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PARTICULARITIES REGARDING THE RESTORATION OF MILITARY MEN WHEN CONCLUDING MISSIONS IN OPERATION THEATERS BY MEANS OF MILITARY PHYSICAL EDUCATION

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Abstract: The participation of the Romanian Army in missions in operation theaters represents an important factor determining increased consumption of physical and psychical energy for military men. Restoring energy resources and the psychical capacity of military men represents a priority for them when returning from missions unfolded in operation theaters, as well as for the Ministry of National Defense. This restoration is reflected in a performing capacity for battle, as well as in emotional stability, conditions which are of crucial importance for any fighter. This material approaches physical and psychical restoration of military men from the perspective of military physical education and of those associated thereto, highlighting the implications of the sportive activity in restoring battle capacity of military men.

Keywords: physical and psychical restoration, military physical education, battle capacity.

Introduction

The ability to combat and soldiers’ adaptation to situations required by combat missions are conditions which are vital for the successful achievement of determined objectives. The lifestyle, geographical location where missions are conducted, strict schedule, inherent situations of control over someone’s life, family separation and difficulties in communicating with it, reduced control over privacy, stress, anxiety, boredom, unpredictable enemy, struggling with personal conflicting views, duration of the mission, isolation, sleep deprivation, prolonged physical effort etc. emphasize the importance of mental and physical health necessary to the soldiers. These factors are inevitably identified with an increased physically and mentally consumption in the fulfillment of the assigned missions.

The literature discusses the relationship between the physical activity and performance in the workplace in many areas, a good example being the control of obesity using physical exercises. However, the importance of recovering the combat capacity of soldiers was addressed very little, from the perspective of using specific means of military physical education. We therefore believe that the interpretation of the relation of military physical education-recovery-combat capacity represents an appropriate solution for understanding the importance of physical and mental recovery of the military. More specifically, the main objective of this paper is to highlight the role of military physical education means in physical recovery of soldiers returning from the theatres of operations.

Conceptual aspects of the phenomenon called “fatigue”

The internal balance of human body changes constantly, being kept under an internal or external “bombardment” of stimuli. These stimuli only serve either to produce higher adaptive changes of the body to effort or to inhibit its activity in terms of lack of rest. Countless specialty papers support the idea that stimulation and over stimulation of the body without rest for recovery of effort capacity, causes and onsets the fatigue, incidentally,
universally accepted. Fatigue exists, it’s a state we cannot deny, which installs as a result of prolonged physical or intellectual activity, without the existence of appropriate rest periods.

Fatigue is a phenomenon known and recognized by the people, a common condition, which scientists have tried to define in many ways. A definition of fatigue is given by Friedl (2007) according to which “fatigue is the state of human performance capacity reduction caused by the inability to continue adaptation to physiological stress factors”. From our point of view, fatigue represents a natural state of man, the body’s defense mechanism against saturation arising from the exposure, consciously or unconsciously, to external and/or internal stimuli on a long period of time, due to a lack of rest, materialized in reducing the mental and physical operational capacity and of optimal answers in the activities performed.

Currently, fatigue is addressed in terms of its shapes, depending on the intensity of the state and differentiates into acute fatigue and chronic fatigue. Acute fatigue involves a psycho-physiological state of medium intensity. Acute fatigue is caused by the residual accumulation of the metabolism, by depletion of energy substrates, by changes of chemical compounds in the muscles and manifests by diminishing the man’s possibilities of coordination, decreased sensorial acuity, increased reaction time to external stimuli, lack of attention, “diminishing the command and control functions”. Most times, returning the body to the maximum operating potential is realized under normal passive rest (sleep, rest on Saturday and Sunday etc), proper nutrition and adequate hydration. Alternatively, chronic fatigue is represented by a psycho-physiological state of high intensity, characterized by an obviously reduced physical and mental performance. Burnout occurs due to the accumulation of normal fatigue and of non-recovery of this fatigue, conditioned in some particular cases (as an example we can admit combat missions in theatres of operations carried out during several days) with a series of intense physical and mental activities, carried out over a long period of time.

Burnout is manifested by “malaise (extreme exhaustion) after a sustained physical or mental activity, trouble sleeping, difficulties with the memory and concentration, persistent muscle pain, joint pain, headaches, storage of lymph nodes in the neck or armpits, sore throat, abdominal or chest pain, chronic cough, diarrhea, dizziness, undue weight loss, balance problems, chills and night sweats, visual disturbances, psychological problems (depression, irritability, anxiety, panic attacks) etc.”

If we look at fatigue in terms of work, we can see that this concept is a relation between supply and demand, between request and potential. Fatigue occurs when physical and psychological resources are below requests. It manifests itself through „real reduction in individual capacities, as degradation of functions and physical processes (attention, alertness, reaction time, accuracy and coordination of movements etc.), through effective reduction of performance in activity (errors, accidents, failure of mission objectives etc.), through changes in tonus and emotional mood, decreased motivation, damage of behavior and command-line relationship, but also in interpersonal relations.” These events will be found in limiting military actions and their effectiveness.

Amid admission of fatigue as general term, the concept of operational fatigue is accepted in the military

1 Weineck, J., Biologie du sport, M.T.S., Research Centre for sporting issues, Bucharest, 1995, p.212


4 Ibidem, p.101
environment, describing the installed state as a result of their combat missions, of their intense mission training, of other highly demanding activities to which the soldiers are subjected, even in times of peace.

Soldiers’ participation to these long-time military activities, often with physical demands at the upper limit or even beyond their physical possibilities, without adequate rest periods, has as a result a reduction of their capacity to combat and also a decrease of their possibilities to adapt to new situations.

Operational fatigue is determined by a number of factors with major implications in the success of military actions. The requests of high intensity represent one of these factors, knowing that military actions have as important features, in terms of the human body, a high physical consumption (marches, seizure of weapons etc) and intellectual (memory, thinking, attention etc.) conditioned by the long period of deployment.

The requests to which a soldier is subjected involve prolonged physical effort, to which, if added lack of food, rest and unfavorable climate, which shall be finalized by the occurrence and onset of fatigue and reduction of its performance capacity. Another extremely important factor is lack of sleep. In the table below I have highlighted the importance of sleep deprivation in terms of reducing military performance.

Table 1. Military performance on the lookout period (Department of the Army, 1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of wakefulness</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 hours</td>
<td>Deterioration of performance in tasks which are partially or recently learned, monotonous or requiring vigilance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 hours</td>
<td>Marked deterioration in the capacity of recording or understanding information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72 hours</td>
<td>Performance of most tasks is reduced below 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 days</td>
<td>Is the time limit for intensive activities, both physical and mental. This can cause visual illusions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 3.00 and 6.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Performance is at the lowest level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of other factors influence decisively the fighting capacity of soldiers, implicitly the finality of military actions. An important factor is the biological rhythm disorder – military actions take place during day and/or night, leading to a conflict in the brain in terms of internal biorhythm. This situation is encountered in changing time zones or when military actions are carried out several days in a row, when the sleep deprivation is felt again. As for the athletes, in this case acclimatization and adaptation to time zone are also needed. Mental stress represents another factor of fatigue. Fear, nervousness, anxiety, war with its horrors, unsatisfactory command or hygiene conditions etc. contribute to the onset of operational fatigue.

Environmental conditions and metabolic processes of soldiers are also decisive factors in the onset of fatigue.

Regarding the environmental conditions it is sufficient to illustrate the fact that at high altitudes the oxygen concentration drops, the body exerting an extra effort to compensate for this lack. In terms of metabolism, we can exemplify
through the fact that decrease of hydration with 3% of the body has negative effects upon it and creates prerequisites for installing fatigue much quicker. (Montain și colab., 1998).

We have analyzed synthetically the fatigue and a series of factors that favors it in order to emphasize the general setup of fatigue both physically, intellectually and behaviorally. Fatigue (particularly – operational or combat fatigue) is always interesting to be explored in order to find solutions to combat its installation and its impact upon the human body, but also to find ways and means to restore the soldiers’ capacity to effort, once installed.

Features on military recovery by means of military physical education

Military activities carried out in the theatres of operations represent high human energy consumers. Restoring the fighting capacity of soldiers may be helped by external intervention, using a series of specific means of recovery from military physical education. Recovery is a process of restoring the functional balance of the body and its ability of perform, due to the emergence of fatigue, using logic and directed natural, physiotherapy and psychological regeneration means.

The term and significance of recovery points the healthy human body, while the notion of recovery is addressed to sick body. Functionally, the recovery process aims to restore the capacity of effort of all major systems involved in its deployment: cardiovascular, respiratory, muscular, nervous, endocrine.

For the military recovery to have positive effects, it is necessary to follow certain rules: it must be customized to the individual, depending on its implications in the conduct of warfare; must follow the system which is most involved in the effort and to be made starting with it; to be gradual and accessible; to be given sufficient time for its achievement, knowing that sustained physical effort over a long period of time causes on muscle recovery parameters in several days; application of active measures „should not exceed 45 minutes because lengthy exercises do not correspond to the actual purpose of balance ... and would impose an additional burden on the cardiovascular system, which would result in additional use of energy substrates”.5

In terms of the intervention of external regulatory factors and achievement of recovery, it can be spontaneous – it is achieved without external intervention and relies entirely on sleep and its quality (recommended 8-9 hours of sleep of which most to be during the night) or directed – it is achieved by cooperating with an expert (in our case the military unit doctor, psychologist and/or the specialist in military physical education).

This type of recovery completes the spontaneous recovery and it can be achieved by using health-resort means, hydrotherapy, physical therapy, pharmacological – vitamins, minerals etc, dietary – nutrition, psychotherapy – suggestion, autosuggestion etc and active rest.

Active rest represents an important way of restoring the fighting capacity of soldiers in which the physical exercise are used6 in a relaxed way, where the main demand is addressed to the components of the body which are not involved in the main effort and to which “the intensity of physical exercise must not exceed 60% of maximum heart rate”7 of the soldier (maximum heart rate is given by the

5 Wiebeck, J., Biologie du sport, M.T.S., Research Centre for sporting issues, Bucharest, 1995, p.222.

6 Physical exercise represents the primary mean specific to military physical education. It is the teaching instrument, recognized and standardized which directly influences the human body and its physical parameters, given the implementation and deployment on a long period of time, gradually and systematically.

difference obtained between the value or 220 and the soldier’s age). Active rest must be understood as a combination of dynamic physical exercises, relaxation exercises and breathing exercises.

By introducing physical exercise in rehabilitation programs in exercise capacity of the military, it is trying to obtain effects in terms of physical, of mental and physical regeneration internal structures, but also further opportunities in terms of future missions in theatres of operations.

The effects of physical exercise are found, in terms of rebuilding the military, at "morphogenetic, functional, educational, prophylactic, therapeutic, psychological and social level"\(^8\). The effects on locomotors are discovered in its components: muscles, bones, joints, tendons etc. Physical exercises determine in the locomotors the increase of blood flow, which is reflected into a better oxygenation of the above components and ensure a rich energy resource; they prevent the onset of osteoporosis\(^9\). At the joint level good indicators of elasticity can be obtained or preserving the existing ones, these changes being in the normal amplitude of movement. In muscles, the physical exercise of relaxation maintains the previously held training level and in very few cases may even cause a muscle fiber development.

From the functional point of view, the effects of physical exercise are found in the improvement of muscle properties (elasticity, excitation etc); in “increasing the muscle blood flow; increased sodium, calcium, magnesium, iron; increasing the amount of glycogen, phospholipids and phosphocreatin – substances which ensure the potential energy of muscle); in the precision of movements, in its normality”\(^10\). In terms of respiratory, physical exercise positively influences the lung capacity, can help regulate breathing and a better control over it. Physical exercise also causes changes on cardiovascular level and may include “increasing the speed of blood circulation; opening reserve capillaries, favoring deep circulation and elimination of toxic products; in time, hypotension and cardiac hypertrophy installation”\(^11\).

In terms of educational plan, by understanding and performing physical exercise, one can transfer the information to other areas of military interest, adapted to current needs. The intellect, affectivity are influenced by physical exercise, which might lead to shaping and defining the personality.

In terms of prevention, the physical exercises are seeking to maintain the health, relaxation and psychological and physical stress relieving after participating in missions, maintaining the body’s defense capacity. Recreation and relaxation of military personnel through physical exercise contribute to getting the job done through a deeper involvement, by increasing concentration, eliminating negative stress accumulated during missions, to increase the work potential. Physical exercise aiming the prevention must be performed routinely, as stated earlier, not to high intensity and long duration, as sports, jogging, gymnastics, swimming, cycling, travelling on tourist routes with mild degrees of difficulty, which requires a substantial energy consumption.

Therapeutic effects of physical exercise are found, mainly, in the existence of soldiers who present various diseases and require recovery programs for their operational recuperation.

From the perspective of physiological effects, physical exercise contribute to soldiers’ detaching from the

\(^{8}\) Cordun, M., Medical kinesiology, Ed.AXA, Bucharest, 1999, p.250.

\(^{9}\) OSTEOPOROSIS, osteoporoze, s. f. Bone lesion characterized by thinning and bone rarefaction, with formation of varisous cavities , https://dexonline.ro/definitie/osteoporoz%C4%83 accessed on 28.07.2015.

\(^{10}\) Ibidem, pp.251-252.

\(^{11}\) Ibidem.
tense situations in which they were during missions, combat situations, raising a capital of self-confidence. Affective processes (primary-anger, fear, terror etc, complex-joy, contempt, sadness, enthusiasm, admiration etc, superior-feelings, passions) they also support positive changes, receiving an additional externalized rate.

Under the social aspect of the effects of physical exercise, we admit the existence of an opportunity for social reintegration for soldiers returning from theatres of operations, whose behavioral structure could suffer. In this sport-social frame, the soldiers can express their personal ideas and membership to social values, they can relate and communicate effectively with others without being reluctant to externalize, they can exploit their behavior and motor experience previously gained without regulatory constraint (maybe just moral), which we would translate here as being expression through movement.

Conclusions

In the physical and psychological recovery process, from the perspective of the two forms of fatigue, acute and chronic, there is a requirement of using passive and active means of restoring the soldiers’ capacity to effort. If in the case of passive means (sleep, massage, sauna) the recovery is slow and requires a longer time to get results, when using the active means – physical exercise the recovery process can be accelerated, facilitating the operation of internal systems of soldiers in the conditions before starting the missions and helping to eliminate the metabolic waste. To the same extent physical exercise of recover contributes in keeping the level of physical training of soldiers they had before and facilitates the resumption of activity sustained for future missions.

However, the active rest cannot substitute the passive rest, the active means do not replace the passive means, they only complement each other and as their fundamental role, they can help restore the fighting capacity of soldiers by customizing the physical and psychological recovery depending on each individual and the tasks performed during missions in theatres of operations.

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MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY VERSUS SPORTS ORIENTATION
IN THE ARMY

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Abstract: The development of military conflicts in very diversified geographic areas of the world imposes the necessity to update military knowledge falling under the specter of military topography, military specialization. The first part of the paper focuses on defining military topography and highlighting its importance in performing the battle actions of military men. The second sequence of the present material offers information necessary for understanding the sportive orientation and the role of this sportive discipline in the context of its contribution in forming and consolidating the human being from the physical and psychical standpoint. The last part of the paper is focused on the comparison between military topography and sportive orientation, highlighting their distinct elements.

Keywords: military topography, sportive orientation, map, compass, military actions.

Introduction

Understanding the battlefield is one of the priorities of each commander in order to predict more accurately the movement of his own troops and the enemy troops, during the military actions. Observing the battlefield is an essential need for conducting warfare, being achieved either classically, on the field, or by “reading” the main instrument offered by the military topography – the map, to whose accomplishment the technological resource is mainly used. However, to finalize an action plan, the technology and digitization of the battlefield is not enough, they must be complemented by the ability of analysis and synthesis, preparation, experience and intuition of commanders.

The vision of commanders on the land and also its understanding, the impact of terrain and the weather conditions on the operations of its own troops and art of combat, will be reflected in the actions and movements that they will perform on the field, in order to achieve objectives. The battlefield, increasingly diversified, requires the assimilation of theoretical and practical knowledge of military topography by each participant in military actions, at all levels, either when we speak about conception human resource, or the executive human resource.

Observing the field, its clarity and precision of its understanding by the commanders and executives of missions themselves, are not military aspects, and far from being recent. Since ancient times, the leaders of armies used the land for military actions that they intended to carry out, the examples being numerous over time.

This material has as a starting point the confusion and the conflict of understanding between the sports orientation as a sport, on one hand, and topography as a branch of geodesy science1, on the other hand.

General notions regarding the military topography and its importance in military actions

In order to correctly understand the issues presented, we must define some notions which we will encounter during this analysis.

Topography is that “applied branch of land measurement science, which deals

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1 „Applied science which deals with determining the shape, size and gravity field of the Earth, as well as the measurements of the Earth’s surface, in order to represent it on a plane”. according to Rotaru, M., and colab., Modern military topogeodesy, Vol. II, Directorate of military topography, Ed. DTM, Bucharest, 1994, p.236.
with the study of methods of measuring the land and its graphical representation on a plane surface, in the form of plans and maps.  

Military topography is part of the topography which analyzes the “methods of studying the land, of using maps (n.n. orientation in the field with maps) and photograms, expeditious enforcement measures in the field, drawing sketches of the land”, of orientation in the field without a map, with the aim of preparing and waging warfare of own or allied troops. Military topography is a fundamental part of military training, which forms their skills to quickly analyze the land, to appreciate correctly the details of planimetry on the map or land (whether natural or artificial), in order to adapt and carry out the battles in concrete, real situations.

Military topography creates a fund of general theoretical and practical knowledge, necessary to any soldier in order to wage warfare. The importance of this knowledge, hence the military topography, is found in what they offer to soldiers: possibilities of knowledge of topographic features and tactical characteristics of the land, absolutely necessary in military actions; “procedures and sequencing study of the land in order to establish the generality and tactical properties (n.n. observation, direct recognition of the land, studying photos and maps etc.)”; rapid means of measuring distances, gradients, angles to determine the site of military targets or object on the battlefield; information regarding the guidance and movements of troops and technique in the field, using or not military topographic maps or other graphic drawings; information enabling the military map reading and understanding, in order to choose how to fight best; sources that facilitate, when appropriate, creating graphic drawings of simple fight (an outline of the land, shooting schemes etc.).

This listing on the importance of military topography can be identified and demonstrated by synthetic presentation of some tactical aspects of the land, and other information useful for soldiers: the land provides possibilities to cover against enemy fire and increased vulnerability of the enemy; in the movements of troops and technique (it is known that wetlands or marshes reduce the speed of the technique, that deep water of hydrographic network also prevents the displacement of technique etc.); the strongly rugged land is definitely an obstacle for the advancement of troops and technique; the covered land prevents observation while providing good conditions for “masking troops and combat technique, secret of actions in battle” in ambush; methods of calculating the angle of slope (steepness of the slope, uphill or downhill, causes a series of measures concerning the movements and enforcement of fire); methods of measuring distances (from sight, using sound, by step); determining the cardinal points and directions of movement in the field after a set angle; the type of representation of planimetric details on the map; ways of representing relief on the military maps; cities hamper the enemy’s advancement, the buildings being designed into true fortresses etc.

**Notional aspects in the conduct of sport and its role in shaping the human being**

Sports orientation represents a sport, not very popular but quite old, with roots in the military, being used in the early XIXth century as a form of training for combat in Scandinavia. It jells as sporting discipline only in the beginning of the XXth century, in Sweden. Sports orientation is described as an interplay of

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2 Dănescu, A., Rudas, L., Rotar, L., Military topography, for NCO’s (Non-commissioned officer), petty officers, degree professionals and soldiers, Directorate of military topography, Ed. DTM, Bucharest, 1975, p.6
4 Ibidem
intellectual and physical, metaphorically said “a chess of mind while running”. It is the sport in which the participants in the activity “use a detailed map of the venue and the compass, to go through once on an unknown route and to find checkpoints (n.n. marked on special maps of sports orientation, with red circles) placed in the field of competition”6. Most often this takes place against the clock, where are deployed official competitions but also other types of informal competitions or lack of timing, when it is approached as a leisure activity.

For the unapprised, the sports orientation is a dilemma, that is why we are trying to clarify below what it means. Whether we are talking about sports orientation as a leisure activity or a competitive one, during the action itself, the participant receives on the starting line a sports orientation map (similar in many aspects with the military topographic maps), a contest card and possibly a compass (for amateurs), if he/she doesn’t have it already. This map is marked with red circles, the checkpoints numbered from 1 to n (n being the total number of posts), the starting point and the place of destination, but not the route to go, a series of graphics that signify the description of control station (which we must find there). With the map and compass, the participant performs a series of actions at the starting line (map orientation – its layout towards the land, setting the direction of movement) after which he goes to the first checkpoint on a route chosen by him.

Each post comes with different electrical devices or devices for punching the contest card, provided with a distinct code for each one. In other words, the post of number 1 corresponds to the code “x”, post 2 has the code “y” etc. On arrival, these codes are validated and with validation it is certified that the participant reached all checkpoints, the tie-break being the time obtained in browsing the route.

We have briefly described the sport orientation in order to be understood and, obviously, to highlight its contribution to the formation and development of physical and psychological human qualities. And in its case we present some elements which prove this role. Thus, the unknown land represents a challenge, a mental and physical stress in human tendency to self-improvement; the map, the compass, the graphical drawings and their interpretation cause an accumulation of knowledge before the activity and an intense demand during the action deployment; running on a route requires good physical qualities in order to face the obstacles of the land; the presence of checkpoints, of loneliness during the journey, of individual predominant character of sports orientation, develops in the individual a spirit of fair-play, of self-knowledge, honesty; overcoming obstacles and loneliness on the route may lead to discovery of volitional qualities and other energy resources unknown until then; physical stress leads to body development, strengthening and improvement of motor skills; weather conditions are not always the best, they create premises for increasing the human adaptability to adverse conditions.

Socially, sports orientation increases the chances of integration or reintegration of man in social groups, where one can freely express one’s beliefs and feelings, respecting the moral demands of living together.

Sports orientation proposes a lifestyle, offering play and fun for children, recreation, and consecration for adults, satisfying the human mental, physical and social needs.

**Similarities and differences between military topography – orientation on the field with or without a map and sports orientation**

We have previously shown some peculiarities of military topography – military orientation in the field with or without a map and of sports orientation necessary in understanding their comparison, and in the following we will

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develop similarities and differences between them.

As it can be seen, even in the examples above, the objectives of military topography and sports orientation are totally different, the first being part exclusively of military training in order to wage warfare, the second being a sports discipline, with an obvious role for competition and relaxation. Based on these targets, we can establish that they have different purposes: in the military situation the “prize” is fulfilling the military objectives and even to save lives, while in sports orientation they are material, financial and spiritual.

Although they are sports competitions on teams, sports orientation is predominantly individual, promoting, in a quite important extent, man as a distinct entity, while in the military, the actions are the team’s/platoon’s appanage etc.

Regarding the equipment used, the soldiers use specific clothing and footwear, not very easy, expensive, with all the “accessories” necessary for waging battle, his weight having negative effects (strain muscle, additional power consumption etc.) on the body in long-acting. Military equipment may hinder rapid movement in going military actions in inaccessible areas (dense forests, strong rugged terrain etc.). Those in the sports orientation use sports, technical, easy, not very expensive equipment which facilitates their movements and does not block them. Both pieces of equipment can also have the function of protection against the weather, when necessary.

Another extremely important aspect comes from the character of military topography and sports orientation. In the first case, this military specialty has a compulsory character in military training, for successful military actions. The second has as a feature the voluntary nature of participants. If in the situation of the army, there are limitations regarding the human access from outside and only the military categories are covered, the sports orientation addresses to all people, from children to the elderly, without limiting the number of participants, conditioned still by their health condition in both cases.

Being an integral part of military training, acquiring theoretical knowledge and practical skills training to work with specific technical tools (map, compass etc.) and field trips, in situations as close to the real ones, requires substantial energy consumption, physically and mentally.

Military training must be done continuously and in a disciplined manner, under diversified conditions, on unknown areas. These conditions are also met in the sports orientation, noting that the training planned are customized at the individual level and conditioned to the time factor (knowing that tie in competitions is based on the obtained time), parameter not so important for military as in sports orientation. For soldiers it is important to achieve the objectives outlined, in safe conditions (if we can speak of it during warfare) without loss of life and material damage.

A specific feature of those two has as a starting point the existence of rules and laws regarding the regulation of military topography – orientation for military actions and the sports orientation and the aspects arising therefrom.

Both have this legal framework, however, for the amount of information to assimilate, in the sports orientation we meet a number of elements, rather simple, more understandable (training for competitions for amateurs and relaxation can be made even a few minutes before the start of the run) and in the orientation for fighting missions the training is a gradual process, lengthy, the amount of information being much higher.

To understand these issues we can exemplify that in the military actions it is necessary to know the land and its importance for battle (landforms, its tactical peculiarities and planimetric details, methods for its research), processes for expedient measurement of distances and angles of slopes; of orientation in the field – determining the cardinal points with or without a compass and the directions of movement in the field, indicating the objectives etc. Not all of these elements of
military training are found in sports orientation or not so detailed.

The deployment environment (it must be taken into account that military actions are carried out anywhere in the world, in nature or cities), the weather conditions and climate, altitude are elements which create similarities between these two. The sports orientation contests also take place on harsh terrain and weather conditions (cold, rain, fog, strong wind, snow), or in wooded mountains and hills, in plains or in cities.

The major difference is given by the psychophysical strains to which soldiers are subject to, as a result of occurrence of danger to their own lives put at stake due to the presence of enemy and its actual combat actions.

Both soldiers and athletes use tools to help them meet the proposed objectives. One of them is the compass. In sports orientation, the compass is the only navigation tool that can be used in accordance with special regulations. The soldiers also use this tool with the specification that the military compass is made of much stronger material (metal-glass, metal-polycarbonate) with greater reliability.

The compass in sports orientation is very light, made of plastic or polycarbonate, but does not resist to physical tough shock. A negative aspect of compass in sports orientation is that after a certain time it gets demagnetized. While in the orientation only the compass is allowed, the soldiers can use a variety of other navigation tools which help them in carrying out their missions (altimeters, GPS tools – in their case it is extremely important to know their guidelines for use and navigation coordinates). However, we believe that “technology, no matter how powerful, cannot be compared with basic navigation ability of man”, very useful in everyday life (driving a car, visiting cities etc.).

Another element to be brought to the fore and analyzed is the second essential tool, together with the compass, both for sportmen, as for soldiers: the map. This tool, defined as “the representation decreased, accurate and detailed in plan of a land surface”\(^8\), belongs to a joint effort, of teamwork in both cases, using a number of devices for mapping and measurement (topographic square rule, theodolite, topographic compass etc.)

Whether we speak about military topographic maps or sports orientation, on these we can find details of represented land: roads, natural or artificial landforms, human settlements, vegetation, hydrology, map scale (reduction ratio of detail on the map compared to the land) etc.

Regarding the use of maps at different scales in the two areas (mainly for the army maps with a scale of 1:250000 – meaning 1 cm on the map represents 250 m, in the land and sports orientation, recently, maps with scale of 1:10000), there is a tendency of annulment of this difference because military actions are carried out in localities, where maps with scale up to 1:5000 are necessary, the same applies for sports orientation.

For the maps to be useful, in both cases, they must contain details of planimetry and more accurate leveling, and also to accurately reproduce parts of the landmarks (see main and secondary landforms: saddle, pap, secondary peaks, potholes etc.)

It should be noted that in sports orientation maps, the details of planimetry and landforms are much richer; distances between contour lines are 5 cm which can lead to a boulder marking, of a smaller pit; it is also marked the type of vegetation which covers the area and how thick is, in order to establish the speed of movement; only the north-south lines are drawn, considering the magnetic declination of Earth; being ready to work; they are colored (which is not the case for the military), updated and very clear.

Coding and representation signs on the military maps and sports of the elements on the land are, in most cases,

\(^7\) Ciapa, G., și colab., Sports orientation, Ed. ATM, Bucharest, 2013, p.91.

\(^8\) Ibidem, p. 18.
similar, but the depth of details of the sports orientation maps has determined the generation of other markings, which are not found in the military topography, extremely useful in establishing the checkpoints.

These elements can form an obstacle to the participation of a soldier in contests of sports orientation but the information gained from studying the military topography could make him adjust and familiarize quite easily to new representations of maps and symbols on them.

Conclusions

By the foregoing, we believe that we have removed a number of uncertainties regarding the military topography and sports orientation. We have shown elements of similarity and difference between those two, emphasizing, where appropriate, through concrete examples.

From the previous presentation, we can admit that the sports orientation can be used as a training tool for soldiers to train practical and theoretical knowledge obtained from the military topography and the contests of sports orientation can be activities to improve the rapid navigation skills in different missions. Implementation of themes in sports orientation in military physical education courses could be a solution, in the same time, for developing qualities and motion habits, capacity of physical, intellectual effort of soldiers and acquiring topographical knowledge necessary in waging warfare.

The final conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that military topography and sports orientation can mutually beneficially influence, that the two can be symbiotic components in training, military and sporting reality proving it in countless cases.

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THE HISTORY OF MILITARY THINKING IN ROMANIA. 1859-1989
– CONCEPTS, THEORIES, IDEAS AND THESES –

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Abstract: The interest in studying the evolution of military thinking in Romania became more vivid in the interwar period. In my presentation, I will approach the issue of military thinking from two perspectives. On the one hand, I will refer to the scientific part of this field and, on the other hand, I will do a review regarding the applicability of the ideas and theoretical concepts presented in several military studies and articles featured in the publications of the Romanian Army General Staff. I consider that the presentation of the main steps in the Romanian military thinking during the specified period is the recognition of the scientific and moral value of our predecessors, who are important military theorists, whose principles and opinions have contributed to the evolution of the military thinking in Romania.

Keywords: military theory; strategy; World War II; doctrine; defense.

Introduction

History teaches us that every period in the evolution of a society is defined by events and works for posterity, as positive or negative examples, as they happened. Over time, the Romanian military thinking, in general, has been discussed in papers, articles, anthologies, the opinions and assessments expressed by personalities in the military field succeeding in defining the role and place of this concept in military culture. According to the stricto sensu definition, military thinking1 cumulates those ideas, theories and doctrines that marked a historical era and hence constituted the edifice of military phenomenon theorisation, of a „philosophy of war”, seen through its political as well as military approach.

The 13 articles about the art of war, belonging to the Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, true moral laws, are also applicable today, although the geopolitical and security environment is completely different, new, challenging and unstable. In addition, The Art of War is considered the „beginning of systematic thinking, constituted by concepts, ideas and principles with a general character, which specifically address the phenomenon of war and try to achieve a management tool to guide the troops in combat”3. The laying plans, waging war, attack by stratagem, tactical dispositions, energy, weak and strong points, manoeuvring, the nine variations in tactics, the army on the march, the terrain and its nine situations, the attack by fire, and the use of spies – all these make up a knowledge guide of thinking and behaviour in a given action. It is said that even Marshal Montgomery would have been happy to talk to Sun Tzu, and Liddell-Hart, in developing his theory of indirect actions strategy, relied on the study of confrontation, direct and indirect, Sun Tzu emphasising the importance of

1 The military thinking is understood as „all ideas, concepts, theories and doctrines that approach the phenomenon in a given period”, in Lexicon militar, Editura Militară, București, 1980, p. 341.
combining the two to understand their strategy.

How long has military thinking been present among human preoccupations? Perhaps it has been always present in the subconscious. Obviously, it was not defined as sophisticatedly as today from the very beginning. However, a type of military thinking having practical applicability, reflected in the actions accomplished by people, has existed since ancient times. An example in this respect is ancient Greece, where the phrase *polenikey tekne* (Art of War) was well known. It is a way of reasoning from the moment a man makes contact with the first forms of battle – attack or defense. And, according to the specifics of each historical period, the ideas, theories, concepts have been preserved and translated into stone, on wood, then on scrolls of papyrus, from the pictorial representations of the Stone Age, tablets of clay next to Uruk, to, why not?, the Târtăria Transylvanian tablets.

**The evolution of the Romanian military thinking – historical coordinates**

The need to have a military force, a permanent army, able to defend the Romanian territory, found the answer in the Union Act of 1859, through the military measures taken by the ruler Alexandru Ioan I. They also came in support of the theoretical activity in the military field. In the pages of *Military Romania*, edited by the General Staff, subsequently the Great General Staff, initially an independent publication, issued in 1864, studies on the organisation of the Army, modern training, and education in the army and by the army were published. Thus, in the first issue of the publication, one of the editors, on the basis of the events in 1864 in the country and worldwide, wrote about the fate of Europe, about the training of the army to defend independence: „The sad situation Romania was confronted with since it had lost its old military institutions, when the country seemed to be only the great grain provider for the invasion armies, showed to Romanians that only the army could guarantee the future existence as well as the right to count among the other free independent nations”.

It seems that the appeal in *Military Romania* had an answer, as the head of state himself, Alexandru Ioan I, and his adviser, Mihail Kogălniceanu, active participants in the revolution of 1848, supported the organisation and equipment of the army.

Between 1900 and 1916, there were issued the first works of strategy and tactics, in an attempt to develop a national military doctrine, based on combat experience.

D.A. Sturdza, a former Minister of War in 1903 and member of the Romanian Academy, a connoisseur of the spirit of soldiers, highlighted in the pages of *Military Romania* the importance of brotherhood within the army corps or in garrison, of the knowledge of mysteries of war and weapons, all of which representing „paths that always lead to the serious training of the military educator”. During this period, military education, especially the Superior War School, significantly contributed to the development of theoretical research. In 1919, the Quartermaster School was established within the Superior War School and the best graduates were sent to schools in France and Italy for training. The contact with the Western education was beneficial for the Romanian military thinking, because many of the trainees, who returned into the country, developed their own works in the field or they translated some

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7 Ibidem, p. 211.
works applicable to our army. It was the period when the Romanian army adopted the French doctrine, "specially adapted to our conditions"\textsuperscript{8}, according to a report issued by the General Staff in 1924. In addition, the national military doctrine continued to be debated in articles and studies on military history, military theory, as well as in military publications, mainly in Military Romania. The journal provided a generous space for such debates starting in 1927. Therefore, the subject was extensively discussed. There were two types of "thinkers": those who advocated the adoption of the French model, and those who supported the development of a national doctrine.

The period between the two world wars is considered the most prolific in terms of the theoretical approach to military thinking.

The Second World War led to implementing the German doctrine ideas in the evolution of the Romanian military thinking – another procedure, other rules and regulations, joint training with German units. Although the theoretical approaches, in this context, were not so important, the Romanian military thinkers sought to capitalise on the results and the characteristics of the military operations conducted in the early part of the war. Thus, Colonel Ioan Gheorghe, assessing the activity of armed combat, emphasised, in the pages of Military Romania too, the role played by aviation and mechanised forces in winning battles, and analysed the situation of small states that were either defeated or forced to join various alliances: "No state should forget that this accession will have no value to ensure its existence unless it does contribute with own forces, with a volume as high as possible, a volume sufficient and appropriate to the means of modern war"\textsuperscript{9}.

The transition of our country on the part of the Allies (USSR, USA and UK), in 1944, sealed the fate of the Soviet influence in Romania, opening the door for the country to become a communist one. Under the influence of the Soviet model, the Romanian military body lost, in fact, its identity. In headquarters, in large units and in units, the political apparatus was infiltrated, and a number of officers were on trial, sentenced to prison, or dismissed. The ideas, theses, concepts were perceived as reactionary or retrograde by the new regime. Some theorists like Ioan Sichitiu, Iosif Iacobici, Nicolae Samsonovici ended up in prison, while others, such as Mircea Tomescu, Constantin Sandovici, Marin Manafu were marginalised and oppressed\textsuperscript{10}. In this context, I would like to mention Major Sandovici who, in his studies, wrote: "Since its renaissance, the Romanian army has passed through the fashion of the Russian, the French or the German armies, but, if necessary, it used none of them and, in front of the enemy, it was disarmed, lacking not only in equipment but also in the leadership spiritual orientation"\textsuperscript{11}.

The years 1945-1947 culminated with the Romanian military body dissolution and, implicitly, with the mandatory censorship in the national military thinking. The situation was similar in the next period, until the fall of the regime established by the communists. The Romanian military thinking, closely monitored, had to comply with the imposed rules. For example, the publication Military Romania had to focus on presenting issues of national defense as well as on illustrating the defensive character of the Romanian military doctrine.

In 1947, within the Great General Staff, the Studies and Doctrine Department was established, which was responsible for outlining "the general principles for the

\textsuperscript{9} Colonel Ioan Gheorghe, După un an de război european. Constatații și reflexii pentru viitor, în România Militară, no. 9-10, September-October, 1940, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{10} Dr. Alesandru Du u, Florica Dobre, Drama generalilor români (1944-1946), Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1997, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{11} Petre Otu, Teofil Oroian, Ion Emil, Personalități ale gândirii militare românești, op. cit., p. 41.
organisation and functioning of a modern army and the doctrinal bases for the use of the three services (land, air and naval), separately and together, in any kind of operation”\(^{12}\). In 1949, it was decided, through an order, that the Military Culture magazine, successor of Military Romania, should publish articles regarding „issues of military ideology, Soviet science and military art, the study, on Marxist-Leninist critical basis, of progressist military theory and art in the historical past of our country as well as of friendly and allied countries, the thorough knowledge of the military art of the great army commanders in the history of the Soviet Union”\(^{13}\). Between 1949 and 1951, the accession to the military structures was made on political grounds, based on the Soviet model, namely considering the quantity, not the quality\(^{14}\). This aspect had also consequences on the development of own doctrine, which could not be accomplished. The theorists’ works were intentionally ignored, and the connection with global military thinking was interrupted.

Overall, the Romanian military thinking was marked, on the one hand, by the repercussions of the alliance system made by our country in different historical periods – with France and England between 1859-1866, 1916-1918, 1919-1939 –, by joining the Central Powers, by the alliance with Germany and the inclusion into the Soviet block and, on the other hand, by the originality and contribution demonstrated by some, unfortunately few, of our military theorists in different debates. Studies on this topic were published in Military Romania, which „created the tradition in our military literature and was deeply involved in the army life”\(^{15}\). In the journal, B.P. Haşdeu, Nicolae Densusianu, General A. Berindei, Brigadier General Constantin Atanasiu, Divisional Generals Constantin Barozi, Grigore Crăiniceanu, Virgil Economu, Ştefan Fălcoianu and other officers in the Romanian army wrote articles: „Military Romania was the publication in which the national defense of the country was discussed at length. Its ideology was closely linked to the conscience of the nation and the organic structure of the state and country. Spreading ideas in the world of readers, the journal ceaselessly intended to strengthen the army and prepare the nation for war, in line with history and national progress”\(^{16}\).

During the „Cold War”, the year 1968 was a turning point for Romania in defining its national military doctrine. Its main objectives were to equip and strengthen the military body and, hence, the general purpose – the national defense, relying on its own forces. The sympathy and moral support on the part of some major powers (US, China) could not guarantee the security of the country\(^{17}\). Concrete facts were necessary. The General Staff initiated and implemented a number of measures that contributed to the development and modernisation of the army services. The ’70s were marked by an effervescence of military thinking, through the thorough knowledge of military science and art; this work was performed by the Military Academy, subordinate to the General Staff at that time. The period 1983-1989 brought radical changes in our country’s existence as the living standard lowered dramatically. We can speak of a real economic collapse. Mention should be


\(^{13}\) Ibidem, p. 214.

\(^{14}\) Ibidem, p. 223.

\(^{15}\) Din trecutul României Militare, op. cit., p. 25.

\(^{16}\) Ibidem, p. 617.

made that in 1981 Romania reached the top of its foreign debt\textsuperscript{18}. The consequences were also felt in the army. It had to contribute effectively to the country’s economic construction: construction sites, coalmines, harvest or the construction of national edifices – Bucharest subway, the Danube-Black Sea Canal, the People’s House. The system got indoctrinated with a Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the principle of all the people participation in the struggle for national defense was included in the military tactics manuals.

Conclusions

Through its two components – the empirical and scientific ones –, the military thinking is the result of a symbiosis between arguments, actions and results in the political, social, and interpersonal fields within a state. The experience gained in the War of Independence as well as in the two world wars significantly contributed to the formation and crystallisation of the main ideas and concepts in the Romanian military thinking, so that commanders training could meet the requirements of the time. Personalities such as Nicolae Bălcescu, Mihail Kogălniceanu and George Bariţiu raised and propagated fundamental ideas about the creation of the army and the role it had to play in Romania’s existence. Bălcescu is considered, in the study of military history and theory, an outstanding personality; he emphasised the need for an indissoluble connexion between the Army and the physical and moral status of the nation. In his opinion, that of a rigorous analyst, Romania could not exist as a nation state without a strong army, composed of motivated people who were free but ready to sacrifice for the prosperity of the country.

The army unification, through the measures taken by the ruler Alexandru Ioan I, was a first step in developing the basic principles of the country military organisation. This system, the “accomplished fact”\textsuperscript{19}, as it was called by Nicolae Iorga, opened the way to the dream of unity of the Romanian people. Cuza’s reforms brought quantitative and qualitative transformations in the army. Moreover, the Law regarding the training of the United Principalities Army, in 1860, under the influence and model of the French Military Mission, set up a unique system of training, staff administration and organisation, in order to modernise the military services and regulations that related mainly to manoeuvres, services in garrison, battalions’ training.

Between the War of Independence and the entry into the First World War, the Great General Staff was the most important structure that got involved in the military forces training, through a number of means, such as: conferences, application maps, war games, training travels, staff travels, organised by both the General Staff and the Superior War School\textsuperscript{20}.

Throughout over 150 years since its establishment, Military Romania has witnessed the development and transformation of the military body, the principles of organisation and functioning of the General Staff, as well as aspects of the army life and military culture, highlighting, in its pages, the difficulties the army has been confronted with, analysing them, and proposing solutions to improve the situations encountered. The journal has presented the main stages undergone by the Romanian Army and by the society as a whole, providing, based on relevant analysis, lines of conduct for the

\textsuperscript{18} See https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republica_Socialist%C4%83_Rom%C3%A2nia, retrieved on 12 August 2015.

\textsuperscript{19} Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sinceră a poporului român, 2nd edition, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 1999, p. 265.

future. In addition, the journal approached the elements of novelty in the military theory and science at national and international level, becoming a valuable source of information, one of maximum utility for the army. The contributions of military authors in its pages have found their confirmation in the evolutionary process of the Romanian military thinking, through a critical analysis of the expressed ideas, concepts and predictions in conjunction with foreign authors.

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ONLINE RISKS WITH RELEVANCE FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN WORKING WITH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

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Abstract: Complementary to multivalent benefit from the development of Internet and technology for online access, an important role is to analyze and monitor the adverse effects of virtual space, both on the individual and organizational impact of which it is part. Information provided by online users, voluntarily or in response to its appeal of directing, popularized by online environment are often an informational risk factors. Personnel security investigative and adjudicative standards were developed before the modern devices were widely available. Although online environment has many beneficial effects, this project evaluates how participation can negatively affect personnel security and employee performance according to the protection of classified information.

Keywords: personnel security, classified information, on-line environment, internet, security risks.

Introduction

The social component and scale of the Internet, already naturally integrated in everyday life, can no longer be ignored by resorting to theories and paradigms of classical social laws, but requires adaptation of a virtuous behavior, under the stimulus results of factual practice investigations and scientific research for the risks that may affect security personnel and professional performance. Statistics on the number of internet users show an impressive evolution. Between 2000-2015, the number has increased by approximately 753% to a total of 3.07 billion users, with 42.4% of the global population. In Romania, the number of users in 2015 has passed 11million, representing 51.4% of the Romanian population1.

From a sociological perspective, researchers from the Pew Internet & American Life Project questions have asked themselves how the internet affects social capital, human relations and professional poise. Responses were grouped into two categories2:

- Optimistic- the online environment emphasizes the individual's ability to expand its geographical and human capital and relations;
- Pessimistic - Internet can alienate and remove the people from authentic relationships in real life.

The access to modern technology has positively changed the way of reporting the individual issues related to a wide range of necessary and popular activities, such as communication, shopping, finance, news, education, research, games, hobbies, and socializing – and the time people spend using computing devices is increasing. Enabled network allowed solving problems in a short time and reduced physical and financial effort. The fact is that the online environment has gradually become a phenomenon of global concern, the benefits of which are felt in the real life. Computer technology has spread throughout modern society and is often an integral part of everyday life. The

1 www.internetworldstats.com, accessed on 07.08.2015

2 Chitoșca Marius Ionuț, Internetulca agent de socializare al generației M, Revista de informaticăsocială, nr.5, 2006, p.64.
The reverse of the positive side is designed as a part of the research—the risks relating to personal security and protection of privacy data and information. These are not isolated, and in the case of organization's members who manage classified information, the risks can be extended and can compromise sensitive data and information for national security.

