives.⁴

During the Japanese occupation in China between 1934 and 1945, the Japanese army has built up a specialized biological agent's center in Manchuria, in order to test their impact on human. For more than 10 years, thousands of Chinese, Korean, Russian, and American people have been massacred in these factories of death (Kwantung Unit 731 and Changchun Unit 100) during experiments to determine the effects of military using of *plague*, *cholera*, *anthrax*, *typhoid fever* and *dysentery*.⁵

In September 1978, the Bulgarian secret police used the ricin toxin in order to murder the dissident Georgi Markov in London.

In 1979, anthrax accidentally released in Sverdlovsk, Russia, killed 66 people, and in 1992 President Boris Yeltsin admitted that the tragedy was due to an accident in a biological weapons laboratory.

In 1984, in Oregon, the religious cult of Rajneeshe contaminated food from 8 restaurants, with *salmonella typhimurium* in order to influence the local elections, 751 people being contaminated.

In 1995, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect used three bottles of botulinum toxin and anthrax bottles placed in Tokyo subway stations (*failed attack*). In 1998, the same sect has spread anthrax spores from the eighth floor of a Tokyo building. The members of this group later acknowledged that they tried to obtain samples of the Ebola virus from Zaire in 1992.⁶

In 1995, two members of a Minnesota militia group were convicted of possession of ricin toxin, which they had produced themselves for use in retaliation against local government officials.

After the events of September 11, 2001, letters containing anthrax spores were sent to NBC and New York Post. Other letters have targeted Washington, government offices and post offices. The result: five dead.

In December 2002, six terrorist suspects were arrested in Manchester, England, because their apartment was serving as a "ricin laboratory". Later, on January 5, 2003, British police raided two residences around London and found traces of ricin toxin, which led to an investigation of a possible Chechen separatist plan to attack the Russian embassy with the toxin; several arrests were made.

On February 3, 2004, three U.S. Senate office buildings were closed after the ricin toxin was found in a mailroom.

In recent years, due to major social changes in the world, as well as the spread of organized crime networks, access to these types of weapons by groups that promote, fund or support various forms of terrorism is much easier than we might think.

2. The main biological threats against humanity

Biological warfare is not and cannot be a reaction to despair because it requires a serious material basis, well-equipped laboratories, high-class specialists, very high costs and thorough training.

An extremely important aspect to be considered about the fight against the biological

⁴ Andrew G. Robertson, Laura J. Robertson, *From asps to allegations: biological warfare in history*, Military Medicine, Volume 160, 1995, p. 369-373, available online at: <https://books.google.ro/books?>, accessed on October 26, 2018.

⁵ Sheldon H. Harris, *Factories of death: Japanese biological warfare, 1932-1945, and the American cover-up*, Routledge edition, 1994, available online at: <https://books.google.ro/books?> accessed on October 26, 2018.

⁶ US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, *Medical management of biological casualties handbook*, 4th edition, Fort Detrick, 2001, available online at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/med01bio/bluebooktitleand disclaimer.pdf>, accessed on October 26, 2018.

weapon is that there is no reliable means of detecting biological agents released into the atmosphere in large areas such as the cities. Biological attacks are recognized only after the affected population has started to get ill, sometimes depending on the incubation period, even weeks or months after the attack.

Smallpox and *hemorrhagic fever virus*, *anthrax bacillus* and *botulinum toxin* are weapons selected by states that have a program of biological weapons. These weapons are also in the spotlight of terrorist groups.

Thus, a biological agent can be considered to be any micro-organism or toxin characterized by the ability to cause illness or death of a living organism, the most dangerous of which is considered to be:

a) Biological agents that can seriously affect public health, with high potential for large-scale dissemination:

1. *Smallpox* – is transmitted from person to person, through direct contact or via a contaminated object, but not by water or air. If used as a biological weapon, smallpox is a serious danger to the population. It is a very contagious disease. In the absence of specific treatment, mortality reaches 30% of unvaccinated persons. Symptoms occur 12 to 14 days after contamination: high fever, headache and lumbar pain. Isolation of patients and vaccination allow the epidemic to stop. The treatment is limited to the administration of specific antibiotics to bacterial infections. Early vaccination against smallpox is not warranted because the vaccine may be dangerous. This disease is considered to be eradicated since 1979, and since 1984 vaccination is no longer mandatory.⁷

2. *Anthrax* – infectious disease, caused by the spores of a bacterium, *Bacillus anthracis* that can be transmitted by the skin or respiratory system. For centuries, animals and humans have been the victims of this disease. Research on this microorganism as well as its use as a biological weapon dates back to 1980. Currently, 17 countries are suspected of having such an arsenal. In the event of a terrorist attack, airborne transmission is the most dangerous. Symptoms occur in seven days, manifested by irritations similar to those caused by insect bites. This disease became serious in the absence of treatment, but known bacilli are sensitive to antibiotics. In the absence of appropriate treatment, mortality is 20% due to septicemia. Respiratory patterns are generally deadly, and for intestinal infections the mortality is 25% to 60%.⁸

3. *Plague* – is an infectious-contagious disease produced by the bacterium *Yersinia pestis*, and still exists in certain parts of the world. It is transmitted most frequently by wild rodents through fleas. Due to the fact that the germs responsible for the transmission of the disease are sensitive to antibiotics, it can be easily treated if done in time. Every year, the World Health Organization reports between 2000 and 4000 cases of plague worldwide. It is manifested by high, oscillating fever, often accompanied by delirium and hallucinations, as well as intense digestive disturbances. Its characteristic sign is the presence of a "bulb wound", a very bulky ganglion. The mortality rate is between 50% and 90% for untreated cases and 15% for treated cases.

4. *Tularemia* – is a viral hemorrhagic fever caused by *Francisella tularensis* virus with a mortality of between 25% and 100% of cases.

5. *Botulism* – a very dangerous condition in manifestation, caused by *Clostridium botulinum* (botulinum toxins). It can contaminate drinking water, can be introduced into food or dispersed into the atmosphere. Since *botulinum toxin* is sensitive to

⁷ *Smallpox - including symptoms, treatment and prevention*, SA Health, available online at: <https://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au/> accessed on October 27, 2018.

⁸ *Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax)*, The Center for Biosecurity, September 21, 2011, available online at: http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/our_work/biological-threats-and-epidemics/fact_sheets/anthrax.html accessed on October 27, 2018.

chlorine from the water, large-scale contamination is unlikely to occur through the drinking water network. Ingestion, inhalation or eye contact or a skin lesion with a small amount is sufficient to cause serious poisoning and deadly neurological disorders. Classical symptoms are: visual disturbances, difficulty in swallowing and extreme fatigue. If the symptoms are not rapidly diagnosed, limb and respiratory paralysis is installed. In case of ingestion, the first symptoms occur between 15 and 36 hours. It can be treated with an antitoxin that will prevent the most serious manifestations: respiratory failure and paralysis. 50 years ago, 50% of cases were fatal but at present only 8% of cases pose risks.

6. *Viral hemorrhagic fever (Lassa fever, Ebola fever)* – are extremely contagious, in most cases fatal and untreatable. Rodents and insects are the main "reservoirs" of viruses. Humans may become infected by contact with virus-carrying animals or urine, saliva, excrement, blood or secretions of a sick person (*Ebola*). The main symptoms are: very high fever, fatigue, dizziness, spasms and muscle aches, exhaustion. In the case of *Ebola fever*, the patients are victims of multiple hemorrhages in the digestive system, lungs and eyes. As a biological weapon, *haemorrhagic fevers* are less effective because the contaminated subject dies so quickly that it does not have time to spread the disease. Besides, these viruses are also very difficult to handle. There is no treatment or prophylaxis for *haemorrhagic fevers*. For Ebola, mortality is between 50% and 90% of cases.

b) Agents which are relatively easy to disseminate and have low mortality rates:

1. *Brucellosis (Brucella spp.)* – infectious disease caused by the *Brucella-type bacterium* that is transmitted between animals. Humans can be infected after contact with animals.

2. *Viral encephalitis – alpha viruses* induced disease, such as horseradish encephalitis, but most commonly those responsible for *mumps, rubella, measles, influenza* and *mononucleosis (Epstein-Barr virus)*. These viruses can cause serious illnesses and in some situations they can infect the brain and cause *encephalitis*.

3. *Cholera* – acute infectious disease caused by cholera virus (*Vibrio cholerae*), which causes a serious alteration of the general condition and the progression to mortality in 50 to 80% of the untreated cases.

4. *Staphylococci* – infectious diseases caused by staphylococci (*Gram positive bacteria*) present in the air, in water and on all surfaces; the man hosts them in the nostrils, intestine, sweat glands and on the skin.

5. *Ricin* – toxin produced by *ricinus communis* plant. Under certain conditions – injected, swallowed or inhaled – is very dangerous, there is no antidote. If it reaches the airways, death occurs within 36-48 hours.

c) Pathogens that can be performed in the laboratory and which have a high potential for causing morbidity or mortality (examples: nipah virus and drug-resistant tuberculosis).

3. Non-proliferation of biological weapons and awareness of the bioterrorism threat

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical) is a phenomenon that can generate serious threats and dangers to international security. The casuistry in the matter confirms that groups that possess or are trying to acquire such weapons are constantly growing. They can escape control, despite the efforts of the international community to prevent their use.

The proliferation of biological and chemical weapons is to a large extent recognized as a growing international security issue, both in the event of an inter-state conflict and as a potential dimension of terrorism.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. The

states parties to the *Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention* (BTWC) have agreed not to develop, produce, store or acquire biological agents and related equipment for hostile purposes.

Subsequently, the "*Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction*" was drafted in 1972, known as BWC (*Biological Weapons Convention*)⁹. This treaty prohibits the development, production and storage of pathogen agents or toxins in "quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes". In accordance with BWC, it is also forbidden to develop delivery systems and the transfer of biological technology or biological expertise to other countries. In addition, the signatories to the BWC requested to destroy stockpiles, delivery systems and production equipment within 9 months of ratification of the treaty. This agreement was signed by 103 nations and the treaty was ratified in April 1972. The BWC came into force in March 1975. Signatories who have not yet ratified the BWC are obliged to refrain from activities that would defeat the purpose of the treaty until they communicate specifically to the UN their intention not to ratify the treaty. The BWC review meetings took place in 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996. The BWC signatories are required to present UN the following information annually: facilities in which biological research activities are carried out, scientific conferences taking place at specified facilities, exchange of scientists or information and outbreaks of diseases¹⁰.

In 1994, a Special Conference set up an ad hoc group of States participating in the Convention to examine possible verification measures and proposals to strengthen the Convention. The 4th Review Conference, which took place in 1996, agreed to conclude a Protocol as early as possible before the start of the 5th Review Conference in 2001. During its meeting on 24 May 2000, in Florence, NATO countries reaffirmed their support for this goal.

Because of international events, there has been a growing number of recent developments in biological weapons, terrorist biological attacks, in a word, bioterrorism. The interest of these groups for chemical and biological weapons is worrying even more. Heads of terrorist organizations have openly expressed their intention to take possession of and use weapons of mass destruction. This desire certainly raises serious concern and poses a threat to all nations.

Some authors even think that a new era, a post-nuclear threat, in which the biological threat takes the place of the nuclear threat, has begun. At present, the "Trojan horse" of international terrorism is bioterrorism, and that is because the main target of the bioterrorist attack is the civilian population.

Bioterrorism, a component of terrorism, is the deliberate use or threat of using biological (etiological) agents of infectious diseases (*viruses, bacteria, parasites and fungus*), their toxins, plant toxins, bio-regulators, materials contaminated with them, in order to induce the death of humans, animals or plants and spread anxiety, fear, terror, to intimidate a person, a specific group of people, or a country's population for religious, political, ideological purposes, financial or personal interests. Bioterrorism can also be directed against food and feed reserves, food preparation and storage facilities, and water supplies.

The interest of terrorists in chemical and biological weapons has increased especially since the Tokyo subway attack, and there is evidence that some terrorist organizations and groups have a particular interest in chemical and biological means.

⁹ *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction*, 1972, available online at: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio>, accessed on October 27, 2018.

¹⁰ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Arms control and disarmament agreements: texts and histories of the negotiations*, 1996, available online at: <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pur1.32754066656608;view=1up;seq=3>, accessed on October 28, 2018.

Bioterrorist attacks are considered by most people to be mysterious, non-discriminatory, uncontrollable and unpredictable, difficult to dissociate from a natural epidemic, all of these characteristics generating a state of collective anxiety.

The means by which bioterrorist actions are carried out, are divided into three categories: known, suspected (possible) and unknown. For those currently known (own laboratories, different enterprises of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, drug and toxin manufacturing facilities, transport and dispersal facilities at the target, etc.) and for those likely to be used, measures can be envisaged appropriate countermeasures and protection.

More difficult to counteract are those that are still unpredictable. These means are based in particular on modern biotechnologies and, in particular, on genetic engineering research. New discoveries on genomics and genetic changes are already being applied in agriculture and animal culture, and the current outcomes (creation of mutants, bacteria, viruses, etc.) start to be worrying. A biological attack will only be detected when the first symptoms or even the first victims occur. This delayed effect also gives bioterrorism a great deal of efficacy.

Regarding the purchase of biological agents, although procurement may be legally motivated, it can still cover criminal activities. For a terrorist, procuring a pathogen or a source of toxins to produce and disseminate a biological weapon is a challenge. Thus, it is possible to purchase biological agents even with the support of a government (national programs of biological weapons), by diversion of substances on the travel itinerary by the theft from specialized institutions in this field (universities, industrial societies or microbiology laboratories) by purchasing from the black market or even extracting from natural sources.

At the same time with the acquisition and production of biological agents, there are several methods that allow the isolation, cultivation and purification of biological materials for later use as weapons, processes that do not necessarily require advanced professional training or the need for specialized equipment. Both libraries and the Internet provide a wealth of detailed information on the preparation of clandestine biological agents.

Some countries, like France, took the risks of bioterrorism seriously. The BIOTOX Plan, created after September 11, 2001, provides for the reconstitution of vaccine stocks against biological agents, 24-hour intervention facilities for specialized laboratories, and the provision of special materials to hospitals to deal with chemical and biological risks¹¹. Water chlorination has been increased to neutralize potential contamination of drinking water networks. A surveillance institute is tasked with detecting health emergencies as early as possible and collecting signals on anthrax, meningitis, etc. Great Britain, Ireland and the U.S. have practiced, especially at the subway, alert exercises to test the ability to react to a biological attack on the population.

In the United States, counter bioterrorism plans exist at the level of each state, drafted just before September 11, 2001. Other states reconstitute their vaccine stocks. Israel has a quantity that will allow it to vaccinate the entire population. In France, 60 million people can be vaccinated within 15 days if necessary. Germany has 100 million doses of smallpox

¹¹ Timothy C. Marrs, Robert L. Maynard, Frederick R. Sidell, *Chemical warfare agents. Toxicology and treatment*, Wiley and sons, 2007, p. 261, available online at: www.google.ro/search?ei=_zbWW_K3I8LXwAKulKrgDQ&q=Timothy+C.+Marrs%2C+Robert+L.+Maynard%2C+Frederick+R.+Sidell%2C+Chemical+warfare+agents.+Toxicology+and+treatment%2C+Wiley+and+sons%2C+2007%2C+p.+261&oq=Timothy+C.+Marrs%2C+Robert+L.+Maynard%2C+Frederick+R.+Sidell%2C+Chemical+warfare+agents.+Toxicology+and+treatment%2C+Wiley+and+sons%2C+2007%2C+p.+261&gs_l=psy-ab.12...3660.3660.0.5387.1.1.0.0.0.0.0.0...0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..1.0.0...0.p IEV61ZGosk, accessed on October 28, 2018.

vaccine¹². However, all these precautionary measures involve huge costs. Risks are at the planetary level, for example, there are no borders in the way of smallpox or plague. The threat is global and therefore the retaliation must also be in the world.

The World Health Organization provides national and international assistance to cope with both consequences of the use of biological weapons and deliberately created "epidemics". For example, the SARS epidemic (*severe acute respiratory syndrome*) has contributed to speeding up the awareness of the biological risks and the impact of economic damage caused by a possible epidemic in a globalized economy.

Each state must undertake to protect its population at present and in the future against the consequences of terrorism, taking into account two legitimate objectives: the life and security of the population respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. Effective population protection requires overcoming national interests and recognizing effective combat against the consequences of bioterrorism.

Optimistic scenarios confirm that there are no "perfect biological weapons". Infection vectors are currently sensitive to known antibiotics. Others, like botulinum toxin, are relatively fragile and non-toxic. Currently, the use of biological weapons could cause a certain number of deaths, but not scary epidemics. However, the pessimistic scenario remains, with the hypothesis of the bacterium resistant to all existing antibiotics through genetic manipulation, a science-fiction scenario.

Conclusion

Considering the above-mentioned aspects of biological warfare agents, I believe we need to learn from the experiences of the past in order not to face similar situations at present or in the future.

Some experts believe that manufacturing of biological weapons is available for many "amateurs". Anyone with advanced knowledge in microbiology could manufacture their own nucleotide synthesizers – devices that serve to set up complex genetic structures. This technology is only at its beginnings, but biologists might someday use it to cause subtle mutations of already known microbes. If these diseases would resist to existing vaccines, their potential to kill would have no limits.

Thus, from my point of view, for a coherent bioterrorist riposte, it is necessary to combine several protective measures, starting with the prevention of the terrorist attacks. For this purpose, the international intelligence structures have developed programs to make the activities of potentially dangerous groups known and supervised strictly. In this area, it is absolutely necessary to step up exchanges of information between structures, agencies, cooperation between states, whose input is vital to the creation of an effective international system to counter any attempts to use biological weapons. Also, I consider that greater attention should be paid to monitoring the traffic of biological agents, even though most of them are dual-use products, demanding export controls, or any exchange of raw materials, in order to reduce the possibilities for terrorist groups to obtain them.

I also consider important the education of the civilian population regarding the way of protection and action in case of a mass destruction weapon attack. Appropriate protection measures, psychological aspects, or support to institutions with incident management responsibilities with a focus on victims care, should be considered here. If military units are equipped and trained to carry out operations in biological environments, civilian population is exposed to such a danger without the possibility of an effective response.

¹² *Vaccination, vaccins et produits biologiques*, World Health Organization (Fr.), available online at: www.who.int/immunization/global_vaccine_action_plan/fr; accessed on October 27, 2018.

In this respect, I appreciate the importance of investing in specialized technology for the detection of biological warfare agents. At national level, institutions with responsibilities are interested in acquiring these devices. The Romanian Army has specialized structures for the detection of biological warfare agents and laboratories for the analysis of suspicious samples to be biologically contaminated, some of which are being homologated at this time.

At the same time, in order to counteract the terrorist threat, at the strategic level, I believe that the fight for non-proliferation must continue. All democratic states need to strengthen their legislation in the field, including the production, development and illegal possession of biological agents, on the list of major crimes against national security. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and their Destruction" of 1972 provides that States Parties shall take the necessary measures to ensure that prohibitive provisions of the Treaty become binding on all citizens.

In conclusion, the understanding of the real nature of the biological weapons threat, the efforts to stop their proliferation through strict control of exports and imports of dual-use agents and equipment, harmonization of legislation, exchanges of information on the purchase of biological agents, and a strong reaction, nationally and internationally, against countries that do not comply with the 1972 Convention, could discourage those who intend to use such weapons of mass destruction.

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DEVELOPMENTS AND CHANGE IN ASYLUM AND MIGRATION POLICIES IN EUROPE

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Abstract: *Due to the flow of migrants in 2015, European governments and the European Union have had quickly to reassess their asylum and migration policies. At national level, states have fluctuated between open borders migration policies for humanitarian, economic and demographic reasons and restrictive measures because of growing fears about security, real risks or perceived as such. At the European community level, amid an European identity crisis and the traces left by the 2008 financial crisis, the flaw especially among the states of the Visegrad Group and the Franco-German core delayed the implementation of unitary measures on asylum and migration across the European Union.*

Keywords: *asylum and migration policies; refugee and illegal migrant crisis; risks; security; perception; populism.*

Introduction

Migrants currently account for 3.4% of the world's population¹. United Nations data show that 243 million people have left their country of origin². We experience a continued *growth* of international *migration*, but we are talking about a moderate growth; for example, in 18 years the share of migrants increased by only 0.5%³. The 2015 migration crisis has again drawn attention to the phenomenon, to the right to asylum.

It should be noted that the number of asylum seekers in the European Union has steadily increased from 2008 to 2016 and that in 2017 there is a decrease in the number of requests, which has almost reached the pre-refugee and illegal migrant crisis: 712,235 requests⁴. The peak of asylum applications was registered in 2015, when 1.3 million people (of which 1.25 million were first-time applicants) requested this form of protection⁵. There is a doubling of the number of asylum seekers as compared to 2014 (626,000 applicants, of which 562,680 are first-time applicants) and six times higher than in 2008 (225,000 applications, of which 152,980 are first-time applicants)⁶.

In 2015, 29% of asylum seekers were Syrians and 17% were Afghans⁷. Germany

¹ Statistics United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "International migrant stock: The 2017 revision", available online at: <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml>, accessed on July 14, 2018.

² *Idem.*

³ In 1990, 2.9% of the world's population was represented by migrants, Statistics "International migrant stock: The 2017 revision", *op. cit.*

⁴ Eurostat, Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data, data from August 14, 2018, available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-datasets/-/MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA, accessed on August 24, 2018.

⁵ *Idem.*

⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁷ Eurostat, "Asylum in the EU Member States", Eurostat News Release, 44/2016, March 4, 2016, available

registered 476,510 asylum seekers that year (441,800 were first-time applicants)⁸. It is a double number over the previous year. The peak of asylum applications was reached in this country in 2016, when 745,155 people (722,265 were first-time applicants) lodged an asylum application, meaning 28 times more than in 2008⁹. If we look at the 2015-2017 period, Germany received the highest number of asylum requests: 1.4 million. It is followed by Italy with 335,350 applications, France 259,765 applications, Sweden 217,565 applications, Hungary 209,955 requests and Greece with 122,965 applications for asylum¹⁰. We note that the migration situation has changed for Europe after the Second World War: from colonizer Europe became a destination for migrants in the second half of the 20th century.

In their work “Age of Migration”, sociologists Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller identified four phases of post-war migration in Europe, based on labor market demand, the evolution of economic and demographic strategies, and on the enlargement process of the European Union¹¹. In the first phase (1945-1970) of post-war migration Western European economies developed rapidly, including due to Marshall Plan, the level of education increased, unskilled labor decreased. Therefore, the Western European countries brought workers first from the southern continent (Portugal, Spain, Italy, the former Yugoslavia) and then expanded their recruitment base with Turkey, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and the former colonies (Mali, Senegal, Caribbean countries)¹². This phase ends with the 1973 oil crisis and the recession which have resulted in the end of recruiting foreign labor policy.

The second phase (mid-1970s - mid-90s) is marked by the introduction of new technologies in industry, the cutting of mining and heavy industry subsidies, which led to layoffs, including among migrant workers¹³. It is the moment when many migrants decide to settle in the countries that have recruited them and it is the starting moment for family-based immigration¹⁴.

With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the German reunification begins the third phase of post-war migration (mid-1980s). The eastern countries become a new source of work, and the southern continent and Ireland are becoming destination countries for migrants in Eastern Europe, West Africa and Latin America¹⁵. The last phase of post-war migration begins with the 2008 economic crisis followed by a downturn, which reduced the annual growth rate of global migration as of 2010 (from 2.3% to 1.5% in developed regions)¹⁶.

1. The development of migration policies in Germany and Hungary

Depending on the country's interests, governments are trying to restrict migration, if not, at least to select the migrants they need with migration policies. “Immigration policy is the outcome of a political process through which competing interests interact within bureaucratic, legislative, judicial, and public arenas to construct and implement policies that

online at: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a549-59b99ed6>, accessed on July 14, 2018.

⁸ Eurostat, *Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data*, *op. cit.*

⁹ *Ibidem.*

¹⁰ *Ibidem.*

¹¹ Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller, “Age of Migration”. Apud: Hein de Haas, “European Migrations: Dynamics, Drivers, and the Role of Policies”, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018, p. 6, available online at: <http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC109783/kjna29060enn.pdf>, accessed on August 2, 2018.

¹² Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller, *op. cit.*, p.8.

¹³ *Idem.*

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵ Stephen Castles, Hein de Haas and Mark J. Miller, *op. cit.*, p.9.

¹⁶ OECD and UN-DESA, *World Migration in Figures*, 3-4 October, 2016, p. 2, available online at: <https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf>, accessed on July 23, 2018.

encourage, discourage, or otherwise regulate the flow of immigrants”, asserts Douglas E. Massey¹⁷.

According to Professor Eytan Meyers, immigration policies have two clear components: immigration control policy-regulation and immigrant policy¹⁸. The first, to which we refer, is the set of laws and procedures for the selection and admission of foreign citizens, whether they be economic migrants or refugees. Immigrant policy has the role to take action to limit illegal migration.

The second component, immigrant policy, is the state's offer for migrants, meaning working conditions, housing and access to social benefits, health care and education.

The 2015 refugee crisis has again brought to the fore the importance of effective migration policies at national level and the need for a unitary approach at European level.

This unified approach still has not been implemented. On the one hand, we have Germany that has opened its doors to the refugees, on the other hand we have the group of Visegrad, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, who refuse to take refugees, which in their view represent an identity and security risk. Austria and Italy adopted a common front on migration matters with the four states. The position of the Visegrad states on the flow of migrants in 2015 was formulated in a joint declaration in September of the same year: the protection of the external borders of the European Union and the Schengen area, combating the causes of migration, migrant trafficking, the implementation of reception and sorting points, the so-called hotspots, and financial support for refugees in camps in the European Union neighborhood, in Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon¹⁹. “*Some saw it as a consequence of the illiberal tendencies in the region while others considered the Visegrad approach as proof of the European East-West divide*”, assess Máté Szalai, Zsuzsanna Csornai and Nikolett Garai from the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade Hungary²⁰.

In order to understand the differences between opposite positions in the European Union, we are reviewing the evolution of migration policies in Germany and Hungary, two states that in the context of the crisis of migrants have different views, one is the flagship of open borders, the other is set on preserving ethnic homogeneity and national identity. At the end of the chapter we will analyze the migration policies of the two states from the perspective of international relations.

1.1. Germany

In the 1960s and 1970s, Germany's economy grew rapidly and the industry was showing signs of needing more labor to sustain production. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has decided to bring labor from abroad to cover the country's workers' shortage.

Thus, agreements were signed with Italy in 1955, with Greece and Spain in 1960, with Turkey in 1961, with Morocco in 1963, there have been agreements with Portugal and Tunisia

¹⁷ Douglas E. Massey, “International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State”, *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Population Council, Jun. 1999, p.307, available online at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/172427>, accessed on July 23, 2018.

¹⁸ Eytan Meyers, “International Immigration Policy: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis”, *Center for Migration Studies*, Volume 34, No. 4, New York, 2000, p.1246, available online at: http://s3.amazonaws.com/migrants_heroku_production/datas/986/Class_2_Migration_Theories_original.pdf?1380220420, accessed on July 22, 2018.

¹⁹ *Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the Visegrad Group Countries*, September 4, 2015, available online at: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015>, accessed on July 22, 2018.

²⁰ Máté Szalai, Zsuzsanna Csornai, Nikolett Garai, “V4 Migration Policy: Conflicting Narratives and Interpretative Frameworks”, *Barcelona Center for Foreign Affairs*, January 2017, available online at: https://www.cidob.org/articulos/monografias/illiberals/v4_migration_policy_conflicting_narratives_and_interpretative_frameworks, accessed on July 12, 2018.

in 1964, respectively, in 1965 and with Yugoslavia in 1968²¹. Historian Heike Knortz argues that Germany's guest worker program was not only generated by the need of labor force but also by its strategic interests: the need to maintain trade relations with certain countries, to support the stability of a NATO partner, to integrate a country into the European Economic Community, or "in the case of Yugoslavia to ease East-West frictions"²². From the late 1950s to 1973, the year of the oil crisis and the year when no such agreements were concluded, 14 million foreign workers arrived in Germany, of which 11 million went back to their country of origin²³.

From the 1970s to the late 1990s, Western-German Migration Policies and after reunified Germany policies had three guidelines: to restrict migration outside the EU space, to encourage and support the return of migrants and their reintegration into the countries of origin, to encourage the integration of foreigners living legally in Germany²⁴. In 1974, one year after the oil crisis and one year after Germany decided to end the agreements for the so-called Gastarbeiter²⁵, a type of work permit was introduced, which was only granted if it could be proved that not every German can do this work, and one year later, the child migrant allowance was reduced, a reward for those returning to the countries of origin was introduced, and measures were taken to combat undeclared work²⁶.

In 1977, even if Germany did not consider itself an immigration country, several measures were adopted for the social integration of foreign labor, and one year later, foreign workers were given a temporary work permit after 8 years of unlimited working in Germany²⁷. In 1980, new regulations to reduce the number of migrants were adopted. Among other things, asylum-seekers who did not meet the legal requirements for receiving asylum were expelled quickly and visas were introduced for countries from which large numbers of migrants came²⁸. In 2000, the government then decided to introduce a so-called Green Card to attract qualified telecoms workers, where the German labor market was deficient. The effect of this measure was clear: between 2000 and 2004, around 18,000 IT-foreigners came to Germany²⁹.

In 2005, the first law on immigration, called "*The law on controlling and limiting migration and regulating the stay and integration of foreigners*" came into force. By this law the state was, for the first time, responsible for integrating foreigners and their families; the new regulation aimed at immigration of qualified and highly skilled workers³⁰. In 2009, the law on labor migration control conditioned the temporary stay of a minimum income of 63,000 euros. In 2012 German legislation transposed an EU directive on skilled labor through which third-country nationals can receive the so-called blue card, a conditional stay permit for

²¹ Vera Hanewinken, Jochen Oltmer, Länderprofil Deutschland, "Fokus Migration", *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung*, septembrie 2017, p. 3, available online at: <http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/laenderprofile/208594/deutschland>, accessed on July 12, 2018.

²² Heike Knortz, "Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte. Gastarbeiter in der westdeutschen Diplomatie und Beschäftigungspolitik 1953-1973", Böhlau Verlag, Köln, 2008, p. 8.

²³ Vera Hanewinken, Jochen Oltmer, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Steffen Angenend, "Die Steuerung der Arbeitsmigration in Deutschland. Reformbedarf und Handlungsmöglichkeiten", Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2008, Bonn, p.11, available online at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/wiso/05705.pdf>, accessed on July 2, 2018,

²⁵ Foreign workers who came mainly in West Germany as a part of a guest worker program in the 1950s till the early 70s.

²⁶ *Idem.*

²⁷ Data from the German Labor Market Research Institute, "Zeittafel der Ausländerpolitik seit dem Anwerbestopp", IAB, 1988, available online at: http://doku.iab.de/chronik/31/1988_02_01_31_zeit.pdf, accessed on July 3, 2018.

²⁸ *Idem.*

²⁹ Vera Hanewinken, Jochen Oltmer, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

³⁰ *Idem.*

higher education, or the proof of a contract that involves an annual income of nearly 51,000 euros³¹. A lower income is accepted in areas where Germany has a labor shortage, for example, medicine or IT.

In 2014, after heated debates on the political scene on “Romanian and Bulgarian migrants”, the German law was changed in such a way that migrants, EU citizens who abused the social system, could be temporarily banned from entering the country³². Another law that passed in 2016 provides for EU citizens access to state aids only after a 5-year stay in Germany³³. Germany, surprised by the radical change in the controlled, restrictive migration line in 2015 when it received a large number of refugees by suspending the Dublin Agreement. But Germany was the first country to temporarily suspend the Schengen Agreement in September 2015 by introducing border controls with Austria to better manage the flow of migrants.

Extremist right-wing populist movements such as the European Patriots against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA) have grown particularly in the East of Germany, and in 2017 the extreme-right Alternate Party for Germany, opposed to migration, entered Parliament, being the main opposition party. A survey in September shows that if there were elections, the Alternative for Germany would be ahead of the Social-Democratic Party³⁴. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s open policy on migration has generated tensions within the CDU-CSU’s political union, and Horst Seehofer, head of the CSU, the Bavarian conservative wing, became Interior Minister in 2018. And Chancellor Merkel had to change his speech radically. “We need to control and order migration. Migration must follow clear rules. We need to establish - possibly according to common European standards - who is coming, who is allowed to stay with us. (...) We must combat the causes of forced and illegal migration. That would mean people do not have to migrate”, said Angela Merkel in the summer of 2018³⁵.

The 2012 CDU / CSU-SPD ruling coalition agreement provides for the limitation of the number of refugees to 180,000-220,000 a year³⁶ and the limitation of family reunification to 1,000 people per month. It is to be said that in 2018 the German government wants to discourage migration for the sake of social benefits, seeking solutions to reduce child allowances for migrants from EU countries residing in the country of origin, about 1 million children³⁷. Data from the German Institute of Statistics shows that in 2016 the percentage of the population with migratory background grew by 8.5% compared to 2015, reaching 18.6 million citizens and it is the highest increase since 2005³⁸. Of these, 2.3 million were rooted in the Middle East (51% growth over 2011) and 740,000 in Africa (46% up on 2011)³⁹. It should

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ Kantar Emnid Survey for Bild am Sonntag, “Afd überholt SPD und wird zweitstärkste Partei”, Bild, September 29, 2018, available online at: <https://www.bild.de/politik/inland/politik-inland/sonntagstrend-afd-ueberholt-spd-und-wird-zweitstaerkste-partei-57556998.bild.html>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

³⁵ Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zum Gedenktag für die Opfer von Flucht und Vertreibung am 20. Juni 2018 in Berlin, June 20, 2018, available online at: <https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Rede/2018/06/2018-06-20-rede-gedenkstunde-20-juni.html>, accessed on July 23, 2018.

³⁶ Coalition Program CDU/CSU-SPD 2018, “Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land”, available online at: https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag_2018.pdf?file=1, accessed on July 3, 2018, p. 15.

³⁷ „Die meisten Kinder leben in Deutschland”, Tagesspiegel, August 9, 2018, available online at: <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/kindergeld-fuer-eu-auslaender-die-meisten-kinder-leben-in-deutschland/22899518.html>, accessed on August 9, 2018.

³⁸ Comunicat “Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund um 8.5 % gestiegen”, Destatis, August 1, 2017, available online at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2017/08/PD17_261_12511.html, accessed on July 13, 2018.

³⁹ *Idem*.

be said that out of 18.6 million citizens with a migrant background 52% have German citizenship⁴⁰.

1.2. Hungary

The evolution of migration in Hungary is quite different from that of Germany. After the Communists came to power in 1947, Hungary closed its borders to both migrants who wanted to come to the country and their own citizens who wanted to leave. Immediately after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, more than 176,000 people fled the country⁴¹. Until the fall of the Iron Curtain, Hungary was almost isolated from the phenomenon of migration. In the years 1988-1990 a number of Hungarian ethnic Hungarians crossed the border illegally in Hungary⁴². In 1989, all laws prohibiting Hungarians from leaving the country were repealed. Two years later, a law strictly regulated the regime of foreign employees in Hungary⁴³. Two new laws governing the granting of Hungarian citizenship and the right of residence were adopted in 1992-1994. Granting Hungarian citizenship was only possible after an eight-year stay in Hungary, and the immigrant status was only granted to the person who worked for three years in Hungary⁴⁴. In 2002, 115,000 foreign citizens had a residence permit, meaning 1.1% of the country's population, almost half (43%) of them being Romanian, ethnic Hungarians⁴⁵.

The Office for Refugees and Migration, subordinated to the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, opened in 2000, deals with refugees, grants citizenship and coordinates centers for asylum seekers⁴⁶. Hungary joins the European Union in 2004, but Italy and the Netherlands open their market for Hungarian workers only two years later, and Austria and Germany only in 2011⁴⁷. In the same year, a new law simplifies the process of naturalization, meaning that anyone who proves that he knows Hungarian at an elementary level, has Hungarian origins or thinks he/she has and presents a clean criminal record can become a Hungarian citizen even if he/she lives outside Hungary⁴⁸. In October 2013, the Hungarian Government adopts the first Migration Strategy, which deals in particular with third-country migrants crossing Hungary to the Center of Europe and asylum seekers. In 2015, when Hungary was crossed by a large number of migrants wishing to reach the Balkan route in central Europe, the Budapest government “*allowed for expedited asylum determination and limited procedural safeguards. Additionally, climbing through the border fence or damaging it became a criminal offense punishable with imprisonment*”⁴⁹. In 2016 and 2017, Hungary took new measures against asylum seekers, firstly illegal migrants were pushed to the other side of the border, and then all migrants who illegally entered Hungary had to be rejected at the southern border⁵⁰. From 2018, only one refugee a day can cross the Hungarian border from transit areas that are mostly

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ Irén Godri, Béla Soltesz, Boróka Bodacz-Nagy, “Immigration or Emigration Country. Migration Trends and their Socio-economic Background in Hungary. A Longer-term Historical Perspective”, Working Paper on Population, Family and Welfare, Hungarian Demographic Research Institute, 2014, p. 11, available online at: demografia.hu/en/publicationsonline/index.php/.../571, accessed on July 22, 2018.

⁴² *Idem*.

⁴³ Judit Juhász, "Hungary: Transit Country Between East and West", *Migration Policy*, Migration Policy Institute, November 1th 2003, available online at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hungary-transit-country-between-east-and-west>, accessed on July 2, 2018.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁹ IOM, “Migration Issues for Hungary”, June 29, 2018, available online at: <http://www.iom.hu/migration-issues-hungary>, accessed on June 29, 2018.

⁵⁰ *Idem*.

on Serbian territory⁵¹. Two infringement procedures were launched by the European Commission and the European Court of Justice against Hungary for the asylum law and the refusal of migrant quotas⁵².

1.3. Comparing Germany and Hungary

The differences between the migration policies of Germany, supported by France, and Hungary, the Visegrad Group's lance peak, can be analyzed with the help of international relations theory.

In the spirit of neorealism, Roderick Parkes argues that "across the world, countries are not only trying to reassert control of their borders but to use people flows and differences of population size for geostrategic gain"⁵³. After 11 September 2001 attacks, migration control became a problem related to the security and sovereignty of the state⁵⁴. European countries are related to migration and geographical location, by the distance of the external borders of the European Union. Germany, France have maritime borders distant to the origin places of refugees and illegal migrants, Italy and Spain have closed maritime borders, and Hungary and Poland manage EU land borders. Therefore, states with external EU maritime or land borders tend to regard migration as a security issue more than Germany, which is in the heart of Europe⁵⁵. In addition, migration, whether initially involuntary, is welcome in the Central European countries experiencing a demographic decline and a lack of workforce. Germany recruited migrants in the 1960s, when migration networks were formed, but Hungary was isolated from communism. Hungary has neither the past of a great colonizer⁵⁶.

The second theoretical approach is that of neoliberalism, of niche parties, which influence the strategies of large traditional political parties. "Niche parties are increasingly viewed as issue entrepreneurs because they contribute to the evolution and politicization of new political issues. Scholars have argued that successful radical right (and left) parties determine the politics of European integration in particular and shape its importance for national political competition", considers Tarik Abou-Chadi⁵⁷.

It happened in Hungary, where FIDESZ had to take over from the Jobbik extremist electoral issues, and in Germany much later, where CDU's political union partner CSU, the Bavarian conservatives, took over part of the Alternative for Germany extremist rhetoric in migration issues. The constructivist approach has to do with a vision of the world that bears the mark of communist isolation that has maintained some ethnic homogeneity. The countries of the Visegrad Group did not have lived the migration experience but experienced the nationalism promoted by the Communist regimes.

⁵¹ *Ibidem.*

⁵² *Ibidem.*

⁵³ Roderick Parkes, "European Union and the Geopolitics of Migration", UIPaper, No. 1, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2015, available online at: <https://www.ui.se/globalassets/butiken/ui-paper/2015/european-union-and-the-geopolitics-of-migration---rp.pdf>, accessed July 22, 2018.

⁵⁴ Fiona B. Adamso, Crossing Borders. International Migration and National Security, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, MIT Press, Summer 2006, pp. 165-199, available online at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137542?origin=JSTOR-pdf>, accessed August on 23, 2018.

⁵⁵ Máté Szalai, Zsuzsanna Csornai and Nikolett Garai, "V4 Migration Policy: Conflicting Narratives and Interpretative Frameworks", Barcelona Center for International Affairs, January 2017, available online at: https://www.cidob.org/articulos/monografias/illiberals/v4_migration_policy_conflicting_narratives_and_interpretative_frameworks, accessed on July 14, 2018.

⁵⁶ Tamás Kolosi, István György Tóth, *Társadalmi riport 2016*, Tarki, Budapest, 2016, pp. 26-28, available online at: http://old.tarki.hu/en/publications/SR/2016/trip2016_resumes.pdf, accessed on July 23, 2018,

⁵⁷ Tarik Abou-Chadi, "Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts –How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact", *British Journal of Political Science*, June 2014, pp. 1 – 20, accessed on July 14, 2018.

If we look at Hungary, xenophobic trends among the population are highlighted by polls. Since 1992, the TÁRKI Social Research Institute has introduced a question about refugees in its opinion polls: receive all refugees, some of them or none. Surveys from 1992 to 2012 show that only a small proportion of respondents agree to receive all refugees⁵⁸. In 1995, 40% of the respondents claimed that no refugee should be received and 55% responded to be selectively received⁵⁹. In 2001, 43% of respondents against receiving a refugee and 53% agreed to accept refugees on a case-by-case basis⁶⁰. In 2012, 43% did not want any refugees in their country, and 49% agreed to their selective reception⁶¹. In the same year, 82% of the Hungarians questioned did not want Arabs to be granted asylum status, 79% of Chinese, 75% of Russians and 71% of Romanians⁶².

2. The evolution of EU asylum and migration policies

The European Union also experienced the dilemma that national Member States have: on the one hand, we have the principle of free movement of labor and the need to open up the market to domestic and non-EU migrants, because the economy is demanding labor, on the other hand we have restrictive regulations and fear of security risks of all kinds, from social to physical security. The proof is the evolution of EU migration policies. “The European Union has gone through a process of internal opening since 1951 when Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded the European Coal and Steel Community, and in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community. In seven successive accession waves from 1973 to 2013, the EU has expanded to its current 28 members”, underlines Hein de Haas⁶³.

Although the European Community adopted in 1969 the free movement of workers, its enlargement has triggered the fear of an influx of migrants from the newer states. That has led to the imposition of temporary restrictions on the labor market⁶⁴. For example, Greece, which joined in 1981, waited for seven years until its citizens could work on the European labor market, Portugal joined in 1986 waited for the opening of the labor market for its citizens by 1991. Malta, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, and after, Romania and Bulgaria had to wait a few years from accession until their citizens have free access to the labor market of all EU countries. The free movement of workers is a fundamental principle shined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union⁶⁵. A new form of gradual internal opening of the European Union took place once the Schengen Agreement entered into force in 1995.

Association Agreements with the Eastern Partnership countries, which guarantee the mobility of citizens of these countries across the EU, represent a new step in the opening of the European Union, but also a closure to migration outside the European Union. The 2015 refugee crisis has caught the European Union in the midst of an identity crisis highlighted by the economic crisis of 2008, which has increased the gap between the southern and central

⁵⁸ TARKI Hungarian Household Panel 1992–1997, *TARKI Omnibus Survey 1998–2012* (apud: Irén Godri, Béla Soltesz, Boróka Bodacz-Nagy, *op. cit.*, p. 18).

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

⁶² *Ibidem*.

⁶³ Hein de Haas, *op. cit.*, p.13.

⁶⁴ *Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community*, available online at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31968R1612:EN:HTML>, accessed on July 23, 2018.

⁶⁵ *Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*, Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 59, June 6, 2016, p. 65, available online at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/oj_c_2016_202_full_en_txt.pdf, accessed on July 4, 2018.

states that demanded austerity measures. In 2016, most Greeks did not feel European⁶⁶. During the economic crisis, the number of Italians who considered themselves Europeans also dropped. The economic crisis has nourished a series of Eurosceptic, populist and extremist movements.

In this context, the European Union has had to take action on three fronts: outside the EU, at the borders of the Union and within it⁶⁷. Inside, the European Union has set up a program for the resettlement of refugees in other EU countries, a plan that was rejected by Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Measures at its borders were taken: the European Union tripled its presence at sea for combat migrant trafficking and save lives, set hotspots in Greece and Italy for receiving and sorting migrants⁶⁸.

One of the measures taken outside the EU with a clear result is the signing of the Agreement with Turkey, which entered into force in 2016⁶⁹. The agreement assumed offering € 3 billion to Turkey for supporting Syrian refugees, he was also meant to stop the wave of migrants at the gates of Europe⁷⁰. The EU assistance program for Libya and the framework of the trilateral African Union (AU) -EU-UN Task Force have the same role of outsourcing migrants⁷¹.

New measures to secure European borders are in the process of being adopted. One of these measures is to strengthen Frontex⁷², by granting more executive power (e.g. identifying illegal migrants for quick repatriation), fitting out the agency with navies and increasing staff numbers (from 400 in 2014 and 2,800 in 2018) to 10.000⁷³. They would support the European Union and its neighbors in defending external borders. Although Hungary refused this proposal and Spain, Greece and Italy were skeptical about this initiative, Frontex already supports Serbia in defending its borders with Bulgaria and Macedonia. In addition, the European Commission wants to *“transform the existing European Asylum Support Office into a fully-fledged European Union Agency for Asylum with an enhanced mandate and considerably expanded tasks”*⁷⁴.

The new structure will provide expert teams to migratory pressure to help national authorities. The European Commission also proposes a new economic partnership between the EU and Africa that will generate 10 million jobs in Africa over the next five years. It should be noted here that improving living conditions does not stop people from leaving their

⁶⁶ Barbara Boettcher, Mattias Dincher, “Are Europeans facing an identity crisis?” Deutsche Bank Research, April 4, 2017, available online at: [https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwsite=RPS_EN-PROD&rwobj=Re Display.Start.class&document=PROD000000000448379](https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwsite=RPS_EN-PROD&rwobj=Re%20Display.Start.class&document=PROD000000000448379), accessed on July 4, 2018.

⁶⁷ “UE și criza migrației”, European Union Factsheets, July 2017, available online at: <http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/migration-crisis/ro/>, accessed on July 22, 2018.

⁶⁸ *Idem*.

⁶⁹ After the record of 10,000 arrivals in one day in October 2015, as of March 2016 arrivals to Greece amounted, on average, to less than 74 per day, „UE și criza migrației”, *op. cit.*

⁷⁰ EU-Turkey Statement. Two Years On, European Commission, April 2018, available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20180314_eu-turkey-two-years-on_en.pdf, accessed on July 22, 2018.

⁷¹ “Factsheet on the relations between Libya and the European Union”, European External Action, Brussels, September 24, 2018, available online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/19163/EU-Libya%20relations, accessed on September 24, 2018.

⁷² Frontex budget raised from €6 million in 2005 to €98 million in 2014 and €320 million in 2018. See details in: Shoshana Fine, “Back to Frontex: Europe's misguided migration policy”, European Council on Foreign Relations, September 27, 2018, available online at: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_back_to_frontex_europes_misguided_migration_policy, accessed on September 27, 2018.

⁷³ “State of the Union 2018. A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard”, European Commission, July 3, 2018, available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf, accessed on July 3, 2018.

⁷⁴ “State of the Union 2018: A reinforced European Union Agency for Asylum – Questions and Answers”, European Commission - Fact Sheet, Strasbourg, September 12, 2018, available online at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-18-5714_en.htm, accessed on September 13, 2018.

country of origin, but rather increases their aspirations and possibly leads them to migrate to countries with a high level of living⁷⁵.

Conclusions

States tend to impose restrictive measures on migrants or at least to select migrants for demographic, economic or geostrategic interests.

It is noticed that the migration policies of the states vary especially according to the evolution of their economies. In times of economic growth, policies are more relaxed, and in times of crisis or recession they become restrictive. In the process of setting migration policies, actors must take into account the determinants of migration and the fact that migrants renounce mobility and tend to settle in their countries of origin when migration is restricted. In times when countries have imposed limits on labor migration, migration has increased for family reunification. The 2015 refugee and illegal migrant crisis in the European Union came amid the weakening of cohesion in the European Union as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The European Union had to take shortly a series of external measures at the borders and within it to reduce the flow of refugees and illegal migrants. The trend is to outsource the flows through agreements with third countries. The red line of the European Union's asylum and migration policies is the gradual internal opening and closure of external immigration. Three years after the outbreak of the refugee and illegal migrant crisis the European Union failed to reach a consensus on refugee quotas. The punitive measures that Brussels threatens to put at risk may worsen the gap between the Visegrad group states, which Austria and Italy, and Germany, backed by France and Brussels have rallied. In order to understand the migration policies adopted by states, their migration related history must be taken into account. We see that the history of the former communist states influences their current migration policies. Country migration policies are also influenced by populist and extremist niche parties, exploiting the fears of the population, and climbing into the electoral stand by exploiting these fears. We see that parties' decisions in power in Germany and Hungary have been influenced by such parties.

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SECURITY DIMENSIONS IN GLOBALIZATION - WAR METAMORPHOSIS

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Abstract: *There are many scientific works in the specialty literature focusing their analysis on the bidirectional relation between security and globalization. It is a much debated topic but this does not lose from its importance for the actual security environment with increasingly multiplied and diversified threats as direct and indirect consequences of globalization spreading in the world.*

The paper will approach security – globalization relation from the perspective of war metamorphosis. In this respect the whole study is dedicated to show the vivid picture created by a parallel between the Barry Buzan's national security dimensions and the new types of wars identified under the ongoing multi-dimensional globalization phenomenon.

Keywords: *security, political, economic, societal, environmental, military.*

Introduction

The current accelerated dynamic of the international security environment under the globalization phenomenon generates the emergence of new security dimensions, but also the diversification of the forms of conflict, thus a metamorphosis of the war, in terms of nature, forms, modalities and effects generated.

In the context of the multiplication of security dimensions under the impact of globalization, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the triggering, deployment and outcome of armed confrontations in the present age have, more than ever, a complex determination, in which the military component no longer inevitably has the decisive role¹. Thus, in addition to the already well-known types of war, some are increasingly being spelled out such as "information warfare", "aerospace war", "cyber war", "cosmic war", "media war", "psychotronic war", hybrid forms of war that demonstrate the current multidimensionality of conflict and complex metamorphosis of the classical war to new intricate forms of it.

1. Security dimensions – globalization dimensions

In principle, the security of humanity under the globalization process is affected by five major types of factors - political, military, economic, societal and environmental² - which

¹ Costică Țenu, Lucian Stăncilă, *Curs de artă operativă tema: "Bazele nomologice ale acțiunilor militare în războiul modern*, Academy of High Military Studies Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, p. 60.

² Societal security refers to those threats to society's foundations, primarily of a community, moral nature, that is that conceptual part left uncovered by state security (in the aggregate sense of national security) and individual security (in the narrow sense of national security), constituted by nation, nationalism, ethnicity, ethnic minority, national political identity and cultural identity that give the identity of a social group. See widely: Ionel N Sava, *Studii de securitate*, Romanian Center for Regional Studies, Bucharest, 2007, pp. 2-3, 5.

elicit as many categories of risks, threats and vulnerabilities against it and expressed in similar security dimensions.

In a broad sense, the dimensions of security are as follows: *political security* that refers to the organizational stability of states, governance systems and ideologies that legitimize them; *economic security* with regard to the necessary access to vital resources, finances and markets to support an acceptable level of welfare and state power; *military security* that refers to the dual interaction of capabilities of offensive and defensive state instruments and the perception of states about intentions of one another; social security as “*the ability of a society to survive in its essential nature under conditions that are constantly changing and in the face of possible or present threats*”³; *environmental security* related to the maintenance of the local and global biosphere, as the essential support on which all the actions of the people depend⁴. These five dimensions of security do not operate in isolation from each other, but interrelated.

Globalization, in turn, is characterized by multidimensionality and dynamics, being a complex phenomenon that encompasses realities and tendencies that permeate all areas of social life, including security. In fact, the most affected areas of social life that are constituted in security dimensions are those presented above, namely political, economic, social, cultural, ecological and military, and which translate into so many dimensions of globalization.

By the dimensions of globalization, we understand the strategic coordinates in which the policies and the action strategies achieved by states and international organizations are manifested to achieve the stages of its expansion and which ensure the simplicity, the succession of the integration processes of development and security. In this context, we note the interrelation of the dimensions of globalization, thus, the problems of the globalized environment cannot be approached individually, which is most eloquently highlighted, we consider, in the present internationalized security that is no longer purely military, but has taken over from the multidimensional character of globalization by acquiring valences in various fields - economic, social, cultural, ecological, cybernetic, psychological, etc. - which also interact, aiming at the shaping of hybrid forms of security (political-military, politico-economic, socio-cultural, economic-social, economic-ecological, socio-political etc.). Thus, the constantly diversified security dimensions are globalization-specific dimensions. Here are some of these.

2. The political dimension of globalization - political war

The political dimension of globalization focuses on the choices and succession of political integration, adherence to major political decisions that concern the world, international political initiatives, support and participation in the creation of institutional structures of global political leadership, expanded and intensified contacts, and the manifestation of pluralistic visions in international relations⁵.

Globalization influences significantly the way of governance, so under the impact of this phenomenon, political, academic notions such as territory, national state, sovereignty or national security are subject to political debate. However, as far as international politics in globalization is concerned, it cannot yet be dissociated from the state actors, which remain the universal landmark of the current world in the international system, but the transformative

³ Ole Weaver, Barry Buzan, et al, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Pinter, London, 1993, p. 23.

⁴ Mirela Atanasiu, *Dreptul la securitate națională și colectivă – pilon al procesului de integrare și globalizare*, Ph.D. thesis, “Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest, 2009, p. 22.

⁵ Dumitru Octavian Mitu, *Globalizare și securitate națională – o perspectivă strategică*, Ph.D. thesis, “Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest, 2010, p. 31.

potential must not be underestimated on the global security scene represented by the action of non-state actors such as transnational and multinational corporations, intergovernmental initiatives on various issues, cross-border organizations (terrorist or organized crime), or even some individuals (very rich people, elitists, opinion makers, online activists, etc.).

In this respect, the forms of change in political regulation, especially those related to the emergence and development of the modern state-nation concept, the consolidation of political processes and the emergence of trans-border, transnational and intergovernmental issues, the internal mechanisms of the institutions and the political decision-making rules that generated the new forms of global and regional governance and the implications of the forms of change of political globalization regarding the nature of the sovereignty, autonomy and responsibility of the state.

As far as war is concerned, it is a political act in itself, which makes the term "political war" seem, in part, pleonastic. But in the literature the phrase is often circulated, some authors believing that "*the political war is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in peacetime*"⁶. In its broadest sense, political war refers to engaging all the means available to a state to achieve national goals. These means can be used in "sight" actions such as political alliances and/or economic measures (e.g. Marshall Plan⁷) and in hidden actions such as propaganda, psychological warfare, encouragement or support of resistance movements in hostile states, etc. Moreover, recent history has shown that the very convergence of this last type of hidden, seemingly non-violent action contributes more successfully to the shaping of the current, and future, international security environment than the military ones described as violent.

3. The economic dimension of globalization - economic war

Economic globalization began when state-owned organizations with their own economic systems began to interact with other similar organizations but with different economic organizations through trade or territorial domination of military gains.

Different specialists identify international trade as "*one of the main driving forces of economic globalization, but also one of the most prominent manifestations of the globalization process, namely the development of international trade of states has a direct impact on their level of economic globalization*"⁸. Trade globalization also has a strong impact on the workforce and income distribution globally as a result of large corporations moving their activity and infrastructure into areas where labor is cheaper and more numerous.

Throughout history, governments have been regarded as the main agents of globalization, but in recent years multinational and transnational corporations have become a force in the process of economic globalization. Many of these companies have become major players in the global market with a decisive role in shaping future international economic relations. Thus, economic globalization leads to the creation of a global economic identity, resulting from the convergence of national values, institutions and policies and of national economic systems, towards a unique model characterized by homogenization of the national economic and social institutions.

⁶ Max Boot, Michael Doran, „Political Warfare”, *Policy Innovation Memorandum*, No. 33, Council on Foreign Affairs, June 28, 2013, available online at: <https://www.cfr.org/report/political-warfare>, accessed on February 20, 2018.

⁷ The Marshall Plan 1947-1951 was an American economic aid program for the reconstruction of Europe after the World War II. See details: *The Marshall Plan 60 (1947-2007)*, Rome, May 30, 2007, available online at: http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2014/05/Marshall_Plan_60.pdf, accessed on February 20, 2018.

⁸ Irena Pekarskienea, Rozita Susnieneb, „The assessment of the manifestation of economic globalization: the international trade factor”, *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, no. 156, Elsevier, 2014, p. 392.

The economic war is represented by the toughest and most obvious forms of competition between economies, sectors or companies, and it is not only self-contained, it falls within the range of political-military wars, or is correlated with periods of tension and crisis before the beginning armed conflicts⁹. Its forms (commercial embargo, boycott, sanctions, tariff discrimination, freezing of capital assets, suspension of financial aid, ban on investment and other capital flows, expropriation) are used to weaken the economic and / or political power of a state or non-state actor considered competitor/enemy.

4. The societal dimension of globalization - societal war

Societal globalization is seen as the globalization of human societies. So, as globalization is not only spread but also interdependence, we can consider societal globalization as the interaction between different human societies (human entities resulting from the cohabitation and association between individuals and groups with common attributes - race, ethnicity, language, history, geography - and which emanates some common feelings - identity, traditions, symbols and values), or groups of individuals, and even isolated individuals, entering into other human societies than belonging to the societal equilibrium in the society of origin, as well as in the host society¹⁰.

Globalization has brought about a number of negative effects at the societal level which, history has shown, can trigger tensions, wars and conflicts. These include:

- Weakening the role of the traditional family, school, community in favor of the individual, leading to the spread of social instability;

- The diminishing of the social control and the existence of normative inflation in the context of too dynamic changes of reality, especially in transition societies, so the legal norms *“fail to keep up with the realities, because between their physiognomy - which is predominantly constant - and social dynamics - which becomes uniformly-accelerated - a real strategic flaw is created, deepened and widened”*¹¹;

- The social media explosion, which spreads especially false values, pornography and violence, perpetuates aggression, ignorance or promiscuity in all its forms in the present society, as well as the expansion of behaviors such as alcoholism, smoking, or drug use;

- The generalization of anxiety syndrome among people with precarious living, amid the awareness of the lack of social security due to the weakening of the social system (health, education, etc.) leading to radical, extremist or terrorist manifestations;

- The explosion of geographical mobility on the background of the permeability of borders in the context of globalization, which creates civilization clashes and, implicitly, social tensions in host states between citizens and newcomers.

Globalization has produced effects on the habits and lifestyles of people in all the world states. Thus, social organizations organized according to multiple criteria (ethnic, religious, political, etc.) profoundly anchored in their own societies must find solutions for adherence to the principles and norms of life in globalization, namely to move to a global social system.

The social dimension of globalization thus encompasses various projects beneficial to the world becoming under the phenomenon¹²: the creation of world organizations acting in various areas of social life; the liberalization of educational exchanges at all levels; creating

⁹ Cristian Băhnăreanu, „*Arma energetică*” în *contextul relațiilor internaționale ale începutului de secol XXI*, “Carol I” National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, p. 23.

¹⁰ Author’s definition.

¹¹ Mirela Atanasiu, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹² Marin Măciucă, *Dimensiunea militară a securității României în condițiile accelerării procesului de globalizare*, Ph.D. thesis, “Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest, 2004, p. 23.

global associations of analysis, assessment, hierarchy and support of global human values; the conclusion of governmental agreements to combat illness and religious, racial, sexual or other nature intolerance; expanding the principle of the free association of people; the overall standardization of the ratio between the guaranteed minimum income and the living standard; the extension of the social protection system of disadvantaged categories, etc. All of this is meant to combat social insecurity because “*security is a precondition for the social organization’s function in relation to the act of disruptive, internal or external factors, insecure generators*”¹³.

The concept of “social war” appears in the literature with reference to the rebellion led by the Italian allies of ancient Rome (*socii*) who, denying the Roman franchise, fought for independence in the 90-89 BC¹⁴. Then the syntax used for a similar type of action is “class war”. In globalization, from an anarchist perspective, it can be understood as “*the war of society against the state or of state against society*”¹⁵. Forms of social warfare are seen as civil war, counterinsurgency, and antiterrorist war. Still, all types of wars have a social dimension because they affect individuals, groups and states, leading to the destruction or modification of social organizations and/or the creation of new ones.

5. The ecological dimension of globalization - ecological war

Environmental issues with a special impact on the security of nations occupy a growing spot on international agendas. Industrial countries are disputing this issue that has different valences from pollution that accelerates climate change to genetically modified organisms that lead to the planet’s ecological decline.

Indiscriminate exploitation of the planet’s resources (deforestation, mining and extraction of energy resources, urbanization at the expense of farmland, poaching, etc.) is another negative factor that leads to the biological degradation of the planet. Thus, ecological globalization is the accumulation of factors that impact on human communities affecting the health and welfare of individuals and the natural balance of ecosystems.

Ecological warfare is defined as “the intentional modification of a natural ecology system such as climate and weather, the ionosphere, the magnetosphere, the tectonic plate system and / or the occurrence of earthquakes (earthquakes) to provoke physical destruction, economic, psycho-social and physical in a geophysical location or on a particular population”¹⁶. This is part of the strategic or tactical war.

The ecological war is almost always carried out in violation of the 1977 United Nations treaty against environmental change. Thus, environmental weapons are developed in secret, and environmental warfare is undercover because both environmental weapons and war are illegal under international law.

The war against the environment is generally a strategic deception and is seen as the ecological violence used against civilians to achieve political, religious or ideological goals. This is done through intimidation or coercion or by incitement of the right fear for which, as a form of manifestation. Moreover, the existence of biological weapons as devices facilitating the spreading, dispersion or dissemination of a biological agent, including their vectors with harmful or lethal effects on humans, animals and agricultural crops, poses a threat to

¹³ Mirela Atanasiu, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁴ ***, „Social war”, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, available online at: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Social-War-Roman-history>, accessed on February 03, 2018.

¹⁵ ***, *The Bastard Chronicles: Social War etc. 2014*, Ardent Press, 2013, p. 53.

¹⁶ Michel Chossudovsky, „Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) and Climate Change, Global Research, Canada, November 12, 2013, available online at: <https://www.globalresearch.ca/environmental-modification-techniques-enmod-and-climate-change/16413>, accessed on September 13, 2018.

ecological security in the context of the amplification of terrorist actions, in the form of bioterrorism.

6. The military dimension of globalization - a new type of total war?

The concept of military security designates a state characterized by the lack of dangers and threats to the existence of an entity, but also the process of managing the actions that are conducive to such a situation. It is accomplished with the help of military power in order for a person, a group of persons or a state to be able to act freely to promote their own interests.

Military power has always held the central role in the process of human globalization. In fact, the formation of the first empires was decisively determined by the available military technology and the degree of organization of forms of violence, the military power having a major importance in the territorial expansion of states and civilizations.

Accelerating developments in science and technology have also marked the military, as the military-technical revolution and the spread of advanced technologies required reorientations, rethinks and reorganizations into the system of modern military action, substantially altering the features and face of the future war.

Moreover, in the context of globalization, the same infrastructure that facilitates benefices as the global flows of goods, people and capital has also generated new security threats to states, under the forms of cyber war, international terrorism, eco-terrorism, transnational organized crime¹⁷ to which we add other identified risks and threats to security: the regional development inequalities, the conflicts of economic interests between different states, local conflicts, ecological threats, uncontrolled mass migrations of some populations, the lack of control of the globalization effects. All these issues are not mainly military and national, for which they require a combination of multilateral and international political responses. Such a political response was the institutionalization of NATO as a multilateral and multilayered security and defense system in the Euro-Atlantic area, complementary to the domestic military structures of the states.

The military component of globalization cannot be dealt without including it in the security dimension of globalization, which is the most sensitive in the relationship, mainly with the tendencies of globalization of terrorism and criminality, but also with the idea of preserving the role of the nation-state on the global scene.

The range of security threats has diversified under the impetus of globalization, so mankind faces a series of challenges, such as: terrorist actions; the danger of having advanced military technologies, including nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, by terrorist organizations and fundamentalist states; the generalization of local conflicts on the grounds of contradictory interests or ethnic-religious intolerances; regional developmental inequalities or economic conflicts between the boiled and poor countries of the world; the proliferation of transnational organized crime networks and activities; cyber space vulnerability; proliferation of ballistic missiles; discriminatory or political, diplomatic, organizational inconsistencies between states and blocks of economic and military potential; ecological threats, etc.

The emergence of hybrid, asymmetric, atypical threats supported by the results of the technological revolution determined the transformation of the war and the ways of its conduction. Thus, we discuss about media war, informational war, cosmic war, economic war, psychological warfare, electronic war, etc. And conflicts have undergone transformations in nature and form. There are no purely military conflicts, there are conflicts with hybrid manifestations that use as methods and means the non-military instruments that are the subject of the various wars already mentioned, corroborated with military instruments, giving

¹⁷ David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformation*, March 1999, available online at: <http://www.polity.co.uk/global/whatisglobalization.asp>Global, accessed on March 30, 2017.

birth to a series of new concepts adapted to the actual face of the armed actions (hybrid war, asymmetric war, atypical war, terrorist war, etc.). This new type of war led with the use of the entire political, military, diplomatic, informational instrument, etc. of one entity over another can be considered a new form of "total war".

Conclusion

Globalization triggers in the security environment a spiral reaction, as the level of integration and globalization increases the level of security decreases. Thus, globalization brings opportunities but also threats in the affected segments of social life.

As far as multidimensional phenomenon of globalization reaches the security environment and generates threats against it, security dimensions needed to be protected multiply and diversify and new forms of war can be seen evolving. For example, contemporary globalization at the military level has been highlighted in the geopolitical rivalry of the great powers, in the evolution of international alliance systems and international security structures, in the emergence of a global armaments market, in parallel with the global spread of technologies military and the institutionalization of global regimes with jurisdiction in the field of militia and security, such as the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Also, under the influence of contemporary globalization, more fierce non-state terrorist and criminal entities emerged or began to appear, that is an additional challenge for national states and their armed forces who have to fight a different war in order to defeat this out-of-law enemies.

Although, in this paper we approached just some of the security dimensions and similar forms of war generated as effect of globalization were presented, following a brief analysis of nowadays entire spectrum of literature on security dimensions, it can be easily seen our synthetic parallel between the globalization dimensions and security dimension is realistic.

Of course, globalization dimensions is not necessary to be directly related to security dimensions or, if they are, could be differently reflected in the security priorities of states and international organizations. Sometimes maybe some of globalization dimensions are not as clearly perceived as security dimensions in the security strategic policies and documents of some states or organizations but this does not exclude the main idea of the existence of a parallel between the dimensions of security and globalization and the emerging conflict types' metamorphosis resulting by this parallelism.

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PERCEPTION OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT THROUGH NATO MEMBER STATES' STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS

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Abstract: *Development of armed forces in the long-term requires a complex understanding of emerging security challenges that will potentially need to be addressed. This contribution will focus on how selected NATO member states differ in perception of the security environment through their strategic documents focused on a long-term view for defence. A threat matrix based on these conceptions exposes several differences in security environment assessment among the Alliance member states. However, these countries should ideally perceive their security concerns as interconnected and shared to achieve greater cohesion and support for joint responses. The analysis also reveals an abrupt change in the assessments following the Russian military intervention in Ukraine.*

Keywords: *security environment, strategic environment, threat assessment, threat perception, NATO.*

Introduction

Security environment of the 21st century has several key features that largely distinguish it from the era of the Cold War. Nowadays, the countries face multiple and simultaneous threats. Some of these threats cannot be deterred, attributed and retaliated by conventional means (e.g. cyber-attacks), which makes prevention and resilience more important than ever¹. Moreover, threats and threatened entities are increasingly globally interconnected. This development calls for a greater focus of the decision makers on the nature of security threats and how these originate and evolve to anticipate and address them better.

However, even today the security environment assessment is theoretically and methodologically under-developed unlike the related field of risk assessment.² Tang has suggested that strategic failures – that are more frequent than successes – are mostly caused by “[states’] inability to understand their security environment”. He criticised that “more often than not, they simply fall back on the all-too-familiar exercise of identifying threats (implicitly or explicitly) and then plan strategies based on the worst-case scenario” while only several countries have used systemic approach for their security strategies planning³. Other

¹ Jamie Shea, *Keeping NATO Relevant*, Carnegie Europe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, <https://bit.ly/2Dw5UWx>; Michael Rühle, “NATO and Emerging Security Challenges: Beyond the Deterrence Paradigm”, in *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 2011, 33:6, pp. 278-282; Enrico Fassi; Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone (eds.), *What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and Beyond*, NATO HQ, 2015, available online at: www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2015/acor/ac15_final.pdf, accessed on September 25, 2018.

² Charles Vandeppeer, *Intelligence analysis and threat assessment: towards a more comprehensive model of threat*, Australian Security and Intelligence Conference, 2011.

³ Shiping Tang, “A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment”, in *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2004, 27:1, pp. 1-34, p. 2, accessed on September 25, 2018.

criticism targeted the excessive focus on *threatening* entities (their intentions and capabilities) while *threatened* entities and the security environment are more or less neglected⁴.

1. Method and data

The paper attempts to explore how different NATO member states differ in their perception on the security environment. For this purpose, strategic documents presenting a long-term view for defence of the country are analysed (Table no. 1). A development of armed forces in the long-term requires a complex understanding of emerging security challenges that will potentially need to be addressed which makes these conceptions a useful source of analysis. In two cases, more general documents were used – Austrian Security Strategy as a document closer to the rest has been published in the German language only and the National Military Strategy of the United States of America in the absence of a comparable document with a long-term view for defence. However, even among the remaining documents, several formal differences will inevitably reflect on the research results such as their different purpose and complexity, length and year of publication. On the other hand, as national security is increasingly shaped by challenges of global character and interconnections of internal and external threats, security environment assessments should not differ substantially according to different kinds of documents. The variation in the publication year is even desirable as it enables to explore whether and how the Crimean invasion and the Russian interference in Eastern Ukraine impacted on security concerns in the West.

Threats identified in the documents were registered in a threat matrix. If a country expressed the belief that any threat was becoming of greater significance/more acute or on the contrary, less likely/decreasing, the trend was marked with corresponding arrows (↑ / ↓) (Figure no. 1).

⁴ Bill Flynt, “Threat Kingdom”, *Military Review*, 2000, July-August, pp. 12-21; Jamie Shea, *Op. Cit.*; Charles Vandepeer, *Op. Cit.*

Country	CZE		B	DK	F	CA	D	NL	PL	A	SK	USA	UK
	2015	2016	2016	2018	2013	2017	2016	2013	2017	2013	2016	2015	2015
Year of publication / Threat													
<i>Power diffusion</i>	↑	•	↑	x	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	•	↑
<i>Non-state actors challenging state sovereignty (hybrid warfare)</i>	↑	↑	•	x	•	•	↑	•	↑	•	•	•	↑
<i>Increase in defence spending outside the Allied territory</i>	↑	↑	↑	x	↑	x	↑	x	↑	x	•	x	↑
<i>Instability outside the Allied territory</i>	↑	•	•	•	•	↑	↑	↑	•	•	↑	•	•
<i>Instability on the southern European periphery</i>	x	↑	•	•	•	x	•	x	•	x	•	•	•
<i>Weak states</i>	↑	•	•	x	•	•	•	•	↑	•	x	•	•
<i>Urbanization, demographic pressures (failing/failed cities)</i>	↑	x	x	x	x	•	•	x	↑	x	x	•	•
<i>Illegal/Mass migration</i>	•	•	•	•	x	↑	•	•	•	•	↑	x	↑
<i>Conflicts over resources</i>	↑	x	↑	x	↑	•	↑	•	x	•	•	•	↑
<i>Threat of conventional armed conflict</i>	•	•	•	x	•	x	↑	x	•	x	x	x	•
<i>Russian interventionism/assertive politics</i>	x	↑	•	↑	•	•	↑	x	↑	x	↑	•	x
<i>Unpredictable development in Russia</i>	x	•	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	•
<i>Disinformation, propaganda</i>	↑	•	•	•	x	↑	↑	x	•	x	↑	•	x
<i>Terrorism, radicalization</i>	↑	•	•	•	↑	↑	•	•	•	•	↑	•	•
<i>Extremism, radicalism, fundamentalism</i>	↑	•	•	•	•	•	↑	x	•	x	↑	•	•
<i>Threat of WMD use</i>	x	•	•	x	•	•	x	x	•	x	•	x	•
<i>WMD Proliferation</i>	↑	•	•	x	↑	↑	•	•	x	•	•	•	•
<i>Arms proliferation</i>	↑	x	•	x	•	•	x	•	x	x	•	•	↑
<i>(International) organized crime</i>	↑	•	•	x	•	•	•	x	x	•	•	•	•
<i>Piracy</i>	x	•	•	x	↑	x	•	x	x	•	x	x	x
<i>Cyber attacks</i>	•	•	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	•	•	•	•	↑
<i>Cyber espionage</i>	x	x	•	•	↑	↑	•	x	x	x	x	x	x
<i>Cyber crime</i>	x	x	•	•	↑	x	•	x	x	x	x	x	x
<i>State aggression in space</i>	x	x	x	x	↑	•	•	x	x	x	x	•	•

Country	CZE		DK	F	CA	D	NL	PL	A	SK	USA	UK
	2015	2016	2018	2013	2017	2016	2013	2017	2013	2016	2015	2015
<i>Year of publication / Threat</i>												
<i>Globalization and rise in inequality</i>	↑	X	X	↑	↑	•	X	•	X	↑	•	↑
<i>Disruption of commodity flow / supply</i>	X	•	X	X	X	•	•	X	•	X	X	•
<i>Disruption of energy supplies</i>	•	•	X	X	X	•	X	•	X	X	X	•
<i>Financial crisis</i>	X	X	X	•	X	•	•	X	•	•	X	X
<i>Climate change, natural disasters</i>	•	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑	X	X	•	X	X	↑
<i>Climate change in the Arctic</i>	X	X	↑	X	•	X	X	X	X	X	X	•
<i>Man-made disasters</i>	X	X	X	•	•	X	X	X	•	X	X	X
<i>Pandemics, epidemics</i>	↑	X	X	↑	X	•	X	X	•	X	X	•
<i>Attacks on citizens living abroad (e.g. kidnappings)</i>	X	X	X	•	•	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Figure no. 1: Threat Matrix (author's conception)

Also, if present, more general reflections on the security environment throughout the documents were analysed (Table no. 1).

Country	Document name	Year of publication
Austria	<i>Austrian Security Strategy</i>	2013
Belgium	<i>The strategic vision for defence</i>	2016
Canada	<i>Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy</i>	2017
Czech Republic	<i>The Long-Term Perspective for Defence 2030</i>	2015
Denmark	<i>Defence Agreement 2018 - 2023</i>	2018
France	<i>White Paper on Defence and National Security</i>	2013
Germany	<i>White Book on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr</i>	2016
Netherlands	<i>In the Interest of the Netherlands</i>	2013
Poland	<i>The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland</i>	2017
Slovakia	<i>White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic</i>	2016
United Kingdom	<i>Future Operating Environment 2035</i>	2015
USA	<i>The National Military Strategy of the United States of America</i>	2015

Table no. 1: Selected documents for analysis

2. General reflections on the security environment in the strategic documents

The strategic documents differed significantly in how much consideration of the security environment they contained. While some proceeded rather directly to listing current threats or trends, others also paid attention to broader context that shaped these challenges. In two cases, comments on the security environment analysis itself were included (Netherlands, Poland). There were also differences in terms the countries used for the security analysis as summarised in Table no. 2. Most common was the concept of “security environment”, while other documents opted for terms such as “strategic environment”, “strategic context” or “security situation”.

Country	Term
<i>Austria</i>	<i>Security situation / Situational analysis</i>
<i>Belgium</i>	<i>Security environment</i>
<i>Canada</i>	<i>Security environment</i>
<i>Czech Republic</i>	<i>Security environment</i>
<i>Denmark</i>	<i>Security situation</i>
<i>France</i>	<i>Strategic context (environment / landscape)</i>
<i>Germany</i>	<i>Security environment</i>
<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Strategic environment</i>
<i>Poland</i>	<i>Security environment</i>
<i>Slovakia</i>	<i>Outside environment</i>
<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Strategic context</i>
<i>USA</i>	<i>Strategic environment</i>

Table no. 2: Terminology in the security analysis

Only two documents (the Dutch and the Polish) contained any specification on how the security environment assessments had been done. The security analysis in the conception “In the Interest of the Netherlands” was based on the Strategic Monitor⁵ findings which – as acknowledged – had also been used for the International Security Strategy and the Internal Security Strategy. Interestingly, the Polish “Defence Concept” openly admitted how were the previous documents “based on unrealistic assessments of the Polish security environment and on superficial methodologies” and how these “erroneous assumptions resulted in inadequate recommendations” and the impossibility to optimise the defence requirements⁶. In addition, the Canadian document acknowledged that “the interrelated nature of global security challenges puts a premium on deep knowledge and understanding”⁷.

Key features of the security environment assessment. Overall, the documents emphasised several characteristic features of the current security environment which are briefly summarised below. Multiple threats need to be addressed. A simultaneous presence of more challenges may require prioritisation of the response based on their probability and impact. The security context is highly volatile and complex which makes it unpredictable on an unprecedented scale. National security is heavily dependent on global events. States and the challenges they face are tightly interconnected. The French *White Paper on Defence and National Security* even explicitly discusses the “systemic dimension” of the challenges. It also stresses that most of the risks and threats are common and “France cannot afford to choose between the different ‘borders’ of Europe” as all have the same importance in the long-term for the continent’s security⁸.

Several documents call for greater cooperation and cohesion to manage the emergent challenges better. Belgium, Netherlands and Germany in this respect highlight the fact of being open economies that are particularly vulnerable to negative challenges related to globalisation. However, not all countries have perceived this development in the security environment solely in negative terms. Canada and the Netherlands highlighted a possibility of exploiting opportunities that result from current challenging trends such as globalisation. Germany in this respect also mentioned migration. The security challenges were also perceived as offering an opportunity for “joint responses”⁹.

The countries applied different approaches towards security environment assessment. Part of them emphasised current or future (global) trends or factors. While some countries listed a whole array of trends (the Czech Republic), others emphasised only a few that currently posed the greatest challenge for their interests. For instance, in the U.S. strategy, these were globalisation, diffusion of technology and demographic shifts. In the Canadian policy document, the trends perceived as most shaping their security concerns were a balance of power, changing nature of conflict and rapid evolution of technology. The British policy planners also warned against an increased risk of instability and conflicts where any of the identified trends would collide.

⁵ The Strategic Monitor is a research on global trends and risks carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence and is considered “the crucial first step in developing effective policies“. Government of the Netherlands, *Strategic Monitor*, 2018, available online at: <https://www.government.nl/topics/strategic-monitor>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

⁶ Ministry of National Defense Republic of Poland, *The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*, 2017, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2DyQUHA>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

⁷ Canadian Armed Forces, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, 2017, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2xnQ9sz>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

⁸ French Ministry of Defence, *White Paper on Defence and National Security*, 2013, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2Oj2Bqc>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

⁹ Belgian Ministry of Defence, *The strategic vision for defence*, 2016, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2NFt1CJ>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

In a few documents, the security environment is described through a basic dichotomy. The French White Book differentiated between threats related to power and those related to weakness. Similarly, the United States saw simultaneous security challenges both from revisionist states and from violent extremist organisations. It urged to pay more attention to state actors as does Canada that accentuates the “return of major power rivalry” and “re-emergence of deterrence”. However, it emphasised that the traditional concept of deterrence may not be relevant to non-state actors who “calculate risks and rewards in radically different ways”¹⁰.

3. Threat matrix

When comparing the countries’ threat assessment (see figure no. 1), we need to keep in mind the different character of the analysed documents. While the Danish *Defence Agreement* lists only several key trends, in the French *White Book* and the German *White Paper* the threat enumeration is much more encompassing. Most of the countries assess numerous threats as increasing, on the contrary, in the American or the Austrian conception, the threats are not assigned any tendency in their urgency and probability.

As most of these countries depend on NATO in the defence of their territory, it is vital to enhance the internal solidarity and cohesion among member states. However, in numerous documents, the security environment assessment reflects more a particular national focus rather than a global view acknowledging shared borders and security concerns within the Alliance. Only three threats figure in all 12 conceptions: instability outside the Allied territory, terrorism and radicalisation, and cyber-attacks. Eleven documents (except for Denmark that, nonetheless, in its agreement focuses only on a limited number of critical trends) warns against challenges of power diffusion and non-state actors that are contesting state sovereignty including through hybrid warfare. The challenges resulting from weak states and illegal/mass migration and the threats of extremism, radicalism, fundamentalism and WMD proliferation are identified in ten documents.

From the threats/challenges that were assigned an increasing trend (none was considered as decreasing), the most frequently listed are the following: power diffusion (in 9 documents), increase in defence spending outside Allied territory, cyber-attacks and climate change/natural disasters (6 documents).

3.1. The Russian threat revisited

Differences in security environment assessment are best shown on the example of Russia. The acknowledgement of the Russian Federation as a threat or a potential threat is nowhere to be found in the documents published until 2014 (the Crimean annexation) with the notable exception of the French White Book. France had already expressed concerns about several developments in Russia such as the increasing military budget, modernisation of the nuclear arsenal, improvement of its armed forces’ intervention capabilities and an attempt to achieve a monopoly over energy supply routes. It was believed that this development indicated the country was “equipping itself with the economic and military clout that will enable it to engage in power politics” but having in mind that the outcome “remains uncertain”. The document also stated that: “Europe’s eastern neighbours continue to require special vigilance”¹¹. While the Netherlands remained silent in the matter, the Austrian document (both published in 2013) emphasised cooperation with Russia as a strategic partner.

¹⁰ Canadian Armed Forces, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, 2017, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2xnQ9sz>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

Since 2015 (as there is no document in the sample published in 2014), the countries could no longer ignore or downplay the Russian influence on national security. However, they opted for different vocabularies in the assessment. Several states were less explicit and employed somewhat diplomatic wording. For instance, the Danish document mentions “a challenging and more assertive Russia”.¹² Also, Slovakia and the Czech Republic resorted to cautious descriptions. While the Slovak conception acknowledges “a fundamental change of the security environment” and “changes and revision of the security system architecture in Europe”, it avoids labelling the situation in Ukraine with terms like annexation or conflict as do other countries. It evaluates an “extensive armed conventional conflict” between Russia and Ukraine as little probable and it refers to the defensive character declared in the Russian Military Doctrine¹³. However, in both cases, it points out that the reality could change quickly. Even less explicit is the Czech outlook that relates the increase of military spending and technological development outside Europe and in Russia with a possible rise in regional powers’ aggression and ambitions¹⁴.

Other countries (with one exception discussed below) used explicit descriptions such as “(illegal) annexation of Crimea”, “violations of the Ukrainian territorial integrity” or “Russian aggression in Ukraine” (Belgium, Canada, Poland) or accused Russia of violating international law (USA, Germany, Poland). Poland offered the most fervent and detailed description of the security situation in relation to Russia describing the country as a “direct threat for Poland and the region”¹⁵. Only the British document refrained from presenting Russia as a threat even though it vaguely predicted the country would keep its “global impact through its trans-regional conduct” and admitted “it could threaten UK interests” that could require “greater Western unity”¹⁶.

Similarly, the threats of propaganda and disinformation are absent only from the documents published in 2013 and from one issued in 2015 (the British conception). To a great extent, these challenges are attributed to Russia. The concept of hybrid warfare is often invoked either in connection with Russia or non-state actors.

Several research papers have recently focused on this issue. According to a RAND report, the “perceptions of Russia as a military threat following the Ukrainian crisis differ sharply across Europe and appear to be heavily influenced by geographical proximity to Russia”. The authors found out that unlike their eastern counterparts, the western and southern Alliance member states did not see Russia as a threat and were more concerned with challenges of terrorism and flows of migrants and refugees¹⁷. However, a more recent study by the European Council on Foreign Relations¹⁸ presented a more complex view on the matter arguing that cyber-attacks and information warfare have “increased concern about Russia in member states outside central and Eastern Europe” while terrorism and migration “made the

¹² Danish Ministry of Defence, *Defence Agreement 2018 – 2023*, 2018, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2nRCVT6>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

¹³ Ministry of Defence of Slovak Republic, *White Paper on Defence of the Slovak Republic*, 2016, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2xFvMds>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

¹⁴ Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, *The Long-Term Perspective for Defence 2030*, 2015, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2xDjQsI>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

¹⁵ Ministry of National Defence Republic of Poland, *The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland*, 2017, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2DyQUHA>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

¹⁶ Ministry of Defence UK, *Future Operating Environment 2035*, 2015, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2tvTyoz>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

¹⁷ Stephanie Pezard; Radin, Andrew; Szayna, Thomas S.; F. Stephen Larrabee, *European Relations with Russia. Threat Perceptions, Responses, and Strategies in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis*, RAND, 2017, available online at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1579.html, accessed on September 25, 2018, p. x.

¹⁸ Susi Dennison; Franke, Ulrike Esther; Zerka, Paweł, *The nightmare of the dark: The security fears that keep Europeans awake at night*, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2JvMQdx>, accessed on September 25, 2018, p. 3.

southern neighbourhood a pan-EU preoccupation". The RAND report in this regard also acknowledges that "[m]ore Europeans are concerned about the risk of Russia employing hybrid warfare than of it carrying out a conventional attack"¹⁹. Results of this analysis support this latter idea of evaluating Russia as a threat primarily in the non-kinetic domain.

Importantly, Russia is not framed exclusively in negative terms in the security considerations. The complex relationship with the country is best captured in the French White Paper and the German White Book. France brings attention to a context "where power issues and interdependencies coexist and are sometimes in opposition" and to a "delicate balance" between the aspects of cooperation, agreements over some issues and disagreements over others with the Russian counterpart. Germany also perceives Europe and Russia as "linked by a broad range of common interests and relations" with the latter having "a special regional and global responsibility" that makes mutual cooperation necessary. The countries should thus seek for a balance between collective defence and cooperative security. The American strategy urged to "engage Russia in areas of common interest" and mentioned the Russian contribution to international security efforts (counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism).

3.2. A narrow-minded security assessment?

Beyond Russia, the conceptions exhibit numerous differences resulting more from particular state interests than from a shared security assessment in the global view. For instance, only Denmark, Canada and the United Kingdom express their concern about security implications of the climate change in the Arctic which means that only countries that form part of the Arctic (excluding the United States that did not mention the issue in the analysed strategy) share this threat assessment.

The same countries together with France and Germany list the threat of potential state aggression in space. These five are at the same time the only countries from the sample that have both satellites and sounding rockets. However, all the Alliance members have their interests at stake in case any space aggression would occur as that could jeopardise their ISR, communication and navigation systems²⁰. The Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations perceives space capabilities as enhancing "effectiveness of their military operations" and "crucial to the outcome of conflicts", but it also raises awareness of the associated dependency that could be exploited by the adversary²¹.

Another difference lies in the countries' decision to include soft threats that have more relevance in the realm of internal security. Most countries listed the currently most debated challenges of illegal/mass migration (10x), climate change (8x) and risks related to globalization and rise in inequality (8x), while the phenomena of disruption of commodity flow or supplies, financial crisis (5x) pandemics/epidemics (5x) and man-made disasters (3x) were less commonly mentioned in the security assessments. This coincides with a finding of the paper of European Council on Foreign Relations according to which the perception of financial instability and disruption in the energy supply as security threats seemed to decline in comparison with the 2008 view on the security environment²².

¹⁹ Stephanie Pezard et al., *op. cit.*

²⁰ See Nina-Louisa Remuss, "NATO and Space: Why is Space Relevant for NATO?" *ESPI Perspectives* No. 40, 2010, available online at: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/124749/ESPI_Perspectives_40.pdf, accessed on September 25, 2018.

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²¹NATO, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations*, NATO Standardization Office, 2016, available online at: <https://bit.ly/2xzZX5J>, accessed on September 25, 2018, pp. 1-2, 5-1, 5-3.

²² Susi Dennison et al., *op. cit.*

Conclusions

The paper compared the perception of security environment of selected NATO member states based on their long-term strategic outlooks for defence (except for two cases where different strategic documents were used instead).

A threat matrix indicates that the countries to a large extent agree on the fundamental threats they currently face. All documents included the threats of instability outside the Allied territory, terrorism and radicalisation, and cyber-attacks. In the overwhelming majority, we could also find the phenomena of power diffusion, non-state actors, weak states and illegal/massive migration and the threats of extremism, radicalism, fundamentalism and WMD proliferation.

Russia did not seem to be a divisive issue within the selected Alliance countries as the previous research on the Russian threat perception could indicate. Instead, the time factor divided the states in their assessments. The documents that did not see Russia as posing a threat were published before the Crimea invasion with the exception of the British conception from 2015. Since then, the countries could no longer ignore the changed circumstances. However, the wording they used differed. While one group used concrete statements about the Russian annexation or aggression, other states used more diplomatic descriptions avoiding explicit legal terms for the situation in Ukraine. This evaluation of Russia also seemed to be closely linked to information and cyber threats.

Based on the comparison, it can be concluded that in several areas, the countries expressed more concern about threats based on their particular state interests than on an assessment reflecting a shared security environment across the Alliance. This could be seen on the example of the Arctic and state aggression in space that were worth the mention only for the countries for which these represented more realistic challenges due to geographical proximity (Arctic) or the capabilities they possessed (space). In this respect, Shea suggested that in NATO “*for average citizen, these threats only really exist if they are close to home and manifest themselves now rather than as future possibilities*”²³.

The dominant emphasis on several soft threats that are of most concern today (e.g. migration, climate change) while neglecting others that in the last decade lost their urgency (e.g. financial crisis) suggest the countries mostly fear the new²⁴. However, this approach reflects a certain narrow-mindedness considering the rapid development in the security environment which is broadly characterised by discontinuity and strategical surprises. The long-term outlooks for defence that are formally guiding the armed forces development should acknowledge this unpredictability and move beyond mere extrapolation of the most visible trends shaping the current environment.

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²³ Jamie Shea, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Susi Dennison et al., *op. cit.*

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DEFINING THE EXTENDED BLACK SEA REGION: FROM GEOSTRATEGIC REASONING TO PSYCHOSOCIAL REPRESENTATION

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Abstract: *The aim of this paper is to analyse the multidimensional significance of the term “extended region” with an emphasis on the Black Sea: from the geographic dimension to the economic, political, cultural, and security ones. The main hypothesis is that defining the Extended Black Sea Region needs not only geostrategic reasoning, but also a psychosocial one that is important to explain the current fragmentation trends manifested here in the last years. The hypothesis will be validated by analysing both the theoretical framework and the main economic, political, cultural and military indicators that characterize the countries in the region.*

Keywords: *region, Extended Black Sea Region, economic integration, cultural map, risk map, psychosocial representation.*

Introduction

The area around the Black Sea is characterized by a dynamism of the security environment that is in contrast with its geographic static aspect similar to the Caspian and Azov Seas with which it is linked by strategic interests. Referring to strategic interests, we must not exclude from the analysis the Baltic Sea nor the Mediterranean Sea with which the Black Sea communicates through the straits to the Marmara Sea and the Aegean Sea. In a 2005 paper on the modalities and possibilities of enhancing cooperation in the space around Black Sea¹, we argued that cooperation in this area takes two main forms with regard to its impact on security: cooperation as a source of security and cooperation as a source of insecurity. At that moment, the most visible agents of cooperation as a source of insecurity were the terrorist organizations and organized crime. Now, the most visible agents are some state actors whose actions and statements are indices of their endeavour to recreate the old spheres of influence and/or to impose new ones.

Based on these considerations, our approach requires the study of three key issues formulated as questions:

1. Is the area around and in the vicinity of the Black Sea a region?
2. Deriving from a possible affirmative answer to the first question, we address the second important problem: is the Black Sea a distinct strategic space?
3. What makes it “extended”: the various interests, the forms of economic and political cooperation or psychosocial representation of security?

¹ Alexandra Sarcinschi, “Coordonatele cooperării în zona Mării Negre”, in Grigore Alexandrescu and Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Modalități și posibilități de amplificare a cooperării în zona Mării Negre*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 7-16.

1. Is the area around and in the vicinity of the Black Sea a region?

The terms *zone/area* (*zonă* in Romanian language) and *region* (*regiune* in Romanian language) are synonymous in Romanian² and they are used in almost equal numbers of occurrences on the Internet³. Also, in English the two words (*zone/area* and *region*) are synonymous⁴ and the most important international organization in the area – NATO and EU – use the collocations *Black Sea region*⁵ and *wider Black Sea region*⁶. Moreover, *the Romanian National Defence Strategy for the period 2015-2019* uses the collocation of the *Black Sea Region*⁷, so it will be necessary to opt for a phrase that reflects, if not the multiple meanings associated with this space, at least its importance for security studies.

In the following we will use the *Extended Black Sea Region* (EBSR)⁸, the reason being that the above actors refer to the region in the sense used in the theory of International Relations, not to a mere geographical area defined only by the proximity of the Black Sea. Covering ten countries (only six of them are riparian) shows that the Black Sea region is indeed wider than the standard surface⁹ (*extended*), not just a measurement from side to side¹⁰ (*wider*).

In the theory of International Relations, the term *region* has great importance. Correlated to this is also the phenomenon of *regionalization*, defined at international level as the tendency to see the states belonging to the same geographic region coming together from an economic and/or political point of view¹¹. However, from this perspective, it can hardly be said without any doubt that riparian states and the ones in the proximity of the Black Sea can form a region because, apart from maritime affiliation, neither economic integration nor the picture of economic indicators are offering a very homogeneous representation.

Economic integration is split in two on the Western and Eastern shores of the Black Sea: if Romania and Bulgaria are EU member states and, implicitly, the European Economic Area, the others are involved in various forms of Euro-Asian cooperation (Eurasian Economic Union, Eurasian Custom Union, CIS Free Trade Area, GUAM, Common Economic Zone, etc.). There are also preferential trade arrangements where Turkey is a supplier for all other EBSR countries except Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, there are regional trade and

² Mircea Seche and Luiza Seche, *Dicționar de sinonime*, Litera International Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002.

³ A simple query of the Google search engine, on June 25, 2018 at 09.50, shows that the phrase “Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre” appeared 10,900 times, and the “Regiunea Extinsă a Mării Negre” 12,600 times.

⁴ *Region* in “Merriam-Webster Dictionary”, available online at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/region> and “Oxford Living Dictionaries”, available online at: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/thesaurus/region>, accessed on June 25, 2018.

⁵ NATO, *The Warsaw declaration on Transatlantic Security issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016*, 2016, available online at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/official_texts_133168.htm, accessed on June 25, 2018.

⁶ European Union, *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe a Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, June 2016, p. 33, available online at: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_2.pdf, accessed on June 25, 2018.

⁷ Presidential Administration, *The National Defense Strategy 2015-2019. A Strong Romania within Europe and the World*, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 10, 12, 14, 18, available online at: http://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/National_Defense_Strategy_2015_-_2019.pdf, accessed on June 25, 2018.

⁸ Performing a survey on the most important nonstate actors in the region, we are able to conclude that the EBSR comprises the following countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey, and Ukraine.

⁹ *Extended* in “Merriam-Webster Dictionary”, available online at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extended>, accessed on June 25, 2018.

¹⁰ *Wider* in “Merriam-Webster Dictionary”, available online at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/wider>, accessed on June 25, 2018.

¹¹ *Regionare* in Aymeric Chauprade and Francois Thual, “Dicționar de geopolitică”, Corint Editorial Group, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 466-471.

investment organizations such as the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, of which nine of the ten countries (excluding Belarus) are part, and the Black Sea Cross Border Cooperation between Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine which is funded by EU through European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).

Regarding the economic indicators, we took into account some of the most important ones, such as GDP, GDP/capita, inflation rate, unemployment rate, economy's total exports and total imports by main destination, and military expenditures¹².

Of the ten EBSR countries, only the Russian Federation and Turkey are in the top 15 of the 230 surveyed countries based on their GDP (7th and 14th respectively), five - in the top 100, but with significant differences between Romania (42nd place) and Ukraine (51st place) on the one hand, and Belarus (72nd place), Azerbaijan (74th place) and Bulgaria (77th place), on the other; Georgia, Armenia and Republic of Moldova ranks 120, 137, and 148¹³.

In terms of GDP/capita, five countries are among the top 100 in the world (Russian Federation - 73, Turkey - 76, Romania - 84, Bulgaria - 87, Belarus - 96), four among the following 50 (Azerbaijan - 102, Georgia - 138, Armenia - 144, Ukraine - 148) and Republic of Moldova in the last quarter of the ranking (168 out of 229 countries analysed for this indicator)¹⁴.

The third indicator, the inflation rate, reveals a less homogeneous picture: only one country is among the top 50 in the world (Armenia - 46th place), two - in the top 100 (Bulgaria - 60 and Romania - 65), four - in the top 200 (Russian Federation - 149, Belarus - 186, Georgia - 187, Republic of Moldova - 193) and two in the last part of the ranking (Turkey - 206 and Ukraine - 212)¹⁵.

As far as the unemployment rate is concerned, the homogeneity is even lower: only Belarus is among the top 10 countries in the world (7th place), five countries are among the top 100 (Republic of Moldova - 55, Romania - 74, Russian Federation - 77, Azerbaijan - 88, Bulgaria - 91), while the others are among the last 100 countries (Ukraine - 134, Turkey - 150, Georgia - 154, Armenia - 182)¹⁶.

Regarding the economy's total exports and total imports by main destination it is noted that the Russian Federation is an important export partner for Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Republic of Moldova, but also import for Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Georgia. The EU is an exchange partner for all ENPI countries, mainly as a destination for their exports¹⁷.

It is also interesting to analyse the military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. The differences are significant among the EBSR countries: Russian Federation ranks 1st in the world, followed by Armenia the 14th, Azerbaijan the 17th, Ukraine the 21st and Georgia the 43rd, although these four countries have a lower GDP compared to the others. Turkey ranks 61st among the 153 surveyed countries (CIA 2016 statistics), Bulgaria in the 78th position, Romania in the 82nd (but in 2018 Romania was one of the few NATO countries that have allocated 2% of the GDP to defence) and Republic of Moldova on 145th place¹⁸.

¹² Sources of data: *The World Factbook 2018*, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2018, available online at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>, accessed on August 28, 2018 and the website of World Trade Organization, available online at: <https://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=>, accessed on August 28, 2018.

¹³ *The World Factbook 2018*, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC, 2018, available online at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>, accessed on August 28, 2018.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *Statistics Database: Trade Profiles*, World Trade Organization, 2018, available online at: <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFReporter.aspx?Language=E>, accessed on August 28, 2018.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

Even if the image provided by the most important economic indicators is not quite homogeneous, the ten EBSR countries are represented with a certain degree of homogeneity with regard to the risk map. This conclusion we reached by analysing their positioning on the risk map and in six of the most important global composite indicators in the field of security: the Fragile State Index¹⁹, the Corruption Perception Index²⁰, the Global Resilience Index²¹, the Human Development Index²², the Global Peace Index²³, and the Global Terrorism Index²⁴.

On the maritime risk map developed by Control Risks, the Black Sea region is framed as having a medium security risk due to disputes over the maritime borders between the Russian Federation and Ukraine²⁵, but on the map of political and security risks, the situation is more nuanced: while Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Republic of Moldova, and Romania are considered to have a low security risk, the Russian Federation and Ukraine have medium to extreme risk in the province of Donbass; Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey have high risk areas due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Kurdish issue in Turkey²⁶. As far as political risk is concerned, none of the analysed countries is assessed below the medium level: Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia (high political risk in South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Romania, Russian Federation, and Turkey are rated as having medium political risk, while Azerbaijan, Belarus, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (extreme political risk in Donbass) have a high political risk²⁷.

Regarding the six indexes invoked, overlapping them shows that, at least in terms of security issues, EBSR appears to be homogeneous, excepting Romania and Bulgaria that are both NATO and EU member countries. This situation is explained by the fact that both organizations requires the achievement of specific sets of standards including the indicators and indices used in the composition of the analysed indexes.

So, beyond its geographic definition, it is obvious that the term *region* is open to the establishment of its meaning, which includes, besides proximity and economic integration, cultural and even linguistic links²⁸. In this regard, the EBSR's cultural map shows a picture where most of the countries are Orthodox (except Azerbaijan and Turkey that are predominantly Muslim) and the traditional and secular-rational values, considered by the authors of the World Values Survey to be in opposition, are distributed equally among the ten countries (traditional values: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Turkey; secular-

¹⁹ *Fragile States Index 2018*, The Fund for Peace, 2018, available online at: <http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data/>, accessed on August 28, 2018.

²⁰ *Corruption Perception Index 2017*, Transparency International, 2018, available online at: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI47b_jtrB3gIVDr7tCh0ySA-2EAAYASAAEgLV_D_BwE, accessed on August 28, 2018.

²¹ *FM Global Resilience Index*, FM Global, 2018, available online at: <https://www.fmglobal.com/research-and-resources/tools-and-resources/resilienceindex/explore-the-data/> accessed on August 28, 2018.

²² *Latest Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking*, United Nations Development Programme, 2018, available online at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/2018-update>, accessed on August 28, 2018.

²³ *Global Peace Index 2018: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*, Institute for Economics & Peace, Sydney, June 2018, pp. 8-9, available online at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports>, accessed on August 28, 2018.

²⁴ *Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism*, The Institute for Economics & Peace, Sydney, 2017, pp. 10-11, available online at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/reports>, accessed on August 28, 2018.

²⁵ *Risk Map 2018 Maritime*, Control Risks, available online at: <https://cdn-prd-com.azureedge.net/-/media/corporate/files/riskmap-2018/maps/riskmap-map-maritime-2018-a3.pdf?modified=20171208130044>, accessed on August 28, 2018.

²⁶ *Risk Map 2018*, Control Risks, available online at: <https://cdn-prd-com.azureedge.net/-/media/corporate/files/riskmap-2018/maps/riskmap-map-2018-uk-web.pdf?modified=20171208130003>, accessed on August 28, 2018.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ Rick Fawn, "Regions and their study: where from, what for and where to?", in *Review of International Studies*, Volume 35, Supplement S1, February 2009, pp. 5-34, Cambridge Journals, p. 12.

rational values: Belarus, Bulgaria, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine)²⁹. As the distinction between survival values and self-expression values, the cultural map is extremely homogeneous, because all ten countries are centred on survival values (economic and physical security, relatively ethnocentric profile and low levels of trust and tolerance)³⁰.

Therefore, the area around and in the vicinity of the Black Sea is not just a geographic area, but a region that not need to have only institutional forms of cooperation between the state actors, but also some common similar economic, political or cultural characteristics.

2. Is the Black Sea a distinct strategic space?

In the first part of 2018, NATO Review published a paper that called the Black Sea region a “critical intersection”³¹. Even if it is stated that the papers published in the journal does not necessarily represent the official position or policy of the member governments or NATO, we cannot completely separate this point of view from the manner the experts of the member countries relate to this space: critical crossroads of the East-West and South-North corridors, an area whose control or dominance provides power in Europe (especially the Balkans and Central Europe), the Eastern Mediterranean, the South Caucasus and the Northern part of the Middle East³².

The next element to be discussed is the framing of the Black Sea riparian countries in the *regional security complex theory* (RSCT). According to some authors³³, the region only partially responds to this theory, but what is interesting is that the authors of RSCT, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, see the Black Sea as an unintegrated space in any of the regional security complexes identified after the Cold War: North American, South American, European, post-Soviet, Middle Eastern, Central African, Southern African RSCs, Asian supercomplex (South Asian and East Asian RSC), West African proto-complex and Horn proto-complex³⁴. The Black Sea, therefore, appears on the map developed by the two authors³⁵ as linked to an *insulator element* (Turkey), at the intersection of three RSCs: European, post-Soviet and Middle Eastern one. The term *insulator element* is defined as “a location occupied by one or more units where larger regional security dynamics stand back to back. This is not to be confused with the traditional idea of buffer state, whose function is defined by standing at the centre of a strong pattern of securitisation, not at its edge”³⁶. Buzan and Waever argue that Turkey is not capable to bring together different complexes in one coherent strategic arena³⁷.

In this context, is the Black Sea a distinct strategic space?

²⁹ *Cultural map - WVS wave 6 (2010-2014)*, World Values Survey, 2017, available online at: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>, accessed on August 19, 2018.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ Pavel Anastasov, “The Black Sea region: a critical intersection”, in *NATO Review*, May 25, 2018, available online at: <https://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2018/Also-in-2018/the-black-sea-region-a-critical-intersection-nato-security/EN/index.htm>, accessed on July 26, 2018.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Cristina Bogzeanu, *Evoluția mediului de securitate în Zona Extinsă a Mării Negre și influența acesteia asupra configurării forțelor navale ale României pe termen mediu și lung*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, pp. 16-17.

³⁴ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. xxvi.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 394-395.

Citing Milan Vego³⁸, but also the Russian retired colonel Vladimir Anokhin³⁹, John R. Haines, member of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (USA), points out that, on the one hand, the Black Sea cannot be a theatre of war for the modern naval forces due to its status as a semi-closed sea, but, on the other hand, it can be considered a strategic space in which the air and land forces, in particular the tactical ballistic missile component, are particularly important⁴⁰. It is brought to the fore one of the main elements that, alongside classical theories of A.T. Mahan, H.J. Mackinder and N.J. Spykman cited in most analyses of the security situation in the Black Sea, exemplifies the current state: the balance of power in the region. The topical case study on this theory is on the effects of the location in Romania of the US ballistic missile defence system. If for the Western world this system is a contribution of USA to the NATO anti-missile system and a warranty against medium-range Iranian missiles against European and intercontinental targets, the Russian Federation sees this system as being directed against it and acts accordingly in a spiral of distrust⁴¹.

Therefore, the *Black Sea region*, extended or not, has its own strategic importance, being as above experts said, a *critical intersection of strategic interests*.

3. What makes Black Sea region “extended”: the various interests, the forms of economic and political cooperation or psychosocial representation of security?

Still, what is the Black Sea: a material space of nature or a legitimate social construction for both expressing and challenging power, as Philip E. Steinberg argued⁴²?

As a material space of natural, the Black Sea is an intercontinental sea that communicates through the Bosphorus Strait with the Marmara Sea, through the Dardanelles with the Mediterranean Sea and further along with the Atlantic Ocean, and through the Kerch Strait with the Azov Sea that appears to be an annex to the Black Sea⁴³. However, there can be no complete distinction between the idea of material space and social construction because, as anthropologist Roy Ellen said, the practical classification of the material world is often based on metaphors that are in fact social, as well as the symbolic things are also practical⁴⁴.

Several types of views on the sea over time were synthesized by professor Mike Brown, according to the social and technological changes, but reflecting the myths, beliefs and knowledge of that era: the sea as “dangerous and chaotic” (image created by Judaeo-Christian representations and Greek cosmology), the sea as a “public space” (representation influenced by the development of science and technology) and the sea as a “sublime, wild

³⁸ According to John R. Haines, “If the Atlantic Ocean is the New Black Sea, What’s the Black Sea? Aegis Ashore and the Black Sea Region’s Changing Security Dynamics”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 5 July, 2016, available online at: https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/07/atlantic-ocean-new-black-sea-whats-black-sea-aegis-ashore-black-sea-regions-changing-security-dynamic/#_ftn1, accessed on July 24, 2018.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴² Philip E. Steinberg, *The Social Construction of the Ocean*, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 208-209 (excerpt), available online at: https://books.google.ro/books?id=_sh9rBbPF6UC&printsec=frontcover&dq=The+Social+Construction+of+the+Ocean,&hl=ro&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjH2c2LxeDeAhWKh6YKHazGD68Q6AEIKjAA#v=onepage&q=The%20Social%20Construction%20of%20the%20Ocean%2C&f=false, accessed on June 23, 2018.

⁴³ “Marea Neagră” in *Enciclopedia României*, available online at: http://enciclopediaromaniei.ro/wiki/Marea_Neagr%C4%83, accessed on June 25, 2018.

⁴⁴ Roy Ellen, “Classification”, in Alan Barnard, Jonathan Spencer (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, Second Edition, Routledge, Oxford, 2002, pp. 155-160 (excerpt), available online at: https://books.google.ro/books/about/Encyclopedia_of_Social_and_Cultural_Anth.html?id=tWCBAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=non-social&f=false, accessed on June 25, 2018.

nature” (image marked by European Romanticism, as opposed to rationalism and expansive materialism but also to ecological destruction)⁴⁵.

In Romanian literature, Professor Ilie Bădescu introduces a representation of the Black Sea that is linked to the Baltic Sea through a “Ponto-Baltic Isthmus” whose role is a “geopolitical-buffer region” between Russian and Western influences⁴⁶. On the geographic and political map of the world, this Isthmus crosses Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Lithuania, but this does not necessarily mean that EBSR includes all of these countries, although the forms of cooperation between them are diverse. The Black Sea is also linked to the Adriatic Sea through the “Ilirio-Thracian Isthmus”, which mainly includes Albania, Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, but is also the end of a Danube and Rhine “boulevard” from the North Sea (Rhine-Main-Danube Canal)⁴⁷. Thus, in his opinion, Romania appears as a “trio-confinium”, i.e. a North-Western, South-Eastern and North-Eastern triple confluence zone, whose main function is pacification, synthesis⁴⁸.

The complex representation of the Black Sea and the role of Romania in the region is supported in part by the forms of cooperation in this space. Still the representation of the sea in this context is not accessible to the public but rather strictly follows the above geopolitical approach or a sociological one. According to the sociological approach, the region is the result of the process of regionalization of social space, which, in turn, is part of a process of transformation and/or genesis of a social, cultural, economic, military space⁴⁹. Regionalization has two stages that involve firstly the emergence of a new type of social relationship between existing groups or social units, secondly the generalization of this relationship over a certain geographic area, which includes a specific apparatus of institutions, symbols, language, etc.⁵⁰ For the Black Sea region, this is valid in a sequentially manner on distinct domains and in different combinations of countries and international organizations.

Conclusions

The fragmentation trends in the EBSR are increasing from year to year, as the evolution towards integration and stability promoted by the UN, NATO and EU is seen as a threat by other actors in the region wishing to assert their strategic economic, political and military interests. The Black Sea is a space of competition for power that continues to unfold even after humanity has learned the difficult Cold War lesson.

Therefore, answering the three introductory questions, we can argue that the riparian and the neighbouring states of the Black Sea form an extended region, both on the basis of the analysis of the classic aspects of economic and political cooperation, the common cultural and security features, and, most important, the strategic interests acting there. The Black Sea and its correlated terrestrial space are of strategic importance due to several overlapping elements: the issue of maritime power (A.T. Mahan), the Heartland (H.J. Mackinder) and the Rimland (N.J. Spykman), but also contemporary more tangible issues such as economic profit and transport and energy. Moreover, the representation of its strategic importance varies according to the historical momentum. It is obvious that both the concept of the region and the region

⁴⁵ Mike Brown, “Seascapes” in Mike Brown and Barbara Humberstone (eds.), *Seascapes: Shaped by the Sea*, Ashgate Publishing, Surrey, England and Burlington, USA, 2015, pp. 13-26 (excerpt), available online at: https://books.google.ro/books?id=bxkKBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA13&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false, accessed on June 25, 2018.

⁴⁶ Ilie Bădescu, *Tratat de geopolitică*, Mica Valahie Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 268.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁸ Ilie Bădescu, *Noopolitica*, Mica Valahie Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 526.

⁴⁹ Ilie Bădescu, *op. cit.*, 2011, p. 269.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

itself are particularly important in the relations between international actors, but it must be stressed out that history plays a significant role in the perceived strategic importance of a region. Thus, the Black Sea was particularly important during the First World War, even it was a closed sea for the Allies, but especially during the Second World War and during the Cold War, when the balance in the region was fragile due to the relations between NATO (with riparian member state Turkey) and the USSR. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia continued to relate to the Black Sea as belonging to its sphere of influence, and NATO's enlargement in the region has again reinforced the its strategic importance for both actors, as evidenced by the subsequent events whose effects we are living.

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TRENDS IN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT – DEFENCE EXPENDITURE IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

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Abstract: *Over the past ten years, the dynamics of defence expenditure in the Black Sea region has been directly influenced by two major events with diametrically opposed effects. Firstly, the financial crisis triggered in 2008 and the spread of its economic negative effects until 2012-2013, led to a drastic decrease in military budgets in the area. Secondly, the annexation of the Crimea by Russian Federation in 2014 and the subsequent Ukrainian crisis had the effect of increasing the military spending of the riparian states. Nowadays, the Black Sea region - the NATO member countries, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other - is the scene of some military developments that seem to maintain the state of instability of the regional security environment. The aim of this paper is to analyse the security trends in the Black Sea region based on one of the most important indicators, namely the defence expenditure.*

Keywords: *economic power, military power, defence expenditure, defence and security capabilities, financial and economic crisis, the Ukrainian crisis.*

The current trends in the security environment show that economic determinants of security have become evident in the sense that everything that means defence and security potential requires significant financial resources. An analysis of the latest strategies in the field of state and non-state actors of the world – the USA, Russian Federation, China or the UN, NATO, EU – shows a growing interrelation between the level of economic development (economic resources) and the achievement of security (defence and security capabilities).

Defence and security capabilities are an important part of a country's security strategy, regardless of its status and role within the international community. They are the resources of a country needed to be prepared for all types of tensions, crises and conflicts, direct or indirect, which could involve that it individually or within the political-military alliances. After 2014, the states from the Black Sea region were concerned to allocate significant funds for the development of military capabilities.

1. Defence expenditure – definition

To achieve the desired level of defence and security capabilities, annually the state allocates funds (certain GDP share) to *defence expenditure*. Generally, these represent the amount of financial resources allocated by a government to provide its armed forces with weapons, equipment, and some compensation to the military, or, in particular, “all costs incurred as a result of current military forces and activities”¹. Obviously, defence expenditure

¹ Sam Perlo-Freeman, “Monitoring military expenditure”, *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*, January 11, 2017, available online at: <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-background/2017/monitoring-military-expenditure>, accessed on October 09, 2018.

is not just about money spent on weapons and fighting capabilities, but also includes wages, pensions, equipment, R&D, and so on. NATO details and defines them as “*payments made by a national government specifically to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of the Allies or of the Alliance*”².

According to the NATO approach, the payments on armed forces constitute a major component of defence expenditure financed within the MoD budget and may include the spending on other forces financed through the budgets of other ministries. Another element is the pension payment made directly by the government to retired military and civilian employees of defence system. Defence expenditure also include the spending for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the destruction of weapons, equipment and ammunition stocks and costs associated with inspection and control of equipment destruction. Another component is spending on R&D in the military field, including those projects and programs that do not necessarily lead to production of equipment, and those on the military component of civil-military joint activities³.

Therefore, the ability to train, feed, and equip the armed forces depends on how the national economy is organized, on its ability to produce and to provide the necessary resources and means⁴. Supporting an adequate level of military power is extremely difficult without an adequate level of economic power because high investments in the armed forces can deprive society of some needed resources, worsening the standard of living. Therefore, economic power is one that allows the strengthening of military power and not vice versa.

The problem arises when the state can no longer achieve an acceptable level of the defence and security due to a major economic and financial crisis, such as the one we faced about 10 years ago.

2. The dynamics of new NATO member countries’ defence expenditure

In a study conducted in 2013⁵, we analysed the NATO member countries on the basis of the 2008-2012 dynamics of five specific indicators: *the military budget (billion dollars), the military budget as a share of GDP, the percentage of military budget allocated to equipment and R&D expenditure, military personnel (thousands of persons) and personnel involved in external operations (persons)*.

	Indicator	Military budget (bn. \$)	Military budget (GDP share)	Equipment and R&D (military budget share)	Military personnel (thou. persons)	External operations personnel (persons)
Country						
High affected	Bulgaria	↓	↓	↓	↓	↑
	Czech Republic	↓	↓	↑	↓	↓
	Lithuania	↓	↓	↓	↔	↑
	Hungary	↓	↓	↑	↓	↓
	Poland	↑	↓	↓	↓	↓
	Romania	↓	↓	↓	↓	↑

² ***, *Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018)*, Press Release, NATO, July 10, 2018, p. 14, available online at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180709_180710-pr2018-91-en.pdf, accessed on October 30, 2018.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Cristian Băhnăreanu, *Influența factorului economic în realizarea securității*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p. 9.

⁵ For details, see Cristian Băhnăreanu, *Determinări ale crizei economico-financiare globale asupra securității statelor membre ale Alianței Nord-Atlantice*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, pp. 24-34.

Medium affected	Albania	↑	↔	↑	↓	↓
	Croatia	↓	↓	↑	↓	↑
	Estonia	↑	↔	↓	↑	↓
	Latvia	↓	↓	↑	↔	↑
	Slovakia	↓	↓	↓	↑	↑
	Slovenia	↓	↓	↓	↑	↑
	Turkey	↑	↑	↑	↓	↓

Figure no. 1: The evolution of indicators for the new NATO member countries plus Turkey (2008-2012)⁶

In 2008-2012, the amount of funds allocated to defence in the NATO member countries depended in most cases on the GDP, namely the size of the state budget. As the economic and financial crisis has increasingly affected national economies, many Allies have cut billions of dollars from defence budgets and, implicitly, from critical capabilities investment. This trend can be noticed especially in the European countries in the *high affected* and *medium affected* categories, which were generally the new member countries of the Alliance. Romania and Bulgaria recorded decrease for most indicators, unlike Turkey, which faced problems with personnel.

State	Year					General trend
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Armenia	↑	↓	↑	↓	↓	↓
Azerbaijan	↑	↓	↑	↑	↑	↑
Georgia	↑	↓	↓	↑	↑	↑
Republic of Moldova	↑	↓	↔	↔	↔	↔
Russian Federation	↑	↓	↑	↑	↑	↑
Ukraine	↑	↓	↑	↓	↑	↑

Figure no. 2: The dynamics of military expenditure in the case of the states from Black Sea Eastern shore (2008-2012)⁷

If we look at the other states from Black Sea region, we find that the budgets allocated to armed forces in the 2008-2012 were not seriously affected by the economic and financial crisis. In these five years, the military expenditure of the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan have increased significantly, those of Armenia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine remained relatively constant, and those of Georgia halved.

The economic improvements at regional and international level after 2011-2012, especially in the USA and Europe, has had positive effects on national financial resources. Thus, the world military spending rose for the first time in 2017, reaching a total of 1,739 billion dollars⁸, the highest level since the end of the Cold War. Reaching 610 billion dollars, American military expenditure accounted for more than a third of the world's total, as the USA spends 2.7 times more than the next country in the top (China) and about 30 billion dollars over cumulated next seven countries (Russia, Saudi Arabia, India, France, Great Britain and Japan). While USA military expenditure as a share of GDP declined each year from 2010 onwards, in 2017, they remained unchanged at 3.56%, as in 2015 and 2016.

Although NATO member countries have often pledged to allocate at least 2 percent of GDP for defence⁹, only three of the 28 Allies – USA, UK and Greece – have met this

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

⁷ ***, *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, SIPRI, 2018, available online at: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, accessed on October 18, 2018.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ The commitment made at the 2014 NATO Summit requires all Allies to achieve within the next decade the target of 2% of GDP for defence expenditure and 20% of those spending on the military equipment procurement and R&D.

requirement in 2014. Three years later, their number rose to five, adding Estonia with 2.08% and Poland with 1.99%¹⁰. It is unlikely that by 2024 all Allies will want and manage to allocate 2% of GDP for defence expenditure, especially as there is no mechanism to sanction those who fail to comply.

The above data show that the world's top military spenders are among the world's top economic players, which allocates significant funds to the modernization of their military forces and capabilities. In addition, the trend of military expenditure concentration in recent years continues, in the sense that a small number of countries allocate large amounts of money for defence.

In 2017, Eastern Europe recorded its first annual decline in military expenditure since 2008, almost entirely due to the fall in Russian military spending. Thus, the three Black Sea riparian states – Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey – had cumulated about 1.74% in 2017 (down from 1.81% in 2014) in total NATO defence expenditure.

3. The dynamics of defence expenditure in the Black Sea region

3.1. The military spending of the riparian states

Despite the Russian-Georgian conflict, the financial crisis and its economic effects put an end to the military developments in the Black Sea region, with defence spending falling by about 10% in 2009 compared to 2008. According to SIPRI, the cumulative military budget has begun to rise again from 86 billion dollars in 2010 to 119 billion dollars in 2013 and it has stabilized over the past two years to approximately 96 billion dollars. In terms of GDP, the military expenditure of the Black Sea countries decreased from 3% of GDP in 2008-2009 to around 2.5-2.6% in 2010-2014. An inflection can be seen in 2015 when the share of GDP for military forces has risen to 2.9%, which is close to 93 billion dollars¹¹.




Figure no. 3: The dynamics of military spending in the Black Sea region (2008, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2017)¹²

¹⁰ ***, *The Secretary General's Annual Report 2017*, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels, 2018, p. 109.

¹¹ ***, *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, SIPRI, 2018.

¹² *Ibidem*.

As we can see from the above graph, the Black Sea region is dominated by the Russian military power, followed at distance by Turkey. Both have implemented military modernization programs, planning to expand their maritime and air defence capabilities. Looking at the post-2014 period, we find that the Russian Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine frequently allocate over 3% of GDP and Georgia over 2% of GDP for their military expenditure, unlike the Black Sea NATO member countries that record 1.5-2% of GDP. If disregard the Russian Federation, we find that the total military expenditure in the Black Sea region remained at 29 billion dollars in the years 2008, 2014 and 2017, with small decreases in these intervals. The maximum was recorded in 2013 when the funds allocated for the armed forces reached 31 billion dollars¹³. The Ukrainian crisis has brought in actuality the necessity of maintaining and equipping the conventional military forces, which, after 2014, imposed the increase in military expenditure, especially of the NATO member countries.

Over the last decade (2008-2017), in terms of spending on major defence acquisition programs, Turkey is ranked 11th in the world with about 8 billion dollars, just after the USA. Also, Azerbaijan is ranked 24th with over 3 billion dollars invested in 2008-2017, Russian Federation on 56th with 810 million dollars, Romania on 59th with 670 million dollars, Bulgaria on 77th with 280 million dollars, Armenia on 83th with 240 million dollars and Georgia on 100th with just 150 million dollars¹⁴.

State Arms	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Bulgaria	Georgia	Republic of Moldova	Romania	Russian Federation	Turkey	Ukraine
Aircraft		168				242	314	1,920	
Armoured vehicles	4	592	3	1		3	45	79	17
Artillery	11	111							
Missiles	109	241				29		226	
Air defence systems		67						42	
Sensors		26				27		219	2
Ships		298		7			20		
Engines						6	143	150	
Naval weapons								55	
Satellites								50	

Figure no. 4: The 2014-2017 cumulated procurement spending in the Black Sea region (million dollars)¹⁵

After 2014, Turkey has invested heavily in the acquisition of airplanes and helicopters, missile systems, sensors, engines, armoured vehicles, naval weapons and satellites. Azerbaijan focused in particular on military vehicles and ships, missile systems, airplanes and helicopters, artillery and air defence capabilities. The Russian Federation has allocated the largest amount of money for aircraft and engines. Bulgaria spent on military vehicles, Georgia on military ships and vehicles, and Ukraine on military vehicles and sensors. Armenia has invested in missile systems, artillery and armoured vehicles only in the last two years.

3.2. Romania's military expenditure

As a result of the NATO request to allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence budget, a *National agreement on increasing the defence funding (Acord politic național privind*

¹³ *Ibidem.*

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵ ***, *SIRPI Arms Transfers Database*, SIPRI, 2018, available online at: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>, accessed on October 18, 2018.

creșterea finanțării pentru apărare)¹⁶ was concluded at the beginning of 2015 at the level of the presidency. According to the document, Romanian decision-makers agree to maintain armed forces funding level at least 2% of GDP for 2017-2027. The causes of this agreement are multiple: from the appeal of NATO officials to member countries to achieve the defence sector financing target and show solidarity in this area, to the awareness of the risks to which Romania is exposed in the region and the need to provide modern military equipment to the armed forces, on the one hand, and the optimal framework for the development of the military cooperation relationship within the Strategic Partnership with the USA, on the other hand.

The 2016 *Military Strategy of Romania (Strategia militară a României)*¹⁷ notes that the structure of forces must be adequate to the mission and configured according to both the wide range of unconventional and asymmetric risks and threats, and the diversification of the types of crises and conflicts. The budgetary support must be sufficient and in an ascending trend in order to develop and engage adequate capabilities, which are task-organized in a modular manner according to the principle of flexibility, needed to accomplish the full range of missions. Another factor is the complication of the regional and global security situation. Starting with years prior to NATO integration, Romanian authorities managed to maintain a positive trend in military expenditure, with some minor exceptions (the effect of the global financial and economic crisis). Therefore, Romania registered the highest relative growth of defence expenditure among NATO member countries, with 37.5% increase between 2016 and 2017; as a result the Ministry of National Defence (MoND) has begun implementing the *Program on the transformation, development, and procurement for the Romanian Armed Forces until 2026 and beyond (Programul privind transformarea, dezvoltarea și înzestrarea Armatei României până în anul 2026 și în perspectivă)*.




Figure no. 5: The dynamics of Romania's defence expenditure (2008-2017)¹⁸

¹⁶ ***, *Acord politic național privind creșterea finanțării pentru apărare*, January 13, 2015, available online at: <http://www.presidency.ro/ro/presedinte/documente-programatice/acord-politic-national-privind-cresterea-finantarii-pentru-aparare-13-ianuarie-2015>, accessed on October 23, 2018.

¹⁷ Romanian Government, *Hotărârea nr. 708/2016 pentru aprobarea Strategiei militare a României* (In English: Decision no. 708/2016 for the approval of the Military Strategy of Romania), published in Official Journal of Romania, No. 789, October 07, 2016, available online at: <https://lege5.ro/Gratuit/geztanjsgeszq/hotararea-nr-708-2016-pentru-aprobarea-strategiei-militare-a-romaniei>, accessed on October 25, 2018.

¹⁸ Ministry of National Defence, *Rapoarte privind activitatea MApN*, available online at: https://www.mapn.ro/rapoarte/rapoarte_activitate/index.php, accessed on October 29, 2018 and ***, *Information on defence expenditures*, NATO, July 10, 2018, available online at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_49198.htm, accessed on October 29, 2018.

Immediately after becoming NATO member country, Romania allocated 2% of GDP for military budget, but the following years have seen a major decrease to a minimum of 1.22% achieved in 2012¹⁹. Although there are some differences between the GDP share allocated to defence expenditure according to NATO and MoND reports, it can easily be noticed that starting in 2012, excepting 2016, it has a steady upward trend from 1.2% of GDP in 2012 to 1.8% of GDP in 2017.




Figure no. 6: Distribution share of Romania's defence expenditure by main category (2008-2017)²⁰

In the area of procurement is a significant increase in budget allocations from 16% in 2014 to more than 33% in 2017²¹ and in the last year the investments in military equipment rise from about 540 million dollars to 1,215 million dollars. According to the *MoND Report for 2017*²², the procurement activities were carried out in the framework of 110 procurement programs, in different stages of preparation, substantiation and execution, such as: Multipurpose Corvette; Mobile Missile Launchers System - SIML; Modernization of MLI-84M Infantry Fighting Vehicle; TBT 8x8 Armoured Personnel Carrier; C4I Systems with Integrated ISTAR Capabilities; Long-Range Air-to-Air Missile System - HSAM; Short-Range Air Defence (SHORAD) and Very Short-Range Air Defence (VSHORAD) Integrated Missile Systems; Multiple-Launch Rocket System - MLRS (High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System - HIMARS). Also, the Romanian authorities signed: the intergovernmental agreement with US government for the purchase of the first Patriot ground-to-air missile system under the HSAM program; the procurement contract for 227 Piranha 5 wheeled armoured vehicles, of which about 197 will be manufactured at the Bucharest Mechanical Plant (Uzina Mecanică București)

¹⁹ ***, *SIRPI Military Expenditure Database*, SIPRI, 2018.

²⁰ ***, *Information on defence expenditures*, NATO, July 10, 2018, available online at: https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_49198.htm, accessed on October 29, 2018.

²¹ ***, *Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018)*, Press Release, NATO, July 10, 2018, p. 13.

²² Ministry of National Defence, *Raport asupra activității desfășurate de Ministerul Apărării Naționale în anul 2017* (In English: Report on the activity carried out by the Ministry of National Defence in 2017), published in Official Journal of Romania, No. 650, July 03, 2018, p. 8, available online at: https://www.mapn.ro/rapoarte/rapoarte_activitate/index.php, accessed on October 29, 2018.

under the "TBT 8x8 Armoured Personnel Carrier" program; the contract with the US government for the acquisition of the first three HIMARS systems under the MLRS program. The Romania's operational air capability in the "Air Force Multirole Aircraft" program was achieved in September 2017 when the last 3 F-16 aircrafts of the 12th Squadron were received. At the same time, the program continued with the initiation of the second stage of the program – 2nd squadron F-16 – for the acquisition of 36 F-16 aircrafts in the VIPER configuration.

Conclusions

Although the use of military power is increasingly challenged in international politics, it continues to remain a fundamental component of state's power and to play a major role in shaping international relations and the security environment. If a major financial or economic crisis will not occur in the following years, the global military spending will continue to increase. According to some studies, the top military powers – USA, China and India – will cumulate over 3,260 billion dollars in defence budget in 2045, taking into account that only USA and China will contribute with 45% to world military spending.

NATO will continue to require its member countries, especially the European ones, to allocate much more financial resources to the development of national and allied military capabilities. After 2014, a process of developing military capabilities was triggered in the Black Sea region as a result of the challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and the risks to which the three riparian states from NATO Eastern flank are exposed.

Over the past 10 years, the military balance in the Black Sea region has remained rather unbalanced due to the large financial resources allocated by Russian authorities to defence and the slower upgrading of the military forces of the other countries in the region. NATO will continue to be an active actor in the Black Sea region, with the defence expenditure of the three riparian member countries on an upward trend. Thus, Romania will maintain at least until 2024 the commitment to allocate sufficient resources to defence and will continue to invest in strengthening the operational capacity of the its Armed Forces, at the same time with the implementation of optimal defence resources management, increased professional training and quality of life for military personnel and revitalization of the national defence industry.

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THE HYBRID WARFARE AND THE MILITARY OR BELIGEN NON MILITARY CONTEMPORARY ACTIONS' CHARACTERISTICS

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Abstract: *The Hybrid War is a system of social, military and non-military actions, carried out in a discreet operational area characterized by political and economic states driven by events. The final result of the actions is the dissolution of statehood.*

Starting with the Cold-War Era, the most effective strategy of defeating undesirable state sovereignty proved to be its destruction, peaceful or violent, by itself (from inside), through discrete social actions, followed, as appropriate, by events management and the restoration of social order through military action. Thus, the role of the military structures has gradually changed, involving the change of organization and training, from the role of the main force of destroying the opponent to the force specialized in post-conflict social status management.

On the other hand, in the Age of Information, within the Knowledge-based Society, space and time have become discontinuous and asynchronous through the universalization of electronically mediated communication and the virtualization of human interactions. This development made possible this type of war, the hybrid, characterized by the physical absence of the external military opponent in the decisive action phase and its emergence, with a stabilizing role, in the phase of managing the results.

Keywords: *hybrid warfare; power; post-conflict societies; military and nonmilitary actions.*

1. Globalization by knowledge and communication¹

The history of wars coincides with that of mankind. People have lived, worked or hunted, built and loved, fought and died in communities since the dawn of history. First in families and extended families, then in tribes and hordes, then in communes and cities culminating in state and supra-state organization, united and divided at the same time by language, traditions and beliefs. The reason is given by the reality that there have always been different interests that have directed the behaviors of individuals and groups in the sense of possession or domination. The contradictory interests have created divergences, conflicts and even confrontations. In past epochs, characterized by low mobility of human organizational structures and a reduced capacity to design the armed power, changes in the balance of power and domination have had a low frequency and allowed empires and dynasties to emerge.

In parallel with the economic, social and economic development, during the last centuries in the history of mankind, political and social organizations have broken down into states whose domination has been shortened and extraordinary mutations in the development of technology, science, culture, belligerence and the arts.

¹ Some ideas of the current communication were published in *Romanian Military Thinking* journal, no. 1-2/2018, Editor: Defence Staff, Printed at Military Technical Publishing Centre, pp. 70-85.

Globalization, which involves a dilution of statehood and a heterogeneity of socio-political-cultural organizations, including the unrestricted promotion of the power interests of international actors, has produced mutations in the international order and the balance of power. The elimination of the Iron Curtain, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the Communist System are crucial events that have led to the confirmation of a single state superpower and the emergence of supra-state powers that dominate differently the world order. There is now a hyper-power: The United States whose status is being challenged by some states with high economic and military potential in the world, in their desire to recreate multipolarity in the world's power balance, as well as by clandestine or criminal supranational organizations supported by failed or corrupt states, in their desire to impose a new world order...

At the same time, there is a relative stagnation in the effectiveness of efforts for peace, harmony and detente at the UN level. The Security Council hardly enforces the observance of the fundamental measures that define the peace of the world, to stop the bellicose intentions and manifestations of the state or non-state actors. The international legal framework continues to maintain provisions to be reformulated, initiatives to renew international law being few and infrequent.

Under these circumstances, in the promotion of interests, the possibility of defrauding the Security Council's vigilance was constantly sought by avoiding the flagrant violation of international law rules, as well as for the diminution of the vigilance of the world public opinion. Among the activated modes, we mention the asymmetric and hybrid forms of conflict.

2. Beligen² confrontations in the global society

The diversity of the world and the effects of globalization induce a multitude of interdependent situations that can be transposed bilaterally or multilaterally into states of harmony (acceptance), disharmony, and disputes or even in specific forms of conflict. In their turn, the state of conflict may contain differences or beligene forms of different natures. Thus, symmetrical, asymmetric or hybrid confrontations may be triggered by the international context, the power ratio on certain geopolitical spaces, the armed effort capacity and, in particular, the interests of confronted actors.

Symmetric confrontation is the predictable way of conducting armed effort. According to DEX, symmetry is considered "... the property of a spatial ensemble to be composed of mutually correspondent elements and to present on this basis certain regularities; proportionality, concordance, harmony between the sides of a whole, between elements of an ensemble, etc.; equal, regular, harmonious distribution of the parts of a whole, of the elements of an ensemble; exact correspondence (like shape, position, etc.) between the opposite sides of an entire"³.

At the strategic level, symmetry is the main characteristic of the confrontation that has accompanied the military history of mankind during its longest period. Specifically, symmetry is the form of armed confrontation against the army, the combat potential being relatively close among the actors. The centers of gravity (Center of Gravity - CoG) are also similar in importance, defined by the strength of the two armies. In most cases, the defeat of the army meant taking power over the adversary.

² Beligen/beligene: There is a political situation, economic or social susceptible to provoke an armed conflict (read more at: <http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/bellig%C3%A8ne/8689#IkKpT3c4SrsiA0PV.99>).

³ Academia Română, Institut de lingvistică "Iorgu Iordan-Al. Rosetti", *Dicționar explicativ al limbii române*, 2nd Edition, Univers Enciclopedic Gold Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p.1018.




Figure 1: Symmetric confrontation (taken over ...) ⁴

Practically, the symmetric confrontation requires only lines of operation, the effort directions being absent, or consisting of peripheral implications of the armed conflict. In this case the confrontation took place directly between the gravity centers by activating the operation lines.

Nature, procedures, and armed effort are predictable. The attitude of attack or advancement adopted by a belligerent party (offensive) corresponds to the form of stationing (defense) of the other party. Similarly, if actor A moves forces (dynamic form), actor B can move to a strong or ambushed position (static forms). The uniqueness of confronted entities leads to predictable or reciprocal forms of countermeasures adopted by the opponent. The combined effects in the actions will be directed to the destruction of the adverse exercise capacity.

The victorious state formation adjudges the territory and property of the defeated, often without the possibility of further subsequent confrontations that would cause changes in the final state.

Particularly symmetrical confrontation is the extensive use of Hard Power. In this type of confrontation, non-military actions know quite a few representations, the military effort being omnipresent and decisive. As a form of manifestation, depending on the historical periods, the degree of development of armaments and confrontational technologies, the goals and the magnitude of the operations, the attack, the offensive, the defense, the siege, the fight for positions, the encirclement and the encirclement of the encirclement, retrieving, tracking, fighting airborne collisions, or fighting offshore collisions and counteracting them.

Concerning possible examples, we mention that the entire existence of mankind, from the beginning of the social organization to the end of the Second World War, is characterized by the predominant existence of such a type of confrontation. The wars of Antiquity, those of the Middle Ages, then those of the Modern Age until 1945, contain symmetrical forms of confrontation.

With few exceptions, for situations where an actor of confrontation, with totally inappropriate possibilities, required the deployment of another type of belligerence.

⁴ Bogdan Alexandru, Ciprian Bogdan Vasile, *Contraacararea afectării teroriste la adresa intereselor NATO și Uniunii Europene*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2017, fig. 7 Confruntare simetrică, p. 52.

Asymmetric confrontation is known to be the opposite way to the symmetrical variant. Asymmetry consists in the absence or non-observance of the rules and it must be adopted in the extreme, when there is a disproportionate military potential among the actors of the confrontation. It exists, or is sought by the commanders, and at the tactical level in symmetrical confrontations, especially for breaking the balance or accomplishing the surprise and/or superiority required by the offensive. At tactical level, asymmetry is the essential condition for winning.

At the strategic level, the essence of the asymmetric confrontation consists in striking the opponent by surprise and in the identified vulnerabilities⁵. Starting from the fact that the direct face-to-face struggle is not possible or not recommended, the weaker actor has to resort to forms of indirect, partial and small-scale confrontation, bypassing the adversary center/center of adversity/adversity. This type of confrontation requires the partial and temporary activation of some operating lines or effort directions, corresponding to the possibilities and advantages of the weak actor.

It is important to note that “Asymmetric war is, in most cases, a war covered, carried out in an expanded manner but with a low intensity by guerrilla groups, religious cults, drug cartels and even by the Special Forces or the forces of the conventional armies”⁶.

What is important is the observation that, by surprise, based mostly on the location, scale and/or timing of actions, and the summation of the effects, the vulnerable actor produces wear and tear and the demoralization of the strong opponent. Thus, with skill and time, it is possible to adjudicate the final victory. We can speak of lines of fragmentary operations, the effort lines being absent or knowing peripheral implications of the armed conflict. There can be no confrontation between centers of gravity.