**Risks of the online environment on human behavior**

According to the results of sociological research undertaken in 2011 by John S. Leggett, Olga G. Shechter, Eric L. Lang submitted and processed with the personnel of US Department of Defense by Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) the internet and the technical „smart” devices development, in time, besides the recognized advantages, have produced negative effects on the human psyche, generally marked by:

- Online disinhibition effector depersonalization: the "smart" technology eliminates many classic relational links in the behavior, specific to a direct human action. Making social contact and forming or maintaining relationships from behind a computer display facilitates things that are not possible or practical in the real world. There is no eye contact, body language, or other. The effects observed are exaggerating emotions and behaviors, unrealistic expectations, lack of perspectives tailored to normal social relations. The most common emotional problems are characterized by lack of self-esteem, distrust, lack of involvement in activities. Amidst the youth there was a withdrawal from social activities, introversion and an enhanced form of verbal and psychological aggression, coupled with irritating explosive behavior\(^4\);

- Problems in impulse control: cyber-dependency, lack of sleep, poor nutrition, low physical effort are causing decrease in effectiveness training, in motivation and inability to achieve professionally required standards;

- Lack of sincerity / lie: breach of regulations and internal rules, breach of security policies- affected confidence and loyalty to the principles and norms of professional activity.

In 2004, John Shuler\(^5\), sociologist, introduced the term of "toxic spontaneity online", manifested mainly in specialized online communities as news, political discussions, blogs, online games, social networks. This condition marked by controversy generates hostility and aggression, contradictory discussions that will manifest on human relationships and the workplace performances. He distinguishes between positive spontaneity—positive effects on social life (whose results are to reduce fear, timidity, involvement) and the negative, "toxic" spontaneity, projected onto work through anger, hatred, toughness, violence, irritability, decreased desire for networking and socializing, inability to teamwork.

Those who played violent games and wishfully identified with aggressive, remorseless game characters were more likely to play damaging sounds even when not provoked. This seems to be of particular interest to the military, where unjustified violence against civilians during combat can lead to increased

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\(^4\) Chele Gabriela, Utilizarea îndelungată a calculatorului la copii și adolescenți, factor de risc sau condiție premorbidă, teză doctorat, Universitatea de Medicină și Farmacie, Facultatea de Medicină, Iași 2010, p.21.

resistance and undermine the chances for a successful campaign. An example, an extreme form of hostility and aggression, maintained by online games participation, translated into physical violence, is the US military personnel action. Military personnel abused and tortured prisoners at Abu Ghrabi in Iraq while executing the mission in 2003. They also took graphic photographs of their actions. During the investigation, the crime has been analyzed from a psychological point of view. It seems to be a correlation between the virtual environment issues (online multiplayer games) and the tension of the real operational environment. It was important to assess how video games online (where some soldiers had accounts) caused extreme forms of aggression, translated into reality.6

It is demonstrated that duplication of social life, through active participation in cyberspace and dependence to it affect social resilience, causes mental health problems and has a significant impact on general health. According to a study published in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder7, internet addicts have high levels of specific symptoms of: depression, social isolation, anxiety, ease for indiscretion and disclosure of personal data/information.

Based on these symptoms, psychomedical results have revealed that negative symptoms occur in people dependent on information technology and upon/during deprivation of access to means of communication online. It can be manifested as: nervousness, frustration, headaches.

For computer game addicts, the consequence of active involvement in the virtual online effects on individual security is given by the high levels of impulsivity, based on impulse, without cognitive analysis and by the increased dependence on them. The negative effects can be observed in the long-term dependence, the addiction can often be treated only clinically.

According to statistics, in China, in 2014 were registered 30 million users of online games, 10% of them developing the advanced form of addiction. Chinese authorities were forced to open in 2005 the first clinical treatment of computer addicts, most of whom were practitioners of online games.8 Statistical research have shown increasing interest in online games among men past 34 years, which shows that the most vulnerable group is not represented only by teenagers, but even mature people are in advanced stages in their careers, the negative effects of addiction to the virtual world could be seen/appeared in their professional activities.9

Behavioral risks are not generated merely by psycho-relational mutations, but also by entourage created in the virtual environment. According to an analysis, presented in 2010 by Gordon Snow, assistant director of the FBI, the most prominent illegal online activities associated with social networks and websites include10:

a) social engineering (misrepresentation to gain another person’s confidence);

b) fraud schemes (simple lies about a product, service, investment, etc.);

c) phishing scams (attempts to make a user believe information is from a trusted source, when it is not).

Starting from the three general categories, he draws attention to their use as: online economic crimes, cyberterrorism, collecting personal information/professional information and target subjects for information, pornography, extortion and other specific organized crime activities. Risks identified include online on personal security and forms of direct harassment or undercover of various forms of socialization. Very interesting, in accordance to the them, are the incidence forms of harassment online among Internet users, studied by Bruce Drake.

He has published in 2015 some sociological studies, completed with statistical results about incidence forms of harassment online among Internet users. He said that “forty percent of adult internet users have personally experienced some kind of online harassment, most of it involving things like name-calling or attempts to embarrass someone”.

The addiction of modern means of communication, through virtual presence in a given environment, marked primarily by high time given to the virtual relationship and superficial knowledge of online partners, increases the vulnerability of indiscretion, the risk of sharing personal information and by directing "a blind

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**Figure 1.** Percentage of the adult population that identified a threatening behavior in the online environment

This section has reviewed a wide range of evidence and research findings for how cyber participation may be associated with serious behavior risks, physical health, and workplace outcomes. Spillover effects related to reliability, trustworthiness, and judgment can be of great concern for many sensitive personnel security positions. For mental health, research suggests excessive cyber use may be associated with impulse control problems and depression.

Regardless of technology, people continue to have the same needs and goals in life, including finding companionship, entertainment, or satisfying employment, and building families. As such, popular online environments succeed by focusing on these interests and naturally tend to be similar.

**Online disclosure of personal data and the compromise of classified information risks**

The addiction of modern means of communication, through virtual presence

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exploitation” information from the professional field could be obtained. As an example, the virtual social environments, like Second Life. A 3D virtual environment is a simulated physical place, be it real or imaginary, created through computers. They are characterized by faithful representation, real spaces in general tourist attractions, but also has the ability to organize thematic meetings, sometimes professional, geographical distances between the members are at large. Between 2005 and 2008, Second Life received widespread media attention and experienced rapid changes due to well-funded experimentation by businesses, individuals, and organizations who perceived it as an opportunity for being at the forefront of the cultural changes enabled by computer networks. A way of relating to personal and sometimes even organizational risks from this kind of virtual socialization, in the acceptance of PERSEREC, is psychosociological analyzed. So, cyber activities potentially affect personnel security practices in two main ways:

- by creating new venues for generating potential problems, such as making it easier for people to cultivate relationships with foreign nationals or engage in illegal activities;
- by transforming conventional methods of interpersonal interaction, so

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<th>Table 1. Personnel risks - comparison between Virtual Social Environments, Online Multiplayer Games, Social Networks</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Social Environments</strong></td>
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<td>Actions that undermine personal security, personal data, assumptions that can lead to compromise of classified information in the case of personnel who have authorization to access them</td>
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<td>2. Clinical addiction or impulse control disorders.</td>
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<td>3. Easy communication with foreign nationals.</td>
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<td>4. Illegal activities such as gambling or simulated pedophilia.</td>
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<td>5. Excessive fantasizing may blur the boundary with reality.</td>
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<td>6. Excessive expenses to support a hobby.</td>
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12 John S. Leggitt, Olga G. Shechter, Eric L. Lang, op.cit., p.10.
that traditional norms and standards used to assess stability, discretion, and judgment could be affected.

Because of the risks for an internet user, PERSEREC’s researchers proposed in 2010 to the US Department of Defense the idea of designing a procedure so that personnel with access to classified information, in case of participating in personal online activities, where interact repeated and long-term with other users, they have to report these events. The main purpose is to advise and prepare the personnel against informative exploitation or recruitment attempts by foreign intelligence services. “Theoretically, internet addiction is a way of socialization, a specialized organization might manipulate people, or be a front for a hostile entity that tracks users’ movements, identifies individuals with valuable information, and facilitates the recruitment of agents”.

Referring to security personnel in the state institutions where information is handled classified, John S. Leggitt, Olga G. Shechter, Eric L. Lang have identified and explained some interesting indices for counterintelligence structures, in order to develop procedures for redress and prevention of information leakage. It is known that these kinds of actions are practiced by foreign intelligence structures, specialized in virtual social environment. We will present a comparison between social networks, online multiplayer games, and virtual social environments risks.

In discussing about personal security and private data protection, we believe that we can state the following risks resulting from the analysis of virtual socialization main forms:

- Social networks, virtual social environments, a popular form, in the last decade, to facilitate human relationships, draw attention because they can be used as tools for: collecting, organizing, storing, making links between data and information. All of them were "posted" in the virtual environment without filtered and conscious control to avoid attempts of compromising personal image. However, the holder of an account in a social network can become a "victim" of the relational circle or other hostile accounts (attempts to discredit or compromise) by posting images or information inconsistent with its socio-professional status. The highest risks are generated by the collection of information by the intelligence services, in order to analyze the effects and achieve a psychosocial profile about a person.
  - Online gaming, characterized as a developed fiction, virtually unlimited, whose participants become addicted without knowing that, can develop adaptive mental problems, marked primarily by a reduced judgment.
  - Online environment involves truly conducting one’s life through computer technology, and this means that numerous aspects of daily life can be affected. The question has considered how cyber activities shape and supply a wide range of real world activities, but the impact extends well beyond desktop and notebook computers, and beyond sitting passively in chairs.
  - Additional topics of security interest arise from the information that users share and collect on their own. For example, one’s GPS location can be combined with photos taken by a smart phone, to obtain information about landmarks of interest to tourists, find the identity of artwork, obtain additional product information, including person's travel itinerary.

In the scientific research conducted by Katherine Herbig, on alterations in espionage after the development of

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cyberculture, it is revealed that the Internet has enabled terrorist organizations to form the international virtual communities, facilitating access to a large volume of information on: training for terrorism, sharing of extremist ideas, even political documents. Terrorist leaders could stay in hiding under the accounts with anonymous identities and geographically camouflage their actions related to cyberspace and the location. He noted a subtle form of online manipulation, unknown by a user without professional training, which can lead to disclosure of information that will be used to support terrorist activities. Assuming a solid information security culture, we cannot overlook the attractiveness of online environment and its risk. Thus, manipulation and exploitation of personal data from a "target user" by an intelligence agency opponent (because of its informative potential) or a terrorist cell, conducted with persuasive actions and trust-building is achieved while indoctrinating with organizations ideologies and promoted online, which may affect national security purposes. Subsequently, the risk of dependence and informative exploitation becomes certain.

Conclusions

In the context of research topics, for the security and protection of classified information it is relevant to consider the following major concerns with reference to the values of the psychosocially changed variables, as result of the internet involvement in human life:

- The online socialization reactions, the attempts to manipulate online relationships and interactions, the control of virtual environment can change the values on the real living standards, focusing on: loyalty, moral uprightness, the principles and trust;
- Understanding the level of involvement in a virtual world, different from socio-professional, reality is on a decreasing path, in the same time we can see an increasing dependence and more time spent in online activities. If this level reaches negative projection in real life, psychic impulses accentuated especially by online games create behavioral risks, unpredictable behavior disorders, low self-control.

People today use computers and “smart” devices to access more information, communicate more efficiently, and have more assistance than any generation in human history before, so the impact is likely to be deep and have unexpected consequences, as time and research have shown about the development of a whole generation of people who interacted with technology and online from childhood to retirement from professional activity.

Finally, because technology constantly evolves, new products and cultural changes must be periodically reviewed to ensure that personnel security activities are effective in protecting against the loss of controlled information. The online impact will always be a subject of interest and how it will affect thinking, judgment of the individual and his behavior motivation to solve professional tasks.

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ANALYSIS OF PORT SECURITY

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Abstract: The hybrid war in Ukraine has emphasized again the security problem in the Extended Area of the Black Sea and, obviously, of its ports. Our study aims to analyze port security in the context of the new security environment, in which several EU member states show a desire to move toward the Russian Federation what worries the states in the Extended Area of the Black Sea.

Keywords: port security, analysis, risks, threats and dangers.

Any port can be considered or treated/analyzed as a system within the general theory of systems. During the process of building and developing ports, depending on the requirements that need to be fulfilled and the terms imposed upon them, a gap appears between the time of building or a phase of their development and the one of the current/actual date; the gap is bigger if there is a big time difference between the first moment and the last moment. The gap is a consequence of technology, time and other factors which determine dangerous behaviours of the system (port) if disturbing/devastating forces act upon it affecting people, equipments, ships, infrastructures and other facilities or materials. These disturbing/devastating forces do not act only in real life but also in the virtual environment (reality) that is in the digital (cybernetic) environment. However, their effects are felt in real life.

Thus it is necessary to do a special analysis of the systems’ (ports’) security based on the theory of reliability and viability of systems and some new methods.

In scholarly literature there are different security concepts: opportune security, sufficient security, total security, security, maximum security, absolute security, durable security or vital security – as an extension of the concept of sustainable (vital) development – optimum security, minimum security or obligatory security and others. ¹

Port security is both a functional and social problem because the lack of security can result in damages and also information theft or data corruption.

It must be understood that the aim of building a port is not about creating a structure in itself, but a structure that ensures the operational capacity of obtaining the technical, economic, social and military projected/desired effects safely. But we should always take into account that we cannot ensure a complete security against terrorist activities for a maritime or fluvial port, but we can reduce

the effects of the terrorist attacks by using resources reasonably and first and foremost by using financial resources. Identifying the weak/vulnerable points, staying alert all the time and knowing the security measures perfectly can ensure the rise of ports’ security level.

Nicolae Dolghin, Alexandru Sarchinschi and Mihai Dinu, in the paper called “Risks and threats that can jeopardize Romania’s national security. Actuality and perspective, published in 2004, consider that there are three types of risks and threats that can jeopardize our country’s south-eastern border: non-military, military and asymmetric and transnational risks.

The concept of reliability means a system’s (port’s) capacity to fulfil its functions specified in time, if it used in the context for which it was built (and modernized) and it is maintained and repaired correctly. So the reliability (R) of a system (port) has two components: safe functioning (S) and maintenance (M); mathematically speaking this is:

$$F=S+M,$$

(1)

Reliability is analyzed in terms of the connexions, the causes, the factors that influence it, the effects and the behaviour of the composing subsystems and the interaction between them.

The following relation can be deduced based on the theory of reliability and the General Theory of Systems (GTS):²

$$R = \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_i \cdot R_i + R'$$

- \(k\)- the number of the composing subsystems;
- \(R_i\)- the reliability of i subsystem;
- \(p_i\)- the functional share of i subsystem;
- \(R'\)- a component due to the system’s organization

So reliability is a quality characteristic of any system and it depends on the influence of all the composing subsystems, and also on the synergy of the system’s organization; the failure of a subsystem can cause the system’s failure (a breakdown in functioning or a functional error).

There is an organic connexion between the quality and the reliability of the port system because quality means the sum of the necessary properties for the right use of the port, and reliability is its capacity to maintain its quality in time. It results that the best value of reliability corresponds to the minimum costs intended for keeping Reliability (figure no. 1).

Viability (V) can be defined based on the Reliability of the port system as follows: “Its capacity to preserve its characteristics (functional, operating and relational and informational), in case the variations of its entry values, external or internal disturbances cause major changes (or similar consequences) of the conditions for which it has been projected”.³

Major changes refer to the functioning situations (cases) in exceptional conditions (which have as a result breakdowns in functioning, functional errors or exceptions). Exceptions are some diversions from the normal values of the functioning parameters, and these deviations are considered to be errors.

Viability (V) represents the sum of the reconfiguration/readjustment (Ra) and the functioning reserve (M’) which is similar to Maintenance (M) and has the following mathematical expression:

$$V=Ra+M'$$

(3)

There is an organic link between viability and reliability, just as there is one between security and viability because

² Ibidem, p. 17.
³ Ibidem, p. 19.
security represents the essential qualitative property of systems and organizations.

\[ \text{Sec} = \text{Cv} + \text{Ra} + \text{S} \]  \tag{4}

**COSTS, MINIMUM COST, RELIABILITY COST, EXPLOITATION COST, COMPLETION COST, OPTIMUM RELIABILITY**

![Image](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

**Figure 1.** Determining optimum reliability


Security is the essential qualitative property of systems and organizations, or, in our case, of ports, their capacity to function safely, to preserve their functioning characteristics against risks, threats, and dangers through avoidance, attenuation or restyling and to readapt themselves functionally.\(^4\)

But risks, threats and dangers act both in real life and digital (cybernetic) environment, affecting ports’ infrastructures.

In our opinion, ports’ security represents the property of the essential quality of port systems (organizations), their capacity to preserve their functional characteristics against risks, threats and dangers by avoidance, attenuation or Restyling (Cv), safe functioning (s) and functional readjustment (Ra) to the new conditions of the security environment.

The smaller the assumed operational risk (Ri) is, the bigger the value of the optimum economic threshold (A) of the security system is and also the value of the security is bigger (R=1-A).

We can also express ports’ security as follows\(^5\):

\[ \text{Sec} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} m_i \cdot S_i + Sc \]  \tag{5}

where:

- \( n \) = the number of the domains that contribute to security (economically, socially, culturally, religiously, politically, militarily, technically, scientifically, nutritionally, energetically, etc.)
- \( S_i \) = the security of \( i \) domain;
- \( m_i \) = the share of \( i \) domain;
- \( Sc \) = the component resulting from the characteristics of the security system;


\(^5\) Ibidem, p. 23.
If we take into account only those domains that contribute to ports’ security, it appears that each domain’s (subsystem’s) security influences ports’ security with a certain share (which is determined by the place that this one occupies in the security system). The exceptions from the normal functioning of the system or errors, irrespective of their nature, can cause failures, deteriorations and malfunctions of the port’s system. Just as in the case of reliability and viability, security’s value depends on costs (expenses for security), determining their optimum value (for the minimum costs), according to costs and risk assumption. It results that according to costs and risk assumption, security’s dynamic corresponds to the curves in figure no. 2.

Our analysis of security has shown that the security measures and mechanisms are perishable in time due to the moral consumption or ageing of the used technologies so that if we do not maintain and replace the old technologies periodically, every security mechanism or system can be compromised at a certain moment.

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Abstract: The data regarding the physiology of physical effort both stresses the role of upper floors of nervous system, and the one on the neural-muscular level, in the adjustment of physical effort, fact that imposes that in the pursuance of certain bioelectric parameters to take into account these two aspects.

Keywords: physical effort, electro-encephalogram, neural-muscular excitability.

Data on exercise physiology reveals the role of the nervous system and the level of neuromuscular in adjusting exercise, which requires that in the monitoring of bioelectrical parameters to take into account these two aspects.

Therefore, in the nervous system plan, the electro-encephalography researches (EEG) in the physical effort, there have been taken into account the pause and effort aspects (specific and non-specific) both to a trained and an untrained person. Additionally, these researches did not stay to the simple EEG determinations, but within certain complex studies it was used the EEG correlation to other metabolic and physiological data.

In the pause state, at the trained, generally, it is allowed that the electro-encephalogram (EEG), under standard conditions, falls within the EEG aspect of normal, healthy, adults of an average age people, except for several fields of trauma physical effort (W. E. Busse si N. Silvermann, J. Temmers si E. Huhmer, E. Pampus and others, for boxers) where the routes may be pathological.

Mihai Demetrescu and Maria Demetrescu, using an original analysis method of slope and of the period of cerebral bio-potentials in the study of motor activity rhythms, introduce the sub-cortical rhythm term, a different rhythm upon the period of groups of cortical waves, considered by the authors as functional units of sub-cortical structures with a diffuse activity. They state that the pacemaker role for motor rhythms that feature the physical activity, mainly to the ascending activating reticular system with all its related items and especially with those of limb system.

The EEG studies of A. Demeter (1994) in the isometric contractions show a series of interesting aspects. Therefore, there appear deep changes, with the change of general aspect of the EEG route (frequency, magnitude and incidence of Alfa waves), the stopping reaction (arousal) lasts for 10-15 seconds after retaking the pause, the flattening of the route with the disappearance of Alfa waves and the replacement with beta waves. After this warning reaction, hardly at 20” the Alfa rhythm reappears.

After the isometric contractions, it increases the alpha rhythm frequency by more than 1 Hz/s, which certifies the great request of the body, while at children, untrained women and beginners, there appear even slow waves (theta). Generally, towards the dynamic effort, the changes are net. Regarding the explanation, he finds it in the excitation through several mechanisms, too, of the ascending activator reticular formation.
Certainly, the EEG research in the physical effort did not limit to the simple registration of the routes, but, like in pathology, it was tried the EEG correlation to other experiment conditions and to other tests, fact of a great importance.

In this respect, Şt. Milcu, Al. Partheniu and C. Neaşcu make assessments on the relationships between the data obtained by EEG and hormonal doses, reaching to the conclusion that in the physical effort, the corticotrop hormones act on the central nervous system and especially on the reticulated formation, fact certified by the change of Alfa rhythm (hyper-reactivity and irradiation in the previous deviations), which betrays the neural-endocrine pathology of central type on over-training or tiredness.

A. Gagea and Al. Partheniu, as well as M. Gerbner, stress the EEG correlations with the reaction time that are very tight, allowing them the discovery and mathematical expression of these correspondents. M. Gerbner realizes to stress significant differences between the reaction times registered on different phases of alpha rhythm.

In the researches on adults, it is underlined the fact that the elements of Alfa rhythm (magnitude and Alfa incidence - index) both correlated to the particularities of neural-vegetative adjustment (studied through several modalities like supine-orthostatic reflex, arterial oscillometry pressure, electro-derma reflex and others), as well as to the hormonal metabolism data, electrolitically and of the neural-muscular excitability provided interesting conclusions.

As for example, in the case of certain complex explorations, in base conditions, the group of sportsmen that mark a neural-vegetative normotony has EEG values of 60-80 mV, 33-66%, is more homogenous, and the one with vagotonia heart and vascular sympathetic has on the EEG plan evident dissociations between the alpha index and magnitude.

After the effort, for those with small Alfa incidents and magnitudes, no significant changes appear, and for those with higher incidents than 33%, at one half of the subjects, the incidence and magnitude decrease by 10-15%, as well as the modulation degree as convulsions of alpha oscillations.

The correlation to the neural-muscular excitability data (ENM) shows that in pause, a hyper-excitability of phase fibers in the studied muscles is associated to the already mentioned EEG manifestations, and after the acute effort, it appears a clear hyper-excitability tendency, for at 24-48 hours after the effort, to appear a return to the original values, especially to the group with a vegetative normotony and homogeneity in EEG.

The characterization of physical effort by the correlated metabolic aspects (bio-chemistry) too, represents for the specialists in the field, a truly important issue in the stressing of the body answer to the provided physical effort.

The physical effort of performance sport is different, taking into account the participation of nervous and neural-muscular system to the issuance of multiple movement acts.

The physiological basis for recovery

Recovery means combat fatigue occurring during exercise, fatigue that diminishes the sport yield.

Recent studies consider that local metabolic fatigue was due to the following factors:
- Muscle phosphocreatine depletion in efforts up to 2 minutes;
- Lactic acid accumulation in the muscle of efforts between 35”-4-5”;
- Psychological factors of discomfort;
- Decrease in circulating glucose (the brain consumes 5 gr. glucose/hour). This favors central fatigue;
- Depletion of essential aminoacid from blood and tryptophan brain penetration.
Recovery, is part of sports pathology, and the same is integrated into the current planning regime and preparation day.

After great efforts - training and competitions - anabolic rest installs expressing pronounced decrease energy reserves across different systems and organs of the body.

This fatigue, which is called by some authors pessimum ultimately represent an alarm that triggers and enhances the intensity and variation of natural recovery processes that occur in the body.

If the functional posibilities of the body are exceeded, are created the conditions to entering in a functional disenergism phase, where all possible consequences conduct to a pathological fatigue.

At the central nervous system occurs post-exercise cortical inhibition, process that follows hyperexcitability that prevailed during the effort. It radiates the entire cortex and thus favors anabolic dominant metabolic type; on the vegetative and metabolic side, slow heart rate, slow breathing, increased alkalinity internal environment and prevalent vagal cholinergic effects represent general expressions of decoupling of general catabolism induced by exercise and creating conditions conducive to the installation of anabolic processes.

Recovery of muscle level are expressed through glycogen reserves restitution and myoglobin, increased enzymatic product oriented increasing protein synthesis and others. In terms of sporting effort this natural recovery is not possible and is compensated by directed recovery. According to Folbert directed recovery, biological rebalancing or physical regeneration is considered a complex methodological, pedagogical and medico-biological process when using natural, physiological or synthesis means from external or internal environment, it seeks to return to homeostasis level body had and even exceed its previous effort by conducting overcompensation.

Along with increased effort, and therefore the possibility of early post-exertion fatigue phenomena, appears imperative use of means of recovery, which should become a reality generalization to speed up restoring of the body's biological potential. Changes occurring in the internal and external environment of the human body, are spontaneous followed by post-action responses after the effort. Responses restoring the affected balance as general requirement of homeostasis. On the metabolic, changes induced by effort is manifested by highlighting catabolic processes occurring exaggerated.

During recovery the anabolic processes for tissue reconstruction prevailing.

The body is balanced, the self-regulation of vital functions is optimal and the more perfect and stable appears homeostasis of internal environment and processes taking place in the cortex will be more economical and balanced. Recovery after exercise depends of this balance.

Effort capacity and athletic performance may be compromised during some training and competition, and if the body does not recover quickly, athlete is in impossibility to train, to execute planned workload and achieve expected performance.

Recovery after effort

To restore fuel energy suppliers as ATP-CP, intramuscular glycogen need time. The disease, dehydration, drastically decreasing of glycogen impedes the restoration of energy suppliers' fuel and their secondary product separation. To restore ATP reserves need energy from oxygen produced by metabolism of carbohydrates and fat. Part of ATP produced by the body decomposes to form CP and the other part is stored directly into the muscle (Fox 1984).

In the first 20-30 seconds ATP-CP recover at a rate of 50-70% and the rest in
3 minutes. To a lesser effort lasting 10” ATP-CP use is minimal, for 30”- 50% is used, for 60”-75%, for 90”-87%, for 120”- 93%, for 150”-97% and 180”- 98% (Hultman et al 1967 quoted by Fox 1984). For glycogen restoration after a prolonged exercise should focus on the following (Hultman and Bestrom 1967 cited by Fox 1984):

- Eating a carbohydrates rich food; otherwise muscle glycogen will recover only partially;
- Allocation of 48 hours for recovery; in the first 10 hours muscle glycogen is rapidly recover;
- In the absence of consumption of carbohydrates, glycogen intramuscular recovers 2 hours after stop de effort;
- With a normal diet after 24 hours muscle glycogen stores are fully restored;
- After the exercise in the first 5 hours muscle glycogen is recovering fastest.

Removal of lactic acid is carried out in two steps: first, removal from the muscles, and the second removal from the blood (Fox 1984).

To remove blood and muscle lactic acid need 2 hours for a liability regime of rest and recovery (after an intense anaerobic exercise) and 1 hour for an active regime of rest.

For an effective recovery must take in account the entire range of methods including relaxation techniques, micronutrients (vitamins), macronutrients (proteins, carbohydrates, fats) and hydration before, during and after competition.

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FORMS OF FATIGUE

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Abstract: When after efforts which are beyond the functionality of the body, the energy reserves decrease, pathological fatigue is installing manifested at both peripheral and central level.

Keywords: acute peripheral fatigue, acute central fatigue, acute pathological fatigue, chronic pathological fatigue.

Fatigue is estimated based on some quantitative and qualitative aspects of its manifestation.

Bugard quoted Bota, C. (2000) orders the stages which are installed to a tired body, as follows:

- Stage I - fatigue with harmonious response - is specific to athletes;
- Stage II - fatigue with oscillating response - occurs when recovery is incomplete;
- Stage III - fatigue with discordant response - when to the physical state of fatigue is added a mental fatigue and sometimes a disease state;
- Stage IV – with exhaustion - pathological condition, including besides scope of the muscular system, the neurovegetative, metabolic and endocrine.

Between fatigue and exhaustion is a quantitative difference, in which the phenomena of fatigue disappear within 24 hours, while recovering from depletion processes require a minimum of 4-7 days with a complementary medical therapy.

If the functional limits of body are exceeded, fatigue is appreciated like pathological form, manifested at both peripheral and central level.

After significant efforts, which decrease markedly energy reserves in the body's organs and systems, install anabolic rest. If an effort is beyond the functionality of the body will be create the premises of "nonfunctional synergism" phase (Brâtilă, F., 2002), which can lead to pathological fatigue.

Weineck, J., (1995) orders manifested forms of fatigue in acute fatigue (peripheral and central) and chronic fatigue (local and general).

Brâtilă, F., (2002) quoting Stegemann, called fatigue: acute fatigue (peripheral and central), local and general fatigue (associated with overtraining) and neuro-muscular fatigue.


Physiological fatique

Physiological fatigue manifests as:
- Acute peripheral – muscle fatigue;
- Acute central – neuro-psychological fatigue.

Acute peripheral fatigue (muscle fatigue)

Muscle fatigue is caused by repeated muscle contractions, which consumes energy reserves, disrupting homeostasis (physicochemical balance) body. Fatigue accumulates gradually, depending on the duration and intensity of exercise, reaching a point that exercise can no longer be continued, which causes termination of execution.
According to Drăgan, I., (2002), muscle fatigue can be caused by the following energy order reasons:

- Depletion of muscle creatine phosphate reserves, in the case of anaerobic efforts (0-45 sec);
- Depletion of muscle creatine phosphate reserves and increasing the concentration of lactic acid in the case of short endurance exercise (45 seconds - 2 minutes);
- Increasing muscle lactic acid, accompanied by increasing hepatic ammonia, in the case of medium level of endurance efforts (2-10 min);
- Depletion of muscle glycogen in the case of long endurance type I and type II (10-35-90 min);
- Depletion of muscle glycogen, accompanied by the accumulation of lipid peroxides in the case of long endurance efforts type III - IV (90 min – 6 hours – over 6 hours).

In addition to the limits of the energy order, fatigue may be induced by other causes, such as:

- Intramuscular ionic imbalance; contractions with long duration and frequency cause loss of potassium and calcium, which has the effect of further reducing of muscle contraction ability;
- Fatigue at the neuromuscular synapse level, which disrupts sending of command from motor level to the muscles;
- Type of fiber, white fibers (phasic) get tired more easily than red fibers (slow), considered resistant to fatigue;
- Lack of oxygen caused by insufficient blood supply to the muscles.

Muscle fatigue can be recognized by a series of clues, signs, subjective and objective aspects, such as:

Subjective aspects:
- Feeling drowsy throughout the body;
- Feeling of heaviness in the muscles and movement;
- Pain in pressure of muscle mass;
- Desire to reduce or terminate the effort and need for rest.

Objective aspects:
- Reduction of work capacity, physical efficiency;
- Increasing of muscle tone in rest;
- Decreasing of muscle tone in effort;
- Impairing coordination and muscle control;
- Decreasing of neuromuscular excitability;
- Decreasing of strength, range of motion;
- Decreasing of appetite, sleep disorders.

The mechanism of fatigue in muscle fiber

During muscle contraction, due to increased internal pressure, the capillaries are compressed and blood exhausted. During state of relaxation, muscle tension decreases, blood capillaries dilate and blood enters into the vessels.

When the contraction follow each other rapidly, the capillaries are compressed again, and in the interval between contractions and not enter enough arterial blood, with oxygen and supporting substances for effort, thus reducing the capacity of the removal of toxins.

In extreme fatigue, relaxation time is small, which leads to a state of permanent contracture of the muscle, which results in a reduction of physical yield. In this situation, muscle excitability exceeds the one of corresponding nerve, which produces a state of permanent contracture of muscle, appearing cramps. In a muscle area so contracted, with insufficient irrigation, substances intake recovery is reduced. It is required neurologic and muscle recovery measures.

Therefore, muscle fatigue is a physiological reversible, which installs normally due to exceeding the limits of the functionality of neurologic and muscle system, as a result of considerable work. Muscle activity is conditioned by the energetic effort: the more demanding of muscle performance (in terms of volume, intensity, complexity), the fatigue installs quickly.
In sports training, in physical education lessons, the occurrence of muscle fatigue can be delayed by using rational exercise or by optimal using of effort and breaks.

Muscle fatigue as a physiological form occurs as a result of an effort within the functional limits of the body, in this case becoming a contributing factor of adaptation.

In sports training or physical education activities, repeated efforts produce a degree of physiological fatigue (within functional limits) lead to higher biological processes of adaptation and improvement of training status and getting sports form.

If the fatigue is installed after overcoming the body's functional capacity, it is estimated that fatigue occurs in pathological form.

**Acute central fatigue (neuro-psychological fatigue)**

The concept of central acute fatigue or Neuro-psychological fatigue is defined as “diminished ability to perform coordinated action with the same precision as in rest” (Stegeman quoted Weineck, J., 1995).

Central fatigue has close connections with peripheral fatigue, because related information issued by the muscle (the periphery) has inhibitory impulses response, leading to discontinuation of effort.

Triggering causes of muscle fatigue attract the same functional and biochemical parameters changes in other vital systems, such as cardio -respiratory, central nervous, peripheral and autonomic system. Information about muscle fatigue (peripheral) affects nervous system and all body functions.

Physiological mechanisms, which result in the installation of central fatigue (neuro - psychological) are:

- Decreasing of blood glucose that has an effect on the brain, which is extremely sensitive to low blood sugar (eg. long endurance efforts III-IV - 90 minutes).
- Accumulation of essential amino acids in the brain disrupts neurons (force efforts); amino acids that are not metabolized (consumed) are accumulating in the brain, hence inducing neuronal disorders (eg. hyper protein food rations uncovered by appropriate effort).
- Neuro-psychological stress to athletes from disciplines such as: shooting, fencing, goalkeepers, high jump and pole vault, sprinters.

According to domain experts, central fatigue is recognized by the following aspects:

- Reducing of coordination capacity, cooperation between central nervous system and muscular system is disturbed, where one of the components of the control and regulation of movement is affected; muscle fatigue (peripheral) has the effect of reducing motor acts coordination, precision and economy of movement. Electrical activity of muscles increases with progressive installing of fatigue, which induces central fatigue manifested in the reduction of the coordination.
- Reducing of sensory performance capacity makes central fatigue to reduce functional status of component analyzers (peripheral segment of the receptor, leading segment, the central segment of the analysis and synthesis of information), the effect manifested in changing of optical, auditory, tactile sensitivity threshold.
- Disorders in mental phenomena regulatory function, because central fatigue reduce intake of psychological and nervous energy in sensory and cognitive processes. The mental process regulator – attention, loses the essential qualities of concentration and mobility (distributive). Installing of mental fatigue has the effect of reduction of intrinsic motivation for athlete activity.
- Disorders of higher knowledge processes are observed, because psycho-physical fatigue alters the ability of thought, the accurate assessment of
information. Individual athlete mentally tired has difficulty assessing the distance, its own actions and reduced capacity of decision and motor reaction.

- Increasing of reaction time is found in physical fatigue, because increases latency for simple motor response, but especially complex reaction, which is determined by: increasing of processing time information at central level or reducing of neurons and synapses functional status. However, physiological fatigue should be assessed as a general mechanism for protection against excessive stresses which occurs through:
  - Sparing (protecting) of nerve structures whose neurons pass into a state of inhibition due to excessive stimulation or its prolonged action;
  - Sparing of the cardiovascular system, the energy reserves of the heart muscle;
  - Preventing of complete depletion of energy reserves, called “autonomous protected reserves”.

Physiological fatigue is a favorable state in sports training, by installing the phenomenon of overcompensation, a phenomenon which improves body exercise capacity.

Preventing of installation of neuro-psychological fatigue is performed through management of sports training and compliance of measures and means of neuro-psychological and metabolic recovery.

**Pathological fatigue**

Pathological fatigue installed after efforts beyond physiological limits of the body, occurs in two forms: acute and chronic

*Acute pathological fatigue*

As defined by Drăgan, I. (2002) is an “acute pathological fatigue form, which consists of discrepancy between the level request and responsiveness of the body, at the moment”.

This form of pathological fatigue installs in case of:
- Insufficient training;
- Start of training;
- Recovering from an injury or illness;
- Use of doping substances.

The most common manifestations of acute pathological fatigue are:

Muscle pain is an unpleasant physical pain, felt in muscles after an exercise performed at a certain level of stress.

This type of pain is felt during exercise, at the end of the exercise or after 1-2 days of physical activity.

Muscle pain, occurring immediately after an effort - acute pain - may be caused by the presence of metabolic products of effort in tissues; intracellular lactate $\text{H}^+$ ions or some swelling formed by leaking of plasma in the intercellular space may cause local pain, especially if the effort was considerable strength or endurance. Acute pain caused by these may go in a few minutes, but at the same time can last up to several hours, depending on the concentration of metabolic products and measures applied to restore the body.

Delayed muscle pains appear after 1-2 days after the end of exhausting effort, conducted mainly in terms of eccentric muscle contractions (muscle lengthening products – plyometric exercises). Muscle pain in these conditions is associated with other causes, such as:

- Inflammatory reactions manifested by hyper leukocytosis;
- Muscle injury that disturb the calcium balance in fiber and trigger the release of intracellular proteins.

Muscle pain can be prevented or at least minimized by methodological rules of request in effort:

- Physical education lessons/training start with light exercises (low intensity), with gradual increase of the request;
- Avoid abuse of exercise performed in the beginning of the eccentric contractions.

Muscle crack – triggered by a muscle contraction which often stems fibrillary muscle injury; local muscle pain and discomfort, the athlete is forced to discontinue the effort. This situation is explained by the fact that the request that the athlete is subject is beyond of his ability to give an answer. In addition to these causes, the phenomenon may be caused by improper issues related to health, musculoskeletal integrity, food, equipment, sports training methodology.

Heart crack (“forced heart”), which can occur from simple rhythm disorder (appearance of extra systoles) to cardiac arrest or death of athlete, is due to a neuro-vegetative imbalance or improper relationship between the request of effort and biological possibilities of athlete.

Neurological, vegetative and sensory disorders are manifested by:
- Gait;
- Decrease of muscle tone;
- Orthostatic disorders;
- Coordination and balance disorders;
- Sensory disturbances: visual, auditory, vestibular;
- Psychiatric disorders: exhaustion, mental fatigue;
- Psycho-motor and spatial-temporal orientation disorders.

In these acute pathological fatigue situations, if efforts continues, accidents can occur which are up to unconsciousness. If it exceeds the acute phase of acute pathological fatigue, sometimes only through medical guidance, in 3-4 weeks, the athlete may resume his activity, but not before he undergo a series of medical investigations.

To avoid installation status of acute pathological fatigue are recommended preventive measures, which include: conducting scientific training, a full recovery, correct lifestyle, medical surveillance (field and laboratory). An athlete who was in acute pathological fatigue remains under medical observation during sports activity.

**Chronic pathological fatigue**

A form of pathological fatigue profoundly affects the whole body, viewed as neurosis or overloading, (name given by the role of central nervous system in genesis of this sport) is overtraining.

Overtraining is a durable functional imbalance, installed after repeated saturation, which leads to decreased work capacity and athletic performance.

Mechanisms of chronic pathological fatigue installation - overtraining can be explained in three general meanings that are based on the central nervous system:
- Overloading excitation processes by volume, intensity and complexity of training;
- Overloading of inhibition processes through prolonged monotony of training;
- Overloading both processes (excitation and inhibition) by sudden changes in techniques, intensity, and training and team positions.

Clues - signs of overtraining are given by both subjective and objective disorders:

**Subjective disorders:**
- Changed behavior: athlete gets moody, with unusual and uncontrolled behavior;
- Advanced apathy: lack of interest in any activity, anxiety, excitability, depression;
- Diminishing cognitive processes (memory, thinking, attention);
- Signs of neurosis (insomnia, headaches);
- Insomnia (nocturnal or diurnal) - restless sleep;
- Headaches that do not yield to the medication and emphasized on the effort;
- Loss of appetite;
- Chest pain;
– Visual, auditory and vestibular disorders;
– Sensations of weight in muscle.
Objective disorders:
– Sweating rendered undue effort;
– Decrease in body weight (over 3% loss of body weight can be caused by overtraining);
– Reduce latency of reaction, force and neuro-muscular coordination;
– Delayed recovery of heart rate and blood pressure after exercise;
– Calcium and magnesium loss through excretory system;
– Rapid and irregular tremor of fingers and eyelids;
– Digestive and endocrine disorders.

Overtraining can be considered a disease (Drăgan, I., 2002), whose mechanism production is based on activity of central nervous system and that can occur in two clinical forms:
– Reactive type overtraining dominated by excitatory type processes;
– Asthenic type overtraining dominated by inhibitory type processes.

Signs of installation chronic pathological fatigue, overtraining, must be recognized early and requested medical intervention that can quickly and efficiently correct the situation.

In contemporary training, when training is done in a multidisciplinary team and knowledge of coaches is complex, installation of chronic pathologic fatigue or overtraining rarely happens.

Preventing the installation of pathological fatigue is performed through the proper application of training and especially the optimum utilization of the means of recovery after effort.

Bibliography

ASPECTS ABOUT THE USE OF AIR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
IN THE MAIN THEATRES OF OPERATIONS

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Abstract: The high precision sensors and the weapons, along with the communication networks, transform the information in military strength, growing the quality and accelerating the speed of the decision making process, and improving the efficiency of military actions in the operating conditions of the current security environment. The ability to accurately locate and destroy high value targets, whether fixed or mobile, from either Earth or space, may improve the operational thinking and the capacity of taking the right decisions by the military, with a big impact on every component of future operations.

Keywords: sensors, air surveillance systems.

The beginning of the 21st century war ushers in an era in which victory will not be won by decisive military confrontation, states having access to a portfolio of tools for civilian or military, which will ensure an adequate framework for combating security threats and accomplish the transformation of any negative action into potential mostly positive results.

The old features of war specific in the 20th century are no longer valid, because there is a profound shift in the conduct of conflict, influenced by the use of intelligent weapons, the precise actions of the intelligence structures, and actions designed to curb breaches to national security. This aspect generates a constant concern for the development of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to present and future changes, offering to political-military decision-makers alternative actions adapted to a concrete situation existing at a given time.

We believe that the first decades of this century are the beginning of permanent supervision of potentially hostile areas, of preventive attacks and of conflicts between states and various networks that jeopardizes their safety, but at the same time represent the beginning of the end for conflicts of type 20 century characterized by conquest, control, stabilization and reconstruction of conquered territories.

Air surveillance is the systematic observation of airspace from responsibility areas, using electronic, visual or other methods, primarily to determine the position of aircraft and missiles, as well as their identification, friend or enemy, aiming to achieve information about Real-time air situation. 1

Finding the means of air attack of the opponent and ensuring a suitable reaction attack is achieved by the help of C4ISR systems made up of surveillance and warning means of high-performance, communication networks, centers of command and computer data processing equipments, designed as network, and which contribute to the increase of operational opportunities of their own air force.

C4ISR systems are designed to obtain information “decisive and relevant at all levels of operational decision in order to allow forces to turn them into goals in all forms of military actions”2, creating the

necessary conditions for the conduct of air operations.

The achievement of high-performance C4ISR systems is a constant concern for the armies of NATO member states, the progress in information technologies allowing the accomplishment of this target. Getting over the opponent's superiority was achieved through improvement and modernization of the control command system as part of C4ISR system whose architecture provides the necessary support to commanders and military structures for planning, deployment organization, management, coordination, guidance and control of the ordered mission.

C4ISR integrates and synchronizes the ensuring, planning and operation of all systems of sensors with processing functions, recovery, fusion and dissemination of information for direct support of decision makers at all levels of command, and include detection, localization, identification, selection and combating targets by air defense system.

Successful defense against an air enemy implies a system of surveillance of airspace as well as of the means of air defense, particularly of the ground-air missiles and fighter aircraft designed for combat and destruction of the opponent’s air assets.

The air surveillance is designed to provide information about air situation needed at all levels of decision of command and control system, representing an activity performed by specialized personnel and sensors arranged in a network of cosmic, air, land and naval components, thus contributing to early warning achievement, providing informational support during the waging of operations, protecting its own forces and helping planning future operations.

The cosmic air surveillance component consists of different types of sensors, which are disposed on military satellites. The military satellites of surveillance are displayed in space, the trajectories orbiting the Earth making up a network that was developed during the "cold war" and is authored in air surveillance whose usefulness was proved during the military conflicts of the last century and the beginning of our century.

Satellite monitoring can execute surveillance 24 hours a day, during peacetime, crisis or war, and are intended for research and air surveillance at operational or strategic level, with a role in detecting and locating targets, based on sensors that make investigations in the domains of microwaves, infrared and visible sensors.

A special category of military surveillance satellites are the ones that use radar systems with a role of air, land and sea surveillance having more efficient detection and research capabilities.

Using air surveillance satellites in military missions has both advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages of the satellite surveillance is the opportunity to explore large areas, thus enabling rapid location of public interest objectives and the ability to supervise the territory of any State without requiring authorization for overflight. Among the disadvantages there is the influence of unfavorable weather conditions on the quality and predictability of observation images of a target area or the evolution of the respective satellite in the orbit.

The air surveillance component provides good opportunities for discovery at great distances and small and very small heights, because surveillance systems are placed on board of the aircraft, thus reducing the possibilities of the relief influencing the sensors. As the costs of production and operation of such equipment are very high, few armies can afford to have and operationalize such systems. In order to achieve air surveillance with sensors airborne there are aircraft with high flight autonomy level to great and stratospheric heights, with board protection systems against electronic warfare and air-to-air and ground-to-air missile.