As a result, the enemy’s vulnerabilities are sought and targeted towards the poor actor’s efforts. Nature, tactics, techniques, procedures, and armed effort will be absolutely non-compliant and therefore unpredictable.

The actor with a modest, repetitive and surprise hit will try to maintain the initiative, causing loss to his opponent, inducing him a permanent state of insecurity, fatigue and fear, disbelief in the possibility of taking the initiative and defeating the ubiquitous but invisible opponent⁷. In order to achieve the strategic goals envisaged, many segments of the population will be confronted with confrontation.

In the face of current confrontations, international law prohibits the execution of military strikes (belonging to a robust military actor) on civil targets. Conversely, the clandestine action is practiced, the asymmetry involving the production of strikes from the civilian to the military environment; hitting, hitting, incapacitating, and destroying the powerful enemy’s military targets.

In the practical plan, all processes or methods that can lead to diminishing the opponent's superior potential and defeating his will to fight will be considered permissible. It is clear that this approach to the struggle falls outside the framework of international law and conflicts with the laws and customs of the war.

⁵ Al. Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁶ Lele, Ajei, *Asymmetric Warfare: A State vs Non-State Conflict*, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, India, Oasis, No.20 – Julio. Dicembre 2014, p.101.

⁷ Al. Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.




Figure no. 2: Asymmetrical confrontation (taken over ...) ⁸

In the *beligen* effort, Soft Power will be used on a large scale, the opponent's surprise will be intensely used by choosing the place, time, and ways of applying Hard Power. It maintains its importance, especially in the case of an international player with a high military potential. We must be aware that the decisive role is played by non-military actions that make a decisive contribution to winning the victory. As a form used over *time*, it has to be said that the asymmetric forms of confrontation have always been used when the disability of a potentially disastrous potential has to be overcome. McKenzie Kenneth has identified six types of threats that can be activated in the current geopolitical context: nuclear threats, biological threats, chemical threats, operational concepts, information operations, and terrorism. If the current asymmetric confrontation may comprise three or four threats, the tendency is that all forms identified by McKenzie may be adjudicated by the future asymmetric warfare.

Examples can be extremely numerous. From Old Testament writings, David's struggle with the giant Goliath is well-known. A stone, a symbol of asymmetric action, skillfully engineered at a vulnerable point of the giant, contributes to victory in the biblical confrontation⁹.

The Trojan Horse, an asymmetric cowardly thought by Ulises, sneaked a group of fighters back to the walls of Troy, the infiltrators flinging the gates of the city at night, making it possible to conquer the city by concealing.

Alexander the Great, the leader of a small army in the Battle of Gaugamela or the "House of the Camels" (October 1, 331 BC), gains a brilliant victory in an asymmetric confrontation, surprisingly oblique movement, action inconsistent with the rules of the time, being used for the first time even the centric effects, defined much later (even Alexander was the spearhead of the decisive attack on Darius' place of displacement)¹⁰.

The greatest empire of the world, Genghis Khan's Mongol Empire, was built through victorious battles in which the brilliant army commander, channeling crushing blows

⁸ Alexandru - Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *op. cit.*, fig. 8 - Confruntarea asimetrică, p. 53.

⁹ Toni Pfeanner, *Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action*, International Review of Red Cross, Vol.87, number 857, March 2005, p.149.

¹⁰ Jeremy Black, *Seventy Great Battles of All Time*, Aquila Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 31.

(especially from the Kheshig fears¹¹), by identifying early weaknesses of the adverse device the intelligence effort and its own genius of leader¹².

On the night of 16-17 June 1472, about 3 hours after the evening, a 700-1,000 - strong army corps disguised in Turkish and led by Vlad the Impaler who knew the Turkish language and customs triggered a night attack the tent and the killing of the Ottoman sultan. In the general nocturnal crackdown, the Turks mutter between themselves. There are losses of about 30-35,000 people from the Turkish camp, the sultan escaping because of the chance not to be present in his own tent¹³.

During the Pacific Battle, in order to bypass the destructive shooting of the US cavalry, the Japanese developed the torpedo Type 93 with a radius of 20,000 yards, the maximum torpedo at that time of 10,000 yards, at a speed of 45 knots/hour. Launched at night, Japanese torpedoes have caused major damage, the case of the USS Minneapolis heavy cruiser being enlightening¹⁴. Among the various asymmetric forms can be listed the harassment, the night attack, the ambush, the use of improvised explosive devices or the hidden mines, the flooding of low portions, the production of waves, the terrorism, the assassination, the poisoning of vital resources (air, water, environment) to the whole people.

The advantages of the asymmetric confrontation, which relied on the actor with modest possibilities, created the discomfort of states with significant resources of potential in the major areas of confrontation. As a result, the form of hybrid confrontation was generated to better meet the interests of actors with different employment opportunities in Beligene space.

The term hybrid means “...*consisting of disparate elements; lacking harmony*”¹⁵. Even if it is generally accepted that Hybrid confrontation is the oldest and most encountered type of confrontation, this kind of confrontation where theorized by polemologists with little time ago, but it getting a high frequency of uses, in the vocabulary of military and media analysts, after the Crimean annexation by Russia in 2014¹⁶.

In the Romanian literature, we see the use of the hybrid warfare in recent studies with regard to actions and/or operations involving the mixing of symmetrical forms with asymmetric and irregular shapes in the forms and proportions imposed by the requirements of the operational framework¹⁷. Exactly accurate predictive theorizations of the concept, without being named as such, of course based on the warm observation of the recent political and military events in our country, the Balkans and the Republic of Moldova, we have found in the autochthonous literature since 2001 The General Army Corps Eugen Bădălan, then General and Chief of the General Staff, said with certainty to the career military “So we will witness a jump from the “military war” to the “political war”. This will involve the use of only limited military action only in cases of strict necessity, not only the destruction, but also the psychological effect on the adverse population, in the sense of discouragement, the loss of

¹¹ Kheshig - elite structures with a constant force of 10,000 fighters, selected from the best and courageous, thoroughly trained and equipped, devoted entirely to the Mongolian ruler, intended to defend the person of the Mongol Emperor under any dangerous circumstances. At decisive moments, part of the structure (or totally) made absolutely impartial blows on vulnerable sectors, adjudicating victory on the Mongol side.

¹² Francis Dvornik, *Origins of Intelligence Services*, University Press, New Brunswick, Rutgers, 1974, pp. 277- 290.

¹³ Constantin Giurescu, *Istoria românilor*, vol. II, All Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, p.39.

¹⁴ J. Ancker III Clinton, Michael D. Burke, *Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare*, Military Review, July-August 2003, pp.18-19.

¹⁵ Academia Română, Institutul de lingvistică “Iorgu Iordan-Al. Rosetti”, *Dicționar explicative al limbii române*, 2nd Edition, Univers Enciclopedic Gold Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p.245.

¹⁶ Erik Richborn-Kjennerud, Patrick Cullen, *What is Hybrid Warfare?*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 2016, p.1.

¹⁷ E. Bădălan (editor), *Concepte strategice și operative de actualitate*, CTEA Publishing House, Bucharest, 2014, pp.16-217.

the will to fight, the shattering of trust in victory and withdrawal of support for their own army. Prevalence is: exerting political and economic pressure (...); call for UN intervention (...); orchestration of externally supported state blows, etc., these actions representing the main contents of operations belonging to the so-called "Grey Zone" (low intensity conflict) that articulate in an elastic conception, terrorism and diversion, psychological manipulation, civil violence, insurgency, border collisions, etc. They will be accompanied by an "external maneuver" on the international sketch, which "can become, through its effects, more important than the direct operation"¹⁸. The Romanian general defines and describes the hybrid war without explicit naming it, thus pre-conceptualizing the future War syntagm Hybrid.

In West Literature, the term began to be used when W. J. Nemeth work "Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare" was published in June 2002 by the Naval Postgraduate School California¹⁹.

Concretely, hybrid confrontation extends the possibilities of accumulation of symmetrical and asymmetric efforts, combining a multitude of forms of irregular war, conventional war, limited war, economic warfare, confrontations for energy resources, cyber confrontation, identity, and proxy conflict.

All these can be used in complicated and versatile forms, along with various capabilities (criminal, financial, informational, economic), using aggressive and denigrating propaganda to the opponent, as well as expanding forms of insurgency, terrorism and ad-hoc conflict, needed to shape the desired final state²⁰.

We have to emphasize that the decisive role in achieving the objectives of the war will come from non-military means²¹, effort lines or operations designed synergistically to shake up the stability of society, dissolution of government and severely affecting the capacity of the armed forces.




Figure no. 3: Hybrid confrontation (taken over ...) ²²

¹⁸ Eugen Badalan, *Securitatea României actualitate și perspectivă. Un punct de vedere*, p. 99, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001.

¹⁹ William J. Németh, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*, Monterey CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002.

²⁰ Iulian Chifu, *Război hibrid, Lawfare, Război informațional. Războaiele viitorului*, p. 200, in the International Scientific Conference *XXI Strategies*, "Carol I" National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, June 11-12, 2015.

²¹ Zdeněk Kříž, Zinaida Bechná, Peter Števkov, *Hibrid warfare: its concept, potential and how to fugit it*, p.10 in *Hibrid Warfare: A New Phenomenon in Europe's Security Environment* (2nd edition), Jagello 2000 for NATO Information Center in Prague, Praha, Ostrava, 2016.

²² Alexandru - Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *op. cit.*, fig. 9, *Confruntarea hibrida*, p. 55.

In hybrid confrontation, the non-military actions that exceed the intensity and results, the effects generated by the military effort, have the decisive role in reaching the final stage²³. The end result of actions in the target state is the collapse of statehood itself.

Conclusions

Asymmetry has existed since ancient times, from David and Goliath, from the barbarian hordes attacking Rome, from the fall of Troy and the charm of Ulysses, or from the night attack in Târgoviște, led by Vlad the Impaler against a large Ottoman army superior to the Afghan mujahedin. Asymmetry is the strategy of the vulnerable and today it is the prospect of low-potential states or non-state actors. In both cases, the low-power actor seeks forms, moments, and action steps that speculate on the vulnerabilities of his opponent. The initiative belongs to the most vulnerable, who can also enjoy some sympathy and support from the population.

Globalization has allowed actors with high military potential to manifest themselves in a relatively similar manner by designing and adopting strategies to drive the conflict, according to the patterns adopted by the vulnerable actor, but with the means and resources specific to the real capabilities they have or even to innovate in the field, expanding the area of non-military interventionism in almost all spheres of socio-economic and cultural life. This is the Hybrid War.

In hybrid confrontation, the initiative may belong to the strong or the weaker actor equally. These, in order to circumvent the norms of international law and to deceive public opinion, on the one hand, and the vigilance of the institutions of the target state, on the other hand, disguises the undermining of organizational capacity and institutional efficiency in the center of adversity, by using clandestine forces and unconventional techniques and means. Successively, the society, then the government and, ultimately, the armed forces are attacked.

In the attacks on society, negative aspects of living and working conditions are exacerbated, communication deficits, vulnerabilities of public services, social fault lines, ethnic or religious animosities, historical misunderstandings, other vulnerabilities are exploited. After the polarization of human groups, out-of-focus outbreaks and inflammation of opinion, military specialists from Intelligence structures or the actor's special forces strongly control non-military destructive evolution so that, in the end, regular military forces come to counsel new social stability and political-economic or support radicalized ethnic/religious groups. Modern state infusion technologies used by militia/belligerent groups create great problems for state structures and conventional armed units of the target. The defeat of the armed structures, the collapse of government, the instability in the target territory, ultimately lead to the dissolution of statehood. The assailant actor will arrogate his role as a savior or pacifist or will portray the victim or mediator of the conflict, vehemently supporting the non-interference in the affairs of the assailant actor.

Considering all of this, in my opinion, the Hybrid War is a System of social, military and non-military actions, carried out in a Discreet Operational Space, characterized by political and economic States Driven by Events. The final result of the actions is the dissolution of statehood.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 54.

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ADDRESSING THE EVALUATION OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETAL SECURITY BASED ON COMPLEXITY CONCEPTS

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Abstract: *Societal security, as developed by the Copenhagen Security School, is an extremely important area of the broader concept of a contemporary security approach that, in addition to military issues, also addresses a host of other threats from areas such as political, economic, societal or environmental ones. In the study of contemporary social security, a series of concepts specific to the theory of complex systems, such as complexity, self-organization, chaos, etc., have been borrowed, which have substantially enriched the hermeneutics of the security discourse on the basis of non-traditional interpretations of social systems. This paper aims to present the basic concepts of complexity and their relevance to the theory and practice of contemporary societal security. At the same time, the paper presents some conclusions regarding the analysis methodology specific to the complexity science applicable to the field of societal security.*

Keywords: *societal security, complexity science, systemic thinking, security in a systemic context.*

Introduction

In order to better understand the dynamics of phenomena and processes from a series of physical and biological domains a new scientific corpus has emerged and developed as the *complexity science*. Derived from the system thinking, this science is seen as a collection of ideas and principles, with which researchers and practitioners from various fields, including those in the theory and practice of contemporary security attempt to understand and influence the socio-political and economic phenomena. Regarding the application of perceptions of complexity in security studies, this was done relatively slowly, as besides their supporters, there were many challengers to this new vision developed from systemic thinking.

However, there were a number of works by authors, as Ian Sanders and Jennifer A. McCabe¹, Jake Chapman² and Alison Gilchrist³, who supported the validity of ideas borrowed from complexity science in areas such as education, economics, or politics. On the other hand,

¹ I. Sanders, J.A., McCabe, *The Use of Complexity Science: A Survey of Federal Departments and Agencies, Private Foundations, Universities and Independent Education and Research Centres*, Washington Centre for Complexity and Public Policy, Washington, DC, 2003.

² J. Chapman, *System Failure: Why Governments Must Learn to Think Differently*, London, Demos, 2004, available at: <https://www.demos.co.uk/files/systemfailure2.pdf>, accessed on October 05, 2018.

³ A. Gilchrist, *The well-connected community: networking to the edge of chaos*, in *Community Development Journal*, Volume 35, Issue 3, July 2000, pp. 35:264–275, available at: <https://academic.oup.com/cdj/article-abstract/35/3/264/348874?redirectedFrom=fulltext>, accessed on 05.10.2018.

authors such as Robert Jarvis, Robert M. Cutler⁴, John Urry⁵ take complexity ideas and transpose them into international politics and later on authors such as Czeslaw Mesjasz⁶, David Nicholls⁷, Todor Tagarev, or David S. Alberts⁸ to open the way to using complexity concepts in security studies.

So, the complexity science has begun to provide increasingly useful analytical models in a wider variety of areas, including the field of theory and practice of today's security. Considering the current approach to the concept of security and the widespread use of complexity science in the study of contemporary social networks, we considered it useful to try to find out whether there is a link between the analysis methodology specific to this new science and one of the major areas of contemporary security, the societal security, which can contribute to a better theoretical understanding and to a more effective practical approach in this field.

Under such conditions, this paper aims to present the basic concepts of complexity and their relevance to the theory and practice of contemporary security. At the same time, the paper presents some conclusions related to the analysis methodology specific to the complexity science and evaluate its relevance for the field of societal security.

1. Complexity and contemporary societal security

Scholars and practitioners in international relations and related areas, particularly security and conflict and peace studies, have high expectations from complexity research. Increasing complexity is seen as a law of nature and society, and international phenomena and processes after the end of the Cold War confirm this theory, given the increased complexity of the contemporary world system. On the other hand, contemporary social systems have also grown in complexity, being labeled as a chaotic or risk society⁹. In this context, societal security, defined as the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats¹⁰, become subject to complexity theory research. Reflected in all forecasts, uncertainty, the speed of change and the complexity of political and economic processes and phenomena, as well as environmental challenges, contribute to the increasing world's incomprehensibility at all levels of its internal hierarchy¹¹. Also, expanding and deepening the security concept contributes to increasing the real or perceived complexity of the world we live in today. Therefore, from the very beginning, complexity-based research has been perceived as very promising for security studies as well.

The traditional state-centered security studies, in which the researches were oriented on the causal-effect linear approach (including those borrowed from early systemic thinking such as stability, polarity, hegemony), aimed at mainly improving security prediction capabilities. However, some more sophisticated analyzes, based on systemic thinking, such as the bipolarity-multipolarity dispute of the 1960s and 1970s, have been largely refined with

⁴ R.M. Cutler, *Complexity Science and Knowledge-Creation in International Relations Theory*, in Encyclopedia of Institutional and Infrastructural Resources and Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, Eolss Publishers for UNESCO, Oxford, 2002.

⁵ J. Urry, *Global Complexity*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Cambridge, 2003.

⁶ Czeslaw Mesjasz, *Complexity of social systems and sustainability theory and policy: A critical survey*, International Studies Association Convention (ISA), Atlanta, GA, March 2016.

⁷ D. Nicholls, T. Tagarev, *What Does Chaos Theory Mean for Warfare?*, Airpower Journal, Fall 1994, pp. 48-57.

⁸ S. D. Alberts, J. T. Czerwinski, *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*, University Press of the Pacific, 2002.

⁹ U. Beck, *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, SAGE, London, 1992.

¹⁰ O. Waever, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, 1993, p. 23.

¹¹ J. C. Glenn, T. J. Gordon, *2006 State of the Future*, The Millennium Project, American Council for the United Nations University, Washington, D.C., 2006.

applications of traditional system thinking. Thus, the concepts borrowed from early system thinking have had multiple applications in contemporary security debates.

According to authors such David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, in their extended approach, security studies use the concepts of complex systems such as analogies, metaphors, or mathematical models¹². Analogies and metaphors from complex systems research have significantly enriched the language of security discourse. At present, it is almost universally accepted that only in a limited number of cases can the mechanistic explanations of the functioning of social systems apply. Therefore, a series of concepts specific to the theory of complex systems such as complexity, self-organization, chaos, and the like have penetrated the language of the security discourse. Thus, the notions taken from the study of complex systems have substantially enriched the hermeneutics of security discourse on the basis of non-mechanistic interpretations of social systems and have allowed the development of analytical methodologies relevant to contemporary security, including societal security.

2. The basic concepts of complexity and their relevance for the social security study

As we have seen before, complexity science has been identified as a collection of ideas, principles and influences from several fields of knowledge (natural sciences, biology, cybernetics, socio-economic sciences, political sciences), close to purpose and origins with systemic thinking, which can be used for analytical purposes in all areas of knowledge¹³. In fact, we cannot talk about complexity only in a systemic context and, in such circumstances, we can talk about interrelation and complex processes.

In his work, *The end of certainty - Time, Chaos, and The New Laws of Nature*, published in 1997, Ilya Prigogine shows that complexity is not simply a theory of the physical world, but it deals with the dynamics of all populations that can be understood by statistical methods¹⁴. But let's look at the basic concepts of complexity and identify whether they can be applied in the study of societal security.

In order to present the key concepts of complexity science, we will use the approach of the four authors, Ben Ramalingam and Harry Jones with Toussaint Reba and John Young of *Exploring the complexity science. Ideas and implications for development and humanitarian efforts*, the second edition, published in 2008, under the aegis of the Overseas Development Institute, London. In this paper the key concepts of complexity are presented in a group of three distinct sets¹⁵, based on the complex system features, which we present in the following passage.

A first set of key concepts of complexity is grouped around the idea of *complexity in a systemic context* - complexity science analyzes the complex processes and phenomena of complex systems. Therefore, according to the above-mentioned source, the features of complex systems are the source of three key concepts of complexity¹⁶:

- a. Complex systems are characterized by interconnected *dimensions and elements* - this is the starting point for understanding the complexity science;

¹² See *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*, Edited by David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski National Defense University Washington, D.C., 1997.

¹³ B. Ramalingam, H. Jones, T. Reba, J. Young, *Exploring the science of complexity. Ideas and implications for development and humanitarian efforts*, 2nd Edition, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2008, p. 5, available on Internet: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/833.pdf>, accessed on 21.07.2018.

¹⁴ I. Prigogine, *The end of certainty - Time, Chaos, and The New Laws of Nature*, 1 edition, Free Press, 1997.

¹⁵ B. Ramalingam, H. Jones, T. Reba, J. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

- b. *Feedback processes* - are determinants for the way in which complex systems change;
- c. The *emerging features* of the complex system describe how the behavior of the system (often characterized by unpredictability) is based on the interaction of the parts so that the whole is different from the sum of the parts;

A second set of key concepts of complexity comes from the feature of *changing* complex systems and covers various aspects that determine how they change over time. This feature is the source of four key concepts¹⁷:

- a. In complex systems, relations between dimensions and its elements are usually *non-linear*, ie when it occurs, the change is usually disproportionate and unpredictable;
- b. *Sensitivity to the initial conditions* highlights how small differences in the initial state of a system can lead to significant later massive differences;
- c. *Space phase* of complex systems helps to understand and construct the dimensions of a system and allows the analysis of the evolution of the systems, considering the process of evolution as a sequence of states in;
- d. The pattern of *chaos/edge of chaos* describes the order underlying the seemingly random behaviors exhibited by certain complex systems.

A third set of key concepts of complexity is given by the notion of complexity stimuli, referring to the concept of *adaptive stimuli* and how their behavior manifests themselves in complex systems. From this feature results three key concepts¹⁸:

- a. *Adaptive stimuli* react to the system as a whole but also to each of its component parts, generating a series of phenomena;
- b. *Self-organization* characterizes a particular form of an emerging property that may occur in systems with adaptive stimuli;
- c. *Co-evolution* describes how the system as a whole and its stimuli evolve together or co-evolve over time.

As expected, systemic thinking has also had a significant impact on research in international relations in general and security studies in particular. Thus, analysts such as Morton A. Kaplan and Karl W. Deutsch¹⁹ used the theory of complexity to study international relations, and later Barry Buzan and other Copenhagen School analysts used elements of this theory to elaborate the extended security concept proposed by this school²⁰.

Therefore, we can say that the new military and non-military threats to contemporary society, such as low intensity conflicts, regional conflicts, terrorism, transnational crime, migration, environmental degradation, etc. cannot be researched in the true sense of the word without the use of tools specific to the study of complex modern systems. Thus, the key concepts of complexity derived from systemic thinking and complex system features are increasingly relevant in security studies as well. Moreover, the research of social systems from a complex perspective has opened the way to the study of societal security with the help of the key concepts put in place by complexity science. To support these statements, we present some examples of analytical methodologies specific to the science of complexity used in the study of societal security.

¹⁷ *Ibidem.*

¹⁸ *Ibidem.*

¹⁹ C. Mesjasz, *Applications of Systems Modelling in Peace Research*, Journal of Peace Research, 25/1988, p. 3, available on Internet: <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/002234338802500319>, accessed on 14.05.2018.

²⁰ B. Buzan, O. Waver, J. de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder-London, 1998.

3. Complex analytical methodologies used in the study of societal security

As we have previously stated, it is more than obvious that a new type of reasoning is needed for the analysis of contemporary social phenomena, which corresponds to the complexity of these phenomena and which can be applied to the systems of international relations, implicitly to military and security relations, including here also the specific societal security relations.

Therefore, for the analysis of contemporary societal phenomena, an analytical methodology specific to the science of complexity is needed to provide a viable alternative to linear, cause-effect methods, which mark the traditional-deterministic thinking. One of the motto-logical tools that promote such an understanding of these phenomena is the *drivers of change*, developed within the Department of International Development - DFID²¹. The drivers of change has been developed as a learning strategy to allow for a better understanding of the causes that make socio-economic changes so difficult in some of the poorest developing countries. This strategy allows to address support policy by these countries on the basis of an analysis of the complex interaction between economic, social and political factors and how this interaction can contribute to the socio-economic change of these states.

Another complex analytical method is known as *growth diagnostics*²², developed by a group of researchers at Harvard University as an analytical framework for diagnosing economic growth. In fact, this method leads to the identification of a strategy for setting policy priorities that impact on economic growth²³. The strategy aims to establish, on the basis of the most important constraints on economic activity, a set of policies that have the greatest impact on economic growth. This methodology can be conceptualized in the form of the decision tree.

*Logical Framework Approach*²⁴ - LFA is an analytical methodology taken from the exact sciences by U.S. Agency for International Development - USAID in the early 1970s. This method is an analytical process that supports the planning and management of goal-oriented projects. It provides a set of concepts used as part of an iterative process that helps structured and systematic analysis of a project or program idea²⁵.

Randomized controlled trial is one of the simplest but most powerful medical research tools that allows random allocation of patients for clinical treatments that can have a defining effect on their health²⁶.

The dependence of the evolution of the complex systems on their initial conditions leads to the conclusion that the evolution of two similar complex systems may be different if the initial conditions in which they are found are different. This consequence allowed complexity analysts to introduce the concept of *path dependence* to more rigorously analyze the dynamics of system changes. In this context, researchers from the International Development Research Center have developed a progress measurement system for

²¹ D. Booth, D. Cammack, J. Harrigan, E. Kanyongolo, M. Mataure, N. Ngwira, *Drivers of Change and Development in Malawi*, Working Paper 261, ODI, London, 2006, available on Internet: <http://www.hrmars.com/admin/pics/713.pdf>, accessed on 30.07.2018.

²² R. Hausmann, D. Rodrik, A. Velasco, *Growth Diagnostics*, Revised, March 2005, p. 2, available on Internet: <https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/files/growthlab/files/growth-diagnostics.pdf>, accessed on 30.07.2018.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ Republic of Serbia Government European Integration Office, *Guide to the Logical Framework Approach: a key tool for project cycle management*, Second Edition, Publisher Milica Delevic, Global Print, Belgrade, 2011, p. 10, available on Internet: <http://www.evropa.gov.rs/Evropa/ShowDocument.aspx?Type=Home&Id=525>, accessed on 30.06.2018.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ A.R. Jadad, *Randomised controlled trials: a user's guide*, London, BMJ Books, England, 1998, available on Internet: <https://www.ajronline.org/doi/full/10.2214/ajr.183.6.01831539>, accessed on 30.06.2018.

development projects called *outcome mapping*²⁷. This methodology does not focus on measuring outcomes and their effects on primary beneficiaries, but on behavioral changes exposed by secondary beneficiaries²⁸. The results mapping process consists of a long design phase followed by a cyclical record keeping phase and is primarily intended for charitable projects in developing countries funded by large donor organizations from developed countries. In a manner quite close to the theory of change, *outcome mapping* can be used as an evaluation methodology to collect data about essential immediate changes from complex systems, changes that lead to long-term changes that may even have a transformative character.

Concerns to identify long-term changes in the evolution of complex systems have opened the way for systemic thinking to look to the *future*. In this respect, the *foresight methodology* has emerged and developed, defined as an instrument that has the "ability to create and maintain viable future prospects and to use them for useful organizational purposes"²⁹, and *futures techniques* such as *driver analysis* or *scenario planning* are suitable for this purpose. The scenario method aims to build a series of future perspectives, useful in decision-making and policy-making under various conditions. This approach allows the development of robust and insensitive strategies for future variability (taking into account several future perspectives) and not only for a single optimal possible future scenario (taking into account the linear evolution of the studied system)³⁰.

To investigate the totality of non-quantifiable relationships specific to complex multidimensional systems, Fritz Zwicky, an astrophysicist at the California Institute of Technology, created a special methodology called *general morphological analysis*. Zwicky created this methodology that he applied in aerospace, but in recent years this analytical framework has begun to be increasingly used in the field of political and security analysis as well as in the field of studies about the future³¹. In 1995, the Swedish Defense Agency developed the computerized version of the general morphological analysis methodology. This has made it possible to significantly extend the scope of this methodology, as well as to multiply its scope. Thus, a series of research projects investigating socio-security issues have started to use the methodology of general morphological analysis. For example, the *Five Challenge Future Scenarios for Societal Security* project, developed by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, finalized in 2013, uses general morphological analysis to identify different *multiple futures scenarios* in the form of five scenarios to show how the company could evolve by 2032³². The prospects of the societies described in the five scenarios are based on different types of societal security challenges and opportunities, which relate first and foremost to changing societal risks and threats and secondly to how social conditions facing society are dealing with accidents and emergencies that influence society as a whole³³. Finally, the scenarios so elaborated aim to provide a solid analytical basis for the adoption of

²⁷ S. Earl, F. Carden, T. Smutylo, *Outcome Mapping*. International Development Research Centre, 2001, p. 1, available on Internet: https://www.outcomemapping.ca/download/OM_English_final.pdf, accessed on 30.06.2018.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ R. Slaughter, *Futures Concepts*, Briefing Paper for Christian Futures Consultation, 2003, available on Internet: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222482088_Futures_concepts, accessed on 01.07.2018.

³⁰ B. Ramalingam, H. Jones, T. Reba, J. Young, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

³¹ T. Ritchey, *Modelling Complex Socio-Technical Systems using Morphological Analysis*, adapted from an address to the Swedish Parliamentary IT Commission, Stockholm, 2002, available on Internet: www.swemorph.com/downloads.html, accessed on 02.07.2018.

³² Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Five challenging future scenarios for societal security*, 2013, available on Internet: <https://www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/26562.pdf>, accessed on 12.07.2018.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

a sustainable strategy for the field of societal security as an important tool in the ongoing analysis of how society responds to accidents and emergencies³⁴.

Another project that uses general morphological analysis is *Europe's Societal Challenges. An analysis of global societal trends to 2030 and their impact on the EU*, developed by RAND Corporation / Europe, at the request of the European Commission and finalized in 2013³⁵. The final report of the project shows that it analyzes the uncertainties and potential trajectories underpinning global societal trends and their impact on the EU. The report also shows that the analysis is based on a series of evolving trends such as: growth and affirmation of a new global middle class, global population growth and aging, employment and labor market changes, the evolution of the trend and impact of migration, societies increasing connectivity and the role of the individuals³⁶. Although these tendencies are rather uncertain, their magnitude depends on development trends rather than the control of decision-makers and could have different types of consequences for European Union societies.

In view of these examples, we can state that the *general morphological analysis* is one of the most complete analytical tools offered by complexity science that is being used on an increasingly large scale.

There are other methods of analysis proposed by complex researchers such as *most significant change*, *force field analysis* or *stakeholder analysis* that can be used in the context of societal security analysis. The existence of all these analytical methodologies reinforces the idea that systemic thinking and complexity science provide useful tools for analyzing societal security, but we should not expect a single instrument to provide exhaustive, fully satisfactory analyzes for the decision-making process. The notion of *strange attractors* and *chaos* suggests that only a combination of these analytical methodologies can be regarded as adequate to all requirements of societal security analysis. However, we are of the opinion that the *general morphological analysis* methodology is the most complete tool for exploring societal security.

Conclusions

Even if there is no general definition of complexity (such a definition does not seem to be necessary or achievable), it can be said without reservation that there is a well-cohesive scientific corpus that makes us assert that the use of the concept of *complexity science* is justified and relevant to security studies. Although security studies cover a very broad field, including purely technical issues, they can be treated as part of the knowledge about society, sharing many of its components with social sciences. Ideas from systemic thinking and complexity studies are used in security-oriented research, as models, analogies and metaphors, and in social sciences they acquire a special significance. For mathematical models derived from systemic thinking, it is quite obvious that they are associated with objective research. Analogies and metaphors taken from complexity studies are related to ideas extracted from rational science. In the application of models, analogies and metaphors in social sciences, the following approaches can be identified: descriptive, explanatory, predictive, forward-looking, normative, prescriptive, retrospective, control and regulatory.

The existence of a rich range of complex analytical methods applied in security studies reinforces the idea that systemic thinking and complexity science provide useful tools for analyzing societal security. Thus, to obtain relevant analytical results for societal security decision-making processes, it is recommended to use specific analytical tools in a

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

³⁵ RAND Corporation/Europa, *Rapport on Europe's Societal Challenges. An analysis of global societal trends to 2030 and their impact on the EU*, 2013.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. xiv.

combination designed in accordance with the problem to be solved. However, we are of the opinion that the general morphological analysis is the most complete tool for exploring societal security.

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DEMOGRAPHICS AND THEIR ROLE IN GLOBAL ECONOMY

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Abstract: *A declining population implies economic consequences. Why? Because oil consumption will drop and sales will drop as well. Because the global economy depends on the industrialized world and the national GDP will be lower. The paradox is that the global economy can slow down its pace, but people in the developed countries of the world will do better than before. Why? Because a less crowded country means less resource reliance, less pollution, fewer traffic jams, and more space. Can we talk of a future crisis as a consequence of the demographic decline in the developed world?*

Keywords: *global economy, demography, economic crisis, population.*

Introduction

A general analysis of the formation and evolution of the world economy should not ignore the great geographical discoveries, the progressive process of private economic agents—that starts with international trade developed in the period between the sixteenth and the end of the 19th centuries and reaches the trans-border investments, revolution recorded in the early 20th century as well as the specific of global demographics. But, economically and socially speaking, the international stage requires a state of equilibrium, stability, which cannot be limited to the sphere of economic trade, but also concerns the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services and the employment of the workforce. The tendency to continuous equilibrium is explained by the permanent interdependence and dynamics of the determinant factors of the economic system, and therefore the existence of a high level of training of the workforce is a key element of this component.

1. The global economy and the world's population

The image of the world economy in the 21st century is changing rapidly as a result of major transformations in its fundamental components – nation-states, alliances and international partnerships, markets, goods, services, trans-border societies, the new actors who have acquired a decisive role in the field of economy and security, migration, and evolutions in demography. A special role in the process of globalization is played by transnational and multinational corporations, and their important position in the world affairs results from their size and their wide scope of activity that transcends national borders and from the actions they carry out in almost all areas.

Globalization is “the process in which the territory ceases to be the pillar of social and cultural organization. Essentially, this consists in a stronger integration of countries and their populations as a result of the significant reduction in the costs of transport and communication and of the removal of artificial barriers from the international movement of goods, services,

capital, information and persons”¹, says one of the greatest analysts in the world. However, the elements of national economies integrate into the world economic space and the rules imposed by states to their domestic producers are increasingly interlinked with the rules of the foreign consumers. Also, local producers struggle to compete with foreign producers on their domestic market owed to the fact the borders got more open and permissible and the national markets got interconnected into larger networks of markets obeying the same commerce rules. Thus, as a result of globalization, national economies become, with or without intent, a part of the world economic system and must respond to its integration challenges.

A significant trend registered in the evolution of the mutual interchange of activities is represented by the spread of globalization in all fields of social life, also in the educational systems directly affecting how the workforce is trained and educated to act in a specific professional branch. This is owed to the fact that education needs resources in order to be well done, thus lack of resources leads to lack of proper training and education of future employees. Some poorer countries are helped by the richer countries with educational resources but the gap among the less resourceful countries and more resourceful countries makes the difference. These resource gap results in different degrees of specialization of the workforce in various countries and consequently in different levels of their development. Also, developed countries permanently assimilate technical progress and attain the highest level of specialization, while developing countries achieve only basic specialization, which makes it difficult for them to accumulate wealth.

But not only countries hold the economic power in the globalized world. According to statistics, “transnational companies hold roughly 75-80% of the global costs for civilian research and development, which constitute the basis of technological development, and the largest 700 of them account for around half of all inventions marketed in the world”². In this sense, the “superior technology, entrepreneurial and managerial skills, a global organizational structure are the strengths of multinational companies”³. As a result, the world’s largest transnational companies hold about four-fifths of the world’s industrial production while employing two-thirds of the domestic work force⁴.

The need to have well-qualified labor force drives the transnational companies to take measures in order to achieve a high degree of specialization in the host country. To attain this goal, they train the personnel within the group, they recruit the best trained specialists, and they offer complex and attractive salary packages, but also rapid layoffs in the event of a crisis.

There is a very simple relationship when identifying the sources of economic growth: changing economic output is related to the evolution in the capital stock, to the dynamics of labor force and to the scientific and technological developments. What is worth noting is that demographics plays a key role for the economic growth. Where people are many the workforce is cheaper and businesses are flourishing. And nowadays here we have some major opposite trend that it increasingly manifesting. The situation when the segment of the population representing the labor force is beginning to decrease, sometimes dramatically (i.e. Japan), and this leads to the increase in costs for supporting the elderly population which will put pressure on active workforce and on the governments burdened by growing spending allocated to health insurance or pension funds to cover the social needs.

¹ Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, Economica Publishing House, București, 2003, pp. 37-38.

² Gheorghe Badrus, Eduard Radaceanu, *Globalization and Management*, All Beck Publishing House, București, 1999, p. 81.

³ Constantin Fota, *International Trade and international trading policies*, Universitaria Publishing House, Craiova, 2002, p. 227.

⁴ *The Economist*, 29 January 2000, p. 21.

But while the life expectancy of pensioners is rising, birth rates have dropped by nearly 50% since the 1950⁵. A key factor of economic prosperity in the developed world after the end of World War II and until the 1980, was a growing population representing the labor force. The American and the European population in this category reached its climax in the last decade, but studies show that it will reduce by almost one percent by the year 2040.

Together, these factors suggest a potential fall in the global economic growth due to a downward trend in the workforce. But one of the reasons why the world economy has continued to grow despite this threatening progression is the unprecedented technological progress that has spurred the development of the global economy. Technological progress is therefore at the heart of the future economy and of the types of future jobs. The ability to interact effectively with technology, though important even now, will become crucial in the future economic development. People who do not have skills in software programming, hardware, networks, or other domain-specific applications will become less important in the new economy. Let's consider, for example, TurboTax, the software and website dedicated to tax returns that put thousands of people in a delicate situation and was quickly implemented in the tax market. Also, e-commerce, which has a large market share, requires new skills from the work force and eliminates uncompetitive people in this economic area. The future will accelerate this model. Google and universities around the world have developed self-driving cars, 3D printing and developments in robotics promise to revolutionize the way goods are produced and make companies rethink the need for storing and managing excess inventory. This can only accelerate the trend of job loss.

Globalization, therefore, signals the emergence of a new economy, a questionable concept that essentially means an economy based on new technologies, with a global scale extension.

2. Trends, developments and movements

However, the global economy in its entirety does not affect the growth of the world's population. Statistics show that the world's population is now at the beginning of the 21st century of 7,653,929,932, and this year's growth is of 62 million people, and is estimated to be up to 80 million by the end of the year. By comparison, today's government spending on healthcare is over \$ 11 billion, and education costs about \$ 7,600 billion⁶. The rising trend of the world's population is kept at about 80 million each year. However, if we are referring to Japan, a heavily developed country in its economic dimension, the situation presented by the statistics of the field shows a decrease of the population (from 127,484,450 inhabitants in 2017, to 127,185,332 inhabitants in 2018, thus a decrease of 299.118 inhabitants year - 0.23% decrease rate)⁷. The population of Europe is also continually changing following these global descendent trends. People have a bigger life expectancy, fewer children are being born each year and many people are moving from Europe. All these fluctuations contribute to demographic changes with major effects on the evolution of the European economy.

On a purely statistical analysis, it can be noticed that developed nations, whether in East Asia or in the Western world, have been at the peak of their development for the past 250 years. But demographic growth proves to be inversely proportional to this economic

⁵ Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on the Long-Run Macroeconomic Effects of the Aging U.S. Population, *Aging and the Macroeconomy: Long-Term Implications of an Older Population*, National Academies Press, Washington DC, US, December 10, 2012, available online at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK148831/>, accessed on October 12, 2018.

⁶ "Populația lumii" (în timp real) (World population - in real time), available online at: <http://www.worldometers.info/ro/>, accessed on October 01, 2018.

⁷ Japan is situated on the 11th place as number of inhabitants in the world but register decrease in terms of numbers. See more at: <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/>, accessed on October 03, 2018.

development. History shows that the most devastating wars have not prevented the nation's long-term population growth. Now, however, in the decades of peace and wealth, the population of the developed states people has decreased, and this trend continues⁸. The phenomenon is not due to extreme poverty or natural disasters, but to the fact that people do not want to have children. Japan is the first country facing this process, and investors are changing their methods to find solutions to this new reality. In the past, each economic cycle, either recession or recovery has ended with a higher GDP and a more developed economy than before. In the future, analyzes show that each economic cycle will probably end with less growth. A declining population entails economic consequences. Japan is a developed economy that has not been affected by mass migration, and in the period 2006-2016 the population decreased by 0.5%, oil consumption decreased by 21.8%, car sales by 7% and GDP- by 4%⁹.

What does a major decrease in a country's population mean? Let's just assume that car sales will fall (global automobiles this year amount to more than 50 million¹⁰), oil consumption will also drop and national GDP will be lower. The paradox is that the total economy may decrease but still the population of economic developed countries (USA, Europe and Japan) may register an increase in the indicators defining the quality of life. Why? Because a less crowded country means less dependency, less pollution, fewer traffic jams, more space.

Nevertheless, a strong economy invests in win-win deals, a stable economy is a zero-sum game, and in a depressed economy, all investors lose. Faced with this reality, the leaders of the world's big economies opted for population relocation. If the pace of this process remains the same, before this century ends, 50% of the population of Western states will be made up of people from countries with poor economic development¹¹.

Transnational mobility of labor force directly concerns only a limited number of people, aiming at the necessary specializations at a time of development. Thus, only the organizational factor or the high technical specialization are transferred. This mobility affects a small percentage of the total population movements and has some influence on the categories of employees with higher education.

Transnational expansion is taking place in countries where there is no available workplaces and development prospects are well outlined. These decisions of preferential relocation to developed countries result from correlating the financial incentives and social benefits for those who choose this solution and who are competitive in a top-ranked economy.

It is a well-established fact that in the developing countries the labor supply is derived from the demographic growth (Latin America, Asia)¹², while in economic developed countries, it is largely derived from emigration. As a result, a population re-establishment has resulted from the fact that the Washington administration has accepted an unprecedented

⁸ World population projected to reach 9.8 billion in 2050, and 11.2 billion in 2100 – says UN, Sustainable Development Goals, June 21, 2017, available online at: <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/06/world-population-projected-to-reach-9-8-billion-in-2050-and-11-2-billion-in-2100-says-un/>, accessed on October 02, 2018.

⁹ *Statistical Handbook of Japan 2018*, Edited and Published by Statistics Bureau Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, available online at: <http://passthrough.fw-notify.net/download/123488/http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/2018all.pdf>, accessed on October 02, 2018.

¹⁰ “Guvernarea și economia”, *Worldometer*, October 01, 2018, available online at: <http://www.worldometers.info/ro/>, accessed on October 01, 2018.

¹¹ Wolfgang Fengler, “Can rapid population growth be good for economic development?”, *The World Bank*, April 15, 2010, available online at: <http://blogs.worldbank.org/african/can-rapid-population-growth-be-good-for-economic-development>, accessed on October 11, 2018.

¹² Paulo M. Saad, “Demographic Trends in Latin America and the Caribbean”, *The World Bank*, 2009, available online at: https://www.cepal.org/celade/noticias/documentosdetrabajo/6/48786/Demographic_Trends_in_LAC_PAULO_SAAD_ED_12_7_09.pdf, accessed on October 11, 2018.

number of Latin American migrants, and the enlargement of the European Union has solved the demographic problem for the moment. As a result of the free movement of labor, a proportion of migrants from Central Europe were registered in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, where there is a shortage of young people.

Let us not forget that the theories and the models we know about economics, finances and markets, have all been developed in times when populations were growing. Demographics are fairly accurate, and analysts have foreseen the “disaster” looming in the future. Peter Sutherland, the former Goldman Sachs banker, has become a lawyer for mass migration. In 2008, he said: rich countries should not try to restrict migration from poor countries, even during the slowdown in economic growth. Migration implies, besides living standards, salary packages and working conditions, also future growth or decrease in economy and finance. Why? Because massive interdependencies in the world economy, which is now concentrated in East Asia and the West, imply that if the West collapses together with East Asia, the rest of the world will follow. If the West and East Asia are no longer interested in African resources, the black continent will have many economic difficulties because, bear in mind, African countries are heavily dependent on imports and exports of goods.

According to Gefira¹³, the next systemic crisis will happen around 2020, when the oil price returns to \$ 100 and mass retirement starts in Germany¹⁴. The future crisis, which is the consequence of demographic declines in the developed world, seems to be inevitable, and economic effects are projected to be deeper than the economic crisis of 2008. It is estimated that demographics will be among the factors that will contribute to a subsequent financial, social and economic crisis.

Conclusion

Demographics do not determine the fate of economic growth, but they are certainly a determining factor in the potential for growth of an economy. An aging population, accompanied by a decline in birth rates in developed countries, indicate a decline in future economic growth. Increasing productivity can mitigate the impact of these population changes, and technological advances are the ideal source of productivity growth. However, the way can be considered a two-edged sword: on the one hand, technological progress increases productivity, but at the same time can directly eliminate jobs, increasing unemployment. This will happen because the workers who will resist will be the ones who excel in technological abilities, which will add to the restructuring of the types of jobs that the current economy has. Therefore, contradictory movements, hard to explain, will be recorded in the national economies, in the re-establishment of the labor force, but also in the social construction of the future.

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¹³ The GEFIRA financial bulletin is a monthly periodical that the Gefira team releases two times a year.

¹⁴ “In 2020, German society will start collapsing”, GEFIRA, April 2018, available online at: <https://gefira.org/en/2018/04/09/in-2020-german-society-will-start-collapsing/>, accessed on October 20, 2018.

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SECURITY TRANSFORMATIONS DUE TO THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT CHANGES. CASE STUDY: CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS

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Abstract: *This study will provide the findings of an analysis of the measures taken by two of the main actors of the international stage: China and Russia against or for the Internet 2.0 era.*

While Russia adopted (voluntary or not) a more visible strategy using Internet for spreading ideas and messages in order to promote the Kremlin's propaganda, China has a more silent exposure of this phenomenon.

One of the challenges of this study was to show if the strategy adopted by China (banning and restricting its population unlimited access to the Internet), which was chosen to protect the Chinese citizens of so-called western malign influence and propaganda, was intended to create more disinformation.

Keywords: *security challenges, cyber-attacks, disinformation, Russia, China.*

Introduction

Nowadays the security challenges are not only related with military disputes or negative aspects caused by terrorist organizations, organized crime groups, but also by cyber-attacks and online disinformation, which could have a great impact on the security environment.

Internet 2.0 era had brought into people's lives advantages that could not have been neglected. For example, the globalization, the technologic advance and the widespread use of the mobile phones, computers had led to the fact that people have had access to a huge amount of information and they have been able to broaden their knowledge horizon at the same time.

We live in a world where information flows quickly to a large number of people, in real time, through the television, the Internet and the social media, and the perception of a particular event is easy to format, alter and enforce. Also, the abundant information has led to the emergence of an increasingly obvious feature of the population, namely the ingestion of information as such, without subjecting it to critical thinking or strong verifications. These are some of the reasons why we consider that security transformations' theme deserves to be examined in this study.

The rapid spread of information technology, the increasing dependence on technology and automation had made them an essential part of human existence. The need for interconnectivity and interoperability is steadily increasing, and with them, exchanges of information and exposure to vulnerabilities are getting bigger.

Technology, but especially digitization, has made information more and more accessible, and of course, extremely powerful. Alvin Toffler, the well-known American

futurologist and writer, considers information to be the cornerstone of all social life, being paramount to the security of the state¹.

We study the state's competition on the Internet and the methods used by some of the states (in our study will be reflected the Russian and Chinese situation) in order to obtain mind games, to convince and to attract the targeted audience and to accomplish their strategies and goals.

1. Russian influence operations

The term 'influence operations' also known as information operations and warfare, includes the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the dissemination of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent². The war of words and information was efficient from early times.

It is inevitable when we talk about disinformation, propaganda, fake news or influence operations not to think to Russia. Also, according to Guy Durandin, the foundation stone of the word 'disinformation' was put into the Soviet Union when, in 1952, 'dezinformatsiya' was defined as "the propagation of false information in order to create confusion among public opinion is practiced by the press and the capitalist radio ... is a new war prepared by the imperialist bloc against the pacifist policy of the USSR"³.

In the 'Age of Disinformation', Henri-Pierre Cathala said: "In the Soviet environment, since 1920, disinformation meant an arsenal of known or occult means of influencing foreign governments, discrediting political opponents, especially emigrants, undermining confidence among Soviet hostile allies, the falsification of the opponents' opinions on the reality of the Soviet are considered, in many cases, the ones who lead the game"⁴. Information operations is a real part of Russia's foreign policy and social media is more like an instrument used by Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, to accomplish some of his goals.

So, disinformation for Russia is not a new phenomenon, but it appears more and more visible, probably, since the annexation of Crimea. The winning solution for Vladimir Putin in this case was to convince not only his population, but also the other international actors, that his claim has strong arguments and also it is reliable. The Russian President's messages were disseminated by media and social media and created an aura of fairness and justice of human rights. The success of Vladimir Putin's plan was transforming social media in a powerful weapon.

Today, in the Internet era, what really matters is the emotion that information can convey, whether it is true or false. Although disinformation is by no means a new phenomenon, novelty is brought about by international actors (states, organizations or even simple people) that use social networks to promote fake news and multiply them. In fact, war is worn in people's minds. The informational world was not created in order to produce disinformation, but the structure of social media allows more easily disseminating emotions, photos, doctored videos that convince people that certain ideas are worthy.

The Russian Government focus on information and also "information superiority" is an important element in the country's doctrines and strategies. The "National Security Strategy 2020"⁵, for example, states in its analysis of future threats that the "global information struggle will intensify"⁶.

¹ Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave*, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1980, p.18.

² Rand Corporation, *Information Operations*, available online at: <https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html>, accessed on October 30, 2018.

³ *Marea Enciclopedie Sovietică*, vol. XXVII, 1952, p. 143.

⁴ Henri-Pierre Cathala, *Epoca dezinformării*, Editura Militară, Bucharest, 1991, p.48.

⁵ General Debate of the 64th Session, 2009, available online at: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/64/generaldebate/RU.shtml>, accessed on October 30, 2018.

⁶ Margarita Jaitner, Peter A. Mattsson, *Russian Information Warfare of 2014*, available online at: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Margarita_Jaitner/publication/280564287_Russian_Information_Warfare_o

Television is very important for Vladimir Putin. Moscow's official messages are transmitted via state and private television networks to over 90 % of the population of the former Soviet Union. The most visible ones are Rossia 1, Rossia 24, Canal 1, RTR and NTV. Starting with 2014, the online environment is invaded by sites that promote the same content as the media. Russia's social networking services, like Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki, disseminate the same type of messages, amplify disinformation and fake news.⁷

The role of the press in what we call the informational war is to build a picture of ideal Russia and to demonstrate that the liberal democracy, specific to the West, is dysfunctional. The picture of international system is designed in an antagonistic way in Russian propaganda. Russia is portrayed as a victim of the other powerful states and it prevails from the myth of the siege fortress.

The Russian president's strategy is characterized by Timothy Thomas, an analyst on Russian information warfare, who writes that there is "a real cognitive war underway in the ether and media for the hearts and minds of its citizens at home and abroad"⁸.

Also, one of the best strategies applied by Russia is to act offensive under a defensive aspect. In this case, the offensive acts could be legitimized in front of the Russian citizens and the state is portrayed again in a victim. In fact, Russia "considers itself to be engaged in full-scale information warfare"⁹ because other states are leading a war of disinformation against Russia.

Apart from implication in controlling Russian media, Putin choose to coordinate other covert information activities, such paying trolls, constructing bots which could generate in a more facile way favorable content for Russia, cyber warfare, phishing or implication in other states domestic elections. "A scheme for troll activity can be described in three phases: luring, taking the bait and hauling in. The coordinated and massive character of troll activity indicates that we are dealing with the phenomenon of (social) media weaponisation"¹⁰.

The many techniques by which Russian propaganda is carried out aim to miss and delegitimize truth - through omission, indifference, over-interpretation, double language, simplification, intimidation or fractious lies, in other words, "dismiss, distort, distract, dismay. Never confess never admit-just keep on attacking"¹¹.

One of the key elements of the informational war is manipulating citizens' opinion and directing attention to the desired goal. Thus, a social imbalance is created by lowering public confidence in state institutions. There may even be social disturbances that can influence public policies, can alter the foreign policy of the state and disrupt the activity of the authorities involved in ensuring the functioning of the state. Unlike Soviet propaganda, Russia's contemporary methods of information warfare do not crudely promote the Kremlin's agenda. Instead, they are calibrated to confuse, befuddle and distract. Russia aims to erode public support for Euro-Atlantic values in order to increase its own relative power. It exploits

f_2014/links/569df99708ae16fdf07a9b62/Russian-Information-Warfare-of-2014.pdf, accessed on October 30, 2018.

⁷ Russian Social Media Influence. Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe, Rand Corporation, available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2200/RR2237/RAND_RR2237.pdf, accessed on October 30, 2018.

⁸ Timothy Thomas, 'Russia's 21st Century Information War: Working to Undermine and Destabilize Population', *Defence Strategic Communications*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 2015, pp. 11–26. As of November 7, 2017, available online at: <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/timothy-thomas-russias-21st-century-information-war-working-undermine-and-destabilize-populations>, accessed on October 20, 2018.

⁹ Keir Giles, *The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare*, 2016, available online at: <https://www.stratcomcoe.org/next-phase-russian-information-warfare-keir-giles>, accessed on August, 17, 2018.

¹⁰ *Framing of the Ukraine–Russia Conflict in Online and Social Media*, NATO StratCom COE, Riga, 2016, p.7.

¹¹ John Pollock, *Russian Disinformation Technology*, MIT Technology Review, 2017, available online at: <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604084/russian-disinformation-technology>, accessed on August, 19, 2018.

ethnic, linguistic, regional, social and historical tensions, and promotes anti-systemic causes, extending their reach and giving them a spurious appearance of legitimacy.¹²

What is it? By exploiting the vulnerabilities, there are characteristics that can define a society at a certain moment: distrust in one's own institutions, disappointment regarding the political class, man's lack of trust in international institutions. Thus, the rescue solution can come from the outside of the state by promoting another international actor as an actor which is capable of solving the existing state problems. This strategy was applied by Russia with the states in its neighborhood. For example, The Baltic states and Ukraine are portrayed to their own people as failures—blighted by corruption, disorder, emigration and poverty—and run by a sinister elite of Western puppets with fascist sympathies. At the same time, Russia threatens Finland with World War III and Sweden with “retaliatory actions” if either country joins NATO, and warns Denmark that it will become a nuclear target if it joins NATO's missile defense program¹³.

Russia took advantage of some great advantages of the online disinformation: the predictability, anonymity, freedom of speech and also people's cognitive bias. The predictability of Internet users' behavior is given by a targeted and individually defined marketing tool based on the preferences of each user. For example, within social networks, the human preferences most often expressed through likes are analyzed and correlated. Subsequently, it can automatically create a profile of a user who can have predictable behavior in a particular situation. The predictability algorithm is based on a way used in psychometrics, called OCEAN (whose initials come from openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeability, neuroticism), and which has been a starting point for the classification of personalities and behaviors. In fact, people, or how they are called in the online environment, users, are analyzed based on 5 personality traits, known as “Big Five2: Openness (how open are you to new experiences?), Conscientiousness (how perfect are you?), Extraversion (how sociable are you?), Acceptability (how preventive and cooperative are you?) and Neuroticism (are you slightly irritable?)¹⁴. Also, this predictability was used by Vladimir Putin who ordered creating bots, creating algorithms which could automatically disseminate a message to the right category of users.

Such reasoning has also been used by Cambridge Analytica, in using a user's preferences and directing the exact message to an already created audience in order to manipulate his preferences. Christopher Wylie, a data scientist and a former Cambridge Analytica employee revealed ‘Cambridge Analytica quietly collected data on Facebook users and weaponised that data, in a sense, by targeting people with misinformation and specific ads designed to change their behavior (like, whether to believe in a cause or vote a certain way)’¹⁵. By using different apps, responding to Facebook quizzes and sharing some personal information, such as likes, comments, family, friends, relationships, education, work history, religious and political affiliations, a user is publishing, in fact, his personal life.

This can be referred to as “precision segmentation”, “computational segmentation”, whereby the messages come to our attention, taking into account our digital profile, the digital footprint that we consolidate, conscious or not, with every click. But what is the link of Cambridge Analytica with Russia? Political consulting group Cambridge Analytica used

¹² Edward Lucas, Peter Pomeranzen, *Winning the Information War Techniques and Counter-strategies to Russian Propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe*, available online on: https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2706, accessed on October 30, 2018.

¹³ Jorge Benitez, “The Bully to the East: Russia is trying to scare Sweden and Finland away from joining NATO,” *US News and World Report*, August 6, 2015, accessed on October, 30, 2018.

¹⁴ *The Psychometrics Centre*, University of Cambridge, available online at: <https://www.psychometrics.cam.ac.uk/about-us/directory/michal-kosinski>, accessed on August, 20, 2018.

¹⁵ Elyse Betters, *Cambridge Analytica scandal: What you need to know and how to change your Facebook settings*, available online at: <https://www.pocket-lint.com/apps/news/facebook/143977-what-the-cambridge-analytica-scandal-means-and-how-to-secure-your-facebook>, accessed on August, 22, 2018.

Russian researchers and shared data with companies linked to Russian intelligence, a whistleblower told a congressional hearing on interference in the 2016 US election¹⁶.

Russia's disinformation campaigns in recent years have led to the decreasing of some people, the influence of elections, the destabilization of some regions, the attempt to weaken EU member states, but also international organizations such as NATO and the European Union.

Russian influence operations have evolved from classic propaganda methods to personalized content creation, to a macro-type analysis, like Big Data which have much more impact on the targeted audience.

In fact, Russia exploits the Internet advantages, such as flexibility, anonymity, free access to information and transformed all this in more tangible things, such as 'bots' (automated accounts), 'trolls' and 'fakes' (websites or social-media accounts). The information era created opportunities for states like Russia, with a powerful agenda, to use information in its advantage by controlling media and parts of social media. One of the Russian Government's aims is to use the great power of internet to promote their own speech, creating an asymmetric advantage for the military domain.

2. Chinese influence operations

This chapter reveals some characteristics of the process of the Chinese influence operations, of the Chinese propaganda, but also come characteristics of the everyday use of the Internet. China has decided to react to the effects of the informational era, specifically by building a crystal ball for Chinese people, isolating them from the danger of information from the West.

In comparison with Russian influence operations, the Chinese ones are not so obvious, so exposed. The Chinese strategy on public information, media and social media is representative for communist countries. This strategy was constructing more on restricting people's access to information or better said harmful information rather than disseminating disinformation.

The Chinese government controls content on the Internet and also restricts, deletes or prohibits the content that it considers to be not in the state's interest. A turning point of this practice appeared in Deng Xiaoping era, when it has been enacted the Open Door policy, which means the acceptance of Western knowledge, internet and also western influences. But soon after the Open Door policy was implemented, 'China has struggled to strike a balance between "opening up" to the Western world and keeping its people away from the Western ideology. Deng Xiaoping once said that "if you open the window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in"¹⁷. In 2000, the Ministry of Public Security created the Golden Shield Project, which was "a database-driven surveillance system capable of accessing every citizen's record and connecting China's security organizations"¹⁸. Better known is the Great Firewall of China, a combination of legislative actions and technologies enforced by the People's Republic of China to regulate the Internet domestically. Its role in the Internet censorship in China is to block access to selected foreign websites and to slow down cross-border internet traffic¹⁹.

¹⁶ 'Cambridge Analytica Shared Data With Russia: Whistleblower', *Security Week*, available online at: <https://www.securityweek.com/cambridge-analytica-shared-data-russia-whistleblower>, accessed on August, 23, 2018.

¹⁷ Torfox - A Stanford Project, *The Great Firewall of China: Background*, available online at: <https://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/2010-11/FreedomOfInformationChina/the-great-firewall-of-china-background/index.html>, accessed on August, 23, 2018.

¹⁸ "Why China's Great Firewall Bans Google and Pooh Bear: QuickTake", *The Washington Post*, available online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-chinas-great-firewall-bans-google-and-pooh-bear-quicktake/2017/11/30/d4ab9f34-d646-11e7-9ad9-ca0619edfa05_story.html?utm_term=.dbcaaf87d699, accessed on August, 23, 2018.

¹⁹ Paul Mozur, "Baidu and CloudFlare Boost Users Over China's Great Firewall", *The New York Times*, 2015.

Later, the drastic measures taken by the Chinese Party implied banning western social networks. It all started in 2009, when in Xinjiang, a western Chinese province exploded some riots and the government restricted access to Facebook and Twitter for Beijing residents because the social networks were suspected to have perpetuated riots. In 2009, the websites of New York Times, Bloomberg News, Wall Street Journal and Reuters were banned by the Chinese Government, but this measure has been removed after a few months.

All in all, China restricts torrents, pornography, political media and social media²⁰. This includes some sites that many of us could not imagine the internet without this: Google, YouTube or WhatsApp.

An interesting explanation of this phenomenon was given in 2013 by Lu Wei, the State Internet Information Office Director who outlines in a speech at the Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference, that it is needed a stronger focus on Internet governance.

According to Lu Wei, ‘forcefully promote the development of new media, expand and strengthen the online mainstream public opinion battlefield’ is a must for Chinese people. She added that “If we do not effectively occupy emerging public opinion battlefields, other people will occupy them, and this will form challenges for the power of initiative and power of discourse in our public opinion work. We must strengthen a consciousness about the battlefield, forcefully move forward with the converged development of traditional media and new media, strengthen dissemination strength, credibility and influence, and realistically and substantially implement the principle and requirement that the Party manages the media. We must promote Party newspapers, Party journals, news agencies, radio and television stations, etc., to accelerate the pace of digitalization, networking and mobilization on the basis of consolidating the development of traditional business, and race to seize the initiative in development”²¹.

In March 2018, the Beijing authorities banned the letter “n” because in Chinese slang it would suggest a person who has done something for many times and using “n” in several combinations may be an attack on the president. At the same time, the syntax Zi Zedon (named after Xi Jinping and Mao Zedong), meaning “immorality” and “life” was forbidden online. The decision comes after people have been dissatisfied with the social networks of the possibility of extending the mandate of Xi Jinping's president.

Another recent example of Chinese censorship is related to Winnie the Pooh's temporary banishment which was initiated by the government after bloggers depicted President Xi Jinping as the cartoon bear. There are a lot of memes on social media that illustrate the joining of the Chinese president and the character, which started in 2013 (in the context of Xi Jinping's visit to the US). On different occasions, the president was likened with Pooh and that seemed not to be tolerated by Xi Jinping. In other countries such actions are considered as freedom of expression, but this was not the case of China.

As Russia is involving in controlling the content of Russian media, China is doing the same. In 2018, the Chinese government “employs at least 50,000 people to enforce censorship, barring websites disapproves of and forcing search engines to filter out content considered harmful. There's also an army of social-media influencers who, by one estimate, post 500 million pro-government comments a year”²².

²⁰ Nick Routley, ‘Map: Internet Censorship Around the World’, *Visual Capitalist*, available online at: <http://www.visualcapitalist.com/internet-censorship-map/>, accessed on August, 24, 2018.

²¹ “State Internet Information Office Director Lu Wei outlines stronger focus on Internet governance”, *China Copyright and Media*, available online at: <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/09/17/state-internet-information-office-director-lu-wei-outlines-stronger-focus-on-internet-governance/>, accessed on August, 23, 2018.

²² ‘Why China's Great Firewall Bans Google and Pooh Bear: QuickTake’, *The Washington Post*, available online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-chinas-great-firewall-bans-google-and-pooh-bear-quicktake/2017/11/30/d4ab9f34-d646-11e7-9ad9-ca0619edfa05_story.html?utm_term=.dbcaaf87d699, accessed on August, 24, 2018.

The Chinese propaganda is assumed and reckoned openly by the president himself who defined the role of the propaganda department. Also, the party's central committee admitted that "In order to strengthen the party's centralized and unified leadership in public opinion work by the media, strengthen the management of publishing activities and develop a prosperous, socialist publishing industry with Chinese characteristics, the responsibilities of the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) will be reassigned to the Central Propaganda Department"²³. Similarly to RT or Sputnik, in 2018 the Voice of China was creating, by merging the activity of China Central Television (CCTV), China National Radio and China Radio International. Western media described Voice of China as "Beijing has a new propaganda weapon"²⁴.

While China is in a continuous struggle to apply censorship inside the country, by limiting peoples' access to internet and, in the same time, to information, outside the borders propaganda and disinformation are being disseminated.

As Russian trolls, there are also Chinese trolls, which are called '50-cent party', because it is supposed that 50 cents represent the earning per post. The Chinese strategy in this case was to abundantly promote the positive aspects related with China so that news to exceed the amount of negative news, and the impact on the audience to be a positive one. 50-cent party members have the task not to contradict other users, not to enhance ideas about the actions or repressions of the Chinese regime, but to change the subject and distract the audience from the initial post. 'In an editorial in the pro-government Global Times, the regime "for the first time admitted the existence of the 50-cent party', King says, and attempted to explain to its citizens the reason for this 'public opinion guidance,' which is their term of art for information control'. Basically, the government argued that without such control, the country would fall into strife and chaos"²⁵.

In connection with China's propaganda campaign outside the country, there were several voices accusing the Confucius institutions of propaganda. They are designed to project a positive image of the Chinese Communist Party around the world through cultural and linguistic programs, but at the same time, reality could be distorted and political issues discussed. There is a fragile border between propaganda and public diplomacy, between lobby in order to promote culture and language and influence operations.

The strategy of China could be described as "sharp power", which means the "effort by authoritarian states not just to attract support but to determine and control attitudes abroad. It seeks to 'guide' the diaspora and enlist it for political activity. It embraces foreigners, appointing those with political influence to high-profile roles in Chinese companies"²⁶.

Chinese influence operations represent, in fact, a mixture between restricting people's access to a variety of sites, apps or search engines and controlling conversations and simulating fake posts by using trolls and bots. Even though the first reaction of the Chinese government was to ban great parts of the internet, gradually, it realized that in a world where digitization prevailed, such an approach would have had a negative impact.

²³ "Orwellian move: China's President-for-life Xi Jinping now controls all media, 'scores' citizens", *News.com.au*, available online at: <https://www.news.com.au/world/orwellian-move-chinas-presidentforlife-xi-jinping-now-controls-all-media-scores-citizens/news-story/8e6c4f0cc0282487d23d24832ad4c026>, accessed on August, 24, 2018.

²⁴ Steven Jiang, 'Beijing has a new propaganda weapon: Voice of China', *CNN Media*, available online at: <https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/21/media/voice-of-china-propaganda-broadcaster/index.html>, accessed on August, 24, 2018.

²⁵ Lydialyle Gibson, "China's Social-Media Smoke Screen", *Harvard Magazine*, available online at: <https://harvardmagazine.com/2017/05/chinas-social-media-smoke-screen>, accessed on September, 6, 2018.

²⁶ 'Contrasting – and combatting – Russian and Chinese influence operations', *Democracy Digest*, available online at: <https://www.demdigest.org/contrasting-combatting-russian-chinese-influence-operations/>, accessed on August, 24, 2018.

Conclusions

In a changing environment, major international actors have adapted to new threats, vulnerabilities and sought new solutions to implement their own international plans. This is also the case for both China and Russia, countries which understood that the security environment must be adapted to new realities, and not only the military aspects should be taken into consideration.

As we have shown in this study, Russia's approach is rather proactive and also offensive inside and outside the Russian borders. Also, Russia's implication in various aspects of strategic importance is more visible (Russia's involvement in the internal choices of states, the construction of a real trolley farm, involvement in cyber-attacks, is already known at international level).

On the other side, China's approach is more offensive and restrictive inside the country, by limiting people's access to information, everything being done under a mask to protect the population from the malign influence of the West.

In order to summarize, both Russia and China approach influence operations as a normal activity and also as a long term activity.

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SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND CONTENT IN STRATEGIC ADAPTATION

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Abstract: *This paper aims to explore how the concept of security is addressed in the information age. It argues that the information revolution is not fundamentally or primarily about technology. It is also about the content (the message per se), about information overload and malign efforts of manipulating the public opinion and the decision-making process. Therefore, this paper outlines the pervasive threat coming from the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes and makes case for the urge to consider the protection of the information space against pollution (manipulation) as a significant dimension to national security. Last but not least, this article highlights the critical role the Academia community should play in guiding the policy-making process. It pleads for a partnership between the scholars and policy-makers in order to revolution the way they address the security challenges in the information age.*

Keywords: *information revolution, information power, information and communication technology, information content, international relations, international system, policy-making, security.*

Motto

Knowledge more than ever before, is power. The one country that can best lead the information revolution will be more powerful than any other¹.

1. The information revolution and its impact on international relations

1.1. Technological progress – a significant driver of systemic change in international relations

If until recently, the main engine of systemic change was hegemonic warfare, nowadays the main mechanisms of change in the international system are based primarily on the redistribution of power among states. Technological progress (the ultimate symbol of globalization) has the potential to become the main driver of systemic change in the international relations as it affects the transformation of power in the international system (distribution, resources and manifestations).

Technological progress leads to the redistribution of power in the international system and significantly facilitates the process of dynamic transformation within it. Already it is a consensus that the inability of the USSR to compete for technological innovation was a key element in its collapse, leading to a change in the structure of the international system. Actually, from the chronological point of view, the two processes: the formation of the new

¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr. and William A. Owens, "America's Information Edge", in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, p. 20.

system of international relations after 1991 and the global spread of the Internet coincided with this period.

A substantial contribution to the conceptualization and coagulation of a theory to explain the correlation between technological progress and change in international relations is the innovative study *Turbulence in world politics*². James Rosenau has paved the way for a new generation of researchers who consider technology as an essential variable that explains systemic change (global turbulence). In Rosenau's view, technology has determined a series of fundamental changes in post-international global politics, altering the parameters of world politics (world structures have been shaken, system parameters have undergone critical variations, system boundaries have collapsed and the world system has suffered a bifurcation)³. An emerging multipolar world competes with the traditional world in which the state plays the role of central actor.

Eugene Skolnikoff enshrines the role assigned to technological progress as the most important factor of societal transformation and change in international relations. In contrast with James Rosenau, Skolnikoff limits the role of technology to change as a factor in the *evolution* rather than the *revolution* in the system. In other words, one cannot yet speak of a systemic change. Skolnikoff remains anchored in traditional approaches that believe that the state remains the major actor of the international system: in its view, technology is a factor that has produced major changes in power distribution in the system, but has not altered the fundamental attribute of the state: sovereignty⁴. However, Skolnikoff's major merit is to point out the necessity that "theorists must more adequately recognize the dynamic and subtle nature of interaction of science and technology with international affairs"⁵.

1.2. Structural changes in the field of international relations related to the information revolution

In the 21st century, the information revolution (the result of scientific and technological progress) plays a crucial role in the formation of the new framework of international relations (similar to the role the nuclear revolution had played in reconfiguring the international system after the Second World War). According to Joseph Nye Jr.⁶, the current information revolution, sometimes called "the third industrial revolution" is based on rapid technological advances in computers and communications that in turn have led to dramatic decreases in the cost of creating, processing and transmitting, and searching for information.

The explosion of information and communication technologies is the driver that reshapes all aspects of social, political, cultural and economic life. The information revolution is now transforming societies around the world, it is also changing the nature of governments and sovereignty and it is increasing the role of non-state actors. The changes brought about by the informational innovations have led to changes in the power resources of a player and, implicitly, on the strategy that, in turn, produces effects in the international system.

In what regards the field of international relations, the effects can be synthesized⁷ as follows:

– the architecture of the international system has changed, with effects on the structure, organization and relations between its actors;

² James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1990.

³ *Idem*, Chapter 10.

⁴ Eugene B. Skolnikoff, *The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1993, p. 7.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 246.

⁶ Joseph Nye Jr., "The Information Revolution and Soft Power", in *Current History*, January 2014, pp. 19-22, available online at: <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/11738398/Nye-InformationRevolution.pdf>, accessed on September 10, 2018.

⁷ Charles Weiss, "Science, Technology and International Relations", in *Technology in Society*, Vol. 27, No. 3, August 2005, pp. 295-313.

- the processes by which the international system operates have changed, with effects on the related fields: public diplomacy, international trade, including intelligence processes;
- new issues, new regulations and international constraints have emerged on the international agenda and, thus, new areas underpinned by international politics;
- new concepts emerged in the theory of international relations: information society, knowledge society, information power, information security or cyber security.

The effects of the information revolution are particularly profound in the realm of international relations: the expansion of the virtual world has led to the emergence of a new dimension of power by altering the meaning of key concepts - *power* and *security*; the information revolution has transformed the nature of power, has weakened the state, revolutionized warfare and it has changed the balance of power between states and non-state actors, bringing about new security threats and vulnerabilities.

Power – the ability to affect others to obtain the desired outcomes – has always been a concept conceived in terms of resources. Over time, the states' power resources have changed, depending on the type of society - agrarian, industrial, post-industrial, informational. The innovations in the field of information technology brought about by the 21st century have profoundly altered the power resources and, implicitly, the power relations between states: the military capabilities no longer represent the most important determinant in shaping the international order.

In the global information age, power depends less on military power or natural resources and more and more on information resources. Power based on these resources is not an innovation, but the current context characterized by the rapidity with which information circulates have also cast their decisive influence on the way in which states think maximization strategies in the international system. In a world where information is transmitted in real time, the capacity to convert information resources is the future of power maximizing strategies, because, unlike conventional war, information requires less resources.

On the other hand, the impact of the information revolution cannot fit into the reductionist pattern of technological determinism, because in practice, international relations are more complex than such technological determinism implies. Military force remains an instrument of international politics to change the balance of power between states, but conventional warfare is less and less regarded as an “extension of political strategies by other means”, under the logic of Carl von Clausewitz, as it has become too expensive. The information society has brought about a refinement of the power maximizing methods, thus turning information into a weapon of war.

In what regards *security* in the information age, one can notice a gap between the practical and the scholarly approach. J. Eriksson and G. Giacomello⁸ notice that when reviewing past research on the impact of the information revolution on security, the first observations are that: *theory and research on information society say very little about security, and when they do, the focus lies primarily on the security of firms and markets rather than the security of states and societies*. Moreover, according to them, the literature dealing with the manifold aspects of digital-age security is predominantly policy oriented and hardly ever involves the application or development of theory.

The complexity of the security agenda therefore requires efforts to merge new realities into core theoretical concepts. Security studies ignored the great paradigms of international relations and showed little interest in the development of new theoretical and conceptual models adapted to new realities. The lack of consensus on key concepts both in the context of academic debates and policy framework, further complicates the picture. Concepts such as information society, information threats or aggressions, information security, information, cyber security, etc., are being used in the absence of a unified terminology.

⁸ Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, *International Relations and Security in the Digital Age*, Routledge, New York, 2007, available online at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292976966_International_Relations_and_Security_in_the_Digital_Age, accessed on October 20, 2018.

2. Security in the Information Age: bridging the gap between technology and content

It has already become a truism that the processes of social transformation induced by the development of information and communication technologies have generated both opportunities and risks for the actors of the international system with effects on power distribution in the system and, implicitly, power relations between states. Anticipating the role of the Internet (called as electronic interdependence) long before its emergence in a world where media power and technology will have a revolutionary impact on individuals and their relationships, Canadian Marshall McLuhan - the creator of the *global village* syntax - forewarned as a true visionary that "World War III is a guerrilla information war with no division between military and civilian participation"⁹.

The cyberspace represents the future tactical ground of the warfare in the era of information and, given the increased reliance on technology, any aspect of the world related to the cyber domain is potentially at risk. The exponential advance of information technologies has led to new emerging threats to national and international security, ranging from cybercrime¹⁰ to cyber espionage¹¹ and even cyber terrorism¹². Given the increasing role of the information revolution, it should not be surprising that *The United States Intelligence Community's 2017 assessment of threats to US national security*¹³ put cyber threat as the top priority, underlining that many countries view cyber capabilities as a viable tool for projecting their influence, while *some adversaries also remain undeterred from conducting reconnaissance, espionage, influence, and even attacks in cyberspace*.

In the immediate term the cyber-attacks pose the greatest threat to state national security, but on long term, the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes by malicious state actors is emerging as a critical threat to national and international security.

When talking about *information power*, it is useful to underline that it is composed of both *information technology* and *information content*. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between ICT (information and communication technology) and IC (the content of the information, the message *per se*). The former is essential in order to multiply the military and economic capabilities while the latter is the main instrument in influencing the public opinion (reflexive control). "The 21st century can be described in many ways -as the century of speed, technology, globalization -, however none of these definitions captures the essence of the revolution going on under our very noses better than *information*. If we admit that information is the premise of knowledge, then the impact of this revolution on governments, societies and individuals is major, increasingly influencing decisions, attitudes and legitimacy models"¹⁴.

The importance of IC rather than its associated vehicle - ICT - creates a situation where *power over opinions*¹⁵ becomes a critical factor in contemporary conflicts. That is why the information revolution is not fundamentally or primarily about technology. It is also about

⁹ Marshall McLuhan, *Culture Is Our Business*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970, p. 66.

¹⁰ *All facts under criminal law or other special laws, which constitute a social threat and are committed with guilt, through cyber infrastructure*, as defined by the Cyber Security Strategy of Romania, available online at: <https://cert.ro/vezi/document/NCSS-Ro>, accessed on October 10, 2018.

¹¹ *Actions taken in cyberspace in order to obtain unauthorized confidential information in the interests of state or non-state entities*, as defined by the Cyber Security Strategy of Romania.

¹² *Premeditated activities carried out in cyberspace by individuals, politically motivated groups or organizations, ideological or religious, which may cause damage materials or victims, likely to cause panic or terror*, as defined by the Cyber Security Strategy of Romania.

¹³ *The statement of the Director of National Intelligence*, May 11, 2017, available online at: <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf>, accessed on September 15, 2018.

¹⁴ George Cristian Maior (coordinator), *Un război al minții. Intelligence, servicii de informații și cunoaștere strategică în secolul XXI*, Rao Publishing house, Bucharest, 2010.

¹⁵ The 3rd aspect of power identified in the international system ever since 1939 by E.H. Carr, along with military power and economic power.

the explosion of information, information overload and the manipulation of public opinion over social media platforms. In this context, the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes by malicious state actors has emerged as a critical threat to national and international security.

Until recently, the concept of *information security* had been thought to apply primarily to threats against the information systems. But it should also refer to defending societies against malign efforts to distort and pervert public opinion. Such threats take the form of disinformation and misinformation campaigns by traditional state actors.

The defining feature of war in the information age is that the perceptions are as important as the real facts. That is why, in today's global information age, victory may sometimes depend not on whose army wins, but on whose story wins. "The new war is a cognitive war in which (...) people are placed in the position of managing multiple identities, and this activates unpredictable patterns of attitude or behaviour. This has paved the way to uncertainty about the future, not only as an integrative metaphor, but also as an epistemological principle that mobilizes creative and innovative resources"¹⁶. This factor of uncertainty accompanying the new security environment is the reason for the poor adaptation of the security normative framework to challenges posed by the information age.

In his book on *Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations*, Scot Macdonald noticed that "although Information Warfare focuses on computers and their use in warfare, only a small part of the literature in the burgeoning field deals with perception management"¹⁷. Why are perceptions so important? Because they create the reality in which we act and function as "power relationships are largely based on the shaping of the human mind by the construction of meaning through image-making"¹⁸.

And indeed, most of the policy research and practitioners on cyber-security focus on addressing the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure that leave space for cyber-attacks - the ICT, tending to neglect the role of information in covert influence activities carried out by malicious actors with the final goal to influence the public opinion and the process of decision-making in targeted states. The best term to characterize this dimension of power is *sharp power*, a term recently coined by the National Endowment for Democracy, as a result of a collaborative effort¹⁹ and which refers to *the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes* and refers mainly to the malign efforts of sowing doubt and disorder among their rivals.

That is why, apart from ensuring the protection of cyber infrastructure, ensuring the resilience against the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes should be a major concern of all stakeholders, especially at state level, where responsibility of elaborating and implementing coherent policies in the field concentrates.

Final considerations

Security in the information age faces diverse challenges ranging from cybercrime to cyber espionage or even cyber terrorism, from the need to protect the critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks to managing information overload and the necessity of identifying and countering the deceptive use of information within malign efforts of manipulating the public opinion and the decision-making processes in open societies.

¹⁶ George Cristian Maior (coordinator), *op. cit.*, 2010, p. 8.

¹⁷ Scot Macdonald, *Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations*, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 179.

¹⁸ Manuel Castells, *Communication Power*, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 193.

¹⁹ *Sharp Power. Rising Authoritarian Influence Full Report*, The International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for Democracy, December 2017, available online at: <https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence-forum-report>, accessed on October 11, 2018.

The complex security environment caused by the information revolution requires a shift in the way scholars and policy-makers manage the profound implications of the information revolution. Also, it requires adjustments to the policy-making process and collaborative efforts to raise awareness and adopt strategies and policies in this field.

To date, there has been less agreement on how to address these challenges. Moreover, the normative process addressing the security challenges brought by the information revolution is a retroactive one, as states had to adopt measures (mostly reactive and not proactive) to adapt to new realities, without linking this process to an intense debate in the academic environment in order to generate a conceptually and methodologically unified framework. Perhaps it could not have been otherwise, because the changes succeeded with too much speed that the scholars could not keep up with the development of new research paradigms.

The expansion of the virtual world has led to the emergence of a new dimension of power by altering the meaning of foundational concepts - *security*, *sovereignty*, *power* -, but also changing the power distribution between states in the international system, now becoming the world's interdependence networks. Under these significant evolutions, the conceptual apparatus of international security is behind the times. New visions and concepts adapted to the reality of the information age are needed.

It therefore requires a new research agenda centered on the impact of the information revolution on international relations, an agenda that should start from a trend-finding exercise trying to find answers to several crucial questions such as: What are the resources of power in the era of information? What is the impact of the information revolution on the power relations between the actors of the international system? What is the impact of the information revolution on the international system as a whole? How is the concept of security addressed in the information age?

Neither the theory (the scholars of international relations and security studies) nor the policy (the governmental response) has succeeded in keeping up with the profound implications induced by these dramatic changes caused by the information revolution. Investigating the security environment created by this tsunami (information revolution) requires a collaborative process based on a partnership between the academic community and policy-makers.

A new type of strategic thinking is needed, based on an interdisciplinary approach that provides a better understanding of the impact of technological progress on the international environment. "It would be useful to meditate on the terms of a new, strategic thinking that somehow combines the traditional elements of geopolitics and classical power play with those on the increasingly complex relationship between cognitive and material factors, between power and knowledge, acting in an increasingly fluid, increasingly unpredictable international system"²⁰.

The emergence of this new strategic thinking to better understand and address the nature and consequences of the information revolution has been a slow process, resulting in a delay or a gap in the strategic adaptation to the new realities. The governmental response to the new security challenges has been thought to apply primarily to threats against the information systems, neglecting the second dimension of the information power and the content of the information, the message *per se*.

The information revolution is not fundamentally or primarily about technology, it is also about the message. The ability of state and non-state actors to affect public opinion and decision-making processes in open societies has been greatly enhanced by the information revolution, posing a significant impact on the security environment as well as on the strategic decision-making process. This domain can be affected, thanks to the Internet and social media, by the deceptive use of information for hostile purposes by malicious state actors. That

²⁰ George Cristian Maior, *Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și relații internaționale în secolul XXI*, Rao Publishing house, Bucharest, 2009, p. 47.

is *precisely* the source of one of the greatest vulnerabilities that societies must learn to deal with and that should become a key preoccupation for national security policy-makers.

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REFERENCES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND PERMANENT NAVAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY

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***Abstract:** The evolution of computer systems and technologies, the data networks interconnections, has generated the need to deliver distributed and integrated services, which has irreversibly conducted to the emergence of cyberspace as a field of battle with further connotations as a war domain. The military actions in the cyberspace domain are not very strictly identified and treated in international laws and norms, well known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) as the preoccupations of developing and internationally recognizing a set of regulations for the cybernetic domain are far from being decided, and the level of understanding and the knowledge within the military frame as considering the implications and application of LOAC for cyberspace is unclear. A complementary development is identified by the different levels of threat to computer security that generates a severity of impact proportional to technical evolution and complexity. In this context, hacktivism, cyber-crime, cyber espionage, cyber-terrorism and cyber-war are defined by the motivation, the actors and the targets for each of them, and are obviously related to the associated vulnerabilities.*

Cyber security is widely used term, whose definitions differ greatly and are often subjectively outlined. Thus, computer security involves the protection of computer networks and the information they include against penetration and against the impairment or interruption of data access. The same problem encounters the Navy in operating their informatics systems along the pursued sea operations.

In the era of the information conflict, cyber-operations policies and the ship's cybernetic systems' availability are correlated with the Navy's cybernetic capabilities and with the possibilities of using information associated with cybernetic scenarios applied by adverse forces.

***Keywords:** cyber security, threats, vulnerabilities, naval risk, hybrid war.*

Introduction

Communications and Information Technology (CIT) leads the way in interaction within and outside of a country's territory and its disruption may potentially affect life. Hence, cyber-space cannot be left out of a country's span of protection.

The evolution of computer systems, technologies and the data networks interconnections have generated the need to deliver distributed and integrated services, which has irreversibly conduct to the emergence of cyberspace as a field of battle with further connotations as a war domain. Military actions in the cyberspace domain are not very strictly identified and approached in international laws and norms, well known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) as the preoccupations for developing and internationally recognizing a set of regulations specific to the cybernetic domain are far from being decided, and the level of

understanding and the knowledge within the military frame as considering the implications and application of LOAC for cyberspace is unclear. A complementary development is identified by the different levels of threat to computer security that generates a severe impact proportional to technical evolution and complexity. In this context, hacktivism, cyber-crime, cyber espionage, cyber-terrorism and cyber-war are defined by the motivation, the actors and the targets for each of them, and are obviously related to the associated vulnerabilities.

Cyber security is widely used term, whose definitions differ greatly and are often subjectively outlined. Thus, computer security involves the protection of computer networks and the information they include against penetration and against the impairment or interruption of data access. The same problem encounters the Navy in operating their informatics systems along the pursued sea operations.

In the era of the information conflict, cyber-operations policies and the ship cybernetic systems' availability are correlated with the Navy's cybernetic capabilities and with the possibilities of using information associated with cyber scenarios applied by adverse forces.

Cyber threats and all kind of cyber challenges will continue to test navy cyber ability to act these will define the secure and resilient results for the cyber team. The challenges like the "Internet of Things" that facilitates an increasingly connected world, the omnipresence of the cyber domain that allows simultaneous and continuous attacks and technology that bring cyber networks more and more complex and facile to be exploited by an ever-growing user base conduct to an exponential effort to defend for a wide array of cyber threats.

1. Discover the network

Looking back to history we discover, and should learn from that, like the great philosopher Sun Tzu said "*one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements*"¹. So, if the Navy knows and understands the enemy and, of course, knows and understands its own vulnerabilities and limits can plan and enhance suitable strategies to deter and fight in a better way against the enemy. Going in the deep, we need to plan, think and interconnect the strategy and the cyber-policy like a central core in conjunction with the military leadership. In conjunction with that, as current war is based on information, and information is linked to the new technology, but, conceptually, war doesn't change its nature, which is a well-known fact, therefore we need to accommodate and utilize by the military domain likewise.

Cyber players may be considered the most interesting antinomy of the cyber battle space as that all the players, big or small, belonging to a state or not, have some advantages according with their preparation and budget. Also, the state actors, well-equipped with IT, play upon superior computing power and of course bandwidth connection and the small actors, countries and even independent or community hackers, stretch the power of the Internet computation to play as a stronger opposed cyber force. Nevertheless, for all, nations with a high degree of dependence on Internet services are the most tempting target because they lose more when the network goes down. The other paradox of deception used by philosopher Sun Tzu "All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him"². In cyber conflict, the conventional terrestrial spaces between opponents can be unimportant and delusory because

¹ Sun Tzu, "Art of War", 16.05.2009, available online at: <http://sun-tzu-aow.blogspot.com/2009/05/chapter-3-planning-offensives.html>, accessed on October 1, 2018.

² "Sun Tzu Quotes, The Art of War Quotes", in *Military Quotes*, 2018, available online at: <http://www.military-quotes.com/Sun-Tzu.htm>, accessed on September 7, 2018.

every entity is to the next-door neighbor in cyber space. Nowadays, computer power and applications connected with the internet bandwidth over the network are for all player at a click distance and can no longer be taken into account the mountains, valleys, or waterways like a no-go/slow-go zones. Nowadays, the most powerful weapons are not based on position, number of soldiers, strength of army, consists of logic, power of computation and mind innovation.

2. In deep analysis

In present, ships could bear a close resemblance rather to “*cyber platforms*”, cyber platforms that are starting with the basic ships’ hull, mechanical and electrical systems – such as those that control steering and power on board – but they do not stop here. Of course, now we have sensors, weapons and navigation systems, aviation systems, and the technology interconnecting and controlling physical devices and virtual devices on bases and facilities (the control systems), and, on top of all, we connect all the social media and fake news, on take away box, for the personnel on board of ships.

After a deep analysis of navy platforms, we discover that almost all important systems on board of ships, aircraft, submarines, and unmanned vehicles are finally, somehow and somewhere networked – connected – interconnected at some level. All these types of connection are subject of data manipulation, and so is the continual support of position, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems that can be easily spoofed or jammed up with vulnerable Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation dedicated for precise navigation and precision weapons, are likewise a technical vulnerability. An internet search on this subject reveals multiple scholarly and journalist works on these vulnerabilities, and of course few of them describe how to exploit them for very little financial investment, making them potentially cheap attack vectors and affordable almost for all³.

With today’s rapidly spread and evolving threats, ensuring in time and complete security is near to impossible. So, instead of acting for every possible weakness in its cyber defenses, it is more appropriate to act similarly to a cyber toughness strategy that will enable it to “*fight through*” the inevitable compromises. Cyber toughness is like shipboard damage control center where it is made the assessment of the ship which is targeted or hit, it is triggered the team, the crew to quickly analyze and assess the damage and isolates the damaged system or service, makes repairs and implements work-around and continues fighting in the battle space.

But the cyber toughness strategy alone is not enough. The concept is not solving the issues in additional are necessary assets which make the difference between a fight and a successful fight like people, training, processes and technology also the infrastructure need to be protected and all of them we identify in significant investments and initiatives to build a good and steady foundation.

Accordingly with today trends, next to the main pillars of *Cyber Security* (formerly Pillars of Information Assurance) we must rely on – personnel, and especially on skillful personnel. This resource, one of the basic items of the strategy, should be also trained, because the proper start should be a good foundation and this baseline can be achieved only with trained personnel and existing cyberspace policies that can be setup by them. If this step is skipped, the unstable foundation can generate, sooner or later, some issues for proper operations on cyberspace, and all cyber defense programs are reduced to check-box requirements, finally doomed for failure.

³ *The Navy’s Cybersecurity Focus*, The official blog of the U.S. Navy, October 18, 2017, available online at: <http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2017/10/18/the-navys-cybersecurity-focus/>, accessed on September 9, 2018.

The strategic challenge moving forward for all the Navy's platforms as a whole is how to make military cyber-security policy (historically inflexible and absolute) and training methods more like special forces units: highly trained, specialized, lethal, shadowy, and with greater autonomy within their specialization. Current training conceptual methods within the Navy like a "Cyber Force" are consolidating and should evolve rapidly, with construction of high-tech cyber training networks and planned exercises. While Cyber Force is not yet nearly as rigorous as Special Forces in terms of training (and certainly not focused on the physical fitness aspect of it), training strategy is clearly moving in a direction that will develop a highly-specialized cyber information work-force⁴.

When comparing traditional warfare with cyber warfare, we should have the defensive and the offensive components assimilated with 0 and 1 cyber digits, so that we can conclude that the heart of cyber warfare is... offensive operations.

But, nowadays, most significant advantage remains the anonymity of the launcher of the attack. Clever hackers hide their spot within the international virtual spaces, setup a maze architecture over a virtual Internet. Their routes of attack go through countries where government has poor or inexistent diplomatic relations or no law enforcement cooperation and, of course, space for corruption. In theory, a major cyber conflict could be setup against anyone by an unknown adversary. The law enforcement and counter-intelligence investigations suffer from the fact that Internet is an international entity continuously expanding and moving, and their jurisdiction ends every time a telecomm cable system company crosses a border and faces another law or no law. In the case of a state-sponsored cyber-attack, international cooperation is naturally absent⁵.

3. References

The Navy Cyber Security Strategy recognizes that tackling cyber security entails the need to⁶:

- Safeguard the rule of law in line with National Constitution and the role as a European Union Member State;
- Adopt a multi-disciplinary approach;
- Ensure that all stakeholders of the maritime cyber-space like government, private sector maritime transportations and civil ships infrastructure should understand their shared responsibility and, thus, their commitment to collaboration and cooperation in order to ensure a safe, stable and secure maritime environment;
- Adopt a risk based approach, based on the premise that it is impossible to guarantee immunity from any cyber-attack.

In the light of the current cybernetic challenges, Navy Cyber Strategy must clearly approach and describe the program's cyber-security (CS). The programs must outline and update periodically the strategy, as necessary, at each program milestone, important program initiation for new ships or new systems on board of ships, full rate production of proprietary systems, full deployment of the platforms involve major changes for the system already in place. So, the strategy should assure the basic guidance for the cyber platforms and the form

⁴ Travis Howard, *A Cyber Vulnerability Assessment of the U.S. Navy in the 21st Century*, Center for International Maritime Security, January 31, 2017, available online at: <http://cimsec.org/cyber-vulnerability-assessment-u-s-navy-21st-century/30405>, accessed on September 9, 2018.

⁵ Kenneth Geers, *Strategic Cyber Security*, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, June 2011, available online at: <https://edoc.site/strategic-cyber-security-k-geers-pdf-free.html>, accessed on September 9, 2018.

⁶ Mita *Malta Cyber Security Strategy - Book -*, available online at: <https://mita.gov.mt/en/Pages/MITAHome.aspx>, accessed on September 9, 2018.

and content will comply with the actual rules of cyber space, and of course the required review should contain some important milestone like:

- Introduction of the context of the Navy Cyber Security;
- Cyber-security approach and management approach should be detailed on the strategy in conjunction with the technical approach, based on the System Design and Architecture Requirements that can define the traceability and of course the Risk Assessment for the system;
- Cybersecurity Implementation can be mentioned based on Technical Implementation and System Design and Architecture according to Cybersecurity Entry and Exit Criteria;
- System Diagram should provide a system diagram including the boundary, major elements, external connections and CONOPS summary;
- Operational Diagram defined by a high level operational diagram.
- Risk Management of the System Performance a list and description of any significant outstanding technical cyber-security risks, and propose solutions and/or mitigation strategies including technical solutions and/or tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- Policy and Guidance with the list of primary policies and the latest guidance. The policy should focus on prevention, resilience and preparedness⁷.

Conclusions

The advance of power for the new available and affordable technology has allowed the defense sector to shift and move the manipulation of information, intelligence and command and control systems to cyberspace. As a result, all other traditional warfare domains have become more and more reliant on operations within cyberspace and of course the LOAC should be rethought, rewritten and even reinterpreted because the understanding and knowledge of use and the implications of LOAC on cyber domain operation and strategy have more and more important and new implication, undiscovered and unimaginable for now, that can conduct in fulfilling its mission within the cyberspace domain. Within the international law regulations, there are contrariety, collision and conflicting on legal arguments according whether the use of cyber-attacks violates LOAC and should be treated like an aggression. The most important argument concerning the potential domino of widespread effects, both on intentional and national level, is related to impact and consequences of the action. We need to take in consideration whether cyber-attacks are the result of human errors or the attacks determine some system failure and inoperative machine services assuming that the systems are engineered incorrectly precisely because of the attack.

Also, the lack of effective information sharing between cyber maritime entities and operators on common ground, over the national and international waters, for the navy intelligence elements, we assume it is similar to a lack of policy and strategy established and imposed, which brings a new vulnerability for all the teams, discovered by some but not discovered by others. The latter will spend resources on the same issues instead of documenting new threats that can lead to successful cyber incident management on the maritime infrastructure.

On the other hand, the fact that the scanty nature of the legal regulation and common understanding regarding the thresholds for what are considered 'cyber attacks' and 'armed attacks' in cyber domain, and when 'inherent right to self-defense' is allowed conduct to the same result.

⁷ Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer (DON CIO), *Cybersecurity Strategy Template and Instructions*, May 09, 2016, available online at: <http://www.doncio.navy.mil/uploads/0512HIP41315.pdf>, accessed on October 1, 2018.

The advantages of anonymity or “attribution” problem is rather serious as it increases the odds for damaging cyber-attacks on national critical infrastructures, and can take place in the absence of any traditional, real-world warning, including in times of peace. The Navy Cyber defense suffers from the fact that traditional security skills are at marginal help, in defending computer networks, and it is difficult to train and retain skillful personnel with marketable technical expertise. Talented computer scientists migrate to more exciting, better-paying positions anywhere in the world. As a consequence, at the specialized technical level, it can be difficult even though we know whether the platforms are under cyber-attack, as the lack of skillful team can conduct to nowhere. At the political level, the complex and fluid nature of cyberspace can make the difference between the victory and defeat. About the cyber law, there is still not enough negative example and expertise to keep pace with the threat.

Finally, cyber domain suffers from the fact that there is little moral self-consciousness of computer hacking entities, which is determined by the use and abuse of computer 0 and 1 codes. So far, there are isolate and small percent of human suffering from cyber-attacks. All things considered, the current balance of cyber power favors the attacker and of course this stands in contrast to our historical understanding of warfare and victory over, in which the winner has traditionally enjoyed the home field advantage of the defeated. Therefore, many powerful states may conclude that, for the foreseeable future, the best cyber defense is a good offense.

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WAR REFUGEES – A FORM OF FORCED MIGRATION

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Abstract: *Refugee movements have regional dimensions, causing the international community to coordinate their diplomatic-political efforts to ensure their protection and to find permanent solutions to their physical security and food security problems.*

From a legal point of view, refugees are people in danger who are trying to take advantage of their right to asylum in other countries. In this situation, criticism of the use of travel, escape from dangers, is the value of a saving solution, and the freedom of movement is of major importance in the European space. Refugee protection has been a topic of great interest to the international community after the United Nations.

The impact of the Syrian crisis on the asylum system of many European countries, the fear of an increase in EU migration and the recurrence of nationalist and extremist movements in Europe make migration a recurring theme in European Union policy. The Syrian refugee crisis has created major problems in the region.

Keywords: *war refugees, political asylum, international legal protection for war refugees, victims of armed conflicts, legal-administrative instruments for the humanitarian protection of war refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for War Refugees (ICHNUR).*

Introduction

Unlike immigrants who leave their country of origin for predominantly economic reasons, refugees constitute a heterogeneous category of people forced to break their natural ties with their native countries, for fear of being endangered by life in conflicts and struggles armed forces in their country or persecuted for reasons of race, nationality, religion, and membership of a social group or political opinions¹.

The right of asylum was enshrined in art. 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), being a fundamental right for the consolidation of which many international agreements and conventions have been adopted, the application of which is ensured by each State by internal law. In this context, important international instruments can be mentioned: the Convention on the Status of Refugees (UN - 1951); Protocol on the Status of Refugees (UN - 1967); Declaration on Territorial Asylum adopted by the UN General Assembly - 1965; EU Council Resolution on Minimum Safeguards for Asylum Procedures of 20.06.1995.

¹ John Muller, *Scenares catastrophe: desorde apres la guerre froide*, Fayard Publishing House, 2001, pp. 18-31.

1. Involvement of the United Nations High Commissioner (UNHCR) to resolve humanitarian crises

In 1945, at the first UN General Assembly, a resolution was adopted which laid the foundations for a refugee protection system based on the principle of “Any refugee or displaced person who has expressed valid objections against returning to his home country cannot be compelled to do so”², and is being developed through the creation of the International Refugee Organization (OIR). The “displaced persons” category included those persons who, due to the oppression of totalitarian regimes were deported from the country of their nationality or where they had their usual habitual residence or who were compelled to leave this country, as well as those who have been forced into forced labor and who have been deported because of their race, religion or political opinions. If the reasons for the displacement of these persons were to cease, they had to be supported to repatriate as soon as possible.

In December 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted the Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees³ (UNHCR), a humanitarian organization invested with two main functions, namely the protection of refugees and the promotion of sustainable solutions to their problems. It began its activity in 1954 as a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly.

UNHCR grants humanitarian protection to refugee groups migrating due to a complex of persecutions, resulting from armed conflicts and human rights violations. Material Assistance to Refugees has become a third function of UNHCR. In recent years, in addition to the task of ensuring voluntary repatriation, the UN General Assembly and Secretary-General has empowered the UNHCR to provide support to protect groups of Internally Displaced Persons who are refugees of their native state.

The editorials in this regard are the considerations formulated in the preamble to the Convention on the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1951)⁴. The Convention represents the legal support of UNHCR's activities. The 1951 Convention by Art. 1 defines the refugee as “Any person who, due to well-founded fears of being persecuted by reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or his or her political opinions, is outside the country of whose nationality he has”. In art. 33, of the Convention, the principle of non-refoulement⁵ is enshrined, a principle widely accepted by the states, by virtue of which a person cannot be returned against his will to the territory of a state where he can be subjected to persecution. The Convention expressly proclaims the freedom of movement by which each Contracting State will grant to refugees lawfully within its territory the right to choose their place of residence and to move freely with the reservations established by the regulations applicable to aliens.

The legal status of refugees is carried out on two complementary plans through protection and assistance (including material - means of maintenance, food security).

The purpose of the protection provided by the Convention is to replace the lack of national protection which is one of the effects of leaving the country of origin.

² *What is a Refugee?*, UNHCR – the UN Refugee Agency, available online at: <https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/what-is-a-refugee/>, accessed on October 25, 2018.

³ *The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* constituted in the General Assembly Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950, available online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c39e1/statute-office-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html>, accessed on October 24, 2018.

⁴ The Convention was adopted on 28 July 1951 at the UN Conference on Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons; entered into force on 22.04.1954, Romania ratified the Convention in 1991 by Law no. 46/1990.

⁵ Note on *Non-Refoulement* (Submitted by the High Commissioner) EC/SCP/2, UNHCR, 23 August 1977, available online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html>, accessed on October 26, 2018.

Asylum is a form of protection granted to a person with a refugee status and materializes in the right to reside in that country⁶.

The liberation of the peoples' energies after the fall of totalitarian regimes also manifested itself in inter-ethnic, inter-confessional confrontations, social convulsions and other serious phenomena. On this background of instability, massive flows of people from the former socialist countries to the industrialized countries in search of asylum. They form the category of "de facto"⁷ refugees or economic migrants who leave their country for better living conditions, food security.

A special situation is the hundreds of thousands of people leaving their homeland because of bloody political or interethnic conflicts (conflicts that broke out in the former Soviet space, in the former Yugoslavia, conflicts in Africa, and conflicts in the Middle East).

Afghanistan was the source of the largest number of refugees. Another large source of refugees was Bosnia-Herzegovina, many of whom were internally displaced. In the literature for this category are also used names like: semi-refugees or internally displaced persons⁸.

Considerable weightings of refugees were also recorded in the case of the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, as well as in the case of the transplants from Rwanda, Liberia, and Azerbaijan. The conflict in the Serbian province of Kosovo has generated tens of thousands of refugees.

Despite the UNHCR's efforts, the problem of refugees continues to become more and more complex. Against this worrying development, UNHCR has a great deal of flexibility and availability to help refugees around the world, with 258 offices in 118 countries.

The UNHCR has determined that groups of people who do not meet strictly the refugee status criterion should be considered "humanitarian interest", including internally displaced persons such as Kurds, different ethnic groups from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia⁹, etc.

The UN institution has assumed responsibility for groups of internally displaced people to prevent these people from developing new waves of refugees.

The UNHCR argues that a refugee must not have been subjected to arbitrary treatment by an official in order to require international protection (war related dramas: famine, loss of home, etc.)¹⁰.

There have been many cases of mass exodus generated by military campaigns of ethnic cleansing or other forms of violence.

⁶ Mihai Delcea, *Legal Protection of Refugees in International Law*, Presa Universitara Română Publishing House, Timișoara, 2005, pp. 14-20.

⁷ "De facto" refugee - a person who, although not meeting the criteria laid down in the 1951 Convention, is considered to need protection because of the conditions in his home country. See: de facto refugee definition on the official website of European Commission Migration and Home Affairs Office, available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/de-facto-refugee_en, accessed on October 24, 2018.

⁸ The most important international organizations in the world are using the IDP term for refugees. See: *Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2015*, UNHCR, 2016, available online at: <https://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf>, accessed on October 28, 2018; *Refugees and internally displaced persons in the Eastern Mediterranean region: a health perspective*, World Health Organization, November 2015, available online at: http://www.emro.who.int/images/stories/eha/documents/migrants_refugees_position_paper.pdf, accessed on October 28, 2018; *Forced displacement: refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced people (IDPs)*, ECHO Factsheet, June 2018, available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/refugees_en.pdf, accessed on October 28, 2018.

⁹ Displaced Persons - Individuals or groups of people who, due to human rights violations, are forced to leave their usual homes and habitual places of residence to settle in other areas within the country. From UNHCR estimates, this category of people far exceeds the number of refugees (68.5 million forcibly displaced worldwide, 25.4 million refugees). See details at: *Global Trends forced displacement in 2017*, UNHCR, 2018, p. 2, available online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5b27be547/unhcr-global-trends-2017.html>, accessed on October 28, 2018.

¹⁰ Crisp Jeff, *A new asylum paradigm, Globalisation and migration*, UNCHR, Geneva, 2003, pp. 64-68.

Through the temporary protection system, governments of migrant receiving countries can avoid, at an initial stage, individual procedures for determining refugee status¹¹.

Persons benefiting from temporary protection differ from refugees through the narrower scope of the rights offered by the receiving country by granting social, feeding, education, labor, etc¹².

The temporary form of protection ceases when the return to their own country becomes secure, with the UNHCR's consent, or when the asylum application is processed¹³.

Material assistance must go from temporary resolution to long-term and full refugee assurance in order to enter a normal life¹⁴.

UNHCR's original mandate did not specifically cover IDPs. But because of the agency's expertise on displacement, it had for many years assisted millions of them, most recently through an inter-agency "cluster" approach, whereby UNHCR takes a lead role with other humanitarian agencies to coordinate protection, shelter and camp management. UNHCR is currently active in many operations, including those in the Syrian Arab Republic, Colombia, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.

1. EU justice and home affairs policies (JHA)

Migration has always been a high concern on the agenda of European human rights at the level of the Council of Europe and at EU level. The EU Justice and Home Affairs Policies (JHA) of the European Union is one of the most important developments in the European integration process at the beginning of the 21st century in the policies of achieving the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), with decisive effects in the field asylum.

Policies involve key functions and prerogatives: providing internal security for citizens, food security, and the speedy administration of justice. Action is being taken to combat illegal immigration, ensure protection of immigrants against abuse and facilitate their access to justice.

By eliminating most of the remaining barriers to the free movement of goods, capital and services, the Internal Market Program has compelled all Member States - not only those participating in Schengen - to strengthen cooperation in certain areas of JHA to prevent the new flow of goods and capital, across internal borders, create increased risks to internal security. A European Police Office (Europol) was set up.

EU Member States are engaged in intergovernmental cooperation in the field of JHA. The emergence of new challenges in the area of asylum, immigration and transnational organized crime as a result of border permeability in Europe and the disintegration of internal security systems has led Member States to strengthen JHA policies.

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty included all the elements of the AFSJ - including the Schengen system, which the new Member States must accept at the time of accession

Conclusions

Forced Syrian migration is one of the greatest international challenges today and is at the core of international security organizations. The Syrian crisis has led to an important wave in the proliferation of asylum applications in Europe. The treatment of the Syrians seeking asylum differs depending on the host country. Victims of contemporary international armed

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 52-60.

¹² Ghosh Bimal, *Managing migration*, Edition Bimal Ghosh, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 14-15.

¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 17-25.

¹⁴ Carens Joseph, "Aliens and citizen", *The review of politics* no. 49, (2), Cambridge University Press, UK, 1990, p. 251.

conflicts (of domestic armed conflicts) have emigrated from devastated states located in the Middle East. A new geopolitical and geostrategic situation has been set up. In this context, the dangers and risks that European security is facing in terms of security, are manifested in severity in complex, diverse and atypical forms, making it difficult to prevent and eliminate the food insecurity effects of regional conflicts.

We believe that the international refugee protection area can be analyzed in the two components. The proactive component refers to humanitarian interventions at source, involving the salvation of peace in international crisis areas. The reactive component of states involves accepting and protecting asylum seekers fleeing international crisis areas. The European Union has developed a common European asylum system designed to harmonize asylum systems and procedures in Member States and to facilitate the examination of asylum applications.

Political asylum can be requested in the first safe country where the applicant can do so. Local economic, political or security of supply factors can cause refugees to seek another state in which to settle. We believe that the international refugee protection area can be analyzed in the two components. The proactive component refers to humanitarian interventions at source, involving the salvation of peace in international crisis areas. The reactive component of states involves accepting and protecting asylum seekers fleeing international crisis areas. UNHCR covers both of these aspects.

The European Union has developed a common European asylum system designed to harmonize asylum systems and procedures in Member States and to facilitate the examination of asylum applications. Thus, most states in the European Union have introduced the so-called safe country principle in the refugee status procedure, and Romania is included in this category. For persons from countries considered safe, the risk of political, religious, ethnic persecution is considered to be extremely low or non-existent, which allows asylum applications submitted by these persons to be examined under an urgent procedure and the measure of expulsion of rejected applicants becomes applicable almost immediately. Taking into account that the UNHCR recommends that any rejected asylum seeker to be guaranteed, before being expelled, with the right to a review of the rejection decision, the long taking administrative process determine the refugees from the "safe" countries to suffer more.

The competent government body in Romania, in the field of migration policies, is the Romanian Committee on Migration Issues. It is competent to coordinate the performance of activities related to migrating individuals.

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WAR REFUGEES – VICTIMS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN SECURITY AND FOOD SAFETY DURING REGIONAL ARMED CONFLICT

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Abstract: *Waves of war refugees, large population movements and famine on a regional level are humanitarian crises generated by social insecurity or abusive behavior of public institutions. Social inequalities are serious political phenomena, social dramas often associated with diminishing food supplies and affecting economic exchange systems.*

Modern armed conflicts are characterized by new forms of violence and have some specific features such as the elements of internationalization present in internal conflicts, in the circumstances of increasing the role of non-state actors in solving management situations of public health and food security. The dangers and threats to international security for human security are manifested in complex, diverse and atypical forms of gravity, making it difficult to prevent and eliminate regional conflicts. Majorities of civil wars that have panicked the international community over the years have erupted countries located at the periphery of production centers and regional economic exchanges.

Keywords: *war refugees, human insecurity, food insecurity, international legal protection for war refugees, humanitarian assistance to war refugees, international legal instruments for the protection of war refugees.*

Introduction

Refugees are part of the migration phenomenon where political, ethnic, economic, environmental, and human rights and freedoms cause large population movements. Refugee status includes the characteristics and elements of the right to asylum, except for the duration of the temporary protection, the applicant being unable to exercise a permanent right of permanent residence. War refugees - the victims of international armed conflicts (of domestic armed conflicts) emigrated from devastated states located in the Middle East. A new geopolitical and geostrategic situation has been set up. In this context, the dangers and risks to European food security are manifested in severity in complex, diverse and atypical forms, making it difficult to prevent and eliminate the food insecurity effects of regional conflicts. The UN Convention of 1951 has a political and ethical legal significance: it provides the basic legal standards on which an action to protect refugees can be based. The dangers and risks to international security regarding food security are severely manifested in complex, diverse and atypical forms, making it difficult to prevent and eliminate regional conflicts.

The status of refugees is regulated in the UN System through the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees in 1951, the 1967 Protocol Relating to Refugees, and resolutions

that the UN General Assembly has dealt with protecting refugees (extended international protection to categories of persons which were in similar situations).

It should be noted that The 1967 Protocol has given the Convention a universality character¹. The 1951 Convention is the first international legal instrument that includes a general definition of the refugee, but limited in time.

According to Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who, following events occurring before January 1, 1951, and fears of being persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, sprang out social group, or political opinions, is outside the country whose citizenship it has and cannot, or because of this fear, it does not want the protection of this or who have no citizenship and find themselves outside the country or who have no citizenship and find themselves outside their country of usual residence as a result of such events, can or cannot because of that fear, does not want to return.

Refugee status is determined individually. The fear of persecution is intimately linked to the person of each refugee; it is not enough for a person to invoke a persecution committed in his country in order to be considered entitled to seek refugee status². He/she has to prove he/she is affected by the persecution. A refugee is and remains a foreigner in the asylum country³.

Each state dictates normative acts relating to foreigners (stateless persons, asylum seekers, and refugees) International law recognizes certain rights for refugees, the application of these rights remains a matter of domestic law. The legal status of refugees is based on two fundamental pillars: legal protection and humanitarian assistance (including food security).

1. A historical legal protection for war religions in the European conflict

The desperate situation of most refugees in Europe after the end of World War I, with no means of subsistence, shelter without food security, has led the Society of Nations to adopt an international protection system for them. Within the Society, a Refugee Committee was created, a body run by the Norwegian operator Frijdof Nansen⁴.

At the initiative of the Committee under the auspices of the League of Nations on 12 May 1926, the Arrangement on Russian and Armenian Refugees, which recognized the right to settle in the territory of a State and to move freely in other States, -You're a ID with the name of the Nansesn Passport.

They were protecting the refugees from World War I and those who left their country after the war.

On June 30, 1928, a new Arrangement was adopted to ensure the protection of the Assyrian-Asian-Chaldean refugees⁵. As far as Turkish refugees are concerned, the Arrangement specifies them (persons subject to the Ottoman Empire) but who, by virtue of the Lausanne Protocol of July 24, 1923, do not enjoy or no longer enjoy the protection of the Republic of Turkey and have not acquired a another nationality.

The protection system of Russian refugees, Armenians and assimilated refugees, established by the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928, was completed by the

¹ Dumitru Mazilu, *Human Rights - Concept, Contemporary Exigencies and Realities*, Editura Lumina Lex, București, 2006, pp. 485-490.

² Moroianu Zlătescu, *Human Rights - an Evolutionary System*, I.R.D.O. Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, pp. 256-260.

³ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, available online at: http://www.onuinfo.ro/documente_fundamentale/instrumente_internationale/conventie_drepturi_civile_politice, accessed on January 20, 2018.

⁴ C. Jura, *Rights of National Minorities*, C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2006. pp. 305-310.

⁵ *Recueil des Tratés*, Société de Nations, No.2006, vol.86, p.63.

"Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees" of 28 October 1933, allowing States Parties to amend in respect of the persons benefiting from this status.

In 1935, the problem of refugees in Saar arises. By the Versailles Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919, the Saar area was established for a period of 15 years under an international legal and administrative regime under the authority of the United Nations. It was foreseen that at the conclusion of a 15-year period a referendum would be organized by which the inhabitants of Saar to opt for one of the three options: to continue the international status, the territory to be incorporated in France, the territory to be part of Germany.

The plebiscite took place on January 13, 1935, with the majority of the right-wing population deciding to enter Germany.

Many people have fled to other states, which has prompted the United Nations Council to adopt on May 24, 1935, Resolution No. 3593 by which persons who have left the territory on the occasion of a plebiscite and do not have a national passport are granted refugee status.

The Czechoslovak crisis, after the invasion of the German army, caused a massive exodus of refugees to other states due to the occupation of the Sudeten Region in Czechoslovakia.

The Society of Nations included in February 1939, in the refugee category refugees of Czechoslovak nationality.

A category of people recognized refugee status is that of Austrian migrants, victims of Nazi persecution after Anschluss⁶.

Their status was recognized by the Protocol of 14 November 1939, concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations.

The phenomenon of refugees takes on a large scale during the Second World War, when massive exodus of populations from countries occupied by Axis powers fleeing fear of persecution, tens of thousands of Polish migrants taking refuge in Romania.

The Romanian state hosted and fed thousands of Polish refugees. Millions of people in the occupied countries were taken to forced labor in Germany and other areas occupied by it, creating a new international problem - the genocide of the Nazi camps.

2. A momentary and stability study in the field of human security and food safety

Refugee regulations complementary to the UN Convention of 1951 tend to absorb the right of asylum (usually instituted at constitutional level) that often leads to the simultaneous treatment of the two issues⁷.

In refugee law, the treatment of refugees is subject to the Asylum Act. Distinction is not easy because the mobility of groups of people is extremely complex, and refugee movements intersect with migration in its many ways.

People who travel from one country to another or one continent on another may include those who require international protection (war refugees) and those who are not in this situation⁸.

A person who has a particular status at a given date may be in a position to change the category to which he belongs. Article 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that the signatory States undertake to respect and guarantee to all

⁶ *Recueil des Traités*, Société de Nations, 2008, No.4634, vol.198, p.14.

⁷ Ion Diaconu, *Minorities in Contemporary International Law*, CH Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009. pp. 351-372.

⁸ C. Bîrsan, *European Convention on Human Rights. Comment on articles*, Vol. I Rights and Freedoms, CH Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 527-532.

individuals who are within their territory and who are responsible for them, the civil and political rights recognized in that Covenant, without any distinction in particular to race, color, sex, language, religion, political opinion, any other opinion, national or social, wealth, birth, and any such difference based on any other circumstance is forbidden⁹.

Starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, violations of human rights repeatedly to a state, invoking the principle of state sovereignty, are considered illegal, and the international community has to react.

The 1951 UN Convention on Refugees does not mention the term asylum¹⁰. In international relations, states are subjects of international law while individuals in the case of refugees and asylum seekers are not subjects of international law.

The concept of a refugee should not be confused with that of the asylum seeker.

Traditionally, asylum was considered to be the refugee's right to refuge. The right to asylum was granted in a refugee situation in another state. It is a prerogative of states to grant protection to exiles and refugees, and not an individual right of the individual.

The right to receive or the right of the applicant to be granted asylum can be regulated in regional conventions. Although the European Union has invoked the importance of asylum, the European Charter of Human Rights does not mention the right to asylum. There is no sign of equality between the refugee status and the status of the asylum seeker. Asylum law is regulated in some norms of international law and at the level of internal law (in construction, other normative acts). Both legal institutions are forms of protection of foreigners.

Asylum law has been regulated the granting of refugee status and the granting of asylum status are the responsibility of the receiving State, thus exercising its sovereignty¹¹.

The beneficiary of refugee status or asylum right cannot be expelled. Refugee status requires immediate protection in imminent danger. Asylum law usually involves definitive protection¹². Asylum rules contain a common element with the regulation of refugee status, consulted by all states signatories to the 1967 Territorial Asylum Declaration, the explicit recognition of the principle of non-refoulement.

Refugee status includes the characteristics and elements of the right to asylum, except for the duration of the protection, which is established as a temporary one, and the applicant cannot exercise a permanent right of permanent residence. In fact, statelessness as a process is a source of human insecurity, forced displacement and serious conflict, which may pose a threat to national and regional stability.

Refugee status, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, is better described as "asylum"¹³. UNHCR) has a mandate to provide international protection to refugees, including promoting the accession to international refugee instruments and other relevant human rights instruments.

Convergence of economic migration with forced migration has highlighted many problems in trying to distinguish between real refugees who are confronted with persecution as defined by the UN Convention of 1951 and economic immigrants in search of food security. The definition of the UN Convention is based on the decision on refugee status.

⁹ R. Beșteliu-Miga, *Drept internațional public*, CH Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, pp.92-98.

¹⁰ *Carta Națiunilor Unite* (In English: The UN Charter), available online at: http://www.onuinfo.ro/documente_fundamentale/carta_natiunilor_unite/, accessed on January 20, 2018.

¹¹ I. Diaconu, *Drepturile omului în dreptul internațional contemporan. Teorie și practică*, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, pp.447-452.

¹² Adrian Năstase, Bogdan Aurescu, *Drept Internațional Public*, C.H. Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, pp.147-150.

¹³ Al. Fărcaș, *Dreptul internațional al drepturilor omului și problema minorităților naționale*, Romanian Institute for Human Rights, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 265-275.

According to the Convention, refugee status is not granted to persons who leave their country of origin because of the economic conditions there. This status is not granted to those who run out of hunger or because of natural disasters.

These people are described as economic migrants. This distinction comes from the apparent rupture of civil and political rights that is the essence of the UN Convention¹⁴.

Under the rules of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, States have an obligation to take measures to ensure the effective exercise of economic and social rights, including measures for food security.

Even if the state is a party to the UN Convention or not, since 1951, it is held with the obligations of the person under the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights¹⁵. Thus, each state recognized on the international scene should convey to the basic regulations concerning the human rights.

Other important document in the field is 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons upholding the right to freedom of movement for stateless persons lawfully on the territory, and requiring to the states to provide them with identity papers and travel documents¹⁶. But its main participation to the international law is the definition given to a “stateless person” as someone “*who is not considered as a national by any State under operation of its law*”¹⁷. Like the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1954 Convention explicitly excludes individuals when there are serious reasons for considering that they have committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a serious nonpolitical crime abroad.

Conclusions

Mankind has always dealt with the safeguarding of peace, food security to protect the health of the population in the context of international and national security. A wide-ranging global collaboration action is needed to integrate the diplomatic, military, economic, socio-cultural, humanitarian, environmental, health and food security dimensions.

Respect for the rule of law and human rights forms the essence of the protection of refugees, returnees and stateless persons.

Reiterating the claim that the responsibility for peace building and ensuring food security rests mainly with international public law issues, states and international organizations, we appreciate that citizens are interested in the issues of peace and war because, ultimately, everyone's life is the stake of this game.

Aborting a solution to the problem of resolving food insecurity for victims, as well as resolving the problems of the victims and resolving them, is difficult at the international level.

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¹⁴ S. Fărcaș, *Forms of Political Participation of National Minorities in the European Union*, Lumen Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, pp. 298-302.

¹⁵ A. Fuerea, *Institutions of the European Union*, Publishing House Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2002, pp. 186-190.

¹⁶ *Convention relating to the status of stateless persons*, UNHCR, 1954, p. 3, available online at: <http://www.unhcr.org/3bbb25729.html>, accessed on October 27, 2018.

¹⁷ *Idem*.

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TERRORIST ORGANIZATION OR LIBERATION MOVEMENT? THE POLISARIO FRONT'S CLASSIFICATION

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Abstract: *The reality of the widening category of irregular warfare and the raising quantity of radical units all around the world arrived in an unprecedented pace in the 21st century's security environment. The decisions on designating and labeling „terrorist groups” were always surrounded with terminological debates, diverse state interests, and different perception of security. Thereby handling and countering their attacks and secondary destabilizing effects are hardly-cooperative among larger alliances. Of course, we might not exclude the good examples of international peacekeeping and countermeasures, such as it is happening in the case of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab or other specific organizations. But in some cases, the methods of engagement, the continuously shaping security environment, shifts in ideology or other factors should influence the classification of a „terrorist group”, which might be questioned by individuals, ethnic groups, states or the international community itself. This was the situation with the Polisario Front group as well, which in some cases was labeled as terrorist organization, while other papers mentioned it as a separatist group or an organized crime unit. However, in the eyes of the world, the Front still is the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi's people and a liberating organization responsible for its people. In this analysis, my main aim is to concentrate on these accusations against the Polisario Front, and its actual activity and connections with organized crime groups and highlight the facts, which exclude the Polisario Front from being a terrorist organization.*

Keywords: *Polisario Front, terrorist group, organized crime group, liberation movement, legal representative of Sahrawis, International law, Morocco, Mauritania, SADR, AQIM.*

Introduction: The definition of a terrorist organization

Although there is no universal definition of terrorism itself¹, since years, experts have longed to define the unique attributes of the phenomena and generate a distinction between violence, war crimes, and terrorism. According to the United States, terrorism is officially defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”². According to the more detailed definition of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, international terrorism could be defined as an act “perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored)”³.

Although, unified definition is hard to be found, there are indicative aspects, which every definition includes:

- acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims;
- it can be committed by governments, non-state actors, or either individuals;
- it generates multiple results, not directly linked with the actual attack, but beyond.

¹ Kollár Csaba, Vinárné Bellász Zsuzsanna, “Terrorism and the information security of media content with special regard to ISIS”, the Balkans and Russia, *Socioeconomic Challenges*, 1: 1, 2017, pp. 13-19.

² Title 22 Chapter 38 U.S. Code § 2656f - Annual country reports on terrorism, available online at: <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2656f>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

³ FBI, Terrorism, available online at: <https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

Citing the United Nations General Assembly, terrorism “unlawfully and intentionally” causing, attempting or threatening to cause: “(a) death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or (c) damage to property, places, facilities, or systems . . . , resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act”⁴.

International humanitarian law specifically prohibits “measures of terrorism” or “acts of terrorism”, “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population”⁵. From the viewpoint of international humanitarian and criminal law, it is important to define the distinction between war crimes, terrorism, acts of violence. Most of the international humanitarian treaties generally prohibit indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, but require States to criminalize specific aspects of terrorism and define specified acts as offences. While defining the actual act is gradually completed by experts, we might also find result when excluding those incidents that should not be labeled under terrorism offenses, as well. Such cases *inter alia* are acts of self-defense, eliminating hostile forces and infrastructure in a war situation, and causing collateral damage in an armed conflict.

Laws such as the Geneva Conventions contain a set of rules on the protection of persons in “armed conflict”, for example, deliberate acts of violence against civilians and civilian objects constitute war crimes under international law, for which individuals may be prosecuted⁶.

Bearing in mind the international norms and humanitarian principles, and having regard to the reigning laws, decisions on designating a given tendency, attack, group or individual “terrorists” thus require the announcement of the sovereign states. In this regard, the designation by the United States of America counts as primary. Turning deeper into the subject of the present analysis, we have to clear, that nowhere does the Department of Homeland Security classify the Polisario Front as a terrorist group⁷, it does not classify the Polisario as a Foreign Terrorist Organization⁸ and does not include them on the Terrorism Exclusion List⁹. And even the Polisario’s appearance on the Global Terrorism Database list¹⁰ is hardly convincing given the lack of evidence tying them to terrorism¹¹ and their consistent refusal to turn to terrorism – even in the face of massive state terrorism by Morocco¹².

⁴ Office of the United Nations - High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights, *Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Fact Sheet No. 32, p. 6, available online at: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁵ *Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions*, art. 51 (2), and *Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions*, art. 13 (2), available online at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0321.pdf, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁶ Office of the United Nations - High Commissioner for Human Rights, *op.cit.*, pp.16-17.

⁷ *Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism*, U.S. Department of State, available online at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁸ *Foreign Terrorist Organization*, U.S. Department of State, available online at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁹ *Terrorism Exclusion List*, U.S. Department of State, December 29, 2004, available online at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm> accessed on September 05, 2018.

¹⁰ *Global Terrorism Database list (Polisario Front)*, available online at: <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=Polisario&sa.x=0&sa.y=0>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

¹¹ For example, attacks by the Sahrawi guerrillas during the war against the occupier Moroccan army are considered in this database as terrorist attacks which is legally unintelligible as a terrorist act.

¹² Jacob Mundy, “The geopolitical Functions of the Western Sahara conflict: US hegemony, Moroccan stability and Sahrawi strategies of resistance”, in: Raquel Ojeda-Garcia, Irene Fernández-Molina, Victoria Veguilla (eds.), *Global, regional and local dimensions of Western Sahara’s protracted decolonization*, 2017, pp. 65-69.

1. The Polisario Front – history and ideology

Since mid-1973¹³, the driving force of the gradually developing insurgency of the *Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro* (abbrev. Polisario Front) was to claim independence – and end the Spanish and later the Moroccan and Mauritanian control – over Western Sahara¹⁴. The first leader of the organization was El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed¹⁵. After the Ifni war - sometimes called the *Forgotten war* - in 1957-58, he settled in a refugee camp near Tan Tan and started school, where he also made friends with youngsters from Spanish-Sahara who later participated in the creation of Polisario. In 1963, he continued his studies in Marrakesh. He studied in Taroudant and graduated in Rabat in 1970. Already in Rabat, he accompanied a group of Saharan students looking to achieve independence and were against the reign of Spain and Morocco over the territory. In 1972, El-Ouali returned to Tan Tan, where he organized an anti-Spanish demonstration with several students, which was abolished by the Moroccan police. El-Ouali and many other students were imprisoned. After his release, he moved to Western-Sahara, where he launched the Polisario Front organization with Brahim Ghali¹⁶. The originally 1,000-5,000 strong guerilla force – built primarily on indigenous nomadic Sahrawis – began its operations in May 1973 as an insurgency, and gradually expanded into a functioning political-military organization.

The organization carried out its first action on May 20, 1973, when its members attacked the Spanish military post in El-Khanga. Although, it was not a large-scale attack, it provided a good precedent for organizing subsequent raids¹⁷. In 1975, Spain transferred administration of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, divided along a northwest-southeast diagonal that corresponded to no human or physical geographic divisions and had no place for the Polisario¹⁸. By 1979, the Polisario had defeated Mauritania, causing it to withdraw from the treaty and its government to collapse.

For achieving a greater political impact and having a secured logistical base, the organization relocated to Algeria in 1976, and was able to manage arms supply and financial support on the basis of the country's strategic interests towards Morocco and the disputed Western-Saharan territory. Houari Boumédiène, the then president of Algeria also supported the transition with designating the Polisario Front as a liberation movement in June, 1975¹⁹.

1976 was a major turning point in the relations of the territory and foreign powers as well. The Polisario's third congress was held in Algiers in August 26-30, 1976 where media representatives and several official state delegations have been represented. Members of the former Jamaa and the Deputy Secretary-General of the PUNS (National Unity Party of the Sahara) were also present at the event. During the meeting, the first constitution of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic was adopted, which meant the finalization of the publication nominated by the Interim National Council in February. At that time, the 21 members of the Political Committee (Including the Executive Committee – 9 people), the National Council of

¹³ Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The roots of a desert war*, Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, Connecticut, 1983, pp. 157 – 164.

¹⁴ CIA-RDP85T00353R000100270001-6, *Memorandum, The Polisario Front*, 1976, available online at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T00353R000100270001-6.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

¹⁵ János Besenyő, *Western Sahara*, Publikon Publishers, Pecs, 2009, p. 66.

¹⁶ Erik Jensen, *Anatomy of a Stalemate*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, p.26.

¹⁷ Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony?*, Zed Books, London and New York, 2004, pp. 170-171.

¹⁸ Ruiz Miguel Carlos, "The principle, the right of self-determination and the People of Western Sahara", in: Marco Balboni, Giuliana Laschi (eds.), *The European Union approach towards Western Sahara*, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels, 2017, p. 80.

¹⁹ Stephen Zunes, Jacob Mundy, *Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 2010, pp. 9, 34, 42-43.

Sahara, and the head of the Council of Ministers, Mohammed Abdelaziz (who was in parallel the new leader of the Polisario), were elected²⁰.

Although the participants agreed to continue the offensive military standpoint, they also decided to start a diplomatic initiative to uncover the reality of the situation in the international media. As a result, Hakim Brahim, Foreign Minister of the Arab Democratic Republic of the Sahara, also attended the Congress of the Socialist International in Geneva as an observer. Since all diplomatic relations with the new state were extremely important, they wanted to establish contact, achieve wider recognition with as many states as possible, regardless of political orientation²¹.

Initially, the Organization for African Unity sought to resolve the conflict, but when the OAU admitted the SADR as a member in 1984, Morocco left the organization²². In 1988, the OAU handed the issue to the UN, which set up an UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and appointed a succession of special representatives of the Secretary General (SRSGs) and special envoys to oversee the process to achieve reconciliation. The parties have changed positions consistently throughout the diplomatic process, according to the interpretation of their interests, although both long held to the idea of a referendum on integration or independence as the way to a solution²³.

After the gradual retreat of Spanish authority, and in line with international diplomatic talks about the territory, Spain handed its power over Western-Sahara and Polisario declared the formation of the SADR, which had been formally renewed at 1991, by the declaration of the new constitution for the territory and agreed in the UN²⁴. However, in line with these confirmations, Morocco and Mauritania partitioned Western Sahara between themselves as well, resulting in a divided and highly disputed governmental system. In this bipolar coordination, both the territory and the society was in an unstable legal and administrative situation²⁵.

Due to the deteriorating circumstances of arms supply and living conditions in refugee camps, however, the active personnel of the Polisario Front had declined in the early 1990's. In spite of the decrease in direct supporters, the indirect legitimacy of the Front remained high among the public²⁶. Many Saharan people in the northern part of Mauritania joined the armed groups of Polisario who fought against the Mauritanian armed forces after the Madrid Treaty was concluded. Other Arab groups were faced with the ruling elite on the bases of old family disputes, which recruited a large part of the army, mainly from the black people that were easier to handle. Most black soldiers, however, did not join the army for patriotic reasons, but to be able to support their families. The noble thought of the heroic death in defense of the country did not give them any enthusiasm; they left it for the Arab elite. Nevertheless, most of the victims of the clashes were still among them. The Arab leadership made the mistake of not

²⁰ Stephen J. King, "The emergence and politics of the Polisario Front", in: Anouar Boukhars, Jacques Roussellier, *Perspectives on Western Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms and Geopolitics*, Rowman and Littlefield, Plymouth UK, 2013, pp. 78 – 79.

²¹ János Besenyő, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

²² Williemi Zartmann, "Morocco's Saharan Policy", in: Anouar Boukhars, Jacques Roussellier, *op. cit.*, p. 63 and J.J.P. Smith, "State of Self-Determination: The Claim to Sahrawi Statehood", available online at: <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~fletcher/Microsites/ILS/PDFs/SADRStateofSelfDetermination4March2010.pdf> accessed on September 05, 2018.

²³ William Zartman, "Time For A Solution in the Western Sahara Conflict", *Middle East Policy Council Journal*, Volume 14, Number 4, Winter 2007, available online at: <https://www.mepc.org/journal/time-solution-western-sahara-conflict>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

²⁴ *Constitucion de la Republica Arabe Saharaui Democratica*, available online at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20060225114423/http://www.ambrasd.org/ES/1des.htm>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

²⁵ Yahhia H. Zoubir, "Geopolitics and realpolitik as impediments to the resolution of conflict and violations of international law: The case of Western Sahara", in: Kerin Arts, Pinto Leite (eds), *International Law and the Question of Western Sahara*, International platform of jurists for East Timor, Leiden, 2006, p. 281.

²⁶ Stephen Zunes, *The United States and the Western Sahara Peace Process*, 1998, available online at: <https://www.mepc.org/journal/united-states-and-western-sahara-peace-process>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

respecting the feelings of black people, and even most of them were still treated as slaves. Over the years, a number of measures have been taken that have restricted and violated the interests of the black minority, who have been seriously disturbed by the Arab aspirations of the Mauritanian leadership, and when the use of Arabic language in state education became compulsory in 1966, mass demonstrations were launched across Mauritania. This problem has not been resolved to this day. Because of the issue of the black minority, it is almost war with the neighboring Senegal, so the army's black-and-white officers took advantage of the situation at the time on July 10, 1978, in the overthrow of former President Mokhtar Ould Daddah²⁷.

The estimated population of Moroccan occupation is around 90,000 - 120,000 people, and approximately 155,000 refugees live in the Algerian refugee camps (Tindouf) and another 30 to 40,000 abroad, in other countries²⁸. According to some sources, Sahrawi's number may reach 500,000 people in Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania²⁹. In line with the motives of having a secured territory, the Polisario Front has denounced terrorism and attacks against civilians³⁰, and claimed to exclusively concentrate on national liberation, where the matter of Western Sahara remains treated as a decolonization matter within the UN³¹. In a 2001 interview, Polisario Front Commander Brahim Badileh explains: "All of these years, we have avoided all kinds of activities that do not comply with international law. Our soldiers are free, it would be easy to go inside the Moroccan territory, to infiltrate, and to bomb hotels or civilians, or to mine roads or the airport. We know that their main source of income is tourism. But we wait for a legal solution because we are a pacific and responsible government. We always respect the rules dictated by the UN and international organizations. We never opted for the ways of terrorism or something like that, in spite of quite a lot of provocations by the enemy. We have been bombed by napalm, including the city centers of the Sahrawis. And yet, we always have been fighting in legal terms"³². There is no evidence that the Polisario ever attacked directly civilian targets, attacks were carried out against members of enemy forces, in addition to a time of war situation³³. As a peacekeeper in MINURSO, I have also experienced that the ceasefire agreement has been repeatedly violated by the Moroccans than the Sahrawians who have always tried to keep the agreement they signed. It is proved by the UN Secretary-General report S/23662 too in 1991, which is stated that the Moroccans had violated the ceasefire 75 times, while the Polisario had done it only 2 times in the given time interval³⁴.

²⁷ Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The roots of a desert war*, Lawrence Hill and Company, Westport, Connecticut, 1983, pp. 262 – 264.

²⁸ Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, "Protracted Sahrawi displacement, Challenges and opportunities beyond encampment", Forced Migration Policy Briefing 7, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford, 2011, available online at: <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4e03287b2.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018; *Western Sahara Population 2018*, World Population Review, available online at: <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/western-sahara-population/>, accessed on September 05, 2018; Toby Shelley, *Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa's Last Colony?* Zed Books, London and New York, 2004, pp. 85-89.

²⁹ "Western Sahara", *Globalsecurity.org*, June 20, 2018, available online at: <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/western-sahara.htm>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

³⁰ *Polisario Front denounces Morocco's hindrances to UN-sponsored talks process*, Sahara Press Service, October 24, 2016, available online at: <https://www.spsrasd.info/news/en/articles/2016/10/24/4945.html>, and Ana Camacho, *Terrorism and war in the Sahara*, ETH Zurich, 2018, available online at: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/88674/pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

³¹ *11 Sept has not influenced Western Sahara's situation*, Afrol News, 2002, available online at: http://www.afrol.com/News2002/wsa014_interview_khadad2.htm, accessed on September 05, 2018.

³² Leah Glade Miller, *The Polisario Front and the World: Leveraging International Support for Sahrawi Self-Determination*, 2014, p. 23, available online at: <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/26431/MILLER-MASTERSREPORT-2014.pdf?sequence=1>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

³³ Ana Camacho, *Terrorism and war in the Sahara*, Strategic Studies Group (GEES), available online at: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/88674/pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

³⁴ *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission for the referendum in Western Sahara*, available online at: <https://undocs.org/S/23662>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

In the light of the subsequent raids, the unstable situation, the humanitarian crisis and the unresolved clashes among the parties on regional and international levels, in January 2003, James Baker, the personal envoy of the UN Secretary General produced a Peace Plan (Also mentioned as the "Baker Plan") that aims the consolidation by calling all parties to one table: Algeria, Morocco and the Polisario Front. In July 2003, the Polisario and Algeria accepted the Baker Plan, but Morocco rejected it, and did so with the other following proposals as well³⁵.