The means of airspace surveillance placed on aircraft provide very good opportunities for the discovery, identification and tracking of the air targets in the depth of the opponent territory and
also give informational support to the radar while waging operations against enemy in the air, on land and at sea; at the same time they provide protection against the opponent’s means of counteraction.

Air surveillance radars displayed on air platforms have advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages we mention the ability to oversee a very large surface area of the opponent airspace in depth and the capacity to obtain and provide information in real time. As disadvantages we can mention the need to develop air platforms at a safe distance from possible retaliation opponent and the dependence on technical characteristics of aerial platforms and weather conditions.

Another category of platform used increasingly more often lately is the aircraft (UAVs) which is a low-cost option to achieve the surveillance of airspace and battlefield due to relatively low cost of acquisition and exploitation of such resources.

Unmanned appliances were designed for the surveillance of airspace, land and sea to small and medium distances, the sensors disposed on these platforms ensuring surveillance and research of the objectives in a particular area of interest, providing a detailed and accurate image of a zone in the theater of military action.

Using UAVs presents a number of advantages which includes: high mobility, wide range of surveillance equipment in the microwave, infrared, visible and radar sensors, high autonomy, reduced operating costs, difficult detection by the opponent, getting real-time information and the possibility of their use during peacetime, crisis or war.

The maritime component of surveillance has sensors embarked on ships involved in the supervision of the naval and air situation from over the maritime space and waterways, discovering naval and air threats, providing navigation, routing drawdown artillery and missiles placed on sea and river military ships, executing port maneuvers safely. The sensors displayed on sea or inland ships ensure surveillance of airspace, land and sea to small and medium distances, depending on the limitations of movement in the marine environment, the sensors disposed on these platforms ensuring surveillance and research of the objectives found in a given area of interest in the microwave, infrared, and visible domain. Radar sensors provide a detailed and precise researched area and ensure real-time information and the possibility of their use during peacetime, crisis or war.

The ground surveillance component consists of sensors located on the ground in a fixed location, designed as a network and aiming at the discovery of certain aircraft at high and very high distances, providing early warning and the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles in the theater; there are also sensors with high mobility degree with a complementing role in the discovery of targets opportunities that evolve from small and medium heights. The process of development of surveillance systems will consider improving the technical parameters of distance sensors with an impact on the discovery, identification and location of a potential threat, contributing to an accurate assessment of the danger in air and the effective counteraction.

Using ground based radar has a range of benefits including increased mobility, the ability to operate in all weather conditions and achieve low height air surveillance in the opponent’s territory, on relatively short distances. Among the disadvantages of these systems we mention the difficulty of their entire masking, in terms of integration into the environment and work of the radar system, as well as from the opponent’s threat to hit these means mainly during operations, which requires the execution of more maneuvers and thus reducing the time for supervision.

The information obtained by the sensors is acquired using the equipment of communications and interconnecting platforms sensors and individual sensors to processing centers within the structures of air surveillance, where they are processed and disseminated to commanders and military structures to support the planning, deployment organization, leadership,
coordination, direction and control of the ordered mission.

Such information is provided to ensure on the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the following missions: early warning, providing information on air situation in the area of interest necessary for the conduct of operations planning, informational support during operations, provision of the information needed in order to assess the situation, force protection. The implementation of new technologies in the military field have resulted in the emergence of new air assets with stealth technology, the development of a new generation of weapons whose effect and precision to the target will be raised, improving the appearance of new types of intelligent munitions (cruise missile, multisensor ammunition, the semi-active laser-guided ammunition of "rambling" type, etc.), which will ensure an enhancement of combat potential of the fighting structures having the effect of increasing the efficiency of air, land and sea operations.

Military specialists converge towards the idea that future war will be a smart, informational, communications and computer-based technologies war. It will be built using high-performance sensors, command and control systems of last generation that will allow access to information and real-time decision.

The Gulf War has used information technology, invisible airplanes and smart ammunition as force multipliers, based on specialized research structures, able to use multiple sensor systems to ensure a true theater of operations. Air surveillance was done with aerospace and cosmic platforms, with a wide range of sensors and systems for research that paved the continuous visibility, day and night, which, together with the advantages offered by the C3I, contributed to shortening the reaction time and cycle of decision-making, increasing efficiency during operations waged.

In this conflict drones have carried out surveillance, equipped with sensors that allow battlefield surveillance during the shares, giving a closer and more detailed view of a small area of the battle space.

It was used the E-8 J-Stars at the board of an aircraft of type Boeing 707, which is a center of command and airborne control and has powerful means of detection and surveillance of targets on the ground, being used to support ground attacks.

In the Afghanistan war, due to an obvious air superiority, the air surveillance was made especially for the location of terrorist training camps, the discovery of hideouts and terrorist groups. There were used mainly drones that patrol the airspace of Afghanistan in order to provide the necessary information about terrorist or hostile groups.

In this same conflict, drones equipped with missiles were being used during military missions in order to monitor and eliminate various enemy terrorists and military chiefs. These drones are endowed with very precise sighting systems, ensuring high precision in the penalty shoot (are credited with killing a large number of terrorists, about 2000, and a few civilians, about 50) 3.

The conflict in Libya between rebels and government forces and the existing humanitarian situation led to expanding activities in the Mediterranean NATO air surveillance to monitor the situation and provide a true picture needed to accurately assess the events.

Air surveillance operations were stepped up in the capital and other areas controlled by the Libyan army, which is still loyal to the old regime. The effect of these air surveillance actions was felt in a better coordination of actions carried out by rebels, coordination between the rebels and NATO, as well as unprecedented intensification and increased efficiency actions carried out by the air forces of NATO after which they attacked thousands of targets, destroying military

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infrastructure and reducing the ability of the Libyan army command.

Islamic State fighters in Syria and northern Iraq have triggered a backlash from the US bombed positions of the Islamic State in these regions in order to stop the advance of this group in the areas of US interest. These actions were preceded by an intense air and land surveillance carried out with drone and aircraft capable of performing such missions, in order to provide the necessary information about the theater of military action and forming a picture of the Islamic State combatants’ positions.

Basically, at the moment, a large number of air surveillance drones are flying over the hot areas of the globe providing accurate information needed to assess the current situation.

Technological innovations are the key catalysts for the physiognomy of future military operations, which will emphasize the decisive nature of the conflict, focusing on action and reducing collateral damage effects. Aerospace technologies implemented in the military will create a new generation of aircraft, capital flight performance C4I systems, electronic surveillance and research smart weapons etc., which will result in the achievement of air superiority. Air surveillance systems will provide continuous visibility during day and night to provide the necessary information to the decision-making process and to minimize the time required for decision making. Thus, it is expected to increase the number of unmanned aircraft, the improvement of military satellites supervision schemes, to upgrade terrestrial radar and the replacement of old cameras incorporating modern technologies and the development of systems for the air assets detection that have stealth technology.

Among some detection systems that are to be operated in the near future there is the Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS NATO), which is intended to support the fight against terrorism, and to interconnect with the missile shield. In making the entire system, whose cost is estimated at 1.2 billion euro, Romania contributes financially with 25 million and actively participates in the construction of the system through specialized companies.4

The system consists of five unmanned aircraft Global Hawk RQ-4B, which are designed to provide information on land or sea operations, or their opponents, giving a true picture of the situation of land and sea to the military decision makers. Among its strengths, this drone may include a height of up to 18,000 meters altitude, an autonomy of flight of about 33 hours and a range of sensors of electro-optical images capture (radar), a SAR type of radar sensor (Synthetic Aperture Radar), a GMTI sensor (ground movement target indicator which can detect targets moving on the ground with a speed of at least 3 km / h, thus including human walking) and Sensor SIGINT (signals intelligence, which captures communications electronic signals).

Another technology of the future that will positively influence air surveillance is the new radar system capable of detecting the fifth generation aircraft, which incorporates stealth technology. This radar is based on the so-called radar passive, which consists of several receivers arranged in a certain geographical area and consists of detecting the emissions of various objects in different electromagnetic spectrum, from radio waves to high-frequency radiation, by analyzing its meeting with foreign objects. Among the advantages of using this type of radar is the ability to remain undetected or scrambled and very low operating costs. This system is already in a process of testing, as some European countries manifest an interest to equip their air surveillance forces.

In conclusion, the air surveillance system will represent an important element able to provide real time information about a particular area of interest, on which commanders and military structures will

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plan, organize and carry out military operations.

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Abstract: A constant preoccupation of the great thinkers and philosophers of humanity, International Humanitarian Law branch has evolved directly proportional to the specific development of each era. The completion of social organization types led to the increase and aggravation of the armed conflicts and their aftermath, so protecting human rights and freedoms became scarce only in peacetime. Thus, a body of conventional and customary law rules, applicable in both inter-state relations and the relations between themselves and other national and international law topics in the field of internal and international armed conflicts, whose effects tend to limit them for humanitarian reasons¹, was gradually established. Currently, the protection imposed by International Humanitarian Law is achieved and supported by the numerous norms regarding the ways of deploying military operations, the treatment of war victims, civilians and persons that do not or no longer take part in the hostilities, as well as the restriction and even interdiction of using certain combat means and methods.

Keywords: International Humanitarian Law, fundamental rights and freedoms, social organization, armed conflict, international cooperation.

Considered as a law branch with the value of lex specialis, the origins of International Humanitarian Law arise from the necessity of protecting the victims of the inherent manifestations of military force. Also called war law, before the evolution of the concept of war from a foreign policy instrument to its banishment as illegal, this law branch has a major importance in preserving the frail international balance eroded by already existing conflicts and especially by the extension of areas with potential high-risk of conflict, with the international community facing ever more atypical situations in point of security and defense.

A quick observation of the historical itinerary of this branch shows that its evolution has been closely linked to the development of human rights and fundamental freedoms issue, representations about justice and fairness, but also the appearance of philosophical interpretations of the idea of human rights being noticed since Antiquity.

Thus, in the first half of the 2nd millennium B.C. man was depicted from the humanistic point of view in the epic of Gilgamesh of Babylon. Later on there were collections of laws regulating social relations and promoting rules of social justice and humanitarian spirit² such as the one from 1470 B.C., written upon the order of Sumerian king Ur-Nammu, then the one from 1620 B.C., written upon the order of the king of Isin, Lipit-Ishtar, which have been only partly preserved.

In 1770 B.C. the Semitic king of the Babylonian Empire, Hammurabi, ordered a collection of decisions previously issued or sanctioned by kings, to be spread throughout the empire. Known

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today as the Code of Hammurabi and completely retrieved, it is considered the oldest collection of laws of all times and a token of the king’s spirit of responsibility. Having an obvious humanitarian tendency, this collection introduced the Law of Tallion, which established a proportional ratio between the perpetrated crime and its punishment, introduced the legal possibility that slaves could be bought back and abolished punishments that caused excessive pain, such as burning, hanging or drowning.

Besides these collections of laws, in 12-13th century India was issued the Code of Manu, made up of 12 books (Manava Dharma-Sastra) comprising, among other things, social rules and duties of the castes and their members, notions of internal and external policy, strategy and tactics, as well as advice for concluding political and military alliances. Likewise, important Indian epics such as the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Sutras, Mahabharata, Ramayana and Purana created the framework of a moral dimension of society, based on social and legislative ethics, which acknowledged certain human rights.

From a legal point of view, the first full acknowledgement of some fundamental human rights dates back from 534 B.C., namely the Edict issued by the Persian king Cyrus the Great after the conquest of Babylon, by which he guaranteed the liberty of cult and the option to return to the native place to practise it.

The outlook according to which all beings are equal as dignity and value, thus having a right to being respected, was first asserted in Buddhist thinking. The founder of Buddhism, Buddha Sakyamuni, spread the idea that nothing could justify an act against a form of life, therefore there were no mitigating circumstances for exploiting or humiliating a being. Accordingly, he was the first thinker to promote the idea of absolute equality among people, the only hierarchies being based on age and personal achievement.

Egyptian civilization and culture was based on the Book of the Dead, which represented a collection of writings by sages and artists, comprising non-religious moral rules on which the Egyptians based their conduct and existence. Later on, the words of wisdom of Ptah-Hotep, a high Egyptian official, collected in what is considered to be the first book in the world, contained rules about social order and harmony, about how to acquire manners and cultivating adequate behavior in the high circles of the Egyptian society. They also contained the first statement that no violence should be exerted against people, since “they were born from the Sun’s eyes and are God’s flock”.

Confucius (Kung Fu Tzu), the outstanding representative of the old Chinese civilization, considered that social harmony relied on flawless morality and principles deeply rooted in collective thinking, according to which man had the duty to love and respect his neighbors. Confucius considered morality as being the first universal principle, also promoting the values of justice, humaneness and moderation for the common ideal of goodness. Later on, Chinese Buddhism took over part of these outlooks, deeming that man’s salvation was achieved through goodness and love. Besides these Buddhist ideals, the old Chinese civilization also had rules about military strategy and tactics, written down by General Sun Tzu in his book entitled The Art of War.

In its turn, The Old Testament of the Bible laid down the prerogatives of the human being and a new outlook on the relation between man’s rights and duties, stating ideas of social equality and resilience to oppression, based on an exquisite religious spirit. Supposed to be


4 R. Miga-Beștelu, C. Brumar, op. cit., Protec ia interna ională a drepturilor omului - Note de curs, p.6, Edi ia a V-a, Ed. Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2010


basically a collection of documents written by various scholars upon the order of leaders and clergymen from the kingdoms of Israel and Judea, it considered man a divine creation with a special status, bringing his image close to God, promoting a set of rules applicable in inter-human relations, without discriminating between allies and enemies. Likewise, it comprised rules for waging war, conveyed by means of the indications given by Moses to the Israeli people, requiring that enemy men should not be spared in combat, unlike women and children, as well as rules applicable to slavery. Christian religion created very important landmarks, underlying the modern outlooks. By promoting love and harmony, with love as a universal law, it tended to reduce violence by resuming the principles of the Law of Tallion, also militating for limiting the state’s power in respect to the individual, for people’s equality before the divinity, for respecting their dignity on account of their divine origins, but also for eliminating the different treatment of slaves in respect to their masters.\(^7\)

Unlike the previous epochs, when juridical norms were deemed to originate from the divinity and leaders had only the role to convey them to their subjects, watching that they should be observed and that transgressions should be punished so as not to attract divine wrath, in Ancient Greece law became public, being known to all the inhabitants of the city. Greek civilization spread into the world the emerging notions of diplomacy and treaty, also creating mechanisms such as international arbitration, which was resorted to in order to solve any differendum regarding borders, trade, navigation or harbor privileges.\(^8\)

The existence of a *ius civitas* in Ancient Greece allowed citizens to participate in social leadership and law making by means of their right to fill public positions. Although there were some individual rights as well, whose existence was documented by Greek philosophers Hesiod, Solon and Pericles and which guaranteed the civil liberties, they were not applicable in respect to state power, state supremacy being incontestable. The Greeks did not benefit from protection only in time of peace, there were numerous conduct rules for times of war, which banned and considered as barbarian a series of acts such as weapons causing excessive pain and important damage, poisoned arms or attacks in absence of a war declaration.\(^9\)

An important contribution to Greek philosophy was brought by thinker and philosopher Plato, who considered that human nature and the convention or law he had to obey were two distinct but interdependent things. Thus, Plato thought that human nature made men similar, the difference being created by convention or law, while the similarity and link between man and the state was justice, to be found both in human nature and social organization, man having the duty of “*not responding to injustice with another injustice or to evil with another evil*”.\(^10\)

Plato’s outlook was taken over and developed by Aristotle, who expanded this reasoning, stating that the natural reality was the city and that, owing to his belonging to the city, “man was a political being”.\(^11\) This was considered the beginning of the natural law doctrine, based on the belief in an intrinsic universal natural law emanating from the divinity or from the order of the Universe, as well as from the social and rational aspect of society, irrespective of its form of organization. Thus, it was considered that man’s rights were *fundamental, eternal and immutable, inherent to human*

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\(^8\) Mitroescu, Taiche, *colectiv. România şi tratatele interne ionale*, Editura Militară, Bucharest, 1972, p.IX.


nature, deriving from natural law, just like the laws, and society was obliged to respect them.

Together with social, cultural, political and economic development of Ancient Greece, the promoters of sophistic thinking voiced the idea that man was the master of his own destiny, not only an instrument of the Gods, who freely exerted their power on him, that his rights existed even before being legally acknowledged and not respecting them actually meant denying his very human nature.

Like Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome granted its citizens the right to participate in the public life, but there were also emerging forms of individual rights as opposed to state interests, namely a number of guarantees granted to the citizens, in comparison to an obviously enlightened juridical system for foreigners. As regards the rules of waging war in Ancient Rome, they favored excessive cruelty and violence, yet without allowing poisonous substances, while the enemy was given a certain time to bury their dead. The imperialist view stated in the Edict of Caracalla in 212 B.C., which stipulated the assimilation of all peoples on Roman territory by granting them citizenship, except those who rebelled against the Roman occupation, was incompatible with the international practice promoted by the Greek world. Thus, it was imperative to create *ius fetiale*, a corpus of norms originating in religion, which guaranteed the inviolability of foreign ambassadors, and *ius gentium*, a corpus of norms that established the limits of the Roman population’s interaction with the foreign population under Roman domination. Other important contributions at that time were those of Cicero and Seneca, who dealt with concepts such as equality among people and individual freedom, as well as that of the Roman law people, who laid the bases of the *ius naturale* theory, which considered that natural law regarded everybody, while civil law regarded only the city’s citizens with equal rights.

A first common element of the great ancient empires as concerns conduct rules in times of war was the use of the mechanism of international treaties to guarantee the protection of civilians and civilian goods that ensured survival, the care for the wounded and the picking up of the dead, as well as the respect for the enemy in combat, protection for the royal emissaries or the ceasing of the fight in certain periods – all these taken over later on and adapted from one historical period to another, which has led to International Humanitarian Law as we know it nowadays.

Greek and Roman stoical thinking claimed that people’s equality and the right to cultivate wisdom and virtue was given at birth, without any social or territorial conditioning, originating from natural law. Moreover, philosophers Seneca and Epictetus considered that human law had value only when having a correspondent in universal law. Likewise, the thinkers of the time made a distinction between the notion of rights and that of privileges and insisted on understanding and preserving that distinction, as rights were inherent and indispensable to the human being, while privileges could be granted only to certain persons, namely the Roman citizens.

Though the great ancient philosophers launched a number of ideas about man and his fundamental rights, which Christian religion promoted, attaching to them a deep religious tinge, at the social level, man was not perceived as an asset and preserving his dignity did not represent a social organization principle.

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The next period, the Middle Ages, also known as the Dark Ages, was one of the bloodiest periods in the history of mankind, being marked by a great number of military conflicts among civilizations.

If in the early Middle Ages the supporters of Christianity fiercely rejected war, seeing it as Satan’s work and refusing to join the Roman legions which they considered pagan because the emperor claimed to be a divine being, above religion and equal to the Gods, starting with the Edict of Milan in 313 A.C., such ideas vanished. The Edict of Milan marked Emperor Constantin I’s conversion to the Christian religion and the end of the Great Persecution against the supporters of this cult, which had begun as early as Emperor Diocletian’s reign, being acknowledged as the most severe form of repression until then. This edict meant not only a guarantee of religious tolerance inside the empire but also the foundation of a new power, the Church, which was to lead to the legitimacy of war.

The first supporter of the theory of the just war was bishop Augustin of Hipona, who tried to find a middle way between the political necessity and Christian morals, stating that war should be regarded as the last resort, waged with pity and understanding for the enemy. In the theologian’s view, the only just cause for waging war was to defend the innocent against the injustice they were submitted to. He did not admit violence in self-defense as being a just cause, considering it could not be seen as a legitimate action in comparison with the defense of others, which required flawless conduct and very good self-knowledge. A few centuries later, saint monk Thomas of Aquino partly took over Saint Augustin’s theory, stating that the objective order installed and preserved in the name of the sovereign in order to reject attacks or punish offenses was not considered unjust but came under the concept of just war, accepted by God, against an enemy that waged an unjust war and even against divinity.  

From a humanitarian point of view, the Middle Ages period was marked by the emergence of the Holy Wars, also known as the crusades. Promoted by Pope Urban II at the end of the 11th century, the crusades were in fact European expeditions justified by religious reasons and presented to the knights as the way to forgiveness. Of Germanic inspiration, the knights’ order functioned like an elite military group in service of the sovereign or the divinity, being made up of noblemen, the only ones with the right and obligation to permanently wear a weapon and fight on horseback. This set of rules, doubled by principles such as faith, honor and loyalty was only applicable to noblemen and the knights of the Christian world, even enemies, with the possibility for captured noblemen to buy their freedom, since their lives were safe. Under the pretext of faith, civilization and a just war, what actually happened was a total war which exhausted all the forces involved, promoted a cult of unlimited hatred and cruelty against Islamism and gradually gained ground in Europe and the world, succeeding to conquer even the cradle of Christian religion, Jerusalem. During the crusades, the power of the Church grew immeasurably and its attitude to war underwent a radical change which is total acceptance and even encouragement of the phenomenon, considered by specialists as a genuine doctrine revolution.  

The Holy Wars are recorded in history as the cause of millions of dead people killed in the most horrendous ways, as a result of both the fights involving various forces (civilian population, soldiers, mercenaries, noblemen, knights) and the fact that the Church accepted the killing or bondage of prisoners, irrespective of their sex or age, on grounds of heresy.

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Wishing to restrain the atrocities committed in times of war, around 1020 the Church got actively involved, imposing the truce days, also called “God’s Truce”, which represented a set of rules that forbade acts of war from Saturday night till Monday morning or even for longer periods, also introducing the first forms of engaging juridical liability for breaking these rules.

In 1139, the second Ecumenical Council of the Roman-Catholic Church from Lateran that year, decided on prohibiting poison and forbidding the arbalest as combat weapons, at the suggestion of a Danish bishop, on account of the cruelty and painful death they generated, these being reserved for killing the unfaithful. However, the main cause for banning the arbalest was that the armor did not protect the knights from the force of the arrows shot from a great distance, which made them certain targets in combat, so that the only way to avoid this was to completely forbid the use of this weapon.

At the Ecumenical Council of Lateran, in 1215, the heads of the Roman-Catholic Church forbade the clergymen to practice surgery, which they did on the battlefield. Thus, the last chance of survival for the wounded was lost and they were abandoned as soon as they were no longer fit for battle. The only ones who had a right to a personal physician were the lords. The situation of the wounded enemies and war prisoners who could not be bought back was dire as they were killed. The civilians did not benefit from protection either, because women and children were at the mercy of the victors.

We can readily notice that the Christian doctrine had an overwhelming influence on all fundamental aspects of society and the world throughout the Middle Ages. Besides labeling wars as just or unjust and establishing their rules, the Church took over the emerging norms for international relations occurred in the ancient period and implemented them in the Western world by means of complex mechanisms such as reprisals as a means of preventing wars or the use of the Pope’s arbitration in maritime law. In the form implemented by the Church and the values taken over and developed into principles and rules of the knights’ order, Christianity was the trigger for the later codes of International Humanitarian Law, mechanisms such as the war declaration, the status of parliamentarians or the banning of certain weapons, which date back from that time.

The Magna Charta Libertatum, the first document to regulate in an empirical manner the juridical protection of human rights, represented an international breakthrough, paving the way for instruments of promoting and protecting the human rights. Its format, similar to a contract, later led to the theory of the social contract, and the principles it supported, such as the principle of lawfulness and the interdiction of arbitrary arrest, led to the notion of law norm, thus underlying a great number of other documents.

However, war became soon a permanent state, fed by the dissolution of states, by the dismantlement process specific of the medieval period. The political-economic relations among states and the difficult diplomatic communication made it impossible to establish stable international relations. The endless fights for territorial expansion and supremacy, as well as the high level of violence led to the condemnation of the act of war. Thus, it became imperative to have humane rules for waging war, as well as a peaceful regulation of conflicts, so that a series of theories were launched to this effect. The most representative theory of this kind was voiced by Pierre Dubois, who militated for permanent peace by federalization of the international community, based on a solemn pact and the Christian states’ renunciation to war, with the possibility for the wronged state to appeal to the Pope in his capacity of supreme judge and unique universally acknowledged authority, whose decision was final.\(^{18}\)

Taking into account the permanent character of the state of war, the papacy began to get ever more actively involved, a

\(^{18}\) Mitroescu, Taiche, *op.cit.*, p.X.
remarkable view on the just war doctrine being that of Pope Innocent IV, the first theoretician who supported the use of offensive force only when based on a legitimate mandate given by the international community of the time, this support being considered the seed of the notion of legitimate conduct of states.

For the first time in history, in 1268, Koradin von Hohenstaufen, also known as Conrad V, claimant to the throne of the Roman-German Empire, was judged and sentenced to death by a court for war crimes, which indicated a beneficial direction in implementing the norms of that time.

However, the course of history took an unexpected turn in 1326, with the emergence of the first firearms, which radically changed the manner and rules of waging war. Initially, because of the complicated procedures of building them, artillery weapons were very expensive, so that only kings and emperors afforded them. This conditioning gradually changed the armies, so that knights became mercenaries, fighting in the name of the king, the latter being one with the state he was the head of. Consequent upon perceiving the importance of the human factor in military confrontations, there started to emerge first aid services for the wounded, together with the possibility of buying back war prisoners. The Agreement of Sempach, 1393, which stipulated the union of the members of the former Helvetic Confederation, included for the first time a provision on the respect for women and the wounded. In the future, there would be numerous other agreements comprising this provision.

Based on the 1268 precedent, in 1474 the Alsatian-born knight Peter von Hagenbach, the administrator of High Alsace territories, was tried and sentenced to death by an international court made up of 27 judges of the Roman-German Empire, being accused of severe infringement of “the laws of God and Man” after the conquest of Breisach, as he had not prevented the rape and killing of innocent civilians, nor the destruction of their property by the troops he had commanded.

Throughout the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance, the concepts of natural law and just war continued to exist, being steadily adapted to the needs of the society and becoming theories in their own right, directly proportional with social progress, while the emergence of modern states also heralded the decline of the Pope’s power.

Thus, the theory of the just war was no longer approached only from the clergy’s point of view, it became a topic for the philosophers and thinkers of the time, who wanted to free law and war from under the Church’s monopoly. A supporter of this theory was philosopher Francisco de Vitoria, who established a dichotomy of war, that it offensive and defensive, stating for the first time the unjust character of a war meant to extend an empire or to spread a religious cult. Though he believed that violence should be met with violence and that a war was just only when endangering the state’s existence and property, he thought that excessive suffering and the massacre of innocents were encroachments upon natural law and had to be condemned as such.

A consequence of the emergence of the modern states and the contribution of personalities such as Francisco de Vitoria and later on, in the 17th century, of reformed Christian jurists such as Hugo Grotius or Samuel von Putendorf, was the creation of the School of Natural Law. Thus, natural law underwent a series of transformations, giving birth to the parallel branch of kindred law, by replacing individuals as law subjects with political entities, this new juridical construction being acknowledged as Classic International Law.

Although revolutionary ideas about law and war were fully present, there were numerous conflicts, some even lasting for decades, which often broke the laws of war and natural law. Starting a war was considered legitimate if there was an encroachment on the state’s fundamental rights, the sovereign deciding as he pleased whenever he considered he had been
Somehow offended or he did not benefit from a certain right. Thus, the Renaissance principles had become insufficient to correct social realities, the armies did not preserve any of the chivalrous spirit, being made up of ordinary mercenaries in search of material gains, who plundered and committed aggression on the civilian population.

Bearing in mind the international context, for humanitarian reasons, Protestant jurist and diplomat Hugo Grotius, author of the book The Rights of War and Peace, published in 1654 and banned by the Church until 1890, supported the idea of managing the war phenomenon by developing strongly reasonable norms, mandatory for all sovereign powers. Considered the father of International Law, Grotius saw natural law and kindred law as similar, while deeming that natural law was a sort of general norm, applicable only when civilian norms did not regulate or insufficiently regulated juridical situations, also extending to international problems. In his opinion, kindred law was the product of sovereign nations and a result of their action, referring to the conduct of state representatives rather than to the conduct of the state per se, being therefore customary law. He fiercely advocated the idea that law and its expression, the laws, originated in human reason and principles, not in the divine justice. As to the view on the just war, it did not differ much from de Vitoria’s. However, Grotius considered that there had to be a cause fit to cause a war, besides its just character, so as to protect state integrity. As to the rules for waging war, Grotius claimed that the obligation to observe them was the duty of the parties involved and, though he deemed that the adversary was at the mercy of the victor, he did not encourage useless violence in gaining the victory, militating instead for sparing the fighters and the civilian population’s lives, as well as for the capacity of kindred law to ensure the individual’s protection in time of war, since the state was unable to do it under the circumstances.

Other foreign authors, such as Samuel Rachel, Richard Zanche, Cornelius von Bynkershoek, considered that states’ agreement led to the creation of kindred law norms, strengthening the idea of the existence of a customary law, voiced by Grotius. Moreover, they deemed that war law was a distinct branch of kindred law, thus acquiring an international character. In 1672 Samuel von Putendorf published his work Natural and Kindred Law, being the first theoretician who, tried to plant into European juridical consciousness the idea of the existence of a distinct kindred law, as separate from natural law. Together with Hugo Grotius, von Putendorf is considered the founder of the School of Natural Law.

Liberalism and the economic development specific of the Renaissance determined a deeper understanding of the world phenomena from a humanistic point of view, based on man’s importance in society, natural law acquiring the status of a law underlying the theories about the relation between sovereign and subjects. Jean Bodin, author of the first theory, also supported by Thomas Hobbes, considered that, without a political-social order, man is a danger to himself and to the others, the king’s sovereignty was incontestable and he had the obligation to observe natural law, general principles and divine injunctions, wherefrom derived the protection of the human rights.

The second theory of the social contract was based on the idea that people willingly gave up their natural state in exchange for the protection and prosperity offered by the state. In his Essay concerning civil government, published in 1690, John Locke deemed that human rights were imprescribable, since they were not created by society, only defended by the latter by its power to punish any encroachment upon them.

During the reign of Louis XIV and Frederic II, armies became regular and acquired a national character, with specific discipline rules and remuneration. Though the rules applicable to the belligerent forces and the civilian population in times of war became more humane, the right to
resort to war was deemed as belonging to the state only starting with the 18th century, when the monarch began to be seen as distinct from the state. In the 18th century the humane character of the war became a principle, so that wars were waged only by professional armies, not very large in numbers. The creation of specific formations and services allowed the civilian population to stay outside the military confrontations and even be protected by the new war rules which forbade plunder and unjustified violence, punishing cruelty and deceitful means and methods.

The first theoretician to use the notion of human rights as we know it today was Voltaire, who thought that the social contract led to the formation of the political society, man consequently becoming a citizen and the beneficiary of a higher form of liberty and equality, different from his natural rights.

Another theoretician of the human rights was Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who stated in his Social Contract (1762) that man was a free being, but this liberty was conditioned by the state which, by its mechanisms, limited it, thus affecting man’s dignity as well. The social contract actually meant man’s willing renunciation to the natural rights in favor of the state, seen as an expression of the will of the majority, in exchange for which natural rights acquired a civilian character, being accompanied by guarantees for their exertion and observance by the sovereign state. In Rousseau’s opinion, freedom was the most important asset, the only way of guaranteeing it being by creating laws meant to protect the just against the unjust. Moreover, Rousseau considered war an act among states, not among people as citizens, who artificially became enemies because of their role in defending their own states, as imposed by the international context. In opposition to Hobbes’ theory that human essence was dominated by war and man was an object in the hands of the state, Rousseau stressed the temporary character of this situation and of the status of citizens’ soldiers, limited only to the duration of the military confrontations.

Likewise, Rousseau proposed a reasoning anticipating the notion of individual protection from contemporary International Humanitarian Law, by encouraging the protection of the lives of the civilians and of those who no longer took part in the hostilities, considering that it was not necessary any longer to reach the war’s aim of total destruction, once it did not present a danger any more.19

Another author who wrote about human rights was Montesquieu, in his work The Spirit of the Laws, in which he stated that freedom was the foundation of the human rights and that freedom was expressed by the right to act freely only within legal limits; law breaking was punished with loss of liberty, precisely in order to avoid a mass phenomenon.20 Confronted with the realities of his time, Montesquieu deemed that it was in his nature for man to be corrupted by the power he wielded, therefore suggesting the principle of the separation of powers in a state as the only guarantee for observing the law by the legally appointed governors.21 Extending his reasoning, the jurist considered that the separation of powers in a state did not only lead to guaranteeing compliance with the law but also to guaranteeing individual liberties by the sovereign state, by its authorities.22

The 18th and 19th centuries represented a remarkable evolution for mankind, prompted by a humanistic spirit in all its aspects, especially in law, justice and war. The period known as the Enlightenment allowed planting into the social consciousness theories on human rights inspired by the American Revolution, then by the French Revolution. Natural law came to be promoted as a doctrine, such documents guaranteeing subjective rights and liberties in a liberal manner, with the theoreticians of liberalism supporting their opposition to

19 Jean-Jacque Rousseau, Contractul social, 1762.
21 O. Predescu, Protecția internațională a drepturilor omului, cit. supra, p.12.
22 O. Predescu, Protecția internațională a drepturilor omului, cit. supra, p.30.
the state, which had the obligation to refrain from any action encroaching upon them and intervene only for preventing any conduct harmful to other persons.

Cartel-type agreements, concluded between the leaders of the belligerent forces before a potential fight, in order to determine the situation of the victims, were an expression of moderation and respect, anticipating genuine humanitarian principles. Such a customary creation was the Treaty of peace and friendship concluded between Frederic the Great and Benjamin Franklin in 1785, which provided for the first time a mutual commitment of the signatories with the only aim of protecting the individual and which comprised provisions like renunciation to blockade measures, the right of enemy civilians to leave the country, the guarantee of treating war prisoners like own troops, that is the right to be visited and to receive aid from a designated person, as well as prisoner exchange, without however allowing the practice of buying them back. Moreover, the status of the sick and the wounded enemies was not the same as that of war prisoners, who had the right to medical aid just like the soldiers of the capturing army and who were to be released at the end of the war. For the first time, hospitals were concretely mentioned, so as to avoid their destruction and the religious and medical personnel were exempt from captivity and redirected to the enemy lines.

The French Revolution of 1789 took over many of these ideas and aimed at universal peace, by adopting the Declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen, a document of utmost international importance, which reiterated fundamental principles underlying modern democracy and led to the adoption of the French Constitution, stipulating that human rights were natural, sacred and inviolable, that there had to be “a mandatory and equal treatment of own and enemy soldiers”, while “war prisoners were under the protection of the nation and the law”. The evolution of events after 1789 did not agree with the principles adopted during the French Revolution. On the contrary, the mandatory military service was introduced, which generated a new approach to war as a mass phenomenon characterized by unprecedented cruelty, concentrating all the available material and especially human resources. The wars waged during the French Empire built by Napoleon I registered an unprecedentedly high number of dead people among the military and a regress. Napoleon considered as just any war that was inevitable and the war machine he built fed on the lives of the subordinated soldiers. In this period, cartel-type agreements dramatically lost their importance and the war laws completely obliterated the humanitarian principles previously successfully implemented. The century-long efforts to humanize the armed confrontations proved useless during Napoleon’s personal dictatorship and the type of war he waged.

Although at European level many states took over the French and American models, adopting constitutions that proclaimed man’s fundamental rights and the means of guaranteeing them, the international community lost control of the realities of this period. Customary rules totally lost their significance for the military parties involved and the fundamental rights and liberties were never implemented in social life, yet without abandoning the attempts of laying them down in texts of law. These attempts underlie the creation of International Humanitarian Law proper, which was to acquire new dimensions starting with the 19th century, together with the adoption of the first conventions to this effect.

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This work was made possible through financial support provided through the Sectoral Operational Program Development of Human Resources 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, in the project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with the title “Security through knowledge” – Integrated/educational network of training, counseling and guidance of PhD students for a career in research of security, defense, public order and national security - SECNETEDU”.
Abstract: The ex-Soviet space represents for the Euro-Atlantic area an exporter of risks and threats. It is necessary for these two organizations to join forces in order to build better security. We have noticed that the events on the eastern European border surprised everybody through their specific characteristics. These types of characteristics induced state of restlessness in the international public opinion. The vulnerabilities identified because of these risks and threats can be exploited by the hybrid state actors and non-state aggressors. These facts create serious difficulties to the members of these two organizations.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, organizations, NATO, EU, security, vulnerabilities, risks, threats.

After World War II, European and American countries promoted in their foreign policy the global, regional and continental security. This led to the establishment of specialized international organizations in this field. These organizations were given the authority and legitimacy to solve international conflicts including the approval to use military force. This legitimacy was given by the countries that have acceded to a set of common values. This set of common values is the base foundation of different organizations.

The aim of this article is to give a brief presentation of the hybrid warfare concept and presentation of the EU and NATO. These two organizations have a decisive role in securing the Euro-Atlantic area. Also in the article I will try to identify some vulnerabilities of these two organizations with respect to the action of hybrid warfare.

It is known that the end of Cold War led to the emergence of new risks and threats in the European area. They took new shapes, starting from ethnic tensions; trafficking of drugs, radioactive materials and human beings; border organized crime; political instability in certain areas; redistribution of zones of influence; proliferation of weak state entities, the so-called "failed states", characterized by inefficient and corrupt governments unable to provide their citizens with the benefits associated with the joint management of public affairs.

In the European space, military experts do not see in the near future the emergence of a conventional conflict, but they do not exclude the possibility that new types of conflicts might appear. The international public opinion was puzzled and disturbed by the appearance at the eastern border of a new type of conflict, different from the conventional one. The complex features that characterized this conflict led to its being called by specialists „hybrid warfare”. These specialists are currently trying to define the concept so as to be universally accepted. So far, it is known that state and non-state actors who use concealed techniques for achieving the strategic objectives create a strong impact in international public opinion.

The concept of hybrid warfare is not new in military literature. It makes a shift from predominantly classic conflicts, in which the military factor has the most important role, to the current conflicts which take unconventional shapes in which the military factor is much less manifest.

The conflict which arose in Ukraine caught the European states unprepared and unable to give a common, efficient and immediate response. In the joint statement of the Heads of State and Government
participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Wales on 4-5 September 2014 it is said: "We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Wales in a crucial moment for Euro-Atlantic security. Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine represented a fundamental challenge to our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace\textsuperscript{1}, thus identifying triggers for these actions.

The hybrid warfare notion was used officially in the Declaration of NATO Summit stating that "NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges of hybrid war threat, which involves the use of a wide range of military action, paramilitary and civilian, open and under cover, in an architecture with a high degree of integration. It is essential for the Alliance to have tools and procedures needed to deter war and to respond effectively to hybrid threats and strengthen the capabilities of national forces. This includes also the development of strategic communications, the development of hybrid scenarios for war exercises, the strengthening of coordination between NATO and other organizations, the adoption of relevant decisions in order to improve the exchange of information, political consultation and internal coordination process.\textsuperscript{2}"

When we are addressing the concept of hybrid warfare, we should take into consideration, in my opinion, the approach of General Valery Gerasimov, Russian armed forces Chief of Staff, presented in February 2013 in VPK a defense-specialized review. In that review he talked about his vision regarding future conflicts. He said that the "the methods of conflict have changed and now they involve massive recourse to measures of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military nature, which can all be supplemented by strengthening the local population as a fifth column and by creating large undercover forces\textsuperscript{3}".

Referring to the hybrid war or unconventional warfare, Gen. Philip Breedlove, SHAPE Commander, said at the Brussels Forum in 2015, that it is a collection of tools having as an acronym in military language "DIME": diplomatic, information, military, and economic tools. These tools have been used in the preceding wars\textsuperscript{4}. What is new in this type of war? The answer can be found in the ways these tools are used in order to put pressure on the state actors. Diplomacy is used by the aggressor actor in its attempt to discredit or destroy cohesion within the alliance and finally to isolate on the international scene the state actors targeted. A new element is the way in which these instruments are used in the speedy propagation of information in all environments by manipulating false information in order to discredit and create a negative image of the respective actors in the international public opinion. False information is distributed through subservient mass-media networks and internet and through the NGOs established in the area of responsibility of the state actors targeted by aggression. These NGOs have a mission to unsettle the country from the inside and destroy the credibility of state institutions in the eyes of their citizens with respect to their capacity to govern and to ensure conditions for sustainable economic and social development.

\textsuperscript{2} Idem.

\textsuperscript{3} A fifth column is a group of people who undermine a larger group-such a nation or a besieged city from within. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_column.
The use of military tools in hybrid warfare is quite new, as the military capabilities are used in order to create ambiguity and to conceal the real intentions of the aggressor actor. Conventional military forces are not used openly, in plain view; they are employed in subversive actions never assumed. The aggressor actors deny vehemently these types of actions. After analyzing this type of warfare, the conclusion was that strategic goals cannot be achieved without the use of economic instruments. When I bring into discussion these types of instruments, I am actually thinking about the energetic blackmail and pressure put on the state actor targeted by aggression and access obstruction to loans from international markets. These actions are meant to incapacitate the actor assaulted to fulfill international economic and financial obligations concluded with economic and financial international institutions. It induces the idea, in the international public opinion, that it is an entity that fails to meet its obligations.

Petri Huovinen said about the hybrid warfare that it is “a cocktail of conventional military capabilities, insurgency, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, organized crime, cyber warfare and advanced military technology”. Under current conditions, we might say that this definition of hybrid warfare is insufficient. Actually, in addition to the simultaneous employment and combined conventional and unconventional means, there are other political, diplomatic, information, economic, social instruments used for conducting operations in order to attain political-military strategic goals. This type of war is claimed both by the conventional capabilities and by unconventional capabilities such as those that support terrorist activities or organized crime.

When confronted to this type of warfare no state is able to fight alone and for this reason NATO and EU organizations have an important role in creating the necessary means of fighting this kind of war.

As it is known, the destabilizing actions in the eastern neighborhood are challenges for both organizations because of regional instability. This instability can generate negative phenomena like the migration of population affected by the conflict and organized crime. On long term, these phenomena damage the potential of economic development.

For the Euro-Atlantic space, inter-ethnic tensions and imbalances between some regions may lead to the outbreak of conflicts that could destabilize the region. The energy blackmail performed by certain states or non-state actors affects this area to assure a sufficient level of energy security. “A constant and reliable energy supply, a diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources and the interconnectivity of energy networks are still critical.”

Hostile state and non-state actors can launch cyber-attacks on information infrastructures. These infrastructures have strategic importance and may affect the Euro-Atlantic security. As James R Clapper, Director of National Intelligence of the US said, “Different cyber actors have different capabilities and different goals when initiating and leading an operation in cyberspace. Russia for instance has a wide range of information and technical capabilities and highly sophisticated human resources. The attention of Moscow is focused beyond obtaining some advantage in exploiting vulnerabilities and common information

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5 Petri Huovinen, op.cit., p.3.


that can be solved by using an appropriate software package. What we need to remember is that in the event of a military conflict or geo-political crisis between Russia and US, some of critical infrastructures and networks of primary importance for United States would be in danger".8

Global terrorism remains the biggest threat because it involves fundamentalist religious movements which have complex causes and affect the European principles on tolerance. Fear is the weapon of terrorism that can make a state unable to react. Terrorist actions are taken continually and are difficult to predict and counteract. Fundamentalist propaganda that is propagating more and more in the online environment led to the emergence of new cases of extreme terrorism. We can take as an example the violent attack against the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo magazine which killed 12 people on January 7 2015.

Instability at the eastern border of NATO and the EU can lead to the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their carrier vector. It should not be forgotten that trafficking products with dual functionality – civilian and military – is a major risk to security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Changes in the international security environment have led to a changed perception of the people regarding security. From this point of view, states have been forced to change their policies and security strategies because they are no longer seen by the public opinion only as a military problem, in which states are concerned with protecting its own citizens, but also as a social problem in which states are compelled to find solutions that lead to prosperity, democratic development and human rights protection. "The issue of access to energy, water sources and food control, and transport corridors security became as important as the defense of society against military aggression or terrorism."9

Taking into consideration all the above, we realize that the two organizations have to find ways to streamline and strengthen institutions of member states and the creation of coalitions to fight against these phenomena. More than ever, these two organizations are compelled to initiate a real cooperation to the interest of all its members.

In the next part of my paper, I will make a brief presentation of the two organizations in order to highlight their importance for the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Also we will highlight the vulnerabilities that we have identified and which can be exploited by hostile state actors or non-state actors.

We will start by making a brief presentation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which has had, since the beginning, the stated aim of standing in defense of freedom and security of its members, by political and military means. In the political field, NATO promotes democratic values and encourages consultations and cooperation in defense and security area in order to build trust and prevent conflicts. In the military field, NATO has the military capacity to intervene when diplomatic efforts have failed on the basis of UN mandates and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty itself or in cooperation with other States or international organizations for crisis management or defense policy. As it is known, NATO is an alliance of countries from Europe and North America that provides the link between these two continents for consultation and cooperation in defense and security area. "It is the

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practical manifestation of collective effort by its members to support their common interests in security issues”. The fundamental principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment to mutual cooperation between the Member States in which the indivisibility of its members is expressed by the fact that no country will be forced to rely on their own forces if security is threatened. This principle does not restrain the right of Member States to promote their own defense strategy because NATO is an intergovernmental organization which respects the right of states to sovereignty and independence.