2. Modus operandi

Although on numerous occasions the Polisario Front's fighters were mentioned as operatives of terrorist organizations, such as the Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM), it is important to highlight, that these links are based on the decision of the individuals, and not on the ideology of the organization itself. This question was investigated by US Congress but they didn't find any evidence on this. In April 2012, State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Daniel Benjamin testified before Congress, in response to a question on this topic, "*I've seen reports of al-Qaeda involvement in Polisario camps and whenever we have dug deeper we have found that those reports were spurious*"³⁶.

Abdelhak Khiame, the head of Morocco's Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (BCIJ) claimed in March, 2018, that the border region between Morocco and Algeria became a safe zone for certain terror cells, including AQIM and ISIS that have been facing serious security challenges in Middle Eastern conflict areas, such as Syria. The Moroccan counter-terror office has managed to identify more than a hundred of the Polisario Front members, who were also operating in AQIM^{37,38}. Based on the indicated individuals, it is no question, that the Polisario have the assets to fulfill the "terrorist organization identity", however, the organization itself does not aim to implement such techniques, while its primary priority is to achieve political and social validation, legitimation and support.

Polisario's active measures include organized guerrilla campaigns (ghazzi) in the spirit of the Saharan Arab traditions, lacking training and heavy weaponry. After the construction of the Moroccan Wall this changed into tactics more resembling conventional warfare, with a focus on artillery, snipers and other long-range attacks. In both phases of the war, Sahrawian units relied on superior knowledge of the terrain, speed and surprise, and on the ability to retain experienced fighters³⁹.

Moreover, guerrillas occupied several Spanish and Moroccan fishing vessels without their permission. In 1978, for example, eight fishermen were captured, who were released only after Javier Rupérez, representing the Democratic Party of the country - Union del Centro Democrático -, personally appeared at the Polisario's fourth congress and recognized the organization as a legal representative of the Sahara⁴⁰. Based on the Terrorism Research and

³⁵ Erik Jensen, *Anatomy of a Stalemate*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005, pp. 17-18.

³⁶ Alexis Arieff, *Western Sahara*, Congressional Research Service, October 8, 2014, available online at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20962.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

³⁷ Safaa Kasraoui, '*Polisario Can Also Be Considered Terror Organization in Sahel*': *Khiame*, Morocco World News, 2018, available online at: <https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/03/242723/polisario-can-also-considered-terror-organization-sahel-khiame/>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

³⁸ Any researcher could say, that Abdelhak Khiame can never be impartial and his statement regarding such a delicate issue should be questioned and disregarded for the sake of academic objectivity. They are right, but my task was to examine any allegation that identifies Polisario Front as a terrorist organization. So, for this reason I investigated the statements of Moroccan authorities and pro Moroccan organizations too, as I investigated the statements of the Polisario Front too.

³⁹ János Besenyő, "Guerrilla Operations in Western Sahara: The Polisario versus Morocco and Mauritania", *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Summer 2017, pp. 23-45, available online at: <http://connections-qj.org/article/guerrilla-operations-western-sahara-polisario-versus-morocco-and-mauritania>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁴⁰ Although Polisario attacked several fishing vessels, no single fisherman was killed during the attacks. However, during their dispute over fishing rights, Morocco also attacked Spanish fishing vessels and, during an attack, seven

Analyses Consortium's (TRAC) information, some members of the movement also provide backing for arms supplies and narcotics trading in the refugee camps across the region. However, the consortium did not name Polisario as a terrorist - only a separatist - group, as it could not be proven that the organization supported the aforementioned acts⁴¹.

The Polisario took action on many fronts, including political campaigning, societal influence and active measures in order to show presence, legitimize its influence and gain supporters. Taking into account that there are serious ethnic conflicts between Senegal and Mauritania, which is the supporter of the Polisario, armed clashes erupted, where Moroccans – understandably - supported Senegal in economic and political terms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) information, it was also clear that not only Algeria but Libya and other African countries provide material and financial support to the Polisario Front too⁴². Bearing in mind this extensive net of supporters, it is important to highlight, that the Polisario throughout the territory took the responsibility of a central authority, which also had its legitimation among its 'citizens'. When compared to other terrorist groups, it is extremely unique, if not incomparable that the organization acts on several levels, including social welfare, political advocacy and direct actions as well.

While the designation is still not clear, the Japanese intelligence agency classified the Polisario as a terrorist movement in its 2011 report, while in 2014, the Japanese intelligence agency specified that the Tindouf camps are "a place of frequent kidnappings" and thus fall into the "dangerous zone" category. Also, Polisario's connections with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as well as with AQIM and other terrorist groups that are active in the Sahel strip, especially in northern Mali were highlighted by the Moroccan American Center for Policy^{43,44}. In addition to the websites supporting the Moroccan position, this claim was not confirmed by any reliable sources, and even the report quoted by the US government did not accuse the organization of having participated in the kidnapping⁴⁵. Moreover the Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 report does not even mention the Polisario's name, not to blame the organization for anything related to terrorism⁴⁶. Likewise, the 2015⁴⁷, 2016⁴⁸ and 2017 reports⁴⁹ did not contain any information that the organization could be linked to any terrorist acts.

In a Report of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, is shown that, *in 1994, arms provided by the Algerian Army to the Polisario were found by ... Algerian security services in the hands of Islamic Armed Group from Algeria militants. Although the exact conditions in which these arms were found in the possession of Algerian terrorists remain unknown, the contacts between the two organizations illustrate the proximity between the*

Spanish fishermen were killed and no one has ever accused Morocco of any terrorist attack. Stephen Zunes, Jacob Mundy, *Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution*, 2010, p. 82.

⁴¹ *Polisario Front – Morocco*, Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, 2018, available online at: <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/polisario-front-morocco>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁴² CIA, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁴³ *Security in the Sahara and Sahel: The growing threat posed by the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf*, Moroccan American Center for Policy, 2014, p. 1, available online at: http://moroccoonthemove.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/SR_ReportandChronology_TheTruthAboutthePolisario_June2014.pdf, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁴⁴ The Moroccan American Center for Policy, is an officially Moroccan-designated lobbying agency in the US.

⁴⁵ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2011*, U.S. Department of State, July 2012, available online at: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/195768.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁴⁶ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2014*, U.S. Department of State, June 2015, available online at: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁴⁷ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015*, U.S. Department of State, June 2016, available online at: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁴⁸ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016*, U.S. Department of State, July 2017, available online at: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁴⁹ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017*, U.S. Department of State, September 2018, available online at: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/283100.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

*Polisario Front and the Islamist terrorist groups*⁵⁰. What is certain, on the other hand, it is that Algerian Military Security demanded explanations of the Polisario and very seriously tightened its control over the Islamists belonging to the Front.

In August 2008, some members of AQIM were scouring the camps of the Polisario – and, in particular, the camp at Tindouf – in order to recruit new Jihadists, and 265 former members of the Polisario have already joined the ranks of the terrorist organization⁵¹. The question was investigated by US Congress, but was not find any evidence on this too⁵². Further, a February 2013 study by the IUCTS cites intelligence reports that confirm al-Qaeda “has established links with Latin cartels for ‘drugs-for-arms’ smuggling through terrorist-trafficking networks that include members of the Polisario Front” in Algeria⁵³.

From another angle, an analysis quotes Mustapha Bouh, a former senior official of the Polisario⁵⁴ on the possible turn towards being a terrorist organization, and he gives the following answer: “In 1975, we had planned to create a specialist hijacking unit, we even selected its members and I even personally met Abou Nidal in Baghdad to see whether we could learn anything useful from him. Then we dropped the idea. We had understood, on the one hand, that it would do us more harm than good and, on the other, that it was far too technical for the Bedouins that we are and who, culturally, are more accustomed to wars of raids. That the Polisario or a part of it should evolves as an armed band which delivering guerrilla harassment for private ends, it is very possible, but that it was transformed into a terrorist organization, I hardly think so. With my opinion, sociologically, culturally and psychologically, that would be beyond what a Bedouin could do”⁵⁵. Reading the interview, it becomes clear to us that the Polisario could be capable of carrying out terrorist acts. However, this – till today – we could not find strong evidence it happened. The organization has repeatedly stated that the use of terrorism is unacceptable and the independence of their nation is to be obtained only in compliance with international law and negotiated.

Assessment

Evaluating the security challenges presented by the unstable and hardly controllable refugee camps, and the Front’s claimed responsibility to protect Sahrawi refugees, many analyses reconsidered the Polisario’s designation as terrorist organization, but these statements weren’t proved.

Polisario’s connections with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as well as with AQIM and other terrorist groups that are active in the Sahel strip, especially in northern Mali might be a push factor in the future towards supporting terrorism by direct means as well. It is clear that those who are receptive to violence, it will not be fully obvious that the question of the Sahara can only be resolved through dialogue and compromise. The youth in the Polisario-led camps are tempted by the activities offered by terrorist networks, which also deal with

⁵⁰ *The Polisario Front: A destabilising force in the region that is still active*, European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, 2008, p.5, available online at: <http://www.esisc.org/upload/publications/analyses/the-front-polisario-a-destabilising-force-in-the-region-that-is-still-active/10.%20THE%20POLISARIO%20FRONT.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵² Alexis Arieff, *Western Sahara*, Congressional Research Service, October 8, 2014, p. 8, available online at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS20962.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁵³ *Security in the Sahara and Sahel: The growing threat posed by the Polisario-run camps near Tindouf*, Moroccan American Center for Policy, 2014, *art. cit.*, p.3.

⁵⁴ His statement is also interesting as he left his previous fellows and changed side and joined to the Moroccan side. The Sahrawis in the refugee camps considering him as a traitor and expressing the Moroccan standpoint. Yet he did not even claim that Polisario would be a terrorist organization, or would have committed any terror acts.

⁵⁵ *The Polisario Front credible negotiations partner or after-effect of the cold war and obstacle to a political solution in Western Sahara?*, European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC), November 2005, p. 72, available online at: <https://moroccoonthemove.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/European-Strategic-Intelligence-and-Security-Center-Report-on-the-Polisario-Front-2005.pdf>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

trafficking and crime. Many of the Sahrawi youths from Tindouf camps trying to avoid unemployment, poverty. Polisario militias are sometimes tempted by terrorist networks that offer tempting money to them⁵⁶. Desperate refugees (both Polisario-affiliates and neutral) in the camps are being recruited by drug smugglers and Islamist militants, according to Moroccan and Mauritanian intelligence reports⁵⁷.

A series of sources are quoted in a study of ESISC⁵⁸ stressing the rising number of Polisario operatives among the terrorist organizations' lines. Thus, in the study is shown the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and The Conflict Management Program's analyses claim "since 2001, North Africa has faced an explosion of violence linked to Sunni radical Islamism", "the number of attacks reported in the region grew by more than 400% between 2001 and 2007" and "the conversion of Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat into the regional arm of Al Qaeda intertwined with a new shift in the violence and the arrival, particularly in Algeria, of large scale suicide attacks".

Today, the stigma of terrorism has become a powerful way of discrediting opponents as well. The identification of the Polisario Front as such is one of the most sought after goals by Moroccan King Mohammed. The way the Polisario is developing is a question of the future: if its combatants and leaders turn to terrorism, radical Islamism or international crime, the development and stability of the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa and consequently the security of several African states would be endangered in the long run. Although in the given security situation, there is a high chance of escalation, Polisario is still counted as a liberation movement with some connections – not really the Polisario as organization, but some of its members - with organized crime groups, rather than a terrorist group.

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⁵⁶ Abdelhak Kettani, *Japan Classifies the Polisario as a Terrorist Movement*, Tindouf.org, July 23, 2014, available online at: <http://tindouf.org/461-japan-classifies-the-polisario-as-a-terrorist-movement.html>, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁵⁷ Kai Lee Labac, *The sources of protracted conflict in the Western Sahara*, Calhoun Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2016, available online at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/48543/16Mar_Labac_Kai.pdf?sequence=1, accessed on September 05, 2018.

⁵⁸ Claude Moniquet (ed.), *The Polisario Front and the development of terrorism in the Sahel*, European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, May 03, 2010, p. 3, available online at: http://www.esisc.org/publications/analyses/the-polisario-front-and-the-development-of-terrorism-in-the-sahel#_ftnref1, accessed on September 05, 2018.

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RECENT STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTIONS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

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Abstract: *The Indo-Pacific region (the Indian and Pacific Oceans, plus all the countries on their shores) is to be regarded as immensely important on the world arena because of several interconnected reasons: it has a really huge size (quite clearly, the largest region in the world); the important number of really significant political actors of the world arena on its shores; the number and importance of major oceanic trade routes crossing the region; the impressive size and pace of evolution of the military capabilities of the countries in the region; and the intense political-strategic competition and conflict potential in the region. The study explores, with some details, using an important number of open sources, three major topics: the sharp increase of the Chinese naval capabilities of all sorts, directly threatening, in the long run, the stability of the regional and global balance of power; the efforts of the USA aimed at preserving and consolidating its global role; and the efforts made by many large and medium-sized states in the region in order to balance, as much as possible, the sharp increase of the more and more assertive Chinese power.*

Keywords: *power status; world power; regional power; naval forces; blue water navy; China; the United States of America; the Indo-Pacific region; regional (and global) balance of power.*

Introduction: a (relatively) new concept, designating some old realities

At the end of May 2018, the highest military officials in the United States decided to rename the Pacific Command in a way strongly underlining the growing geostrategic importance of both the Indian Ocean and the increasing ties, at different geopolitically and strategically significant levels, connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Major international press agencies were quoting, at that very moment, the official declaration of the U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. His statement said “in recognition of the increasing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, today we rename the US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command”; the senior U.S. official has also added “relationships with our Pacific and Indian Ocean allies and partners have proven critical to maintaining regional stability”¹. The episode is clearly showing the way in which the United States, the most powerful actor of the international arena at the present moment, is paying more and more attention to the geo-strategically important evolutions in the vast region made up by the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

¹ Idrees Ali, Ben Blanchard (reporting), Tom Brown and Darren Schuettler (editing), “In symbolic nod to India, U.S. Pacific Command changes name”, *Reuters*, May 30, 2018, available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defense-india/in-symbolic-nod-to-india-u-s-pacific-command-changes-name-idUSKCN1IV2Q2>, accessed on September 5, 2018.

The importance of this *immense* region – the Pacific has 161.7 million square kilometers, and the Indian Ocean has 73.4 million square kilometers² – is boosted by several significant circumstances. First of all, a *large* number of world powers and major regional powers have *direct* access to (and *major* various interests in) the region: the U.S., China, India, Russia, plus Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf region and Iran, plus Indonesia and Vietnam have to be listed here. Secondly, the region is crossed by a lot of *major* sea trade routes, really vital for both the very existence of several large national economies, but also for the evolution of the world economy. Thirdly, the conflict potential of (or in) the region is both traditionally high³, and sharply increasing⁴.

We have to strongly underline the fact that, if the Indo-Pacific region is a *relatively* new concept to be consistently used by civilian and military top officials in different countries, the *realities* proving how strong the strategically significant ties between the two oceans are, are clearly both *older* and really *significant* ones. Two briefly examples might reinforce such an opinion. In the early stages of the First World War, the German naval squadron in the Far East operated according to a plan proving the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are a *single* entity: while most German ships combat ships in the Far East were sailing across the Pacific in order to reach the Southern Atlantic (in a deliberate attempt to damage, as much as possible, the sea trade routes connecting India and Great Britain), the cruiser *Emden* was successfully staging an impressive raiding operation mainly in the Indian Ocean, attracting in this way many Australian and Japanese combat ships, and obviously facilitating the trans-Pacific voyage of the naval squadron led by Admiral von Spee⁵. In the Second World War, at the zenith of the Japanese offensive moves to the South, an important Japanese naval squadron sailed from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, cruising not far away from the coasts of India and Ceylon, and attacking (mainly with carrier-based airplanes) several significant strategic assets controlled by the British⁶.

1. A massive and accelerated Chinese naval buildup: brief overview

China *does* have a really significant naval (and *oceanic*) tradition: at the end of the Middle Ages and in early stages of Modern Times, for example, huge Chinese fleets explored, on several successive occasions, the Indian Ocean, reaching Eastern Africa, the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf⁷. Later on, naval development was neglected, and at the end of the 19th century, its navy was badly crushed by the Japanese. A really massive revival of the Chinese navy is now a *very* visible reality.

In 2012, the Chinese naval forces (the People's Liberation Army Navy - PLAN) has commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Soviet-built (but highly upgraded) *Liaoning*. A media report published in late June 2018 by the serious and usually reliable *The Diplomat* was openly stating "China is on schedule to have four carriers by 2025": the same media report

² Gérard Chaliand, Jean-Pierre Rageau, *Strategic Atlas: A Comparative Geopolitics of the World's Powers*, second edition, revised and updated, Harper & Raw, New York, 1985, p. 51.

³ Gérard Chaliand, Jean-Pierre Rageau, *op. cit.*, pp. 61, 67 (for the roots of the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea), p. 70.

⁴ See, for example, the way in which some recent works are evaluating the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea: Robert D. Kaplan, *Butoiul cu pulbere al Asiei. Marea Chinei de Sud și sfârșitul stabilității în Pacific*, Editura Litera, București, 2016.

⁵ For the cruise of the *Emden*, and for von Spee's actions before the battle fought off Coronel, see, for example, Jacques Mordal, *Twenty-Five Centuries of Sea Warfare*, Abbey Library, London, 1973, pp. 266-268 and 293-301.

⁶ Paul S. Dull, *A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945)*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1978, pp. 109-118 (the entire Chapter 7: Raids in the Indian Ocean).

⁷ Lincoln Paine, *Marea și civilizația: o istorie maritimă a lumii*, Ed. Polirom, Iași, 2015, pp. 251-269 and (for the large naval expeditions led by admiral Zheng He) 309-312.

was stating China has “three new” aircraft carriers “currently in various stages of testing or construction”, focusing the attention on the fact that these mighty ocean-going ships are the direct “cause for great apprehension” among Beijing’s “potential adversaries in Asia and the West”⁸. The same open source is also reporting “Chinese shipbuilders have also begun the construction of three amphibious assault ships – 40,000 ton warships, approximately the same size as the French carrier *Charles De Gaulle*. The warships are highly similar to the U.S. Navy’s *America* and *Wasp* class amphibious assault ships, almost identical in size and appearance”. According to some estimates, each of these large amphibious assault ships (or very large helicopter carriers) might be able to carry “up to 30 aircraft” - most probably some newly developed short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) or vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft. In such a situation, the three large Chinese amphibious assault ships will be able to carry and launch, in combat missions of all sorts, roughly 90 modern jets, strongly augmenting the capabilities of the larger aircraft carriers. The open source we are quoting here is also stating that, if China is going to successfully commission all these seven ships (four large carriers, plus three large amphibious assault ships), “2025 could well thus mark a considerable turning point in the Pacific balance of power, providing the U.S. Navy with the first real challenge to the dominance of its carrier strike groups in Asia since the sinking of the Imperial Japanese supercarrier *Shinano* in 1944”⁹.

But China is quickly building and commissioning not only aircraft carriers. Along the past three decades, but above all along the past few years, China has pursued a massive and overtly ambitious naval program, aimed at strengthening all elements of the navy, and above all its *blue-water capabilities* Beijing can use in order to accomplish several very important *strategic* goals. Recently, a reliable open source was reporting “the size and scale of this shipbuilding programme is particularly apparent when contrasted with the total size of other significant regional navies, and some European navies”. The same source was also adding: “for example, since 2014, China has launched more submarines, warships, principal amphibious vessels and auxiliaries than the total number of ships currently serving in the navies of Germany, India, Spain, Taiwan and the United Kingdom”¹⁰. In early May 2018, another very serious open source was stating, dealing with the same topic (the evolution of the Chinese naval capabilities), the available data we can use is clearly showing “how that Chinese output has accelerated in recent years, and throws up some striking comparisons even with recent US naval shipbuilding”, also adding “in the period 2012–14, US output remained just ahead in total tonnage terms, not least with the launch of the 100,000-tonne aircraft carrier USS *Gerald R. Ford*. In 2015–17, China was significantly ahead, thanks in part to the launch of its own first indigenous aircraft carrier”¹¹.

2. Interpreting the strategic goals of the ongoing Chinese naval buildup: what history is teaching us

In order to better understand both the immediate and long-term meaning of the sharp increase of the Chinese Navy along the past few years (and also its increasing appetite for

⁸ Abraham Ait, “Will China Have 7 Aircraft Carriers by 2025?”, *The Diplomat*, June 30, 2018, available online at: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/will-china-have-7-aircraft-carriers-by-2025/>, text accessed on September 5, 2018.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ ***, “How China is becoming a naval superpower and why it matters”, on the webpage of the *World Economic Forum*, May 23, 2018, available online at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/05/how-chinas-ship-building-investment-is-turning-it-into-a-naval-superpower>, text accessed on September 23, 2018.

¹¹ Nick Childs, Tom Waldwin, “China’s naval shipbuilding: delivering on its ambition in a big way”, on the webpage of the *International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*, May 1, 2018, available online at: <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/05/china-naval-shipbuilding>, accessed on September 27, 2018.

operating *globally* capable ships – see the already mentioned large aircraft carriers, but also large oceanic destroyers, and some very modern guided missile cruisers), we are to briefly explore, with only a few (but really illustrative) details, some significant previous situations of almost the *same sort*. *On several occasions along the past few centuries, developing stronger and stronger naval forces with blue water capabilities has been a powerful ‘ingredient’ in the process of sharply boosting the power status of some actors on the global arena*. This means that, on several occasions, the evolution of states from regional or continental great power status to world power status¹² was clearly accompanied (and made possible, in strictly operational terms) by a *massive* increase of the naval capabilities of all sorts. Among these, the most important to be properly addressed by any serious debate are those we are usually designating by means of using the concept of *blue water navy* – naval forces able to operate far away from shores and ports, with an impressive range and able to reach, without problems, any region of the World Ocean.

The earliest example, in *modern* history, clearly proving in which way a significant general growth of the Navy (one which was more and more *globally* capable) is accompanying (and boosting) the positive evolution of the power status of states (and, up to a certain point, is a *major catalyst* of getting more and more influence on the world arena) is that of *England*. In one of his notorious and influential works, Paul Kennedy is openly stating that, between 1650 (immediately after the end of the English Revolution and in the opening stages of the dramatic and strategically significant Anglo-Dutch Wars) and the end of the Napoleonic era, in 1815, the total number of major combat ships used by all major powers in order to control the World Ocean was almost constant (350 to 360 ships-of-the-line). In 1689, when England was nothing else but an ambitious *European* great power, London’s Navy had only 100 major combat ships. Roughly 125 years (or almost five generations) later, Royal Navy had no less than 214 ships-of-the-line (this figure representing roughly 60 % of the number of capital ships in the *entire* world; *all* the other powers with naval interests and ambitions, put together, had only 165 capital ships in 1815)¹³.

At the end of the 19th century and in the early stages of the 20th century, *the most* relevant situation of the same sort is that of *Germany*. Quite clearly an outstandingly important *European* great power, Germany’s ambitions and plans directly aimed at getting *global* power status were clearly ‘contained’ by the British Empire, which was the dominant actor on the World Ocean since October 1805. In such a situation, Germany has deliberately attempted to develop a navy able to openly challenge the British naval global dominance. In 1897, the German Navy had limited capabilities, most probably fit only for controlling a large part of the Baltic: “8... battleships...organized into a squadron; there were also on hand 8 armored coastal-defence ships, 10 large and 22 light cruisers, 13 gunboats, 110 torpedo-boats, and a host of small craft”¹⁴. Roughly 10 years later, in 1908, Germany already had significantly larger naval forces: 24 large battleships, plus 8 coastal-defence armored ships, plus 8 large (and ocean-going) armored cruisers, plus 30 other cruisers, plus 128 torpedo boats and destroyers, plus 20 auxiliary ships¹⁵; these figures, compared with those showing how large the German Navy had been in 1882, were clearly indicating a *very* large increase of the combat capabilities Berlin could deploy in various parts of the World Ocean: the number

¹² In order to better understand the vitally important concepts used here: great power(s), world power(s), regional power(s), plus other power statuses (minor powers, dominant powers, etc.), see, for example, Martin Wight, *Politica de putere*, Editura Arc, Chişinău, 1998, pp. 31-88.

¹³ Paul Kennedy, *Ascensiunea și decăderea marilor puteri: transformări economice și conflicte militare din 1500 până în 2000*, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 110 (table 5).

¹⁴ Holger H. Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888–1918, Routledge, London and New York, 2014, p. 32.

¹⁵ Helmut Pemsel, *Von Salamis bis Okinawa: Eine Chronik zur Seekriegsgeschichte*, J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, Munchen, 1975, pp. 316-317.

of battleships has grown 2 times larger (from 12 in 1882 to 24 in 1908), and the total number of cruisers of all sorts (armored or not protected) has also grown several times larger -from 18¹⁶ in 1882 to 38 in 1908¹⁷. The increase of the German *naval* capabilities along the two decades and a half (1882 to 1908) is even more obvious if we are seriously taking into account the evolution of the *total displacement* of the German combat ships: all the German combat ships, together, had 157,000 tons in 1882, and 570,000 tons in 1908 (the total displacement in 1908 is almost 3.5 times larger than that in 1882, according to the figures used by author we are quoting here); the total displacement of the German auxiliary ships has also grown in significant way, from roughly 15,000 tons to approximately 40.000 tons (a 2,6 times increase, smaller than the increase of total displacement of the *combat ships*)¹⁸.

Another potent example, vividly illustrating the *strong* connection between the evolution of the power status of a state and the growth of the naval capabilities of the political actor (or state) we are speaking about is that of the United States. In the opening stages of its national history as a completely independent entity, its navy was quite small. The *Navy Act* adopted by the U.S. Congress on May 27, 1794 provided the means “for the purchase or building of six frigates”¹⁹. Along the so-called Quasi-War against France (1798-1800) against France, the total number of combat ships grew for a while, reaching roughly 50 (most of them small ones). The total manpower used by the U.S. Navy at that very moment was also small: some 150 commissioned officers, plus 350 midshipmen, 6,000 seaman, and some 1,100 marines²⁰. Several decades later, when the Civil War (1861-1865) started, most of the U.S. Navy ships and crews were controlled by (and loyal to) the Union’s leadership, with only few ships in Confederate hands. In spite of this situation, the naval forces of the North were, in the early stages of the war, not at all able (because of the *limited* size of the Navy) to accomplish their main mission: that of implementing a complete blockade, denying the South any chance to export raw materials (cotton, mainly) and to import weapons, ammunition and other items badly needed for the war effort. “At the outset of the Civil War, the Federal navy was composed of around ninety ships, only around forty of which were close to combat-capable”, an open source is stating; according to the same text, along the next four years “the Union navy grew to comprise more than six hundred ships by 1865, the largest in the world at the time, giving the North a consistent advantage in the war on the water”²¹. And later on, the U.S. naval forces became a really *globally capable* political and military instrument, mainly in the context of the Second World War and of the Cold War. In 1952, for example, in the early stages of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy – the largest and most powerful in the world – had 102 carriers, 15 battleships, 72 cruisers, 385 destroyers, 207 submarines, 850 smaller combat ships, 530 landing ships of all sorts, and 850 auxiliary vessels²².

Most probably, at this very moment, China is *deliberately* attempting to reach a *fully operational global (or world) power status*, using, together with many other tools and methods aiming this major geo-strategic goal, *a massive naval buildup* of the same sort as the naval buildups in the previous situations briefly presented above. More combat ships, larger displacements, better weapons, increased range, increased capability of maintaining a robust

¹⁶ This figure is including not only the (ocean-going) cruisers, but also an unspecified number of clearly smaller combat ships of at least two different types (frigates and corvettes) – see Helmut Pemsel, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

¹⁷ For the key figures used here, and showing the obvious increase of the total might of the German Navy from 1882 to 1908, see Helmut Pemsel, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-317.

¹⁸ Helmut Pemsel, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

¹⁹ E. B. Potter (editor), *Sea Power: A Naval History*, second edition, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1981, p. 86.

²⁰ E. B. Potter (editor), *op. cit.*, p. 87.

²¹ “10 Facts: Civil War Navies”, on the *American Battlefield Trust* webpage, available online at: <https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/10-facts-civil-war-navies>, accessed on September 30, 2018.

²² Helmut Pemsel, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

naval presence far away from national shores – all these are clearly proving China is now implementing *the same* policy as Germany at about 1900, for example, with the same basic geo-strategic goals (both of them to be accomplished by means of placing a special emphasis on using the larger and larger *blue water* navy Beijing is now developing in an accelerated way) : that of *eroding the present balance of power on the World Ocean*, and that of *gaining a fully operational world power status, in direct competition with other actors on the world arena*.

3. Aimed at maintaining the strategic balance: reactions generated by the massive and accelerated Chinese naval buildup

First of all, the increasing role of the Pacific Ocean in every facet of the world affairs, plus the increased ambitions and increased assertiveness (regarded by some authors and decision-makers as being increased *aggressiveness*) of the rulers in Beijing led the U.S. decision-makers to strongly rethink the way in which American military capabilities are deployed. As a direct result, the so-called “rebalancing” (or “Pacific pivot”) has occurred – a set of policies designed a few years ago, by the Barack Obama administration: policies by means of which, quite soon, almost 60 % of the globally relevant strategic assets the U.S. can rely on were to be concentrated *in (or near)* the Pacific area (in a way able to deeply influence evolution in the entire Indo-Pacific region). In March 2017, senior U.S. officials were stating this set of policies is to be replaced by something else: on March 14, 2017, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton declared some changes might occur: she said “pivot, rebalance, etcetera – that was a word that was used to describe the Asia policy in the last administration. I think you can probably expect that this administration will have its own formulation. We haven't really seen in detail, kind of, what that formulation will be or if there even will be a formulation”. On the same occasion, Susan Thornton was openly stating “we're going to remain engaged and active” in the Pacific and in Asia, mainly because “the Asian economy is very important for US prosperity and growth, so we will be there working on fair trade and free trade issues, working on regional security challenges such as North Korea, and continue to press for a rules-based and constructive, peaceful and stable order in Asia”²³.

According to open sources (including *official* documents made public), the *U.S. is planning to strengthen its Pacific Fleet along the next years and decades*. At this very moment, the U.S. Pacific Fleet, “the world's largest fleet command”, is responsible for a huge area, “from the West Coast of the United States into the Indian Ocean”; according to official data, this fleet “consists of approximately 200 ships/submarines, nearly 1,200 aircraft, and more than 130,000 Sailors and civilians”²⁴.

And on quite many occasions, *individual U.S. naval vessels are visiting different countries in Asia, in order to train together with naval (or other military) forces of the host nation*. Interoperability is thus increased, and such episodes are clearly proving, even if only with *limited* means, the U.S. *do* have the political will to stay strongly engaged in the Indo-Pacific region. See, for example, the quite recent episode (June 2018) in which the Military

²³ Aaron Mehta, “Pivot to the Pacific' is over, senior U.S. diplomat says”, *DefenseNews.com*, March 14, 2017, available online at: <https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/14/pivot-to-the-pacific-is-over-senior-u-s-diplomat-says/>, text accessed on September 21, 2018.

²⁴ “U.S. Pacific Fleet advances Indo-Asia-Pacific regional maritime security and enhances stability”, on the *official* webpage of the *Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet*, at <https://www.cpf.navy.mil/about/>, accessed on September 17, 2018.

Sealift Command hospital ship *USNS Mercy* visited Vietnam, completing there “a successful two-week Pacific Partnership 2018 mission”²⁵.

If we are to briefly present *other* main reactions to the so intense Chinese naval buildup, *India* is also currently attempting to limit the expansion of the Chinese sphere of influence. If we are speaking about the naval arms race, India is trying a lot to balance, as much as possible, the massive evolution of the Chinese capabilities. Three years ago, an official document was stating India was building, at that very moment, no less than “forty-eight ... ships and submarines”. The same document was emphasizing the idea of “indigenisation” of all fields of naval production (in order to diminish the need to rely on strategically *vulnerable* imports), and was depicting the range of potential missions of the Indian Navy: “the specific roles of the Indian Navy in future would continue to extend... from peace keeping, through the low intensity segment to high-intensity conventional hostilities up to and including nuclear conflict”. And the reason to prepare for war (including *nuclear* war) was presented in a very clear way: “In the last two decades, the capabilities available with our potential adversaries have grown considerably and are forecasted to only improve with time. The Indian Navy would therefore acquire adequate deterrent war fighting capabilities”²⁶ (dealing with the problem of *potential adversaries* India might be confronted with, only two are to be seriously taken into consideration: Pakistan, a country roughly 6.5 times smaller, in demographic terms; and *China*). Some new and powerful *ocean-going* warships have also been built by India – see, for example, the large (and technologically advanced) *stealth* guided missile destroyers belonging to the *Kolkata* class²⁷ (each of them with a total displacement of more than 7,400 tons, with a speed of more than 30 knots, and with a range of 15,000 kilometers²⁸).

Japan is also pouring a lot of money into developing a highly modern and really powerful navy. Two years ago, a reliable open source was stating the Japanese naval forces are, “ship for ship, the best navy in Asia”. According to the same open source, Japan had “a total of 114 warships and 45,800 volunteer personnel”; the text we are speaking about was also stating “the main component of the MSDF²⁹ are its fleet of forty-six destroyers and frigates – more than that those fielded by the United Kingdom and France combined”, adding some data about the Japanese “force of twenty-two submarines to provide great numbers against a growing Chinese Navy”³⁰.

Most obviously, two strategically significant tools (or methods) are intensely used by political actors in the region in order to limit the magnitude of the Chinese threat (embodied inclusively in the massive naval buildup already presented here). First of all, we are speaking about *transferring important military technologies (including some combat ships)*, enabling smaller and (or) weaker countries to increase their military (mainly defensive) potential. The

²⁵ Kelsey L. Adams (Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class, Pacific Partnership Public Affairs), “U.S., Partner Nations Conclude Pacific Partnership 2018 in Vietnam”, *U.S. Department of Defense*, available online at: <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1541214/us-partner-nations-conclude-pacific-partnership-2018-in-vietnam/>, accessed on September 5, 2018.

²⁶ Directorate of Indigenisation IHQ MoD (Navy), *Indian Naval Indigenisation Plan (INIP) (2015/2030)*, available online at: https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/themes/indiannavy/images/pdf/naval_initiatives/INIP_2015-2030.pdf, accessed on September 6, 2018, p. 2.

²⁷ *Destroyes – Kolkata class*, on the official webpage of the Indian Navy, available online at: <https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/vikramaditya-delhi-class-rajput-class-kolkata-class>, accessed on September 18, 2018.

²⁸ Rahul Singh Dhari, *Kolkata class. Guided missile destroyer*, on the military-today.com webpage, available online at: http://www.military-today.com/navy/kolkata_class.htm, text accessed on September 20, 2018.

²⁹ The Japanese *Maritime Self-Defense Force*.

³⁰ Kyle Mizokami, “Sorry, China: Why the Japanese Navy is the Best in Asia”, *The National Interest*, October 16, 2016, available online at: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/sorry-china-why-the-japanese-navy-the-best-asia-18056>, accessed on September 27, 2018.

goal of such actions is that of making the recipient countries stronger, and more able to successfully cope with ongoing or potential Chinese pressures. See, for example, the fact that Japan has already transferred, along the past few years, several combat ships and naval surveillance airplanes to both Vietnam³¹ and the Philippines³². Secondly, we are speaking about *almost regular multi-national major military (and naval) drills*. In November 2017, major new agencies were reporting an “U.S. Navy carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan, conducted three days of drills with a Japanese destroyer and two Indian warships in the Sea of Japan, Japan’s navy said”³³. And, more recently, in June 2018, the 22nd edition of the yearly *Malabar* naval drills took place in the Central Pacific, near Guam. It’s important to take into consideration that it has been a major “trilateral naval drill involving India, Japan, and the United States”. The open source we are using here (*Jane’s Navy International*) was reporting that “the ‘Malabar’ series of naval war games began in 1992 to improve levels of interoperability between the US and Indian navies. Over the years, several other countries, including Australia and Japan, have also been involved either as participants or observers”, also adding that the 2018 edition of these massive naval war games has focused “on high-end warfighting skillsets, subject matter expert and professional exchanges, combined carrier strike group operations, maritime patrol and reconnaissance operations, surface and anti-submarine warfare, medical operations, damage control, helicopter operations, and visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations”³⁴.

Some brief conclusions

Most probably, the massive and accelerated development of China’s *blue water* navy will go on along the foreseeable years. Most probably, the very complex set of policies pursued by other world (or regional) powers in in Indo-Pacific region, which have as a strong and visible common denominator the geo-strategic interest of balancing (or deterring and stopping, if possible) the increasingly *global* ambitions of China will also go on. In such a situation, the *continuity of the U.S. strategic involvement* in the Indo-Pacific is *vitaly* important for preserving the regional and global balance of power; also *vitaly* important is the *continuity* of the political effort aimed at maintaining and strengthening *intense strategic cooperation of the U.S. with major regional powers* (most notably India and Japan, and Australia too), and also with some other important regional actors (South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, plus other countries as well).

³¹ Ankit Panda, “Japan Pledges 6 New Patrol Boats for Vietnam Coast Guard”, *The Diplomat*, January 17, 2017, available online at: <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/japan-pledges-6-new-patrol-boats-for-vietnam-coast-guard/>, text accessed on September 30, 2018.

³² Robin Harding, Michael Peel, “Japan provides ships for Philippines to help counter China at sea”, *Financial Times*, 2016, available online at: <https://www.ft.com/content/6bdb1cdc-7422-11e6-b60a-de4532d5ea35>, accessed on September 30, 2018.

³³ Nobuhiro Kubo and Tim Kelly, “U.S. Navy carrier drills with Japanese, Indian navy in Sea of Japan”, *Reuters*, November 7, 2017, available online at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-japan-us/u-s-navy-carrier-drills-with-japanese-indian-navy-in-sea-of-japan-idUSKBN1D70ED>, accessed on September 26 2018.

³⁴ Ridzwan Rahmat, “‘Malabar’ naval war games move to Guam as drills grow in complexity”, *Jane’s 360*, available online at: <https://www.janes.com/article/80623/malabar-naval-war-games-move-to-guam-as-drills-grow-in-complexity>, accessed on September 30, 2018.

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THE CONNECTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION WITH THE SOCIAL SYSTEM AND ITS SUBORDINATION WITH REGARD TO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

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Abstract: *For the organization and functioning of a state, it is necessary that the administration and the political power cooperate, the state administration being one of the fundamental forms of achieving political power. State administration is one of the most important activities of contemporary society, and it has to be at the heart of the concerns of the political factors. Between the system of public administration and the political parties as elements of the political system there are differentiated relations from one state to another, depending on the system of government.*

Another issue concerns the relation between the public administration system and the pressure groups using certain constraints on the system of public administration, when its component bodies make certain decisions affecting the interests of these organizations.

Keywords: *public administration, social system, political parties, media.*

Introduction

Etymologically speaking, "administration" comes from the Latin *ad minister* in which "*minister*" means servant, aid or, in another sense, instrument, tool, agent, "*ministratio, -onis*" means service and is a preposition with the accusative that signifies to, towards, near to, etc. The Romanian legal doctrine appreciated that the term administration designates a certain activity of someone who helps to something and to someone's orders¹, in its contents has as essential components those of providing, organizing, conducting, coordinating and controlling².

The object of public administration is the practical realization of those values expressing the interests of the state or any form of human collectivity organized and recognized as such by the state, as those values expressed in normative acts and judgments whose execution is, both cases, the main task of the public administration.

Public administration does not function as an isolated system but is actively involved in all spheres of social life, sometimes having the role of coordinating some activities and sometimes even managing them.

¹ Al. Negoită, *Drept administrativ și știința administrației*, Universitatea Athenaeum, București, 1991, p. 1.

² *Idem*.

1. The relation between the public administration and the political sector

The administration has and must have a position of subordination with regard to the political decisions, in the forms and frames prescribed by the law, because it carries out the tasks entrusted by the political power. The powers of the public administration are set out by the political power, which thereby assumes the responsibility for their content, even if they were inspired by the administrative bodies.

No elective political body or person can ever put in practice their political agenda, for which they have received the votes of their constituents, unless they have, within the limits of the law, control over an administrative structure that is charged with carrying out their decisions.

For the organization and functioning of a state, it is necessary for the administration and the political power to work together. The state administration is one of the fundamental forms of putting into action the political power. Among the instruments available to the political power for the political leadership, of course, the administration is one of the utmost importance³.

The political system, in the meaning which we will use for the purposes of this analysis, consists of the state, the political parties and those social groups with an important role in identifying social interests, politically valorizing them and legislatively consecrating them.

The public administration is organically and functionally linked to the legislative power and the executive power.

The legislative power is the one that formulates, via the law making process, the political values that the system of the public administration carries out accordingly. The legislative power has also important attributions in setting up the bodies of the executive power, the government and in controlling its functionality. This highlights the link between the administrative system and the legislative power.

The most extensive and complex relations exist between the public administration system and the executive power bodies on the determinations and influences of the political environment. In Romania, the executive power is represented by the President and the Government. The public administration operates under the authority and the general management of the Government. It is the executive power that assures the leadership and the control of the entire system of the public administration for the achievement of the state public powers. That is why within the structure of the public administration system there are important political leadership offices coordinating the activity of the public administration system.

However, besides these state-related functions with a pronounced political character, public administration system also includes functions revealing the technical nature of the public administration as an activity aimed at both regulating the behavior of the citizens and providing necessary public services. This part of the public administration, comprised by the officials, the services and the various public institutions, marks and tones the specifics of the public administration system in relation to the political system.

An important issue concerns the interaction between the system of public administration and the political parties.

Between the system of public administration and the political parties, as elements of the political system, there are differentiated relations from one state to another, depending on the system of government.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 32.

In multi-party democratic states, administrative systems have indirect connections with the governing parties and those involved in the governing coalitions.

The persons nominated or accepted by these parties occupy political positions within the bodies of the executive power and thereby influence the system of the public administration in its functionality.

At the local government level, the representatives of the political parties elected in local government bodies have the same role in the structure and functionality of these components of the public administration system.

From this point of view, it can be said that through these levers a certain administrative policy is outlined under the influence of the factors participating in the realization of the political power in the system of public administration.

In governing systems based on the existence of a single political party, the public administration system is structurally and functionally completely subordinated to this political party. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to distinguish between state administration and the party leadership⁴.

Another interesting aspect of the matter is related to the links between the public administration and economic interest groups and/or pressure groups. Pressure groups are actively pursuing interests of a professional nature (such is the case of the trade unions and the employers' associations) and they are exerting pressure on the public administration bodies, especially on the government. The economic interest groups have a broader meaning and may be licit or illicit, influencing the political system and, through that, the public administration.

Nevertheless, this doesn't mean that the only role of the public administration in relation to the political system is to blindly execute the political decisions. Not only politics influences the administration, but also the administration influences politics through issues such as the drafting of the laws, the preparation of the policy makers' decisions and the pressures that the civil servants' unions exert on the government, alongside with the other unions.

2. Public administration and the society it serves

The strongest relation is the one between the public administration and the social environment. The relation is one of inter-conditionality and mutual modeling. Firstly, the public administration is the result of the social environment, elements such as the demographic structure, the stage of economic development, the level of technological progress, the cultural specifics or the ethical system of a social group determine the active forms of the administration that serves it. That is why no system of public administration can be studied apart from the social environment that has produced it and within which it operates.

The connection with the social system is studied along two main directions – the sociality of the administration and the sociability of the administration.

Sociality or the social governance is an indicator that expresses how the social environment puts its mark on the public administration, primarily as an activity, and secondly as a system of institutions.

The sociality of the administration is investigated via two elements – time and space – because both the social environment and the administration exist in time and space. The social administration shows the features that make up a certain type of administration to be more specific to the social environment. One can not speak of an ideal and abstract system of public

⁴ Tiberiu Pavelescu, Gabriel Moinescu, Andreea Cîrciumaru, Visan Mihaela, Neagu Aurel, *Tratat elementar de Drept administrativ*, Editura Sitech, Craiova, 2007, p. 35.

administration, because there is no such thing; there is only a concrete historical type of administration in one country or another. The construction of the administrative system is closely linked to the particularities of the social groups at the state level. These aspects largely determine the structure and functionality of the public administration system⁵.

Taking into account that two types of activities are included in the content of the public administration – regulating the behavior and providing public services – it should be noted that the regulatory activities of the institutions will be more strongly influenced by the state organization and the political regime. The service provision activities are influenced by the structure of the social environment and its placement in the territory, such activities being generated by the needs of the society and, therefore, mandatorily to be made more accessible to the members of the society (e.g., the prefecture secondary offices, the office of the village delegate, etc.).

The sociability of the public administration measures the compatibility of the administrative system with the society it needs to serve. There are some types of public administration that are incompatible with the social environment in which they operate from the point of view of the social make up of the people who are employed in that system of public administration, because the bodies of the public administration are formed only by certain classes or social categories of the given social environment⁶.

A sound and functional administrative system must be open to the social environment, allowing its infiltration at all levels of the public administration. Sociability therefore is a factor that shows us the degree of rigidity and the progression of stiffening of a system of public administration.

3. Mass-media – the new actor and influencer of the public administration

An important and, at the same time, delicate subject is the relation between the media as a social phenomenon and the public administration, especially with the system of the public authorities as a fundamental part of the central or local administrative phenomenon. The preoccupation to study this relation meets the imperatives imposed by the social reality, a reality in which the role of the media has become very important.

Press has become in recent years in Romania a strong dynamic factor of awareness raising, which leads many analysts to say that a “fourth power” in the state is now in action. In fact, mass-media has become an interface between society and the individual as well as between the system of public authorities and the citizens⁷.

The term “media” designates all means of expression, including the voice and the gestures. There is autonomous media (books, newspapers, video and audio cassettes, etc.), broadcast media (radio and television) and communication media (phone, videotext, etc.).

The media can influence the citizen about any everyday life problem, thus implicitly about the exercise of the rights and the duties in relations with the administration. Moreover, the media can also be a cause for distortions, even conflicts between the administration and the administrated, the relationships between the administration and the media being ones of mutually influencing⁸.

Practically, between the media, the public authorities and the citizens there are evident bonds of interdependence and mutual pressure⁹.

⁵ See Alexandru Negoită, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁶ Tiberiu Pavelescu, Gabriel Moinescu Andreea Cîrciumaru, Visan Mihaela, Neagu Aurel, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁷ Alina Livia Nicu, *Sistemul autorităților publice în România și media*, Editura Sibila, Craiova, 1998, p. 253.

⁸ See also: Balle Francis, *Media și politicul*, P.U.F., France, 1985, p. 32.

⁹ See also: Balle Francis, *Médias et société*, 5e éd. refondue, Éd. Montchrestien, Paris, 1990, p. 8.

The designation of the public administration authorities, by election or appointment, mobilizes the entire social structure of a state. At the same time, the media intervenes throughout the exercise of the power and activity of the administration, including through rigorous control and the reporting of public power malfunctions and excesses.

On the other hand, the public administration authorities have a tendency to control by way of the legal regulation, the audio-visual and written media, as well as other media segments, for the purpose of handling more or less directly the information that get passed on to the public.

In fact, regardless of the state's socio-political organization, the media cannot be totally independent. Where the media is a public service, the dependence on the political power is evident, with funding being provided mainly from the state budget. This does not mean, however, that the media as a commercial service offered by a private entrepreneur would be totally independent and neutral.

In the relations between the administrations and the media, the administrated occupy in the society a place with a double meaning: the beneficiaries of the messages transmitted by the media from the public administration authorities, but also the determinant factor in the constitution of these authorities under the influence of the meditated message¹⁰.

Conclusions

As we have seen, no administrative system appears out of thin air, nor does it exist independently of the "life of the city". Therefore, no administration is or can ever be ignorant of the needs, desires, requirements or even shortcomings of those who are administered, of the society as a whole and in all its aspects, the political life being one of the most important of these aspects as it reflects the due involvement of the citizen in the "life of the city".

All these taken into account, none of the activities that come within the scope of the notion of public administration can be carried out outside the normative framework. The legal rules make up the normative framework that the public administration is called upon to apply and maintain.

Having the enforcement of the law ensured, the public administration system is the instrument by which the rule of law is achieved. In order to respond to this mission, the public administration, viewed as an activity and organizational system, must also be subject to the law. In this way, the principle of the lawfulness of the public administration characterized by the rule of law is outlined.

The principle of the lawfulness of the public administration must be interpreted dynamically in the sense of the obligation of the public administration bodies to act by enforcing the law and to take the necessary measures, including the constraints, on the basis and in the enforcement of the law, in order to restore the legal order if it is violated. This interpretation derives from the very purpose of the public administration as a servant of the general interests of society as expressed in the law. Moreover, only this interpretation of the principle of the lawfulness of the public administration can explain the particularities of the administrative law which admits the existence the implicit administrative act inferred from the inactions of the public administration bodies.

In law enforcement, the administration may be allowed to issue legal rules itself.

The issuance of legal rules by the administration must be based on the enforcement of the law and with respect for citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms.

¹⁰ Tiberiu Pavelescu, Gabriel Moinescu, Andreea Cîrciumaru, Visan Mihaela, Neagu Aurel, *Tratat elementar de drept administrativ*, Editura Sitech, Craiova, 2007, p. 41.

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MAIN PARADIGMS SHAPING THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL WORLD (“THE GREATER EUROPE” AND “THE GREATER EURASIA” RUSSIAN PROJECTS)

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Abstract: *Our paper proposes a brief exploration of both key-geopolitical paradigms (Pacific century and Eurasian century), whose interaction, due to divergent interests of the current great powers might offer an interesting insight into the general evolution (and reset) of the entire contemporary political world. We are taking into account the present profile of an international system shaped mainly by the rising powers, in a kind of asymmetrical multipolarity. The Pacific geopolitical extension of the Eurasian trend that Russia, as a rising power and global actor, has already deployed in this key-area, shows the inner dynamism of an order in full stage of reconstruction, in which rising powers (Russia) are revealing themselves as controllers of the declining political global order, as well as promoters of the new “Eurasian century”.*

Keywords: *Eurasian “Looking East” mega-trend, Pacific area, Russian worldwide strategies, rising powers.*

Introduction: Paradigm of the “Eurasian Century”

The Eurasian theory promoted by N. Trubețkoi, P. Savițki, P. Surcinski, G. Florovski has been a subject matter ever since 1921, when the *Exodus spre est* (translator’s note: “Exodus to the East”) paper was published. According to Savițki, Russia needed to implement a distinct policy for the preservation of its particular identity, as a country which practically forms “a third continent, a distinctive space, anchored between Europe and Asia, an independent area not only from a geographic standpoint, but also in a strategic sense”¹. According to these authors, “Russia’s Eurasianism is owed to the fact that, by virtue of our history and geography, we have vital interests both in Europe and in Asia. This is the difference between Russia and the other European and Asian countries. Turkey is the only country which can claim to be somewhat Eurasian (Euro-little-Asian, to be more precise)”².

As noted by the theoreticians of this geopolitical trend, “post-communist Russia lies within boundaries with no historic precedent, having to invest most of its energy into the efforts to define its identity”³. The geopolitical directions proposed for shaping Russia’s future policy for the 21st century include the *Eastward direction*, i.e. Russia focusing on an eastward strategic line, moving towards the Pacific, where it becomes an active participant in the key-region of the entire 21st century⁴.

Eurasianism is regarded as a visionary strategic option for Russia, being in fact “the only truly viable option, meant to ensure its survival and prestige, its influence in the new world focused on the Pacific Ocean area”⁵. Eurasianism is regarded by the doctrine as “*the alternative to Russia’s isolation* - a truly catastrophic process in the century of globalization-

¹ Paul Dobrescu, *Geopolitica*, ed. comunicare.ro, Bucharest, 2003, p. 293.

² *Idem*, p. 294.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 294-295.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 294-295.

⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 294-295.

”, in which *isolation is mistaken for being left behind*⁶, for descent and being removed from the global flows of commodities, capital and know-how.

1. The “Looking East” Direction (including the Pacific within the Eurasian Paradigm)

Eurasianism is regarded as *the strategic alternative to Atlanticism that Russia must embrace*⁷. Therefore, Eurasianism is a complex doctrine, which includes the eastward direction, plus the Pacific. Access to the Pacific by expanding its influence over the Far East as much as possible will provide Russia with the needed strategic alternative to Atlanticism. Russia is preparing to play an important role directly in the Pacific, by building a strategy which includes this region directly by creating a clear strategy concerning the Pacific, indirectly by creating the “Eastward” strategic direction, within the Eurasian doctrine and indirectly, by using the “Pacific Century” paradigm (consecrated by the American doctrine) and converting it into a strategy meant to meet Russia’s interests in the Pacific.

Therefore, Russia is directly interested in playing a major role in the Asia-Pacific area, considering that one of Asia’s natural advantages is the fact that it is *the first major pole of world trade*, as it is currently equipped with world-class port equipment, the first in the world (today, the Asian side of the Pacific is a fully dynamic multipolar interface, which includes 17 out of the 22 largest ports in the world, for the global commercial traffic, and 3 out of the 5 largest ports in the world, for commercial traffic in containers – Singapore, Kaohsiung in Taiwan, and Hong Kong)⁸. Oriental Asia controls over 55% of the world container-carrying fleet⁹. The emergence of Asian industrial-port structures turns this continent into the great hub of global and regional maritime trade: the Tokyo-Yokohama-Chiba port, first in the world in terms of global shipping (approximately 300 million tons of goods); the Ulsan-Pusan port in South Korea, on the Eastern shore (approximately 300 million tons of goods); the Chinese ports along the shores of the China Sea (Dalian, Tianjin, Ningbo, Shanghai, Qingdao, Canton, Hong Kong; the Taiwanese port Kaohsiung (129 million tons of goods); Singapore, the largest port in Asia, which controls the traffic covering the entire South Asia (335 million tons of goods)¹⁰.

In Dughin’s view, one of Russia’s strategies to ensure domination over the Pacific is built within the Eurasian paradigm, *by forming the Russia-Japan strategic axis*. Such a move entails making a very important strategic choice between China and Japan, in order to gain domination over the Pacific, which is regarded as “the Eastern axis of the new empire” and which is considered to be of “vital importance” (this theory sees Japan as “the marrow of the entire Pacific ocean”, while an alliance with Japan is considered to be one “for the long run, a priority, opening the way for the empire to build its continental strength, in order to weaken the Atlantic empire”¹¹.

Russia is interested in reaping all the benefits of a conflictive relationship between the USA and Japan, even from its economic differences. In order to build its Eastern axis in the Eurasian empire (i.e. its imperial extension in the Pacific), Russia needs Japan as an Asian power already established from the technological and economic standpoint. Russia can provide the Japanese direct access to resources, a relationship of strategic partnership based on the

⁶*Ibidem*, p. 296.

⁷*Ibidem*, p. 297.

⁸Claude Chancel, Eric Pielberg, Cédric Tellene, *L’Autre Monde. Géopolitique de l’Asie Méridionale et orientale*, PUF, Paris, 2005, pp. 369-370.

⁹*Ibidem*, p. 370.

¹⁰*Idem*.

¹¹Aleksandr Dughin, *Bazele geopoliticii și viitorul geopolitic al Rusiei*, Ed. Eurasiatica.ro, Bucharest, 2011, p. 156.

win-win concept, as well as support to build a military-strategic system¹². According to Dughin, this axis enables the creation of a geopolitical pole of regional power, which includes Siberia, Mongolia, Japan and, by extension, the entire region of the Pacific Ocean. In order to express Russia's interest in expanding in the Pacific, the strategic partnership would also include *the creation of a regional body*, in which Japan would be guaranteed strategic defence and access to the resources of the Eurasian continent, in regions dominated by Russia, providing in return advanced technological assistance, and capitalization of Siberia; at the same time, the relations based on same-origin affinity with Mongolia would be resumed (including expansion towards Tibet), thus creating "an authentic *Buddhist civilizational block*, plays a part in the geopolitical stabilization of the Far East", as well as "the continental link of the Pan-Asian union in the Pacific ocean"¹³. The Moscow-Tokyo axis is regarded as part of a Pan-Asian project going back to the 1930s-1940s, project interrupted when the Axis powers were defeated during World War II. According to Russian strategists such as Dughin, resuming this Pan-Asian project is necessary in order to counter American domination in the Asia-Pacific region and in order to deprive the Americans of their economic and strategic bases¹⁴.

The Eurasian axis built by the Russia-Germany-Japan trilateral would oppose the Atlantic axis built by the USA (Far West) – Western Europe (Great Britain and France) – Japan trilateral, which is meant to restrict Eurasia (regarded here as assimilated with Russia itself)¹⁵. Thus, according to the Russian strategists, the battle for the Pacific, i.e. the battle for the future, for domination over one of the main poles of civilization in the 21st century, will actually be *the battle for Japan* (given that the Atlanticist *is interested in keeping Japan* tied to its structure of world security, based on the Atlanticist trilateral).

In addition, in the light of the official speeches delivered by the leaders of the Atlanticist block, a serious analysis must also reveal how much Western Europe (one of the components of the Atlanticist trilateral) currently want to be part of the Atlanticist trilateral. It is noteworthy that the president of France (country which should hold a key-role in supporting this trilateral, next to the UK) declared in numerous occasions that, given the changes in the international environment, he is considering *a change in alliance*¹⁶, hinting at Russia, even though the two countries are not quite on the same positions in certain key-issues (for example, the Iran agreement/2015 and its support, against the will of the USA, its traditional ally)¹⁷. Having into account the previous mentioned aspects, this repositioning tendency of the USA's traditional allies (France, in this case) shows that the so-called "Atlanticist trilateral" is menaced and that the USA must consider any strategic option, in order to maintain its Thallasocratic domination, going as far as making leadership changes in Europe's political elite, if considering that this split in vision deepens.

2. Some Russian Strategic Options regarding the Asia-Pacific Dimension of the Eurasian Policy. The Concept of "Greater Europe"

Even from '80s, Russia's presidential administrations (on that time, USSR) were preoccupied with initiating the strategic lines of the Russian presence with interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Mikhail Gorbachev made three major decisions to this end (acting to open up new regions of the Far East, including Vladivostok, and to remove them from the

¹²Aleksandr Dughin, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

¹³*Ibidem*, p. 157.

¹⁴*Ibidem*, p. 156.

¹⁵*Ibidem*, p. 158.

¹⁶ Source: site Internet de la Présidence de la République), Conférence des ambassadeurs et des ambassadrices - Discours de M. Emmanuel Macron, Président de la République, Paris, 27/08/2018, available online at: <https://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/vues/Kiosque/FranceDiplomatie/kiosque.php?fichier=bafr2018-08-27.html#Chapitre1>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

¹⁷*Idem*.

isolation in which they had been kept for security reasons; normalizing relations with China; creating diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul)¹⁸.

For the current Russian officials, the change in the international security environment also requires adjustment of the Russian presence in the Asia-Pacific key-region, as Russia recognizes that this will be the pivot-region of the 21st century. According to the doctrine, “Eastward Direction” no longer means “a short-term manoeuvre, but an intrinsic part of an ample strategy to reposition Russia in the Asia-Pacific region”, *by building its own network of alliances* (also by consolidating relationships with China and India, regional emerging powers) and through the idea that “the region needs a system much more balanced and inclusive than the current one (dominated by the USA), a system based on the principles of equality and indivisible security (a country cannot improve its own security at the expense of another country)”¹⁹. One of Russia’s strategic options for the assumption of a major role in the Pacific region is to convert Europe into a unified geostrategic structure, which ensures Russia’s access to the Pacific (also indirectly, as *a European actor, through a type of partnership with the Western European powers*). This project would entail:

– Attracting and using the current Western-European partners of the US (the so-called circle of traditional allies) in *a join political-economic structure* (multilateral organization; supranational entity, looking like an extended EU) *established to create a unique geostrategic space, from Lisbon to Vladivostok*. This is a *multilateral project*, focused on building a regional organization with one or several strategic components of joint cooperation (transcontinental gas pipeline routes, new infrastructure which connects the political and commercial hubs from the Western Europe to Vladivostok, by connecting Western Europe to the Pacific region, through the space controlled by Russia – the former Soviet space).

– Building *a EU-type integrationist economic entity* (supranational entity) between Western Europe and Russia (the version of *an extended European Union in which the new EU can play directly a major role in the Pacific region*, with Russia’s geostrategic support), with areas of free trade, with a unique market from Lisbon to Vladivostok (which would create commercial, political and economic, as well as infrastructural connections, in a Eurasian megaproject initiated by Russia, *between Western Europe and the Pacific, enables access for the Western Europe to Russia’s infrastructure in Central Asia* (or *new infrastructures could be built on this unique market of Eurasian transports, connecting Lisbon to Vladivostok*). This project would also entail *regional initiatives to create new gas/oil pipelines*, which connect the interests of Western Europe to Central Asia and to the access to the ports in the Pacific controlled by Russia (including the possibility that Russia, together with its business partners – Western Europe –, attract *other Asian ports in the Pacific* under its influence, *thus forming a string of ports in the Pacific, controlled by the Eurasian Union*)²⁰.

In the perception of the Russian theoreticians, the geostrategic concept of “*Greater Europe*”, which comprises the expansion towards the Pacific, is not meant to counterbalance the US’s initiatives for the Pacific (TPP or the Transatlantic Partnership); it is “rather a partnership based on equal relationships among the states, without touching or denying the national sovereignty” (according to Sergey Naryshkin, spokesman for the State Duma of the

¹⁸*The US and Russia in the Asia-Pacific*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington DC, US, available online at: www.iiss.org, accessed on November 12, 2018.

¹⁹ *Idem*.

²⁰ Surely, we need to take into account that Russia isn’t organized as a Western type of democracy, this country developing rather a sort of original kind of “hybrid” democracy (authoritarian features and preeminence of presidential institutions over all other state institutions). In this sense, Russia would not be able to participate to the “EU -style integration” as it is implemented at present. See also, State Duma Speaker: “*We need a greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok*”, Point Russia, translated by J. Arnoldski, June 16, 2016, available online at: www.fort-russ.com/2016/state-duma-speaker-we-need-greater.html, accessed on November 12, 2018.

Russian Federation)²¹. For this theoretician, the concept of “Greater Europe” does not include unions of regional integration, or a private club with strict access rules; instead, it is a natural structure, which gives shape to Eurasia²². However, Vladimir Putin’s view about the potential of this project goes further, towards creating *an economic community*, from Lisbon to Vladivostok, *creating a double-ocean type, socialist area of free trade* (from the Atlantic to the Pacific)²³. In an interview for the German daily *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, Putin proposes an extremely ambitious transcontinental project: A Europe expanded from Lisbon to Vladivostok, based on *a EU-type economic integrationist structure* (integrated economic community, which starts out as an area of free trade and subsequently takes more advanced forms of economic integration, between the West of Europe and Russia, which would form “a unified continental market with a capacity worth trillions of euros”)²⁴.

This proposal (Russia’s view of the extended Europe) can be implemented using a series of strategic methods:

–Based on *a strategic political-economic partnership between Russia and Germany* (possible given Germany’s dependence on Russia for gas and oil, dependence which can be exploited to give shape to such a truly Eurasian project)²⁵. Replacing the current French-German engine, which fuels the EU in its current form, *the Eurasian project would be an economic partnership of transcontinental integration* (in which its German influence, covering the current EU, is unified with the Russian influence – control over Central Asia and the former Soviet republics), creating a joint transcontinental market, from Lisbon (the port in the Atlantic) to Vladivostok (the port in the Pacific). This integrationist project is completed by *the specific infrastructure network* (currently not used), on the *European West – Far East, as far as the Pacific* axis (using both land routes and combined, fluvial, maritime, and land routes, in order to establish a continuous and easy connection between the two oceans). Thus, through the geostrategic project of *the extended Europe, open to two oceans*, Russia would have access to the Atlantic Ocean, and Germany would have access to the Pacific Ocean; a very ambitious joint partnership would take shape, by converting the current EU into a mechanism to create the Eurasian Union (the Russian-German engine), by taking over the influence areas of the two engine-countries.

²¹ State Duma Speaker: “*We need a greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok*”, Point Russia, translated by J. Arnoldski, June 16, 2016, available online at: www.fort-russ.com/2016/state-duma-speaker-we-need-greater.html, accessed on November 12, 2018.

²² *Idem*.

²³ Michael Snyder, November 29, 2010, *Vladimir Putin’s vision of a socialist European free trade zone that stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific, End of the American dream*, available online at: <http://endoftheamericandream.com/archives>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

²⁴ *Idem*. We need to take into account that, despite the fact that Russia means only around 2% of world GDP, it remains a nuclear major power, an energetic power, that it is capable to develop and maintain new forms of structural (energetic) dependency of Europe.

²⁵ Essential aspects for the future of bilateral relations between Germany (the EU engine) and Russia, with effects for the future of transatlantic partnership, materialized mainly through the North Stream 2 projected pipeline. Aspects remarked as such by US President Trump, and put on the Germany attention, at the NATO summit (July 2018). See: “Trump slams Germany at NATO summit: It’s ‘totally controlled by Russia’”, CNBC, July 11, 2018, available online at: <https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/11/trump-slams-germany-at-nato-summit-says-its-a-captive-of-russia.html>; “Donald Trump HITS OUT at Germany for paying Russia ‘BILLIONS’ for new gas pipeline”, Express Co UK, September 19, 2018, available online at: <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1019520/Trump-news-US-President-Germany-Russia-nord-stream-2-pipeline-sanctions>; Dave Keating, Despite Trump’s Threats, Nord Stream 2 Is Very Much Still On, The Forbes, August 21, 2018, available online at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2018/08/21/despite-trumps-threats-nord-stream-2-is-very-much-still-on/>; “Putin & Merkel could stick it to Trump as they look to bring Nord Stream 2 over the line”, Russian Today, August 18, 2018, available online at: <https://www.rt.com/news/436255-merkel-putin-nord-stream-meeting/>, accessed on November 12, 2018.

–Based on the *France-Germany-Russia trilateral* (used to create a new treaty which completes and expands the current EU, forming the new Eurasian Union)²⁶; in this case, the trilateral would have access to the string of ports of the current EU in the Atlantic Ocean and to Russia's points of influence in the Pacific Ocean, building a strategic position focused on the *concept of double-ocean*, which would end the American Thallasocratic hegemony, in both oceans.

–Based on a new, non-integrationist treaty, entailing the creation of a *regional, multilateral organization (among the EU member states and Russia) for security and cooperation, from the Atlantic to the Pacific (OSCAP)*²⁷, in which the participating countries maintain their sovereignty at first, thus keeping the real and final (integrationist) project under wraps.

–Annexing Ukraine and Belarus to the Russian project of expanded Europe, in order to form a large and continuous geo-economic and geo-strategic corridor (open to transcontinental infrastructure projects, from ocean to ocean), between Lisbon and Vladivostok.

–Signing de facto “annexation” treaty (under the form of a “consolidated cooperation” or a “strategic, economic, political, military partnership”) *directly between Russia and the European Union (reformed in the sense of strengthening its supranationalism – as supranational entity, distinct from the member states, with the right to lead its own supranational foreign policy, which the member states must observe)*. The EU member states would have the obligation to comply with such international treaty concluded *directly between the EU representatives (as a supranational political entity) and Russia*, and to form a joint investment space, a joint market, a transcontinental area of free trade or other joint forms and policies meant to gradually give shape to parts of the extended Europe project (regarded here as the Eurasian Union, formed of the EU or expanded in the West Balkans and Russia). Thus, Russia would gain access and influence not only in the West Balkans, but also in the seas and the ocean in the Western part of Europe: the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, the Adriatic Sea, because *the entire strategic area currently covered by the EU would become an integrating part of the Eurasian Union, through the new treaty*. This project can be implemented even if Russia would modestly settle for a position of plain membership, in the new treaty, of simple participant or even observer in the new organization. The type and degree of Russia's participation in this project is irrelevant; what is relevant is *Russia is capable of initiating it and participating in it*, by controlling Western Europe and even Eastern Europe (the Russian gas and oil, political corruption at the level of the EU member states, lack of reform to establish democracy and strengthen the constitutional state, the obsolete political and pro-socialist class ruling the EU²⁸, which would directly oppose the American interests).

3. The “Greater Eurasia” Russian Mega-project and Its Main Pillars

The doctrine asks the following question: given the enhanced importance of the Asia-Pacific region, will Russia be able to develop more or less formal types of partnerships (*strategic gas pipeline structures, infrastructure to connect the West-East axis, investments*)

²⁶ Despite the fact that those countries are not economically equal. We take into consideration rather the geopolitical shifts favored by a dynamic political environment, and the growing gap between US main political orientations (rightist nationalism and capitalism) and those preserved by European Western allies (leftism, globalism, progressivism). This ideological clear fracture can be at some moment in time, exploited by Russia, for enhanced partnerships in its favor (in a context where US have not claimed for the political ideological and regime changes of those allies political life), that will augment the chances for implementing such projects.

²⁷ Organization for Security and Cooperation from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

²⁸ Michael Snyder, *art. cit.*

with Western Europe, *reclaiming it from the transatlantic partnership, with these infrastructure, investment and power projects?* Is Russia capable of merging with the current EU, in order to form a massive socialist empire, which spreads from one ocean to the other²⁹? This is an extremely challenging question, for which the doctrine must seek answers.