Throughout its existence, NATO has adapted to changes in the global security environment. We noticed that by analyzing the concepts in time. The Alliance first adopted the concept of collective defense in 1949 and because of following further developments of the global security environment and the emergence of new risks and threats, this concept has changed. We will not list here all the concepts adopted by NATO over time but we will stop to the NATO Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon summit in 2010. It outlined the directions of action of the Alliance for the coming years. The main provisions of this concept refer to the following:

- Member States reaffirm their strong commitment to “defend each other against attacks, including the new threats.” It is clearly stated that NATO remains a nuclear alliance as long as there are nuclear weapons, because nuclear forces provide the ultimate security guarantee, but on the other hand, it undertakes creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.
- Missile defense is one of the central elements of the defense of the alliance’s territory by engaging actively in the cooperation with the Russian Federation and the other partners in this area.
- The Alliance’s vision regarding international security and defense is to strengthen the cooperation between NATO and the interested countries that prepare for membership. It can be achieved through partnerships with third countries. “An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO.” NATO-Russia cooperation is of “strategic importance”.
- NATO will remain engaged in preventing and managing crises threatening to escalate the conflict, in order to “stabilize the post-conflict situation or help in reconstruction.” The lessons learned from the alliance’s past operations "will create a civilian structure for adequate but unassuming crisis management, in order to interact more effectively with civilian partners ".
- Terrorism continues to be a current “direct threat.” This, together with extremism and weapons, drugs and people trafficking can feed conflicts outside of Alliance borders that can threaten its security.
- NATO cyber-attacks represent a serious concern because they can be launched by "armed forces and foreign intelligence services, organized crime networks, terrorist and / or extremist groups.” The concept envisages the development of capabilities necessary to prevent and detect them.
- Protection of energy infrastructure, zones and transit routes is a concern of NATO in the area of energy security.

The XXI Century Alliance reflects the NATO leaders’ determination to reshape the structure of the Alliance in order to meet the challenges of XXI century and maintain its effectiveness as a political-military alliance.

We notice how this alliance is a living organism able to adapt its capabilities to face existing risks and threats and to develop scenarios for possible risks and threats.

“The European Union is a family of European countries that have committed themselves to working together for peace and prosperity.”\(^{11}\) It is organized to operate on the principles of democracy and human rights.

The policy of asserting the European Union as an organization valued internationally was achieved by developing a strategy for European security. To fulfill its missions it created under the Lisbon Treaty the institutional system to enable these goals. Its institutions operate on non-discriminatory grounds (be it sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, disability, age or sexual orientation). The Lisbon Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community came into force on 01.12.2009 and represented the strengthening of the European Union by the will of Member States to build an area without internal frontiers in which security, freedom and justice could prevail.

Even if the EU is composed of 28 member states, the enlargement process is not completed because all European countries can adhere to the values of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

“For peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter”\(^{12}\), the European Union has introduced a new concept called Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which provides the Union with operational capacity drawing on civilian and military means to execute missions outside of their space. This concept includes defining the common defense policy which is based on decisions made by the European Council members in compliance with the states’ legal provisions. The Lisbon Treaty stipulates that Member States shall provide for the objectives of the European Council civilian and military capabilities that could become multinational military forces.

CSDP decisions are made unanimously by the European Council decrees that aim at defending the Union's values and interests. Such decisions are taken at the initiative of a Member State or on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. They specify the capabilities that can be used. They may be national, or made available for the union, or may be entrusted to the group of states that are capable of organizing and performing a mission.

The analysis of the European security environment has highlighted the increasing interdependence of internal and external aspects of security that is based on the awareness of the energy dependence of the European area of the Gulf, Russia and North Africa space and continue with increasing risks and threats such as the aggression of area at EU eastern borders of a neighboring state, regional conflicts or frozen conflict / failed states\(^{13}\). Recognizing these threats the EU has set targets to combat them by implementing international order based on effective multilateralism and neighborhood security. The establishment of


\(^{12}\) Art 28A from Lisbon Treaty.

neighborhood security refers to the fact that the enlargement process should not create separation lines in Europe is itself a signal to countries outside the EU that this process is irreversible. Effective multilateralism is an important topic in the EU. It includes an important theme regarding the development of a strong international community that is based on strong institutions acting under the principles of international law and the UN Charter. These institutions have a primary responsibility in maintaining or restoring international peace.14

In the Romanian language dictionary the notion of vulnerability is defined as something that can be hurt, which can be easily attacked, which has weak or faulty parts.15

“Vulnerabilities are consequences of dysfunctions or systemic weaknesses that can be exploited or contribute to a threat or a risk.”16

State instability in some parts of the world and regional conflicts in the immediate vicinity (Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus and Transnistria, Ukraine) had the effect of strengthening the position of organized crime that ended in the European space in different forms of violence, extremism leading to loss of lives and threatening the fundamental rights and freedoms of vulnerable ethnic minorities and, at the same time, damaging state infrastructure. This situation has led Euro-Atlantic territory to an increase of organized crime exemplified here by drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal immigration and illegal trafficking of small weapons, etc. The effect of these events was to limit the ability of both organizations to promote its foreign policy beyond their borders because they were forced to allocate additional resources and capabilities to manage internal phenomena.

European Union institutions and NATO capacity to evaluate and diminish the risks and threats are limited by the persistence of some vulnerabilities in the national governments regarding the EU funds absorption. In this respect, Romania has the lowest absorption rate. It is 20% lower than the EU average that is 76%. The causes that led to this state of facts are “hyper-bureaucracy, the dense bureaucratic procedures for accessing European funds and changing the rules of the game during the game,” said Agela Filote, European Commission Representative in Romania.

The inefficient use of public funds and unrestricted use of energy can be vulnerabilities. The lack of involvement of some national governments in securing and developing their critical infrastructure because of the lack of real multiannual planning budgets have negative effects on defense capabilities in these states creating further vulnerabilities in these two organizations.

The failure to respect the commitments related to military spending by some member states of the North Atlantic Alliance is a vulnerability that can be exploited by state actors or non-state aggressors due to insufficient response capabilities in the face of threats. At the last summit in September 2014 NATO leaders have pledged to increase military spending until they reach 2% of gross domestic product (GDP). They were worried about the attitude of Russia towards Ukraine. However, a European Leadership Network study showed that not all Member States have increased the defense budget. According to the study, six countries (UK, Germany, Canada, Italy, Hungary and Italy) have reduced their defense budgets.17 It is worrying that the UK and Germany are the largest contributors to the Alliance's budget after the United States.

Hostile forces can exploit the vulnerabilities arising as a result of exposure to insufficient response capabilities in the face of threats. At the last summit in September 2014 NATO leaders have pledged to increase military spending until they reach 2% of gross domestic product (GDP). They were worried about the attitude of Russia towards Ukraine. However, a European Leadership Network study showed that not all Member States have increased the defense budget. According to the study, six countries (UK, Germany, Canada, Italy, Hungary and Italy) have reduced their defense budgets.17 It is worrying that the UK and Germany are the largest contributors to the Alliance's budget after the United States.

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14 Idem., p. 35.
15 https://dexonline.ro/definitie/vulnerabil
Decisions in NATO Member States, February 2015, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-
underfunding the scientific research and the lack of sustainable agricultural policies implemented throughout the European area. Scientific research can be the engine of economy and for the European Union it has a major importance.

On the other hand, corruption generates severe problems in the economies of Member States and affects the potential development creating because of this reason vulnerabilities in both organizations. This has long-term negative effects on the legal system, the health system, and the education system, in other words on systems that can ensure a development based on competitiveness and respect for values. Corruption is seen as a vulnerability to the Romanian state and this is stipulated in the Country's defense strategy for 2015-2019 period which states that corruption is responsible for generating state vulnerability affecting the economy in this way, harming the country's development potential, good governance, decision for the benefit of citizens and communities, as well as trust in the judiciary and state institutions.

Another vulnerability is the inability of the European Union and local administrations of the Member States to implement public policies developed by the European institutions involved in these tasks. The negative effects in certain areas can lead to increasing poverty due to lack of employment and hence the rise in unemployment. This phenomenon has a domino effect. It may cause the phenomena of stigmatization and discrimination of a part of the population that can be combined with a massive migration from those areas to other richer areas. Weakening from inside the power of the European Union because of these challenges will affect on long term the capacity of the organization to give an effective response to external challenges due to globalization and changes over the border.

The emergence of various crises has demonstrated the inability of member states of both organizations to consistently manage new types of risks and threats and to ensure the necessary resources. This inability of Member States have a big impact in Euro-Atlantic area in case of asymmetric or hybrid threats. Financial problems faced by Union due to the global financial crisis were felt directly in its capacity to become a global security actor. Without financial discipline, EU Member States cannot become global players in the security area. The Greek problem cannot be overlooked. The irrational use of funds and indebtedness of some European countries are vulnerabilities for the entire region and hostile state or non-state actors can exploit them. These states in difficulty can easily slip down the slope of populism and xenophobia creating domestic instability or worse outbreaks of ethnic conflicts within the Euro-Atlantic area.

In conclusion, I can say that "Europe must be prepared to assume responsibility for its part in the international security and to build a better world". The European leaders have the responsibility to diminish de vulnerabilities in European space despite the risks and threats. This can be achieved only through union efforts in promoting a unique Common Security and Defense Policy. It was noted that the instruments available to the two organizations for conflict prevention, rationalization of resources and combating non-military risks do not guarantee the needed security and prosperity of its members.

Ensuring the security of European areas cannot be performed without granting necessary funds. Each European citizen must be aware that security costs but that its benefits are seen in the high standard of living that the two organizations have ensured for their members through the policies implemented. Vulnerabilities can be eliminated by unity of will of European


leaders. They can implement policies in order to provide the necessary funds for these two organizations and for each individual Member State. Constructive cooperation between states provides benefits for the whole area. The fight against corruption in each Member State eliminates one of the most dangerous vulnerabilities and provides Member States with the potential of development capable to ensure the necessary security in the European area.

We should not forget the sayings of Fraser Cameron, referring to the draft of European Security Strategy: "the EU is an actor whose influence on the international stage is growing and who must assume more responsibilities for its own security but also for regional and global security... and external relations should be directed to prioritize over the EU's immediate vicinity."20

We notice that the EU is bound to become – in cooperation with North Atlantic Alliance – a global actor in security field and to maintain the winning role as a global player in the economic, commercial, and financial fields. This can be achieved by promoting a Common Security and Defense Policy and through developing effective defense capabilities needed both in order to reduce vulnerabilities in their own space and to keep under control all the hot spots around the globe.

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20 Fraser Cameron, Towards an EU strategic concept, in Romanian Journal of European Affairs, vol. 3 no. 3, Institutul European din România, București, 2003 pp. 20-34, Fraser Cameron is Studies Director in European Political Centre (EPC) Bruxelles.
CONCEPTUAL DELIMITATIONS REGARDING OF CAPABILITY NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE MILITARY EFFORT TO COUNTER HYBRID WAR ACTION

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Abstract: NATO and UE organisations have the most important role to create military response to the threat of hybrid warfare. Members of these organisations must to ensure the necessary funds for the new military structures more adaptable at these threats.

Keywords: hybrid war, European Union, NATO, concept.

In the new context of security, the European space is threatened by conflicts which have taking place near its borders. In this context is imperative the process of transformation and adaptation the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Romania as a member of this two organizations should have an active role in field of security because he has experience in managing the Middle Eastern problems. This experience comes from its geographical position in which Western, Eastern and Balkan influences have been managed for a long periods with great diplomacy. This article is an short analysis of the measures that have been taken by policymakers of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance to counter the effects of hybrid war actions that threatens European and Euro-Atlantic space. Also its aim is to identify the concepts that can be developed to counter these threats by creating the response capabilities and command structures.

We notice how the interdependence of the European countries with the other countries in the world in cultural and economic field has made today, all humanity to be found in one social system. In these days we see how the Syrian war which started in 2011, has greatly influenced European states. This influence was on the one hand in terms of economic development but also in terms of social stability. International security context, advertise developed countries to make an immediate intervention in order to stop the export of instability from “fragile societies” and “weak states”. This intervention is required because in future this instability could become unmanageable.

Even if the last decade ensured the European continent a period of peace which enabled a sustained economic development the conflicts in the neighborhood have highlighted the needs to create new military capabilities or to adapt existing ones to these new realities. The conflict in Ukraine has changed the paradigm which said that an armed conflict in the European area is impossible. It is shown that Europe still has unresolved problems because of the expansionist state actors who remain tributary to Cold War mentality.

We know that in this moment, NATO is the center of European military security and the EU through its resources should be the most important partner that have the capacity to work in benefits of the Euro-Atlantic community. The fundamental principle that guide the North Atlantic Alliance is the mutual cooperation between Member States which are based on the indivisibility and security of its members.

Since its establishment NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) had
to protect the freedoms and security of its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949 in Washington. To strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and its neighborhood, NATO needs military capabilities that enable to engage actively in crisis management and conflict prevention but in the same time promotes partnership and cooperation with other international actors. All these actions were made in compliance with the UN Charter recognized as the basic document within which took place any military activities. Article 1 of the UN Charter clearly states that the UN has the lead role to “maintain international peace and security”.

We note that the North Atlantic Treaty was founded based on the UN Charter principles that underline the fundamental importance of widespread consultation process entry states regarding at decisions in field of security. We observe how these principles are respected within the Alliance because NATO is an intergovernmental organization of democratic nations, in which "civilians decide and the military executes." In the European Union nearly 94% of its population are citizens of NATO member states. More specifically, from the 28 NATO member states, 22 states are members of the EU and Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership and a longtime NATO member.

A strong partnership between NATO and the European Union can multiply the effects of policies and actions. This partnership could reduce the security risks in the Euro-Atlantic area. The relations between NATO and the European Union began in 2001 at institutional level but this thing is built step by step since the 1990s when it was promoted the European responsibility in defense issues¹.

NATO strategic concept makes clear that an important role in the Euro-Atlantic security has the European Union. From this point of view both organizations can complement each other in developing actions in the area of security and peace. In this regard, starting from 2009, when was signed the Treaty of Lisbon which founded the European Union set, that the two organizations have to join theirs efforts to ensure greater transparency and independence of composing institutions. It also started a cooperation in crisis management who start from preparation of Joint Action Plans for mutual assistance in theater. To develop the concept of "Comprehensive Approach" in operational and crisis management it needs a common approach from these two organisations in the military and civilian area in this context of austerity which affects all Member States. This cooperation is also important in terms of civil and military capability development because avoid duplication and use resources in efficiently mode by the two organizations. Our country has argued since the beginning that a strong partnership between this two organizations have a beneficial effect. As an example is the cooperation between this two organizations in the Balkans and Afghanistan and the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa that demonstrated the indispensable partnerships for this two organizations in strengthening Euro-Atlantic and international security².

The partnership between the two organizations was based on political principles enshrined in the Declaration NATO-EU of 16 December 2002 on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The principles are: mutual consultations, respect for equality, decision-making autonomy and interests of Member States, the development of coherent and transparent, in the spirit of


mutual support military capabilities\textsuperscript{3}. Package "Berlin Plus" from 2003, has operationalized the principles laid down in 2002. This cooperation for the two organizations was established in crisis management field. The declaration stipulated that if NATO decides not to engage in a certain operation, the European Union can do this. NATO will supply it with its own resources and capabilities and supports the arrangements order and assist in operational planning.

Today the EU is one of the largest economic, commercial and financial powers in the world and this can not be overlooked by state and non-state actors who find themselves required to compete on principles of market economy. European area ensure for their citizens a sustainable development and an increase of living standards. These things creates around of the european area a restlessness and frustration that can affect the regional and internal security. This situation requires the EU to become a force that acts globally to promote stability and security through a effectively Common Security and Defence Policy. EU has to develop his defense capabilities in order to defend himself against new types of risks and threats that the more dangerous because are asymmetric or hybrid.

The two organizations had to act in consequences at the appearance, on the eastern border of NATO and EU, a different conflit than conventional one. This type of conflict was named hybrid war. So, at the NATO Summit in Wales that took place from 4 to 5 September, 2014, the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting adopted a joint declaration where appeared the notion of hybrid war. We reproduce below an excerpt from this statement "We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges of the threat of hybrid war, which involves the use of a wide range of military action, paramilitary and civilian, open and covert, in architecture with a high degree of integration. Alliance is essential to have tools and procedures needed to deter war and respond effectively to hybrid threats and strengthening the capabilities of national forces \textsuperscript{4}."

This notion of hybrid war is not new for the connoisseurs. It has been used by military experts when they analyzed the Hezbollah actions against Israel Defense Forces (IDF), in Lebanon war that took place in 2006. In this regard the experts have observed that Hezbollah organization has used in the conflict the paramilitaries groups that they had at their disposal. The groups had success against the regular Israeli army, well-equipped and trained countering the fighting strength of the Israeli. Hezbollah organization used conventional and unconventional actions that afford to multiply their combat power.

Until now is not an universally definition of concept of hybrid war, accepted from specialists. In his book “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars”\textsuperscript{5} appeared in 2007, Frank Hoffman\textsuperscript{5} analyzed the concept of war hybrid based on the concept of combined war. He is the biggest supporter of this concept showing that it involves “a high level of strategic coordination between actions of irregular and regular forces”\textsuperscript{6}. American military specialists have tried to define that concept in “Training Circular 7-100, Hybrid Threat” as “a diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces,

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\textsuperscript{3} Idem.
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\textsuperscript{5} Frank Hoffman, cercetător in cadrul Centrului pentru Cercetări Strategice de la Universitatea Națională de Apărare (UNAp), S.U.A.
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\textsuperscript{6} Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, National Defence University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington DC, 2009, p. 3.
\end{flushright}
irregular forces and / or criminal elements, acting together for the same purpose”. NATO military experts were made since 2010 references to the concept of hybrid war. They warned that the threats which the Alliance may face will be hybrid. They understand by this threat any actual or potential adversary state or a terrorist state that have the demonstrated or probable ability to use simultaneously conventional and unconventional means that are adapted to fulfill the objectives.

SHAPE Commander, General Philip Breetlove, said at the Security Forum held in Brussels in 2015, that the hybrid warfare or unconventional warfare is a collection of tools having its acronym in military language as "DIME" that represent Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economic what they have been used in the preceding wars. The novelty and therefore the danger comes from way how these tools are used to meet certain predetermined targets.

We notice that the hybrid warfare is more than “a cocktail of conventional military capabilities, insurgency, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, organized crime, cyber warfare and advanced military technology” as Petri Huovinen said. It involves the simultaneous employment and combined conventional and unconventional means of conducting operations simultaneously with the use of political, diplomatic, informational, economic, social, for political-military strategic goals.

When we referring to the military capabilities that support this type of war they can be classical (conventional) and unconventional which are manifested by terrorist or organized crime combined with actions in diplomatic, informational and economic field. Characteristic of this war is that it is not declared alloing the use of political and diplomatic maneuver. In this way war laws can not be applied because this form of conflict does not exist in these provisions.

Naturally, the question that arises is what can be done to counter hybrid war actions in the Euro-Atlantic area?

The answer can be found in the actions that will take this two organizations in order to reorganize their own structures or setting up new ones to be more slender and with a capacity to anticipate and respond much faster.

As if anticipating a multiplication of risks and threats at their security, the European Union has taken action since 2010 through the development and approval of the Internal Security Strategy. In this respect were taken internal measures in order to dismantling the networks of organized crime by creating legal instruments that prevent the financing of these networks and protect savings accounts against criminal activities.

Although the fight against terrorism has fired since 2001 this scourge could not be eradicated completely witness is the attack against the seat of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo on January 7 this year in which 12 people were killed. Steps have been taken to protect the road, railway, sea and air because that infrastructure is very important.

The clashes were moved from the battlefield in cyberspace and in this respect were created capabilities designed to increase the level of security for its own citizens and companies. In member countries have taken further steps to strengthen the capacity of law enforcement and the judiciary cybercrime. It works to create integrated capabilities at EU level to manage the informal incidents and Warning networking as EU Computer

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9 Petri Huovinen, op.cit., p.3.
Emergency Response type or CERT Alert System (EISAS).

Events in the EU's southern border, where tens of thousands of refugees seeking asylum in EU countries requires a different approach to border management and migration policies in order to reduce illegal migration. Those events has the potential to create social instability in European space.

On the other hand though North Atlantic Alliance has promoted since the 90s a policy of partnership and openness to old Cold War rivals this things was not enough to deter hybrid actions in the vicinity of its borders launched by state actors remained Soviet rhetoric. In this context Alliance has adopted decisions regarding to common defense of all its members, through rehabilitation of operations including Afghanistan operation, approval and implementation of NATO Action Plan to increase reaction. This plan enables better collective defense of NATO against Russian challenges, risks and threats that comes from the Middle East and North Africa.

Immediate measures that were taken included a continuing military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both land, sea and air on the rotation basis. These measures were meant to deter not to limit at these measures because they are not sufficient to ensure an effective response due to growing risks and threats at this space. For this purpose, Alliance created new Components adapted to the new conditions and fully capable of meeting the security challenges.

It increased NATO response force (NRF) by developing force packages capable of countering these threats. This force packages consists of ground military structures, special operations structures, aviation and marine forces. They will comprises a total of 40,000 troops that can carry out tasks in all environments and represents a substantial increase from 13,000 soldiers as they were in September 2014. In the Summit of Wales was also established that will create Multinational Force Group with a very high level of response (VHRJTF). That force could be deployed within 48 hours anywhere in the NATO member states territory. It depending of the emergence of challenges. This force already has about 5,000 troops ready to intervene. Over 2,100 soldiers belonging Reaction Force with a very high level and other troops from 9 Member States have participated in June 2015 for the first time in the military exercises "Noble Jump" which took place in Poland.

Since September 2014, NATO has

Figure 1
Source: https://civitaspoliticsblog.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/11087797_537562226383032_3407000525491876536_o.jpg, accessed: 09/19/2015

potential attackers against the Euro-Atlantic area. Euro-Atlantic Alliance has increased the number of military exercises. These types of activities is the opportunity
for Member States to improve their ability to work together and to demonstrate that they are able to respond to potential threats. These exercises are conducted using scenarios in which they want to test how do states act at the activation of Article 5 (collective defense) and at crisis management. For example, in this fall will take place the military exercise "Trident juncture in 2015" that have a great visibility for NATO because at this exercise will participate a brigade from VHRJTF and about 30,000 soldiers from Italy, Portugal and Spain.

To facilitate very fast deployment of Forces with the very high level of response have been set up and are in operation from 3 September 2015, in Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia Bulgaria and Romania six NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) headquarters.

With the support of Denmark, Germany and Poland it will establish Multinational Corps Northeast Command, which will have the capability to lead the forces deployed in the Baltic States and Poland and to achieve regional cooperation with other structures. In this context Romania has decided to operationalize the command of Multinational Southeast Division. We notice how NATO military structures adapt itself quickly to changes in the current security environment.

All these changes that are taking place within NATO structures can not be sustainable without adequate logistical support. In this respect it welcomed the establishment of new elements of logistics and pre-positioning of equipment and materials types. That things have the effect of multiplying the power of NATO forces to fight against all types of threats. All NATO Logistics Command Structure is recognized as a power generator. Logistics structures will be led by Joint Logistic Command Group. It will operate under central NATO command structure.

The decisional factors realised that the Euro-Atlantic area is confronted with dangers. In this regard they decided to increase the defense budgets of member states. This facilitates the growth of capabilities that the Alliance needs with the help of the European and American defense industry. Giving 2% of GDP on defense enables Member States to ensure at least 20% of these funds to purchase important equipment and to start programs of research and development. The benefits of 2% from GDP for defense will be seen more than 10 years by providing capabilities needed for each military forces of states to deploy and sustain itself and in their ability to work together based on NATO standards and doctrines.

We know very well that no nation except the USA can not have all the capabilities to be able to defend itself. That is the reason of Nations-Framework Concept that was developed by NATO. This concept encourages the groups of Member States to work together to develop joint forces and consistent capabilities that are necessary in Europe. That is possible by taking the nation's leading nation status. Through this cooperation, the European Allies demonstrate their commitment resolving their own security and in the same time reducing the footprint of US capabilities in european area. At present Germany as framework nation along with nine other states develop this concept for implementation of multinational priority project required for Alliance. This project aims to create capabilities in the areas of logistics support, protection of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, execution of ground fire, air and sea as well as mobile headquarters.

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Britain as a nation framework along with six other members have embraced this concept and decided to create Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) able to rapidly deploy and conduct high intensity missions in all spectrum of operations. The operationalization of this structure will facilitate efficient deployment of existing capacities and military units in training.

Another group, has Italy as framework nation and other five countries. They want to improve capabilities in areas such as stabilization and reconstruction, provision of facilities, improving the use of land formations and command and control.

Another concept that has gained value thanks to the experience gained in various operations is Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) which aims to create a broader program of exercises from 2016 and a deployable headquarters for Special Command Component Operations. As a key component in achieving NATO Forces 2020, CFI take into consideration a whole range of missions and to fulfill this purpose it facilitate multinational and multiweapons training. These actions are aimed at interoperability achieving by leveraging technology advances. The Federal Interconnection Mission Framework is an example how Alliance share information between its members and with partners in order to support training exercises and operations.

I conclude by saying that this two organizations are practically obliged to work closely to block hybrid threats in the European and Euro-Atlantic space. Also they have to ensure that initiatives of Smart Defence and Pooling and Sharing are complementary and are directed towards building needed capacity to ensure capacity effective response. We know that the financial resources will be never sufficient to ensure to every state the response capabilities in case of threats. In this regard duplication in purchasing capabilities will maximize power efficiency of costs. Therefore, effective cooperation in the fields of strategic transport and refueling in flight, medical support, maritime surveillance, satellite communications and in the sphere remotely piloted aerial systems have multiplier effects at reasonable costs. The efforts of the two organizations can materialize in a joint endowment concept, fluent and effective as long as there is transparency and openness between them.

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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO STRUCTURES IN ROMANIA – GUARANTEE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

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Abstract: Concerned with preventing and countering of new threats to global security and ensuring the protection for eastern European countries, NATO decided to significantly increase its force response by configuring and setting up structures with very high combat readiness and creating headquarters, close to its eastern flank, including Romania. These are designed to integrate and lead these operational forces, properly equipped and trained, capable of being deployed in just a few days, at short notice.

Keyword: NATO, NFIU, VJTF, deployable, reaction, readiness.

Which are the reasons for increasing the NATO's reaction speed?

The unilateral annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, in April 2014 and events in Ukraine that started in the same year generated a serious crisis between West and Moscow. As a result of Russia’s provocative rhetoric, of undermining European neighbors by spreading misinformation, by financing some anti-Semitic political parties, the corruption exploitation and utilization of the hybrid war’s tactics and procedures, all these being supported by an aggressive propaganda machine supervised by the state, the alliance between Europe and the United States of America, as well as the one from European Union and NATO have been subjected to the largest test from the end of the Cold War.1

It is no longer a secret that Moscow longs the extensive ground territories of the former USSR, and that is the reason of becoming so aggressive and unpredictable, especially reported to NATO. We must not overlook that, in the vision of Russian military doctrine, NATO represents a threat.2 Also, the Russian Federation did not hesitate to defend their interests, using even military means in its areas of influence, situated outside the current borders.3 Currently, Russia maintains at the Eastern border of Ukraine a concentration of troops meaning over 53,000 troops, in 50 battalions,4 which marked the possibility of starting at any time a military offensive to the west. Moscow continues to be accused of being behind the pro-Russian separatists in Donbas region, and by carrying out extensive military exercises in the territory of Abkhazia, continues to violate the international law.

Even if it seems that there can be no question about a new cold war between the two super-states, the relationship between NATO and Russia is “at the lowest point of the last few decades” as a


result of the conflict that it has carried out for more than a year in Ukraine. These actions have led to some major decisions regarding NATO, for consolidation of “collective defense”, by strengthening military troops on the eastern borders, in order to formulate a decisive response. If the European Union advocates for the application of economic sanctions on Moscow, for failure of complying with the Minsk’s agreements regarding the ceasefire, NATO, as a political-military alliance has to adopt certain measures of re-insurance its eastern flank, through the establishment and operationalization of military force with a very fast response, but also the command-and-control structures, that are able to integrate the Alliance forces in order to preserve the inviolability of allies borders.

**The adaptation of NATO response capacity to the security environment changes**

NATO officials consider that when the world evolves, the security environment changes, requiring adjustments also for the Alliance, both in force structure as well as in actions or in the responsiveness, for an “essential adaptation” to the new security environment.

When the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, launched in 2002, his conception that NATO should establish a joint, robust military force, tailored as a brigade, highly trained and capable of rapid deployment, called NRF, the initiative was regarded with caution, especially among European allies, generated by the visible technological gaps at the level of military capabilities, noticeable in the conflicts carried out in those years, in the Balkans. However, in order to achieve interoperability, it was considered that the troops who should be rotated in NRF must benefit from an ample retrofitting and upgrading process in order to increase their combat capabilities. Obviously, the Pentagon proposal aimed at the Eastern European Allies.

One of NATO general secretaries, Lord George Robertson, during his mandate, noted that not only technological equipment and capabilities that belong to these troops are sufficient, but the speed of actions is essential for these types of expeditionary forces. According to an analysis made by him at the time, excluding the United States, having 1.4 million active soldiers and 1 million in reserve, all together, the 18 NATO Member States are able to engage into multinational military operations only 55,000 people, representing 3.9 percentage. It was necessary therefore to increase both the number of forces and the speed of reaction. Created as an USA initiative, after the Prague summit, in 2002, the NATO's Response Force (NRF) is a multinational one, common, expeditionary, well trained and equipped with land, air, navy and special operations components, capable of rapidly reacting to a wide range of security challenges, from crisis management to actions of collective defense and even education and training, through participation in a wide range of exercises, some of them at the Alliance level.

Even if it is a permanently available force, with rotating troops, the decision concerning the mobilization is taken by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), as the NATO highest political decision forum, and with the overall command exerted by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), currently, NRF is not fully deployable in less than a month.

Although the weak point of a

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8 Ibidem.
10 *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 52, issue 6, 11 February 2015, p. 5.
collective security system is the fact that its members' interests are not always identical, they are rather willing to inaction than to collective actions. In this particular situation, faced with these threats, NATO member countries have proved solidarity and cohesion by a quickly and efficiently adaptation.

The main point of the NATO summit held in Newport, Wales, in September 2014, was to take rapid measures capable of efficiently respond to the new threats represented by the hybrid fighting, tactics that the Russian Federation applies in Ukraine. Although in that situation could not be invoked the NATO Treaty Article 5, the Baltic States and those from Eastern Europe, feeling threatened by Russian foreign policy, requested that NATO should play a more preventive and active role in defending their territory. The official document approved during summit, called NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP), came to respond to this concern expressed by the allies. In order to apply comprehensive and coherent measures, for responding to recent changes in the contemporary security environment in the vicinity of NATO eastern borders, expressed by the declaration summit, the defense ministers of the Member States were charged to follow the RAP implementation, as a proof of the fact that the Alliance is in a position to decisively meet any challenge.

Subsequently, at the Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers held in Brussels, on 5 February 2015, it was agreed further steps of re-insuring the eastern flank of the Alliance, by increasing the NRF reaction capacity. This was reflected by the establishment of Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) - a "spearhead" consisting of 5,000 soldiers of reaction force, and increasing the number of NRF from 13,000 to 30,000 troops, all these because, as noted the NATO's secretary general, by carrying out the decisions that have been taken “we ensure that we have the right forces, in the right place, at the right time”. Also, in the context of this meeting, it was decided to create six NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU), in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, vital for preparing the infrastructure, in logistic support, planning of training and in entering VJTF and NRF into a possible theater of operations. In the same context, NATO officials appreciated Romania's intention to set up and host a multinational division headquarters, as a counterbalance of Multinational Corps Northeast headquarters, located in Szczecin, Poland.

“Our security is not at the appropriate level [...] and the measures taken by Europe in face of the threats of Russia and Islamic State are embarrassingly ineffective”, said the NATO Military Committee Chairman, General Peter Paul, during the conference on topics of security, held in Prague, at the end of May, 2015. And in the same context, the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg noted that "so we are at a turning-point for Euro-Atlantic security. We face rising challenges. The very fabric of our security order is at stake. And we must be prepared for the long haul". To strengthen the ability of responding to the entire spectrum of security threats, for offering stability in the region, NATO goes through a continuous process of adaptation to the new geopolitical realities,

particularly those in the immediate vicinity of eastern and southern flanks.

Also, in his attempt to renew the commitment to the collective defense, NATO has started a series of exercises at the alliance level, having as strategic objectives:

- the common training of its troops, in order to counteract the new military challenges, in particular hybrid techniques, practiced by certain states in the last few years;
- to send messages that the Alliance is prepared, politically and militarily, to fulfill its obligations concerning the protection of the Member States, including those from the Baltic region;
- to send a firm message to the Eastern Europe member countries, according to which the Alliance is in a position to act at any time to defend them against new types of threats.

On the other hand, Russian officials, leaders of the defense committees of the two chambers of Duma have warned that armed forces of the Russian Federation shall remain in alert, as a reaction to these exercises, carried out in the vicinity of NATO's eastern border. Thus, Konstantin Kosaciov, head of the defense committee in the upper Chamber of Russian Parliament, considers that the exercises recently carried out on a large scale by NATO undermines the European security rather than consolidate it, and that "it is an equivalent to cover operations or a support to the Kiev's new adventure" 19.

It should be noted that a number of non-NATO countries, like Sweden or Finland, attended to these common exercises. These are countries where there has not been yet a majority support among the population to join the Alliance 20, but who feel threatened by some state's foreign policy, which continues to rise tensions in the region, including the violation of neighbors' airspace.

**Romania's effort to implement the NATO's decisions**

Romania as a NATO member wishes to be an important component of the Alliance, sharing a common destiny with this, within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic community values 21. Even if a large part of Romania's programmatic documents in the defense and security fields are not yet adapted to the new types of threats such as hybrid or cybernetic war, they are currently subject of a new development process. However, the Romanian National Defense Strategy, adopted in July 2015, for the next five years, stipulates both the active participation of our country in the NATO collective defense, as well as the implementation of the solidarity and mutual assistance clause for solidarity and mutual assistance are important 22. So, the document comes to clarify that, in addition to installing in Romania some components of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, our country shall make available to the Alliance the infrastructure and a part of the staff for two NATO structures' headquarters that shall be established here. According with the above mentioned strategy, developing own capabilities for countering the asymmetric threats, the intensification and strengthening of regional cooperation with the neighboring countries and with those of NATO's eastern flank, become national objectives.

Beside the elaboration of the National Defense Strategy 2015-2019, there have been issued two other

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20. Ulrich Kühn's remark, NATO-Russia relations expert, Institute for Peace Studies and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, told DeutscheWelleonhttp://www.dw.de/a-signal-to-russia-ulrich-k%C3%BChn-on-natos-exercises-in-
documents in order to create the legal framework for implementing and operationalizing of two NATO structures, in Romania. The first one is the Parliament Decision no. 32/2015 for the approval of establish on the Romanian territory the NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) and the Multinational Division South-East Headquarters (MND-SE HQ). This was adopted by the Chamber of Deputies and by Senate in a joint session, on 23th June 2015. The document stipulates the legal framework regarding the establishment and functioning of the two new headquarters, located in Bucharest. In this way, the Romanian Ministry of Defense, the allies, and military authorities of NATO set up measures for the organization, manning, management and host nation support, in order to assure their functioning and accomplishment of missions. According to this decision, the two headquarters can be deployed to conduct missions outside the Romanian territory, only on order of NATO appropriate authorities\(^{23}\).

The second normative act is Law no. 189/2015 for changing and completing the Law no. 291/2007 relating to the entrance, stationing, carrying out of operations or transit of foreign armed forces through the Romanian territory\(^{24}\). As a novelty element, among others, the document stipulates aspects regarding the setting up of military commands and pre-positioning\(^{25}\) of military goods from other armed forces in our country, together with the way that Romania may provide to these forces, paid or free, the infrastructural facilities, shooting ranges, materials, combat and military equipment.

Within the extensive training program of the Alliance, Romania has hosted this year a series of multinational exercises, designed to prove the NATO's forces ultra-quick capacity of reaction, in a safe and strong Europe. For the first time in its history, in June 2015, Joint Force Command - Naples tested its ability of command-and-control, by deploying itself in Romania and Bulgaria, during the operative-level exercise "Trident Joust 15", integrating in operation, along with other 1000 NATO troops, one Romanian infantry division headquarters.

**NATO Force Integration Unit**

In order to materialize the obligations that Romania assumed within the North Atlantic Alliance it should also fulfill those relating to insurance of a troops high degree of mobility rapidly deployment, support and redeploy them during the NATO-led operations.

Inaugurated on 2nd July, 2015 and operating at full capacity starting with this autumn, the NATO Force Integration Unit from Romania, the first tangible structure of the Alliance in our country, consists of 42 military personnel, of whom 27 are Romanians, and the other 15 positions are filled in with personnel from the other NATO member states. Designed to coordinate the transit and the integration of the most rapid NRF troops, this headquarters practically do not represent a military base but rather an element of support, although it is set up, somewhat, on a headquarters classical structure.

NFIU has an important role in accelerating the reception of personnel and military equipment, troops staging, onward movement and integration (RSOMI) during the forces' insert in theater of operations and in supporting them subsequently. After the VJTF deployment, in the context of NRF and Follow on Forces (FOF), the cooperation between NFIU and the Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) of Joint Task Force, at theater level, is crucial in achieving the current logistical support.

Where acts, NFIU will work closely with the Host Nation (HN) to

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\(^{23}\) Published in Monitorul Oficial, (Part I) no.450 of 23 June 2015.

\(^{24}\) Published in Monitorul Oficial, (no.4926) July 2015.

\(^{25}\) According to art. 2 lit. i, from the text of the law, pre-positioning means "arrangement of military goods, equipment and materials of equipping foreign armed forces and, where appropriate, presence of service personnel in facilities owned by public authorities in order to prepare and/or performing actions".
identify infrastructure support, logistical and communication networks, hubs and transportation key points, in order to integrate the NATO's most rapid and professional forces into a given region as soon as possible.

Using NFIU, parts of VJTF will be able to enter the theater of operations in just two days, and NATO main forces in maximum seven days. Unlike the doctrine and principles of NRF, through VJTF action not only a shorter reaction time is achieved, but also a higher efficiency of deployable forces, depending on the NFIU performances.

Besides the important role in the rapid deployment of forces in the Alliance's collective defense planning, the six NFIUs set up in the states on the eastern flank of NATO will be important elements of forces training, especially during multinational exercises of the allies.

**Multination Division South-East Headquarters**

The main initial effort will focus on employment vacancies, achieving initial operational capability (IOC) until the Warsaw Summit, in 2016 and personnel training in order to achieve the full operational capacity (FOC), in 2018, when the headquarters must be able to integrate forces and perform missions, anywhere in Southeastern Europe. After IOC, one of the initial tasks of the MND-SE will be the coordination of the two NFIU from Romania and Bulgaria.

Up to next summer, when the NATO Summit is held in Warsaw, and where other important decisions will be taken, regarding the two headquarters, MND-SE must have about 200 Romanian soldiers, and up to 70 officers and NCOs from other NATO member countries. The readiness process of MND-SE is a complex one, defined by NATO, and after the position negotiation process, Alliance countries, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Great Britain, Spain, France, Germany, Poland, Turkey, and last but not least USA have shown their willingness to participate with officers and NCOs in the headquarters' structure.

As host nation for this headquarters, Romania will have to support the majority of the material and budgetary efforts of this establishment. According with the Romanian Ministry of Defense's current estimations, the MND-SE operationalization costs will represent approximately 60 million Euro, but funding will be carried out in the most parts with the Alliance funds.

An important role in the establishment, combat readiness process and operation of both MND-SE and NFIU will be played by the staff selection activities, the motivation and training methods. Behavior and thinking style of an organization's members are key elements in conducting a successful change and its subsequent functioning. An important criterium for a multinational organization is represented by the English knowledge, but other relevant factors in the selection process of the Romanian staff will most likely be their experience in working in an international environment, their recent participation in theaters of operations, the fulfillment of the job descriptions criteria, and the graduation of courses and training abroad. The meeting of all these cumulative criteria, an efficient management, appropriate military training and courses for each microstructure, carried out under JFC Naples coordination, as higher, will generate a strong and professional structure capable of achieving its objectives.

Although this headquarters will be established in former units of the Romanian Army, the criteria, requirements and NATO standards regarding their

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reconfiguration and functionality, the physical protection, the installation and protection of computer systems with a high level of classified information, the achievement of interoperability with other NATO communications systems impose serious physical and financial efforts, in a relatively short term.

Conclusions

Nowadays, for NATO is a fact that the hypothetical enemy is less stereotypic and increasingly unpredictable in its actions, evolving and becoming more and more able in applying new methods of triggering and carrying out a potential war. Neither for NATO, nor for each of its members, the existence of a potential adversary, powerful and innovative, is not new, but the approach from a "hybrid perspective" of social phenomena associated, obliges both Alliance and the other international security structures to prepare and train for a range of challenges, which require the completion of capabilities that have not been taken into consideration so far.

Romania, as a member of NATO, does not consider threaten by a certain military aggression from a particular state, but the fact that Russian Federation included the Ballistic Missile Defense elements from our country, as potential threats in their spectrum of security, which was expressed in the Russian military doctrine, issued in 2014, as well as the hybrid actions carried out in the Eastern Ukraine, determines the Bucharest authorities to consider appropriate that a firm decision taken by the Alliance, this including the presence of command and control structures on the Romanian territory.

It is obvious that by creating VJTF, NATO do not intend to interfere in any way in the current crisis in Ukraine or anywhere else, in current conflicts in the world. But creating and improving these forces, as well as the headquarters established both on the Romanian territory as well as in other East European states may have a deterrent effect, in case of any aggression against NATO territory. And these measures are taken in accordance with the conditions stipulated in the agreement that Russia and NATO signed in 1997, which does not allow the establishment of NATO permanent military bases in Eastern European countries.

The decision of setting up these NATO headquarters, as well as the large number of large-scale exercises, carried out by the Alliance on the territories of eastern flank countries, may not remain without an echo in Moscow. In the Russian officials’ opinion, the increasing of NATO activity in the vicinity of Russia's western borders does not contribute to restoring confidence in Euro-Atlantic area, and the answer to such actions must be an appropriate one.

The establishment in our country of these new types of NATO structures, together with the Ballistic Missile Defense elements and the infrastructural support for the US armed forces, determines both a certain comfort for Romania and a hostile attitude from Moscow. Therefore, it is necessary to achieve an efficient diplomatic dialogue for clarifying the defensive nature of the actions in which Romania, as a NATO member state, takes part, in this context.

Quite rightly, both in the military and public opinion, a natural question arises- whether it is necessary to set up headquarters in Romania, as long as the potivit commitments, a series of diverse Romanian Army entities, up to brigade level, were evaluated starting with 2005, certified and affirmed as NATO structures or are in process of operationalization. Not to mention the opinions and reactions related to Romania’s element of antiballistic project, installing at Deveselu.

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30 Iulian Martin, Raionament și argumentare în planificarea operaților, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2015, p. 10.

Moreover, the creation of these NATO headquarters required the transformation of other structures and a rigorous selection of personnel for the vacancies. But from the NATO point of view, the establishment and operation of these headquarters, aims presence and a common training in similar conditions with those generated by a potential crisis or conflict in the region, when it should require only subordination and rapid integration of units that Alliance decides to be allocated according to the real situation.

The presence and operation of major NATO structures within our country’s territory, in the current context of global and regional security environment, creates the guarantee that the Alliance is here, ready to defend its borders, to support partners in Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia to become stronger and, on the other hand, provide certainty that the armed forces and the Romanian territory are essential to strengthening security and stability in Southeastern Europe.

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SPORTS DIPLOMACY
2022 QATAR SOFT POWER – THE OPERA BEHIND THE GAME

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Abstract: From ancient times until today, sport competitions have always been a part of a global socio-economic and cultural agenda. From Leonidas of Rhodes to Usain Bolt and from Kyniska of Sparta to Larissa Latynina, the history of sports always had some unwritten celebrities. Since antiquity, behind sports competitions were Greece's elites who met for discussions, establish arrangements and collusions. The celebration of the Olympic Games has set the ground for citizens of Greek cities to gather around the table. Although, during the games, important political matters were a topic of discussion, common military victories were also celebrated, and so political and military alliances were set. Today, a worldwide sports event provides the host state a new kind of soft power by creating an identity, a national and security brand, and strengthening relations with great powers.

Keywords: Soft Power, National Security Strategy, Diplomacy, National Defense Strategy, security brand, economy, cooperation security, terrorist groups, ethnic conflicts.

Moreover when it comes to the venue for one such competition, the Olympics become, every four years, the most important pillar of diplomatic, economic and political agenda. Organising sports competitions generated, in the case of a Greek citadel, an increase in prestige, economical benefits and, most importantly, a great political influence. The importance of the Olympics Games has become progressively visible, animating and boosting the two of neighboring areas, Elis and Pisa, which disputed the control of that certain area and were fighting for organizing the competition1.

This reveals one of the sports features, which transcends the cultural and geographical obstacles, connects and joins world’s population. For these reasons, sport events continue to be used as a means of influence/shape the diplomatic, social and political relations2.

From the Russian leader to the American, from the Congolese president to the Uruguian, the head of states and government representatives have seen in sporting competitions an occasion to make an informal meeting. For this matter, in 2014, at the opening of the Winter Olympics Games in Soci, over 60 heads of state and government representatives attended3, meanwhile the Football World Cup in Brazil was attended by more than 20 world state leaders. The finals of this competition-a brought at the same table the Russian President and German Chancellor, who, during a discrete meeting, talked about the Ukrainian crisis4.

4 Alexei Anishchuk and Kevin Liffey, ”Merkel and Putin meet before World Cup Final” Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/13/uk-
The balance of power at the negotiation table

The fragile balance of power generates a redesign of the regional and international relations architecture, which led the world strategists to be concerned about placing themselves in the more favourable balance pan and repositioning in the new global equation.

With this background in mind and the fact that it is imperative to consolidate a position in the geopolitical quicksand areas, Prince of Qatar needs greater power to guarantee the Gulf’s security. For these reasons, the Arab Emirates aim to become useful and indispensable for the international community, forcing them to seek legitimacy and protection.

Doha authorities have brought into attention the importance of Qatar in the geopolitical environment in order for the international community to acknowledge and act accordingly. “In this crowded global marketplace, most people and organizations don’t have time to learn much about other places. The clichés and stereotypes-positive or negative, true or untrue-fundamentally affect our behavior towards other places and their people and products”.

Last year’s conflicts in the Arab world accounted for Qatar both security risks and geostrategic opportunities. The Qatar actional strategy has included the establishment and operational diplomatic channels to recreate an equidistant and democratic state brand based on gender equality and human rights. Joseph Nye argues that “The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it is up to them at home and abroad), its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”.

The objective of strengthening the soft power in which Qatar lies is changing the stereotype of the “Muslim state in the Middle East” and trying to promote a new culture similar to the Euro-Atlantic values. The new national brand shown by the international media depicts a credible actor engaged in regional crises which has ability to mediate some conflicts that are emerging on the international scene.

One of the alternatives frequently used by the Doha administration to fulfill the aspirations of foreign policy consists in the involvement, both in financial development and organization of sports competitions. Golf and tennis tournaments and Formula 1 racing drew media who has raised international exposure of statelet. The investments in sport were not limited only to their national territory, but also were extended to Europe. Qatar is paying the debts to one of the greatest football clubs in the world, namely Football Club Barcelona and purchasing some shares at Paris Saint-Germain.

Moreover, to define Qatar as a regional center of sporting events, Doha administration hosted the 2006 and 2011 Asian Games, the Arabian Pen Games, and several Asian Cup matches.

The next step in this roadmap for the Arab Emirates is to become the sports center of the world for a month that can attract global glance. After having tried to win the organization of the Olympic Games for 2016 and 2020, Qatar intends to host the 2022 Football Championship, and

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so becoming the first country in the Middle East in charge of this event.  

**Qatar separation from the Middle East**

Qatar sports investments are the human face of its foreign policy. The principle behind Qatar's soft power strategy lies in distancing from the Middle East and repositioning on the world map. By organizing the World Cup Qatar aims to change the Baghdad-Gaza-Doha axis to Paris -Abu Dhabi-Doha. The bridgeheads on the global economic roads (i.e. shares held by the sovereign of Qatar at Harrods department store in London, Royal Savoy Hotel Lausanne, Volkswagen and Porsche, Barclays Bank and Credit Suisse, French publisher Lagardere and many other companies) favored Qatar as choosing organizer of such an event. Simultaneously, football diplomacy allows Qatar to promote at a global level and to attract international investors to strengthen the pillars of society.  

Such an event is intended to measure, to substantiate and to manage the country's reputation and to help building the national brand. Managing such a tournament, under security conditions, will transfer the success to other levels.  

**QATAR – A regional player with global perspective**

Nicknamed “Arab Kissinger”, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar from 1995 to 2013 and owner of one of the greatest economic and political powers in the region, started a high scheme aiming to attract as partners the Great Powers and large multinational companies. Efforts were continued since 2013, when his son bin Hamad Al Thani Tamim has taken over the country.  

In search of a regional and a global identity, Qatar is trying to build and promote the country brand, including restructuring various levels of society. For this purpose, important funds were allocated in education, this area seeing significant progress, edified by raising the literacy rate over 85 percent. Another example is that of giving scholarships to those who wish to study at the University of Qatar in order to attract students from around the world.  

Concerning the religious dimension and being aware of what Islam means for international sporting community, Qatari authorities have been preoccupied with building the image of a Muslim secular state where religion does not have control over politics or sports. The pact, concluded by clergy Sunni Wahhabi with Al Thani, has generated significant changes at social level, and Qatar is presented today as a country without restrictions in which women are free to drive, wear jeans, have the right to participate in political life, have the right to vote and to run for an elected position. By bringing the 2022 football cup in an Arab state, Qatar is trying to achieve the objective of improving the image and reputation of the state and nation. The materialisation of this endeavour involves an economic boost, which can successfully reflect in the development of business tourism, in increased exports of oil and gas, in attracting an investment capital and also in the cheap labor, while enhancing the cultural and political influence in the world.  

Organizing this sporting event involves a wide range of opportunities and risks. The presence of leaders of Western countries, the participation of a significant number of spectators/fans from all over the world and the big companies involved in

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global economic circuits represent some of the greatest opportunities. In the field of challenges and vulnerabilities, there is also included a multitude of global risks and threats arising from the international visibility of sport events amid turmoil in the Middle East.

As a consequence, the organization of a sporting world event under security conditions and without incidents is a top priority for the authorities in Doha. To attract investors and to set itself up as a durable and reliable partner in a region severely tested by history, Qatar has sought to create a stable and secure national environment. As a result, in the past two decades, Qatari leaders have signed several military agreements and have allowed the United States to install the main command center in the Gulf region in 2002 and headquarters during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Knowing for a fact that any security risks can stop the competition, Qatar has played a major role since the beginning of the Arab Spring, both from the perspective of international relations, diplomatic and military and from humanitarian perspective, by managing the flow of refugees: Palestinians Libyan opponents, Syrians and Egyptians.

Qatar has sought, by exploiting diplomatic means, to maintain a balance between the interests of great powers and the powers of guerrilla-Islamists, in order to prevent any security threats to its own citizens. Qatar seeks to prevent the spread of the Arab Spring on national territory and throughout skillful diplomacy techniques, backed by its own television - Al-Jazeera, tried to exploit the moment and promote their own interests. For hosting the 2022 World Cup, Qatar will spend approximately 200 billion dollars, money which come from an economy that is based on more than 85% oil and gas. Nevertheless, the most important costs arise from the prevention of terrorist threats and other global risks which by the harnessing of any security breaches, could affect the smooth running of the football match.

"Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment."  

Significant international presence, the massive participation of officials and big corporations has resulted in the increased interest of all countries involved, along with the authorities of Qatar in order to ensure an event lacking of security incidents. Amid the complexity and global exposure of this sporting event, Qatar is focusing its efforts on the development of a shared security strategy and thus taking advantage of the current international system based on interdependence in order to identify, assess and manage risks and opportunities derived from partnerships.

With the help of soft power, reflected in organizing cultural and sports events, Qatar aims to strengthen its hard power by using a system based on interdependence and strategic incentives of other states. In this context, great actors can be seen collaborating and offering their expertise in the field of security, which brings more value in the security paradigm of the regional and global level.

The 2022 sports event represents for Qatar the moment when will join (at an economic, cultural level) – nevertheless paying great interest to security level – a group consisting of major global players. Interconnection with the highest standards

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of security and defense will lead to lower risks, lower transitional period and will reduce the costs of adaptation and generate for the country a new growth opportunity.

For the risk management and threats in the area, with negative impact on the organization of such a tournament, the officials in Doha have signed an agreement with Interpol, which will rewrite the event in terms of security. For this event, Interpol has appointed a group of security experts from all countries, meetings under the direct coordination of Janet Williams, which drafted the plan for the 2012 London Olympics security map.\textsuperscript{15}

Bringing Qatar together with other 190 member countries and being part of the Interpol’s network, allows them to transfer expertise from around the world and enjoy the highest international security standards. Moreover, in collaboration with Interpol, Qatar is concerned with identifying other cooperation fields both with international law enforcement and institutions that can support further national and regional security.

\textbf{Risk management and threats in the area}\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Terrorist threats.} As the tournament held in Brasil was threatened by delays in infrastructure or street protests, in Qatar threats come from terrorist groups. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has "recommended" FIFA not to organize The Football World Cup 2022 in Qatar because the area is part of the Islamic Caliphate:

"We sent you a message in 2010, when you decided or were bribed by the former emir of Qatar to have the 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Now, after the establishment of the Caliphate, we declare that there will be no World Cup in Qatar since Qatar will be part of the Caliphate under the rule of the Caliph Ibrahim Bin Awad Alqarshi (is the legal name of Islamic State leader) who doesn't allow corruption and diversion from Islam in the land of the Muslims. This is why we suggest that you decide to replace Qatar. The Islamic State has long-rang scud missiles that can easily reach Qatar, as the Americans already know.\textsuperscript{17}

The conflicts in Syria and Iraq, the declaration of the Islamic Caliphate and ISIS attacks, which remain an upward trend, are prerequisites for amplifying the local potential threats on regional spreading. Therefore, Qatari authorities closely follow the Syrian and Iraqi crisis and their reflection outside this state, trying to prevent and limit the extent of insecurity in the proximity of Qatar.

The main challenges in terms of security are generated by the magnitude of this event. 2022’s games will take place on 11 stadiums with an average capacity of 50,000 seats each, which will be added at the areas dedicated for fans near the stadium. Five of the seven host cities are concentrated within a radius of 25 km and it is intended the organization of three or four games per day.

According to Qatari government representatives, direct effects lie in overcrowding, and on the inability to monitor the flow of people and reducing the capabilities to prevent actions, that could escalate into risks and threats against sports events participants.\textsuperscript{18}

Officials from Doha estimate that, during the tournament, the airport in the capital of Qatar will be transited by 46 000 to 64 000 tourists in just 10 hours, while high-speed trains in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia will bring thousands of tourists every day that will the events be part.

\textsuperscript{15} INTERPOL, “INTERPOL and Qatar 2022 Committee launch major sporting event security initiative”, Available at http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/ 2012/PR086, accessed 05.09.2015.

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As a result, amid volatility and insecurity climate, security of the region and in a condition a large flow of people who will enter in the capital of Qatar in a very short period of time. Because there is a low number of people who will handle the checks, terrorists are likely to penetrate the territory of the host country and seriously affect the interests, values and national security objectives.

**Cyber threats**

Cyber attack threats occurred during the football World Cup from Brazil, when the infrastructure used for the event was the target of several groups of hackers and cyberterrorists, had intended to steal information, to protest or even hinder the deployment of the tournament. Hackers and cyberterrorists launched attacks not only against the institutions, but also against the participants. By taking advantage of the football World Cup, cybercriminals have attacked several bank customers using e-mails, under various pretexts relating to football event, and requesting personal information.

In order to prevent any repetition of the situation from Brazil, the officials from Doha have committed themselves to creating a safe infrastructure of mobile telephony for data transport and higher banking security. Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), an organization of hackers pro-Bashar al-Assad declared themselves responsible for the attacks on the Al Jazeera - website because Qatar supports the groups of the Syrian opposition, and continues to have as target the sites from Qatar. It is expected that cyberattacks will maintain the same trend before and during the football tournament.

**Legislation**

One of the main sponsors of the World Cup is a company which produces beer in America. Qatar Law, written in Arabic without an official translation, based on the principles of Sharia imposes restrictions on the sale and even advertising campaigns for various consumer goods used in other states.

The 2014 World Championship and FIFA has asked the Brazilian authorities to change the law which did not allow the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages inside stadiums, which was materialized through the promulgation of the law known as "Budweiser Bill". This law allowed consuming massive amounts of alcohol both on and outside stadiums throughout the tournament.

Given the fact that the authorities in Qatar have guaranteed compliance with the legal framework imposed by FIFA, sale and consumption of alcohol in an Arab state, which is a source of law Sharia, can attract controversies which may degenerate into threats against tourists attending the event, as well as the football tournament itself.

**Conclusion**

Organising the World Cup in Qatar and therefore positioning this state at the economic, geostrategic and military crossroads of the great powers is the main geostrategic opportunity for the tiny Gulf state.

Knowledge, mitigation, and exploiting the security risks lie in the organization of such an event and all are essential to identifying new geostrategic opportunities. Hosting a global event helps creating global interdependence, strengthens the state’s institutions and sketch at international level a positive
stereotype of the country, subsumed to the national security brand regarded as part of the soft power.

In this context, the security risks of Qatar, adequately managed and advertised with sporting events can become key elements in managing the soft power and influence the certain regional or even global decisions.

By providing clear, firm answers and solutions to questions and partners, fears regarding the regional threats are globally advertised. The national security brand is presented as an opportunity for Qatar and will transform the country into an exporter of security.

This way, effective global risk management capability makes security threats become predictable and can be exploited in a way that provides new resources for the fulfillment of strategic objectives.

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SMUGGLING OF IS-REFUGEES

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Abstract: Western intervention, both directly and indirectly in certain areas such as Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya and Syria were the end of the domination era of a single religion (Christians from the Balkan’s and the Shites in Iraq). The lack of control and authoritarian ideology led to an implosion of these states and the division into distinct groups based on ethnic and social criteria, separated in terms of social and cultural behavior. The civil war in Syria, the urge of Kurds in creating a state and of course the weak security of the Middle East and North Africa has become fertile ground exploited by the Islamic State to take over large parts of Syria and Iraq, and to impose a medieval state type organization. In this regional chaos, thousands of civilians have crossed the borders into neighboring countries in search of a more peaceful area where they can become refugees.

Keywords: terrorist groups, ethnic conflicts, smuggling terrorists, migrants, refugees, transnational organized crime, immigrants’ route.

Summer has ended with the world wide question: “Is the Islamic State smuggling terrorists among the migrants”? Many people are confident that there is some truth in this question, and everybody knows that there is no smoke without a fire.

Are immigrants a threat to one’s country security? Or better, are asylum seekers a terrorist threat? A lot of specialists in this field have come forward with their own opinion on the matter.

The refugee crisis that has befouled over the EU is considered one of the most pressing challenges and it is complemented by a lot of other fears. Some believe that along with the migration flow, it is possible that unrecognized terrorists are infiltrating among other people. Amnesty International has also declared that if one listens “to government ministers and many other political commentators” the refugee crisis “constitutes a dire threat” for the EU.

The term refugee is the person who, because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or one’s political opinion, lives outside their mother country, and because such concerns or fears, that person is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of his country. Amnesty International suggests that the most affected countries when it comes to the refugees are not those of Europe, but by contrary, are those that have grown and lived across the Near and Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the same


2 Richard Burton, „The truth about... refugees” (accessed at24.08.2015), available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/truth-about-refugees#.VgfWsX1c7b8


4 Richard Burton, „The truth about... refugees” (accessed at24.08.2015), available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/truth-about-refugees#.VgfWsX1c7b8
organization has published a list of 6 specifications about refugees that try to come to Europe:

Refugees are those who make journeys across the Mediterranean, and that are gathered at Calais. This assertion was denied by ministers and FRONTEX, the EU’s external border control agency, stated that the “majority of the people come from Syria, Eritrea, Sudan, Afghanistan and Iraq. Of these, by far the largest groups are Syrians” according to the table below, the number of refugees that crossed the border on the Eastern Mediterranean route in 2014 is almost the average between 2008 - 2011.

According to EU border agency FRONTEX, by the end of July, over a third of a million migrants and refugees had entered the EU, Hungary, Italy and Greece.

As it was specified earlier, a refugee is someone who is trying to escape from persecution in their home country, bombardments, gas attacks, violence, torture, repression and enslavement by their own government. Amnesty has also stated that “is not about economic betterment; it is fundamentally about life and liberty – which is why so many men, women and children risk their lives trying to get to safety in Europe”.

The other three specifications of the article published on the Amnesty international site are referring to the non-existence of “safe and lawful routes available for these people”, “no legal requirement for a refugee to claim asylum in any particular country”, “UK is not disproportionately affected by the global refugee crisis, and neither is Europe” and none the less “The UK asylum system is no more generous than many others.”

From the start of the Syrian conflict, more than four million refugees have crossed into neighboring countries like Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. In

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Lebanon, a country with 3.5 million inhabitants, 1.5 million people officially received registration as refugees but in reality it seems that the number reached around 2.5 million. In this context EU policy on migration was distant and only intervening and giving financial aid to those states that offer home to a large number of refugees, in order to stop other migrants in entering Europe\(^{10}\). Currently, the management of migrant flow in Europe redefines geopolitical relations at the regional level. This applies especially in relationship with Turkey where more than two million refugees live.

From the latest geopolitical analysis is one can see that the number of Syrian refugees in Iraq and Lebanon is on a downward trend, opposing the one in Turkey that reached almost two million people. The reflections of this trend are also observed in European countries where the number of asylum applications is also increasing. This increase shows a movement of refugee masses to Turkey and onward to the European Union\(^{11}\). This analysis estimates that the number of refugees is to reach 1.5 million people early next year. This number does not represent a demographic risk, being less than 1% of the population that Europe has, that being of 504 million people.

**Refugee vs. migrant – the immigration of refugees**

Some people that arrive in Europe are also refugees and immigrants when they come directly, on sea or in other ways, from the areas affected by the crisis and when the distinction between groups could endanger certain individuals. Refugees are those people who choose to run from war or persecution, from their native country while immigrants are people who leave for reasons which are not included in the definition of a refugee\(^{12}\).

Thus, the term migration represents a movement in order to change the place of living and working, determined by social, political, economic or natural factors, or a mass displacement of certain tribes or populations from a territory to another, determined by the same set of factors\(^{13}\). The facilitation, in return for a financial or material gain, of clandestine passing into a country of a person that is neither a citizen, nor a permanent resident, means illegal migration, or human smuggling\(^{14}\).

Cross-border crime networks organize routes, ways of transportation for a large number of migrants seeking to reach the EU. These groups obtain substantial profits at the same time, putting in danger the lives of migrants. In order to maximize their profits, transnational groups involved in such crimes resort to overcharging migrants on boats, including sketchy on small pneumatic boats, disused ships or in trucks. Thousands of migrants drowned in the sea, suffocates in containers or died in the deserts\(^{15}\).

The routes are extremely unstable when it comes to the risks, costs and opportunities involved. If until now, many

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\(^{13}\) Dicționarul explicativ al limbii române, Ediția a II-a – Institutul de limbvistică “Iorgu Iordan”, București, 1998.

\(^{14}\) INTERPOL, „People smuggling”, Available at http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Trafficking-in-human-beings/People-smuggling, accessed 17.09.2015

African migrants went through Libya, the insecurity of the route leads them to rethinking the road, through Maghreb or Turkey. For those in the Middle East or Afghanistan, the route used is through Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary. Regarding maritime routes, the classic Libya-Europe routes are used, but these tend to be avoided because of the high risks. Maritime routes often have as a starting point for Turkey to reach the Greek island of Kos, except that the Greek police let the migrants pass, and in Kos, there are more than seven thousand refugees. The Government in Athens has asked the European Union to help deal with the thousands of people who come from Syria and Iraq.

The immigrants’ entry route from the Middle East to Europe. The link between international conflicts and transnational organized crime

From Greece, immigrants pass to Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, then in Austria to reach the desired destination Germany. This year, to reach the European Union they went through Greece, Italy and Hungary and about 340,000 immigrants entered. The community block has already announced its establishment of distribution quotas of immigrants in each Member State. Introducing binding quotas or permanent solidarity measures represents an extension of the Dublin Regulation.

According to the Dublin Regulation, when a person who has applied for asylum in an EU country has illegally crossed the border in another country, that person will be sent back to the first European country. If the Greek police let them pass towards Central Europe, Hungary has become overstressed of asylum applications and by 23 June 2015 it received those asylum seekers who have crossed borders into other countries in the EU and were detained there and sent back in the first country. On the 24th of August 2015, Germany has decided to suspend the Dublin Regulation regarding the Syrian refugees.

Concerning the route through the Balkans, this is composed from migrants in association with locals and sometimes with the help of some authorities. Immigrants who are involved alongside the guides in illicit activities are part of trans-border crime groups. These people are regularly exposed to acts of violence, threats and extreme living conditions. At the same time, people who begin their journey on a voluntary basis and pay considerable sums to clandestinely pass the border, are vulnerable and can be used by labor or sexual exploitation networks.

Human trafficking designates the recruitment, transportation, transfer, lodging or receipt of persons, by threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, deceit, abuse of authority or of a position of vulnerability, or by offering or accepting payment or benefits to obtain the consent of a person having authority over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. The operation includes forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to it, or by traffic of organs.

The difference between the two offences is that in the case of human smuggling, the people willingly participate in that action and are directly involved in perpetrating the illegal migration process through payment for the services supplied.

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by the person who places illegal migrants to pass an international border. In the case of human trafficking, migrants are victims, victims that are being compelled to undergo a serious exploitation, which may or may not involve crossing the frontier.

Europe’s crime – ISIS terror nexus. The links between transnational organized crime and international terrorism

In this international context it is necessary to create a strategy that will take the attention from the long-term effects of the migrant wave. In the Islamic State propaganda sent among Muslims in Europe, the Caliphate is presented as the one and only realm for Muslims whose territory tends towards the old Caliphate from the Prophet’s visions. This new State would have meant to accommodate Muslims worldwide along with their families, which is different from the field training of al-Qaida whose goal is formation of the hijackers. The Islamic State is a new type of terrorist organization whose main objective is to expand the territory through the recruitment of combatants from all over the world.

Asked at a press conference if NATO intelligence can confirm ISIS to be sending smugglers, through the port, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared in May that 20: “First of all, this is a human tragedy. People lose their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean. And therefore, it is important that the European now acts. This is about criminal networks. It's about border control. It's about migration. And therefore the European Union is now working on how to respond to this.

“...And NATO is working on the root causes of the problems by working with partners both in the Middle East and North Africa to help them increase their capacity to stabilize their own countries. We work with Jordan. We work with partners in North Africa. And we stand ready to do so also in Libya” 21.

“...Of course, one of the problems is that there might be foreign fighters. There might be terrorists also trying to hide... to blend in among the migrants. And this just underlines the importance of... that we have to respond to this turmoil, to these threats in many different ways” 22.

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Claude Moniquet, former French intelligence agent, now the head of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center in Brussels mentioned that the “Islamic State has no need to export fighters to Europe because it imports fighters from Europe. There are five to six thousand Europeans who are, or have been, in Syria, and others are leaving all the time. So it's hard to see the advantage for Islamic State to export Syrians or Iraqis -- people who speak Arabic, who know Iraq and Syria, and who they need over there.”\(^\text{23}\)

Another motive and source of international terrorism is Wahhabism, according to a European Parliament’s report from 2013, form of religion that can be observed in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qaeda, al-Nusra, Talaban, al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram\(^\text{24}\).

Immigration policies want to facilitate the entry of desired foreigners and also to identify those that are unwanted. After September 11, policymakers along with the general public, discussed whether these policies are capable of coping with those challenges\(^\text{25}\).

Leandro Di Natala, Senior Analyst at ESISC - European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, in a briefing the fact that “there is still no evidence that IS or other Islamist terrorists would have used the recent refugee flows to reach Europe” and mentioned that “(…) especially the Syrians, are the very victims of the Islamist terrorist groups present in their countries. It should be also recalled that several terrorists who have carried out attacks in the European countries in recent years were not refugees but European citizens”\(^\text{26}\).

In ESISC’s briefing, the factors that would make it unlikely for a terrorist to enter Europe are shown and explained. The most important one was that “the migrant routes are not only expensive but also very dangerous.”

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)\(^\text{27}\), more than 2,500 migrants are missing or are dead after trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea since January to July 2015.

According to a report published by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, named “Libya: a growing hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara”, the Islamic State terrorist group could benefit from the refugees both by increasing destabilization for the European states and also as a source of income.


\[^{26}\text{Mark Trevelyan, „Militants posing as migrants? Unlikely, say European experts” (accessed at28.08.2015), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/28/us-europe-migrants-security-idUSKCN0QX18L20150828} \]

The report shows that “the high number of migrants along the North African coast has enabled the development of a far more lucrative coastal migrant trade, valued now at US$ 255-323 million per year in Libya alone”\(^{28}\).

There was no evidence that the Islamic State charges money from the refugees, and more than that, IS’s sources of income and financing its activities come from “extortions on local businesses, kidnappings for ransom, smuggling of oil and antiquities, and human trafficking, by selling women and children of ethnic and religious minorities as slaves”\(^{29}\).

Magnus Ranstorp, research director at the Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College explained that “It is a very cumbersome way for terrorists to come into the European Union. There's a lot of easier ways to slip in, such as by using forged papers or stolen passports. (...) The volume of people in contact with Islamic State not only the ones who've gone, but sympathizers who decide to act, that's what's keeping security services awake in Europe”\(^{30}\).

Regarding the exploitation of the Islamic State and the possibility of operations in Europe with the help of migrants, Shiraz Maher, expert at Kings College London, suggested that is “not inconceivable”, although “there is an element of this being seized on in a populist fashion by politicians on the right. There's not an overriding need for them to send people right now. (...) That may well change over time”\(^{31}\).

Gilles de Kerchove, the EU’s Counter-Terrorism Coordinator since 2007, had a speech in the Internal Security Forum Prague organized by the Czech think tank “European Values”, where he explained that foreign fighters from Europe, trained in Arab countries are now more important than Muslims send under a refugee mask\(^{32}\): “Unfortunately, there are approximately five thousand – if not more – European citizens who went to Syria and Iraq. Some of them had not been detected by our services. So, if I were Daesh leadership, I would rather take a Belgian, a French or a Dutch foreign fighter with a valid travel document, undetected by the security service, and send him back to Europe after having trained him. Why would I have to infiltrate among asylum seekers?

I think the migration crisis is already a major challenge itself. If you start mixing the two, you confuse the logic. (...) We have to help people who suffer from one of the deepest crises we have had. These people are in danger of being killed, beheaded, raped or tortured.

There is a link. We know that some terrorist organizations try to engage in human trafficking at Libyan shores, because it is a very lucrative job. We have to address this problem, but it does not mean they send terrorists together with refugees”.

He sustained the cooperation between the member states that have made a lot of efforts in the crisis of foreign


\(^{29}\) Leandro Di Natala, Senior Analyst at ESISC - European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center, “Migrant crisis triggers fears over increase of terrorism threat in Western Europe” (accessed at21.09.2015), available at http://www.esisc.org/publications/briefings/9770


fighting. Also, explaining the new methods of securing the borders, he mentioned the PNR (Passenger Name Record) directive. The PNR refers to “unverified information provided by passengers and collected and held by air carriers. It includes information such as names, travel dates, itineraries, seats, baggage, contact details and means of payment”.

Conclusions

The European immigrant crisis may pose security risks at the European level in terms of terrorist threats and increasing illegal actions of crime groups specialized in smuggling and especially the two threats combined. At the same time immigrants weaken both the transit countries and especially the host countries.

The intensification of the anti-Muslim feeling

Given that there is an anti-migration predisposition on the European level, both inside and outside a community, where are also added European tensions caused by austerity policies, this can create a general European feeling of anti-Muslim immigrants. This tends to become a security risk together with the increase of population that is part in a nationalist political parties and also extremist, religious, nationalistic and xenophobic groups.

Short-term implications in European countries

If normally, traditional migrants that came to Europe would integrate themselves in communities, finding a job quickly, those migrants living in camps will become and represent a financial collapse and permanent insecurity.

Another consequence would be the flow of migrants entering together with more fundamentalist-terrorist elements on European territory. This can be done both by the return of Europeans who have travelled to those countries and joined terrorist groups or with the help of terrorists who come as refugees and having no identity documents. In this sense, the probability of a terrorist event becomes extremely high.

Medium and long term implications

It is possible that the support and acceptance of the immigrants would represent a negative action. This type of actions will mainly afflict on the long term the financially developed countries that must receive a large number of immigrants and will lead to a quantitative growth of the migration phenomenon by encouraging the increase in the number of source countries. European states that offer benefits to immigrants will become main targets for organized crime groups specialized in illegal migration that will facilitate the clandestine trespassing of people into Europe, from both high risk areas and countries in terms of political, military and social conflicts, like Iraq, Lebanon Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sudan, Congo, Rwanda, Somalia and economically disadvantaged areas.

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ROLE OF THE CONCEPTUAL MODELS IN INTEGRATING THE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS

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Abstract: The development of the economies of well industrialized countries was also felt in the defence industry by generating new attitudes and conceptual models on the conduct of military actions. Contextually, new weapons systems were made, focused primarily on joint cooperation and the pursuit of substantial resource savings calculated per unit of "military confrontation event". The safety and security of the airspace of responsibility is one of the major priorities of the defense, whether we talk about a potential military conflict or an air terrorist act (USA, September 11, 2001). In this respect, the concerns of the specialists of critical infrastructures are focused on identifying mutations in terms of risks and the most pertinent solutions for avoiding accidents in the air (Ukraine, July 7, 2014) and developing amore efficient air defence response, aimed at the new air threats from a hypothetical opponent.

Keywords: airspace safety, critical infrastructures, conceptual model, collaborative interface, air defence collaborative workflow.

At least from the dual technological and sociological perspective, the safety and security of the contemporary airspace has become one of the most important subjects brought to the attention of the military specialists and defence officials. The unprecedented growth of air traffic in particular exacerbated the exposure to new risks with major impact on military forces but also on the civilian population, through risks arising from the lack of a proper control of different flight heights airspace users.

The dual approach of the airspace security from a complex military and civilian perspective helps us understand the relationships of the decision-makers’ actions both in peacetime, crisis or war, which implicitly requires identifying relevant solutions that would provide a real state of normality of the contemporary society. Being aware of a certain state of affairs represents a first step towards understanding the reality and the importance of control over the potential factors influencing airspace security. In this respect, we have identified among the air defence artillery structures as one of the factors whose action has a major impact on the normality of the critical infrastructure given by the national and international air transport network.

Airspace security from a dual military and civilian perspective must be seen not as two separate items, as they function presently through cooperative measures, but rather under collaboration relations on air traffic and assumption of responsibility on the risks that the aircraft are exposed to in each structure’s airspace of responsibility. Several concepts were developed at military level, reflected by the defence doctrine, which underlie the functioning of the military national defense system. The concept on the development of the air defence response systems is closely related to the action of a hypothetical air enemy, and the air defence artillery systems were designed and operate according to algorithms specific to each area of action in the airspace, to certain flight heights of the target and a certain operational magnitude given by "the range of the air defence system".

From a military point of view, the confrontation between a hostile aircraft and the air defence response system is given and described in "fighting the air enemy." In this sense we can explore an extensive sequential process in several distinct steps.
taken according to a certain identified algorithm: airspace reconnaissance, discovery, identification of the aircraft, the decision to destroy, fight and annihilate it (the actual conduct of air defence fires), the assessment of air defence firing outcome and, if the situation so requires, resuming the fighting and destruction sequences. We consider this sequential process to be one of the most popular models of air defence action or fighting the air enemy. In this context, several constructive models of air defence artillery systems are known, of a larger or smaller wingspan, which by their independent action can be construed as air defence operational monoposts. The vulnerability of these constructive variants of the air defence systems are given by way of interaction with the hostile aircraft, the capabilities that they can achieve in a given unit of time and spatial arrangement (the achieved combat formation).

The constructive and operational diversity and complexity of the aircraft (the air enemy) proved that the air defence response systems with a specific action, typical to the "air defence operational monopost" cannot face the new air threats alone, due to several factors such as: decreased radar footprint of the aircraft, the diversification of the air defence countermeasures (jamming, anti-radar missiles, etc.), use of UAVs, changing the tactics of using helicopters (indirect firings from a stationary covered position, surprise by flying at very low heights, very high flight speeds, etc.), launching LASER and GPS guided missiles from outside the air defence systems’ fight and destruction area, satellite control, etc. The military experts in collaboration with the weapons factories have found several technical solutions to counteract these shortcomings and constructively rebuilt most air defence artillery systems, several constructive variants\(^1\) or series of weapons being known (PATRIOT, HAWK, ZSU-23, GEPARD, GEPARD B 2L, GEPARD 1 A2, etc.).

In this material, due to the issues raised in the introduction, we would like to draw your attention on a very important aspect in our opinion. We noticed that most air defence artillery systems were designed to fight the air enemy independently and autonomously, for which we have called them "air defence operational monoposts". The constructive changes and those at the level of tactics on the use in battle of the air enemy led to the removal from combat, both physically and morally, of the air defence artillery systems of the “monopost” type and others were transformed at least in terms of technical-functional but also tactical aspect. One of the major recorded technical trends consisted of the partial conversion of the “old” systems by replacing or modifying certain subsystems such as: the firing elements (automatic guns), the computing device, the supplementary devices (wedging, eliminate firing errors, measuring the muzzle velocity of the projectile, improving the rate of fire, increasing the effective range, increasing accuracy, etc.) the "barrel-missile" combination, the change of the user interface of the fighting machine, the computation of direct intelligence for air defence combat, cooling the fighting compartment and the apparatus, increasing the maneuver and combat autonomy, increasing safety and reliability of communications, etc.

The digital interface of the air defence systems allowed a radical transformation of the air combat and recorded new trends on the sequenciality of the air defence collaborative workflow. One of the trends of topical interest is the

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distribution of the responsibilities to the sequences of the air defence workflow: airspace reconnaissance, tracking, identifying the aircraft, the decision to destroy, fight and annihilate it (the actual air defence firing), assessing the outcome of the air defence firings and, if the situation so requires, resuming the fight and destruction sequences. In the first sequence, airspace reconnaissance, a sensor integration was achieved mainly in the infrared spectrum.

- target position coordinates;
- distance to target and value of the velocity vector;
- decomposed values of target acceleration;
- typology of the target trajectory;
- estimated time to the target engagement line etc.

A variant for a sequential description of the air defence workflow can be represented on an axis of time elapsed for conducting each sequence individually, as shown in Figure 2.

The sequential approach of any process, regardless of its nature, will implicitly lead to an increase of costs per unit of event or sequence, in our situation distributed in a collaborative network. As it can be observed in Figure 2 the implications on the resources are very

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limited given the time allotted for each sequence, in the range of tens of seconds. There was often underlined the fact that the air combat can be interpreted as a struggle with the seconds and tens of seconds. More specifically, the sequences identified in the accomplishment of the air defence workflow are short and very short, which implies a very short decision time, an attribute specific only to certain specialized structures which could be able to fulfill the mission that they were designed for. Therefore, we consider very necessary to develop a new integrated approach that could allow "the breaking" of the sequences into subsequences that can be implemented by the most appropriate structures, interconnected according to operational interoperability criteria. Through the undertaken measures, the level of responsibility for the safety and the security of action in the national or/and international airspace under normal conditions is relatively familiar. The problem that can be expressed in terms of the airspace in the context to which we referred above, arises when there are mutations in the centers of power on both sides: air and air defence. Here, we exemplify with the two real situations: *USA, September 11, 2001* (in terms of air power) and *Ukraine, July 7, 2014* (in terms of air defence power). The two actual situations we refer to, come to prove that the airspace safety and security can be seriously affected beyond the limits of the risks taken by the specialized structures in this regard. If the terrorist element of the two apparently unrelated events can be technically analyzed, it becomes difficult to interpret and correctly assign to whose responsibility can it be designated: to the civilian structures for flight safety or to the military structures having responsibilities in the airspace?

Under the impact of the responsibilities and the means of action specific to each authority/structure, we consider it is necessary to change our mindset on the airspace and at the same time, it is required at least a dual approach – military and civilian – on the events that may take place in the airspace. The exhaustive cooperation between the civilian and military institutions concerning the safety of the airspace, namely for preventing the situation of "renegade aircraft" must be overcome in terms of identifying the possibilities of integrating and achieving a collaborative workflow and establishing a structure.

Figure 3. Variant\(^4\) of the relationships between the institutionalized structures on the airspace safety and security

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\(^4\) Roman Daniel, Teză de doctorat „Modele conceptuale avansate de lucru colaborativ destinate creșterii interoperabilității sistemelor de ripostă antiaeriană”, Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2015, Anexa nr. 02.
responsible for the critical infrastructure identified, under military and civilian dual aspect, on the model provided in Figure 3.

The important aspect resulting from the configuration of the cooperative relations between the institutionalized civil and military structures on the security and safety of the airspace, may be expressed under the impact of at least three key factors: the reaction time factor, the action space factor (interaction) and the technological factor. In order to find a concrete starting point of our approach, we believe that the understanding of the need to address jointly the civil and military responsibilities over the airspace and the establishment of an interface structure of responsibility for the identified critical infrastructure to be a priority.

On this occasion, we wish to make known our concern over the formulation and explaining of a conceptual model for achieving command and control for an infrastructure identified as being critical, for airspace safety and security from a military and civilian perspective. The conceptual variant is based on the existence of a collaborative air defence workflow. A workflow is generally described as the whole of operations or logical, successive phases of a technological process of processing, transforming data/ input material into finished products characterized by certain qualities and features derived solely from a priori designed technological process. The phases of the air defence workflow, according to the described conceptual model, are: airspace reconnaissance; discovering, identifying the target, the continuous and coherent tracking of the air target; fighting and annihilating the air target (the actual engagement with air defence firings), observing and approving the result of fighting and annihilating the air target and resuming the previous stages, if the situation so requires. Relatively to this description of a workflow and the combination of responsibilities of at least two institutions acting on the airspace, a relatively new concept arises, that of collaborative workflow which can be applied sequentially, timely, the most appropriate measures to avoid or counteract an undesirable event with a possible major impact on a critical infrastructure.

After correlating the three concepts (air defence system, airpower, critical infrastructure) and considering the social and technological involvement of the two unfortunate events to which we have referred, (USA, September 11, 2001 and Ukraine July 7, 2014), we can put together some important conclusions about the possibility of avoiding or countering future events similar to those mentioned above. A first conclusion concerns the application of a more detailed study on the use of the airspace and on the characterization of the direct and indirect beneficiaries of the air traffic. We intend to discuss the airspace safety and security aspects and other potential prospects that may be influential in case of a military aggression or air terrorist act. Another conclusion concerns the establishment of independent structures to be responsible for formulating risks, solutions to prevent and counteract undesirable events with a catastrophic impact that can take place in the airspace.

The increased number of airspace users, especially at low altitudes, in the scope of the helicopters and UAVs, is expected to cause the creation of surveillance and control cells\(^5\), which will have to adopt one or more conceptual models of air defence action As shown in Figure 02, it is required to fully understand the duration of air intervention and to be aware of the very short reaction time for the analysis and the decision making process, so that enough time is left for the execution.

Finally, we would like to add that such joint military and civilian structures

responsible with the management of critical infrastructure protection need not only the legislative framework of operation but also a longer period of time for adjustment and adaptation to the operational environment which is currently really difficult to characterize. Through this, we urge the factors of responsibility for protecting critical infrastructures to identify and appoint responsible institutions which will be able to achieve genuine airspace safety and security in order to avoid and early prevent the dangers that may occur in the airspace.

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POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY CONFLICTS

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Abstract: The military conflict is certainly the phenomenon with the widest destructive function, whose factors, laws, principles, forms and procedures the military experts are trying to identify and develop that operational framework with the capacity to express as close to reality as possible, a reality which is dimensioned in time, space, action, etc. In this regard, scenarios are formulated containing the power of prediction, of "arranging the future" based on extensive military action planning processes. The correlations, the understanding and the explanation of the interactions between the factors generating the reality of the military conflict are: own forces, enemy forces, terrain, time, etc. underlying the concept and the action plan to be put into execution. Therefore, we affirm that under the conditions of operational complexity, probabilistic determination and difficulty of control, the consequences can be positive or negative and the decision-makers will act dynamically by assuming the probability of favorability or unfavorability of the effects of their own decisions.

Keywords: decision, course of action, risk, event, descriptive statistics, inferential statistics, credibility.

The military conflict, and not only, is one of the destructive phenomena to which the specialists seek to find answers in terms of factors, laws, principles, forms and procedures governing this particular field of human action.

Like other areas of confrontation specific to human action, such as: the economy, state-of-the-art technologies, sports competitions, politics (seizure of power), etc. the military field is based too on interaction - as energetic element, with a high power of generating reality in at least three characteristic dimensions: space, time and action. In specialized language, we talk about defining the operational framework which through its dimensionality reflects a certain reality described by summing the indications or the results of the sensors that can generate a reality which is “real” or distorted, depending on the competence of those involved in analyzing the more or less "realistic" data. What is highly visible after the manifestation of the operational factor is the trend to accomplish the control of the action of generating certain states, experiences or of fulfilling certain objectives needed for "writing the future". The effects achieved from the application of the operational factor will later demonstrate whether or not the decisions made were or not in full knowledge of the concerned details, weather they were productively correlated with the other describable factors of space and time.

In order to delimit our subject of interest, we suggest limiting the conceptual approach on the course of action (COA), to the magnitude of the two levels of military planning: operational and tactical. Distinctively, the two dimensions of military action planning have limited manifestation by the very coverage and use of defense resources. Subordinated to the operational framework, the tactical level is characterized mainly by the notion of mission, through which certain goals are successively pursued based on the requirements or the tasks assigned/ordered by the upper echelon. In turn, the operational level may be described by its focusing mainly on the achievement of a certain desired end state, which can be
reached by going through several stages, objective by objective, described by the effects of conducting the assigned tasks and consuming a certain quantity, sufficient, of defense resources. Mainly, we schematically observe the two levels of military planning as follows: for the tactical level: requirements/tasks, objectives, missions; and for the operational level: requirements/tasks, effects, objectives, desired end state. In order to achieve the successive conceptual shift to the completion of the schematic chain, specific to each level of military planning, we resort to developing the operational design, namely the construction of the effort lines. In order to do this, we suggest focusing our attention on describing the multiple alternatives which lead to achieving the courses of action (COA). In statistical terms, the COA is nothing but the way or ways in which you can "write the future" as the deciding factor intends to or how he thinks that the desired end state will look like. Once this aspect is determined, we can mention that there are at least a number of identifiable factors which "oppose" to the achievement of a future as the military planner wants or envisioned. We include countering the factors opposing to the desired end state in a broad range of countermeasures that can be taken knowingly/certainly or we place it in the category of risks / when uncertain. According to the two states the military planner, respectively the decision-maker, can act, we can conceptually move in two directions of interpretation, on a descriptive statistics or on an inferential statistics. It would be interesting to dwell on the two issues to which we can statistically refer.

Statistics is the science that collects, synthesize, describes and interprets the data related to the general phenomena of what happened from a certain perspective and what might happen in the future, being a support for decision-making, in our case as addressed subject: the military conflict. At least due to the need for "arranging the future" or, in other words, achieving the desired end state, the military planners use statistical tools, which often underlie decision making, as we mentioned before - more or less "knowledgeably" The descriptive statistics is a tool with which the large data bases can be described (it usually happens like this...), while the inferential statistics allows the use of data samples for the inference on the nature of the data bases from where the respective samples have been extracted (the detail makes the difference...). Either of the two instruments being applied, their role is to lead to making a decision on an informed basis. To decide is to choose a variant from several possible variants in order to achieve the objectives or the desired end state. There are two issues we can distinguish between here: one related to the means of achieving the possible variants (their building mechanism) and the second is given by the control and implementation of the variant designated as the most appropriate.

The decision, as it is generally known, can be "an empirical decision " or "a statistical decision". In everyday life we are subjected step by step to a continuous process of making all kinds of decisions. For example, when crossing a street at an illegal place, we empirically collect some information related to the action we want to perform (the distance to the nearest vehicle, the speed it is approaching us, etc.) and then we make the decision to cross. Every time we take the risk that the decision is wrong, and sometimes it really is, even with disastrous consequences. Another variant of making decisions is made following "the risk assessment" based on statistical processing. For example: an automotive company F has to buy a large quantity of tires and has to choose between the brands A1 and A2. Before making a decision, the company is testing n A1 type tires and n A2 type tires in and notes that the A1 tires are better. However, the n number of tested tires is
smaller compared to the very large number which will be bought and therefore there is a risk that the decision is wrong. After the statistical processing of the results of the tests, it follows that the likelihood that the decision is wrong is smaller in the A1 case than in A2 than, let’s say by 0.05%. Given this result of 0.05%, it can be considered a taken risk or may require additional testing, which can lead us to a similar or, on contrary, very different score. When we decide to cross the street at an illegal place, we act on the basis of subjective probabilities, and so the degree of risk is judged subjectively. When the numerical results of the experiments are available to us, the statistical theory of decision allows us to measure the degree of risk associated with any decision in terms of objective probabilities. In conclusion, in both decision-making variants, the action planner operates with data and information from which he must act both under certainty and especially uncertainty conditions. The difference between the subjective and the statistical probability is the lack of determining the amount of risk associated with the planned action and whether or not this risk can be taken.

We consider necessary to explain the decision in the context of subjective and statistical probability, as it opens the way towards achieving the operational framework by activating and using the concept of event. In this context, we consider the notion of event as the basic element of developing the scenario, namely identifying the optimal route that a subject must follow to fulfill certain objectives and achieve the desired end state (designing the future). By event we mean any result of an experience of which we can say it was achieved or not, after conducting the considered experiment. The events can be classified into: certain events, impossible events and random events. Each of the three categories, in statistical concept, carries a certain amount of risk. The operationalization of the concept of event for the purposes of decrypting the phenomenon of military conflict, can lead us to obtaining tangible results regarding the decision-making on the military action. The operational design, or designing the operation lines, is the means by which "the future can be visualized" in terms of the military operations to be executed, by developing

Figure 1. Variant of representing the relationships of conceptual integration and achieving the operational design

conditions. The difference between the subjective and the statistical probability is the lack of determining the amount of risk associated with the planned action and whether or not this risk can be taken.