Far from considering that such projects are utopia, *we must carefully investigate* the gradual methods employed to fulfil this objective. Thus, a piece in *Ria Novosti* describes the implementation stages of Putin's vision to create the extended Europe, based on the "double ocean" concept (Atlantic-Pacific)³⁰:

- Forming the "harmonious economic community", from Lisbon to Vladivostok;
- A joint industrial policy based on integrating the resource and technological potential of Russia and the EU;
- Developing balanced and fair relationships among energy suppliers, consumers and transit countries (a new energy treaty, initiated by Russia);
- Close partnership in the field of education and science (know-how);
- Eliminating the visa requirements (in order to create a joint Russia-EU space, based on the freedom to circulate for the people, goods, ideas and capitals);
- Creating a macro-block called "*Greater Eurasia*", initiated by Russia and consisting of multilateral cooperation agreements among Russia, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, India and others, where China acts as a leader, but not as a hegemony. This macro-block is regarded by the Russian strategists as a necessary counterbalance to the macro-block initiated by the USA (TPP – Transpacific Partnership, combined with TTIP – Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). The "Greater Eurasia" block has begun to take shape with the agreement signed by China and Russia, in May 2015, to *integrate the Eurasian Union (EAEU) with OBOR, the Chinese project* (with direct impact on Europe, weakening its economy and policies, and witnessing a declining security)³¹. According to this vision, the "Greater Eurasia" community includes an extended base for cooperation between Russia and countries from the EAEU, such as China, as well as SCO partners, such as South Korea, Pakistan, Israel, and Turkey. The concept used is the Chinese concept of "Eurasia", launched by President Xi Jinping in May 2015, in joint statement on cooperation in coordinating development in the EAEU and Economic Belt of the Silk Road³².

Another part of the doctrine considers that Russia currently plays *a modest role* in the Asia-Pacific region, because it focuses more on a dominant presence in Europe, in the Balkan area, and on stabilizing its economic, which is affected by the sets of Occidental sanctions³³.

The author warns that, if Russia *fails* to reform and support its economy, a possible result would be Russia's enhanced involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, as a revisionist power, willing to ally with the anti-Occidental China, which will reclaim its lost territories in Central Asia and will reassert its position as power hostile to Japan³⁴.

²⁹ *Idem.*

³⁰ *Idem.*

³¹ Sergei Karaganov, "Eurasian way out of the European crisis, for Russian", Global Affairs, June 2, 2015, available online at: www.rusemb.org.uk/opinion/44, accessed on November 12, 2018.

³² *Idem.*

³³ Paul Dibb, *The emerging strategic architecture in the Asia-Pacific region*, in the *New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Denny Roy, 99, New Hampshire, Macmillan, 1997, p. 109, quoted by Maree Reid, *The Asia-Pacific: A Zone of co-operative security or a hotbed for conflicts?*, in *Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy*, volume 3, Peter Lang, Bern, 1999, International Security Challenges in a changing world, ed. by Kurt R. Spillmann, Joachim Krause, with the assistance of Derek Muller and Claude Nicolet, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2004, p. 149, available online at: www.isn.ethz.ch and <http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine>, accessed on July 04, 2016.

³⁴ *Idem.*

Instead of conclusions

According to our opinion, it is, however, unlikely that Russia should be capable of assuming such a power role in the Asia-Pacific region and having a “negative” impact on the geopolitical situation in the region, in case its economy is weakened. It is more likely that, in case Russia *succeeds* in restoring its economy after the Occidental sanctions (which is quite improbable hypothesis), it will focus on a consolidated presence as a global actor in the Asia-Pacific region. For the time being, *the Occident maintains Russia in the paradigm of a new cold war*, by making it focus on its strategic interests of immediate security (Ukraine, Crimea) and on targeting its immediate comfort zone.

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THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN SOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AND COMBATING TERRORIST THREATS

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Abstract: *The study offers a perspective of the relation between activities specific to public diplomacy and the image of a state in international politics. In a more and more interdependent and complex world, the means of public diplomacy, perceived as a dialogue oriented towards engaging the public, can lead to a better understanding between peoples by bringing forth what unites them and by eliminating the discording factors. The means specific to soft power can be more effective in managing crises and international conflicts.*

Keywords: *country image, influencing, cultural exchange, mental map, regional and global security.*

Introduction

The theory and practice of public diplomacy are part of a larger discourse that involves both the creation of a country's image in the international arena and also its strategic communication. Taken together, these represent a new direction in the evolution of diplomacy occurring in a new technological and political context. From this perspective, public diplomacy can be regarded and is used for the promotion of security and the elimination of terrorist threats that marked the contemporary society after 11 September 2001. As a preventive measure, this provides an alternative measure to military or police force, because it tries to reduce the level of animosity between those who could commit such acts and the potential victims. The terrorist confrontation sometimes tends to be left to be dealt with mainly to the actors that use classic, military type force. Public diplomacy has the unique feature to form opinions among large audiences and to create a receptive environment for the foreign policy objectives of the state. While the use of classic military force strengthens the feelings of hate and revenge among the ranks of the public, public diplomacy intelligently conducted can promote peaceful cooperation.

The American analyst David Hoffman observed in a study published a decade ago that: "The military operations carried out abroad and the new security measures taken by the American society did not lead to a decrease in the viral anti Americanism in the mass-media of the mullahs and medresses (the so-called Islamic schools) supported by the government. More than that, as the Israelis discovered, terrorism develops in a cruel paradox: the more force is used for revenge, the more fuel is added to the cause of the terrorists"¹. This vision makes sense in some cases, but defeating terrorism will require a more complex and careful

¹ David Hoffman, "Beyond Public Diplomacy", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, Issue 2, Mar-Apr 2002, p. 83.

approach which will lead to measures meant to counter terrorist actions from other perspectives as well, not only through physical elimination. One of these envisages the large public from whose ranks the terrorists obtain support and recruit followers. Very different publics can be exposed to more and more sophisticated media messages, and these are the messages that need to be countered². Thus, beside the actions carried out by the classical diplomacy, the public diplomacy recently occupied its deserved place within the “arsenal” with which states build their policies in the field of national security. The strategies and means used by the public diplomacy in order to secure the internal security and to make the international arena a safer place are helped by the revolution in communications and the increase of the role played by non-classic actors in international affairs - non-governmental organizations, interest groups, journalists, human rights and environment protection activists etc. The “street” has become a powerful force and it can undermine even the best elaborated peace agreement³.

1. Missions of public diplomacy campaigns during international conflicts

In carrying out its mission to promote national interests, and also to lead to the ending of international conflicts, public diplomacy can achieve a series of specific tasks and objectives, having as a final goal to “win the hearts and minds” of those engaged in conflicts in order to determine them to relinquish force and the threat of force in solving the problems / interests considered to be vital in relation to other actors. We can mention the following specific tasks:

1. the communication of the legitimacy of an armed intervention in a conflict area (the inter-ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the conflicts in the former USSR, etc.);
2. to co-opt a former adversary in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions;
3. to change the mental map and behavior of enemies, neutral actors and of those who could enter alliances in the sense of relinquishing war and the threat of force;
4. to attract support for the ideals of peace and security in societies in a state of crisis and conflict;
5. to counter propaganda and public opinion manipulation by dictators, tyrants and terrorists;
6. to stop the actions envisaging genocide and ethnic cleansing promoted by ultra-nationalist, ultra-religious organizations and their leaders;
7. to determine the warring factions to cease fire;
8. to destroy the morale of the enemies of peace and security;
9. to improve the morale of those intervening in peacekeeping and conflict management operations;
10. to determine the perpetrators of crimes against humanity to give themselves up;
11. to prepare the public opinion in conflict areas to help the peacekeeping forces and to help them with information in order to combat rumors and other misleading operations carried out by terrorist or ultra-nationalist organizations, etc.;
12. to prevent the possibility of occurrence of a security dilemma in international politics (the perception that the increase of a nation’s security threatens the security of the others);
13. to solve and prevent conflicts;
14. to support international institutions and organizations to enforce peace in crisis and conflict areas⁴.

² Seib Philip, *Public Diplomacy, New Media and Counterterrorism*, Figueroa Press, Los Angeles, March 2011, p. 5.

³ David Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁴ See Anthony Pratkanis, “Public Diplomacy in International Conflicts”, in Nancy Snow, Phillip M. Taylor, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, Routledge, 2009, p. 111.

A part of these missions that can be carried out by public diplomacy organizations can be found in the actions conducted in Afghanistan by the USA, in the context of the war against terror. The American public diplomacy in Afghanistan is strongly focused on communication and education. For example, the United States continues to train Afghan diplomats through the young diplomats training program, which is sponsored by the US Department of State and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the *Foreign Affairs Institutional Reform* project in Afghanistan is financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). These efforts are connected with the larger training capacities directed towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kabul, for example, with regard to politics, administration and linguistic competences⁵.

In 2010, the USA Department of State allocated 113 million dollars to develop civilian communications, including the mobile ones, in order to form media communities that will spread ideas and opinions that will combat the trends promoted by the Taliban. Although this is partially an effort to develop the services rendered to the population (as an example, the use of bank cards for salaries and other banking services), the support was also motivated by preoccupations towards the Taliban propaganda in fields where different information is hard to access. Thus, it partially is a communication offensive meant to counter the insurgent discourse of the Taliban.

The public diplomacy also acted in the education field through the Fulbright program. It was re-launched in 2003 allowing over 300 Afghan students to study in US universities in recent years. This program is administered by the US Embassy in Kabul and one of its objectives is to promote mutual understanding and empathy between the two peoples and countries. From another perspective, the public diplomacy also manifests itself through other public and private initiatives, offering cooperation platforms for the promotion of dialogue and cultural exchange, like the *Global citizens in action* program, which promotes the integration of the young in the education system and also intercultural communication. In 2002, only one year after the Taliban regime was overthrown, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) estimated that only one million Afghan children - mainly boys - went to school. The girls did not have this right. Now, after millions of dollars from international governments and organizations were offered as aid and invested in education, almost 3.6 million Afghan girls go to school - although the situation remains far from ideal⁶. It must be noted that such activities are also carried out by other states that have interests in certain areas of the world. The Russian Federation, for example, conducts public diplomacy activities in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, areas that are rife with profound interethnic crises and where grave conflicts, that are now only "frozen", occurred. Professor Alexey Fominykh from the Volga State Technological University analyses the public diplomacy campaign carried out by the Russian Federation in the Caucasus and Central Asia. He claims that the Russians carry out these campaigns in a different manner than the ones carried out by the West in the areas considered by the Russians to be their "near abroad", such as Ukraine⁷. Fearing accusations of imperialistic behavior from its allies in Eurasia, because it does not cease, after the collapse of the USSR, to look after populations sharing its cultural values and political customs, Russia maintains its political influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus through public diplomacy activities, including exchange programs in the field of

⁵ Kamminga Jorrit, *Public Diplomacy in Afghanistan beyond the 2014 Transition: Lessons from the United States and the Netherlands*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', The Hague, June 2013, p. 8.

⁶ *Idem*, p. 9.

⁷ Alexey Fominykh, *Russia's Public Diplomacy in Central Asia and the Caucasus: The Role of the Universities*, p. 2, available online at: https://inter.volgatech.net/upload/documents/Fominykh_ful%20text%20for%20HJD.pdf, accessed on October 12, 2017.

education, such as: giving out study grants, assistance for development and economic integration. Central Asia currently represents the biggest and closest trans-border market for Russian universities, due to its geographic proximity, economic interdependence and the persistent presence of the Russian language as a means of communication in all fields of activity. Furthermore, the Russian government perceives the competitive environment of international education in post-Soviet countries in regards to the geopolitical and security rivalry and, consequently, encourages its state universities to recruit students and to establish partnerships in this strategic region in order to oppose competitors like the United States, China or Turkey⁸.

Coming back to the activities of public diplomacy conducted by the United States in Afghanistan, we must emphasize that, beside the already mentioned activities, USAID played an important role in supporting and promoting civil society organizations led by women. It trained more than 700 female journalists from Afghanistan and supported their access both to independent mass media and to public radio and television stations. In 2002 the United States also began supporting *Radio Free Afghanistan*, the Afghan branch of Radio Free Europe. Also, the United States of America lead a cultural heritage mission, focusing on the consolidation of the capacities and efforts to preserve cultural heritage sites in Afghanistan. Concrete projects that were supported include the conservation of the old Afghan city of Mes Aynak, the Logar province and the restoration of the National Museum in Kabul⁹.

These public diplomacy actions largely contributed to diminishing the success of operations by terrorist networks, and the support provided to the civilian population contributed to the arrest or killing of terrorists. The efficacy of the public diplomacy conducted by Western governments requires better cooperation with Muslim governments in the region in order to carry out a large and diversified array of activities. These governments must be convinced to cooperate, and not only constrained. But the efforts to convince have to be extended beyond governments - and even beyond political elites - in order to reach an effective, stable and durable cooperation. The extension of the cooperation will inevitably be limited by what even undemocratic or semi-democratic governments perceive as being acceptable for their societies. For example, the Pakistani government had to clearly balance its cooperation with the USA in the “war against terror” with what is acceptable for its entire society, including its own military and security elite. There are mentalities and stereotypes regarding the West and its people that are deeply rooted in the profound strata of the Pakistani society, as the war correspondent Anne Nivat shows, to whom it seemed important, running the risk to be labeled as a “sympathizer”, to *listen* to young Ahmed, an ordinary Pakistani, in order to make all of them “heard”. And this for more communication and understanding. “As a Muslim, I would not want my children to grow up (...) in the West ... they would adopt ugly manners - Ahmed believes - they would forget their language, their culture, the respect owed to women and the elderly and, above all, they would destroy the image of their father. ...In the West, houses may be beautiful on the outside, by their inhabitants living bad lives. All the Western films that we can now watch thanks to satellite television show the same thing: families crumbling, the cruelty of inter-human relationships, vices... // ... we totally disapprove of the policy that the Westerners do here, but we have nothing against Westerners themselves! Their education and healthcare systems are very good and that is exactly what they should export, not only their music and clothing!¹⁰. Forcing the cooperation with an Islamic government beyond the limits of acceptability in that specific society does not serve Western interests. The effects can be contrary and can lead to the growth of Islamic

⁸ *Idem.*

⁹ Kamminga Jorrit, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁰ Anne Nivat, *Islamiștii. Cum ne vād ei pe noi*, translated by Luiza Gervescu, Corint Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, pp. 68-71.

fundamentalism within the society and to a weakening of the government and even to its replacement with an extremist alternative. The long term efficiency of the fight against Islamic terrorism requires the intensification of public diplomacy activities in order to win the support, or at least the agreement, of larger Islamic societies¹¹.

2. Principles of strategic communication in public diplomacy

The main objective of public diplomacy in cases like the one mentioned above is to change to profoundly negative image of the West in Islamic societies. It is a desire that also requires an effort to make more effective the instruments and means of public diplomacy. The conferences and seminars sponsored by the government can be effective among political elites, but it is very unlikely that they will reach the larger Islamic societies. The new technologies, satellite television, the internet and its facilities, like email and chat, provide cheaper and more effective techniques to create networks of relations with all the governmental and non-governmental "agents" / actors involved in public diplomacy activities. But these exact facilities are also in the hands of extremist and Islamist organizations which can use them efficiently, exploiting the "hunger" for images in Islamic societies. There are innumerable examples of copying and adapting locally of Western reality TV shows. The film about the Taliban dynamiting the statues of Buddha in Bamiyan, the images of the destruction of the twin towers in New York, the beheading of hostages demonstrate that the war of images is nowadays integral part of anti-Western terrorists' strategy. Beside these, there is evidence that extremist groups use cookies and other techniques like the e-commerce to construct user profiles on their websites in order to identify and recruit potential agents of influence or even terrorists¹². We need to change both the techniques and actors, and also the messages with which these spaces of interest are "bombed". For example, it would be advisable, for more credibility, if some radio and television stations also showed a number of dysfunctions of the Western society, to criticize certain aspects and thus the main message envisaging to change the mental map of the viewers or of the sympathizers of Islamist organizations would be more effective. Other agents should also be used, who have much to offer, but never thought of doing it and who would consequently need to be encouraged, like small enterprises, chambers of commerce, sporting and cultural associations etc. They could receive technical or even financial support in order to carry out such actions to combat terrorism and to increase regional and global security¹³.

The use of public diplomacy in the fight against terrorism and as factor of diminishing the potential for conflict in certain regions and areas of the contemporary world must continue despite critiques and doubts - otherwise inevitable - regarding its efficacy. The results of the inquiry by *US News* in 2016 on this aspect remain relevant. The key question answered by 8000 members of the political and intellectual elite from several countries was: Which state has the greatest influence in the world? The answers placed at the top the United States (followed by Great Britain, Germany, China, and France). The American export of influence contributes to the modelling of the international environment and to maintaining peace, the safety of international waters and airspace. Given that nowadays the foreign debt of the country reaches 20 trillion dollars, the United States are engaged in sort of permanent Marshall Plan, of which an important part reaches nations that are often hostile to America, at least during the current generation. The amount of 30 billion dollars is annually destined to American abroad aid (combating AIDS - 3.1 billion, aid for mothers and children - 530

¹¹ Shaun Riordan, "Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: a New Foreign Policy Paradigm?" in Jan Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy Soft Power in International Relations*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005, p. 181.

¹² *Idem*, p. 15, 183.

¹³ *Idem*, p. 186.

million, combating malaria - 470 million, economic development - 2.7 billion, education, research, military aid etc.)¹⁴.

There is an opinion among specialists, and also among the left American and foreign media, that the US public diplomacy efforts in the entire world have failed, because anti-Americanism has not subsided and the US has a negative image in the collective mental of a number of societies that are in a profound political crisis or in conflict. There is even talk of an image crisis of the United States¹⁵. The poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2016 with the question "What do you think about the United States?" showed the following favorable opinions: Poland 74%, Italy 72%, Japan 72%, Sweden 69%, Canada 65%, France 63%, Australia 60%, Spain 57%, India 56%, China 51%. Enough voices have been "deploring" for quite a while the negative influence of the phenomenon called Americanisation, which includes the pop culture, music, media, language, clothing and behavior, business, political models and principles, beneficial "exports" nevertheless, if we consider the generally favorable impressions of the wide foreign public. After all, nobody forced Russians, Chinese or Romanians to eat fast-food and to wear jeans, and we do not believe that the import of American influence is really guilty of the gaging through imitation and the diminishing of the national specificity. What is truly "toxic" is the influence of "exports" that can induce negative long term effects, like drug culture, organized crime, gun violence, cultural products that legendize violence, racism, social anarchy, and the concept of nihilism¹⁶. For these reasons, the Pentagon, the State Department and other agencies of the federal government must hold into account the famous "*infernal triangle of the XXI century - identity, culture, communication*"¹⁷ and they must seek new models of strategy, coordination and elaboration of messages¹⁸. The anti-American current was possible because, in the opinion of the organizations mentioned above, there was in the public diplomacy activity a dependency on a model of influence in a single direction - maybe also because of an under-evaluation of the critical intelligence of the receptors, the insufficient theoretical reflection on the profoundness and finesse of non-Western cultures - and, as a consequence, an incapacity to prepare and effectively respond to the mass media strategy and jihadist message both toward the Islamic society and also toward the Western one. An ambiguous form of communication as a strategic form in crisis situations was intentionally used. But ambiguity as strategy in strategic communication must be re-considered. Practices of ambiguous, but conscious, communications are necessary in uncertain times, especially when we are confronted with audiences that we do not understand and that we do not fully trust. For these, it is necessary to apply a number of principles in carrying out activities specific to public diplomacy. Some specialists believe that there are five principles that must guide the strategy of communication¹⁹:

¹⁴ Martin S. Martin, Cristian Pătrășconiu, *America la răscruce. Un dialog transatlantic*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 2017, pp. 108-110.

¹⁵ Julia E. Sweig, *Friendly Fire. Secolul antiamerican. Mai puțini prieteni, mai mulți dușmani pentru SUA*, translated by Victoria Vușcan, Tritonic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 207; Emmanuel Todd, *Sfârșitul imperiului. Eșeu despre descompunerea sistemului american*, translated by Dan C. Mihăilescu, Albatros Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, pp. 11-60.

¹⁶ Martin S. Martin, Cristian Pătrășconiu, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

¹⁷ Anne Nivat, *Islamiștii...*, p. 10.

¹⁸ Bud Goodall, Angela Trethewey, Kelly McDonald, *Strategic Ambiguity, Communication, and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World: Principles and Practices*, Report of Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, June 2006, p. 2, available online at: http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/pdf/research/books/public_diplomacy/Strategic_Ambiguity_Communication_And_Public_Diplomacy_In_An_Uncertain_World_Principles_And_Practices.pdf, accessed on May 5, 2018.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

- (1) – a practical and adequate strategic commitment to the realities in the area, not a general plan that is valid anywhere;
- (2) – the same message must be repeated on the same channels, by the same spokesperson and new and different results must be expected;
- (3) – let us not try to control the significance of a message in culture to which we do not have full access;
- (4) – the accuracy of the message and the perception of its meaning are a function of the relationships between people and not strictly a function of word usage;
- (5) – let ourselves be guided by a “unified diversity” based on global cooperation, and not by a “concentrated mistake” based on dominance and power.

Conclusions

One of the essential tasks of public diplomacy is to provide attractive activities and actions capable of combating the messages by the supporters of hatred and violence in attaining political and other objectives. Establishing a dialogue involving ordinary people, respected leaders, moderate priests and civil society leaders is part of this effort. But an argument is convincing only when it is sustained by a policy that can guarantee that the promises made during such a dialogue become reality. This emphasizes the importance of the introduction of public diplomacy among the main vectors of the foreign policy of a state, that it should not be treated anymore as its satellite, placed on a remote orbit, and only occasionally remembered.

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THE GEOSTRATEGIC CHOKE POINT IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLD GEOPOLITICS

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Abstract: *Considering that the current geopolitical global context is full of uncertainties, the world's states need strategic anchors in order to constantly assess their position. This necessity is met by the geostrategic field of study, namely the field that studies the geostrategic choke points of all categories and offers an action plan based on the abilities of the respective state. The analysis of how they can be used in the new geopolitical, economic and technological context represents a vital area of study for determining the advantages that a state holds, as well as its vulnerabilities so that a geopolitical plan of action can be elaborated in a close connection with the real situation in the field.*

As a result, the present article proposes a brief presentation of the geopolitical theory related to geostrategic choke points, the different categories of geostrategic choke points, how they influence the geopolitical situation in the field, as well as their identification on the global map and the exemplification of the geopolitical theory. Such an analysis also offer an explanation of the motivation of geopolitical and geostrategic maneuvers throughout history.

Keywords: *geopolitics, geostrategy, geostrategic choke point, Panama Canal, Suez Canal, Strait of Gibraltar, Island of Taiwan, Island of Guam.*

1. Geostrategic choke point theory

The concept of *geostrategy* was first used in the mid-nineteenth century by Italian general Giacomo Durando¹ and was brought back into the strategic discussions of the 20th century by Admiral Castex and analyst Colin S. Gray². Numerous distinguished personalities of this field have offered different definitions of the term *geostrategy*, among which we can mention:

- Zbigniew Brzezinski – “long-term management of geopolitical interests”³;
- Pierre Gallois – “the study of the relationship between the political conduct of multiple powers at the International level and the geographical framework in which they are exercised”⁴;
- André Vigarié – “the ensemble of defense components in relation to the widest dimension and the widest variety of means of action”⁵;
- Hervé Coutau-Bégarie – “the theoretical attempt to notice the simultaneous conduct of operations in combat theaters so far separated”⁶.

Among the Romanian personalities that contributed significantly, in defining the term *geostrategy* and its conceptual delimitation, we can mention:

¹ Marian Sârbu, Leonida Moise, *Geopolitică și geostrategie*, „Mircea cel Bătrân” Navy Academy Publishing House, Constanța, 2006, p. 14.

² Pierre-Marie Gallois, *Géopolitique, les voies de la puissance*, Pon Publishing House, Paris, 1990, p. 317.

³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Marea tablă de șah*, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, p. 52.

⁴ Cristian Hlihor, *Istorie și geopolitică în Europa secolului XX*, RAO Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, p. 119.

⁵ André Vigarié, *Géostratégie des océans*, Paradigme Publishing House, Caen, 1990, p. 9.

⁶ Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Tratat de strategie*, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 247.

• Silviu Neguț – “if geopolitics tells us what has to be won and preserved, geostrategy tells us if this is possible, how and with what, emphasizing the decisive points of the spatial configuration”⁷;

• Constantin Hlihor – “the way and means by which an actor materializes his interest in a certain geographic space”⁸;

• Mircea Costea – “geostrategy studies the current state and the future evolution of the factors that influence the national security and applies the strategies necessary to fulfill the objectives established by the political power (state or group of states) for a certain geographic area”⁹;

• Constantine Posea – “is nothing but geopolitics applied to the concrete-historical conditions, taking into consideration an opponent or a potential opponent”¹⁰.

The influence of certain geographic positions in the context of the mutual rivalry of different states can be noticed through a detailed analysis of the direct confrontations of the combatants. This way you can see key positions that give a small or big advantage to one of the opponents. The direct implications of the influence of commodity trade on the prosperity of a state have long been noticed so that the fundamental rules that generate, coordinate, concentrate and distribute the wellbeing in a state’s economy can be identified, defined, delimited and implemented¹¹. In this context, the first forms of geostrategic choke points were shaped in the form of commercial routes representing the oxygen of geopolitical relations between states. Of those, it is particularly noteworthy of the ones of maritime nature, which is “a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined them to be sought in the history of the world”¹². These are favored due to the benefits of shipping (cheap, large, and relatively safe). Thus, following the corroboration of natural human trends with the new geostrategic principles, a desire to secure a disproportionate part of the benefits of commerce has been developed, which has led to the identification of some geostrategic choke points with military applicability that of protection or conquest of the already existing commercial ones. Therefore, there is an intimate connection between the economic needs of a state and the geostrategic principles that govern it.

Geostrategic choke point is an increasingly common concept that does not have a stand-alone place in the literature and is often a subcategory of geostrategy¹³.

Among the primary tasks of military art in the context of geostrategy, is the obligation to identify the vulnerable elements of the opponent through which you are able to control the course of interaction. In this context, we can define the geostrategic choke point as *a geographical area with strategically-military valences, whose possession gives control over communication routes of any kind within a significant geographic region*. Thus, “any entity that has access to a geostrategic choke point and is capable of preventing its use by someone else has an advantage that can be used to obtain political or diplomatic benefits”¹⁴. These geostrategic choke points limit through their nature the strategic possibilities of the opposing

⁷ Silviu Neguț, *Introducere în geopolitică*, Meteor Press Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 209.

⁸ Constantin Hlihor, *Geopolitică și geostrategie în analiza relațiilor internaționale contemporane*, “Carol I” National Defense University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 255.

⁹ Mircea Cosma, *De la geopolitică la geostrategie*, Land Forces Academy Publishing House, Sibiu, 1999, pp. 65-66.

¹⁰ Constantin Posea, *Geostrategie*, Land Forces Academy Publishing House, Sibiu, 1996, p. 11.

¹¹ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, Dover Publications, New York, 1987, p. 1.

¹² *Idem*, p. 25.

¹³ Silviu Neguț, *op. cit.*, 2005, p. 253.

¹⁴ John J. Klein, *Space warfare*, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2006, p. 80.

military units, simultaneously offering to their owner a wide range of military action. So they represent simultaneously both a position of strength and a geostrategic vulnerability¹⁵ of the possessing state.

For a geographic position to be considered a geostrategic choke point, a number of three characteristics of it must be taken into account:

- *Physical features.* These characteristics, through their nature, they must be able to restrict traffic so that it is conveyed, in the case of commercial traffic, and to be able to limit different tactical variations in the military sphere of action. A geographic area with strategic fortuitous physical features near or even in a high traffic area can be called a geostrategic point.

- *Degree of use.* The importance of a geostrategic choke point is directly proportional to its level of use. Thus, areas where transit is significant can be considered as geostrategic choke points.

- *Accessibility.* They involve both physically and legally aspects. The importance of a geographical position becomes greater when it simultaneously provides rapid accessibility to the dominant force and fulfills the other criteria. In this context, the dominant force will want to secure its position by acts of international law. These must be taken into account when considering the strategic valences of a geographical area. An example may be the Montreux Treaty of 1936, which today regulates the transit of Bosphorus and Dardanelles¹⁶.

Depending on the impact these geographical positions have on the economy and global geopolitics, geostrategic choke points can be separated as follows:

- *Of vital importance*, category I. These are those geographic areas that by their very nature succeed in destabilizing the world's geopolitical structures;

- *Of regional importance*, category II. Represented by geographic areas that are a geostrategic key for a given region, providing control over it, which implies a maximum of regional geopolitical destabilization;

- *Of third importance*, category III. These are geographical locations with a maximum local impact that could represent a brick in a geostrategic construction on a much larger scale.

If we take into consideration human involvement, geostrategic choke points can be separated of two kinds:

- *Natural geostrategic choke point* at the formation of which man did not contribute. These are natural geographic formations that are used in military strategy. Example: straits, passages, isthmus, etc.

- *Anthropic geostrategic choke point*, which are built by man in support of the military or economic efforts. Example: the Turkish military base of Incirlik, Kazakhstan's Baikonur cosmodrome, etc.

Depending on the military sphere of applicability, we can identify three types of geostrategic choke points.

- *Terrestrial geostrategic choke points.* Are represented by geographical areas on land on which military control is exercised through the land and air troops. Among these we can list: gulfs, bays, isthmuses, peninsulas, passages, etc.

- *Marine geostrategic choke points.* They are represented by geographical areas of water on which the naval power is the main actor. These are characterized by formations that are limiting access to the areas they connect. Among these, we can mention: straits, channels, safe shipping routes, mouths of rivers, islands, etc.

¹⁵ These positions can be considered vulnerable because they attract the attention of all the major military forces, so the need for continuous defense and control of these positions necessarily requires significant financial resources that are represented by military expenditures.

¹⁶ Jean-Paul Rodrigue, *Straits, passages and Chokepoints. A Maritime Geostrategy of Petroleum Distribution*, Le Cahiers de Géographie du Québec, 2004, p. 3.

- *Space geostrategic choke point*. It is only available to space powers and it is the area where 90% of the satellites in operation¹⁷.

These geostrategic elements can also be categorized according to their geostrategic relevance in time. Thus we can identify two categories of geostrategic choke points:

- *Geostrategic points of permanent importance*. These are those geographic areas in which geostrategic impact does not change over time. Their relevance is not influenced by military technological capabilities. Among these, we can mention the Gibraltar Strait, which is a gateway to the Mediterranean and the planetary ocean, the Panama Canal that acts as a shortcut to the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, the Hawaiian island that acts as a “stopping” or pivot for naval forces, etc.;

- *Geostrategic points of temporary importance*. They are relevant only within the theater of war operations and their conquest is an intermediate stage for the fulfillment of the macro-strategic goal. These geostrategic points are irrelevant as military effort advances in predetermined stages to finality. Such an example can be considered the city of Stalingrad during the World War II, a geostrategic city that offered access to the Volga River, northern Russia and to the Black Sea.

2. Identifying and exemplifying geostrategic choke points

With the characteristics presented in the first chapter, an assessment of choke points can be done. In this context, we can identify a number of such geostrategic choke points on the global map.

2.1. The Panama Canal

The assessment of the geostrategic choke point according to the geostrategic criteria identified previously: anthropic, maritime, of permanent importance, in the first category of importance, a high degree of utilization especially by commercial maritime traffic, accessible within the limits of boats that do not exceed 365 m length and 50 m width.

Geographical features: In terms location, the channel is displayed on a northwest, southeast trajectory and it links the Atlantic Ocean (Caribbean Sea) to the Pacific Ocean (Panama Bay) with a total length of 80 km separated into 11 segments, which represent a number of natural or anthropic lagoons linked together. The minimum depth is 12m and the minimum width is 31m, maximum dimensions for ship's crossing limits (Panamax).

Geopolitical characteristics: The entire channel extends through the current state of Panama and is under the authority called the Panama Canal Authority, which took over its administration from the US-Panama bilateral Panama Commission on December 31, 1999. The first international treaty that regards the panama canal was signed in 1903 (the Hay-Bunau-Varila Treaty) totally unfavorable to the state of Panama, a treaty that offered sovereignty rights to the United States via the Panama Canal Company. In order to secure traffic including during a possible war, the United States has stationed marine forces in the Canal Zone. The situation improved for the Panamanian state following the treaties of 1936 and 1955, but these were not enough. Thus, in 1977, a treaty was signed that provided full sovereignty to the Panamanian state over the canal with the right of the United States to operate and administer it for a period of 20 years. In parallel to this last treaty, an indefinite neutrality treaty, which opens the canal for any vessel irrespective of its flag, prohibits the military presence of any state nearby and with reservation of the US military to intervene, if

¹⁷ Jhon J. Klein, *op. cit.*, 2006, p. 83.

necessary, to ensure free movement in the case of war. This is the current international status of the Panama Canal¹⁸.

Geostrategic features: Given the geopolitical evolution of the Panama Canal, it is easy to recognize a permanent interest from the United States for the canal. This comes in the context in which most of the goods transport to the East coast from the West coast and vice versa of the US pass through this geostrategic choke point. Thus, it can be deduced that the entity that can enforce its will on the Panama Canal controls most of the US intra-state trade. Geostrategic relevance is significant as long as maritime traffic is high, as the government of Nicaragua has accepted in 2012 the Hong Kong HKND firm's offer to build a 280 km channel in Nicaragua with a subsequent concession for 50 years, to rival the geostrategic impact of the Panama Canal. It is also worth mentioning another attempt by the Chinese state to diminish the geostrategic relevance of this channel. A 220 km railway line linking Colombia's Atlantic coast to the Pacific (via the Caribbean Sea). One can see a particular interest from the Chinese state or the Hong Kong Autonomous Republic in the geostrategy of the two oceans. These plans have not yet materialized, but in the event of their realization, they will rival the Panamanian channel's geostrategic importance.

2.2. The Suez Canal

The assessment of the geostrategic choke point according to the geostrategic criteria identified previously: anthropic, maritime, of permanent importance, in the first category of importance, a high degree of utilization, especially the commercial sea traffic, accessible within the limits of boats that do not exceed 66 m width.

Geographical features: The canal is displayed on a north-south trajectory and connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea via the Suez Isthmus. Initially, it was 162 km, later, when it was last improved in 2015, it measured 193 km. It currently has a minimum width of 205-225 m and a minimum depth of 23-24 m, characteristics that dictate the maximum dimensions of ships that can cross the Suez Canal (Suezmax).

Geopolitical characteristics: The construction of this canal began in 1859 and was completed in 1869. It is entirely located on the territory of Egypt. This was achieved in the context of which, it shortening the road between the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean and the northern Indian Ocean with 7,000 km, thus avoiding Cape of Good Hope and the South Atlantic. In the same context, the Mediterranean is becoming more actively involved in the maritime trade of goods from the Far East to Europe. Although it was built for the benefit of international trade, its legal status was not well defined, so in 1888 a convention was drafted and ratified by the greatest maritime forces of the time, with the exception of Great Britain. The Convention of Constantinople clearly explaining the international status of the straits "any ship may pass either in peacetime or war". The convention also forbids acts of military intervention in the canal and near its waters and it forbids the construction of fortifications on its banks. The United Kingdom would ratify this convention in 1904¹⁹. Throughout the history of this channel, that convention was not fully respected. In 1898, Spanish ships were not allowed cross the canal to enter while the Spanish-American conflict was taking place. In the Second World War, access was blocked to the Axis Powers. Following the Arab-Israeli armistice of 1949, Egypt blocked the transit of Israeli ships and those with economic relations with Israel. Another blockade took place in 1956-1957, when Israel attacked Egyptian forces, as a consequence the Suez Canal was blocked. Following the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967,

¹⁸ William E. Worthington, Burton L. Gordon, Norman J. Padelford, Aileen Cho, Wayne D. Bray, *The Panama Canal*, Encyclopedia Britannica, available online at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Panama-Canal>, accessed on September 24, 2018.

¹⁹ Charles Gordon Smith, William B. Fisher, *Suez Canal*, Encyclopedia Britannica, available online at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Suez-Canal>, accessed on September 25, 2018.

the Panama Canal was once again blocked and even represented the front line of the conflict. The channel was reopened in 1975, and following the peace treaty of 1979 there were no more blockades²⁰.

Geostrategic features: By following the geopolitical disputes that the Suez Channel that took place over time, one can easily see its geostrategic importance. The control of the Suez Canal is synonymous with the control of commercial maritime traffic from and to the Far East and Europe. The same can be said about military maritime traffic, which also gives added strategic-military valences. In geostrategic analyzes, it should be noted that due to climate change, the North Sea route is becoming more and more favorable to transit, which could, in the future, redirect maritime traffic away from the Suez canal. For the moment, this is not a threat, but if climate change continues, it is likely that in the near future, the North Sea route will be preferred because of its 6400 km shortened. Another threat to the geostrategic relevance of this channel is the Israeli-Chinese project consisting in a railway through the Negev desert with the unique purpose to rival the Suez Canal Maritime Traffic. Although there are a number of potential attacks on the geostrategic impact of the Suez Canal, it retains by its geographical positioning as a hinge for two continents, a great degree of global strategic importance, in both commercial and military spheres of interest.

2.3. Strait of Gibraltar

The assessment of the geostrategic choke point according to the geostrategic criteria identified previously: natural, maritime, of permanent importance, in the first category of importance, high degree of use especially commercial maritime traffic, accessible to all ships.

Geographical features: The strait has an East-West layout and is the connection between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. It has a minimum width of 14.3 km and a minimum depth of 300 m, which allows the physical access of any craft of any size. Due to its minimal depth, it even allows access to submarines.

Geopolitical characteristics: The strait was a major point of interest even in prehistoric times. Numerous countries have used its geostrategic valences to exercise geopolitical power in the Mediterranean Sea. Among these we can mention: Carthage, Rome, Spain, Italy, the United States (World War II), Great Britain, etc. Currently the northern part of the strait is under the geopolitical power of Spain since 1492 when the Arab influence in the region was pushed back in Africa, while in the southern part the state of Morocco is the dominant power. One interesting geopolitical players in the region is Gibraltar, which is a British territory of 6.8 km² in the Iberian Peninsula that provides Great Britain with access to its geostrategic interests at the “West Gate” of the Mediterranean Sea. We can also mention the exclave of Ceuta, an 18 km² Spanish city on the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco, serving as a geostrategic outpost of Spain in northern Africa. In view of these geopolitical interests, the legal state of straits becomes complex. To clarify this issue, it is necessary to consult the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which clearly establishes the status of a strait that separates two Exclusive Economic Zones, this includes the Gibraltar Strait is free for all ships no matter what flag it hoists. In this context, the main status of the straits is freedom of navigation for all state²¹.

Geostrategic features: The geostrategic importance of Gibraltar strait has been recognized since Prehistory. Because it is the closest point between Europe and Africa, cultural exchanges in this region have been prevalent, being used at first as a mere pass between the two continents. Subsequently, with the emergence of powerful states in the Mediterranean region such as Rome or Carthage, the strait has also acquired a geostrategic

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Vincente Rodriguez, *Gibraltar*, Encyclopedia Britannica, available online at: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Gibraltar>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

character with maritime importance. Throughout the history of countless geopolitical entities, that tried to gain absolute control over the two seashores of the strait. The last time this was done was in 1492, the year when the Islamic influence on the European shores of the Straits was pushed back to North Africa. The small British province in the region, Gibraltar, is testimony of the fact that Britain recognizes the geostrategic importance of this strait. Through history, the UK always wanted to exert a degree of influence in the region. This territory was acquired by the United Kingdom in 1704 in military form and in 1713 in legal form by the Treaty of Utrecht. Spain has tried twice to undermine the authority of the British state in this region of Gibraltar by the means of two referendums to annex the province to the Spanish territory. Both 1967 and 2002 failed. These attempts by Spain demonstrate the intention of this state to eliminate any form of foreign influence in the region. Even the symbolism of the Gibraltar flag denotes the British vision of this key region of the Mediterranean Sea. The geostrategic importance of the straits was greatly felt in the 1976-1979 period when the Suez Canal was closed and the only other sea route in the Mediterranean was Gibraltar.

In the conditions that the Strait of Gibraltar is crossed by half of the world's annual commercial maritime traffic, it truly can be considered the gateway to and from the Mediterranean. Because more and more countries are trying to obtain a degree of influence in this region, the Strait of Gibraltar becomes a geostrategic choke point that can influence world stability at any time.

2.4. The Island of Taiwan

The assessment of the geostrategic choke point according to the geostrategic criteria identified previously: natural, terrestrial/maritime, of permanent importance, second category of importance, permanently used (inhabited), accessible by sea or by air.

Geographical features: It is an island with an area of 36,193 km², located approximately 180 km away from China in the northwest, bordered by the China Sea in the North and Northwest, the Philippine Sea in the east and the Bashi channel in the South. The territory is varied with a plain area in the West and the Jade Mountains in the East that have a maximum altitude of 3,952 m.

Geopolitical characteristics: The island was an integral part of China that was lost in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 when the Japanese armed forces attacked and conquered this island along with two smaller islands of lower geostrategic importance (Panhu and Pescadores). Japan renounced the Island of Taiwan on two occasions following with the San Francisco (1952) and Taipei treaties, but did not specify the subsequent attachment to the Chinese state, which led to the formation of a new self-standing state called Taiwan that is exercising full geopolitical power over the island.

Geostrategic features: The island is the key of the South China Sea and is China's first bastion. In the event that this island falls into the hands of a hostile state of China, it will easily manage to limit their strategic military maneuverability and simultaneously it can be a base that can be used to bomb the Chinese territory. Also, this island can constrain maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait.

2.5. The Island of Guam

The assessment of the geostrategic choke point according to the geostrategic criteria identified previously: natural, maritime, of permanent importance, second category of importance, permanently used (inhabited), accessible by sea and air.

Geographical features: It is an island with an area of 549 km² located in the South Pacific Ocean. It is the southernmost and largest of the Marian Islands and is also the largest island in Micronesia. The tallest peak of the island is 407 m, Mount Lamlam.

Geopolitical characteristics: Spain was the first state to realize the strategic importance of Guam Island following Magellan's voyage. Thus, Guam became the main stop of long-distance commercial maritime traffic between the American continent and the Far East. Guam is currently under the auspices of the United States and was acquired in 1898, following the victory of the Spanish-American War. This island became an essential pawn in the United States Pacific Ocean chessboard for US that guarantees the trans-pacific communication lines.

Geostrategic features: The geostrategic relevance of this island is due in particular to its positioning and unique topography for the major maritime powers of the Pacific Ocean. On the axis that crosses the 5,000 miles of the Pacific between Hawaii and Asia, Guam is the only island with both a protected harbor and sufficient land for major airports. Guam is also the largest landfall for communications, shipping, and military installations on the nearly 3,000-mile north-axis from Japan to Papua New Guinea and Australia. This geography means that anyone who controls Guam has access by air and sea to China to the West, to Hawaii and North America to the East, to Southeast Asia from the North and to Japan from the South. These geopolitical factors make Guam a valuable strategic nexus similar to other small island bastions in military history and maritime trade such as Hawai'i, Gibraltar, Malta and Singapore²².

Thus it is easy to understand why the United States wants to keep its geopolitical influence in Guam permanently representing one of the instrument through which Washington is projecting its power in the Pacific Ocean.

A number of geostrategic choke points with less impact on the world geopolitical stage can be mentioned²³. This are some of them:

- The Bab el Mandeb Strait - connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean. Theoretically, it is a continuation of the Suez Canal, most of the maritime traffic passing through one is crossing the other as well. This is due to the small number of ports in the Red Sea;

- The Ormuz Strait - connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean. It is a major point of oil traffic from the Middle East to Europe and the United States. In this context, any threat to the fluidity of traffic in this strait has a direct impact on the oil price;

- The Danish Straits - consist of three waterways linking the Baltic Sea with the Kattegat, a wide waterway connecting the Skagerrak and the North Sea. Two of the waterways lie entirely on the Danish territory. They are of strategic value when we take in consideration the Russian fleet stationed in the Baltic Sea;

- The Strait of Bosphorus and Dardanelles - they link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Between the two Straits lies the Marmara Sea which can be considered a Turkish ante camera;

- Strait of Malacca – Singapore – connects the Andaman Sea to the South China Sea. Here is the port of Singapore, one of the world busiest ports. This strait has a special geostrategic valence for Japan and China, as it is the most used sea route for oil from the Persian Gulf;

- The Dover Strait – makes the connections between the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. It is the world's busiest maritime traffic route thanks to the largest European port, Rotterdam;

- Bering Strait – it separates Siberia from Alaska. The Diomes Islands split it in two waterways. Through the Strait of Bering, the North Sea Routing takes place that links the Pacific Ocean to the northern European sea;

²² "Guam's Strategic Value", Guampedia, available online at: <https://www.guampedia.com/guams-strategic-value/>, accessed on September 29, 2018.

²³ Lwies M. Alexander, "The Role of Choke Points in the Ocean context", *GeoJournal*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1992, p. 507.

- The Magellan Strait – separating Chile from Argentina, which is an alternative route for large vessels that cannot pass through the Panama Canal;
- Cape of Good Hope – it is the southernmost point of the African continent. All the maritime traffic from the east coast to the west coast of Africa passes through this choke point.

Throughout history this geostrategic choke points have been proven to influence the geopolitics of states in a number of different ways. The ones mentioned above have been unquestionable the focal point in the last 200 years, shaping the world we live in today. Geopolitical structures of power have constantly adapted there diplomacy and there economy to fit the geostrategic landscape thus giving enormous weight to choke points that can sway the advantage to their interests.

Conclusions

Although geopolitics is considered to be the first violin, geostrategy is the conductor that conducts the entire orchestra. Geostrategy is what determines the practical feasibility of the geopolitical vision. The symbiosis of these two fields of knowledge, requires a thorough study of the particularities that characterizes them as an inseparable couple. Thus, the geostrategic choke point can be considered a topic of greatest interest, especially for states that are capable of projecting power at a minimum of a region, in order to implement geopolitical theory.

The influence of a geostrategic position on the world chessboard cannot be neglected. Global geopolitical tectonic plates change so that their joints are geostrategic choke points. These geographical positions have a direct influence on national security, geopolitical power or even the welfare of a state, which is why states are carefully watching the evolving geopolitical game in different regions. These can simultaneously represent a portion of potential strength or of potential vulnerability, as can be seen from geostrategy of the Island of Taiwan in relation to the Chinese state. Throughout history, geostrategic choke points have decided the fate of military campaigns, so the one who can use the maximum potential of a geographical feature, becomes master of human geography.

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FROM THE JUST WAR TO THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

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Abstract: *As between individuals, there are conflicts between the actors of the international scene, the solving of which is possible either by force or by diplomacy, both methods being used throughout history, sometimes even in a congruent way. At first, a few thousand years later, war prevailed due to the possibility of achieving faster and more lasting effects than through diplomacy.*

However, because generalized violence sometimes had catastrophic consequences for those endowed with sense and reason, they sought justifications for the recourse to the armed force, which materialized in the theory of warfare based on the idea of legitimate defense, but also on the formalization of the hostilities and the establishment of rules of warfare. Only in our time the idea that the shift to use of the armed force without any motivation is a crime of aggression prevailed, so that a return to diplomacy is considered possible, the choice between these two modalities remaining a politics attribute.

Keywords: *international humanitarian law, just war, crime of aggression, hostilities.*

1. Introduction. The theory of just war

There is a dictionary¹ that explains the view that the theory of just war refers to thinkers who try to elucidate the situation when the recourse to arms in international relations is not only "justifiable" by the respective motives but also "just" from the perspective of justice.

1.1. The origin and evolution of the concept of "just war"

As in other areas of human thought and practice, the roots of the just war can be found in Greek and Roman antiquity, spreading over time in all regions of the world, though there were specific forms of these ideas and actions. To summarize things, it must be said that Aristotle believes that if the world is practicing for struggle "*it must not do so in order to submit enslaved peoples which do not deserve this terrible yoke, but first and foremost not to be subjugated itself, then to conquer power, only in the interests of his subjects*"²; so the war warning procedure accompanied by some symbolic actions and the application of solemn acts of rituals of religious significance appeared to the ancient Greeks as marking the transition from the state of peace to the state of war by sending a lamb, as a warning for the use of the

¹ Paul Robinson, *Dicționar de securitate internațională*, Ed. C.A. Publishing, Cluj Napoca, 2010, p. 225.

² Aristotel, *Politica*, Ed. Antet, 1996, p. 147.

force, in the enemy territory, meaning that the territory of the enemy fortress will be transformed into pastureland³. For the Romans, the procedural formalism had the purpose of questioning the gods about the legitimacy of the war, and consisted of an animal sacrifice whose internal organs indicated this, obviously after the Senate adopted the decision to launch the war; perhaps the sacrifice was repeated until the state of the animal's organs coincided with the political will of the Senate. Similar practices existed also in the peoples considered barbarian by the Greeks and the Romans, at the same time as the possibility of going to war without any warning. They will be convened after thousands of years in the Hague Convention of 1907 on the commencement of hostilities, either by reasoned warfare, or by an ultimatum containing a declaration of war⁴.

It is believed that the European Christian tradition played an important role in the theorizing of the just war, without detracting from the "will of God", although in reality the recourse to arms was an attribute of the government. Representing the most significant adaptation of ancient Greek and Roman tradition to Christian ideas, St. Augustine (of Hippiana, 354-430) outlined a new way of understanding human society by placing "the city of God" above and against "the city of man" towards the end of the *Pax Romana* era when Rome began to be the target of barbaric warrior hordes, as speculations appeared that the Roman Empire had wronged the gods and that the new Christian god was not as strong as it seemed because the ancient gods had defended their subjects better⁵. The Thomist doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) and his disciples continues the Augustinian thinking from the point of view of the Spanish philosopher Averroes, commentator of Aristotle, very well known in Europe at that time, introducing the naturalism opposite to the social vision of the world in the field of political conduct but also the newly-revived Roman law in the experimental and rational attempts of governing, trying to replace the fanatical recourse to the ordeals and the judgment of God⁶.

The secularization of these ideas, which preceded the theory of the just war, which referred to the use of the armed force as opposed to diplomacy (although diplomacy always exists, including in wartime) was based on the formalization of the war declaration, the legal warfare for the reparation of injustice and the emergence of war-waiver arrangements. The precursors of the theory of natural law, Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, belonging to the Salamanca Spanish School of Law, consider that, like other human actions, the war as a recourse to the use of armed violence must be subject to immutable rules, intrinsic to the nature of human beings and values it⁷. The one who coagulates these ideas into a real theory is Hugo Grotius for whom the just war must be examined through the triple perspective of *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus postbellum*. Hugo Grotius adds the seven criteria that a war must fulfill to be fair: just cause, self-defense, but also the protection of innocents from aggression, the regaining of property, or the punishment of those guilty of the violation of peace; the legitimate authority to decide on the recourse to the armed force, which is, as a rule, in the democratic societies, the supreme representative body; good intent, meaning that legitimate armed violence should not be used in its own interest (the pride of princes or generals) but for the good of the international justice; the proportionality of the finality, that is, the good obtained by war is to overcome the evil caused by it; the last instance, which means that the switch to use of the means of war must be done only after the reasonable satisfaction from the diplomatic and judicial dispute settlement mechanisms was not obtained;

³ I. Cloșcă, V. Gherghescu, *Reguli de drept internațional privind starea de pace și starea de război*, Ed. Militară, 1972, p. 188.

⁴ I.M. Anghel, V.I. Anghel, *Regulile războiului și dreptul umanitar*, Ed. Lumina Lex, București 2013, p. 64.

⁵ *Enciclopedia Universală Britanică*, Ed. Litera, 2010, vol.1, p. 352.

⁶ *Idem*, vol. 15, p. 249.

⁷ Ion Gâlea, *Folosirea forței în dreptul internațional*, Ed. Universul Juridic, 2009, p. 30.

the feasibility of recourse to the armed force, and the reasonable hope of success, for as fair as the cause may be, the loss of war is devastating; the beginning of the war only for the purpose of achieving peace, a stronger peace than the one that preceded it⁸.

1.2. The Critique of the Fair War Theory

Like any theory, it also has its supporters and detractors, and it could not have been otherwise in view of changes in the dynamics of international relations over time. We could assume without exaggeration that it was applied from its emergence in 1625 until the prohibition and punishment of aggression by the Charter of the United Nations in an era dominated by the sometimes divergent interests of nations and national states. The worldwide political and legal order of these 320 years has demonstrated the viability of the theory, even if the abuses have always been manifested especially by the subjective interpretations of those who were planning, preparing and conducting the war of aggression. In contrast to the humanitarian laws of the war (*jus in bello*), the theory of just war remains an ensemble of moral values and not a projection of an international or domestic law, an ethical ideal only to be realized in practice in 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and by defining the crime of aggression in 2010. In fact, perhaps even inertial, certain criteria of the theory of the just war are invoked as valid even after 1945 and even after 2010. The imperfections of organizing global governance and, in particular, blocking by veto by the permanent members of the Security Council as the holder of the monopoly of the use of force in the new world legal order, made it so that, during the Cold War and afterwards, there were many controversial recourses to the use of force. And in recent years, the debate on the humanitarian intervention right and the responsibility to protect, as well as that on the preventive war and the global fight against terrorism have re-utilized certain dimensions of the theory of the just war.

The critique of the theory of the just war was also made by the adherents of the realism in the international relations as well as by the pacifists and the human rights defenders. The former have dealt with both the causes of the war⁹ and the impossibility of the international law to regulate war because of the decentralized structure of the international society for “where there is neither a community of interests nor a balance of power, there is no international right”; that is why “the distinction between right and wrong was at best ambiguous and was finally abandoned in the nineteenth century when the war was considered a mere fact whose deregulation was governed by certain moral and legal rules, but the right to trigger it was totally at the moral and legal disposition of all states, the war being a national policy instrument, meant to be used alternately or simultaneously with diplomacy, as the rulers decided”¹⁰. Considering that by increasing the consciousness of humanity as an undivided community, it is also increased the interconnectivity in all domains and, above all, the new forms of overlapping political authority described as global governance, involving states and international institutions, civil society and individuals, we see a complete transformation of the international society that makes it possible to overcome the old decentralized structure of the world and the legal application of the distinction between righteous and unjust wars. In this sense, if past pacifists completely rejected the idea that the war might be just, those of our times propose that instead of the theory of the just war, a new ethical approach is to be taken, based on the increasingly admitted fact that individual rights have priority over the rights of the state and that, therefore, the IHL that applies to individuals

⁸ Hugo Grotius, *Despre Dreptul războiului și al păcii*, Editura Științifică, București, 1968, p. 219 and the following.

⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Omul, statul și războiul*, Ed. Institutul European, Iași, 2001.

¹⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni*, Ed. Polirom, 2007, p. 395.

is above the laws of war, in other words, *jus in pace* cannot be suspended during the war in favor of *jus ad bellum* or *jus in bello*¹¹.

Although legal theory of just war should have been abandoned with the ban on the use of armed force for any other purpose incompatible with the principles of the United Nations adopted in 1945, it was still invoked in wartime policies and conceptions about war that persist despite the criminalization of aggression in our times. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that the legitimate military force still has a role in the international relations, but since the UN does not have its own armed forces, it must appeal to the armies of the member states; however, the way state armies are used under the authority and the control of the United Nations is more about law enforcement than domestic war, even if some of the principles of the fair war theory are relevant to the “police force” of global governance within which the rule of law, as is already demonstrated by most of the rules of humanitarian law (*jus in bello*), is fully applicable. Thus, the theory of the just war has not exhausted its explanatory valences, and still offers arguments for the justifiable use of military force in a globalized society in which old ideas reappear with new names, but obligating doctrine, by the force of things, to conceptualize the armed aggression as a massive violation of human rights to authorize the use of force from sovereign states to a multilateral set of supranational legal and diplomatic arrangements, while rejecting the notions of “collateral damage” or “unintended effects”.

In this respect, it is appreciated in the literature¹² that the thing we call the “modern world” or “postmodern” world, with reference to the times we live, represents, in spite of the technological evolutions, a continuation of the ancient and medieval world in which the definition of the crime of aggression leaves room for victims of war and generalized violence although the conceptual apparatus has changed for both the neo-idealists and the neo-realists. Thus, inspiring from the doctrine of the just war and even from the “Holy Crusade”, some American authors introduced the notion of “spectacular warfare” for the type of remote air warfare practiced in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya or Syria in which his imaginary nature is shown from the point of view of the Americans in the sense that he does not risk casualties on US territory; variants of this notion are the “war of virtue” to highlight its noble cause, or “the honest war”, for it is carried out against criminal, illegitimate and odious regimes¹³. For the neo-realists, the “international police” of the global order is more important than the human rights violations, so they propose “the revolution in military affairs” and the “transformation of defense” (concept taken over by both NATO and the states) in combating new threats to global security, regional, national or local.

Under the influence of the philosophy of natural law, a real science of human rights¹⁴ has been developed more and more in recent decades, in which ideas of the theory of the just war are revived. Within this, in the classical conception of the international law, human rights were, like war, the exclusive competence of states, but today the elaboration and the application of the norms of the two domains should be governed by the principle of conferring authority, control and jurisdiction to supranational bodies also. This process of transferring sovereign powers to the governing of wider human communities does not mean emptying out the sovereignty of states, but sharing common competences about core values such as democracy, the rule of law, and the human rights. Moreover, the supranational right was inspired in its elaboration by the domestic law, attracted states to its application, and always respected the national specificity. An enlightening example in this direction is a provision in the Declaration of Human Rights proposed by M. Robespierre in the 1793 National

¹¹ Mary Kaldor, *Securitatea umană*, Ed. CA Publishing, Cluj Napoca, 2010, p. 184.

¹² Robert D. Kaplan, *Politici de război*, Ed. Polirom, 2002, p. 21.

¹³ Mary Kaldor, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

¹⁴ Irina Moroianu Zlătescu, *Drepturile omului-un sistem în evoluție*, IRDO, București. 2008, p. 23.

Convention: "... Those who declare war to a people to hinder the progress of liberty and to destroy human rights must be pursued by all not as ordinary enemies, but as assassins and rebellious thieves"¹⁵. We can conclude that on such bases the crime of aggression was defined to stop the generalized war violence.

1.3. Several consequences of applying the theory of the just war

The just war theory has managed to explain the legitimacy of the recourse to the armed force, and in practice has outlawed the private war but cannot and could not "humanize" the catastrophic human effects of the domestic and the international armed conflicts. Based on politics' involvement in warfare conducted by the military combatants using combat means and methods, wars continued to produce casualties due to the generalized violence characteristic of all armed conflicts.

The national and supranational military doctrines rightly reveal the reality that before the war, there is a tension with violent accents resulting from inadequate management of internal or external crises or from failure to solve them. In other words, this pre-war tension represents the drums that announce a generalized violence of states in a special political and legal order, at regional or global level. This seems to be the reason for the EU's Lisbon Treaty solidarity clause, where, when one Member State is the subject of a terrorist attack, the Union and the Member States provide mutual assistance by jointly managing threats to prevent the threat of terrorism and the protection of the democratic institutions and the civilian population.

2. The crime of aggression

The prohibition of war as an instrument of the national policy (the Briand-Kellogg Pact) or in any way incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations (Article 2 (4)) would have remained without effect if the concept of unlawful armed attack had it not been defined. Beginning in the early years of the UN, the process of defining aggression has gone through the soft-law phase of the 1974 General Assembly Declaration finalizing through the Resolution Adopted by the States Parties to the Statute of the International Criminal Court in Kampala in 2010, which is a hard-law instrument with a legally binding force, although not yet in force, which will in the future ensure the end of the impunity of those that dare to defy the political and legal order of the world by planning, preparing or executing political action or military or aggression acts that by their nature, gravity and scale are contrary to the manifest values of the UN Charter.

2.1. Defining the crime of aggression

Represented by Bogdan Aurescu, the State Secretary for Strategic Affairs at the MFA, Romania participated in the Rome 2008 Review Conference on the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Kampala (Uganda), where all 111 states¹⁶ but also states with observer status (US and Russian Federation) as well as numerous intergovernmental organizations active in the field of the international criminal justice. As the first such event since the entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002, the Conference had an ambitious objective to define the crime of aggression, an unresolved issue in 1998, and Romania actively participated in the pre-conference meetings of the Review Conference, contributing to the debates by promoting, together with Bosnia and Herzegovina and New Zealand, a proposal on the definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions for exercising the jurisdiction of the ICC over this crime. The success of adopting the amendments to the ICC Statute on the definition of

¹⁵ Marcel Gauchet, *Revoluția drepturilor omului*, Ed. Trei, București, 2004, p. 341.

¹⁶ Meanwhile, from 2010 to today, the number of Member States to the CPI has reached to 122.

aggression removes dilemmas about the will of states and peoples to live in a more peaceful world by bringing to account those guilty of committing the most devastating international crime in the shadow of which genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes could be committed.

More than 60 years after the establishment of the International Law Commission¹⁷ in the UN which, in the process of the progressive development of the international law and its codification, worked incessantly on a draft code of crimes against peace and security of humanity, it was possible to define the crime of aggression, already included in the competence of the ICC since 1998, but to be exercised, according to Article 5.2 of the Statute of the Court, only when revision amendments are adopted, in accordance with Articles 121 and 123, which will establish the conditions for exercising the Court's competence in this field. One can say that the amendments adopted in Kampala in 2010 at the Review Conference of the ICC Statute represent a revolutionary act for the evolution of the international law, an accomplishment of the joint efforts made by the whole of humanity for decades, with a special impact on the suppression of the serious crimes of humanitarian law, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Historically speaking, only the Statutes of the International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo¹⁸ contained provisions on "the war of aggression", described as an "international crime against peace", taken over and reaffirmed in Resolution no. 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 of the UN General Assembly on "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter and the Nuremberg Tribunal"; even in the case of the respective processes, the lack of definition of aggression was the main argument of the defense for the failure of the individual criminal responsibility of political and military leaders to plan, prepare, initiate or carry out a war of aggression in the sense of the *nullum crimen sine lege* principle.

This was probably the reason why the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 did not bring this crime into the jurisdiction of these ad hoc courts, a situation corrected by the CPI Statute of 1998, which was concretely revised in 2010 on the crimes of aggression. At this point, the situation has not been disputed, mainly because of the specificity of the international relations, in which the responsibility for aggression can be attributed to the state guilty of committing the act, where the sanction measures are determined by the global governance represented by the Security Council of the UN and guilty individuals who will be tried and punished by the ICC, including heads of state, government officials, high-ranking military staff, diplomats, or political parties. That is why in the Working Group on Defining Aggression in the Preparatory Commission of the Review Conference 2010 there have been heated debates on the role of the Security Council regarding the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over this international crime¹⁹, especially since in the Article 5.2 it was expressly stated that the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the ICC's competence "will have to be compatible with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations".

In particular, the Review Conference of the Assembly of State Parties to the Statute of the ICC added, by the Resolution no. RC / Res. 6 of 11 June 2010, a new article on the crime of aggression, Article 8 bis, which provides in para. 1 "For the purpose of this Statute, "crime

¹⁷ Details in A. Bolintineanu, A.Năstase, *Drept internațional contemporan*, R.A. Monitorul Oficial, București, 1995, p. 290.

¹⁸ Previously, the peace treaties at the end of the First World War containing provisions on „the supreme offense against international morality and the sacred authority of treaties”, nor the 1928 Brinad-Kellogg pact with the commitments of the states to abandon war as an instrument of national politics in their mutual relations did not define the crime of aggression. Only the 1933 London Convention did this, but it was limited to the reality of the time that still saw war as a way of settling disputes.

¹⁹ D.S.Paraschiv, *Sistemul sancțiunilor în dreptul internațional public*, Ed. CH Beck, București, 2012, p. 243.

of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”²⁰; in the second paragraph of Article 8a it states that an act of aggression means the use by a state of the armed force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state or in any way incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, further specifying that they are considered acts of aggression committed with or without declaration of war, those contained in Resolution no. 3314/1974 of the United Nations General Assembly, namely the invasion or attack on the territory of a state, its bombing, the military blockade of the seaside and the ports, the use of armed forces stationed in that territory contrary to stationary agreements, the provision of territory to an aggressor and the sending of gangs, irregular bands or mercenaries to execute those acts. The introduction in 2010 in the text of the CPI Statute of the definition of aggression also led to other changes, as set out in Resolution no. 6 of the Review Conference, such as the suppression of point 2 of Article 5 or the modification of Article 9 (constitutive elements of the crimes), 20 (non bis in idem) and 25 (individual criminal liability); the most important changes refer to the exercise of the competence of the ICC over the crime of aggression, a matter solved by the Resolution no. 6 by introducing two new articles, Article 15 bis (the exercise of jurisdiction by reference from a Member State or non-member State to the Statute) and Article 15 (exercise of jurisdiction by referral by the Security Council) articles stating the application of the aggression crime provisions one year after the ratification of that amendment by 30 States Parties²¹ and subject to the adoption of a decision to be taken after 1 January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as required for the adoption of the 2010 amendments. In addition, following the rules of classical international law, the Court will not exercise this specific jurisdiction over a State Party if it has previously declared that it does not accept such a jurisdiction, and to States that are not party to the statute when the crime was committed by its own nationals or on its territory. No less important in the interpretation and the application of Article 8 bis are the Annexes II and III to Resolution no. RC / Res. 6 of 11 June 2010 on the elements of the aggression crime and the amendments to the ICC Statute relating thereto which do not in any way prejudice the existing or emerging rules of international law applicable for purposes other than the ICC Statute.

2.2. The consequences of the definition of the crime of aggression on the respect for the international humanitarian law

Regardless of the effective date of the amendment of the ICC Statute by defining the aggression crime, it is clear that it is now causing a greater respect for the principles and rules of the international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts, primarily through the fear of sanctions of the political and military leaders from totalitarian regimes that may eventually resort to acts of aggression. On the other hand, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes often find their source and motivation in acts of aggression, and their conventional definition may reduce the amount of human losses and damages caused by the use of the armed force in the international relations as a tool of national policy.

Also, the entry into force of the amendments to the ICC Statute on the aggression crimes restrains the scope of the international humanitarian law, which implies the effect and the reduction of humanitarian disasters caused by armed conflict, even if the IHL has other criteria of distinction (between combatants and civilians, military and civilian assets,

²⁰ The text reads the wording of art. 2.4 of the UN Charter on the establishment of the principle of non-refoulement and the threat of violence.

²¹ Currently, 13 states have ratified amendments to the crime of aggression.

belligerent and neutral states, licit and illegal war means and methods) than the right to international peace and security that only admits the legitimate defense against aggression.

The different regulatory object of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* made the provisions of the international peace law not interfere with those of the international humanitarian law. Only the more recent doctrinal studies have unified the two branches of law, but have no significant application in practice, being rather indicative of national strategies and national laws of warfare. The first of these was the San Remo Manual on International Law applicable to Conflicts at Sea, which shows in Article 3 that the exercise of the right to legitimate individual and collective self-defense is subject to the conditions and the limitations of the UN Charter and which derives from the general international law, including distinctly the principles of necessity and proportionality, 6 states that the rules of international humanitarian law apply equally to all parties to the conflict, this equal application being unaffected by the international responsibility of one of them to trigger the conflict. The second doctrinal elaboration of peace and warfare is the *2014 Tallinn Handbook* on international law applicable to the cyber-war that regulates the use of force, including cyber operations, in rules 10-19, so that in Rules 20 and the following should specify the applicability of the IHL in the context of armed conflicts that are also cybernetic. Including the aggression crime (specific to the law of peace) along with the genocide, the crimes against humanity and the war crimes (especially the law of war) has reason to consider all of them as particularly serious facts, which are a matter of global concern. Not sanctioning such atrocities (due to impunity or lack of cooperation among states) threatens peace, security and even the existence of the world.

3. Crime of aggression in the Romanian law

For its part, Romania incorporated the serious crimes against the Geneva Convention after their ratification on 14 May 1954 in the 1968 Penal Code which also contained 6 humanitarian law offenses²²; The 2004 draft Code of Criminal Code contained 8 international humanitarian law offenses²³ and the 2009 Code, entered into force in 2014 reflects better the obligations assumed in the ratification of IHL instruments through the 9 offenses included in Title XI, offenses against the fighting capability of the armed forces (Article 436 robbery of the dead and 437, unlawful use of the Red Cross emblem) and in Title XII, Genocide crimes, against humanity and war (Article 438 genocide, 439 against humanity, 440 war against persons, 441 war against property, 442 war against military operations, 443 prohibited methods of fighting, and 444 prohibited means of fighting). The crime of aggression is not present in the Romanian criminal codes except in the form of war propaganda (Article 405 in the Code entered into force in 2014), included in Title X “Crimes” against national security.

The analysis of our criminal legislation and its comparison with the list of the serious crimes provided by the CPI Statute allowed the specialists to find the differences and even the inconsistencies, for example the failure to include in the Romanian code the deed provided by Article 8 par. 2, lit. b) XIX (the use of dum-dum bullets in the international conflicts) or that provided, in Article 8 par. 2 (c), IV (convictions and executions without legal pre-trial in non-international conflicts) that Good governance, characterized by intelligent regrouping, implies the fulfillment of the commitments assumed in the ratification of the international treaties under the conditions of Article 11 and 20 of the Constitution of Romania, which states that the law is to be respected in good faith, especially in the field of the respect for the human rights, including in the conditions of armed conflicts; the criminalization of these infractions should have taken into account the list of crimes within the competence of the ICC, even using its

²² I. Dragoman, *Drept internațional umanitar*, Editura Fundației Andrei Șaguna, Constanța, 1999, p. 216.