To formulate the conditions for expressing the operational planning centered on event, it is required to take

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several descriptive steps: defining the situation, identifying/defining the problem, resources, threats and opportunities, weaknesses and strengths, limitations and constraints, objectives, effects, desired end state, expectations, the amount of resulted risk, etc. By combining more events in all their aspects, the military planner can project the so-called effort lines and therefore can establish the trajectory of the subject of the action (the actor), place it in certain sequences of the future, predetermined beforehand. If the conducted or proposed experiments, generating events, take place in an isolated environment, under tabulated conditions, then we can say with certainty that the future may be identical with what was designed or planned. But things in real situations do not happen as in an isolated environment and therefore it is necessary to apply another describable factor called interaction. Interaction can be of two kinds: between our topic of interest and its external environment and between the subject and its internal environment. The internal environment describes and includes all the internal processes that occur after the organization for the mission, while its external environment describes the threats and opportunities that it may be subjected to, on an axis of events occurring in space and time.

Please note that the future described by expressing the desired end state is the result of the chronological summation of all events related to whether or not the objectives described for obtaining certain effects were achieved, following the completion of tasks or established requirements. Placing a subject of the action (the actor) in the wide spectrum of a military operation must be done by describing the circumstances in which it takes or not part in a possible event that may take place after the planning, in order to exploit an opportunity or to avoid/counter a real risk. Thus, it can result in multiple lines of operations or effort lines built from several events which chronologically summed up can develop into a course of action or a scenario. In this sense, comparing the courses of action, namely conducting the war game, turns into a statistical analysis on two or more sets of events envisioned to take place in space and time coordinates. The advantage of such a statistical approach of events consists in identifying a limited number of solutions that can be described and

Figure 2. Variants of graphical representation of the events in the coordinates of space and time
descriptively or inferentially related after certain mathematical formulas - on a time axis. We say that the event A and involves the event B and we write $A \subset B$ if the achievement of the event A entails the achievement of the event B. Another formula\(^2\) is given by combining the events A and B and we understand the event marked $(A \cup B)$ which is to achieve at least one of the events A and B. Since the events A and B are subsets formed with the elementary events of the space $\Omega$, it results that bringing together the events can be written

$$A \cup B = \{ \omega \in \Omega / \omega \in A \text{ sau } \omega \in B \}$$

and so forth all formulas specific to working with sets and subsets, based on subordination, can be applied.

The advantage of such a conceptual approach to the operational design in terms of the events consists in simplifying the thinking and the decision-making process closer to the reality of the environment, on statistical criteria and less on empirical support. In other words, if we manage to identify all possible events on the coordinates of space and time, the involvement of the actors and the correlation of these events, then we can achieve a collinear planning with multiple variants of conducting or not conducting them, in terms of developing the associated risks or creating opportunities that can be operationally exploited in the coordinates of space and time. Basically, we "the break the future" or the desired end state in several associated sequences called events, organized in three coordinates: space, time and actors. The newly introduced concept of *actor* highlights the idea of relevance of actions of the structures involved in the operation. In one of his works, A.J. Greimas says that "To increase our knowledge on the models of building and combining the characters in the narrative discourse, we intend to observe that, starting from a single basic structure, we can explain both the creation of the actors of a story, and the number of possible stories according to the different distribution of these actors". Therefore, specific structures can be generated (battlegroups) intended for certain missions or another variant by developing several courses of action starting from the available structures or their capabilities.

Whether we want to admit it or not, the military planner's role is to "write the future" of current military actions, of what is going to happen. If this military planner has sufficient expertise and competence in the field of military actions that he plans, we can say that the future is entirely in his hands. The intervention at the conceptual level of this article can be realized through an interdisciplinary approach to several concepts (event, interaction, actor, narrative discourse, course of action, etc.) and their role in the act of decision-making. Therefore, the several analyses of the developed courses of action, their comparison and the conduct of the war game lead to a certain *credibility* of the final action variant, chosen to be implemented by the executers, practically an activation of the roles to perform the events arranged on a time axis, spatially distributed and operationally assigned.

After going through this material, we notice that there would be some other problems to approach, several items that were left "in the air" on the wording of the decisional act. To this regard, we identify two distinct working methods on making the decision. One of the variants of achieving the decisional act, namely that of control, is to approach the present from the perspective of the past, an analysis of what it is in the light of what has already been (feedback). For example, in the management of the cybernetic-economic systems, the major role in achieving the feedback is assigned to a particular type called the *control loop*, to achieve the negative or positive adjustment, in the sense of reducing or increasing the difference in correlating the output

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\(^2\) Ibidem, p. 12.
measurements (achieved) with the input measurements or the expected ones. A second variant of expressing the decision is anticipatory one (feed-forward), approaching the present from the perspective of the future, of what might happen. In the “predictive variant” the key role (in the systemic perspective) is played by the monitoring-prediction subsystem/compartment, which elaborates predictions on the output of the system for the future time periods. Highlighting the possibility of predictive control-adjustment of the current activity by activating the feed-forward loop can lead to an overall improvement of the system’s performance. The ratio of the two variants of control: feedback and feed-forward, is represented in Figure 3.

According to the percentage identified or arbitrarily given to the descriptive factors of space, time, or operational, we can express consistent descriptions of the events that are happening (now) have happened (in the past or in the immediate past) or will happen (in the future or in the immediate future). The ratio of the involvement of both methods: feed-back and feed-forward in the decision-making process, may lead to the development of a course of action which is “closer or more distant from reality”, the most likely or the most dangerous. To obtain the identifiable amount of risk, we notice the impossibility to make the difference between the two courses named especially due to the different nature of their design. Therefore, we suggest, in order to “eliminate the risk”, to develop two more types of courses of action: the least likely course of action and the least dangerous course of action. The advantage of creating the additional two types of courses of action is to determine the events that could happen (according to a developed scenario), which, by differentiating the courses similar in nature, could eventually lead to a realistic elimination both of “the amount of risk” and of the “amount of opportunity” per event.

At the end of this article, we want to recommend the military planner, as the subject of the decision-making process, to take into consideration the important issues related to achieving the desired end state in the sense of understanding the consistent relationships between the events. The operationalization of the concept of event, in the sense of what we have mentioned before, can yield results very close to reality, that true reality from the perspective of the three time dimensions: past, present and future. Subsequently, on the correlation of the events, we can assess and achieve the performance of

**Figure 3.** Variants of approaching the decision-making methods of feed-back and feed-forward
understanding and explaining the interactions between the factors generating the reality of the military conflict, a convincingly achievement of the concept and the action plan to be put into execution. Therefore, we affirm that in the conditions of operational complexity, probabilistic determination and difficulty of control, the consequences could be both positive and negative, and the decision makers could act dynamically by taking or not the probabilities of favorable or unfavorable effects of their decisions.

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DEVELOPMENT OF LIDER SKILLS DURING MILITARY CAREER, GENETIC HERITAGE INFLUENCE

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Abstract: Most of the time military with similar education have different performances. For better understanding the cause we must analyze are both nurture and nature. This paper is studying the leader. Current background generally accepts the idea that the leader needs a system of complex skills which are developed in time. The starting point of this development begins with the education received from family. Research method is based on direct observation and participation, during an university year of 60 military students from the first year of a military academy. The conclusion underlines that the difficulty of the development is different from a military to another and that there is no need of a title to become a leader.

Keywords: leader, leadership, military education, team.

Introduction

In this paper, when referring to military occupying leadership positions, I will only refer to officers, as the research has appliance on the field of military academies. Therefore, the military career of the most future leaders starts with a military academy. Their first steps are marked by comparison whether they graduated a military high school or not because both institutions having almost the same rules adaptability is facilitated. The first leadership positions they are able to occupy are squad, platoon level and even though they benefit from the same military education, their effectiveness is different in some cases even radical. This initial stage of development is showing from my point of view how important is to acknowledge leadership not only on an education and environment basis and also the importance of the education received form the early age which developed the individual psychological. For example, at this early stage we can compare these individuals with almost zero experience with older ones who have a career behind to support their decisions based on experience, even so some of these young students perform extremely well, fact that raises questions.

One of the questions I want to address is to what extent there are scientific arguments to justify born leaders? Is it possible that some military to hold a low efficiency on their leadership position no matter how much they are trained in the right direction? These questions arise from a recent research background on genetics implication on leadership made by civil research institutions.

Genetic heritage influence in leadership

The research field is extremely vast, genetics in particular as a biological science branch has on its horizon a lot of mysteries which awaits to be identified, discovered, revealed. Genetics however, is the one of the key sciences to answer questions regarding behavior differences in individuals. For a better understanding of what makes us more efficient leaders, we must understand clearly that there are many aspects of this complex trait. Before reaching our limits we need to acknowledge them, challenging ourselves has to be constant but it doesn’t guarantee development.

The question if leaders are born has lead to a lot of research in the past decade which formed a database bigger and bigger regarding the importance of genetics in leader development. This is a promising fact because as we speak there is a lot
research made which promise to come with better answers.

Based on past research made worldwide, in the early 2012, a study [1] appeared in the scientific review Leadership Quarterly which, starting from the question Born to lead?, identifies a genotype named rs4950 responsible for occupying a leadership position. People that have this genotype is more likely to occupy a leadership position by 25%. For a better understanding of this study and to be able to draw some conclusions which can be adapted to the military environment I have researched the background of this study.

Most of the researchers had encountered the problem of giving a generally accepted definition of leadership and also measure it. In 1998, Gary Yukl, professor at the State University of New York in Albany, USA published a comparative study [2] on present conceptions of effective leadership. He identified four approaches on leadership based on the power-influence, on leadership traits, behavioral and situational. These approaches are well validated and known paradigms on many publications.

The limitations he found in defining and measuring leadership includes from his point of view the simplistic methods used for research like:

The limitations of two factor models and dichotomies – like management-leadership, charismatic – non-charismatic leadership, autocratic – participative leadership, dichotomies that produce good insight but simplifies very much a process so complex and forms individual leadership stereotypes;

The limitations of dyadic processes – most of the studies focus on leader-follower relationship underestimating the importance of the environment

Heroic leadership assumptions – recent past leadership upraise has lead to an increased number of “leaders” which by giving motivational speeches and publishing a lot of books filled with advises and “secrets” formed a lot of stereotypes which puts the individual in the center of an efficient leadership with his power, influence to make followers sacrifice themselves or putting up a lot of effort while assimilating leaders vision. The limitation here is at organizational, group level power to adapt, transform once the leaders vision is never challenged and improved.

The limitations of research methods – the majority of studies most of the time is based on only one method: static correlation analysis of data from survey questionnaires. This research method which is widely encountered at big organizations exaggerates the importance of individual leaders gotten out of their environment. Another disadvantage is that questionnaires usually refer to a past experience of the participants which is situated in a certain context and for a variable period of time.

In conclusion, to define as clear as possible and draw highly relevant conclusions, it is absolutely necessary to correlate more methods of research and especially use longitudinal and more intense studies which approach the process from a systemic point of view. These limitations, from my point of view, made the research of identifying the rs4950 genotype to focus on a specific aspect of leadership, the emergence by occupying a leadership position though not clarifying its efficiency.

Another study [3] that contributed to the identification of this genotype is those of professors Nicolaou, Shane, Cherkas, Hunkin and Specter from 2008 which describes the mechanism through which the genes influences the predisposition of someone to occupy a leadership position. According to this study those mechanisms gives behavioral changes by directly influencing the chemical reactions at brain level implying therefore the existence of certain genotypes. The quantitative research
The method was applied on a sample of 851 monozygotic female twins and 855 dizygotic female twins with two variables, career development and experience and family environment. The results had shown that the variation of heritability on association with occupying a leadership position was measured at 32% and also that the major role was of the career development and experience.

The contributions of past research on identifying the genotype are more vast but I only mentioned these two because I just wanted to underline the basic theoretic and practice background on which the hypothesis, objectives of that study were formulated.

The study [1] was made by a team of five members from UK and USA lead by Jan-Emmanuel De Neve, professor at University Collage London, UK. In order to identify this genotype the researchers team used two data bases from two major USA samples, “national Longitudinal Study of Adolescent health(Add health)”[5] and “Framingham heart Study(FHS)”[6]. The first sample was started in 1994 in order to study the health behavior of adolescents towards health, consisting in a number of 26 666 participants. To build a dyadic marker leader-follower the researchers team got in consideration one of the questions from a survey applied: thinking about your official job duties, which of the following statements best describes your responsibilities at your(current/most recent)primary job?” arguing that the purpose of the study was to identify just the leader status, not the efficiency of their leadership. The second sample, “Framingham heart Study (FHS)” was initiated in 1948 being a longitudinal study during three generations with a number of 14428 members from which 9237 were genetically tested (4986 females and 4251 males). From this sample a number of 3540 individuals were surveyed about their career, one of the questions being if they had at least one subordinate during their career. The ones that answered with having at least one subordinate were marked as an indicator of occupying a leadership position.

Based on those two samples provided by the sources the research team has identified the relationship of genotype rs4950 with occupying a leadership position identifying the genotype to predispose individuals during their life to occupy a leadership position.

**Conclusions and implications**

“The conventional wisdom – that leadership is a skill – remains largely true, but we show it also, in part, a genetic trait.”[1]

After this study regarding the identification of a genotype responsible for occupying a leadership position was published a lot of publications appeared confusing what really was discovered. The answer to the questions whether a leader is born or if there is a responsible gene for transforming an individual into a leader, in a development and transformation meaning is still far away. This study only marked a beginning of research into the field of the psychology and biology of leadership. Even the authors confess that the research is at the beginning warning not to draw conclusions, the environment in which the individual is developing and training still plays the most important part. In order to understand this complex process any research must take in consideration both nurture and education.

From a military point of view, considering that usually an officer occupies or will at a certain point a leadership position over subordinates or organizational structures, the first reaction after we would know for sure who has the genetic predisposition on developing into a leader, would be to apply a testing procedure when admitted into the military system. Even if we would know for sure that would be discrimination. Hiring based on genes an individual has negates the idea
of hard work, to take the challenge to go over your limits. Work ethics has a lot of implications on this matter, another example would be that if a person would know he doesn’t have that genotype probably will never take an active role, responsibility withing his team even though he might have the most qualities needed there are generally three opinions regarding the evolution and development of a leader, one that says leaders are born and there isn’t much to do in order to develop over career, one that says the environment, training, education represent the most important part together with motivation and a lot of hard work and one that takes both in consideration as a process of development of a complex trait which start with early age education, family and continues for the whole life with motivation to reach the best even with traits that were not so efficiently identified. Those traits could be the lack of a certain genotype but in his complexity, the leadership gives the chance to compensate through balance or the chance that the team the individual takes part in might have all is needed, desired, a leader doesn’t need a title to stand out of the crowd, he emerges from situations and this is something we encounter day by day.

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NATO’S STRATEGIES FOR THE MARITIME SECURITY
IN THE BLACK SEA AREA

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Abstract: The Black Sea region is important for NATO and insurance solutions to maritime transport security are often compared to policies manifested in other areas, the Mediterranean or the Baltic. Those models had other approaches and implemented regional conditions. The extent of asymmetric threats in recent years, with reference to maritime space in particular, required application of international law firm, to ensure the security of maritime transport.

Keywords: NATO’s maritime strategy; combating organized crime in the Black Sea area; risks and threats in the Black Sea area; international crises and conflicts in the Black Sea.

The Black Sea Area has become a challenge for the international security organizations that aim to solve regional problems on a global level with clear objectives: supporting the states in this region to achieve their democratic ideals, ensuring the maritime security, fighting terrorism, and maintaining peace in this area. The purpose of my paper is to show the problems related to the NATO’s security strategies in the Black Sea Area, in the context of the great issues of the modern world and in correlation with the counteraction of the main risks, threats and vulnerabilities regarding regional security. The focus is on the main aspects regarding the security environment in the Black Sea Area, the role played by the lead actors in the equation of the competition for the energetic resources and the political and military dimensions of this area.

The maritime space represents the stage for the actions of the terrorists’ and criminals’ organized crime groups. In order to get rid of these threats it is absolutely necessary to create and put into practice an efficient strategy that internationally ensures the security of the maritime transports.

One of the main purposes is analyzing the way in which international maritime law influences the practice of the security initiatives in the maritime area. We took into account the quality of our country as a member state of the euro-Atlantic community, based on the main piers of the NATO’s strategy for the maritime security regarding the security of the maritime transports in the Black Sea Area.

The Black Sea Area is one of the areas where NATO and the European Union have common objectives: maintaining stability, reducing trafficking of human beings, drug smuggling and illicit arms trafficking, improving the management of the borders and turning it into a democratic area.

Since the beginning of the third millennium the Pontic space, NATO and EU developed a closer relationship due to the changes in the euro-Atlantic geopolitics and geo-strategy. Once the European and the euro-Atlantic integration of the central-eastern states took place, the economic development and security problems in the Black Sea Area, which had been ignored during the last decade of the 20th century or were not considered important, can no longer be ignored. The Black Sea Area has become the focus of the cross-border activities not only in a positive way (trade, tourism and the transport of the energetic resources), but also in negative way (the intersection between the request and the offer of the illegally trafficked products). If we analyze some other dangerous situations (frozen conflicts, terrorism, the
radicalization of the autonomous-separatist groups, organized crime), we have to admit that the maritime security in this area faces serious challenges.

The economic development in the Black Sea Area depends on the abundance of the controlled resources. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that everyone is interested in this area nowadays.

The political-military factors can help with the identification of the risks, dangers and threats likely to exist in the Black Sea Area: the exacerbation of the territorial disputes, the emphasis of the nationalist behaviors and tendencies, the internal political instability in the former Soviet Union states, the lack of sustainable political solutions; Russia’s reticence towards NATO’s continuous expansion into Eastern Europe, considering that the states in this area have shown their interest in becoming part of NATO; the deterioration of the dissensions regarding the management of the energetic resources; cross-border criminality, a process that has favored connections with the organized crime, that is the trafficking in human beings, drug smuggling and illicit arms trafficking.

Terrorism, organized crime, the poverty of the populations of the countries bordering the Black Sea, and religious extremism can lead to a dangerous evolution of the political-military context in this area.

Only a correct analysis of the sources of instability may offer a solution for the efficient counteraction of the obvious risks and threats in the Black Sea Area and a close understanding of the characteristics of the international security environment. The Black Sea Area has unconsolidated states, with a reduced administrative capacity, with economic recession, with serious corruption cases, and with organized crime structures. Therefore, NATO’s politics and strategies have to be adapted to these circumstances in order to ensure peace in the Black Sea Area.

The region is disturbed by dangers and threats, human and environmental security risks, with a global impact: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and dual-use items; illicit cross-border trafficking in human beings; considerable migration phenomena from Asia and Africa to the European Union; instability, tension, conflicts and organized crime activities; amplification of separatist tendencies, and reactivation of frozen conflicts. NATO has named the conflict in Ukraine a hybrid war, introducing an ad-hoc term in the debates of the organization and those of the public opinion, without any base in international law. Actually, we are talking about a complex war, with symmetrical (activation of the Russian unities that are in Crimea) and asymmetrical components (using “the green little men”), but also with dissymmetrical ones (“gas dispute”), without Ukraine’s possibility to react to it.

For NATO, the Black Sea Area has become the new frontline in the fight against trafficking of human beings, drug smuggling, and illicit arms trafficking, etc. Along with the campaign against terrorism started in Afghanistan and Iraq, the extension of NATO’s responsibilities in the Black Sea Area has become one of the main elements of the Western strategy as well.

By the admission of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO on the 29th of March 2004, the borders of the member states bordering the Black Sea Area measure 2174 km (Turkey 1595 km, Romania 225 km, Bulgaria 354 km). This means that NATO takes care of half of the Black Sea’s coast line which measures 4090 km.

NATO became more influential in the Black Sea Area in 2006 when the US signed agreements with Romania and Bulgaria on the establishment of American military bases on their territories. Therefore, four American military bases have been established in Romania and four more in Bulgaria with a view to launching military campaigns against the logistic
bases of the terrorist organizations from the Middle East which is the source of the most serious threats to regional security. Later on Georgia and Ukraine showed interest in hosting this kind of bases on their territories and allowed NATO access in their air space for missions fighting cross-border organized crime.

During the NATO Summit “Security at the Black Sea” in Bucharest in 2008, the strategic importance of the Black Sea was acknowledged and NATO undertook to support bordering member states. Allies acknowledged the strategic importance of the Black Sea for the Euro-Atlantic security. NATO officials appreciated the progress made in consolidating regional responsibility with a view to developing dialogue and cooperation among the Black sea states and the Alliance.

One of the important NATO’s aims is the establishment of some military facilities on the Western shore of the Black Sea in Romania and Bulgaria to fight terrorism. The Black Sea Area has got problems in stopping the afflux of smuggled products, illicit arms trafficking, drug smuggling, trafficking in human beings and nuclear weapons.

Romania has been actively involved in solving the major problems that worry the EU and NATO: economic and social differences, ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism and organized crime, illicit arms trafficking, drug smuggling and trafficking in human beings, corruption and disrespect for fundamental human rights.

Romania plays and active and positive part in finding a solution to regional crises. Its important economic, human and military potential is appreciated worldwide, being comparable with the one of the developed countries, which allows it to ensure a stable balance in the region together with the other states of the Black Sea Area.

We think that ensuring maritime security is important for creating a favorable climate for peace and international commercial relationships.

In order to set some general objectives of maritime security, as part of Romania’s security, it is necessary to analyze the Black Sea Area geopolitically and geo-strategically, and to define our country’s role as a NATO member state and EU member state in order to assert its national interests. In our opinion, maritime security represents a headline target of the national security policy.

In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to use the potential of the instruments and judicial and administrative mechanisms to fight terrorism and organized crime. All actors must act together (the European Union, OSCE and NATO) in order to guarantee the security of ports and ships, to develop methods which offer better information about maritime traffic incidents and to reduce the effects of the impact of transnational organized crime on the maritime environment.

The Black Sea is an area where the strategic interests of the European Union and NATO meet. This fact can transform this region in a platform for cooperation contributing to the consolidation of maritime security.

The Black Sea Area is important for NATO and the solutions to ensure the security of maritime transports are often compared to the policies from other areas, the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea. Those models had different approaches and regional conditions of application. The length of the asymmetric threats during the last years, by reference to the maritime area especially, has decisively required implementation of the norms of international law with a view to ensuring the security of maritime transports.

The Black Sea has played and will continue to play a major part in the history of the European continent and it is about to become an area of convergence of some political tendencies that appeared at the beginning of the 21st century.
There is no precise solution to fight risks, no matter what their traditional-military or asymmetric-nonconventional nature is, in the Black Sea Area. We live in a time that is contradictory and troubled by the effects of the globalization processes, of the rebalancing of powers both regionally and worldwide, of a world that keeps changing, marked by huge efforts of the entire international community for the efficient management of the crises originated in the international armed conflicts.

The aerial systems of surveillance, in the area of free sea, are interoperable and adapted to a common software.

We think it is necessary to amplify international cooperation to fight and to stop cross-border organized crime.

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OPERATIONAL ART IN MODERN MARITIME OPERATIONS

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Abstract
The clarity and efficiency of the planning of maritime operations depends on the quality of training, understanding and successful application of operational art in developing operational design eliminating such uncertainties and operational environment variables that could influence an appropriate response to possible threats due to the changes in the geostrategic scene. In this article we bring to your attention some aspects of theoretical on the importance of using operational art during the preparation, organization and conduct of maritime operations in order to remove misunderstandings and omissions that could endanger, failure to comply with the conditions of achieving desired end states.

Keywords: operational art, interpretation, operation, operational level, elements of design.

"War is a matter of vital importance for the state, area of life and death, the way of the survival or to destruction. It's necessary to be studied thoroughly.”
Sun Tzi „The art of war”

The changes taking place on the stage perennial security environment, identifying risks, vulnerabilities and adoption followed directions require changes in regulations that dictate continue running the planning process. All this is reflected on the meaning and correct understanding need art operations in maritime operations, meaning that often has a pejorative meaning.

However, if action planning maritime forces at the tactical level is a process easily accomplished through the “steps” described in the "Operations Planning Manual", all items can be viewed objectively, the same could be done at the operational level, particularly important due to the level of bonding between strategic and tactical level; for this reason, the impediments are found both in understanding ambiguous processes and phenomena that shape as a whole, operational art and the subjective interpretation of all elements of design flows described in “Operations Planning Manual”.

In this context, in our approach, we try to bring to your attention certain aspects of operational art seen from the perspective of planning of modern maritime operations, understanding and proper application of its elements representing a wish not very easy to achieve and which constitute an essential part of military art and that can bring a noticeable change to remove ambiguities, artificial barriers and contradictions that arise during the implementation of a planning process.

In terms of planning maritime operations, the Navy still undergoing a process of transformation and standardization aiming at an optimum level, modern, efficient and consistent with that of NATO countries among which we tend to get. This process of standardization of planning is given and the need to respond adequately and in a coherent manner possible threats existing in the sphere of geopolitics in the Black Sea, prompting the same extent, a particular interest in terms of adapting the Navy to character multinational forces. At the same time, the involvement of multinational forces within joint maritime operations can cause problems of planning, efficiency,
maneuverability, timing/coordination, logistical support, command and control operations, all of which could be avoided if they are understood and managed consistent with operational art.

Throughout history of military conflicts, the first “bones” of operational art were recorded during the “Campaign of Ulm” (sept. – October. 1805) when Napoleon I foreshadowed, for the first time, the need for the military thinking of operational level planning, organization and conduct of military operations with the emergence of an army corps numerous and different cultures and who, under the auspices of planning, coordination, synchronization, maneuver and ensure logistical competed successfully to achieve a common goal.

Also, during eighteenth century and beginning of nineteenth century, it was customary term "Great Tactics" to describe maneuver troops as precursor enforcement action attack and during nineteenth century was in circulation the term "Minor Strategy” whose meaning was similar to what is meant to be today, operational art. Later, during the Second World War when military equipment was mechanized, it was used the term “Operational Mobility” to play action to lead troops from parking place to the tactics area of responsibility.

For starters, one aspect that requires to be enlighten is definition of operational art. According to the Operations Planning Manual, operational art is "skillfully employing the military instrument in order to achieve strategic and/or operational objectives, by design, organization, integration and management of campaigns, operations and battles, linking the strategy to the military tactics". Another definition of what is operational art is found in AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine: „Operational Art is the orchestration of an operation, in concert with other agencies, to convert strategic objectives into tactical activity in order to achieve a desired outcome". The two definitions are almost identical as planning operations manual takes concepts of planning from NATO document except that it wanted to highlight a very important aspect that use of operational art allows the commander to addressing and solving complex problems and who have a illegible structure, he can provide clear and logical solutions (some being the intuitive nature) to enable the implementation of plans and orders.

Similar and even interesting is the interpretation of Russian literature, namely: operational art - the branch of military art - involves theory, training (practice) and conduct operations independently or in cooperation, by the operating units of the armed forces in various theaters. The theoretical part deals with the study of nature and content of operations (combat actions such as attack, defense, reoccupation of operations area), also, it study development of methods for preparing and conducting combat operations in order to identify the most effective ways to fight against the enemy, as well as, the analysis methods on the successful interaction of these operations (develop recommendations regarding actions management, operational support of it). So between interpretations stated in NATO and Russia documents, they share the same common part, namely, the achievement of strategic and/or operational objectives through the use of the military instrument. Notable differences between the two types of interpretations are:

– a first difference is that Western explanation given commanders freedom to put their intuitive nature, being skillful, while the Russian is clear: development and implementation of methods, only those exclusive, by using of the military instrument leaving commanders freedom to use intuition, to use his qualities of military genius; so this interpretation, we might say, that this interpretation has a "dictatorial" character.

– another difference is that the eastealy interpretation has an reverse

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2 NATO, AJP 01(D) ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE, NSA, 2010, pp. 5-8.
relationship between the strategic/operational objectives, methods and military means: for instance strategic/operational objectives are set taking into account the level of development of operational art theory and practice as well as real possibilities to fulfill using the military instrument. It could therefore justify "ardor" exhibited by Russian officials regarding equipping and modernization of military equipment.

Another point of view that we would like to emphasize in terms of operational art interpretation is that given by the China’s doctrine: "operational art involves combining operational power, space operations and operational methods to obtain the desired effects in theater". With strong Russian interference in the years 70'-90', China has been reformed doctrine between 1999-2000 focusing on military science with its two components: military theory and practice or operational art. The first part defines the concepts of operational art and methods of application, and the second component, namely the operational art, studying methods of organization and execution of operations, including thinking operative in terms of principles, command and control (C2), the management of time and space offensive and defensive actions, tasks set by the political and logistical support. As differences between the definitions referred to NATO documents and chinesse interpretation, we highlight just left fingerprints, throughout history, philosophy and military traditions: while the western side bears influences from Carl von Clausewitz’s work "On War" who said that war can not win without heavy fighting, the easterns interpretation is dominated by the depth of Taoist and Confucian’s ideas characterized by the cult of supreme balance of contempt radical for violence and care for the spiritual and moral realities that determine social, and also by the military traditions expressed by Sun Tzu in "The Art of War".

As a result of the statements above, we can say that regardless of culture, military tradition, national identity and social organization, economic or political role of operational art is properly understood as a whole, have the same purpose – the fulfillment of strategic/operational objectives with the same means - military instrument but with different methods of organizing and conducting combat operations due to the different level of equipment with military equipment and of the different cultural military background.

Another important aspect in the analysis of operative art is the determination of the place they occupy, and the subject of it. The operational art represents, together with the strategy and tactics, a component of the military art which, in its turn, is a field of study of military science, dealing with the study and generalization of the experience of battles in order to knowledge and the development of principles, rules and methods of action. More broadly, the operational art deals with the study of theoretical and practical preparation and waging military operations and develops the principles, rules and procedures for the preparation and war-fighting operations in line with the laws of military combat, the military means created by science and modern technique with the characteristics of operation theatres. Narrow, operational art is studying how to use military forces to meet strategic/operational objectives by designing, organisation, integration and management of major combat operations and actions. At the same time, through the use of operational art are determined time, place and purpose for which the main forces will be used in order to influence the course of actions of the enemy. She also determines forces deployment, employment or their withdrawal from the battle, and the organization of the main operations for the achievement of strategic and operational objectives.

Next, we will address the concept of maritime operation as the domain of the...
operational art. Firstly, we would bring attention to the definition of joint operation according to JP 3-0 "Joint Operations": "joint operations describes military actions conducted by joint forces or by Service forces employed under command relationships". Another definition to consider is related to multinational operations that are "multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action."

In other words, the military operation is any kind of lethal or non-lethal military tool carried out by, involving relationships of command and control and aimed at achieving certain goals. What does maritime operation mean? Naval Forces maritime operation aimed at achieving the objectives established for military maritime area of operations, which directly lead to the attainment of echelon’s objectives, using the maritime capabilities.

For achievement of strategic/operational level task naval forces conducted operations of naval battles/major operations type that, in turn, can be carried out within the framework of a campaign, this is always a joint operation. The planning is done by integrating the military power with the power of a nation in order to achieve the conditions that define the desired final condition laid down in strategic/operational level. Therefore, a campaign is a set of operations conducted through naval battles/major operations in a given order and at a given time and space and aimed at fulfilling one or all of the strategic/operational objectives. However, it is not wrong to say that Navy tactical units also conducted naval battles: the major difference that separates them between the two levels – the operational and tactical – is that the battle of tactical level is limited in time and space, while in the operational level naval battles are more extensive in time and space. In addition, at the tactical level, aside from battles, operations may carry out engagements, fighting which represents the short confrontation as time, on the order of minutes, hours or, at most, a few days, walked between two groups of forces of the tactical level, carried out in an organised and pursuing the achievement of goals.

Relying on operational art, in the operations area are established: principles of use of the available forces in the area of operations; the place and time of the action; the algorithm of using forces/deployment, hiring, withdrawal; the algorithm of naval battles/major; how to achieve cooperation between services, departments and multinational forces.

What does naval battles versus major operations mean? In The Military Lexicon battle is defined as “combat ensemble conducted by forces of an operational/tactical groups, simultaneously or successively, in a unitary concept, in cooperation with other forces in a limited period of time, in an area of operations, or in a part thereof, including the objectives of operational significance (maritime bases, maritime knots of great importance, counties that have essential maritime determinations on action within operational design whose maintenance is especially important in..."
terms of politic, economic, military, cultural and moral) in order to meet one or more of the partial strategic purposes of operation or war.

Among the elements that define the major operation can be listed as follows:
- the carrying a major operational unit;
- unfolds in a single area of operation or part of it thereof encompassing objectives of operational significance;
- it runs after a single concept plan and a defined time;
- the aim of the operation is an integral part of the strategic operation (production loss, destruction, maintenance of alignments).

If the purpose of strategic operations can say that it has mostly politico-military character, the major operation has a military character.

Comparing the defining elements of the two types of operations (strategic and operational) we can establish some criteria shootout materialized in:
- the purpose of the operation;
- the value of forces constituted for the operation;
- the importance of the objectives included in the content;
- the extent of actions to be executed for the purposes of the operation;
- services and branches of armed forces involved in the operation and the magnitude of the actions carried out by them.

So, defining elements of a major operation shows that it is part of a strategic operations.

Emphasizing the idea that operational art helps commander to imagine how to achieve the conditions that define the end state, it is necessary for him and his staff have an operational approach that would provide the big picture of the operational environment in which they can use operational art’s elements. Analysis of the operational environment in the light of these elements will help them to understand, to grant them the ability to combine the power of the combative forces subordinate to, as in the end, acknowledging the intention of the commander and his guide lines. These elements of the operational art represents, in fact, some of the elements of the operational design and consist of:

1. End state\(^7\) represent the situation described by the conditions that must exist at the end of the operation. In this regard, the establishment of these conditions implies inexistence of variables of the operational environment which in turn must be analyzed in the light of the eight areas PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time)\(^8\). Emphasized that the PMESII-PT analysis is done, chiefly, in the strategic/operational level; at the tactical level, the operational environment analysis is done by examining the six variables that may affect the fulfillment of the mission – METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations)\(^9\). The correct analyse of the operational environment, the commanders shall conduct operations for the achievement of the desired final condition that sometimes may change during deployment of operations as a result of the changing of the conditions of the operational environment. In this case, they will reevaluate the intentions and guide lines so that the desired new end state can be met.

2. Centers of gravity\(^10\). In recent years, in the literature, were spun off a series of concepts and definitions of the center of gravity (CoG) who, in the end, it is clearly an organization power equated with critical vulnerabilities – the resultant component of analyzing of the center of gravity – equivalent weaknesses that they should exploited in order to neutralizing the enemy’s CoG. Why is the center of gravity so important? Whereas the intensity of fighting is in direct correlation with the constitution and protecting it in the right place and at the appropriate time. This can be achieved by concentrating the

\(^7\) Ibidem, pp. 7-6.
\(^8\) Ibidem, pp. 1-5.
\(^10\) Ibidem, 7-6.
use of force upon the enemy's center of gravity for the purpose of its kind, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the achievement of force in efforts to protect their own center of gravity. In this regard, it is essential to look at him, from all points of view, as a system consisting of those elements which interact both with each other and with the outside and whose disappearance sequential or total may cause system crashes. During planning may be determined at any given time, several centers of gravity but in order to cause the enemy to accept defeat, in its entirety, should be neutralised that center of gravity that is most important and incorporating other centres more or less viable. This statement has a corresponding only to the tactical level, and sometimes for the operational level; for strategic level and most of the time, at the operational level it can be more than one center of gravity. To support what we said earlier, Dr. Joseph l. Strange takes over and develops the idea that Clausewitz circulated that a CoG can be of a physical nature/material – human and material resources, production of goods and services for defense and military effectives subsistence and population centers of political and military leadership, communication infrastructure – or moral/spiritual values, traditions, habits, psychological traits peculiar to a nation that give power – to resist, their will continue the fight and keep the unity and cohesion of the army and the civilian population in the face of an opponent's attacks. Very important is the fact that these two CoG (material nature and moral in nature) are interdependent and it is imposing interrelate continuous presence of both. As a conclusion of the accusations about the CoG, the reference remains the idea of Colonel (r) Petre DUŢU whereby different interpretations regarding the "understanding and identification of a center of gravity is due to both the way different than training as soldiers, as well as the experience gained in different theatres of operations. Also, the services of armed forces to which the beneficiary belongs, it influences the design and approach of the status and role of the Centre of gravity during armed conflict."11.

3. Another element of the operational art is represented by direct or indirect approach12 of the centre of gravity once it has been identified. The term "approach", in military sense, in this context, it means the commander's personal manner to deal with the center of gravity. In this regard, direct approach of commander personal manner means to directly attack the enemy's center of gravity by using military power. In most cases, this approach is avoided by commanders because it is known, whereas, the enemy center of gravity is very well-protected and attacking his it does mean that "unconscious" military power and unobtainable the desired result. Therefore, the manner of indirect approach is the most widely used whereas supposes military power with maximum efficiency, when there are displayed the existence of decisive points, avoiding thus the military power of the enemy.

4. Decisive points13 can be represented by geographical areas/spaces, events, or circumstances which, in the military sense, can lead to an increased advantage relative to your opponent or, even, can contribute to the achievement of success. This element of the operational art, where at the operative level, touching them, can lead to attacking enemy’s CoG but does not neutralize him, may be taken into account at the tactical level, just to complete the mission. As examples, points could be decisive: zone/geographic spaces – port facilities, network infrastructure, military bases; events – logistics movement capability; factors/conditions – running a refinery.

5. Lines of operations/effort14. A line of operation represents the direction to follow, in time and space, of its own

12 FM 3-0, Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008, pp. 7-6.
13 Ibidem, 7-9.
14 Idem.
force in relation to the enemy from the moment of opening of the operation to the achievement of the objectives, on whose trajectory can be found decisive points. In addition to these lines, between those points mark the decisive phases of the operation of the tactical level, are thus a way to sync these actions by the high-end level. The line of effort represents the line direction for concentration of effort in the performance of duties (operational level) in order to achieve the conditions (at the operational or strategic level) that will achieve the desired end state (at the strategic level-military or political). These representations are essential, at operational level, when they are involved and other non-military agencies and the conduct of the operation covers a long period of time. In addition, they offer the big picture for the commander visualize how he would be able to use military power in support of other instruments of power (diplomatic, economic and civil).

6. Operational reach. According FM 3-0 "Operations” this element of the operational art represents “the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities.” Operational reach is always in conjunction with lines of operations and allow the commander to see how to achieve the success of an operation using, in an effective manner, of military capabilities within the operative action. When you reach the operational reach of the military capabilities it shall meet the conditions of a culmination. To use this feature, the commander must correlate effective endurance, momentum and protection.

7. Culmination. According to the Operations Planning Manual, the culmination is "a time of operation in which the force can no longer achieve success, this concept can be applied both in defense and offensive.” In other words, it is placed in time and space when the military forces can no longer lead the actions started as a result of resource depletion and energy; so this point is found, always at the limit of operative action.

These seven elements of operational art are found, in an identical manner, in the elements of operational design. Further, we will expose the other elements of the operational art that does not match the design task force, namely:

1. Tempo. In the Operations Planning Manual tempo of the operation is "the rhythm of the action of the force reported at within the opponent's fighting and operations.” Controlling with efficacy, the rhythm of the action of the force it can use them through their operational reach while maintaining the initiative in combat. A high rhythm is useful in offensive or defensive action but can lead to high consumption of energy and resources. By combining the capabilities of the resources and energy efficient, the commander may establish such a rhythm of the operations, in time and space, in order to avoid unnecessary focusing employment and capabilities in the decisive points.

2. Simultaneity and depth. Simultaneity and depth results in operations that are expanding as time and space leading to obtain lasting effects. The combination of simultaneous actions offensive, defensive, and stability can overwhelm enemy causing it to no longer have the will to resist. Depth may cause disruption of the enemy's decision-making cycle and, todată, loss of its capabilities before you use them.

3. Phasing and transition. There are instances when commanders shall establish more goals as a result of extensive operations like time and space...
and may thus be achieved, the simultaneity. It is precisely due to this fact, as well as the need to maintain a certain tempo, it is necessary to partition the operation established itself on the phase coordination capabilities, and synchronizing their actions to exploit, the operative action limit in order to concentrate military power around the decisive points in order to obtain the expected effects. The transition represents the stages, characterized by time and space, between the phases. These items must be thoroughly planned in order to maintain the tempo and moments of the execution of a series of attacks, just the fact that military capabilities during transitions are vulnerable to enemy actions.

4. **Risk**\(^{26}\) represents the event that can generate losses of any kind, and the commander must provide since the time planning to handle the situation accordingly. Provided for since the time of planning, this risk becomes assumed by the commander that you can exploit to create opportunities in taking initiative and obtain the success of the operation.

Further, I like to present the six elements of operational design that are not found in the elements of operational art:

1. **Termination**\(^{27}\). A planning process is not effective unless it was understood the final end state and that conditions must exist at either end of the operation. As a result, a proper quantification of this element leads to the formulation of the desired end state and objectives to be achieved, since the early stages of planning to understand, from the outset, of the conditions which must be complied with at the end of the operation in accepted terms by nation/nations participating in the operation. Several criteria it can be used to determine the completion of the operation, namely:

- borders of state X are secured;
- X state no longer possess offensive capabilities to represent a threat to other countries in the region;
- security forces of the state X is sufficient to repress any internal revolt;
- state X has enough military power represented by its capabilities, which are deployed near the state Y in order to ensure the support of the military.

2. **Objectives**\(^{28}\). An objective is, in fact, a well determined purpose, defined, achievable for military forces. In this sense, an objective must be SMART (ro)/S:

- **Specific**: this means that a specific objective indicates exactly what you want to achieve. A specific objective is very clearly expressed, leaves no room for doubt. A specific objective differs from the general one. He aimed at tangible results and not results in general;
- **Measurable**: it means that a objective can be quantified, either in terms of quantity, or quality. A measurable objective is one that enables exactly that can be touched or not, or to what degree can be achieved;
- **Approachable**: it means that a objective can be, indeed, feasible;
- **Relevant**: it means that objective contribute to the end state laid down in the planning process;
- **Temporal**: it means that the object contains date/time until which is intended to achieve.

The following errors must be avoided when they formulate an objective:

- the objectives are formulated in a vague, blurry manner;
- the objectives are established without having the necessary information in order to do that;
- the objectives are developed under certain conditions that change later;
- appear due to deficiencies in the formulation of objectives in preparation for poor judgement or through ignorance of military times non-operational art fair.

Related to the operational art, we can say that strategic objectives become operational purpose for operational level and operational objectives become tactical tasks for tactical level.

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\(^{26}\) Idem, 7-15

\(^{27}\) Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, August 2011, p. III-18.

\(^{28}\) Ibidem, III-20.
3. Effects\(^{29}\). The effect represents a physical and/or behavioral resulting system as a result of an action or set of actions, or the other effect. Effects are planned because they transpose in tasks whose realization go to achieve the goals proposed.

4. Anticipation\(^{30}\) it is the result of a process of analysis of various information arising from the operational environment, a result that leads to removal of surprise. A commander who predicted events, may have recourse to their exploitation of opportunities even if these events represent risks.

5. Arranging operations\(^{31}\). In The Operations Planning Manual we meet the element named as maneuver whose purpose is "obtaining favorable positions toward the opposing forces, from which its own forces can be used with maximum efficiency"\(^{32}\). Commander, combining effectively the three elements of the operative art-simultaneity, the depth and the tempo-effectiveness can be obtained for carrying out the tasks of the manoeuvre. All for the purpose of organizing the manoeuvre, planners can use following sub-elements:

- **5.1. Phases**\(^{33}\) as element of operational art;
- **5.2. Branches and sequels**\(^{34}\). Branches represent a set of options to provide more flexibility when you expected a situation that could change. Sequels represent a set of actions to be taken in the event of operations complementary to that of the main where there was a strategic/operational objective fulfilled.

- **5.3. Operational pause**\(^{35}\). Following the context under which the commander must obtain and maintain the initiative in the area of operations, not always can achieve this objective reasons, namely the exhaustion of resources of logistics, firepower disadvantage in comparison with that of the enemy. In this case, it is necessary to adopt an operational pause just to avoid the culmination and the commander will attempt to maintain the initiative through other means, for example, the maintenance of a part of the offensive, thus putting pressure on the enemy, and the other part of the force operational pauses.

6. Forces and functions\(^{36}\). When planning an operation, commander heading the attention to physical defeat of enemy forces or neutralising their functions (C2, logistics, protection, etc.) or neutralising some combination of the two. Direct effects resulting from these actions can lead to the production of certain indirect effects such as: uncertainty, confusion, panic, demoralization, and depended on the conditions that the enemy reaches its culmination. This manner of conducting an operation is characteristic of an indirect approach.

In the light of those presented in this article, we might say that listing and developing those aspects of the operational art, we did not want only to emphasize the importance of knowledge but also the efficient use of the operational art, both during the planning process and during the deployment of the operation, due to the need to address in terms of intrinsic to give evidence when the commander formulates his intention and direcționăriile for subordinates. Whereas the actions will obviously change over time, the same can be said about the nature of violent conflict that remains unchanged. Therefore, the essence of operational art remains unchanged with regard to the correlation between the effectiveness of the means, procedures and ends.

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\(^{29}\) Idem.

\(^{30}\) Idem, III-33.

\(^{31}\) Idem, III-35.


\(^{33}\) Ibidem, p. III-36.

\(^{34}\) Idem.

\(^{35}\) Idem, III-37.

\(^{36}\) Idem, III-38.


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THE ACTIVITY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS FOR THE REPRESSION OF WAR CRIMES

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Abstract: Since ancient times, mankind has faced the most serious situations following the outbreak of armed conflict. Culminating with the two great world wars that marked the twentieth century, many countries and international institutions have tried to find an appropriate regulatory framework to limit the negative effects of wars and hence the casualties. Although the international community has developed a series of tools and mechanisms in this respect, they have shown their limits in terms of gross violation of fundamental rights in situations of armed conflict such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. In most cases the war crimes and atrocities committed during the conflicts remained unpunished in the absence of Courts that can decide. Thus, ad hoc international criminal Courts (Nuremberg, Rwanda) and the International Criminal Court arise as a permanent Court with responsibility for war crimes.

Keywords: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, ad hoc international judicial institutions, permanent international judicial institutions

The activity of judicial institutions for the repression of war crimes is closely linked to the issue of determining the subject of criminal liability. Until recently there was the theory of collective criminal liability of a state for international crimes, which today is an outdated theory, contrary to international law principles. According to the same principles, for offenses committed in the name of a state, the responsibility is not of the state, but of the person or persons who committed those crimes. In other words, only individuals can be fined for international crimes. Further, the state may be held accountable for international crimes committed in its name or by its own citizens, but without the sanctions to be of a criminal nature. These sanctions may be economic, political, etc.

Historic moments relevant to international criminal jurisdiction

Since the early Middle Ages, the idea of having an international court to punish those who were guilty of mass murder and mistreatment of people has emerged. A good example is the case of the governor Peter von Hagenbach who, around the year 1474, was sentenced to death for crimes and abuses committed against civilians in the region of Alsace and Breisach. The condemnation came following a complaint by Austria, France, German and Swiss cities. It was implemented by an ad hoc international tribunal composed of members states allied against him. This case, although one rare at the time, is one that marks the first international sanction against someone who violated the rules or customs that safeguard the fundamental values at the time.

Later on, in 1872, Gustave Moyner, founder and president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, presented the draft of a treaty for the establishment of an international tribunal. A need for a supra-state body to enforce rules agreed by states, Moyner made this decision having unsuccessful experience of the Franco-

1 Grigore Geamănău, International criminal law and international crimes, RSR Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 1977, p.275
The project of "Convention for the creation of an international judicial institution to prevent and repress offenses of Geneva Convention" contained ten articles. The court was not permanent, but it only gathered in case of armed conflict and the complaints on violation of the Geneva Convention of 1864 could be addressed. As a feature, only governments could address the court by making justified complaints. Implementation of court convictions was the responsibility of governments of the states whose persons were convicted. Moyner's project failed to be implemented, being criticized from those time lawyers, one of these being related to the fact that the Court did not consider national jurisdictions. The project did not clearly define what crimes and what punishments entered within the competence of the tribunal. However, the project initiated by Gustave Moyner remains a courageous step which prefigured the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal. It seems that at that time the international community was not sufficiently developed at the level of ideas to support such a project.

Another attempt of establishing an international judicial institution was in 1907, by a Hague Convention which provides for the establishment of the International Prize Court, which had exclusive competence in the maritime area for the resolution of conflicting claims relating to captured ships during wartime (to capture ships by other foreign ships). The Convention has not been ratified and therefore had no effect in legal terms. The notion of the war crime is found for the first time in the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The Peace Treaty of Versailles was the one that confirmed the end of The First World War, among signatories being found Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers. The Treaty had a provision which set up an international tribunal to try the former German emperor, Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern. Under Article 227 of the Treaty, Wilhelm II would be tried for "supreme offense against international morality and the sacred authority of treaties". The charges against the former king were those of violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg and the principles of the Hague Convention. In the same Treaty, under Article 228, Germany recognized the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring individuals accused of war crimes in the military courts. No exception those who were already under the jurisdiction of the German penal institutions. The defendants could defend themselves, while Germany had to respond to any requests for information to prosecute them expeditiously. Depending on the victim country of origin, national or mixed courts were constituted. However, Wilhelm II was not tried. This was caused partially by his refuge to Holland, although it was made an extradition request, in whose content nothing was stipulated about the existing international recriminations. Other voices said that the Allies had not really wanted to send the former German emperor for trial, fearing not to create the

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4 Stelian Scăunaş, op. cit., p.125.
5 Grigore Geamănu, op. cit., p.281.
6 Ion Dragoman, Contribution to the study of war law in the period between the two wars, AISM Publisher House, Bucharest, 2000, p.92.
dangerous precedent to send a high-ranking dignitary for trial, a fact which they were not sufficiently prepared to manage. Except for some German officers, prisoners in Great Britain and France, other persons guilty of war crimes had not been brought in courts.

A visionary in the field of international criminal law, was also the Romanian Vespasian Pella, who held several positions in international tribunals, such as the UN legal expert and president of the International Association of Penal Law. He was noticed by the proposed statute for an international criminal tribunal. In 1937, following his steps, the Convention for the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal was adopted to deal with offenses contained in the Convention on prevention and prosecution of terrorism. The legal efforts in this respect were thwarted by the outbreak of the Second World War, and the conventions were not been operated. 8

Ad hoc criminal tribunals

The period up to the outbreak of the Second World War was marked by a series of projects that foreshadowed the international criminal liability in respect of international crimes. New standards on individual criminal liability for violations of laws of war were adopted after finding sad actions of unprecedented severity during the Second World War. Thus the so-called ad hoc courts arose to prosecute Nazi criminals, such as the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Tokyo Tribunal for punishing War Criminals to punish the Far East. Similarly, after the Cold War and in the absence of a permanent international court, as a result of the genocides committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, special courts were created. Their mission was punctual, which was to bring to justice those who were responsible for abominable crimes committed during the armed conflicts in those areas.

Through the London agreement, signed on August 8th, 1945, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was created in order to punish the war criminals. As a result of an international agreement between France, Britain, the US and the USSR, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, although it claims to be an international tribunal, was formed selectively only of the countries that came out victorious from the war. The Loser States, whose citizens were to be judged, had no representative in the composition of the tribunal. Moreover, only the citizens of defeated states were to be brought to justice, although war crimes had been perpetrated by both sides. 9

According to Article 6 of the Statute of the Tribunal, there were set "the crimes which attract individual responsibility and jurisdiction of the Court" and included three categories of offenses: crimes against peace (leadership, preparation, initiation or prosecution of a war of aggression, with violation of an international treaty); war crimes (murder, ill-treatment of civilians and prisoners of war, the execution of hostages, looting of public or private property, destruction and devastation without reason of the localities); crimes against humanity (extermination, enslavement, deportation, any inhumane act filed to civilian population, persecutions on political, racial or religious reasons). 10 The Nuremberg Tribunal functioned for almost a year, between November 1945 and October 1946 and had a total of over 400 public meetings. During its operation, more than 100 witnesses were heard, 24 people were indicted, high officials of the Nazi regime, three of which were discharged and 12

were sentenced to death. Among those who had been sentenced to death, there was the Reich Marshal Hermann Göring and the Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. In addition, there were criminalized and considered criminal organizations six Nazi institutions, including the leadership of the Nazi Party, SS and Gestapo service.\(^\text{11}\)

The establishment of the **International Military Tribunal for the Far East** (IMTFE) in Tokyo was possible due to the unconditional surrender of Japan.\(^\text{12}\) Terms of Japan surrender, stated in the "Potsdam Declaration" on July 26\(^{\text{th}}\), 1945\(^\text{13}\), and creation of the Commission for the Far East\(^\text{14}\) led to the establishment of a tribunal that would punish Japanese war criminals. Thus, on January 19\(^{\text{th}}\), 1946, the Supreme Commander of Allied in the Far East, Gen. Douglas MacArthur approved the act that originated the International Military Tribunal for the prosecution and punishment of major war criminals in the Far East, with headquarters in Tokyo. The Court was composed of a minimum of six and a maximum of 12 members, the panel was composed of six judges. General MacArthur was tasked with the coordination of the Tokyo Tribunal. Also, he was the one who called the President of the Court and the judges. The judges were appointed by the signatory states and by those that joined to the act of capitulation of Japan.

Compared to the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the Tokyo Tribunal powers were quasi-similar. A first difference is that the Tokyo tribunal could judge only individuals, not organizations, and the sentences could be appealed. The Tribunal powers in criminal matters were classified into three classes.\(^\text{15}\) Class A included crimes against peace and the Japanese leaders who had planned and had led the hostilities; Class B included offenses that aimed to those who had coordinated, authorized or not prevented the war crimes; Class C included the war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The Tokyo Tribunal carried out its work in the period between April 1946 and November 1948. During this period there were over 800 public hearings and about 130 in the deliberations chamber. The results of the Court in respect of sentences granted were seven convictions with capital punishment, 16 defendants received life imprisonment. Among those who were sentenced to death by hanging were ministers, senior military commanders and Prime ministers (Kōki Hirota – Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Gen. Hideki Tōjō – Army Commander, Prime Minister).\(^\text{16}\)

**The International Criminal Tribunal for War Crimes in Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)** was established by UN Security Council resolution no. 808 on February 22\(^{\text{nd}}\), 1993. The Court was mandated to try those who were guilty of war crimes and serious violations of human rights committed in the former Yugoslavia since January 1\(^{\text{st}}\), 1991 and until peace building.\(^\text{17}\) The tribunal based in The Hague is composed of 16 judges with permanent status and 27 members elected by the UN General Assembly for separate cases. By 1994 there was no hearing, the Court works focusing on defining rules of operation and organization. Activity of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia resulted in the indictment of 161 people, of whom 69 were convicted. A total of 13 people were sent to the national courts in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia.

\(^{11}\) Idem.

\(^{12}\) The terms of surrender were accepted by Japan on September 1\(^{\text{st}}\), 1945.

\(^{13}\) It was signed by the US, UK and China. On August 8\(^{\text{th}}\), 1945 the Declaration was also signed by the USSR.

\(^{14}\) Established in December 1945, as a result of the conference of Moscow. It was empowered to prosecute, judge and punish the war criminals in Japan.


\(^{16}\) In http://www.cnd.org/mirror/nanjing/NMTT.html, accessed on 3 sep. 2015.

Before the Court there are still four processes in different phases, trial or appeal, of important leaders, such as Ratko Mladic. The former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, accused of war crimes, has died in custody in The Hague.

Taking as inspiration The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations Security Council established by resolution no. 955 on November 8th, 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda based in Arusha, Tanzania. The purpose of the Court was to "punish the persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of the international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and against Rwandans, responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring States between January 1st, 1994 and December 31st, 1994". On September 2nd, 1998 there was the first conviction for genocide charge. The defendant Jean-Paul Akayesu, former mayor of Taba community, was sentenced to life imprisonment. Since the start of hearings in 1995, 93 people were indicted for violations of international humanitarian law, of which 61 people were convicted, 14 discharged and 10 sent to the national courts. There were prosecuted and convicted including members of the military and governmental elite, media and religious environment. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was the first court which investigated media leaders accused of sending messages (texts) with the obvious purpose of influencing people to commit acts of genocide.

**Permanent criminal jurisdiction**

The need for a permanent International Criminal Tribunal has been acknowledged as a necessity by the international community after the experience of the 90s, that of the ad hoc criminal tribunals, which had been made for a determined period of time in order to bring to justice those who were guilty only of issues arising in a specific situation, such as in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The initial (zero) moment of establishment of a permanent international criminal court occurred on July 17th, 1998 when 120 states adopted the Rome Statute, document which represents the legal basis for the organization and functioning of the International Criminal Court. Subsequently, on July 1st, 2002, 60 countries ratified the Statute. By now, 123 states have joined to the Rome Statute, becoming States Parties. More than half are states from Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific Region. It is important to note that the US has not acceded to the Statute.

According to the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court (ICC or The Court) is a permanent institution which has the power to exercise its prerogatives over individuals for the worst possible aspects which may be committed in international crime. A very important aspect to note is that it is defined as a complementary institution to the national institutions with powers in criminal matters. It was not created to supplement the national justice systems. The only cases in which the Court can replace a national system of justice are those where a national system of justice is incapable of, has no necessary procedures or unwilling for various reasons to conduct a fair and transparent process in cases of special gravity and importance.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) defines itself as an independent international institution that is not a part of the United Nations system. The head office is in The Hague, Netherlands. The main sources of financing of the Court are provided by the Member States and as secondary sources of financing, the Court receives donations from governments, international organizations, corporations, individuals or other entities. For 2015, the
Court has a budget of about 130 million Euro.\textsuperscript{21}

We can state that the Court's jurisdiction is limited and it accepts only the most serious offenses that are consistent with those defined by the international community, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. The Court cannot act retrospectively and it is able to judge only the facts that were committed after July 1\textsuperscript{st} 2002, the date of entry into force of the Statute. The States that joined later in the Rome Statute fall under the Statutes provisions on the signing date of accession.

Genocide is considered the most serious crime in the international law and includes acts that consist in the entire or partial destruction of human groups formed on national, ethnic, racial or religious criteria. Crimes against humanity consist of a series of acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, torture, rape, forced prostitution, serious deprivation of liberty, torture, forced deportation, persecution of a group on national, ethnic, racial, religious or sexual or on other criteria universally recognized by the international law as inadmissible and seriously harm the human integrity and human dignity.

War crimes include a wide manifestation of violent acts defined as such in the Statute of the Court\textsuperscript{22}, particularly those that are part of a plan or of a policy. War crimes are classified into four categories, according to the situation in which they were committed. The first category refers to serious violations of the Geneva Conventions of August 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1949, and includes acts against persons and property protected by the Geneva Conventions: "willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; intentional provocation of strong suffering or serious violations of physical integrity; extensive destruction and appropriation of property, unjustified by military necessity and carried out on a large scale, unlawful; coercing a prisoner of war to serve a foreign army."\textsuperscript{23} The second category of facts refers to serious violations of laws and customs applicable to international armed conflicts, and the third one to the violation of article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions, regarding acts against persons who do not participate in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms, and the last category includes the disregard for the rules of international law during a non-international armed conflict. The crime of aggression means, according to article 8 bis of the Statute, "the planning, preparation, initiation or execution by a person who is actually able to control or direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which by its nature, gravity and scale constitutes a clear overriding of the UN Charter."\textsuperscript{24}

The Court has jurisdiction over international crimes described as such in the Statute, only if they are committed in the national territory of the States Parties or if they are committed by their nationals. However, this rule does not apply if the case is notified by the United Nations Security Council, as UN resolutions are applicable to all UN Member States. Another situation in which the Court can act is the one in which a non-Member State notifies the Court accepts its jurisdiction.

The International Criminal Court does not grant immunity to anyone regardless of their position in the hierarchy of a state or military at the time when the offenses they are responsible for are committed. The Court does not judge minors. Court may sentence punishments that go up to 30 years in prison. In

\textsuperscript{21} In http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/TheCourtTodayEng.pdf, accessed on 6 sep. 2015
\textsuperscript{22} Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, in http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf, accessed on 3 sep. 2015
\textsuperscript{23} Idem
\textsuperscript{24} Idem
exceptional cases, the Court may order imprisonment for life. The punishment of imprisonment may be added to the obligation to pay a fine and confiscation of property acquired through crimes.

As a novelty in international law, besides the fact they can send information on the offenses related to the competence of the Court, the victims have the right to participate in all the process steps and to claim damages. Victims and witnesses may receive magisterial assistance and support throughout the process and protection from the ICC.

The International Criminal Court Bodies

The Presidency of the Court shall consist of the President and two Vice-Presidents. They are chosen from among the 18 judges of the ICC, which have a mandate of nine years and cannot be re-elected. The President of the Court is a very important position and ensures the relations between the Court and the external environment and also ensures the smooth running of the administrative matters of the ICC, and a proper coordination with the Office of the Prosecutor. Under the Article 38 of the Rome Statute, the Court's judges choose the presidency of the Court. Starting with March 11th, 2015, as President of the Court was elected Judge Silvia Alejandra Fernández de Gurmendi from Argentina.

The Prosecutor's Office is the independent body of the court. Chief Prosecutor and his aid are both elected by the Assembly of Member States. The main task of this body is to receive the complaints on various international crimes, to sort them, study and analyze them in order to start the investigation or not. The Chief Prosecutor is elected by the Assembly of Member States and has a mandate of nine years. Starting with June 15th, 2012, the ICC Chief Prosecutor is Mrs. Fatou Bensouda. She has replaced the former chief prosecutor of the Court and the first prosecutor in the history of the Court, Mr Luis Moreno Ocampo.

The International Criminal Court is made up of a total of three chambers: Pre-Trial Chamber, the Trial Chamber and the Appeal Chamber. In these three courts operate the 18 judges of the Court.

The Registry is headed by a chief clerk and a deputy. It is an administrative department for support, especially for the other bodies of the ICC. It holds a very important role in terms of providing aid for witnesses and support to victims and to defend their rights. The Registry is headed by Herman von Hebel from the Netherlands, elected by the judges for a mandate of five years.

Assembly of States Parties is the body with managerial role of the Court and it is composed of representatives of states which have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute. It is led by a Board consisting of a president and two vice presidents, plus 18 members elected by the Assembly for a mandate of three years. The selection of these members is made with respect to equitable geographical distribution and to have a good representation of the judiciary systems in which they originate.

The work of the International Criminal Court

According to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Prosecutor's Office may initiate and investigate a case in three separate situations. The first case relates to start the investigation on a complaint received from a State Party, which joined the Statute of the Court or of a State that recognizes the jurisdiction of the Court. Also, the United Nations Security Council may refer cases to the Court on that of its competence and not least, the prosecutor can self-refer on information received from individuals and

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25 Data processed on http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/Pages/default.aspx
organizations in the area of jurisdiction of the Court.

So far, the States members of the Rome Statute such as Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Mali reported offenses on their territory, related to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council reported serious cases in Darfur, Sudan and Libya. Regarding the cases in which investigations of the International Criminal Court Prosecutor started, following the procedures of self-referral, on March 31st, 2010 the investigation on the situation in Kenya was authorized and on October 3rd, 2011 the investigation on the situation in Ivory Coast was authorized.

The Prosecutor's Office is the body that oversees analysis of all complaints received to determine whether a situation reported is for the Court competence and to initiate the investigations. By the end of 2013, the Court received over 10,000 complaints under Article 15 of the Statute. Since the Prosecutor's Office determines that a situation is valid, under Article 53 of the Statute, the preliminary inquiry can start. To determine accurately whether a situation is imperative to start a criminal investigation, the preliminary investigation stage contains four distinct phases. The purpose of the four steps is to determine whether the situation can be investigated with the provisions of Article 15 of the Statute (step 1), taking into account the Court's jurisdiction in all its aspects (step 2), the criteria for admissibility of the case (step 3) and the interest of justice (step 4). Depending on the circumstances of each situation, the Court may decide to refuse an inquiry if the criteria specified in Article 53 of the Statute are not met, or to continue to assess the relevant national procedures or to continue to gather information to have the legal basis to initiate a criminal investigation.

In the preliminary investigation phase there are nine situations from distinct countries, in different stages of the investigation as follows: in the second stage, that of establishing jurisdiction of the Court there are Palestine, Honduras, Ukraine and Iraq; in the third stage of the admissibility of the case there are Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, and Nigeria.

In three of the cases, the Court has decided not to initiate a criminal investigation. It refers to The Republic of Korea and Venezuela. For Comoros States, on May 14th, 2013, the ICC received a referral from the Union of Comoros States regarding the interception by Israel forces of a humanitarian convoy of eight vessels in international waters. Three of them had the flag of Comoros States, Greece and Cambodia, states that had joined the Rome Statute. The raid ended with nine victims and dozens wounded. After preliminary examination, the International Criminal Court, claiming contextual objectives and reasons out of its jurisdictional area, including the relatively low impact of the event relative to its powers, it decided not to open an investigation.

At the moment, during the investigation phase of the ICC, there is in a number of 21 cases in nine situations whereas the facts that fall under the jurisdiction of the Court happened. These situations and cases are from: the Democratic Republic of Congo - six cases, Uganda - two cases, the Central African Republic - two cases, Darfur, Sudan - five cases, Kenya - three cases, Libya - a case, Ivory Coast - two cases and Mali. Six of these cases are at the stage of the process.

Recently, at the UN General Assembly, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, in his opening speech of the meeting, in front of the 193 member states representatives, asked for the first time the International Criminal Court referral on the situation in Syria.

The aspect of a particular relevance to the topic at hand is that the majority of persons indicted or convicted by the International Criminal Court are responsible for war crimes. Only in Congo, from the six people indicted totaling of 45 counts of indictment, 42 are war crimes. A similar situation is in Uganda, where for four people indicted there was established a number of 82 counts of indictment, of which 54 are war crimes. From Sudan
there have been brought to justice six people responsible for a total of 124 crimes, including 64 war crimes.

The Activity of National Institutions for repression of the war crimes

Romania has always had an open attitude and showed interest in compliance with the rules of the international criminal law for the repression of war crimes. Member country of the two institutions oriented to providing a safe and secure environment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), Romania joined fast to the regulations of the international law, by harmonizing the national legislation with them. Thus, the Penal Code of Romania stated that its provisions apply as such unless specified otherwise by an international treaty to which Romania is a party. In matters of international judicial cooperation, stipulated by EU acquis too, Romania has mostly ratified the European conventions. The fact that Romania acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court since 2002, is a further argument for the interest showed to the compliance with the regulations of the international criminal law. As a party of the Geneva Conventions of August 12th, 1949, Romania introduced in the new Penal Code, at Title XII - Crimes of genocide, against humanity and of war, a separate chapter that provides the war crimes against persons. Article 440, paragraph 1 of the new Penal Code expressly states which are the facts alleged for "committed within the framework of armed conflict, international or non-international, over a person or over a group of persons, protected by the international humanitarian law". Also, in paragraph 5, the persons who fall within the category of those protected by the international humanitarian law are described.

By the Government Decision no. 420 of 2006, the National Commission for International Humanitarian Law was established, as an advisory body of the Government, consisting of representatives from Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense, Justice, Education, and Health. Based on the recommendations of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Commission was created with the purpose of initiating a series of activities with the aim of increasing the national and international visibility of the Romanian efforts towards the development of the international humanitarian law. In 2007, the Commission developed the National Strategy of Romania for the implementation of the international humanitarian law, published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 871 of 2007. The committed aim of the Strategy is to provide knowledge and respect for the obligations of Romania in the field of the international humanitarian law and their dissemination to the civilian population.

The rules of international law are the underlying regulation of interstate relations. The international humanitarian law is the law applicable to states during an armed dispute, which focuses on preventing the violent confrontations and also the limitation of their impact. Globally, through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other conventions in the field, and on the European level through the European Court of Human Rights and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, there have tried to be created a framework and some mechanisms to watch and monitor the compliance with the civil, political and otherwise rights, and the protection and compensation of the victims of armed conflicts. However, Member States could not remove the serious impacts on human security in terms of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and unprecedented violation of fundamental rights, many of the perpetrators of crimes committed during the armed conflict remaining unpunished. For this reason there have been created ad hoc international courts in an attempt to resolve every serious collectively breach of the fundamental rights in terms of criminal liability. The concept of individual criminal liability developed mainly after the Second World War, the two Criminal
Courts, in Nuremberg and in Tokyo, being good examples in this regard. Although the courts were blamed for being one sided in the benefit of the winner or that the political factor induced bias in judging cases, the two courts created the precedent needed to set up a permanent Criminal Court. On the international community desire and will to end the security threats and to hold accountable those who were responsible for serious violations of the humanitarian law also, the two ad hoc Criminal Courts were created, for atrocities in Rwanda and the war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. The idea of creating a permanent International Court encountered many controversies over time, controversies that hid a series of problems for states, from a general distrust in the objectivity of such a Court, to creating a common framework of operation, determining the exact terms of jurisdiction and the conceptual boundaries of terms which had to be universally accepted. The establishment of the International Criminal Court represents a breakthrough in terms of repressing the war crimes, especially by introducing a unified vision in the field. Although perfectible, especially through the organization, in the Romanian Criminal Code, the genocide, the crimes against humanity and the war crimes have been introduced and shall be punished with severe penalties.

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CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES REGARDING FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING ACTIVITY OF THE BUDGETARY SECTOR

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Abstract: Accounting, as a specialized activity in measurement, assessment, knowledge, management and control of assets, liabilities and own capitals, as well as the results obtained from public institutions activities, must provide chronological and systematic registration and processing. It also must publish and maintain information on financial position, financial performance and cash flows, both for internal requirements and for external users: Government, Parliament, creditors, customers, and other users as well (international financial institutions).

Keywords: public social functions, specific chart of accounts, loan managers.

Budgetary institutions have certain peculiarities that also define a different way of organizing and managing accounting, besides economic agents, as follows:

a) Do not cover their expenses from their own income, except the self-financed institutions, in exchange receiving, entirely, from the state budget or local, as appropriate, the funds required for implementation of their tasks.

b) Institutions are not equipped with net current assets.

c) Budgetary institutions, including those partially or fully self-financed by their own revenue, usually fulfill certain public social functions representing the state in certain areas of activity such as state administration, education, health, culture, art, national defense, etc. or certain economic activities of public interest, such as street maintenance, parks and green areas, etc.

Due to these characteristic peculiarities, budgetary institutions use a specific chart of accounts and accounting records adapted to the specific features imposed by the nature of the activity.

Accounting Law no. 82/1991 establishes the obligation of managing the accounting records based on the norms elaborated by the Ministry of Finance, by all public institutions that have the status of credit release authority.

Therefore, the ministries, departments and other central bodies of public administration, whose leaders have the status of principal loan managers and public institutions with legal personality in their subordination, organize the accounting of revenues received and expenditures made under the approved budget, off-budget resources and special funds, with a record of everything under management. Also, local subordination of state institutions that have legal personality and whose managers have the status of authorizing officers organize and lead the accounting of revenues and expenses, under the approved budget, as well as the heritage found under their management.

Public institutions are compelled to organize and manage their own accounts, financial accountancy as well and, where appropriate, management accounting.

Accounting, as a specialized activity in measurement, assessment, knowledge, management and control of assets, liabilities and own capitals, as well as the results obtained from public institutions activities, must provide chronological and systematic registration, processing, publish and maintain information on financial position, financial performance and cash flows, both for
internal requirements and for external users: Government, Parliament, creditors, customers, and other users as well (international financial institutions).

Accounting of public institutions ensures information to authorizing officers regarding budgetary execution of income and expenses, the budgetary outturn, the assets under administration, the patrimonial (economic) result, the cost of the approved programs by budget, but also information needed to draft the annual general account of execution of the state’s budget, the annual execution account of the state’s social insurance budget and special funds.

Within the meaning of Finance Law no. 500/2002, public institutions represent the generic naming which includes the Parliament, Presidential Administration, ministries, other specialized bodies of public administration, other public authorities, autonomous public institutions and the institutions in their subordination, regardless of how they are funded.

For the purposes of the Government Emergency Ordinance on local public finances no. 45/2003, approved with amendments and supplements, public institutions represent generic denomination that includes the communes, towns, municipalities, districts of Bucharest, counties, Bucharest, public institutions and services in their subordination with legal status, regardless of method of financing their work.

According to existing regulations in public finance and accounting, public accounting includes:

a) accounting of revenue and budgetary expenditures, which reflects the collection of revenue and payment of costs pertain to annual budget;
b) the State Treasury accounts\(^1\);
c) general accounting based on the principle of establishing rights and obligations, which reflect the evolution of economical and financial situation, as well as patrimonial excess or deficit;
d) accounting intended for the analysis of approved programs expenses\(^2\).

For the purposes of section a) and c) account planning will include:

- budgetary accounts - for reflecting the revenue collection and payment of expenses and determining budgetary outturn (surplus or deficit).

Accountancy of income budgetary expenditures is achieved by means of special accounts opened on budget classification structure in place. These accounts ensures the recording of revenue received and expenses paid under the approved budget and provide the required information for the assembly of the account for budgetary execution and establishing budgetary outturn;

- General accounts - for reflecting the institution’s assets and liabilities, income and expenditure of the year, whether revenue has been received and expenses paid, to determine the patrimonial result (surplus or deficit asset).

Accountancy accounts will be consistent with present regulations, correct and complete and will provide true and accurate position of the heritage and the implementation of the budget.

Public institutions are required to conduct double entry bookkeeping using accounts provided for in the general accounts.

The chart of accounts includes the following general classes of accounts:

- Class 1 "capital accounts";
- Class 2 "fixed assets accounts";
- Class 3 "Inventories and work in course of execution";
- Class 4 "Third party accounts";
- Class 5 "Accounts from the state treasury and commercial banks";
- Class 6 "Expense accounts";

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1 State Treasury Accounting does not cover the presented regulations.

2 Accounting intended to the analysis of approved programs expenses will be developed in a methodological standpoint after the implementation of component c)
• Class 7 "Revenue accounts and funding."

In the context of classes there are several groups of accounts, and the groups are developed on synthetic accounts of Tier I and II. Synthetic accounts can be developed in analytical accounts according to the particularities of the activity and its own necessities and information.

With these accounts, public institutions record the economic and financial operations based on accounting principles of rights and obligations (commitments), and upon the creation, transformation or the disappearance / reverse of an economic value of a debt or an obligation.

For this purpose, the main credit release authorities elaborate accounting plans with the development of accounts in analytics and monographs containing specific operations of their respective activity.

Public institutions also perform direct accounting usually, in separate compartments, led by a chief financial, accounting officer or another person entitled to perform this function. These individuals should have a degree in higher economic and together with his staff are responsible with the organization and management of accounting, under the law.

The head of financial and accounting department is the person who holds the position of leading financial-accounting department and is also responsible for the collection of revenue and the payment of expenses and, where appropriate, one of the people who shall perform these functions within a public institutions that does not have in its structure a financial and accounting department or person who fulfills these tasks on a contractual basis under the law.

The persons responsible for organization and management must ensure, according to the law, the necessary conditions for organizing and conducting accurate and timely accounting, organizing and performing inventory of assets and liabilities and capitalization of its results, following the rules of drafting financial situations, in time deposits of these situations to the authorized institutions, retention of supporting documents, records and financial situations, organizing the management accounting, adapted to the peculiarities of the public.

Currency and currency registration

The accountancy of economic and financial transactions is kept in Romanian language and currency. Accountancy of forex operations is handled both in national currency and foreign currency, according to regulations issued in this context.

Transactions regarding foreign currency, receipts and payments, shall be accounted in daily currency, elaborated by the National Bank of Romania.

In the financial statement date, monetary items denominated in foreign currency (availability and other assimilated items, receivables and payables) are revalued at the exchange rate notified by National Bank of Romania for the last day of the reporting period.

Recording of accounting operations of public institutions regarding the European Community refundable financial contribution is carried out in EUR and RON at INFO-EUR rate. INFO-EUR rate is the exchange rate between the EUR and the national currency and it is communicated by the European Central Bank. INFO-EUR rate used during the accounting registration of transactions in the current month (n) is the one from the second-last working day of the preceding month (n-1). This rate will be used by all public institutions that carry out transactions financed by PHARE, ISPA etc. community budget, namely: Agencies and / or Implementing Authorities, public institutions - beneficiaries - of such funds under various forms: availability, goods, services.

Monetary items denominated in EUR: availabilities and bank deposits,
receivables and liabilities are revalued, at least, at the preparation of financial statements, at INFO-EUR rate on the penultimate working day of the month released in which the financial statements are prepared.

**Supporting documents and accounting records**

Possession of any title, of goods, stock, cash and other rights and obligations, as well as conducting economic transactions without being accounted, constitutes contraventions to the Accounting Law, if not committed in such conditions that, according to the law, are infringements of the law.

Public institutions record the economical and financial transactions when they are carried out under justifying evidences based on which they are recorded in journals, fact sheets and other accounting documents as appropriate.

Documentary evidence shall bear the following elements:

- document name;
- the name and, where appropriate, branch offices working out the document;
- file number and date;
- indication of the parties engaged in the economic and financial transactions (where applicable);
- economic and financial transaction content and, where necessary, the legal basis of its performance;
- quantity and value data related to conducted economic and financial transactions;
- full name and signatures of the persons responsible for carrying out economic and financial transactions, the persons responsible of the preventive financial check and the persons entitled to approve the transactions, as applicable;
- other elements meant to ensure complete registration of transactions performed.

Entries in the accounts shall be performed chronologically, compliance with the succession after compiling of documents or their input in the unit and systematically into synthetic and analytical accounts, in accordance with the rules set for recording in accountancy as "Chess-Master".

Entries in the accounts can be done manually or using computer systems of automatic data processing.

Accounting registers and common forms on the economy, which have special procedure series marking and numbering, regarding financial and accounting activities can be adapted according to the characteristics and needs of the public institutions, provided that the minimum content of information and regulations for preparation and use. They can be pre-printed or edited on computerized systems for automated data processing.

The number of copies of the forms that do not have the special series marking and numbering may be different to those prescribed in legal regulations, given that its own procedures on organization and management of accountancy require.

**Types of accountancy records**

The types of accountancy records represent the registry system, forms and interrelated accounting documents that are designated at recording chronologically and systematically in accountancy of economic and financial transactions carried out during the fiscal year.

In public institutions, the type of accountancy record of economic and financial transactions is the "Chess-Master".

In the context of provided registration form known as "Chess-Master", the main registers and forms that are used are: The Journal-Register, The Inventory-Register, The Big-Book and The Trial Balance.

In public institutions it may be used as a form of accountancy recording the "Simplified Chess-Master". In this case, the synthetic accounting is held on
"Worksheets for various transactions", opened for every synthetic account in The Big-Book (Chess), and the analytical accountancy is held on the referred worksheets in the type of accountancy recording known as "Chess-Master".

Analytical evidence of budgetary appropriations, cash disbursements and actual expenditure shall be held using the "Worksheets of budgetary transactions".

**Accounting registers**

Compulsory accounting registers are: The Journal-Register, The Inventory-Register and The Big-Book. They are used in strict accordance with their intended purpose and presented in an orderly manner and thus completed to allow, at any time, the identification and monitoring of accounting operations performed.

Account registers can be presented in forms of registry, leaflets or information listings, as appropriate. The Journal-Register is an accounting document mandatory chronological and systematic registration of any alteration of assets and liabilities of the institution.

The Journal-Register is done by each public institution into a single copy, after being numbered, laced, initialed and recorded in the institution’s evidences. The Journal-Register is done since the institution’s establishment, at least once per year during the institution functionality, in case of merging, division or closure and in other cases provided by law based on factual inventory.

In this register shall be recorded in a summary form, inventoried items by their nature, sufficiently detailed to justify the content of each post balance sheet. The Inventory-Register is completed based on factual inventory of each asset and liability. Assets and liabilities registered in the Inventory-Register are based on inventory lists or other documents showing their contents.

If an inventory is held throughout the year, in the Inventory-Register the balance account registered on the inventory date is recorded, supplemented by turnover inputs and deducted by turnover outputs, then centralized account amounts, which can be used from these records.
from the inventory date until the end of the assessment.

If the public institution has subordinated units without legal personality that lead the accountancy up to trial balance accounts, The Inventory-Register shall be guided by the subordinate units, by providing its registration in the unit’s records.

The "Big-Book" is a mandatory accounting registry that records monthly and systematically, by regrouping accounts, the existence and movement of assets and liabilities at a given time. The "Big-Book" registry (Chess) is done monthly, in a single copy, separately for debit and separately for the credit of each account, as the registration of operations is done.

The "Big-Book" is the basis of preparation of trial balance. The "Big-Book" can be replaced by Ledger card for various operations. The editing of The "Big-Book" shall be made only at the request of a Supervisory Body or according to its needs.

**Trial balance**

The Trial balance is the accountancy document used to verify the accuracy of records and supervisory of consistency between the analytical and synthetic accountancy, as well as the main instrument on which financial statements are prepared.

The Trial Balance is done based on the assets from the "Big-Book" (Chess) and on the open records separately for each synthetic account.

In order to verify the recordings in the analytical accountancy, analytical trial balances are issued. In public institutions, synthetic trial balances are monthly issued and analytical trial balances no later than the end of the period for which financial statements are prepared.

The trial balance contains for all the institution’s accounts the following elements: symbol and naming of the accounts, in the order entered in the chart of accounts, initial balances or the total of amounts, receivable and payable of the previous month as appropriate, current debit and credit turnovers, total amounts of receivables and payables, closing balances of receivable and payables. In the trial balance for January, "initial balances" column is filled with final receivables and payables of December of the previous year.

**Archiving, preservation and replenishment of documents**

Public institutions have the obligation to keep records in their accounting archive, other accounting documents and the supporting documents underlying accounting records. Responsibility for financial accounting archiving falls upon the authorizing officer or another person who has received the management of the entity.

Accounting registers, supporting and accounting documents are archived, based on service contracts, with onerous title, by other Romanian legal persons, who have appropriate conditions. The term of retention of registers and supporting accountancy documents is 10 years starting from the ending date of the fiscal year during which they were prepared, excluding payroll which is kept for 50 years. The annual financial statements are kept for 50 years.

In case of cessation of activity, public institutions hand over the documents to the State Archives or military archives, as appropriate. Archiving of accounting records, supporting documentation is in accordance with the law in force.

In order to be recorded in the accounts, economic and financial operations must be listed in genuine document, drafted or reconstructed law.

Anyone who notes the loss, theft or destruction of additional supporting documents or accounting is obliged to notify in writing, within 24 hours of
finding, the authorizing officer or other person who is liable to manage the unit.

If loss, theft or destruction of documents is considered a criminal offense, prosecuting authorities shall be immediately notified. Reconstitution of documents is done on a "case of reconstruction".

The reconstructed documents will worn, compulsory and visible the title of "Reconstituted", specifying the number and the date on which the order has been reconstituted. The documents reconstituted according to the law are the legal basis for registering in accountancy.

The computerized system

The computerized system of automated data processing of each institution must provide data processing accounted for in accordance with applicable accounting standards, supervisory and maintenance of them on technical support.

In developing and adaptation of software, it should be considered the minimum criteria for the software used in the financial and accounting activities, according to legal regulations. Computer establishments or persons performing daily activities by using computerized system for automatic data processing are liable with the accuracy of information from these documents and the beneficiaries are responsible for the accuracy and fairness of the data submitted for processing.

The responsibilities of the institution’s staff on using computer system for automatic data processing shall be established by internal regulations. In terms of the database, it must be possible, at any time, the reconstitution of contents of ledgers, journals and other financial and accounting documents.

In conclusion, we must state that the financial activity of the budget sector is a complex process of relationships, accompanying the material or non-material component of relationships between different entities, process translated in financial flows and relationships.

This system has to be analyzed taking into consideration public and private finances, their components, financial subsystems, the economic-financial levers which might be used and the defining characteristics of the budgetary process.

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FEATURES AND FORMS ON PROCESSES, FINANCIAL FLOWS AND RELATIONS

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Abstract: Conducting a formative process requires the existence of means that the initiator of this process uses in order to develop, build the object (good, service, information) that it aims to achieve. The means may consist of the patrimony/shares of the subject or, more often than not, must be based on flux transfer. The object flow of transfer is made up of goods, services, and information etc. that represented the subjects of the social activities. Both these objects and the means used for manufacturing them may be expressed in physical, material, value and money types.

Keywords: transfer of cash resources, consideration, financial relations

The activity of the human society appears as a complex sum of actions and relations that promote the participants, i.e. subjects of this activity or individuals, groups of individuals or institutions that represent them on the whole or in communities defined by different criteria. This activity is reflected in the formative/production processes (making certain goods, collecting information, performing a service, creating a work of art or science, etc.) and flows of transfer which generally express the desire of each participant to satisfy consumer needs, to secure and improve lives.

General defining aspects of the processes, flows and financial relations

Conducting a formative process which requires the existence of means that the initiator of this process uses in order to develop, build the object (good, service, information) that it aims to achieve. The means may consist of the patrimony of the subject or, most often, must be based on flux transfer. The object flow of transfer is formed of goods, services, information etc. that represented the subjects of the social activities. Both these objects, and the means used for manufacturing them may be expressed in physical, material, value and money types.

Cash aspect of these flows and processes are "emancipated", individualized during the evolvement of social activity and generated relations of some kind, called financial relations, and its scope includes the financial relations. The process of "emancipation" has acted in connection to financial relations that have become a separate object of study in science, materialized in finance, component of the group science known as economics.

Finance is the science of establishment and administration of funds available to a trader, public institutions to fulfill its object, functions and tasks.

The initiator of this formative process has, only as an exception in their physical or material form, all necessary means for running the process. Most often it has, only partially or not at all, the necessary, even physical means, material forms specifically required for the process. For example, a farmer does not have, most often the wheat seed required, even if he produced wheat before. Seeds must have certain qualities to be treated in a certain way to meet the requirements of a particular use. Therefore, the farmer must
procure such grains and must consider these means needed to perform his work.

In relatively many cases, the initiator has only money means (funds) or (currently customary) financial means, with which he can constitute the basis of a flow transfer. Such constitution of means generates money relations between partners.

In most cases, the initiator has only partially available means, both in their physical form expressly required and money form. But he has experience and is willing to start a formative process. In such cases, his partnership with other companies includes supplementing the insufficient funds. Such a constitution of means generates financial relations between partners, within which those resulting from the relations with the state are included.

Financial relations are money relations to allocate the overall product or its components, relations representing cash transfers, in both ways, between the public budget and companies or between companies.¹

These cash flows of money resources in two-ways are represented in Fig. 1.

These flows above-mentioned and expressed in value, occurring during the formation and distribution of financial funds to meet the needs of the society constitute financial relations, hereinafter called as finances. They include only financial/cash relations expressing transfer of value, but not those which reflect a change of value forms. Financial relations arising from the transfer of value to the funds that are constituted in the economy or from them to various beneficiaries are conducted through money without equivalent and as not refundable or refundable in order to meet the public (social) needs.

The financial sphere includes the financial relations as cash relations involving consideration, it does not necessarily reflect a legal instrument or a legal basis, and it does not necessarily generate a rule or a continuing basis. For example, the acquisition by a Building Contractor of a quantity of cement with cash shows the existence of consideration (which in this case is direct and immediate), considered by both partners equal because "the business" would not have been initiated if one of them had had second thoughts. Selling can be done or not based on an agreement ("legal instrument"), but it is unlikely that it was generated by the current legislation: the Constitution, the Civil Code, an ordinary law, a government decision etc. Also,
nothing justifies any of the parties (buyer, seller) to pretend or hope that such an arrangement might be perpetual or even repeat itself.

Regarding the financial relations, we must emphasize that they have some specific features:

a) It expresses a transfer of cash resources with no equivalent and as a non-refundable sum;
b) It expresses a loan of cash resources over a period of time;
c) It expresses voluntary or compulsory transfer of financial resources, in change of a consideration which depends on the production of a random phenomenon;
d) It occurs during training and the distribution of funds available to businesses for business purposes, and development of, on account revenues.

**Processes, flows and financial relations have the following characteristics:**

a) They are part of the processes, flows and economic relations.

The membership in the financial sphere of economic relations is determined by having the monetary support of some properties and relations between partners or at least a modified heritage structure. For example, company "A" pays at the end of the month some bill for electricity consumption. Such a relationship is usually a continuing basis. Consumption is done gradually but permanently and its considerations are paid afterwards, which involves generating an obligation to the company on the supplier of energy that is an immediately unquenchable obligation. On the other hand, the two partners are distinct subjects, based on their economic autonomy, expressed by each property over its assets, property recognized and guaranteed by the state.

Finally, the payment made by the company “A” changes the volume and/or heritage structure of each partner. Regarding the “A” it is a change in the structure of assets: reduce the funds available but properly increases the value of finished products or manufacturing work in progress; in the composition of current assets remaining at the same volume, it lowers the component of “cash” and increases the “stocks”. Regarding the energy supplier, their asset increased by profits included in the price of energy and produces a change in structure because the component of "results" increases, by increasing its share in total assets (the volume of the other components of heritage has not changed).

b) They have an organized place, with the legal basis and usually work on a continuing basis.

When the public budget is a party, the law establishes the following: a requirement, the amount and the term characterizing the relationship. For example, the Law on taxes states that all economic agents making profits from the activities they perform are required to pay a tax of 16%, in monthly payments, quarterly, and annual adjustments.

When the state budget is not a party, then the law only specifies the conditions creating the obligation, following partners to determine the amount and the term in this context defined by law. For example, Law no. 33/1991 on banking activity and NBR regulations on credit can establish credit instruments between business partners with specific nonfinancial (commercial loan) and it enshrines that the legal instrument (bill of exchange) remains at the discretion of both partners to use this possibility or not and, if so, the specific express terms will be mentioned in the bill.

c) They have final, unchangeable effects.

This feature expresses that once financial transfer is made, changing the structure of assets is basically irreversible, and also the amount transferred can no longer return to the transferring part. For example, if a company increases the share capital of its reserve fund account, the new equity structure will not restore, only as an exception and only in time, through periodic payments from profit fund reserve, which gradually will get back to the share they have regarding the above alleged transfer.