²³ I. Dragoman, M. Radu, *Modernitate în problemele fundamentale de DIU*, Editura ZEDAX, Focșani, 2005, p. 242.

philosophy of classification in serious crimes and other violations of the laws and customs of war, in international and non-international armed conflicts. Moreover, the competent authorities to decide in this regard, should also consider the ratification of other instruments of international humanitarian law, such as the Convention on Fraudulent Weapons, the Private Military Business Act or the definition of the crime of aggression. Under the conditions in which the IHL and the reality it regulates evolve incessantly, such an attitude demonstrates the will to protect the human rights in time of war.

Conclusions

For some historians, it is a quasi-truth that the war has never solved the different problems of international relations, but the presentation of the advantages and disadvantages of the just war theory shows the involvement of politics in the application of international humanitarian law. Thus, the abuses in the conduct the war of aggression are in contrast to the humanitarian laws of the war (*jus in bello*) and as the theory of just war is only an ensemble of moral values and not a projection of an international or domestic law, prohibition of war as an instrument of the national policy would have remained without effect if the concept of unlawful armed attack had not been defined.

Once the crimes against peace and security of humanity were coded by the International Law Commission, it was possible to define the crime of aggression, which since 1998 is included in the competence of the International Criminal Court since.

Largely, Romania adopted the international law in matters of crime of aggression but there still exist differences and even inconsistencies some of them presented in our paper (as the failure to include in the Romanian criminal code of the deed concerning the use of dum-dum bullets in the international conflicts).

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AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA – PROFILE, HYPOTHESES AND PREDICTIONS

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Abstract: *AQAP, whose original purpose was to overthrow the Saudi monarchy, resulted from the merger with Yemen's Al-Qaeda, in 2009, whose stability was well anchored at national level. Since that period, which corresponds to the weakening of Al-Qaeda's terrorist projects in Pakistan, AQAP has seen an increase in its power and influence. The ability to organize international attacks, to capture Yemeni cities and regions through local groups, or to train foreign fighters, the South-Arab branch of the Al-Qaeda network gets an aura among terrorist organizations at a time when there is an increasing lack of certainty regarding the future of the parent organization.*

Keywords: *Al-Qaeda; threats; security deficiencies; ideology; radicalization.*

Introduction

Founded in Southern Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to be one of the growing branches of international jihadism. Its current patterns of action tend to fall in line with those of the Islamic State and raise serious doubts regarding the strategies adopted by Western states to combat them.

The death of Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and the gradual disappearance of its main leaders have led to speculations about the future of the terrorist organization and associated groups in the region.

AQAP – history and actual threats to the international security

Leah Farrall, a researcher in the field of terrorism at the United States Study Center for of the University of Sydney, claims that AQAP is rather a division of Al-Qaeda than an associated group. The same view is shared by Barak Mendelsohn, a professor at Haverford College, author of several works on terrorism, claiming that AQAP enjoys the trust of Al Qaeda (AQ) and is therefore at the heart of its terrorist activities against countries outside the Middle East.

Analysts Bill Braniff and Assaf Moghadam express the opinion that, following September 11, 2011 attacks, Al-Qaeda has become a multi-polar organization with a central core in Northern Waziristan and several autonomous regional centers¹.

Among the AQ-associated groups in the region, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen, is often considered the main threat. Dr. Christopher Boucek, a member of the Carnegie Middle East Program, considers AQAP as the most dangerous Al-Qaeda group².

¹ Bill Braniff, Assaf Moghadam, “Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda’s Strategic, Ideological and Structural Adaptations since 9/11”, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 5, nr. 2, 2011, pp. 36-49.

² Christopher Boucek, “Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland - Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 2011.




Figure no. 1: AQAP - geographic representation, committed attacks, leader³

There are three distinct elements that characterize this terrorist threat.

1. First of all, *there is a declared intention to attack the United States and its allies*, an intention proved by the attempt to have an attack with a bomb against a passenger aircraft flying to a United States destination, in December 2009 and by the failed attempt of an attack on a line aircraft, in 2012, that would coincide with the two-year anniversary of the death of Bin Laden.

2. It is also worth noting *the time-effect of radicalization activities of the main propagandist of AQAP*, Yemeni Anouar al-Aulaki, who was killed on 30 September 2011. He is said to have inspired many "lonely wolves", in their attempts to commit terrorist acts such as the November 2009 armed attack at Fort Hood, triggered by Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Times Square bomb attack in May 2010, and some acts of terrorism for which a former British Airways employee, Rajib Karim, was charged in March 2011.

3. Finally, there is a real threat that *AQAP might continue to exploit Yemen's current security deficiencies* through other attacks against local and international targets, enhancing recruitment activities and expanding its scope.

In 2011, through its organization Ansar al-Sharia, AQAP exploited the power vacuum created by the Yemeni government, concerned with its survival rather than national security, and seized large areas of the territory, turning them into "emirates" according to its model.

On the ground, the Yemeni army put an end to this operation for gaining territory, with the help of the United States, and their campaign of air raids that expanded considerably. According to a New America Foundation, the number of raids has increased from 18 in 2011 to 53 in 2012, becoming almost triple⁴. It remains to be seen whether these air strikes, which also cause collateral damage among civilians, do not have the effect of favoring the recruitment process by AQAP instead of weakening the organization⁵.

³ Source: Nicolas Hautemanière, "Qu'est-ce Qu'al-Qaïda dans la Péninsule Arabique?", *Le Cles du Moyens Orient*, January 19, 2015, available online at: <https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Qu-est-ce-qu-Al-Qaida-dans-la.html>, accessed on November 16, 2018.

⁴ <http://yemendrones.newamerica.net/>, accessed la September 15, 2018.

⁵ Gregory D. Johnsen, "The Wrong Man for the C.I.A.," *The New York Times* (electronic edition), November 19, 2012.

While Yemen tries hard to establish a national dialogue and reform the political system, AQAP will see its long-term prospects, through its efforts both locally and internationally, to address the main socio-economic issues that AQAP exploits, in fact, very effectively, and through the efficiency of counter-terrorism operations.

Analyzing AQAP speeches, we notice that they are based on a number of themes: social injustice, poverty and lack of opportunities, but also on the perception among the population that threats come from both the outside and the inside. In many cases, it is noted that the main dissatisfactions expressed by those seeking fundamental change in Yemen is the same.

Analyzing retrospectively, we could say that the presence of radical Islamists in Yemen (more precisely violent jihadists) is not a new fact. Long ago, the Yemenis got involved in classical jihad activities, such as resistance against the Russians in Afghanistan or against the Americans in Iraq.

According to Laurent Bonnefoy, a professor at the French Institute for the Near East, since neither society nor the Yemeni state has ever directly condemned this type of militancy local violence tends to remain marginal, rarely being directed against the state⁶. Many times the state used some armed Islamist groups to fight both against the Southern Socialists during the civil war and to attack them along with the tribal recruits of the Houthi rebels in the northern part of the country, where the government has been in conflict since 2004.

Shortly after the unification of the Yemeni Arab Republic (Yemen) with the Yemeni People's Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) in 1990, hundreds of Mujahedin from the Afghan and Pakistani fronts returned to the country where they sought refuge. These fighters, including Tariq of Fadhli, Jamal of Badawi and Nasir al Bahri (alias Abu Jandal), former Ossama Bin Laden's bodyguard, even if they participated in Afghanistan's jihad, are still part of a generation that, as a whole, could be said to have refrained from a violent confrontation with the government. They have established a nearly-symbiotic relationship with the former Saleh regime, some Jihadists fighting even in the service of the state against the South Secessionists⁷.

The attacks were directed against foreign interests, and here we can take into consideration the December 1992 attack on US military staff at the Hotel Mohur in Aden (the attack was planned and led by Tariq al-Fadhli) or, in the same year, the failed attempt by a group linked to Al-Qaeda, regarding a rocket launcher attack on US Air Force airplanes, as well as the 2000 bomb attacks on USS Cole and, since 2002, against the French Limburg oil tanker⁸.

However, in contrast to this "first generation" of jihadists in Yemen, a new wave of violent radicalization, more inspired by transnational networks such as Al-Qaeda than local conflicts, covered the Arabian Peninsula and found a fertile land in Yemen.

The analyst Gregory D. Johnsen believes that there was tension between the Yemeni government and the returning jihadists in the country. While well-known jihadists, like Tariq al Fadhli, were working for President Saleh, others were fighting the state, many of whom formed the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, which was particularly active in the South, in the second half of the 1990s⁹.

⁶ Laurent Bonnefoy, "Violence in Contemporary Yemen: State, Society and Salafis", *The Muslim World*, from April 2011.

⁷ Gregory D. Johnsen, "The Wrong Man for the C.I.A.", *The New York Times* (electronic edition), November 19, 2012.

⁸ Laurent Bonnefoy, "Violence in Contemporary Yemen: The State, Society and Salafis", *The Muslim World*, April 2011.

⁹ Gregory D. Johnsen, "Yemen Faces Second Generation of Islamist Militants", *Terrorism Focus*, vol. 4, no. 27, 2007.

Members of this second generation acted in Iraq or in Afghanistan, or even in both areas. The current leader of AQAP, Nasir al Wahayshi (former secretary of Bin Laden), was one of them. Many of them were tortured by the Yemeni security services and therefore did not want to work for the government. The Yemeni government believed that the death of the main executor Abu Ali al-Harithi in an air raid in 2002, and the capture of his successor Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal in 2003, considerably decimated Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

However, in 2006, the escape of 23 Al-Qaeda executives from a prison belonging to Sanaa's Political Security Organization revitalized the organization and marked a turning point. Thus, militants directed their jihadist activities towards the Yemeni State and its security forces, more traditionally Saudi Arabian enemies, and against the United States and its allies.

From 2007 to 2011, in Yemen occurred repeated kidnaps, assassinations and attacks, targeting foreign tourists, members of humanitarian organizations and Yemeni security forces. Also, complex international operations took place during this period.

In 2011 and 2012, while the Saleh regime was busy with survival, AQAP took the opportunity to take control of several governors in southern Yemen.

In its current form, AQAP is made up of two branches, Saudi and Yemen, which joined each other in 2009, thus having more advantages over its Saudi predecessor; it enjoys great autonomy and, for better survival, has built a structure that is rather horizontal than hierarchical¹⁰.

Thus, while AQAP has an emir, a deputy head, a *shura* council, and various military, religious and media committees, it has delegated executive powers to semi-autonomous local cells. This is an obvious example of organizational training.

Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia was severely affected by the deaths of some leaders, such as Yusuf Al Uyayri and Abdel Aziz Al Muqrin. Meanwhile, in November 2002, the death of Abu Ali Al-Harithi, Al Qaeda's leader in Yemen, led to the beheading of the organization. Therefore, in its current form, AQAP is strictly survival-oriented.

It partially centralizes its administration and operations (for example, Adel Al Abab, alias Abu Zubayr, the head of the religious committee, was the one in charge with approving the selection of recruits), but, at the same time, he was in favor of a pragmatic decentralization. Thus, the heads of different cells communicate through messengers, but most of them do not know the identity of their colleagues.

At present, the number of AQAP members and supporters is not exactly known. A Yemeni analyst, Abdul Ilah Haydar Sha'I, estimates that AQAP has hundreds of members and thousands of followers, and that tens of thousands of Yemen share their views against the state and the international community. As in the case of the AQAP Saudi branch, the number of people concerned exceeds the number of vacant positions in the organization, which allows it to choose recruiters and not to count on first comers.

AQAP recruits in relatively stable and prosperous areas such as the cities of Sanaa, Ta'Izz, Ibb, Hodeida and Aden, the recruits being then sent to train in arid areas as the Sanaa governorates in Ma'rib al-Jawf, Shabwah and al-Bayda. Eventually, recruits are sent to the areas of jihad or "Islamic emirates", such as Abyan, Rada, Arhab and Jaar.

The AQAP recruitment process involves several stages: intense indoctrination with AQAP's ideology and vision of the world, taking the oath of loyalty, carrying out a simple mission (e.g. guard duty at night, in the neighborhood he comes from), participating in a *Sharia* training course for forty days, under which intensive training on jihad is underway, and a three-day training to use the weapon.

¹⁰ Leah Farall, "How al Qaeda works", *Foreign Affairs*, March /April 2011, p. 132.

Higher levels of AQAP correspond more closely to Al-Qaeda's traditional model and its associated organizations. Leaders such as Nasir Al Wahayshi and Saeed Al Shihri are connected to Afghanistan, though this connection does not necessarily lead to jihad against the Russians. They have personal connections with Al-Qaeda members and are deeply involved in local and regional programs such as the overthrow of the "apostate" leaders of Sanaa and Riad, the establishment of an Islamic emirate, the expulsion of non-Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula and, as the final transnational ambition, the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate¹¹.

AQAP leaders were further radicalized by the invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq by Americans, led by an ideology and recruited from very close social groups, mainly relatives, close friends and arms brothers.

The organization has also developed an international image through the profile of jihadist leaders such as Anwar Al-Awlaqi and has been transformed by social media users who have removed the barriers to jihadist activism, especially among Anglo-American Western youth familiar with the technology.

In order to increase its attractiveness to gain wider popular support and thus avoid the fate of the Al-Qaeda Saudi branch, the organization has solved, in the short term, the possible conflicts between its international and local programs through attacks highly publicized abroad, but also attacking local targets¹².

This way, AQAP takes into account both Al-Qaeda's transnational and local Yemeni's allegations. The organization has thus acquired the ability to promote a coherent discourse that attributes alleged social injustices and repression by the regime of US support to the government of Yemen and the process of assaulting Muslims around the world.

Being very effective and methodical, the strategic communication campaign AQAP is at the center of the success of its mobilization and recruitment activities, both among Yemenites and those of dissatisfied Anglophones, from abroad.

This "hybridization" of AQAP has caused the merger of the targets in an unbelievable way for the previous generation of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. Concerning the concept of ideological hybridization, which I mentioned in previous chapters, Thomas Hegghammer argues that a group with a hybrid ideology is characterized by ideological behavior and by theories influenced, almost equally, by several types of ideological motivation. He points out that the Al Qaeda ideology in Yemen is almost entirely hybrid, making it one of the most ambiguous enemy hierarchies of contemporary jihadism¹³.

Starting from the same theory, Mohammad Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou claims that Al-Qaeda is currently a declining organization that has successfully launched an international movement that it no longer controls¹⁴.

The first Jihadist speeches described Yemen as a refuge, not as an active front¹⁵. However, in its 1999 manifesto, entitled "The Yemenite People's Responsibility to the Sacred Sites of Islam and Their Riches", Abu Musab Al-Suri claimed that the Yemeni population organization and tribal structure of Yemen made its inhabitants the ideal targets for the Jihadist mobilization.

Poverty and the sense of injustice have forced some to become mujahedins. Such feelings were reflected in AQAP's first media products, such as the second edition of its

¹¹ Official website of International Arab News, <http://www.aawsat.com>, accessed on August 10, 2018.

¹² Bryce Loidolt, "Managing the Global and the Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2011, p. 104.

¹³ Thomas Hegghammer, "The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups", *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, vol. 9, 2009.

¹⁴ Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, "The Militarization of Islamism: Al-Qa'ida and Its Transnational Challenge", *The Muslim World*, 2011, p. 323.

¹⁵ Bryce Loidolt, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

Arabic online magazine, *The Al-Malahim Squad (Echo of Epic Battles)*, in which Abu Hammam Al-Qahtani claimed that this earth is already plowed, and there is only one need to work together¹⁶.

Since the Arab Spring Revolutions of 2011 and the death of Osama Bin Laden, *two common themes* have emerged.

First, the events in Egypt and Tunisia have shown that young protesters can make changes without resorting to armed violence, which greatly undermines the rhetoric of Al-Qaeda violence.

Secondly, the main requirement of protesters (a democratic change), as well as the predominantly secular nature of the revolts, put Al-Qaeda in difficulty. According to this interpretation, Al-Qaeda's inability to respond appropriately or to play a tangible role is exacerbated by the death of the leader and his emblematic figure.

However, Bin Laden's death did not affect AQAP, except perhaps the loss of certain control by Al-Qaeda over his regional associates¹⁷.

QPA has publicly supported the Arab awakening and seems to want to take advantage of the instability of the situation in Yemen. The organization is trying to increase its legitimacy by supporting the cause in its speeches and by multiplying attacks against state security services.

In 2011 and 2012, AQAP sought to increase its popularity, maximizing its gains against the government, where it retreated with other Islamist armed groups in the south of the country, Jaar, Zinjibar, Hawta and Lawder, as in tribal governorates, especially in Abyan and Lahij.

Aware of the limits of Al-Qaeda's "social cause", AQAP deliberately used the name of Ansar Al-Shariah to avoid losing local support and improve its recruitment prospects.

According to the report of the International Institute for the Fight against Terrorism - "Yemen: Global Jihad and Houthis Campaign - Situation Report and Development Directions" (October 2010) - despite the panic prevailing in Western and Yemeni government circles, AQAP is not taking the control in Yemen and does not enjoy large popular support.

But it is no less true that if attacks can slow down recruitment, they cannot stop them. We are no longer in 2002, and the organization cannot be beheaded. In fact, in the absence of effective government presence on the ground, it is impossible to stop the threat posed by AQAP only by air.

Also by targeting Islamic militants opposing the government but not belonging to AQAP, the government and the United States could involuntarily increase the attraction to AQAP in Yemen, giving a common cause to its activists and those of other organizations.

According to Nabil Bukairi, director of the Abaad research center in Sanaa, it is impossible to fight a whole country. The jihadist ideology is widespread in the south. To get it out of the area, you should kill millions of people¹⁸.

Also by targeting Islamic militants opposing the government but not belonging to AQAP, the government and the United States could involuntarily increase the attraction to AQAP in Yemen, giving a common cause to its activists and those of other organizations.

¹⁶ "Analyse: engagements radicaux et idéologies extrêmes", *Terrorisme net*, available online at: <http://www.terrorisme.net>, accessed on August 29, 2018.

¹⁷ Bruce Hoffman, "Bin Laden's Killing and Its Effect on Al-Qa'ida: What Comes Next?" *CTC Sentinel*, May 2011.

¹⁸ Hakim Almasmari, "US drone attacks in Yemen ignore Al Qaeda for local militants", *The National*, June 21, 2011, available online at: <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/us-drone-attacks-in-yemen-ignore-al-qaeda-for-local-militants>, accessed on 10.10.2018.

Conclusion

Yemen is unlikely to become a failed state because of AQAP. Rather, the apparent failure of the Yemeni State has the effect of boosting AQAP growth, a clear failure highlighted by recent events in Sanaa. It is not just about the demonstrations for a democratic change in the country, but about the alienation of the tribes to the state, the *houthi* revolt in the north, and the increasing appeals of secession from the south, which should be priorities for the international community.

Currently, AQAP is not a terrorist organization; it is defined as a social movement or insurgency. It is hybrid and opportunistic, a mixture of great local dissatisfaction and transnational issues designed to increase its attractiveness, especially among young dissatisfied Yemenite. This makes *AQAP be the contemporary face of the Al-Qaeda threat*.

The rapid pace of change in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 and 2012 shows that Soviet-style isolation policies are still present, even after the end of the Cold War, which is to support dictatorships that repress the population than to emancipate it, leading to an increase in attraction to Al-Qaeda.

Arab uprisings have shown that people want economic growth, jobs and good governance, instead of an anemic development, conflict and militarization, which is largely a way of living in this region. As the recent US strategy on countering terrorism shows, the global approach to Al-Qaeda should include objectives such as promoting responsible governance and respect for human rights, which will reduce the impact and importance of Al-Qaeda¹⁹.

Although it is impossible to simply reject the adoption of concrete information-based measures, the real solution against AQAP in Yemen will be to recognize the prevailing context at the moment and the role played by various accusations. Excessive dependence on remote capabilities will entail an escalation of the conflict and an increase in the threat posed by AQAP in both Yemen and other areas because tactical success can have unforeseen consequences, which could lead to costs at a strategic level²⁰.

Regarding the fact that misdirected drone attacks have helped AQAP in its recruitment activities, analyst Gregory Johnsen points out that the current way to act does not allow, as is often the case, the dismantling, disruption or defeat of Al-Qaeda. On the contrary, this only exacerbates the problem and extends the threat. To reduce the danger of AQAP, the first step would be to launch a post-Saleh Yemeni political process focused on participatory democracy that would prevent the imminent humanitarian and economic crisis.

In such a more nuanced approach, AQAP should rather be seen as a symptom, not as a cause of instability. This would avoid focusing efforts only on an inaccessible goal, as the beheading of AQAP, this approach being necessary in the direction of solving political, social and economic problems that lead the population to join the extremism, amplifying AQAP's violent speech.

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¹⁹ *National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America*, October 2018, available online at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf>, accessed on June 15, 2018.

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THE STRATEGY FOR EVALUATING THE APPLICATION OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

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Abstract: From the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) the most dangerous are the biological weapons (BW) that use living organisms, which after their dissemination, can get out of control and their effects could thus be devastating. As such, BWs were the first WMDs to be prohibited by means of law by the United Nations (UN) thus in 1972, at Geneva, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was signed.

As a result, the necessity of a coherent strategy that could evaluate the application of the BTWC at a national and international level emerged and specific mechanisms of evaluating the convention’s application were created, including at UN level. Yet, because of the contradiction between, on the one hand the need for transparency and on the other hand the need for maintenance of the military secret, these evaluation methods were not efficient. As such, some states possess or could possess own BWs, creating a potential danger for the international community.

In this article we aim at presenting some elements of the strategy for evaluation of the application of the BTWC.

Keywords: CBRN protection, biological weapons, biological agents, toxins, international laws, BWTC 1972, evaluation, medical intelligence.

Introduction

Weapons of Mass Destruction) are divided into four categories: chemical biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN). Of these, the most dangerous are the biological weapons (BW) with living agents. This is because, on the one hand, compared with the chemical weapons, a small amount of toxin is needed to make hundreds of kilometers of damage in terms of weather conditions. On the other hand, BW after dissemination can easily escape from control, and the effects would be devastating for combatant, non-combatant and neutral camps as well as for the environment as biological agents affect fauna and flora. For example, in a study conducted by the US Congress on WMD, it was demonstrated that in the case of a single air strike in Washington DC, anthrax would dump between 1 and 3 million people as

opposed to an attack with a bomb with a megaton of hydrogen and ear dead between 0.5 and 1.9 million people¹.

As a result, BW were the first WMDs that were outlawed by the United Nations. In 1972, the Geneva Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) was signed. The convention includes prohibitions on research, manufacture, storage and use of living biological agents and their toxins in combat action. Convention regulations came into force only in 1975, but there were no clear rules on the development and results of the BTWC. Chemical weapons (CW) were banned in 1993, and in 1995, production and development of these weapons was governed by a ratification document. As for nuclear and radiological weapons, they have not yet been banned.

The Convention has been signed up to now by foreign ministers of approximately 90% of the nearly 200 states of the world, and about 90% of them have ratified it through the National Parliaments, being transposed into their national legislation. At the beginning of the 21st century, there were still 17 states that did not obey or abstain from this ban². Romania signed it in 1972 and ratified it only in 1979, because after 1968 it preferred to have an advantage over a possible assault of the USSR. At the same time, it is important to mention that Romania has never used BW for offensive purposes.

As a result, a consistent strategy for national and international verification of the application of the BTWC has been required. National and international verification mechanisms have been put in place to implement the Convention through specific mechanisms, including at UN level. For example, the national yearly reports provided by the Foreign Ministry of each country recorded in Geneva in the context of the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) mechanism. Each ministry centralizes national questionnaires that include quantitative and qualitative data from medical institutions related to biological agents. The questionnaires refer to institutions, addresses, facilities, personnel, endowments, legislation, scientific publications and biological products, "double cross-question", some of which can be doubled. Yearly, the UN publishes these online questionnaires to be available to specialists in the field. Other mechanism are field verifications (the verification is based on the statements of the representatives of the respective countries without the mechanisms for verifying the reported data).

Because of the contradiction between transparency and military secrecy, verifications were not effective. For example, the US does not allow international control on their territory. Also Iraq, which was confirmed by UN inspectors that had destroyed their WMD arsenal after the 1991 Gulf War, , in 2003 was accused by the US of having biological weapons to justify their invasion in the absence of an UN mandate. Moreover, some internationally recognized or unrecognized state entities resulting from the fragmentation of some larger states (*divide et impera*) have not been involved in recognizing the BTWC.

1. History

The process underpinning BW is called biotechnology. It dates back thousands of years, appearing with the discovery of the fermentation that people use to get the yeast for bread and get the wine. Towards the end of the nineteenth century it was discovered that

¹ Marie Isabelle Chevrier, Krzysztof Chomiczewski, Henri Garrigue, Gyorgy Granasztói, Malcolm R. Dando, PEARSON, Graham S., *The Implementation of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention*, volume 150; chapters 1.

² Recomandarea si monitorizarea terapiei biologice in bolile inflamatorii intestinale nespecifice (rectocolita ulcero-hemoragica si boala crohn, E-medic, November 08, 2013, available online at: <http://www.emedic.ro/Ghiduri-de-practica-medicala/Ghid-privind-recomandarea-si-monitorizarea-terapiei-biologice-in-bolile-inflamatorii-intestinale.htm>, accessed on October 28, 2018.

microorganisms and their products are at the heart of this process, thus generating science called microbiology. There are three important steps that have led to the development of this science, namely, the recognition of DNA as a genetic information carrier at the mid of 1940s, early 1950s, establishing the DNA structure and deciphering the genetic code, and the first artificial recombination of DNA in the early 1970s that led to the development of genetic engineering with which genetic changes can be realized.

The Geneva Convention attempted to regulate the use of genetic engineering for military purposes, but without having any verification methods for those who were already use it.

Although the Convention is very detailed, it is necessary to establish a verification mechanism. In the early 1990s, negotiations were launched to introduce a protocol including provisions on international scrutiny, but these negotiations failed in 2001 at the 5th Review Conference. The provisions of this meeting were summarized in paragraph 18: “At its eighth plenary meeting on 14 November 2002, the Conference decided by consensus, as follows:

- (a) To hold three annual meeting of the States parties of one week duration each year commencing in 2003 until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held not later than the end of 2006, to discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action on:
- i. The adaption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibition set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation;
 - ii. National mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins;
 - iii. Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of diseases;
 - iv. Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals and plants;
 - v. The content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists”³.

In order not to close the negotiations completely, the State Parties agreed that meetings should be held yearly to address a limited number of topics. Although these meetings make little contribution to the development of the Convention and the States Parties’ compliance with its provisions, they still draw attention to the individual obligations of the States Parties, as well as to the responsibility of scientists and those engaged in the field for the transformation of biological weapons agents.

In 1925, the Geneva Protocol concluded that many states agreed to prohibit the use of biological and chemical weapons, but not to prohibit the production or possession of such weapons. Thus, during the two World Wars between 1930 and 1960, there were numerous offensive programs of biological weapons in Japan, in the US and in the UK, and towards the end of the century, also in Russia. So, in 1972, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (shortly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention BTWC) was signed in Geneva. The Convention prohibits research, manufacture, storage and use of live agents and their toxins in combat activities. Then, in 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention was also signed, which provided for a ban on the research, manufacture, storage and use of chemical weapons. But, this time it also provided verification mechanisms for signatories to comply with the agreement. They had 10 years to destroy the reserves with the possibility of extending the period for another 5 years.

³ Marie Isabelle Chevrier, Krzysztof Chomiczewski, Henri Garrigue, Gyorgy Granasztói, Malcolm R. Dando, Pearson, Graham S., *art. cit.*

There have been numerous adherents of signatory states of the Convention in 1980, 1986, 1986, 1991. Within them, the Convention on the banning of BW has been updated according to new discoveries in microbiology, biotechnology and genetic engineering.

As with the Chemical Weapons Convention, it was necessary to create a coherent national and international verification strategy for the application of the BTWC. Thus, in 1992, in the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX) was set and, in 1994, the National and International Verification Strategy for BTWC implementation was launched at the Special Conference of the States Parties to the BTWC

2. 20th Century (Recent History)

After the events of the early twentieth century during the two world wars in which the programs on biological weapons were widely used by many states, the development in this field has taken hold. As such, more and more organisms have been considered for use in biological weapons with live agents (Anthrax, Variola, and Botulism). After 1969, the US continues their research program to find out whether viruses are being used as biological weapons just like bacteria. Also, with the advent of genetic engineering in 1980, there was a major interest in understanding the mechanism of toxin production with the help of it. To have an overview we can share the use of offensive biological weapons in three situations, namely using them on a small scale in World War I, their widespread use by Japan, the UK and the US and their large-scale use by Russia in the second half of the 20th century.

2.1. World War I

During the World War I, the horses were of particular importance to the fighting armies. Thus, there were suspicions on sabotage cases aiming to infect horses with biological agents. Also, many laboratories were discovered to study anthrax bacillus or morass bacillus. However, due to the numerous epidemics of that period, it was difficult to demonstrate the certainty of the use of biological weapons. Also Romania has been subjected to biological attacks from Germany

2.2. Biological weapon use by Japan, the UK and the US

In 1933, Japan began research on biological weapons on Chinese prisoners or on Chinese villages with anthrax, cholera, plague, etc., but the effectiveness of the biological bomb could not be demonstrated. In response to the action of Japan, in 1942, the development of research laboratories on biological weapons began, but there was no data on their use.

UK manufactured five million linseed-oil cattle cakes with a hole bored into them for addition of anthrax spores between 1942 and mid-1943. And the US offensive biological weapons program was instigated by President Franklin Roosevelt and the U.S. Secretary of War in October 1941. The U.S. developed anti-personnel and anti-crop biological weapons⁵.

2.3. Biological weapon use by Russia

There are not known details about the research or use of biological weapons by Russia. But in 1979 a pulmonary anthrax epidemic appeared in a group of researchers who were taking a laboratory to over 60 people who live there. After this incident, Russia closes the research program. Due to the very mild dissemination and devastating effects, the biological weapons were the first weapons of mass destruction prohibited by the 1972 Geneva

⁵ David R. Franz, Cheryl D. Parrott, Ernest T. Takafuji, "The U.S. biological warfare and biological defense programs", in *Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, Air University, USA, available online at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/medaspec/Ch-19electrv699.pdf>, accessed on October 28, 2018.

Convention. However, in 1976 some mayors of some US cities received some letters whose seal was impregnated with deadly germs.

In 1991, during the Gulf War, Iraq threatened to use biological weapons, thus violating the treaty. He also led a program to manufacture anthrax and other biological agents. As a result of this violation, Iraq has been forced to destroy all its reserves of biological agents, as confirmed by ONU inspectors.

In response to the violation of the Convention by Iraq, President Clinton declared in 1993: "One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether they are nuclear, chemical and biological; and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away. If we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure". Another attempt to disseminate chemical and biological agents took place at the Tokyo subway in 1995 (Aum Shinrikyo sect)⁶. Following the investigation after this event, it was discovered that this sect also researched botulin toxin and anthrax, and would release these biological agents. This sect also participated in the treatment of Ebola in Zaire in 1992, where it obtained strains of Ebola which it intended to bring to Japan to cultivate them.

A Chicago extremist was discovered in 1972 to have types of typhoid bacilli with which he intended to pollute water, thus spreading bacteria and affecting many people⁷.

All of these events have led to increased stringency in respecting the Geneva Convention by applying national and international measures such as⁸ the purchase of chemical and biological weapons is totally forbidden, with strict control measures in place; purchasing the materials and equipment needed to manufacture these weapons became much more complicated, with all exports being carefully monitored and controlled; this strictness of the protective measures has led to a decrease in the number of chemical and biological weapons in the world; the existing repercussions on the state using these weapons and in violation of the international protocol led to a good understanding that chemical and biological weapons are totally forbidden.

3. XXI Century (present and future)

Although almost 90% of the world's states signed the Geneva Convention, ratified it in the national parliaments, and imposed numerous national and international verification strategies, the use of biological agents continued.

Thus, in 2001, a publisher of unified tabloids died in the United States after inhaling bacilli that caused anthrax. Following a thorough investigation, traces of the pathogen were found at the publisher's office. In the same year, two post employees died and two others were hospitalized after they had inhaled anthrax spores. They had delivered three letters with anthrax spores in Washington DC, which were for a Senate member and two other journalists.

Over time, science has evolved into new discoveries in the scientific world, appearing new pathogens that can cause infections, disease and even deaths.

Unfortunately, many scientists who have worked in such biological weapons research laboratories since the end of the Cold War have returned to their countries of origin, suspected that they have given information about these weapons to certain groups.(ex col Alibekov worked in URSS and then he left in SUA)

Following bioterrorist incidents and the evolution of science, a professor at Tel Aviv University said in an interview that there will be two major problems in the future: terrorists

⁶ Malcolm R Dando, Graham S. Pearson, Tibor TOTH, *Verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention*, NATO ASI Series – series 1: Disarmament Technologies, volume 32, chapters 1-2, 2000.

⁷ Idem.

will consider the over-classical method of shipping anthrax-infected envelopes and might think about contamination of building ventilation systems and spraying pathogens on the plane; there is a risk of terrorists replacing anthrax spores with pathogens of diseases such as pestilence or hemorrhagic fever.

Many countries have supported offensive programs for the production and storage of biological weapons. There about the use of material and information technology on this type of weapon by both countries and by numerous terrorist groups. For example, in 2005, a handbook for producing a cyanide dispersion mechanism appears on the Al-Qaeda website⁸. This mechanism can also be used to disperse other substances. Lately, the terrorists have tried to acquire or have declared many times that they hold biological weapons. Also, many states now hold or could hold legal or illegal biological weapons, creating a potential threat to the international community.

Although there are national and international verification strategies on compliance, these are in contradiction with keeping military secrecy in a country. Thus, it is very difficult to monitor compliance with the Convention by all the signatory states. So, many states have begun to take precautions against the risk of a biological weapon attack. In France, the BIOTOX plan was developed by which the smallpox vaccine stocks were reintroduced, a laboratory working 24 hours a day for those, the chlorine concentration in the water was increased to combat future contamination, and there was an institute responsible for early detection of possible contamination⁹. Also, states such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and the US have developed and conducted subway exercises in case of biological attack. Not only France has reintroduced its stocks of smallpox vaccines, it has also been done by states like the US, Australia and Germany.

Due to the very mild possibility of spreading epidemics through a biological attack, the response to such an incident must be taken internationally. Thus, the World Health Organization has taken into account seven class A pathogens that can be easily spread on a large scale and may cause diseases such as: anthrax, smallpox, Ebola, pestilence, brucellosis, botulism and may be lethal. Details of these agents are found in Table no. 1.

Table no. 1: Class A pathogens¹⁰

	Anthrax	Smallpox	Botulism	Hemo- rrhagic fever	Pulmo- nary fever	Tula- remia	Bruce- llosis
Disease name	Bacillus	Ortho-	Clostridium	Filovirus	Yersinia	Francisell	Brucella
Nature	Bacteria	Virus	Toxin	Virus	Bacteria	Bacteria	Bacteria
Treatment	Yes	Partially	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incubation	2-5 days	12-14 days	12-32 hours	3-21 days	2-5 days	1-10 days	5-21 days
Death rate	100%	15-45%	100%	90%	100%	10%	5%
Contagion	Nula	Strong	Nula	Strong	Strong	Soft	Soft
Contamina- -tion	Inhalation	Inhalation	Ingestion	Contact	Inhalation	Inhalation Contact	Inhalation Contact
Vaccine	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes

⁸ PAUN, Ludovic, *Bioterorismul si armele biologice*, Editura Amaltea, București, 2003, <https://issuu.com/edituraamaltea/docs/bioterorismul>, accessed on August 21, 2018.

⁹ Serviciul Român de Informații, *Bioterorismul si armele biologice in lume*, Centrul de Informare pentru Cultura de Securitate, București, 2008, <https://www.sri.ro/upload/Brosura%20Bioterorism.pdf>

¹⁰ Serviciul Român de Informații, *Bioterorismul si armele biologice in lume*, Centrul de Informare pentru Cultura de Securitate, București, 2008, available online at, <https://www.sri.ro/upload/Brosura%20Bioterorism.pdf>, accessed on October 28, 2018.

In this context, it is important and medical intelligence that through scientific and technical documentation at international level can detect possible research attempts for cultivation, conditioning, storage, experimentation, production, or the use of biological agents of war (BAW) and/or BW.

4. Comments

Biological weapons are the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction because they can easily spread many pathogens that can lead to epidemics for humans, animals and plants. They can escape very easily from control and lead to enormous destruction among the two combatants and non-combatants.

The first uses of biological attacks date back to 1300, when the Tartars attempted to siege today's Crimea and pillage corpses to spread the disease. With the scientific development and new discoveries of genetic engineering, the biological weapons became more prominent as the one being used in the two World Wars on both camps causing major damage, although most states signed a protocol to ban biological and chemical weapons in 1925.

In an attempt to halt the widespread use of this type of weapon in 1972, the Geneva Convention banning the research, manufacture, storage and use of living biological agents and their toxins in combat activities was signed. Unfortunately, strategies to verify the implementation of the Convention have not been developed. In view of clarifying the methods of controlling compliance with the Convention and the numerous violations of the Convention, there have been reintroductions of the 5-year Convention and Ad Hoc Conventions.

To date, the Convention has been signed by 182 countries, of which about 90% have ratified it in Parliament. Romania also signed the Geneva Convention in 1972, but ratified it only in 1979 because it wanted to have an asset in front of Russia after 1968. Our country has never used offensive biological weapons.

Even after the signing of this Convention there have been many states that have violated it. Some of them have not signed it from the beginning. Thus, at the beginning of the 21st century there are 17 states that did not obey or abstain from this ban. In this situation, it is necessary at international level to implement legal measures on the application of the BTWC. On the international level, the UN is the only one able to impose and control the application of the Convention with the help of the Security Council and the World Health Organization. Thus, the UN yearly sends reports to the CBM on the use of pathogens in each country.

Conclusion

International law forbids biological and toxin weapons from research to use, including through the BTWC 1972. Thus, under the Geneva Convention, signatory states are forbidden research, manufacture, storage and use of living biological agents and their toxins in combat action.

The application of this legislation is different due to military secrecy and requires a constant effort of the international community. Because the international situation is changing, new states are emerging, and some non-state states / organizations (Aum, ISIS) do not respect the Convention.

The strategy for verifying the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should be permanently to be a real and useful tool in preventing biological warfare.

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STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES USED FOR SHAPING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

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Abstract: *The complexity of today's operational environment entails a series of activities and actions aimed to prepare it before acting or introducing forces in order to conduct military actions. These activities / actions are designed to shape the operational environment, in such a way that, the success of the forces operating in that area would be largely assured. Shaping the operational environment is a detailed process, from political-strategic to tactical level that involves detailed planning and precise execution over a variable period of time from years to hours or minutes. The means, capabilities, or „tools” through which this is accomplished, is what we intend to detail in this paper.*

Keywords: *shaping, operational environment, capabilities, unconventional components, special operation forces, asymmetric.*

Introduction

If we take a look through history, we can quite easily realize that, there was no war or conflict without having some structures that prepared the main forces actions or operations. In military vocabulary we say that, those forces were shaping the operational environment.

Shaping operation is an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through generating effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain, also by creating and/or preserving conditions for the success in the decisive operation. Of crucial importance in shaping the operational environment is the influence not only of the opponent but also of the neutral parts or those acting alongside their own forces.

In order to obtain the most proper operational environment, almost all forces are using for that, unconventional elements and actions. Unconventional components are all other forces and weapons, other than regular/conventional forces. Here we may include: Special Operations Forces (SOF); Insurgents; Terrorists; Guerrillas; Mercenaries; Criminal organizations; INFOOPS and PSYOPS; Economic actions/operations; Electronic warfare; Cyber warfare; Psychotronic actions/operations; Geophysical actions/operations.

1. Special Operations Forces (SOF)

A particularly important component most commonly used for shaping the operational environment stands for the Special Operations Forces. With these types of forces infiltrated

into the territory of the threatened state, many types of operative and strategic objectives can be accomplished.

Special operations forces are forces specially designed, organized, trained and equipped to carry out and support special operations¹.

Special operations are military actions performed by forces specially designed, organized, trained and equipped, using techniques, tactics and procedures distinct from those used by conventional forces in order to achieve military, political, economic, and informational objectives at tactical, operative level and strategic².

These actions are executed in the whole spectrum of military operations, independently or in cooperation with conventional forces operations, to achieve political, military or psychological military objectives. The political-military implications of these actions may require the secret operation of special operations forces or the use of hidden operating techniques and the acceptance of a higher level of physical and political risk than in conventional operation.

To shape the operational environment, SOF can be infiltrated in the future area of operations in order to influence the population or to train and prepare some paramilitary troops, and also to execute direct actions. Direct actions are high precision operations, normally limited in purpose and duration. These actions normally involve a planned withdrawal from the immediate vicinity of the target, and focuses on specific, well defined, strategic or operational value targets, or in the context of decisive tactical operations. SOF can carry out these types of missions independently or with the support of conventional forces. Direct actions include the following: raids, ambushes, direct assault, end-to-end routing operations, personnel recovery operations, precision damages.

Special Operations forces are forces that require a long period of time to generate, with much higher costs than a similar conventional unit. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to provide continuous and decisive support for the political and military factors. The process of selecting, training, providing weapons and military systems and using the Special Operations Forces is complex and lasting.

2. Insurgents

Insurgency is an organized movement aimed at overthrowing a government constituted by the use of subversive methods and means and the armed conflict. Insurgency is a confrontation inside a state and is not a confrontation between states. Normally, there is a long-standing political and military conflict aimed at weakening the power, control, and legitimacy of the ruling regime, while enhancing the insurgents' power, control and legitimacy³.

Insurgent groups do not have organizational rules or specific equipment. Mission types, the environment, geographic factors and many other factors determine the configuration and composition of each insurgent organization as well as its subordinate cells. A powerful insurgency organization can include organizations at regional, provincial, district, national and transnational levels. Such organizations are usually formed by local insurgents and guerrilla organizations. Once this type of organizations grows and grows, it forms a political headquarters to communicate with the people in the area, with supporters from

¹ S.M.G.-103, *Doctrina Armatei României (In English: Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine)*, Bucharest, 2012, p. 154.

² *Doctrina Forțelor pentru Operații Speciale (In English: Special Operations Forces Doctrine)*, Bucharest, 2003, p. 5.

³ FT-5, *Manualul operațiilor de contrainsurgență (In English: Counterinsurgency operations Manual)*, Bucharest, 2011, p. 9.

outside and with their opponents or enemies. Their leaders direct the insurgent paramilitary forces and ensure that they remain focused on achieving long-term political goals.

Achieving success by the insurgent movement requires the use of both non-violent tactics and violent tactics. Predominant forms of non-violent warfare are subversive actions and propaganda actions.

The violent tactics used by insurgent forces are characterized by surprise, speed, and hard to anticipate results. In the early stages of the insurgency movement, terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare are used alternately. In the last stage of evolution, the predominant use of conventional operations is estimated. Four major categories of violent tactics used by insurgents have been identified terrorism, guerrilla tactics, conventional tactics and illegal activities.

Insurgent actions are used to influence the operational environment, by setting up some insurgent movement in order to disorganize the situation in area of operations, and conducting violent actions to evade attention from the future actions.

3. Terrorists

A *terrorist* is a person who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence with the aim to achieving political, religious or ideological goals, while a terrorist group is any number of terrorists who act together to commit an act or acts of violence or threat of violence in order to achieve the proposed political, religious or ideological objectives. In view of affiliation with governments or organizations, terrorist groups may be directed by different states, sponsored/funded by states, or sponsored / funded by non-state organizations, in order to shape the operational environment for the following actions/operations. In some cases, the state itself may be a terrorist regime.

Given their increasingly frequent presence in the media, the terms „insurgency” and „terrorism” (and especially „insurgent” and „terrorist”) are often mistaken or misused. Confusion is so common that surprisingly it can go unnoticed even for specialist editorial staff of prestigious press institutions, or in the work of specialists.

To explain the two terms, it is enough to present the relationship between them: insurgency is a political move, while terrorism (like guerrilla warfare) is a tactic subordinated to the pursuit of the aims of a political movement (insurgency).

In conclusion, insurgency is a popular movement that aims to achieve / change a state of affairs, using tactics such as: political activity, insurrection, propaganda, terrorism, etc. Insurgency leads to an asymmetric struggle against state power and conventional forces.

Terrorism is pure violence against civilians, politically motivated, with the aim of imposing fear. Terrorism can be a part of the insurgency arsenal.

4. Guerrilla

Another component of irregular forces is guerrilla. American publications define *guerrilla war* as „*military and paramilitary operations deployed by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces in hostile territory occupied by the enemy*”⁴.

Modern guerilla warfare is a manifestation of armed struggle, obeys its laws and principles, and has causes and effects, taking shape through specific means, pathways, and finality. Traditionally, the war of guerrilla meant the struggle of the weak against the strong, the occupied against the invader, the rebel against the regime, the subject against the

⁴ US Department of Defense, *Joint Publications (JP) 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, April 26, 2007, p. GL-11.

oppressor, the fight under certain conditions, usually with the support of a part of the population⁵.

Guerrilla tactics is the weapon of poor/weak structures with a multitude of techniques, methods, and processes that weaken the enemy's military potential while preserving its own potential. Simplicity, clandestine action, long-lasting operational manifestation, lack of formal attributes specific to regular forces, and the possibility of using some tricks to avoid the enemy strikes and to hit him heavily, are all characteristic elements of guerrilla tactics.

Guerrilla tactics can be understood as a materialization of "hit and run" operations, with the action-reaction binomial, seen as a reference during the engage stages. Thus attack a weak enemy - retreat when attacked a strong enemy and attack when you have made the surprise - disappear when you were discovered by the enemy. Effective guerrilla avoids being discovered, does not openly engage a strong enemy, puts his opponent in the dilemma, and always strikes by surprise.

5. Mercenaries

Mercenary is a foreign soldier hired in an army (), who makes any kind of services, for money or for some material advantage.

According to art 47 from the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions from 12 August 1949 regarding Protection of International Armed Conflict Victims, a mercenary is not entitled to status as a combatant or prisoner of war. By mercenary term we understand any person:

- Who is specifically recruited in the country or abroad to fight in an armed conflict;
- Who, in fact, takes part in hostilities;
- Who takes part in hostilities in order to obtain a personal advantage and which is effectively promised by a party to the conflict or on its behalf, a remuneration superior to that promised or paid to combatants having a similar degree and function in the forces army of this party;
- Who is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of the territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
- Who is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict;
- Which has not been sent by a state other than a party to the conflict in an official engagement as a member of the armed forces of that state.

Due to the fact that the mercenary retains money as its main motivation, the term itself has got a negative connotation.

They also can be used for shaping the operational environment and can be hired to perform different tasks in the operating area. In many cases they can perform similar actions to those of special operation forces.

6. Criminal organizations

Criminal organizations are normally independent of state control. Often, they extend their influence across borders to operate at regional or global level, including a component of political influence. That's why they can be a tool used for shaping the operational environment and create special conditions of disorder in area of operations.

Some specialists from the countries where *organized crime* has deep roots and is permanently manifested in the everyday life of society, it is defined by the existence of

⁵ Valerică Cruceru, *Elemente de artă militară întâlnite în războiul de gherilă modern*, Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, Nr. 2/2013, “Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, p. 2.

criminal groups structured in the idea of carrying out illegal conspiracy activities, with the main purpose of obtaining illicit profits at odds particularly high. The complex arsenal of these groups of offenders includes, in varying proportions, the use of violence, blackmail, labor extortion, drug trafficking, gambling, usury, kidnapping, prostitution, counterfeiting and placement of false payment, smuggling, tax evasion, the corruption of public officials and even seemingly legal actions but with tortuous consequences. All of these have the purpose of generating substantial incomes, which are channeled into resuming criminal activity at higher levels with a higher degree of social danger, including penetrating and controlling organisms' power and state administration.

When their interests coincide, criminal organizations are affiliated with other actors such as paramilitary forces. Groups of insurgents, or guerrilla type organization controlling or operating in the same region with a criminal organization, can provide them security and protection, in exchange for financial support, information, weapons, materials and general logistic support.

Guerrilla or insurgent organizations can create diversionary actions or perform reconnaissance and early warning, money laundering, smuggling, transportation and civic actions on behalf of a criminal organization. Their mutual interests may include preventing government forces from intervening in their activities.

In some circumstances, criminal organizations may be affiliated with state military or paramilitary organizations. During an armed conflict or in support to an insurrection, a country may encourage or support criminal organizations committing acts that would destabilize civilian control in a neighboring state.

7. INFOOPS and PSYOPS

In the Romanian Army Doctrine we find the information and psychological operations explained:

- *Information operations* - military actions coordinated and conducted to influence the decision-making process of an adversary to support the achievement of political and military objectives by influencing its will while protecting its own commanders and processes⁶.

- *Psychological operations* - psychological activities planned and conducted to influence attitudes and behaviors that affect the achievement of political and military objectives⁷.

While propaganda, advertising or publicity are common terms for everybody, information operations (with the NATO acronym INFOOPS and American version IO) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are terms that only a few persons from military, political, and academics can say they know what it is about. Finally, the notion of public relations or PR (Public Relations in European Terminology) or PA (Public Affairs in North American Terminology) tends to gain its identity in public consciousness with more and more accuracy due to its applicability, alike commercial and institutional ones. All of these terms are used in connection with the people's tendency influence, persuade or simply impress other people, with or without a definite purpose, and in a more or less honest manner.

The INFOOPS field is defined by three pillars: people, opinion leaders and decision makers, then hard systems, computer networks and data processing, and finally processes linking system leaders, such as organizational structures: techniques, tactics, procedures.

⁶ S.M.G.-103, *Doctrina Armatei României (In English: Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine)*, Bucharest, 2012, p. 160.

⁷ *Idem*.

Within this spectrum, information operations are co-ordinated, continuously moving processes that bring together diplomatic, political and military activities to influence adversary decision makers in meeting the objectives. On the other hand, military intelligence operations are those coordinated actions to influence leaders and decision makers to support the achievement of the proposed objectives by affecting information, systems and processes based on their information, simultaneously with the exploitation and protection of their own information and systems based on information.

On the other hand PSYOPS are conducted to directly transmit selected information and indicators to governments, groups and individuals belonging to a hostile, allied or neutral camp, to influence emotions, attitudes, motives, perceptions, the judgments and ultimately their decisions and behavior, in order to achieve political and military objectives.

8. Geophysical operations/actions

Until now, the most powerful and effective weapons were weapons of mass destruction, such as the atomic, neutron, and hydrogen bombs, so that 27,000 such atomic bombs were gathered on the planet, capable of destroying 12 times the planet. Being so destructive, these weapons have become ineffective and there were developed sophisticated weapons such as psychotronic weapons, geophysical weapons and climatronic weapons.

The *geophysical war* known in the literature as *ecological* or *geoclimatic war* is a form of manifestation of total warfare in which means and methods are used to modify the natural environment so great that it forces the opponent to cease fighting, even to surrender unconditionally.

The most important ways of this type of war are:

- Various methods of creating rain on demand by spreading aerosols into the atmosphere by means of so-called meteorological missiles;

- The destruction of the hail clouds and the decompensation of the areas threatened by storms with rockets and large caliber projectiles. The Americans also used this method in Vietnam to cause rain on the route by which North Vietnam supplied with weapons the Communist troops in South Vietnam;

- Detonation of high explosive loads at certain points of tectonic plate jointing, can cause earthquakes in precisely established areas;

- Artificial landslides may be created in areas where tectonic destabilization is intended. Also there is the possibility of activating volcanoes. As a tool of initiating such ordered phenomena, nuclear charges are used (detonated even thousands of kilometers away from the place where the devastating earthquakes will be triggered) or oscillators on ultra-low or ultra-high frequencies;

- Real storms of fire can be created with high power lasers, also from the artificial satellites, devastating fires at any point in the globe;

One of the advantages of this type of war is the possibility of using these techniques in secret against the opponent, without knowing that he is the victim of a premeditated aggression.

9. Psychotronic operations/actions

Psychotronic weapons work on the human psyche by altering its state of normality. There are two types of such weapons: psychotropic and psychotronic.

Psychotropic weapons are a category of substances that have recently appeared. Psychotropic substances are natural or synthetic compounds inoculated olfactory, intramuscular, alimentary, and capable of generating in the healthy people the most different

physical or mental abnormalities, to perform the most different tasks. These substances generate psychic and mental destructions that are manifested by a sudden change in human behavior. The psychosis state generated by certain psychotropic compounds is analogous to the schizophrenia illness. Some of these substances are capable of generating an inability to coordinate movements, temporary blindness, deafness, vomiting and suddenly can alter blood pressure. There are substances that can be used for military purposes with effects of sedation, relaxation (tranquilizing) that generates apathy, indifference, lethargy, negative influences on thinking, generates the inability to focus and to think⁸.

Psychotronic weapons are a complex of influences that destroy the nervous system, the heart, the bile, the pancreas, the liver, it generates artificial dyskinesia of the bile ducts, sexual organs and urinary tract, intestinal tract, desynchronizes and stops brain activity, strained, back, kidneys, neck, wrists, destroys teeth, infects the body with microbes, viruses, staphylococci, streptococci, so the ultimate goal of the weapon is to destroy the man or to skew it⁹.

Categories of psychotronic weapons:

- Extremely high-frequency psychotronic weapons range from 30 ghz to 300 ghz. Such a weapon may destroy, in a hidden way, a brain center at a certain distance, trigger the destruction or complete shutdown of any vital system.

- Psychotronic weapons operating on the basis of ultradimetric frequencies from 300 mhz to 3 ghz. The wavelength ranges from one meter to 10 cm. This weapon can penetrate deeply the human body and, as a result, it can activate or generate carcinogenic cells, so that over a period of time, man naturally dies of cancer. Such a weapon is not capable of instantly destroying a victim like a firearm. Instead, the result of death always seems to be natural.

- Psychotronic weapons based on higher radiation and frequencies, 3000 mhz, like the microwave. These are the strongest waves, almost identical to those in the microwave. To initiate these waves, a telephone cable, TV, telephone, fire-fighting weapons or radio networks can be used very efficiently. Such a straightened weapon, which carries a man or more, usually generates spasms of the legs, burns in the soles, sore throat, eye bites, crackling headaches, vomiting and headaches.

- Psychotronic weapons based on ultrasounds, operate on wavelengths of about 0.017 meters and frequency bigger than 30khz. Such a weapon can be used to inhibit the immune system of the body. Scientists say that ultrasound can suddenly stop every man's heart, and pricking certain areas of the brain with ultrasound can wipe out some parts of memory.

- Weapons based on infrared radiation, wavelength 17 m with frequency less than 17 hz. The most dangerous range is considered to be from 6 hz-9 hz. During this time, man feels that his brain will explode. A sound with such insensitivity generates vomiting, sounds in the ears, distortion and destruction of sight, or an unconscious fear. Such a weapon can easily be used as a weapon of mass destruction. On the same principle, many civilian devices operate, with smaller effects, aimed at scaring dogs, rats, other animals.

- The weapon that uses the 25th frame. The weapon was successfully used by Stalin and Hitler. In the last period of time, remarkable improvements have been made to this principle and the new findings have been successfully used in Chechnya. Our eye is built in such a way that the film is only possible due to the inertia of perception, in other words the rate of excitement of the receptors. If you mount the 25th frame with a certain image, then an image will appear for 1/25 seconds. If the image is very bright, we will see it and it will bother us, we will somehow perceive it as a small flash on the screen. If it is too dark compared to the

⁸ Adrian Pop, *Psihotronica războiul viitorului*, available online at: <http://www.sfatulbatranilor.ro/threads/5350-Psihotronica-%E2%80%93-razboiul-viitorului?s=3dfaae16564b0f8e8ae0f985f4f2abe9>, accessed on September 27, 2018.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

other 24 cadres, it will not be remarked, so it will become ineffective. If the 25th frame meets certain general background conditions, then it will be quickly perceived by the eyes, thrown into the subconscious, and will produce effects (desires, affects, dispositions, etc.).

Much of the psychotronic weapons are not made to kill, their task is to produce influences of the most diverse types with the most different purposes. For this reason, many scientists tend to call them psychotronic or psychotropic influence means and they are very useful in order to create proper conditions in area of operations.

10. Economic operations/actions

Generally, *economic warfare* includes the use of economic instruments to force the opponent to change their policy or behavior, or to undermine the state's ability to maintain normal relations with other states. Such a war can be defined by „*aggressive use of economic means to achieve national goals*”¹⁰. We could add also, the threat of using these means to weaken the opponent's economy, which would reduce its political and military power. The economic war is in fact a post-competitive phase in which loyal competition turns into unfair competition, then in crisis, and eventually degenerates into a conflict in the process of conquering markets and dominating the resource space.

Economic wars are characterized by continuity, both in peacetime and in wartime.

The actors of the current economic confrontation use a wide variety of tools and methods to influence the strategies and policies of governments. These “tools”, in terms of exigency of application and effects, are: public appeals, political-diplomatic approaches, judicial measures, non-economic sanctions, economic sanctions, military action. Also, the maneuvers and procedures used in the economic war are diverse: from embargoes, boycotts, blockades, customs barriers, royalty, production quotas or import / export to dumping and monopoly policies, alliances, takeovers and mergers or even espionage, naval piracy and “economic terrorism”.

Other specific economic measures that may be adopted against the other states are: withdrawal of economic and financial assistance from the international community, limit or restrict investments, freezing and seizing external accounts and possessions, hampering the free development of bi- and multilateral economic exchanges, declaring that the economic and financial, bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties involving the state concerned are void and inoperative, non-compliance with contractual rights and obligations, exclusion from regional and international economic and financial organizations.

11. Electronic warfare

The increasingly important role and the increasing number of electronic means in modern military actions have forced the emergence of a new concept and a new weapon, the *electronic warfare*.

Electromagnetic spectrum domination is a crucial component of most modern military operations based on the intense use of information, communications and electronics systems in general. If these systems are destroyed, degraded or knocked down, then the commander cannot achieve an effective command, being metaphorically blind, deaf and dumb.

The *electronic war* comprises all military actions involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, counteract, reduce and prevent actions in the electromagnetic space, as well as measures to ensure the safe conduct of the actions of its own and/or allied forces.

¹⁰ DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, *Economic Warfare*, available online at: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/e/01830.html, accessed on September 28, 2018.

The strategic goal of electronic warfare is to control and use the electromagnetic spectrum to maximize the efficiency of the military operations of its own troops, to produce the forbidding, interruption, degradation, confusion in the use of the entire electromagnetic spectrum, while ensuring its full use by its own troops and/or allies.

Electronic warfare activities have direct and/or indirect action on all military, conventional or unconventional military operations. In peacetime, the specialized armed forces are trying to intercept, locate and identify the electronic emission sources of potential enemies.

12. Cyber warfare

The way the war is worn has changed with the emergence of the new battle space: cyber space. The battlefield is made up of five dimensions: air, land, maritime, cosmic (space) and cybernetic (informational). All of these dimensions are interdependent, with overlapping areas, so that elements of cyber space are physically located within all other areas. Cyber war is one of the planet's major threats, and military specialists are demanding the change of international law to face the challenges.

In order to shape the operational environment, states can execute the most sophisticated attacks. Through these they aim to achieve the following objectives:

- Obtaining information about political, economic or military plans and capabilities;
- direct or indirect subversive attacks on military and commercial communications and information systems in the area of operations or against elements that can contribute to the fulfillment of missions;
- Blocking access to media resources and strategic communication channels;
- Coordinated and synchronized actions through interconnected physical and virtual networks using internet connectivity and exploiting individual access networks or systems to achieve punctual objectives.

Another category of attackers is hackers and activist groups, politically motivated. They may be supported or sponsored by government bodies and aim to achieve the following objectives:

- The challenge of interruptions of networks and systems that cause image or financial damage;
- Media coverage through attacks on web sites and on-line public and private services;
- Exploitation of media resources and web sites for propaganda.

Conclusions

The shaping of the operational environment is essential before the start of any conventional military operations. The more detailed it is planned and executed, the easier it is to achieve the military objectives. Sometimes there is no need for conventional armed forces to intervene to win a conflict.

As it has been seen in the present paper, the means and capabilities through which the shaping of the operational environment can be obtained are quite varied. Not all of these are always used. On the contrary, in most cases, only some of them are used, due to the fact that not all actors have the possibility to use them, or simply because they do not all work in different cases.

The beginning of these types of operations can be long before the intervention of conventional forces. For example, economic operations take time to prepare and use them. It may take a few years. Other capabilities can be used immediately without the need for a long time to prepare them.

The end of their use is not determined by the beginning or ending of the armed conflict itself. They can continue after the conflict ends, until the proposed goals have been achieved.

Using these capabilities leads us to an asymmetric or hybrid war where their combined use creates surprise being very difficult to anticipate or counter it. The actual war is essentially based on asymmetry without the use of classical doctrinal lines. The use of classic conventional strategies leads to operations where the opponent's reaction will be a swift and tough one. That's why preparing the area of operations for the future actions is essential.

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SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND THE ROLE OF EXPERTISE IN CREATING DEFENSE POLICIES AND SECURITY STRATEGIES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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Abstract: *In the Russian Federation, the process of public policy elaboration has the imprint of the recent past, but also of the illiberal political regime. In Russian society there are various types of expertise communities that carry out research projects, analyze, elaborate strategic documents etc. Yet others are the actors that influence the decision-making process. “Siloviki”¹ - building power that unites the armed forces, law enforcement and intelligence services, with common identity, with a shared world view, and a personal loyalty to Putin.*

The Russian authorities are very closed to the debate and are reluctant to rely on any expertise other than that provided by government agencies. The role of the expert communities in the decision-making process is “close to zero” because officials make decisions based on secret information and usually stress that any external expertise is irrelevant.

Keywords: *expertise, security strategy, defense policies, community of experts, Russian Federation, decision-making process*

Introduction

The Russian Federation's behavior towards Ukraine has surprised most of Western foreign policy observers. The way in which most governments reacted to the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Donbas by Russia, but also to other actions and statements made by politicians or by some high-ranking military in Moscow, starting in 2014, that the West has little information about how to build public policies in general, but also those in the field of Russian diplomacy and security.

Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev believes that anyone who tries to understand the actions of Russian decision-makers “*has to forget the traditional norms and logic as it exists in the democratic nations*”². His observation does not refer only to the differences between the current democratic and authoritarian regimes, but also to the repercussions of the historical experiences that shaped Russia both as a feudal domain and as a socialist state (in the form of the USSR) and superpower during the Cold War. This implies that any attempt to design one's own attitude directly over the other can be particularly deceptive in terms of Russia. Therefore, we need to examine some fundamental assumptions of the Russian elite, which

¹ The term silovik, literally translated as “person of force” (from Russian сила, “force”), originated with the phrase “institutions of force” (Russian: силовые структуры), which appeared in the earlier Boris Yeltsin era (early 1990s) to denote the military-style uniformed services, including the military proper, the police (Ministry of Interior), national security (FSB) organisations and some other structures.

² Susan Stewart, *Fundamental Attitudes of the Russian Political Elite. Law, Truth, Public Welfare and Violence*, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Paper, Berlin, 2017, p. 5.

play a role in political decisions in both internal and external politics, but also how this elite takes or disregards the views and ideas of scientific research in the field of international relations and security studies.

1. The Role of Scientific Expertise in Building Public Policies in Contemporary Russian Society

In modern Russia, as in the whole world, social-political life is becoming more and more complex, due to the increase in the freedom to disseminate information, to activate civil society and to increase the number of political actors. In this situation, the community of experts from different fields of scientific research begins to play a special role in the process of making important political decisions in this country that has not only a separate history in relation to Western societies but also difficult evolutions to put in patterns. Unlike Western societies, the process of public policy-making in Russia is shaped by the recent past as well as by the illiberal political regime.

There are few cases where the role of expertise is diminished or even falsified. Alexandr Iurecivici Sungurov, referring to this point, appreciated that politicians do not always want to get expert answers to questions that appear in public policy making and mimic their consultation to show the public that they consulted with “experts to improve the legitimacy of the decision already in force, in other words, using the symbolic capital of the experts. In such cases, we can only speak of the symbolic function of specialized knowledge”³.

Sungurov’s opinion is not singular among field specialists. Vladimir Rimsky, in an article published more than a decade ago, showed that in Russia, politicians do not have a correct understanding of what politics means because they only associate it with the struggle to reach the government, and in these conditions the experts are used only in electoral campaigns and therefore expect civil society “to legitimize their power”⁴.

A better understanding of these situations will therefore be useful in defining more realistically the spectrum of policy-making actions and their application in practice in Russia. The academic debate highlights the fact that there are two major currents of opinion in this respect. One that focuses on the role of the political personality that forces its will in building public policies, and another emphasizes the role of the political institution that prevails.

According to some Western specialists, one can speak of personalism and institutionalism in the elaboration of public policies in the Russian Federation⁵. The predominant opinion highlights the humanist nature of policymaking within the political regime that has been operating in recent years in Russian society. This vision is an extension of the long tradition of conceptualizing the Russian political system as patrimonial and despotic. According to this characterization, important decisions in the country are made by the executive director and/or by a small circle of officials and chroniclers surrounding him. The Kremlin political elites argue that, in order to maintain the spirit of national unity, Russia must develop within its own political and social system, without sterile confrontations

³ Sungurov Aleksandr Yur'yevich, *Роль и функции экспертов в процессе принятия властных решений*, in *Управленческое Консультирование*, (In English: “The role and function of experts in the process of making powerful decisions” in *Management Advice*), № 6. 2017, p. 9.

⁴ Vladimir Rimsky, *Роль экспертного сообщества в российской публичной политике*, in «Агентство Политических Новостей – Нижний Новгород» (In English: “The role of the expert community in Russian public policy”, in *Agency of Political News - Nizhny Novgorod*), February 01, 2006, available online at: <http://apn-nn.com/87611-400709.html>, accessed on October 20, 2018.

⁵ Stephen Fortescue, *Institutionalization and Personalism in the Policymaking Process of the Soviet Union and PostSoviet Russia*, in Stephen Fortescue (ed.), *Russian Politics from Lenin to Putin*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2010, p. 22.

between distinct political parties, without independent media, and without an unprofitable civil society.

“Siloviki” in Putin's entourage claim that this kind of regime is best suited to ending the exhausting anarchy in the post-communist transition period, to minimize the geopolitical vulnerability of the country and to ensure security in a state with vast territories in Europe and Asia. Putin, on the other hand, claims to be the guarantor of a powerful state, but in reality he weakens and discredits public institutions. The structure on which it is based is the Presidential Administration, an expanded cabinet that doubles government and works closely with business and information networks⁶.

In such socio-political conditions, the process of public policy-making is condemned to remain dependent on only one direction, the state budget. The professional community of social, economic and political experts is thus required to comply with state requirements on the content of their activities. This being the largest “consumer” of expertise and consultancy services in these areas, also requires research and analysis directions. Indirectly, the Russian state also controls the private market because many of the companies linked by state-owned enterprises are subject to imposed constraints. Medium and small businesses in Russia are traditionally not willing to spend their resources for research and analysis. Nonprofit organizations and civil society structures often do not have sufficient financial means to pay in-depth and objective research. As a result, practically all the experience of experts and analysts is related to research, coordinated with the state's priorities or on the direct government orders. Therefore, even with a variety of opinions and assessments, the Russian expert community effectively defends the priorities and interests of the state and not the citizens. Their priorities and interests are most often represented by experts and analysts as being less fundamental than the state, but decisions that are bureaucratic alternatives are less effective and sometimes simply insolvent. Therefore, analysts, experts and professionals in various fields of activity, in the current situation, often fail to lobby and impose on the state the real solutions to the issues of public interest that arise in society, but only to respond to the “problems” the state⁷.

The government and parliament do not play an independent role and, in the main, public policy decisions are made elsewhere⁸. This system of power and policy-making also shows the prevalence of weak institutions to the local level. This institutional weakness essentially limits the ability of the central management to implement many of its decisions. Given that the political leader is not constrained by democratic control, such as free and fair elections, parliament and an independent justice system, or free media, the capacity of the institution to develop public policies is limited by the corrupt behavior of officials serving state agencies⁹.

Although personalism and neo-patrimonialism as ways of approaching public policies in Russia are more widespread among specialists, the institutionalist perspective also has its followers. They do not underestimate the will of the Russian President to maximize his power

⁶ Marie Mendras, *Russie: les institutions politiques en danger*, CERI/CNRS, November 2004, available online at: <http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr/ceri/files/artmm.pdf>, accessed on October 20, 2018.

⁷ Vladimir Rimsky, *art. cit.*

⁸ Vladimir Gel'man, *Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2015, Chapter 5-The unpredictable 2010s. Rising Challenges.

⁹ K. Dawisha, *Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?* Simon and Schuster, New York, 2014; R. W. Ortung, S. Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic Mega-project and Russia's Political Economy”, in *East European Politics* 30, no. 2, 2014, pp. 175-191; P. Hanson, “Networks, cronies and Business Plans: Business-State Relations in Russia” in V. Kononenko and A. Moshes (eds.), *Russia As A Network State: What Works In Russia When State Institutions Do Not?*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, 2011, pp. 113-138.

and the leverage he has to loyalty to his close allies¹⁰, but he also believes that a number of institutionalized political actors - such as government ministries and other bureaucratic agencies of the state, parliament, some social actors, such as business associations - may influence the policy-making process in Russia to some extent for different spheres of activity¹¹. The institutional vision of public policy-making in Russia complements the humanist perspective, highlighting a more nuanced role for political actors not linked or controlled by the state. This idea argues that a more regular bureaucratic procedure for political decision-making is as important as the President's personal interventions in the decision-making process¹². In the absence of genuine representation of popular interests in Russia, interest groups of financial, commercial, and other bureaucracy act as "advocates" of general interstices in Russian society. Through this mechanism, actors who practically should be neutral and independent of the state become interconnected in a prolonged political battle and often enter into endless political consultations.

The debate between specialists on the predominance of one or the other of the current is in no way resolved, and the relationship between the personalized and institutionalized elements of Russian policy-making is a subject that, in the opinion of Russian specialists, needs to be further explored¹³.

2. Community of experts in the vision of the Russian Federation

To understand how political decisions are made in the field of public policy in general and security and defense policies, in particular, we need to know the perception that the Russians have of what we call the expert and expertise, a community of experts and then to know the steps that are being taken to use expertise in policy making¹⁴.

One of the founders of the interdisciplinary expertise of V. Sidelnikov defines expertise as a set of "assessment and analysis activities conducted with expert involvement to analyze and/or evaluate different specialist issues"¹⁵. Similar definitions are given by other Russian specialists. Elenskiy believes that the best definition given to the expertise belongs to A. Degtyarev. It considers it a process "applied by political analysis with methods in political and administrative sciences, which implies the use of a multidisciplinary integrated knowledge system, focused on the development of common principles and specific methods of modeling, diagnosis, prediction for a situation political issue and the formulation of

¹⁰ Stephen Fortescue, *Institutionalization and Personalism in the Policymaking Process of the Soviet Union and PostSoviet Russia*, in Stephen Fortescue (ed.), *Russian Politics from Lenin to Putin*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2010, p. 22.

¹¹ Marina Khmel'nitskaya, "The Policy-Making Process and Social Learning in Russia: the Case of Housing Policy", in *Russian Analytical Digest*, No. 199, 27 February 2017; S. Wengle, *Post-Soviet Power*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015; T. Gustafson, *Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2012.

¹² Marina Khmel'nitskaya, *art. cit.*, p. 2.

¹³ Vladimir Gel'man, "The Vicious Circle and Authoritarian Russia, and the Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia", in *Demokratizatsiya* 22, no. 4, 2014, pp. 503—522; A. Starodubtsev, "Agency Matters: the Failure of Russian Regional Policy Reforms", in *Demokratizatsiya* 22, no. 4, 2014, pp. 553-574.

¹⁴ Andrew Monaghan, "Putin's Russia: Shaping a 'Grand Strategy'?", in *International Affairs*, 89, no. 5, 2013, pp. 1221-1236, *Idem*, "Defibrillating the Vertikal? Putin and Russian Grand Strategy", Research Paper, Chatham House, October 2014, available online at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20141024Defibrillating_Vertikal.pdf, accessed on October 20, 2018.

¹⁵ Yu Sidelnikov, *Экспертиза: состояние и тенденции развития/Expertiza: sostoyaniye i tendentsii razvitiya*, in *Мировая экономика и международные отношения*, № 2, 1997, pp. 122-130; *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya*, no. 2, 1997, p. 123.

practical recommendations for the preparation, adoption and implementation of public decisions”¹⁶.

Expertise is a study of a specialist (expert) in certain aspects of the life of society, which requires special scientific knowledge and experience to obtain the necessary information about the subject studied, in order to identify the issue that concerns the subject of management. There is a wide variety of examinations: internal and external, economic and socio-political, environmental and military policy, conducted in different spheres of society. Political expertise, implicitly security and defense, is one of the types of expertise. Its main object of activity is the political situation existing in this sphere of society (generally or in its separate aspects and problematic components). Russian specialists consider political expertise a social (professional and managerial) institution designed to provide practical guidance for managing bodies of different organizations and institutions to manage political power, security and defense analytical information, to reduce the risks involved in developing specific policies, with the implementation of the general policy of the domestic and foreign policy of the state¹⁷.

In the opinion of E.V. Maslennikova, a political expert usually performs three types of functions:

- acts as a source of unique information, thanks to its high professionalism, good scientific training and its experience;
- penetrates deeper into the essentials of studied phenomena and processes, characterizes objects, problems, events, decision making and evaluates them;
- creators of ideas and proposals, contributes to the solution of developing policy issues, identifies them and qualifies them from a present and future position¹⁸.

The activity of the experts ends with the acceptance of the administrative decision by the leader of the political institution/organization. Without this, the information received in this process (as a result) of the expertise hangs in the air. Therefore “the assessment of the results of the expert’s work by the leader of the institution is the most important part of the expertise process”¹⁹.

The expert can act individually to provide advice, but may also be part of a community of experts. According to Sosunov, the term “community of experts” is sometimes used arbitrarily, which creates a “methodological discord” in some publications or discussions on the subject. It joins the opinion of the director of the International College of Modern Technologies, E.V. Kazakova, who proposes to interpret the two-way expert community. In a narrow sense, the expert community is an association of people who have special knowledge to solve a problem. In a broad sense, the community is an environment where the views and ideas of experts are generated in the direction of human activity, for example in the policy sphere. Political elites (from parties that have won the election and sent people to executive and legislative parties and extra-parliamentary parties and extra-parliamentary movements are consumers of the community's expert products²⁰.

¹⁶ A.A. Degtyarev, *Политический анализ как прикладная дисциплина: предметное поле и направления разработки*, Политические Исследования (In English: “Political analysis as an applied discipline: the subject field and areas of development” in *Political Studies*), № 1, 2004, pp. 154-168.

¹⁷ A.V. Yelenskiy, *Политическая экспертиза: генезис, понятие и когнитивные возможности*, Вопросы философии (In English: “Political expertise: genesis, concept and cognitive abilities” in *Philosophy issues*), No 2, 2011, pp. 57-69.

¹⁸ Ye.V. Maslennikov, *Экспертное знание: Интеграционный подход и его приложение в социологическом исследовании*, Академиздатцентр “Наука”, Москва (In English: *Expert knowledge: Integration approach and its application in a sociological study*, Academic Publishing Center “Science”, Moscow), 2001, p. 6.

¹⁹ A.V. Yelenskiy, *art. cit.*

²⁰ L. M. Grigor'yev, *Экспертное сообщество современной России* (In English: *Expert community of modern Russia*), available online at: <http://xn----ptbljed.xn--p1ai/node/2363>, accessed on December 23, 2017.

In the Russian society today there are various types of expertise communities. The most popular is the so-called “factory/incubator of ideas”, which are called upon to carry out research projects, to collect and analyze information, to elaborate strategic documents, etc.²¹

Of the expert communities operating in Russia today are mentioned:

- 1) Centers studying, monitoring crisis situations and proposing anti-crisis measures;
- 2) Centers operating as operational dispatcher; and
- 3) Strategic management analytical centers that analyze possible risks and develop scenarios on country development.

As part of the decision-making process, the Public Policies Centers can be effective if they cooperate with each other if they come with practices that can prepare and implement proposed decision-making projects, interact with leaders of other civil society structures and representatives of different levels of government.

Public policy centers can be seen as a form of connection, expertise interaction²². They are in the opinion of efficient specialists because “in Russian society, there is still a very high level of trust in scientists, researchers, teachers, specialists, because in decades our citizens have developed a fairly high level of confidence in scientific knowledge and its promoters. But this high level of trust now allows scientists to manipulate citizens’ conscience, and such manipulations are often carried out with the help of mass media”²³.

An increasingly important role in the expert communities is played by those in the field of political science and institution management. This community is made up of graduates of faculties of political, administrative, security and geopolitical science. The majority of the members of this community formed a national association of the Russian Association of Political Sciences, which contributes to the consolidation of the scientific professional community, the development of the communication among the scientists in the field of politics, as well as the improvement of the image of the expert of political sciences in the Russian society. Representatives of Russia's top public authorities are increasingly talking about the need for public policy expertise and that even one of the most popular methods of Western society Crowdsourcing²⁴ has a certain popularity.

3. Actors in the development of defense policies and security strategies in the Russian Federation

A. YU. Sungurov believes that, in the process of drafting political sessions for different sectors of activity, we can no longer speak only of a single traditional participant the state, because in recent years civil society represented by leaders of NGOs known not only internally but also internationally has increased its visibility, and many specialists from the community of experts in political, administrative, security, and defense science work in these NGOs. These actors should be filled with others who do not directly contribute to the elaboration of public policy expertise but can sometimes influence it decisively. Among them we highlight the media, independent journalists, business structures and organizations,

²¹ D. V. Sosunov, *Роль и функции экспертов в процессе принятия властных решений* (in English: *The role and function of experts in the process of making powerful decisions*), p. 172.

²² A. YU. Sungurov, *art. cit.* available online at: https://www.civisbook.ru/files/File/Sungurov_public_pol_kak.pdf, accessed on December 22, 2017.

²³ Vladimir Rimsky, *Роль экспертного сообщества в российской публичной политике*, in «Агентство Политических Новостей – Нижний Новгород», 01.02.2006.

²⁴ “A procedure that can involve a lot of people through computer networks to develop the best solution to a problem”. Similar with Daren C. Brabham, *Using Crowdsourcing In Government*, Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism University of Southern California, 2013, available online at: https://www.cbs.dk/files/cbs.dk/using_crowdsourcing_in_government.pdf, accessed on 21 December, 2017.

corporations of various types from those active in the energy sector to those in the military complex etc.²⁵

Interaction of these actors in the preparation, adoption, and implementation of governmental decisions takes the form of a field of action that knows different manifestations and insights from one area to another in political and socio-economic life.

Studies by Russian analysts show that, sometimes in many areas, public policy decisions have involved prolonged debates, with societal actors and the community of experts having the chance to contribute to this process²⁶. Marina Khmel'nitskaya notes that, according to recent studies “the influence of experts is real but limited. In the context of Russian politics, this vision of the political process and the influence of experts on it is further intensified by the particularities of Russia’s undemocratic political system. The humanistic dimension of Russia's decision-making process, which involves the Russian President's personal charisma designed through the media, and its central position within vertically-organized informal government networks, defines an important stature of the decision-making literature”²⁷.

Of the actors who do not provide direct expertise for public policy development in various areas, including security, defense and foreign policy, but they influence policies that are sometimes decisive in Russian society, we will only recall a very important one: bureaucracy of information and military structures called by the Russians *siloviki* because it limits or even can exclude if its interests demand it.

Russia’s security and intelligence services operate in a political context quite different from that of the West, and this gives them a radically different character. President Vladimir Putin, the former KGB officer of the Soviet Union and then director of the FSB, considered the leaders of this service as one of his closest allies and the most useful tools in exercising power in the Kremlin. In 2015, with a FSB celebration, President Putin said these were “strong and courageous people, true professionals who reliably protect Russia's sovereignty and national integrity and the lives of our citizens”²⁸.

The word “*siloviki*” derives from the expression “power structure”, which unites the armed forces, law enforcement agencies and intelligence services, that is, agencies that perform state power functions. United by a common identity, a shared worldview, and a profound personal loyalty to Putin, this structure is a cohesive corporation that has been rooted in the center of Russian policy administration. It does not respond to anyone for its work, except to the president himself. According to analysts Andrei Soldatov and Michael Rochlitz, the “*siloviki*” group is the driving force behind increasingly authoritative policies in Russian society, and in the foreign policy plan it behaves aggressively²⁹. Ian Bremmer and Samuel Charap described “*siloviki*” as a group of current and former intelligence officers in Putin's hometown of Sankt-Petersburg, which exerts immense power in the Kremlin and controls key sectors of the Russian economy.

²⁵ A. YU. Sungurov, *art. cit.*

²⁶ Marina Khmel'nitskaya, “On Policymaking and Policy Change in Russia” in *Baltic Worlds*, A scholarly journal and news magazine. October 2016, Vol. IX, no.3, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University, 2016, pp. 73-76.

²⁷ Marina Khmel'nitskaya, “Making Social Policy in Contemporary Russia”, in *Russian Analytical Digest*, no. 199, February 2017, p. 2, available online at: <https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/178850/RAD199.pdf?sequence=1>, accessed on December 23, 2017.

²⁸ Marina Khmel'nitskaya, “On Policymaking and Policy Change in Russia”, in *Baltic Worlds*, A scholarly journal and news magazine. October 2016, Vol. IX, no.3, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University, 2016.

²⁹ Andrei Soldatov, Michael Rochlitz, *The Siloviki in Russian Politics*, available online at: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55510affe4b06afeca50df07/t/57d3923859cc684a23285460/1473483331787/Siloviki+Final+Aug+17+.pdf>, accessed on December 23, 2017.

The siloviki group is a structure with a well-defined hierarchy among its members. Its structure can best be described as a series of concentric circles. Thus, "siloviki" can be divided into main, secondary, and tertiary subgroups, based on seniority, political influence and control over resources and institutions. Those closest to the center enjoy the closest relations with the president and each other, communicate most often and exercise the greatest influence. Secondary and tertiary members have less direct access to basic members and Putin.

Conclusion

The conclusion that can be drawn from the above points is that Russia's federal authorities are very closed to the debate and are reluctant to rely on any expertise other than that provided by government agencies. According to Trenin, the role of Russia's think-tank groups in the country's foreign policy decision-making process is "close to zero" because, firstly, officials make decisions based on secret information, and usually underlines that any external expertise is irrelevant. The secret is an instrument of the Russian authorities to keep power under their control. The governing style in Russia, where power is in the hands of one person, exacerbates the issue of making decisions.

This, in turn, impedes the quality of the decision-making process and leads to the emergence of pseudo-expertise and conspiracy-related products. This explains why in the Russian Federation the occupation of independent expert member of a think-tank is devalued and confronted with great suspicion. This is fueled by the fact that these structures of "production" of ideas for public policies emerged after the First World War in the Anglo-Saxon world, with great popularity in American society. Their expansion to the east of the European continent and the Euro-Asian world took place after the end of the Cold War, with funding from both private business circles and the US government.

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STRATEGY AND WAR IN KAUTILYA'S VISION. TOPICALITY REFLECTIONS

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Abstract: *A true compendium of great strategy, Kautilya's Arthashastra gives us a complete picture of the state leadership that transcends time, presenting us, with a perfect political realism, the art and science of government, diplomacy and war. The center of its strategy is the state's power in all its forms, as well as the means by which it can be acquired, maintained and expanded.*

For Kautilya, the war is viewed in the strategic context of alliances, providing the political decision maker with the necessary instrument for internal well-being, expanding the influence at the macro level, balancing the equilibrium of regional power, allowing it to achieve political goals.

Arthashastra is a leader's art and science, its guide through which he can provide protection against internal and external threats, law enforcement, border security and economic progress. Peace or war are only "state of facts" imposed by social pyramid needs, the national interest being the supreme goal of politics.

Keywords: *strategy; state; political objectives; war.*

Introduction

In times of evolutionary uncertainties of the state, with major existential turmoil, defined by unpredictable disputes in the plane of regional and global reconfirmation, the nations are facing the adoption of collective responsibility, managed by political leadership, directly responsible for joining the convenience of protective rigors. In such times, when the level of governance floats in a gray area of options, when lessons of the past are exhausting their statutory dogmas, it is beneficial to refer to the theory fundamentals, deciphering the essence of strategic thinking by recourse to historical transcendental writings. Despite the changes in social, materials and technological conditions, in a logic of inter-state organizational conflict, security-seeking, the Great Strategy remains the constant basis.

Explained in general terms by Liddle Hart, in *The Strategy of Indirect Approach*, it implicates the use of all resources of a nation with the purpose of achieving the determinative political goal. "The Dialectics of wills" summarized by Beaufre should not be justified only by means assimilated to war, but also through an assumed vision, prioritizing the events, estimating the reactions and extracting the critical elements of the power instruments in all its forms: economic, military, diplomatic, etc. The Great Strategy is delimited by the conjunctural interests, partisans of a limiting conception. It excludes the subjective side of the immediate result, balancing the knowledge of the context and the predictive capacity of the evolutionary dynamics of the international environment with the ultimate goal. The Great Strategy implies a level of ambition, a pro-active capacity, capitalizing on its own opportunities and exploiting the vulnerabilities of the other. The appropriate response must not be dimmed by the risks and threats, it should be modeled in the context of geographical layout, dimensioned to international peculiarities, to existing organizational resources,

protecting national assets, sovereign space and the population, in order to ensure internal legitimacy.

Returning to classics is not a waste of time. On the contrary. It may represent the regaining of a lost sense or the building of a new road. Thucydides is believed to be the father of international relations, who first created a comprehensive theory of how states provide their security, in concepts and meanings that incorporate factors contributing to this state. Sun Tzı does not explicitly describe the Great Strategy, but conveys the impression of a vision. For its own time, preserving its own values, by perpetuating the life of the state, represented the great task of the organization, on which salvation or extinction depended. The Great Strategy belongs to the army and was made through the army, the absolute means of the ultimate goal. Machiavelli's *The Prince* translates the strong state idea into several major goals, converging to the same state: power. His treaty is more about a monarch's strategy in an attempt to preserve the throne, and not a throne's strategy, as a symbol of the state.

In the same presentation area as the previous ones, Jomini and Clausewitz talk about the pure reason for the action of the armed forces. Their works are a true apology to the armed conflict, treated as a serious enterprise with thorough preparations, with a violent condition in which the state has the main role, through its strategy of ... war. *De facto*, the two do not describe any concrete strategy, summing up a battle art, with its means, immediate missions, tactical objectives, etc. Gamers of zero sum games, things are generally simple: one's gain is the loss of the other.

Trying to establish a complexity of works, related to the Great Strategy, I find it appropriate that the *philosophical stone* of this relationship between resources, services and industries¹ is the work of Indian Kautilya, *Arthashastra*.

Over all, just as an appreciation of the influence of all the factors in the strategy of a state and the way in which the Great Strategy is presented, stands Kautilya, I believe, with its work *Arthashastra*. True Compendium of Great Strategy, it can be reduced schematically to the cycle: *good governance* → *perfect economic conditions* → *conquering new territories*, resumed whenever the situation requires it. Equally, it is the state's art and science, in a rational and not empirical form. Influential in ancient India, it continues to be topical, in a political realism that today sometimes lacks to decision makers. The truly radical Machiavellianism, in the popular sense of this word, is classically expressed in the Indian literature of *Arthashastra* de Kautilya (written long before Christ, apparently during Chandragupta's time); in comparison, Prince Machiavelli is harmless².

1. On Kautilya and Arthashastra

According to the legend, Kautilya, a Brahmin by birth, was the son of a professor at the prestigious University of Taxila (near Rawalpindi in today's Pakistan)³. Talented and renowned for his intelligence, he became a teacher at an early age. Interested in politics, he was convinced that India, disturbed by many social riots, could very easily be the ideal victim in the event of a foreign invasion. He headed for Patliputra, the most powerful city in the Nandea kingdom, to advise his rulers. As it turned out, Dhanananda, the ruler of the kingdom, was already preparing for the campaign, gathering his army for future battles. Accepted as a counselor, Kautilya militates for the imposition of a governing regime based on morality, with

¹ B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategia Acțiunile indirecte*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1973, p. 367.

² Masood-Ur-Rehman Khattak, *Indian Strategic Thinking: A Reflection of Kautilya's Six Fold Policy – Analysis*, Pulse, March 29, 2011 (*apud*: Max Weber, *Politics as a Vocation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 220).

³ Chanakya-Niti, *Understanding Hinduism*, available online at: <http://www.hinduism.co.za/chanakya.htm>, accessed on September, 15, 2018.

the center of its main resource, the man. As Dhanananda did not want such a style, he insulted and fired him without much explanation. Kautilya cursed him and promised to destroy his kingdom.

As a state man, Kautilya was Chandragupta Maurya's chief adviser (317-293 BC), known in history as the one who defeated Nanda's kings (who unsuccessfully tried to dominate India), stopped the advance of the successors of Alexander the Great, and first gathered most of the Indian subcontinent into an empire. Kautilya, sometimes called the chancellor or prime minister of Chandragupta (something like von Bismarck to Wilhelm I⁴), composed *Arthashastra* or "*the science of politics*" to show how a wise king can defeat his enemies and rule in the name of the good. Not at all modest with his achievements in leadership, Kautilya has eternalized his theory on the very pages of the book: "This science was composed by him [Kautilya] who ... quickly regenerated science and the army and conquered the earth that was under the control of the Nanda king"⁵.

Immediately after the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC, Chandragupta and Kautilya began conquering India by stopping the Greek invaders. In this effort, two Greek governors, Nicanor and Philip, were murdered, and after a treaty with Seleucus (the heir of Alexander the Great in Western India), Chandragupta and Kautilya reunited almost all of the Indian subcontinent.

As a result, Chandragupta was and is considered to be India's first unifier and the first authentic king of the Mauryan Empire. Kautilya continued to serve as a counselor for the followers of the throne, Bindusara (293-268) and Ashoka (268-232 BC), also contributing through his ideas to the transformation of an empire with the brightest existence in India's history. The basic principle was morality or *dhamma*, a word that means conduct, duty, religion, justice, social justice and responsibility. It seems that these virtues, known today in the sense of meritocracy, formed the basis of the work of *Arthashastra*.

Kautilya's *Arthashastra* offers a view over the political wisdom, theory and state government. It is one of the main political and strategic treaties that make up a collection of concepts with close links and an almost indefinite timeline.

In short, *Arthashastra* provides guidance to a wise king who supports the national interests of the state, focusing on security, wealth and prestige. As I said above, the three fundamental objectives are: promoting the welfare of the subjects, acquiring wealth and extending the territory. Diplomacy is the means by which to conquer and then restore (stability). Therefore, six foreign policy measures are recommended to help the political decision maker in crisis management and progress: peace, war, neutrality, march (in the sense of surprise), political alliance and political dualism (in international relations, in the sense of making peace with some and war with others - *na*). The policy must be applied depending on the relative strength of the state, the strategic environment and the dynamics of the situation. The purpose of the policy is to increase the state's power at the expense of the enemy. Henry Kissinger, in his comments on *Arthashastra* in his latest book, *The World Order*, writes: "This work presents with a clear, unmistakable vision of how to establish and preserve a state neutralizing, undermining and (have been the opportune conditions established) by conquering its neighbors. *Arthashastra* comprises a world of the state, not a philosophical dispute. *Arthashastra* is *The Great Strategy*"⁶.

From the standpoint of reporting on state functionality, *Arthashastra* has three distinct parts. The first part refers to administration; it describes the organization of the state and

⁴ Romila Thapar, *Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations*, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1978, p. 12

⁵ Kautilya, *The Arthashastra*, 2nd ed., edited and translated by R. P. Kangle, *Part II of The Kautiliya Arthashastra*, book 15, chapter 1, line 73, p. 516.

⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Ordinea mondială Reflecției asupra specificului națiunilor și a cursului istoriei*, Translated from English by Adriana Bădescu, BCU, Cluj Napoca, p. 125.

prescribes the duties and responsibilities of each key official either to maintain order or to collect revenue. The second part refers to a *codex iuris* and justice; covers both civil and criminal law and provides for a penal code. The third part refers to foreign policies, the main purpose of which is to acquire territories by conquest. A stable and prosperous situation can be sure only if it has a just and efficient administration, that sets the right conditions for the accumulation of wealth (in treasury) and new territories.

The state of Kautilya has seven constituent elements: the ruler (king), the ministers, the urban and rural population, the fortifications, the economy, the army and the allies. Each is described and placed in a hierarchy, in an interactive relationship system and then subjected to a systematic examination. Kautilya's theoretical analysis of the functioning of a state includes a breakdown of aspects of internal administration in constituent terms, as well as the analysis of relations between states in terms of the theory of concentric circles. (Figure 1)




Figure no. 1: The theory of concentric circles in foreign policy

Arthashastra contains fifteen *adhyakarni* or books. Of these, the top five are dealing with “*tantra*” or internal government. Topics covered include, among others: administration, legal system, social norms, tax system, income and costs. The next eight refer to the “*avapa*” or the relationship with the neighboring states, and the last two are of a different nature. The eighth book is concerned with *vyasanas*, that is, natural calamities, deficiencies or weaknesses that affect *prakritis* differently (the ultimate balance). It is necessary to overcome the shortcomings before an aggressive activity can be undertaken. The ninth *adhikarna* deals with the preparation for war and describes the types of troops that should be mobilized for an expedition, the seasons appropriate for starting a campaign, the troop protection measures, the types of danger, etc. The tenth book deals with battles and describes the army's camping, its march, various modes of combat, types of battles, etc.

2. Kautilya's Great Strategy

"The welfare of a state depends on an active foreign policy"

Kautilya

Kautilya's *Great Strategy* is an extremely simple and pragmatic model. The ultimate goal is the welfare of the people / the population. The paths are multiple, using all the state power tools, and the means are those in reach of the king, in a very well-established hierarchy.

Kautilya argues that the wealth of a nation consists in the people who inhabit it, regardless of social status. The very word *artha* is defined by the material welfare of individuals. In other words, the state, through its institutions, is obliged to ensure internal security and maintain the social order of the population. (Figure 2)⁷.




Figure no. 2: Great Strategy Trinity

Underlining the importance of the population, Kautilya states “*There can not be a country without people, and there is no king without a country*”⁸. It is clear that a leader who does not use and protect his primordial resource for strategic interest is a leader with no vision. Everything is in a perfect harmony, in a balance of values and principles that justify internal and external actions.

The goals and roles of each are clear. In order to protect its institutions against external threats, the army rejects enemies and extends territory by conquest. Faced with internal threats, police maintain order, and justice administers the law correctly. Economic policies are designed to enhance the richness and well-being of the people, which, in turn, increase the state's treasury. In a simple rhetoric, the king sustains the reputation and is the moral symbol of the state; the human resource is the center of gravity; political leadership symbolizes the prestige; economy, wealth; and the army, security. Kautilya states: *in the happiness of his subjects lays the happiness of the king; the welfare of the king in their welfare. He will not only consider what he likes as good, but he will take care of what pays better his subjects*”.⁹

The absolute power of the kautilyan state, which contributes to the realization of the Great Strategy, is a sum of seven interconnected powers, which are generated by the constitutive elements and are generating attributes of force. These are: political power, administrative power, social power, economic power, territorial power (infrastructure), military power and the power of alliances. (Figure 3)¹⁰. Diplomatic power is subsumed to any of these types of power, with political diplomacy, administrative diplomacy etc.

⁷ Vinay Vittal, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: A Timeless Grand Strategy*, Maxwell AFB, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Ala., 2011.

⁸ Kautilya, *The Arthashastra*, second edition, R. P. Kangle, Part II of The Kautiliya Arthashastra, book 7, chapter 5, line 27, p. 335.

⁹ L.N. Rangarajan, *The Arthashastra*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1992, p. 15.

¹⁰ Source: Vinay Vittal, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: A Timeless Grand Strategy*




Figure no 3: Elements of National Power for Grand Strategy

The seven constituent parts of a state provide the general framework for designing the Great Strategy. The ideal of constituents implicitly leads to the ideal state. Moreover, they must be the antagonistic reflection of the similar components of the enemy in a projection of the Great Strategy by military component. For example, before a war begins, it is essential to capitalize on the strength of the various constituents of the state that, at the same time, negatively affect the opponent's force. Therefore, the syllogism of orchestrating all the power tools to achieve the Great Strategy becomes an axiom. The demonstrated cases are numerous, one of which can be exemplified in the centennial year and with small limitations, the Great Union from 1st December 1918.

3. Kautilya's war

Remaining in the military plane, Kautilya lists eight factors that need to be considered before starting a military campaign. These are: the value of the desired final status, related to the probable losses, expenses and gains; the relative power of the enemy state; space for deployment (today we speak of several spaces - land, air, sea, virtual, cognitive); the time (duration) of all anticipated military actions, including the transition; the season, especially for meteorological reasons; composition and adaptation of forces; gaining public support and eliminating internal political disturbances; estimation of endogenous and exogenous factors, multipliers or reducers of fighting power.

The eight factors above matter in planning the war. In addition, Kautilya describes the essential factors during the military campaign, those who influence the real military power. These are: the commander's ability to drive a campaign and anticipate changes, available forces and troop morale. It seems that Napoleon and Clausewitz were the followers of Kautilya, and in their tactics and writings, these attributes of the military genius were found!

The supremacy of Kautilya's model is easily demonstrated by the state of Israel. Located in the vicinity of several hostile Arab nations, Israel was involved in military confrontations with its neighbors, of intensity and duration shorter or longer. Whether we talk about the Liberation War (1948), the Six Days War (1967), the War of Iom Kipur (1973), etc., or the ongoing clashes with Hezbollah, Hamas or the Palestine Liberation Organizations,

Israel, a small state and a short history as a state, knew how to generate a great strategy and how to apply it. Large-scale information operations, including clandestine, sabotage, recruitment of double agents and assassinations, have been carried out throughout the whole period since gaining the independence. Israel has received help from England, France and the United States to fight Arab states (double politics), has accepted and enforced punitive treaties, joined and refused coalitions, and called for support in all its forms for former enemies. Israel is continuously preparing for war, protecting the population, concluding strategic partnerships, attracting neutral nations, producing diplomatic earthquakes (see statements on the change of embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem), maintaining a state of tension near the borders and a calm one in the next circle ! Since 1948, from a state of relative obscurity and almost total foreign dependence, Israel has gradually stabilized and has reached a stage of evolution over the Arab nations of which it is surrounded.

Kautilya's desire was for his king to conquer the world. Today's great strategic thinking must be about conquering the world, not necessarily physically, like two and a half millennia ago, but as a behavioral influence in all environments. It's hard, but not impossible! Thus, the methods by which Kautilya accomplished this desiderate were: peace; the war; neutrality; march (raid); alliance; double policy.

Interesting are the moments chosen to appeal to these methods. Peace was only signed when the king was in decline relative to his enemy; "When a king is in a higher position than his enemy, he will attack and carry on war"; neutrality was chosen when the King felt that his enemy and he were equal and neither would act against the signed commitments; when a king increases his own power and has a particular advantage over his enemy, he will participate in the fourth approach to foreign policy, preparing for war, planning his march (raid); the help required by a king through an alliance happened when the neighboring enemy was stronger than he; finally, dual policy was, in fact, a dual condition: war with some and peace with others. Today's examples are many. We can recall the Russian raids in Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea, Turkey's dual policy in relation to Russia and the US, Russia's Syria war with ISIS and peace with the mother state, India's relationship with Pakistan and China, Israel's actions in relation to internal enemies, and external, and so on.

Kautilya states that the King is responsible for protecting the state from external aggression and the expansion of territory by conquest. In today's world of interest, of manifesting and imposing power, it is natural for state and non-state actors to interact through force and conflicts of interest. Political realism must be preserved, how do we also have to understand that the one who knows and masters the political science (externally – author's note) can conquer the world!

"*War is extreme and must be considered the last solution*"¹¹, argues Kautilya in Arthashastra. However, even at the risk of losing human lives, there are four types of war for the Indian strategist: Counseling War (Mantrayuddha), describing the exercise of diplomacy by a weak king who does not consider an open war to be appropriate; *open war* (Prakasayuddha), specifying time and place; *the hidden war* (Kutayuddha), which refers to the irregular war; *the underground/silent war* (Gudayuddha), using hidden methods to achieve the goal without really conducting a military campaign¹². Each of these four types of war corresponds to a type of strategy: *the in sight strategy*, specific to Mantrayuddha, whereby all actions to be taken are discussed and publicly presented; *the strategy of direct actions*, specific to Prakasayuddha, may be similar in the sense to the frontal impact of tactics; *the strategy of indirect actions* for Kutayuddha, involves engaging resources without fully respecting the principles of war and recognizing the importance of maneuvers; *strategy of guerilla*, using almost anything for the purpose.

¹¹ Kautilya, *op.cit.*, p. 305.

¹² *Idem.*

According to the theory of concentric circles (figure 1), the king is advised first to conquer his natural enemies, those at his border, who are preparing to expand their own kingdoms into the territory of the future conqueror. Later, after the strengthening of power, he should overcome the king in the middle. In the end, he must subdue the neutral king and thus establish his suzerainty over the circle of states. If the circle of states has only allies and enemies, and not middle and neutral kings, he should try to subdue his enemies and assure the loyalty of his allies. When there are a number of neighboring kings, he must weaken each one, through different paths, and when those are enough vulnerable, to conquer them. For Kautilya, war is not an objective itself, but a necessity determined by the conjuncture. A state can engage in war to neutralize an enemy, attacking it back, helping an ally or subduing a small state. The ultimate goal remains the destruction of the natural enemy, which is the main obstacle in the path of the conqueror ambition.

Kautilya's explanations for each of the types of war are as simple as contemporary. A king will declare war only when his army is superior, the enemy camp instigations have been successful, the risk is properly managed and the land is right for the conqueror. If these conditions are not met, royal will use a scam! The enemy will be attacked when its forces suffer from a calamity, are unprotected and are in lower ground positions. If, however, the key positions in the field are held by the ianmic, the king will pretend to be weak, fooling him to leave them. Tactics is just as simple and effective: if a front attack is unfavorable, the attack must be from the back and vice versa; similarly, if the attack on a flank is unfavorable, it must be done from the other. Everything combined with deception, psychological fatigue, and insecurity insertion.

Trying to turn to a post-factual rhetoric, in an objectivity generated by recent actions, Russia's strategy from 2014 falls into the Kautilyan Great Strategy model. Misdirection by the Euromaidan movement, the annexation of the Crimea, similar to a natural calamity (when the storm takes away part of the house), silent intervention in eastern Ukraine, alliance with Turkey (exploited as a result of misunderstandings with the US), participation in the Syrian war (against a planned heartland), economic agreements between Moscow, Tehran and Damascus for post-conflict reconstruction, alliances with China and Pakistan, strengthening the naval and air bases of Tartus and Latkia, access to the Planetary Ocean (allied by domination), prove that the Soviet state has equilibrated its European balance and continues its offensive towards the global one! Nothing new under the sun, just an implementation of a vision of more than two thousand years.

Conclusions

In the field of the Great Strategy, most of the literature explicitly focuses on the great powers, such as the United States (since the beginning of the First World War), the United Kingdom and France (until the Second World War), the Spanish Empire, the Soviet Union / Russia, India and China during their ascension. Smaller states are often excluded from the list, assuming their inability to politically self-support in a well-polarized world. Maintaining a status quo or a hegemony already installed guarantees the great strategy. True to one point. In order to build your vision, you need two realities: the resources available and a declarant enemy! Interactions between the two are obvious in a globalization that is sometimes exaggerated, impossible to stop (by natural means) and difficult to estimate the consequences.

Under certain circumstances, a country will abandon a major strategy and will adopt a new strategy that takes into account the new national targets. For example, due to its unprecedented intensity, it can be said that the First World War dramatically changed the Great Strategy of each of the country involved. From a diplomatic point of view, the war

reorientated Romania's strategy on foreign alliances and its rehabilitation during the conflagration.

The goal of the strategy has always been to conquer other states. The goal of the Great Strategy is to win. A weak nation is bound to rely on the good neighbors if it does not want condemnation to destruction. A strong nation is guided by Kautilya's military thinking: "*Prepare for war and plan to conquer*"¹³.

The Great Strategy is not an Indian pattern, on whose scientific or artistic rigor relies the success of a nation. Kautilya's Arthashastra reinforces a theory. This work deepens us in front of the simplicity of a sparkling vision, equilibrates us in the balance of ephemeral values, and translates us into roles of leader, all for a noble cause: the welfare of his people.

The Great Strategy remains an art of a nation's whole life. It links the means to the objectives, prioritizes them and guarantees victory. It imposes consistency and predictability in a disordered and inertial environment, involves reaction, competition and rapidity in a logic of unfolding events often hazarded. It is based upon the belief in the leader's vision, in thegnoseological foundations of national values, and in the moral and material balance of the whole society.

Today, when national identity is more and more difficult to preserve, Romania must tailor its great strategy on two fundamental attributes: the value of the national culture and the adaptive intelligence of the Romanian people. When we understand that strategy means not only immediate material benefits but wellness, then we will have a Great Strategy.

POST SCRIPTUM

If war involves both parties in common ruin that is the bankruptcy of statesmanship. War must be conducted by armed forces, but much more important than the force of arms, is the high strategy which saps the enemy's morale and disrupts his forces, and brings about his collapse or takes him to the verge of collapse before armed attack.

Unscrupulous and rigid as Chanakya was in the pursuit of his aim, he never forgot that it was better to win over an intelligent and high-minded enemy than to crush him. His final victory was obtained by sowing in the enemy's ranks and in the very moment of his victory, so the story goes, he induced Chandragupta to be generous to his rival chief. Chanakya himself is said to have handed over the insignia of his own high office to the Minister of that rival whose intelligence and loyalty to his old chief had impressed him deeply. So the story ends not in the bitterness of defeat and humiliation, but in reconciliation and in laying the firm and enduring foundations of a state, which had not only defeated but had won over its chief enemy¹⁴.

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¹⁴ The maxims have been extracted from the Arthashastra and the translations by Dr RP Kangle, available online at: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1019423.pdf>, accessed on September, 20, 2018.

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AL-QAEDA – A MILLENARY ORGANIZATION

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Abstract: *The terrorist organizations as the Islamic state, Al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups are the protagonists of the deepest current crises, which complicates the process of halting them. The Al-Qaeda network with all its branches in various geographical areas exploits conflicting outbreaks, the critical situation in some states, and geopolitical disturbances in the Middle East, continuing to pose a constantly evolving threat.*

Challenged by an aggressive international campaign, the threat from Al-Qaeda persists, contrary to opinions expressed in public space. In the present study, based on data made public by competent structures, I have tried to outline some possible perspectives of Al-Qaeda evolution built around the same analytical starting points to help better understand them. The central hypothesis would be that the network will evolve depending on the external environment and its nature. In the course of the study, this hypothesis focuses on three points of interest: the external environment of Al-Qaeda, the characteristics and nature of the network.

Keywords: *Al-Qaeda; threats; organizational structure; terrorism; intelligence.*

Introduction: The international context under the pressure of a crisis

Modern threats do not know limits. The comparison of the intelligence community's field analyzes shows the trend, which unfortunately became evidence that jihadism and espionage cyberattacks are two critical points of the security policy of countries around the world. Considering the intensity of the threat, the state security policy increasingly focuses on identifying and rapidly assessing threats, as well as developing appropriate strategies and measures to deal with this.

At the same time, however, attention must also be focused on insecurity, which is becoming increasingly felt by a part of the population, not negligible, to the changes in the security policy of the states that face this scourge. The feeling of insecurity, even among specialists in the field, is explained not only by the recent emerging dangers, but also by the changes induced by some strategic developments that are not neglected at all.

Only by systematically and continuously analyzing and processing data and information will real-world threats be identified and a pertinent assessment of the security context can be obtained.

The division of the security policy environment, due to the growing number of key players in this area, continues to put pressure on the structures with attributions in promoting this policy. The solutions envisaged require a stronger involvement of national and transnational actors, as well as new forms of cooperation, which are currently partly defined.

In the European order, visible fractures begin to appear under the pressure of internal and external crises. Faced with the important challenges of recent years, Pan-European responses have failed to convince a large part of the population of many countries.

Sustainable stabilization of the European financial system, following the 2008 crisis, remains in the project phase, with a weaker political will to find a solution at European level. A European cessation of global migratory movements to Europe shows syncope, even if

statistics say that they are below the 2015¹ peak in 2016, as the situation in the countries of origin continues to push populations to emigration. According to forecasts in the foreign media², the new regulation of London-Brussels relations will definitely last more than the two sides want, and the uncertainty at the center of the European order will extend beyond the current decade. The pressure of change across Europe, as we know it, remains very high.

The terrorist threat at alarming odds

Against this background, the terrorist threat on the European continent remains high, as is shown by analyzes published by various European secret services³. This is mainly due to jihadist terrorism⁴, ethnonational terrorism and violent extremism, elements with a significant weight at both national and global level.

In the given context, it can be said that the “Islamic State” is the headline, and as we can see from the data provided to the public, the activities of the intelligence, police and security authorities of states around the world are strongly influenced by fight against this threat.

Thus, in a recent assessment, published on its official website, the Crisis Center⁵ a security authority which, along with other Belgian intelligence and security structures, has powers in the field of counter-terrorism, appreciated that The “Islamic State” remains the most influential terrorist organization within the jihadist movement, a group capable of acting yet, being a powerful military player. The “Islamic State” does not question its rationale for being, its leaders continue to pursue the goal of building a universal caliphate.

According to the cited source, contrary to the military pressure to which it is subjected, the organization has managed to maintain a form of state structure in the territories it controls: where the “Islamic State” has an influence, it dispenses, for example, and administrative structures, controls movements in the territory, levy taxes, and pass laws. In these areas, the rules they have established are imposed with totalitarian violence. The financial means available to the “Islamic State” cannot be accurately assessed. However, it cannot be said that this factor limits the overall capacity of the reactionary terrorist organization.

In a closer analysis of the data published by official sources (security services, structures with attributions in the fight against terrorism), it can be stated that, in understanding the complexity of the phenomenon, several factors have to be considered: the “Islamic State” product, as well as an actor of the information age; it is based on the jihadist ideology promoted by the hard core of Al-Qaeda, and is now the main vector for spreading it; the organization makes a great deal of use of resentment, resulting from social, confessional fractures with roots in power politics.

In the opinion of some analysts*, the military, propaganda and terrorist activities of the “Islamic State” will continue, the global destruction of the organization's military wing in the near future is unlikely.

In the case of additional losses of the territories under its control, this terrorist organization could undergo an increase in illegal actions. The “Islamic State” could, in the future, try to attract attention by committing attacks in Europe and the United States⁶.

¹ *Perspectives des migrations internationales 2018*, OCDE, 2018, pp. 85-90.

² According to: <http://www.fr.euronews.com>, accessed on October 15, 2018.

³ Stefano Valente, “Terrorismo globale, insicurezza locale”, *GNOSIS, Rivista italiana di intelligence*, nr.2, 2018.

⁴ *** Situation Report - Suisse 2018, available online at: <http://www.admin.ch>, accessed on September 30, 2018.

⁵ <https://centredecrise.be/fr>, accessed on August 10, 2018.

* Jean-François Mayer, analyst, member of the editorial board of the Journal for the Study of Radicalism, author of several articles posted on <https://terrorisme.net>.

⁶ *Rapport de situation – Suisse 2018*, available online at: <http://www.admin.ch>, accessed on September 30, 2018.

It can be said that the fight against the "Islamic State" over the world has not yet reached a turning point, capable of causing an effective stop to this phenomenon. At present, there are no concrete signs of disintegration of the power structures of the "Islamic State". The complexity of the situation would become more pronounced, and the threat to Western interests, larger and diversified⁷.

The divergent origins of the conflict in the region are far from being solved, the conditions to combat this phenomenon in a sustainable way are unfavorable, and visible successes in the struggle against the "Islamic State" imply less visible risks and germs of future problems.

Striking for an aggressive international campaign that has lasted for more than ten years, Al-Qaeda (AQ) faces an uncertain future. The disappearance of Osama Ben Laden, the increase in popular upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa, and the pressures of a global recession that force governments to rethink their counter-terrorism strategies are just a few of the many important events with consequences the future of the movement.

Throughout its existence, various local-level organizations have attempted to join AQ, which has gradually turn into an expanded organization with multiple branches:

- *Al-Qaeda Headquarter (Central Al-Qaeda)*: considered to be Al-Qaeda's leadership - this tough core of the organization is in Waziristan (Pakistan);
- *Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQPA)*: Founded in 2009, it operates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, which has assumed responsibility for attacking Charlie Hebdo's office on January 7, 2015;
- *Islamic Maghreb Al-Qaeda (AQIM)*: a particularly active group in the Sahel, a product of Albanian Salafing Group for Sermon and Fighting (GSPC), who vowed to join Al-Qaeda in 2006;
- *Al Shabaab: present in Somalia*, attached to Al-Qaeda, starting in 2012;
- *Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent (AQSI)*: created in September 2014, demonstrates Al-Qaeda's desire to revitalize its Asian networks. AQSI is particularly active in Bangladesh.

The movements took the name Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Maghreb, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia, the geographical extension of Al-Qaeda can be seen in Figure no.1.




Figure no. 1: Representation of the Al-Qaeda organization⁸

⁷ *Intelligence Online*, " Sous la pression djihadiste, le renseignement intérieur se réforme dans la douleur", available online at: <https://intelligenceonline.fr>, accessed on September 30, 2018.

⁸ Source: <http://www.geolinks.fr>

It can therefore be argued that the threat from Al-Qaeda persists, although the hard core of this group does not have enough resources to organize attacks, its various regional branches, especially those in Africa and Yemen, posing a threat to many countries, as pointed out in the annual report of the Swiss Intelligence Service⁹.

Adapting AQ to the issues and opportunities that will be critical to it over the next decade is a lively source of debate between government officials, academics, analysts, and private consultants. At a prospective workshop held in Ottawa in 2017¹⁰, analysts tried to make some predictions about the future of AQ, starting from the very definition of the phenomenon, which includes: a core group of leaders, called the generic term AQ nucleus, affiliated regional groups, which, together with this core, form the AQ network, the same orientation groups located in the main regions where the network operates, Islamic extremists originating in Western countries, adherents from various corners of the world, and AQ's own ideology.

In view of this complexity, the participants focused their scenarios on those al-Qaeda elements with the greatest incidence on the future of the phenomenon in a broad sense, namely the AQ core and the affiliated groups (especially Al Qaeda in Iraq - AQI - Al Qaeda Arabic Peninsula - AQPA - Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb - AQMI - and Al-Qaeda in East Africa - AQAE).

Based on various analyzes, this prospective study attempts to outline a possible evolution of Al-Qaeda, following three trajectory models: *gradual decline, progressive ascension, and rapid ascension*.

Before presenting the results of the study on possible developments of AQ, I would like to highlight a number of points that need to be taken into consideration in the way this research is to be considered:

- Scenarios are not intended to predict the future of AQ. They propose a set of possible perspectives on the future of AQ and, at the same time, identify those contexts in which the signals and consequences of the evolution of AQ to date are studied;

- Scenarios are being brought up today. In the present study, we have chosen as the time horizon the last five years, a period considered to have a decisive role in some essential points of interest, such as the stability and governance of the world's powers, in relation to the long-term repercussions of political and economic transformations. However, it should be emphasized that the use of verbs at the present time in the exposition of ideas in the work is not an indicator of the inevitable nature of predictions.

1. In the hypothesis of *a gradual decline* in the loss of ideological warfare, it is based on the principle that local governments, which seem to address the causes of instability and weak governance, enjoy considerable legitimacy and support. To the extent that they reduce the forces at the origin of the disturbances, the new situations reinforce the existing political regimes.

At the same time, they allow resource allocation of local security services to address other security issues and order maintenance. Confronted by political forces in conflict with its interests, AQ notes that its prospects are gradually diminishing.

When the governments of the regions where AQ has its bases appear to be concerned about the causes of instability and inadequate governance, they put into operation forces that conflict with AQ's interests. AQ's efforts to neutralize these forces favors small fractures, which are becoming deeper in relation to the organization's ideology, fuel the tensions between its leaders and exacerbate the decentralization pressures within the network.

⁹ *Rapport de situation – Suisse 2018*, available online at: <http://www.admin.ch>, accessed on September 30, 2018.

¹⁰ "Niveaux nationaux de la menace terroriste pour le Canada", Government of Canada, January 22, 2018, available online at: <https://www.canada.ca/fr/services/defense/securitenationale/niveau-menace-terroriste.html>, accessed on October 01, 2018

In spite of these dynamics, which further undermines the ability to penetrate Western security systems and to carry out ingenious attacks, AQ does not accept defeat, focusing rather on small, rudimentary attacks, fixing itself as an objective increasing their number. The adopted strategy is simple: it continues to be a source of inspiration for Muslim terrorists living in Western countries and continues to make short-term alliances with dissident factions and "road comrades" in their camps.

There is the temptation that the gradual decline of AQ be presented as a success, which Western countries risk confusing with victory. If they react with a new wave of intense anti-terrorist operations, their approach could confirm AQ's vision of the world, awaken hostility among traditional regional network partners and slow down economic growth. So with little help from AQ propagandists, the West would only strengthen its position.

To the extent that "anti-Occidentalism" will continue to resonate among the population, members and partisans of AQ may be able to include extremist views of the network in state institutions. Then the AQ's hostility to the West will translate into both terrorist attacks and indirect tensions among states.

2. Another vision of the possible evolution of AQ could be the development and propagation of the so-called "AQ mark", a *progressive increase* that risks gradually transforming the dangers associated with AQ. These become less predictable as AQ leaders are more autonomous and opportunistic, and more visible as AQ uses new weapons, new recruits, new sources of funds, and new shelters.

In addition, threats become more numerous, with the proliferation of AQ-affiliated groups, in all regions of the network, but also in other areas. It can be said that all these changes, in the profile of the threat posed by AQ, are intensifying as a growing number of weak or conflicting states only open the possibility for AQ executives to infiltrate movements' refugees to Western countries.

The evolution of the Western perspective towards the fight against terrorism can outline a new profile of the AQ threat, namely an excess of confidence, generated by the successes in the fight against terrorism, the progressive increase of AQ, the budget cuts in the fight against terrorism caused by the pressures recessions pressures and troop withdrawals, in line with planned mission dates, may lead to new gaps in Western intelligence, while reducing counter-terrorist pressures on AQ. The resulting situation is serious: The West is becoming more and more vulnerable at a time when AQ is getting progressively more and more resources.

It is assumed that in the regions where AQ is based, the causes of instability and weak governance are getting worse. The dynamics is similar in all the regions where the AQ camps are located: political tensions are accentuated by frictions within the state, by personal dislike and by sabotage, and the economic outlook is compromised by stagnant economic growth, reserves and increasing deficits.

As these pressures lead to generalized instability and weaken local governments, they fortify AQ. In fact, they contribute to the spread of extremist views, which only help to develop the network, opening up their way, for example, to ultra-conservative Islamic organizations to meet basic needs. Thus, the number of young people deprived of their rights has grown, AQ chooses its recruits from the territories dominated by anarchy, in which AQ finds refuge. In addition, the counter-terrorism pressures on the AQ network are reduced by overshooting local security services with immediate interest (state collapse, regime survival, mass violence, etc.).

3. When the causes of instability and lack of government are getting worse, the outlook for AQ is improving. When they are well outlined, AQ will have a *rapid increase*.

A great instability and serious governance gaps in the regions of AQ camps animate the forces that fuel this whole nebula, namely violence, poverty, security void, and the

collapse of regimes. They only promote AQ's popularity at high levels, dramatically increase the wealth of the network and fuel the rise of the network. Under such circumstances, AQ is more present and more active in a greater number of sanctuaries.

It also exercises effective control over states that have weapons of mass destruction. When Al-Qaeda will have chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN) weapons to fight against its counter-terrorism action, it will become a new threat to international security.

Conclusions

Western governments are faced with a much more complex and serious AQ threat at a time when recessionary pressures, that exhaustion of public opinion about counter-terrorism operations, and excess confidence arise after success, in recent years, in the fight against terrorism, they only create quite strong premises at national level to take a step backwards.

Palliative solutions to annihilation of these conflicting powers include an uninterrupted transition from information to technical solutions, and from military interventions to strategic attacks by the Special Forces.

In the long run, the West could seek new opportunities to take advantage of Al-Qaeda's most likely vulnerabilities: local resistance to AQ control, determined by social structures and strong loyalty, conflicts among factions fueled by conflicts between personalities and ideologies, as well as contradictory tactics and the changing nature of public opinion in AQ areas, caused by political repression and excessive economic difficulties.

Although the Islamic State has taken over the leadership of its rival Al-Qaeda for a while, Western intelligence services agree that AQ still poses a threat. Working from the shadow, it can be said that Al-Qaeda has had a lot of time in the past to strengthen its network.

In a January 2018¹¹ report, several UN observers have come to the conclusion that Al-Qaeda remains "remarkably resilient". "Al-Qaeda-related groups are the main terrorist threats in some areas, such as Somalia and Yemen", the observers say.

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CONCEPT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGAL MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

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Abstract: Geneva Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC 1972) provisions must be respected by all signatory countries, while non-signatory countries are required to refrain themselves from using those kind of weapons.

BTWC allows signatory countries to possess and use reasonably small amounts of biological agents of war – BAW (grams) for defensive purpose of scientific research for obtaining new means of diagnosis, prevention and treatment. But living biological agents can be multiplied on demand in any amount, or toxins may be biosynthesized in any amount as specific ammunition for biological weapons.

It means that the implementation of the Convention is a complex action and difficult to achieve in practice. In this situation, effective legal measures for the worldwide implementation of BTWC must be set, but concrete actions are more difficult to implement. UN, as an international body, is able, to enforce and to monitor the compliance with the Convention, being helped by other entities, such as the Security Council, the World Health Organization (WHO), etc.

Keywords: CBRN protection, biological weapons, biological agents, toxins, international legislation, BTWC 1972, legal measures implementation, evaluation, medical intelligence.

Introduction

By means of biological weapons, many pathogens can easily be disseminated, which can lead to epidemics among humans, plants and animals. Thus, due to the fact that a very small amount of the toxin can cause major damages and a lot of possibilities to getting out of control after dissemination, these weapons are considered the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction.

Since 1940, science has made remarkable advances in biology, as DNA¹ has been recognized as an information carrier, its structure has been revealed, and genes have been deciphered, but in 1970 the first artificial DNA recombination was obtained. Thus, with these findings, the biological agents could be used for medical purposes to vaccine manufacturing or used as treatment methods. Unfortunately, their multiplication has also been used in the production of various biological weapons used over time.

Following the many possible uses of biological weapons, in 1972 the Geneva Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention assembled. It has been signed so far by around 160 countries and ratified by 90% of them. Thus, the signatory countries commit themselves not to research, manufacture, store or use living biological agents and their toxins in combat actions. Also, non-combatant countries are forced to refrain from using them for not being accused of war crimes. For the first time, the problematic of toxins classification, as biological substances produced by biosynthesis of living organisms, being non-living biological agents, therefore BAW (biological agents of war) and not CAWs (chemical agents of war) are considered.

The BTWC allows signatory countries to possess and use very small amounts of BAW for defensive scientific research to obtain new means of diagnosis, prophylaxis and treatment. But living biological agents can be multiplied on demand in any amount, or toxins can be biosynthesized in any quantity, as specific ammunition for biological weapons. Therefore, the Convention implementation is a complex action and difficult to be implemented. It should be noted that none of the conventions that prohibits the use of a certain type of weapon against the enemy does not prohibit its use on its own population (BTWC Article XIII).

The many uses of biological weapons, both as national programs and as threats or accidents with biological agents or toxins, have led to an increase in the need for demanding programs to verify the application of the BTWC. Unfortunately, due to the rapid scientific progress, the attempts to develop protocols to strengthen the BTWC have not been successful.

With the development of the weapons industry, the purchase or production of biological weapons it is also taken into consideration. This assimilation process takes into account two important factors: the need to own such a weapon (contextual factors) and the need to produce BAW depending on costs and country needs (favored factors).

This assimilation process studies the demand factor of how to buy weapons. In particular, the analysis on the material ground reveals ingredients that might be missing from the weapon dynamics support system.

Thus, it becomes possible to study the technological transfer process (the most visible aspect of the so-called proliferation process) from the perspective of the demand. This dynamics are analyzed for both type of actors, state and non-state. There are proved the complexities of weapons programs and reveal various levels at which the concept of technology transfer might be relevant for early detection and prevention from a biological weapons program.

In the light of the specific challenges raised by biology and biotechnology for monitoring and verifying activities as support for the rules regarding the prevention of the disease to weapon transformation, it is necessary to analyze the concept of “dual-use technology” (for example: microorganisms that can be used as biological agents or for the vaccines).

An important part of the future verification process will therefore need to focus on maintaining the transparency of technology transfers (thus contributing to building confidence). In addition, it is becoming increasingly clear that security and the concept of security can no longer be limited to military security. Security involves several dimensions, such as personal security, economic security (for companies, states, etc.), social security

¹ Deoxyribonucleic acid is the molecule that contains the genetic code of organisms.

(including health and safety issues on water and food), political security (regimes' survival), environmental security and so on. The AIDS (Acquired immune deficiency syndrome) disaster in several African countries illustrates how these dimensions intertwine. A future technology transfer control regime to support the prevention of disease to weapon transformation should be designed in such a way to not cause ethical or humanity welfare related concerns.

Under a future transparency regime, it is worthwhile to preserve the concept of the general purpose criterion in Article I of the BTWC. Microbes, other infectious substances or toxins are not considered to be biological combat agents if they are used for three other permitted purposes, such as prophylaxis, protection and other peaceful purposes.

1. The provisions of the Convention

After many international attempts to stop the use of biological weapons based on living agents and toxins following the Geneva Protocol in 1895, which was violated during the two World Wars, the Geneva Convention was ready for signature on April 10th, 1972. Therefore, the BTWC was the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban the production and use of a wide range of weapons. It began to be applied since 1975. Until now, the Convention has been signed by 187 states (182 state parties and 5 just signatories), and unsigned by only 10 states².

The BTWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, storage and use of biological and toxin based weapons as a key element in the efforts of the international community to fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Despite the rapid changes that have taken place in the scientific, political, economic and national security spheres, the signatory states are trying to keep the Convention efficient and flexible in order to adapt to any changes. So, the Convention is prepared to face new threats of potential biological agents, and their use is forbidden if they are not used for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.

The Convention has an impact also on non-signatory states, as they have to refrain from using the BAW in order not to be accused of war crimes. At the same time, the non-signatory states are not admitted to discussions on the interpretation of the Convention's provisions and do not have access to information about the results of the discussions from the Convention meetings.

The state-parties are required to take steps to introduce national legislation for implementing the provisions of the Convention, to act in such a way that the prohibited activities do not take place within national territory.

Romania has ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction by Decree of the State Council no. 253 of July 6th, 1979, published in the Official Bulletin no. 57 of July 7th, 1979.

ANCEX is the national authority that oversees and coordinates all activities related to the application of the provisions of the Convention. ANCEX has promoted a draft law on the application of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction. The above-mentioned draft of the normative act was in the endorsement procedure from the institutions involved in the endorsement process and it became law.

² Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, Namibia, South Sudan and Tuvalu never signed or ratified the Convention. See details: *Biological Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties*, Arms Control Association, September 2018, available online at: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwcsig>, accessed on October 27, 2018.

2. Exceptions on the use of BAW

Another important issue in controlling the application of the Convention is the existence of exceptions because the Convention cannot completely ban the use of living agents and their toxins.

First of all, the biological agents and some toxins can be used in vaccine manufacturing for diagnose and treatment purposes. For example, biological agents may be used in the treatment of inflammatory bowel diseases such as the Crohn's disease with moderate or severe activity that have not responded to conventional immune-suppressive therapy or when the immune-suppressive therapy is contraindicated. They may also be used for patients with moderate/severe RCUH (ulcerative-hemorrhage colitis) who have not responded to corticosteroid and immune-suppressive therapy or with severe/fulminant colitis. These patients are required to undergo treatment with drugs such as Infliximab or Adalimumab containing a chimeric anti-TNF α agent consisting of IgG1 monoclonal antibodies, 25% murine and 75% human, respectively a fully humanized IgG1-type anti-TNF α ³.

In the same time, the vaccine has revolutionized the medical science since it has an important prophylactic role. The vaccine is a biological product containing suspensions (antigens) of attenuated, inactivated (killed) viruses or live bacteria, or fractions thereof, which are administered in order to induce a specific immune response. Depending on the type of the vaccine, pathogen fragments were used differently. Viral-vaccines are corpuscular with live attenuated viruses (oral polio vaccine, rotavirus, measles, rubella, urticarial, varicella, amaryl) or inactivated (inactivated poliovirus, rabies, A hepatitis) and antigenic fragments or viral subunits (B hepatitis, influenza). Bacterial-vaccines are (complete) corpuscular with living attenuated *Bacillus Calmette–Guérin* (BCG) or killed germs (cholera vaccine, pertussis), uniform polysaccharide (meningococcal, pneumococcal, Hib, typhoid vaccine) or purified protein (pertussis acellular); Antitoxin diphtheria, tetanus.

Secondly, one of the BTWC articles states that in case of major force, when a state itself is threatened, it may notify the UN three months before resuming the production of biological weapons to deter the enemy. This also explains why Israel, “an island in a sea of hostile Arabs”⁴, has not signed and ratified the convention. Also Romania, which joined it in 1972, ratified it only in 1979, in order to have an extra advantage in the face of a possible USSR aggression in the after 1968 context. It should be underlined that in fact Romania did not investigate, manufacture, store, and never used biological or toxin weapons, nor did it have such intention, but it was the target of masked biological attacks in the 20th century and we must continue to take preventive measures.

In this complex situation, effective legal measures for the application of the BTWC need to be implemented worldwide, but concrete actions are difficult to apply in practice. The UN is in the position, as an international body, to impose and control compliance with the Convention, with the help of the Security Council and the World Health Organization as a specialized body.

³ Sung Chul Park, Yoon Tae Jeon, „Current and Emerging Biologics for Ulcerative Colitis”, NCBI, published online January 15, 2015, available at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4282853/>, accessed on October 27, 2018.

⁴ “Ariel Sharon”, *Slate*, October 06, 2000, available online at: <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2000/10/ariel-sharon.html>, accessed on October 27, 2018.

3. Measures for the implementation of the Convention

Following the many uses of biological weapons, the Geneva Convention on the Prohibition of the Storage, Use, Production and Purchase of Biological Weapons was signed in 1975. Until now, this Convention has been signed by most of the nations. At first, it did not have any mechanism to check the Parties for its observance. Following the violation of the Convention by some signatory states (Iraq, 1988) the Confidence Building Measure (CBM) constitution, which began operating in 1991, has been approved at the second meeting of the Parties on the Convention revision in 1984. Then, after the third review meeting of the Convention in 1991, following the Iraqi breach of the pact during the Gulf War and after the changes that took place in the USSR, the signatory states have decided to form groups named "Ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts (VEREX)", which had the purpose of identifying and investigating potential verification measures from a scientific and technical viewpoint. This group had two meetings, in 1992 and 1993 and a report on the compliance with the Convention and a set of measures to verify the compliance with the Convention followed. After the 1997 meeting, a draft of a legal set of measures was compelled to ensure compliance with the Convention. Over time, depending on the international context, they have undergone numerous changes.

In 2001, the final set of measures was done, but there are small differences from the initial draft (Figure no 1, Figure no 2).

Composite legally binding instrument text (Annex B to AHG/56)	Previously in rolling text (Annex A to AHG/56)
Preamble	Preamble
Article 1 General Provisions	Article I General Provisions
Article 2 Definitions	Article II Definitions
Article 3 Lists and Criteria, Equipment and Thresholds	Article III A, B, C Lists and Criteria, Equipment and Thresholds
Article 4 Declarations	Article II Definitions
Article 5 Measures to ensure submission of declarations	Article III D III Measures to ensure submission of declarations
Article 6 Follow-up after submission of declarations	Article III D II Follow-up after submission of declarations
Article 7 Measures to strengthen implementation of Article III of the Convention	Article III F Measures to strengthen implementation of Article III (of the Convention)
Article 8 Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation	Article III E Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation
Article 9 Investigation	Article III G Investigation
Article 10 Additional provisions on declarations, visit and investigations	Article III H Additional provisions on declarations, visits and investigations
Article 11 Confidentiality provisions	Article IV Confidentiality provisions
Article 12 Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance	Article V Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance

Figure no 1: Initial draft of measures (1997)

Article 13 Assistance and protection against bacteriological (biological) weapons	Article VI Assistance and protection against bacteriological (biological) weapons
Article 14 Scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes and technical co-operation	Article VII Scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes and technical co-operation
Article 15 Confidence-building measures	Article VIII Confidence-building measures
Article 16 The Organization	Article IX The Organization
Article 17 National implementation measures	Article X National implementation measures
Article 18 Relationship of the Protocol to the Convention	Article XI Relationship of the Protocol to the Convention
Article 19 Settlement of disputes	Article XII Settlement of disputes
Article 20 Review of the Protocol	Article XIII Review of the Protocol
Article 21 Amendments	Article XIV Amendments
Article 22 Duration and Withdrawal	Article XV Duration and Withdrawal
Article 23 Status of the Annexes and Appendices	Article XVI Status of the Annexes and Appendices
Article 24 Signature	Article XVII Signature
Article 25 Ratification	Article XVIII Ratification
Article 26 Accession	Article XIX Accession
Article 27 Entry into Force	Article XX Entry into Force
Article 28 Reservations	Article XXI Reservations
Article 29 Depositary	Article XXII Depositary
Article 30 Authentic Texts	Article XXIII Authentic Texts

Figure no. 2: Final set of measures (2001)

Particular attention was given to: Article 4 (Declaration) which was divided into: a) Submission of Declarations, b) Initial Declarations, c) Annual Declaration; Article 5 (Measures to ensure the submission of declarations), Article 6 (Follow-up after submission of declarations); Article 7 (Measures to strengthen the implementation of Article III of the Convention); Article 8 (Consultation, Clarification and Cooperation); Article 9 (Investigations); Article 13 (Assistance and protection against bacteriological (biological) weapons); Article 14 (Scientific and technological exchange for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation); Article 16 (The Organization); Article 17 (National implementation measures).

So, in view of respecting the Convention, it is important to have a set of legal measures internationally valid. At the same time, the implementation of these measures is possible only with the good cooperation of the national and international institutions.

4. Comments

The Geneva Convention was ready for being signed in 1975, but over time there have been numerous violations. Starting with 1984, Ad Hoc Groups have been set up to verify the compliance with the Convention. For example, the UN records in Geneva the annual national reports on Confidence Building Measures (CBM). Foreign Ministries centralize the national questionnaires and forward them. These include the quantitative and qualitative data required from all human, veterinary, military and civilian medical institutions that are directly or indirectly linked to biological agents. The UN annually publishes these online questionnaires to be available to the field specialists. Each signatory state is required to abide to the

provisions of the Convention, and the non-signatory states must refrain from using them in order not to be accused of war crimes.

Establishing strict measures for compliance verification is necessary because the use of biological agents cannot be completely banned and they are used both in the medical field for diagnosis, treatment and prophylaxis, and in case of BAW threat

Therefore, since 1997, the work on establishing a legal set of measures to strengthen the Convention has started, with more emphasis on the following articles: Article 14, Article 16, and Article 17, which refers to the application of the Convention compliance measures. But one of the major issues that emerged when implementing these measures was the transparency of national safety information. Thus, there has been a contradiction between the need for annual reporting of information and its level of security, and some states like the US have refused to comply.

Therefore, a good cooperation with the government of each state has a particular role in the application of the verification mechanisms, because the foreign ministry of each signatory country annually sends to the UN reports on the use of biological agents for offensive purposes.

The representatives of various industrial branches also participated in the meetings generating the set of measures. They also contributed to the establishment of Relevant Measures in chapters such as Definition, Declaration (Declarative Formats), Follow-up after Declarations, List of Approved Equipment.

Conclusion

After signing, the Geneva Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention was violated, so a set of measures was in place to verify its observance.

Since 1991, it has been decided to hold meetings of the VEREX groups, which in 2001 established a final set of measures to verify the implementation of the Convention.

The international law provides for legal measures to ban biological weapons and toxins, but they need to be implemented to be respected by all countries and continually updated according to the evolution of science and technology.

All States signatories to the Convention, including Romania, report annually to CBM in March the situation regarding the use of biological agents for the previous year that helps to a better control of the situation on the matter.

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INDEX OF AUTHORS

- ANGHEL Iulia, 24
ANTONESCU Mădălina Virginia, 36, 236
ATANASIU Mirela, 116
BĂHNĂREANU Cristian, 143
BESENYŐ János, 209
BORȘA Silviu-Stelian, 287
CÎRCIUMARU Andreea Rurela, 230, 262
CÎRCIUMARU Florian, 7
COSTEA Cătălin Alin, 47
CRĂCIUN Ioan, 162
CRIȘAN Magda, 104
DIACONU Florin, 220
DIMA Octavian Victor Mihail, 162
DINCĂ Cristina-Florentina, 84
DIVIŠOVÁ Vendula, 124
GABROVEANU-GHINEA
Gheorghe-Alexandru, 176
GIUȘCĂ Florin Laurențiu, 198, 203
HERCIU Alexandru, 95
HLIHOR Ecaterina, 244
LUCINESCU (MUNTEANU-CASELLA)
Alexandru, 66
MANGA Marius Vasile, 59
MIHALCEA Viorel-Cătălin, 152
MOISE (BĂDĂLUȚĂ) Iulia-Petronela, 185
MUREȘAN Doina, 170
NEAGOE Visarion, 287
ORDEANU Viorel, 279, 322
PALĂ Dragoș Ionuț, 252
POPESCU Sebastian-Gabriel, 192
RĂPAN Daniela, 76
SARCINSCHI Alexandra, 135
SÂRBU Tudor, 244, 297
STAFI Florin, 306
STAIKU Iulia Mădălina, 279, 322
STAN Corina-Georgiana, 176
STOICA Alexandru, 271, 316
TUDOSIE Mihail-Silviu, 279, 322
ȚONEA Bogdan, 17
UNGUREANU David Nicolae, 230, 262
ZĂVOIANU Tomiță, 198, 203

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