On the other hand, the payment of the tax provided for a taxpayer is definitive in the sense that that amount cannot be returned to the payer. The law provides the
exceptions and arrangements for return. For example, the Tax Code establishes in which conditions VAT may be refunded or partially recovered, when and how to make return/recovery in cash or on behalf of future payment obligations.

d) They provide, in principle, money transfers without consideration and without a title directly and immediately refundable.

This feature implies that the one which transfers cannot claim direct and immediate consideration or reimbursement of amounts. In the example on trade credit it is evident that business “A” cannot claim a refund of the electricity consumed and the energy provider cannot claim consideration (payment) immediately. The law provides some exceptions related mainly to non-compliance with the conditions agreed in the contract (actual or virtual) delivery, i.e. “hidden vices” etc. Similarly, the company cannot claim any refund interest alleged possibly with the commercial credit in question.

If payment of taxes, as in the case of the insurance there is indirect and mediated consideration (conditioning) provided either in a legal context more generally, either expressly by a contract between the parties.

Taxpayers create state financial resources with which it carries out its functions. By virtue of this, that and the meaning and purpose of social function of the state, for example, they may require, to the extent they meet certain conditions, benefit from free general education for their children or other free social services functions assumed by the state.

If insurance operations, between the parties shall be concluded a contract for the obligations and conditions, and for the insurer’s obligation arises to pay certain sums that are insured. The consideration paid by insurers is subject to the contingency in the contract of insurance, but is not conditioned by the number of paid insurance rates or their share of the estimated amount of risk product.

Financial relations can be public or private, as the state appears in them as a public authority or not. For example, a state-owned company is part of a commercial loan and an insurance contract. Financial relations arising in this case are covered by private finances, whereas it appears here as a trader. The financial relations arising in connection with state ownership and private property are treated in the same way.

In conclusion, it needs to be stated that budgetary processes and flows influence each other reciprocally, they are inter-related and interacting, which can only mean that the only way in which they function is in accordance to each other, being complementary, as an increase or a decrease of any of these financial subsystems automatically attracts evolution in the same positive or negative direction of the other subsystem of finances.

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Abstract: Airspace management is one of the most important components of both civil and military activity in peacetime and wartime. Military and civil authorities have a great responsibility for air safety and for ensuring an optimal flow of air assets in order to fulfill the requirements of airspace economic operators and military missions, as well. If peacetime airspace coordination belongs to a large extent to civil authorities, as crises arise or a country goes to war, military authorities involvement becomes more and more present and require a set of measures regarding airspace control aimed at achieving military objectives and coordinating all airspace users in a well-defined areas in time and space.

Keywords: airspace, airspace management, airspace control, air assets, war.

Introduction

The exponential technological development which characterized the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century emphasized the use of the third dimension of space, the vertical dimension. The abundance of airspace users determined in the mid-twentieth century the need to regulate this space for more efficient use of the airspace, thus on 7 December 1944 in Chicago the Convention on International Civil Aviation was signed, which anticipated the subsequent development of civilian aviation, established a set of principles and fair rules for all the states signing it for the civil Aviation to evolve in circumstances of safety and order.

Simultaneously, the regulation of the airspace was a necessity stemming from the needs of military users, who in addition to air assets, represented by aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft systems, are formed by the surface-to-air or ship-to-air defense artillery, artillery, and other military assets. The multitude of military and civil users of airspace imposed to set strict rules complied so as to avoid unwanted events and ensure the safety of air assets at any time.

The requirements resulted from civil and military considerations have led to a complex set of measures on airspace management, which govern the use of airspace in peacetime as well as other specific measures in times of crisis and war.

Airspace management is defined as "the process by which the use of airspace options are analyzed, selected and implemented to meet the needs of airspace users." Users’ requirements and interests determine that airspace management is a complex activity that requires an analysis process which ends with an effective resolution of these requirements. In the same idea, the fundamental purpose of airspace management is to achieve the most efficient use of airspace based on certain needs at a given moment that as far as possible avoids the permanent fragmentation of airspace.

1 Civil Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management, ICAO, 2011, p.vii
Specific activities regarding airspace management are based on the following principles and strategies:\(^2\):

- The entire airspace available must be managed in a flexible manner;
- Airspace management processes must ensure dynamic flight trajectories and optimal operational solutions;
- When conditions require that different types of traffic be separated by the organization of the airspace, size, form or time, the instructions must have minimal impact on air traffic operations;
- The use of airspace should be monitored and coordinated in order to harmonize the demands of all users and reduce any constraints on air traffic operations;
- Airspace reservation must be planned in advance and changes made in real time whenever possible. Airspace management system must be able to provide solutions for unforeseen demands;
- The complexity of air traffic operations may limit the degree of flexibility of the airspace.

Effective implementation of the airspace management process implies the active involvement of all stakeholders. An important concept to increase the effectiveness of airspace management is the flexible use of airspace (FUA). This will allow civil users temporary access to airspace reserved for military operations execution in order to ensure an optimal use of airspace. The flexible use of airspace is based on national and Eurocontrol\(^3\) regulations, which require specific activities of the three levels of airspace management, as follows:

- **Level 1** - strategic - strategy involves establishing and organizing national airspace
- **Level 2** - pre-tactical level - requires daily allocation of airspace
- **Level 3** - tactical - involves the use of airspace in real time.

Airspace management at strategic level involves measures to ensure the overall implementation of the flexible use of airspace concept. These measures include the establishment of airspace management measures, improving procedures for control and coordination of airspace and the development of cross-border coordination and standards of segregation of military and civil flights. Strategic coordination involves making civil-military airspace management in relation to the requirements and needs of national policy and international regulations concerning airspace.

To assure airspace management at pre-tactical level, the states should nominate bodies which are able to allocate airspace in accordance with the conditions and procedures established at the strategic level. These bodies are made up of both civil and military personnel. In some cases joint organisms could be created at the level of two or more states in order to jointly manage the common airspace. Civil-military coordination at pre-tactical level represents the operational management act within a structure of predetermined air traffic management structure, a set of procedures applied at the strategic level and agreements established between military and civil authorities involved.

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\(^2\) Ibidem, p.7

\(^3\) European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation
Airspace management at tactical level is accomplished at the level of military and civil authorities responsible for air traffic coordination. Specific procedures for coordination and communication facilities must allow an efficient use of airspace in order to ensure real-time activation, deactivation or reallocation of the airspace allocated to the second level – the pre-tactical one. Airspace users will receive information on the current status of the airspace. Civil-military coordination in real time corresponding to this level involves solving specific problems on airspace, general and operational air traffic (GAT / OAT) situations in real time between air traffic system structures and specialized personnel for military and civil air traffic.

The coordination between military and civil authorities at the strategic, pre-tactical and tactical levels is presented in Fig. 1.

**Figure 1.** Coordination between civil and military authorities carried out at the strategic, pre-tactical and tactical levels

Flexible use of airspace is achieved by specific airspace elements and established procedures for its allocation and temporary use. These consist of conditional routes (CDR), temporary segregated areas (TSA), temporary reserved areas (TRA), cross-border areas (CBA), dangerous areas (D), restricted areas (R), prior coordination areas (PCA) or airspace used by low coordination (RCA). Temporary segregated areas and reserved areas shall be temporarily designated according to needs for military, civil flights or other activities limited in time, management structures are established for specific activities in relation to national airspace legislation.

In emergency situations, military and civil air assets that are, in special situations, performing missions in response to disasters, saving lives, or other similar situations, are treated with priority over other aircraft. They will be allowed to use cross border areas, airspace temporarily segregated areas by civil and military coordination and to take appropriate measures in real time.

Airspace management during crisis situations

In crisis situations a higher degree of coordination is required between military and civil bodies in order to ensure civil traffic continuity of operations while
ensuring freedom of action for military air operations in the area. The changes performed in airspace management system and initial flight plans will be made gradually, but they can be taken immediately in certain circumstances, depending on the concrete situations. Emergency situations can generate unusual military traffic in the operations area and adjacent airspace.

Regardless of situation, the necessity of increasing coordination between military and civil authorities require the elaboration of timely action plans in emergency situations which provide the management of air traffic if the traffic intensifies in a certain responsibility area belonging to a particular state, and in border areas with neighboring countries, which include procedures relating to implementation of diplomatic agreements related to the aircraft flying over those areas.

In the first phase there should be established and if necessary, supplemented military and civil air transportation means which will be integrated in flight plans and they should evolve in parallel with planned flights. Meanwhile, at this stage, repatriation flights or VIP flights may be necessary, which require a higher degree of priority. Along with increased military air traffic, humanitarian flights of civil organizations add to existing traffic. Although the measures taken under normal air traffic are designed to cope with changes in routes and traffic density, it is expected that these measures are not sufficient. As a result, national or regional contingency plans should be able to face the increasing complexity of the air situations and future changes. At states’ level it is necessary to establish and endow with state-of-the-art equipment the entities which can manage emergency situations and which work in a permanent collaboration with national authorities and international aviation organizations.

It is extremely important that in crisis situations, after taking political decision the air traffic management authorities give priority to military and civil aircraft that are engaged in supporting military operations in emergency situations.

Balanced and safe cohabitation of military and civil traffic is crucial. The operational requirements of military air traffic and military flight planning analysis should generate a quick impact on the civil operations in airspace, and following this analysis the priorities should be reassessed to assure military and civil traffic. Impact assessment is a permanent activity as military operations evolve, and plans must be adapted to the concrete situations of airspace.

Control of the airspace in case of war

Airspace management at war in conflict zones is performed by military authorities. As shown in Fig. 2 as the situation is changing from peace to war, the procedures issued by the military authorities are becoming more consistent, to the detriment of procedures issued by civil authorities. Documents regulating the airspace issued by civil bodies are replaced by the documents issued by the military airspace control authority. The most important documents produced during military operations are: Airspace Control Plan (ACP), Airspace Control Order (ACO), Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Special Instructions (SPINS).

Airspace control is based on a set of principles that are applied by the airspace control authorities. These principles are:

- Unity of effort requires an airspace control system and related procedures to be coordinated, integrated, and centrally planned by the airspace control authority.
- Reduce the risk of unintended actions against civil, friendly, or neutral air traffic by military air operations.

5 JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, 2014, p. 1-4
aircraft, and optimize the effectiveness of air defense.

- Centralized airspace planning facilitates the fulfilment of Joint Force Commander priorities.
- Decentralized execution offers subordinate commanders the opportunity to execute their missions effectively.
- Keep close coordination and liaison among all airspace users.
- Claim mutual airspace control procedures, which include positive and/or procedural control measures.
- Demand reliable, secure, beyond line-of-sight, and jam-resistant communications networks.
- Require integrated, redundant, interoperable, and survivable, airspace control systems.
- Respond to evolving threat conditions and to the progressing operations.
- Airspace control is based on airspace management capabilities provided by airspace control elements and host-nation air traffic control.
- Underline flexibility and simplicity.
- Support 24-hour operations in all environmental and weather conditions.
- Require proper training for safe and effective airspace control operations.

Airspace control authority (ACA) is responsible for coordinating and integrating the airspace by developing policies and procedures for coordinated

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Figure 2. Notional Airspace Control Authority

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airspace control required among structures located in the area of operations. Airspace control system must meet the requirements set by the Joint Force Commander, ensuring the integration of the airspace control system with the host nation, coordination and separation of users providing direct assistance to civil structures of air traffic management. The airspace control authority implements its measures through the airspace control plan, which is submitted for approval to the Joint Force Commander and subsequently distribute to all users in the area of operations, coordinating the implementation of the plan in the airspace control order. ACA is responsible for providing facilities and staff for implementation of the provisions included in the airspace control plan.

The airspace control plan shall establish procedures for the implementation of the airspace control system in the area of operations. These plans must be prepared as early as possible, in a simple and intelligible manner for all users. Airspace control plan must ensure the transition from state of peace to the specific combatant operations conditions. The transition takes place gradually as tensions increase or decrease in intensity, or the transition suddenly takes place, without warning.

Airspace control plan details coordination measures, such as the airspace control measures, fire support coordination measures, or air defense measures and how they will be distributed and implemented. It provides procedures for fully integrated personnel and facilities for civil and military air traffic control. Air traffic control facilities are interconnected with air traffic communications system in order to provide a system for monitoring the safety and efficiency of air traffic flow.

Airspace control plan contains rules of engagement and provisions regarding air and missiles defense systems, and command and control air defense system, along with limitations or disruptive factors that can affect measures included in the plan. The restricted areas are established by taking into consideration Air Force, Army, Navy or the Special Forces operations, air traffic areas, base defense zones, controlled or uncontrolled airspace and flight regime of the neutral nations.

The plan includes details on the types of missions, means of identification friend or foe or other means of identification, air defense capabilities of the enemy, means of electronic warfare and deception, procedures for emergency situations, specific procedures for daylight or night actions or conducted in adverse weather conditions, procedures for aircraft transiting the area of operations, procedures to support major operations requiring large volumes of air traffic, enemy offensive air assets, the vulnerability of friendly air capabilities to enemy surface to air missiles, and enemy long range missiles. To effectively implement close air support for the land forces and naval operations a complex system is established for procedures, routes, restricted areas, re-supply and aerial refueling zones, personnel recovery or medical evacuation routes, civil air traffic corridors and specific procedures, such as provisions for fire support coordination measures.

Airspace control order shall be prepared in accordance with the general stipulations of airspace control plan, and shall implement specific procedures within a determined period of time. Airspace control order defines and sets limits for airspace designated for military operations, notifying airspace management bodies of the effective duration of activation and the shape of airspace to be used for these operations. It can include coordination measures such as base defense zones, boarding zones, landing zones, coordinated fire lines, or other specific measures. Changes in airspace control order are distributed immediately in the shortest time by all users to ensure efficient use of airspace, when coordination measures are developed, modified or canceled. This is necessary to avoid fratricide, accidental employment of neutral or civil aircraft, and to increase the effectiveness of military operations.
Conclusion

Airspace management is an extremely laborious and important activity in peacetime and in time of crisis or war. In peacetime, coordination and integration of airspace users is done by implementing the concept of flexible use of airspace, which allows optimization of the use of civil air traffic by permitting civil users by civil aircrafts temporary access to the airspace reserved for military operations. In crisis situations, as in the same airspace the number of users increases, it is necessary to establish additional measures to ensure the prioritization of military and civilian users depending on the urgency of the missions that they are carrying out. The transition to the state of war involves increasing the weight of procedures developed by military structures to the detriment of those issued by civil authorities. Therefore, airspace management in the areas designated for military operations is performed by military airspace control authorities, who issue plans, orders and specific instructions but, at the same time allow the civil users to use the airspace under well defined conditions.

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HYBRID WARFARE – SPECIFIC FEATURES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 21st CENTURY

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Abstract: Nowadays states are facing a seemingly new form of war – the hybrid war. Although conventional in form, this type of conflicts is characterized by a mixture of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and state or non-state actors who may use both simple and sophisticated technologies in new ways. The future conflict will have a hybrid shape in a sense that the conflict will be conducted on a several battlefields, by several means, and will pretend to be isolated, as different actions with no relation to each other in a military campaign, but will still be driven by a collective idea without the need of central command and control.

Keywords: Hybrid war, hybrid threats, unconventional war, irregular tactics, cyberwar, strategic actions.

Introduction

Analyzing the conduct of the post-Cold War conflicts, we observe a tendency manifested in their new forms and tactics which fall within the spectrum of hybrid warfare.

The hybrid warfare concept is not new, though its name is recent. Throughout history, hybrid forms and methods of struggle have been used in several battles and conflicts, starting from antiquity, although the fighting means used were different depending on specific technological development of those periods.

If a state is attacked by means of conventional combat forces: land, sea or air of an opponent, retaliatory measures expected are obvious. The situation changes when it is attacked by vectors comprising a mixture of military forces, special forces, diplomatic and economic actions, cyber attacks, terrorist actions, psychological propaganda and media campaigns of misinformation.

Within conventional wars, it is still possible that they will no longer be the primary means used by international players in the battlespace of the twenty-first century. The hybrid threats have become reality and hybrid warfare will be a defining feature of the future security environment.1

1. Conceptual delimitation and specific peculiarities of hybrid threats in the current security environment

The proliferation of regional conflicts in conjunction with the cooling of relations between the US and Russia have highlighted the frequent use of state and non-state actors of a variety of hybrid threats, in order to intimidate the opponent and impose their own interests in the areas concerned.

A hybrid threats uniquely focuses on the ability to organize and gain an asymmetric advantage against an opponent in a specific environment. This advantage is reflected not only in pure military force, but in a holistic manner in all elements of national power, including diplomatic means, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement resources.

This advantage generates conventional battle space transfer rules in areas of confrontation chosen by the hybrid

opponent, where it controls the rhythm, intensity and complexity of the actions. In this case, a weaker opponent, using means of hybrid fighting may oppose a stronger opponent for an indefinite period of time, causing devastating effects that a conventional adversary, in the same situation, can generate.

These capabilities create significant difficulties for hybrid opponent conventional military bodies because conventional structures are oriented to face an adversary using conventional means of warfare.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization has defined hybrid threats as a threat of any current or potential adversary, including state actors, non-state actors or terrorist groups with capacity, proven or probable, to engage in the pursuit of their objectives simultaneously both conventional and unconventional means.2

Another approach to hybrid threats defines the actions of an opponent’s simultaneous and appropriate combination of military, informational, economic and social means with the conventional, unconventional, and asymmetric actions associated to the phenomena of terrorism and organized crime.

Hybrid threats are defined as actions that simultaneously engage an opponent of conventional and unconventional forces, including means of terrorist and criminal elements, to achieve their objectives. It also takes a variety of conventional and unconventional tactics to create multiple dilemmas and confusions.

Hybrid threats are the threats that include the whole range of ways of waging the struggle, including conventional capabilities, asymmetric tactics, terrorist acts, acts of violence and coercive non-crime related acts, carried out by both countries involved and a variety of non-state actors.

A hybrid threat is a diverse and dynamic combination of regular and irregular forces and criminal elements, all unified and used simultaneously to achieve the desired results.

The hybrid threat is the threat of an opponent that has the capacity and ability to use and adapt simultaneously conventional and unconventional means to achieve its objectives.3

Hybrid threats are innovative, adaptive, networked and connected globally. They can provide to the opponent a wide range of traditional techniques combined with advanced fighting technologies, including the possibility of using weapons of mass destruction.

Also, hybrid opponents can operate conventionally and unconventionally, using adaptive and asymmetric combination of traditional tactics, unconventional tactics, using traditional military capabilities in new and old ways.4

2. Particular features of hybrid warfare in the 21st century

The concept of hybrid warfare refers to a wide range of hostile actions, in which the military force is just one part and the strategies are executed in a flexible way, with long-term goals.

The hybrid warfare is a conflict in which a synergy of conventional and unconventional tools of war are used including the use of regular armed forces, special forces, intelligence, economic


actions, political and diplomatic actions, cyber-attacks, informational propaganda actions, etc.

Among the tools used in the hybrid war we can refer to the one about exploiting the potential of the local population, the use of political forces directed from abroad, the organization of social movements or funding of non-governmental organizations so as to achieve, through them, national or group interests. Current conflicts are characterized by a fusion of different hybrid forms and methods of fighting that combine conventional means of warfare, unconventional and criminal actions underway in the full spectrum of conflict (Figure 1).

Hybrids opponents use combined combat capabilities in order to achieve an asymmetric advantage. An example of this type of risk was the asymmetric confrontation in July 2006 between the Hezbollah, a political and paramilitary Shiite organization in Lebanon, and Israeli armed forces. The paramilitary forces of Hezbollah used conventional capabilities of fighting (small arms, heavy weapons, missile systems and command and control networks) combined with irregular battle tactics, asymmetric informational warfare techniques, (combat forces dressed in civilian clothes, using the population as human shield). The immediate result of these actions was a strategic and tactical step back to Israel.

Hybrid Warfare is defined as a combination of conventional, unconventional and asymmetrical means, including handling of political and ideological conflicts, and can contain a combination of special operations and conventional military forces, intelligence agents, political provocateurs, media representatives, economic intimidation, cyber attacks, paramilitary forces, terrorist forces and criminal elements.

Hybrid warfare includes actions taken on several plans and aimed at destabilizing the normal functioning of state and at confusing and manipulating the target state’s population.

In such hybrid conflicts, potential adversaries such as groups of countries, states, hostile groups exploited the access


to military capabilities of modern systems including command and control, missile systems, and other lethal modern systems, combined with use of combat insurgent type of actions: ambush, use of improvised explosive devices (IED), kidnappings and assassinations. In case of hybrid conflicts, we cannot exclude the possibility that hybrid vectors might have high-tech capabilities, through which they can start cyber attacks with catastrophic results in the social, economic or military field.

Analyzing the current conflicts, characterized as hybrid, we find that they do not resemble each other. In the hybrid conflict, the tactics and methods used vary from one area to another, from one actor to another, depending on the security situation and the geopolitical context.

When ISIS terrorist organization started its way, using violence and terrorism to western Iraq, political observers described this type of confrontation as a hybrid war. The same thing happened when the Ukrainian rebels took control of the industrial regions of Southeast Ukraine. Thus, it is necessary to consider both conflicts and identify specific hybrid characteristics.

2.1. Particularities of hybrid actions carried out by the terrorist organization “ISIS”

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – ISIS (alternatively translated as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant - ISIL or Islamic state – IS) is a militant jihadist group and an internationally unrecognized state. In its self-proclaimed status, ISIS claims the territories in northern Iraq and part of Syria’s territory, and also Lebanon. It was founded in the early years of the Iraq war and joined the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in 2004. ISIS Sunni insurgent group is an Islamic state and had its capital at Ar-Raqqaq Syria. Since 2010, ISIS has been led by religious leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and activates in Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon.

A decade ago ISIS emerged as a small group of Iraqi Al-Qaeda terrorist organization specialized in suicide attacks. Today ISIS has conquered cities and large territories in Syria and Iraq.

ISIS is a hybrid organization, modeled on Hezbollah – as a terrorist network, as a guerrilla army and as a pseudo-state. ISIS combines conventional combat fighting means such as combat maneuver and use of heavy weapons (artillery, tanks) with unconventional means of warfare such as terrorism and attacks on the civilian population. Currently ISIS has a polarizing religious factor in the person of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a military structure made up of former officers and soldiers of the Iraqi army (especially former members of the Republican Guard of Saddam Hussein), and a number of financial sources from the Arab space and the space of the Russian Federation and China.

A feature of the hybrid actions developed by ISIS is supporting and financing its political agenda through narcotics, drugs and arms smuggling, or by taking hostages.

The hybrid actions performed by ISIS combine combat fighting means and methods of conventional and unconventional warfare with fanatical fervor and terrorism. Jasper Scott and Scott Moreland in the article Islamic State identified six characteristics of hybrid shares held by ISIS:

1. The use of mixed media and battle tactics: ISIS forces have conventional military units and small semi-autonomous cells which combine conventional fighting tactics with guerrilla actions. It has a wide range of weapons, from improvised explosive devices (IED) and mines crafted to grenade launchers, drones and chemical agents;

2. The flexible and adaptable structure: ISIS implements and absorbs new resources very quickly. ISIS constantly incorporates new acquisitions in

its strategy and structure such as recruits, weapons or territory;

➢ The use of terrorism: Through cruelty and exaggerated violence, ISIS exposes its ideology to a very wide public. The persecution of Yazidit community and Christian minorities, destroying religious icons and cultural objects, such as the destroying the tomb of the prophet Jonah, and widely publicized beheadings of Western workers and journalists are meant to amplify and provoke terror for strengthening the status and image of the organization;

➢ The use of propaganda and disinformation: ISIS media campaigns launched clear and carefully designed messages. Virtual pages (tweet, blog) or video posts controlled by ISIS are intended to glorify the cause of ISIS to win new sympathizers and recruits. High quality movies, subtitled in several languages which present conflict in Iraq to the international viewers have clearly contributed to the success of ISIS in recruiting foreign fighters;

➢ Conducting criminal activity: ISIS uses a variety of methods to finance their actions, holding a diverse investment portfolio: black market sales of oil, wheat and antiques, money from ransoms and extortion. While donations are the main part of the ISIS finance, the criminal activities conducted by ISIS ensure that the organization is financially solvent;

➢ Failure to comply with international law: ISIS has no respect for humanitarian and legal norms. Based on extremist interpretations of Sharia law, ISIS causes violence against women and minorities, including barbarous punishments, stoning and amputations.

2.2. Particularities of the hybrid actions undertaken by the Russian Federation

A main feature of the hybrid actions is the diversity of forms in which they can be used in hybrid battle space conflicts. Thus, the hybrid actions undertaken by the Russian Federation differ from hybrid actions developed by ISIS and distinguish three stages of deployment:8

➢ Destabilization by generating and maintaining an internal conflict in the targeted state;

➢ Determination of economic and financial collapse by ruining the economy and destroying the infrastructure of the targeted state;

➢ Replacing local political leadership with men loyal to Kremlin.

A feature of the hybrid Russian actions during the conflict in Southeast Ukraine was the bullying policy which was very well managed and applied. Thus, during the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian Federation caused instability in Southeast Ukraine using paramilitary forces and undercover agents, while, near Ukrainian border, but on its own territory, it carried out extensive training exercises involving all categories of forces.

Besides intimidation and discouragement actions, Russian Federation carried out other nonmilitary actions, all in the spectrum of hybrid actions:9

➢ Investment in key sectors of the European economy;

➢ Use of investment, trade and capital to influence important political and economic actors;

➢ Purchase of media companies to support anti-political parties and pro-Russian integration;

➢ Widespread penetration of European organizations to collect information;

➢ Fostering links between Russian organized crime and local criminal elements;


Exploiting unresolved inter-ethnic tensions by campaigns for the rights of minorities;

- Providing support for large-scale Russian information agencies abroad;
- Launching widely coordinated cyber attacks on selected targets.

Although hybrid actions undertaken by the Russian Federation appear to be separate and scattered, they are actually part of a whole strategy for concerted hybrid action. Russia has managed to combine strategic actions with non-military actions and diplomacy to achieve objectives. Thus, Russia is promoting its national interests by means of carefully controlled levers such as:

- The increasing of Russian investment capital and running through British financial institutions;
- The purchase of military weapons and equipment from France (Mistral-type amphibious ships) during the conflict in Ukraine, in the context of the European Union appliance of economic sanctions, in order to create divergences between European states;
- Making pressure on European states by controlling energy resources (gas and oil) and using them as a tool of foreign policy;
- Performing regional media control by purchasing media enterprises and funding media campaigns, including state control of social networks and the Internet;
- Exercising huge pressure on EU states with the highest level of civilization, and on Germany in particular, for the purpose of weakening and destabilizing their economy by orchestrating refugee crises.

By analyzing the hybrid warfare developed by the Russian Federation, Phillip Karber, an internationally recognized expert in national security and defense issues, has identified some key points of Russian hybrid strategy, points that could be lessons learned from the Russian hybrid actions:

- Using propaganda - mixed ethnic societies are particularly susceptible to the manipulation of mass media and networks;
- Preparing the ground for conflict by influencing the economy promoting corruption and compromising key politicians and security structures;
- Making use of terrorist actions, including attacks on critical infrastructure, police intimidation, causing major damage by cyber attacks, political assassinations, abductions, torture and humiliation of prisoners of war;
- Sabotaging state institutions by infiltrating political agents, advisers and mercenaries;
- Speculating the advantages of rapid escalation of low intensity conflicts produced due to lack of police training, particularly border police, security units and rapid intervention teams, to meet these challenges;
- Using a wide variety of subtle or direct threats to the spectrum of nuclear war, including nuclear alerts and reopening the international debate on the nuclear issue.

**Conclusion**

Analyzing the current conflicts from another perspective, we can see that the methods and tactics used are not new, but the shape they take is new, adapted to the technological development period.

A characteristic of this new kind of war is that the belligerent actors have changed, as well as the tactics and methods used by them. Conventional war between two or more states became rare (but not excluded), while an overwhelming majority of current conflicts are taking place within the borders of the state (civil war) or regional conflicts (border), in which, besides the involvement of state

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Phillip A. Karber, *Russia’s Hybrid War Campaign, Implications for Ukraine & Beyond*, Washington CSIS 1o March 2015,

actors in the area at least a non-state actor’s involvement is recorded.

Asymmetry was always a fundamental concept in the course of the war, the combatants tried to identify and exploit opponents’ weaknesses to secure victory. This was the basic tactics adapted in many battles and conflicts starting from antiquity, labeled as asymmetric conflicts.

Adopting techniques and tactics of asymmetric warfare is proven by the fact that some of the combatants reached a high technological and military superiority that led to weaker opponents ready to use asymmetric/hybrid methods to counterbalance this power.

By understanding how a hybrid adversary developed as an entity, we can shape a perspective in understanding how it works.

Hybrid actions are generally characterized by the simultaneous adoption of multiple forms of struggle and combining military and non-military means of struggle. Hybrid threats can materialize in different ways of warfare, battle opponents may use conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations and terrorist acts (including indiscriminate violence and coercion).  

From our point of view, the preparation and training of the armed forces to counter the hybrid threats is a strategic necessity in an era of asymmetric conflicts.

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PARTICULARITIES IN DEVELOPING HYBRID WAR IN UKRAINE

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Abstract: Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template. A perfectly thriving state can, in a matter of months and even days, be transformed into an arena of fierce armed conflict, become a victim of foreign intervention, and sink into a morass of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe, and civil war. Hybrid warfare has its roots in past conflicts but it also has the power to transform the strategic calculations of today’s combatants because of the growing proliferation of non-state actors, information technology and advanced weapons systems.

Keywords: Hybrid war, hybrid threats, Ukraine regional conflict, cyberwar.

Introduction

The area of modern conflicts involve more and more a world without borders in which internal and external security are no longer separated and must be aware of the reduced power of individual states when we address the issues generating hybrid threats.

Current conflicts are characterized by a fusion of different hybrid shapes and methods which combined conventional means of warfare, unconventional and criminal actions underway in the entire spectrum of conflict.

A comprehensive definition of hybrid threats is shaped by Frank Hoffman defining hybrid threats as actions of any enemy that uses simultaneously in space combat a mixture of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorist and criminal behavior to achieve political objectives.¹

The actions undertaken to annex Crimea province and the subsequent actions taken in Donetsk and Luhansk areas in eastern Ukraine by the Russian Federation are called by many experts in security studies as specific actions of hybrid warfare.

1. Description of the Russian actions in Ukraine

Behind a facade of civilized contractual relations between two sovereign states, the Russian Federation was the architect of special operations against Ukraine focused on three main objectives:²

✓ Combating and preventing Ukraine’s integration into NATO and in the European space as a key factor in the revitalization and reaffirmation of Russia as a great power and the revival of Russian imperialism concept;

✓ Confusing and dividing the population of Ukraine because the Russian empire will not be able to exist as long as Ukrainians maintain their national identity;

✓ Perpetuating guided chaos to provoke separatist movements meant to


weaken government institutions in Ukraine, in order to split the country and undermine its sovereignty.

The implementation of these tasks is performed by Russian diplomats and intelligence services and the armed forces of Russia. Their key methods include subversive activities carried out by agents of influence, misinformation and blackmail, threats and pressure at the political level, actions of bribery and persuasion, involvement of criminal elements in special operations, recruitment of mercenaries and the use of units of regular Russian army unmarked for conducting covert operations.

Moreover, to prevent Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and NATO, Russia has kept action levels of influence through agents infiltrated in the information, linguistic, cultural, historical and religious spheres.

In this way, Russia has sought and seeks to destroy the Ukrainian identity, which is a formative element of the Ukrainian national state in order to achieve the traditional Russian imperial ambitions.

Kremlin Government led by the pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, who solidified his political power at the election in 2010, chose to abandon the European integration course of Ukraine and NATO and applied anti-Ukrainian policies. At that time, temporary control of Ukraine by Russia was no longer a key priority rather the permanent integration of Ukraine into Russia was the ultimate goal. This goal must be achieved by keeping Ukraine in Russia’s orbit and by crushing freedom and Ukrainian identity at the individual and national level.

The fall of Yanukovych and his removal from power in 2014 raised hopes that the new Ukrainian government will renew the course towards European integration and NATO, will counter Russian expansion, will restore law and order, strengthen democratic institutions and preserve national unity.

Feeling that its interests were threatened, the Russian Federation resorted to military aggression and invaded Crimea, accompanied by a large-scale special operation.

Currently, the Russian Federation continues to destabilize Ukraine by maintaining smoldering conflict areas in Donetsk and Luhansk. Meanwhile, another less obvious goal of Russian Federation’s actions is to test how Western democracies are prepared and are able to withstand and respond to revisionist and expansionary plans to use force to reclaim the territories that were parts of the Russian empire in the past.

2. The analysis of Russian hybrid actions in Ukraine

The actions undertaken to annex Crimea province and later Russian Federation’s actions in Donetsk and Luhansk are called by many experts in security studies as a specific action of hybrid war.

These operations are considered by the community of Western states as a model or pattern of aggressive action of Russia applicable to all states in the former Soviet space.

The actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine took place in two distinct phases. The first phase began in February 2014 when the Russian armed forces occupied Crimea, which was later annexed. The second phase included the Russian actions in Donetsk and Luhansk areas.

2.1. The analysis of hybrid actions of Russian Federation in Crimea

Russian actions in Crimea were performed as covert military operations that combined ambiguity, deception and surprise element at the operational level with conventional military actions, electronic warfare and informational actions.

The annexation of Crimea ended with the invasion and its occupation by Russian military forces.

The initial hybrid actions of the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine were storming in and occupying the Supreme Rada in Crimea Peninsula by the
Russian Special Forces. This was accompanied by specific actions of hybrid war, such as:

- Invading Crimea by Russian military units whose troops did not wear military insignia;
- Locking Ukrainian ports and vessels of Ukrainian Navy by Russian fleet in the Black Sea;
- Recruiting pro Russian locals, organizing them in groups and arming them with Russian weapons and equipment;
- Encouraging the formation of an Executive Authority which organized, under the protection and influence of Russian occupation forces, a referendum for annexation of Crimea Peninsula in the Russian Federation;
- Signing an agreement whereby, following a referendum, the self-proclaimed Supreme Rada of Autonomous Republic declared the independence and annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation;
- Taking propagandistic actions in order to influence Western public opinion shown in numerous declarations and pressure on a diplomatic level and in the media. These actions include Lavrov Plan – a program developed with the goal of Ukraine’s international isolation, fragmentation and division of Western public opinion.

A feature that made possible and contributed to the success of Russian operations in Crimea was the existence of a transit agreements on the Ukrainian territory by Russian military forces, which allowed Russian troops to infiltrate easily in the territory of Ukraine under the guise of conducting military exercises.

Another peculiarity of Russian actions in Crimea is influencing public opinion and the Crimean peninsula population using mass media and propaganda. Recent studies have revealed that 84% of Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in Crimea became favorable to annexation after Russian propaganda, through inoculation by the media, spreading the perception that ethnic Russians would become second-class citizens in Ukraine.

Another finding of these studies which demonstrated the effectiveness of Russian media is that unlike residents of western and central Ukraine, a strong majority (85%) of the population of Crimea do not perceive themselves as Europeans.

After annexation, Ukraine did not dispute the information space broadcast in Russian, and Russian media created a dominant and favorable position to transmitting and adapting information in support of the Kremlin.

In Crimea, hybrid and synchronization actions worked together to create an opportunity for Moscow to conduct hybrid military operations.

2.2. The analysis of the hybrid actions of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk areas

Just as in the Crimea Peninsula, the Russian actions in Donetsk and Luhansk areas were combined ambiguity, deception and criminal elements with conventional military action.

The conflicts in eastern Ukraine began when armed groups controlled, supervised and financed by the Russian special services created Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) on 7 April 2014 and the Luhansk People’s Republic (NRL) on April 27, 2014. These events were accompanied by specific actions of hybrid warfare including:

- Organization by the self-proclaimed leaders of Luhansk and

motives-in-contested-ukraine/, accessed on 05.08.2015.


5 Michael Kofman, Matthew Rojansky, A Closer look at Russia’s Hybrid War, in Kennan Cable, no.7, April 2015, p.5.
Donetsk People’s Republic of referendums to certify the secession of these territorial units from the Ukrainian State;

➢ Infiltration of military reconnaissance and sabotage groups composed of forces of the secret service (GRU, FSB, SVK), Russian Cossack paramilitary and armed bands of Russian mercenaries;

➢ Involvement of diversionary elements infiltrated into the assault and occupation of administrative unit in many cities in Donetsk and Luhansk areas;

➢ Organization of attacks by separatist elements infiltrated in the Ukrainian units in Donetsk and Luhansk areas;

➢ Arming and equipping separatist elements with weapons and military equipment, including tanks, artillery and anti-tank systems;

➢ Conduct and development in Donetsk and Luhansk areas (August, 27 2014) of regular military forces of the Russian Federation;

➢ Broadcasting propaganda leaflets among the local population (one of the messages spread through the propaganda leaflets stipulating: Do not prevent the movement of the Russian army, equipment and personnel, in any circumstances).

6 Russian actions in Donetsk and Luhansk areas present unique features due to the combined and simultaneous use of specific devices and techniques of conventional warfare, covert military elements, psychological, diplomatic, informational, and misinformation actions to achieve political goals, all these action features falling in the categories of specific actions of hybrid war.


Conclusion

The methods used by the Russian Federation to conceal the beginning of the invasion in Crimea and action in the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk including covert operations carried out by Russian special forces, using regular unmarked armed forces, providing basic military equipment and weapons to the separatists, using propaganda and subversive means to confuse and disrupt local population, they all fall in the spectrum of hybrid actions.

Also, the use of the Russian Federation tools to broadcast propaganda and psychological operations, part of a campaign of misinformation and under cover military operations, combined with conventional military actions, specific electronic warfare and informational actions allowed us to say that the actions of Russian Federation in Crimea fall in the categories of specific actions of hybrid war.

The most important aspect regarding Ukraine’s integration into the European Union is the development of a regional conflict with large-scale territorial implications within its borders. Ukraine is unable to apply for access to the European Union as long as it is unable to resolve an already chronic conflict which consumes resources and makes Ukraine less and less resembling the image of a European country and farther and farther away from the quality of member of a political and especially economic union.

Depending on the way hybrid threats will be managed in the future, they can destabilize and weaken state actors and international security organizations or, on the contrary, they can strengthen cooperation among them. Due to the era in which we live, characterized by globalization and interconnections, states perceive their own security threats in the same way, and a threat arisen at thousands kilometers away from the borders of a state, affect, directly or indirectly, the security of that state in the same way as close security threats. Thus, preparing the way to react to this new type of hybrid...
threat is the responsibility of all actors in the international arena.

Knowing the features, the particularities and the manifestation of hybrid threats enables states and international security organizations to prepare a comprehensive strategy to counteract them, while ensuring close cooperation among them.

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This work was made possible through financial support provided through the Sectoral Operational Program Development of Human Resources 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, in the project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with the title “Security through knowledge” – Integrated/educational network of training, counseling and guidance of PhD students for a career in research of security, defense, public order and national security - SECNETEDU”.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON DEFENCE COOPERATION

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Abstract: Military budgets have also been hit by the recent economic and financial crisis. The reconfiguration of security strategies was a necessity for European Union and NATO and both international organizations considered that cooperation among states would be the best instrument to stop the effects of the economic crisis phenomenon. The main objectives of the two cooperation initiatives: Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defense were creating efficient armies and increasing the level of trust and cooperation between countries, considering the economic crisis and budget cuts. The role of these concepts was to support the recovery efforts of the states after the economic recession. Thus, although all EU and NATO member states have been impacted by the crisis effects and forced to adopt austerity measures, the defense spending had a constant path. The state budgets have been reduced and the military investments have decreased, but the members of political and military alliances had to identify new methods of cooperation in order to make the armed forces more efficient and to develop new defense capabilities.

Keywords: cooperation, economic crisis, military expenditures, capabilities.

Introduction

The security environment is still under the influence of classical risks and threats, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter-ethnic conflicts or organized crime. In addition, the economic and financial crisis affected not only the economic, but also the political and social sectors. The global economic and financial crisis had a strong impact on military budgets. The states and the regional and international organizations were forced to adjust defense planning and to find new cooperation strategies in order to reduce costs and render the army structures more efficient at the same time.

In his book, “The Rise of European Security Cooperation”, Seth G. Jones states that “States are much stronger when they combine military power than when they act unilaterally. Constructing joint military forces merges military project power abroad. Combining power also necessitates maximizing efficiency. On the strategic level, the military have different grand strategies, military doctrines, and force structures. On the operational and tactical level, they may have different command, control and communication (C³) equipment as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capacities. Soldiers even speak different languages. Creating multilateral forces with an integrated civilian-military organizational structure can help overcome these problems by forcing participant states to address their differences.”

1. Collaborative and cooperative initiatives in the context of the economic crisis

The budgetary pressures and the austerity measures represented a new challenge in the defense area. States have been forced to contribute to the common security plan with fewer resources. Pooling and sharing of resources, prioritization, specialization and the multinational solutions have become central points in defining new defense strategies.

Given the budgetary reductions and the new threats in terms of security, the European Union and NATO have had to take action to avoid turning the economic crisis into a security crisis. To this end, the two initiatives for international cooperation, Smart Defense and Pooling & Sharing targeted the consolidation of military coordination and cooperation.

Pooling & Sharing

By Pooling and Sharing, the European Union seeks solutions to ensure the security in the global economic and financial crisis context. EU therefore tries to reinforce the coordination and harmonization of military requirements, by promoting cost-effectiveness, improving procurement methods and identifying and supporting the best practices for the development and the acquisition of military capabilities. The purpose of this initiative is to avoid duplication of capabilities, both at the EU and NATO – EU levels. It also represents an economic solution to the impact of the financial crisis on military budgets as all member states are involved. In order to meet national interests and to fulfill the responsibilities of the European Union, the states are required to maintain cost efficiency, but also to invest and share the military equipment.

Pooling and Sharing is based on two concepts: the first one would be pooling capabilities – this concept refers to the fact that, nowadays, it is no longer necessary or economically viable for each member state of the Union to keep its own force structure. Certain parts of the national force can be pooled with those of other states and be used together as a whole. Thus, the individual costs are being reduced and the efforts are focused towards effectiveness. The second concept: sharing - refers to the fact that all member states have the possibility to use, when necessary, the military forces of another member state. This concept assumes, however, strong political arrangements and the strengthening of confidence among states.

A strong incentive for European states arises from the necessity of cutting the expenditures at national level and the responsibility of maintaining the military capabilities at an optimal level. The states must find a way to enhance the military cooperation in research and development or procurement as well as training and current missions.

In 2008-2010, the first two years of crisis, the total defense expenditure in the EU decreased by about 4%\(^2\). European army structures have started to intensify the international cooperation process in order to develop defense capabilities.

The creation of EDA (European Defense Agency - EDA) in 2004 represented a systematic approach to collaboration on the development of defense capabilities at European level. At the same time, it represented an appropriate framework for identifying and meeting operational requirements, but also support for technological progress in the defense industry. The efforts of the defense ministries of the 28 EU member states have been focused toward finding solutions to strengthen European military capabilities in the context of the budget cuts. Each member state had to make an inventory of national capabilities. After this procedure, the stocks have been

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centralized in a document illustrating the endowment situation of the armies in Europe. The states should try then to identify possible areas of cooperation. Once the inventory of existing military capabilities has been completed, each member state may avoid the investment in the capabilities that are already held by another member state and they would focus on the capabilities that are necessary to be acquired in order to achieve the national strategic objectives and to maintain the European Union as a relevant actor on the international security scene.\(^3\)

The European leaders underlined in the Council of the European Union in 2010 the necessity of a stronger coordination among the European states and they drew attention to the following point: all member states were to review their army structures and group them into three categories: capabilities that are essential for the national security and needed to be maintained exclusively at a national level, capabilities that can be maintained in close cooperation with partners (the concept of pooling), capabilities that can be eliminated from the national structures and provided by partners (the concept of sharing).

Regarding the debates on the economic crisis and spending cuts in the military field, we believe that European leaders should also have an alternative perspective: the strategies should not be focused only on the idea of saving money, but also on security and on current threats; European leaders and European elites must take into account that hard power forces and capabilities are neither archaic nor dispensable. If the public opinion does not figure out this part of the problem, it would be difficult for the European leaders to obtain a democratic mandate for hard defense spending.\(^4\) The defense expenditures cuts were influenced primarily by the need to reduce budget deficits and not by a change of the nature of security threats.

The Pooling & Sharing concept is not quite a new one. The member states of the EU and NATO have shared their capabilities for a long time through bilateral or multilateral arrangements. This type of cooperation has already been experienced but it is rather difficult to state, that it has really solved the strategic deficits within the European Union.

\textit{Smart Defense}

The concept of Smart Defense appeared because of the imbalances in terms of contributions made by the member states to the NATO budget. These imbalances have definitely stemmed from the economic crisis. The Smart Defense initiative is part of the transformation that NATO has been subject to in the recent years. Its main purpose is to cover the lack of defense capabilities that require considerable expenditure and to develop the necessary capabilities for NATO to cope with the international current context: anti-ballistics, surveillance and reconnaissance, intelligence, maintenance and training, education, force protection.\(^5\)

The following steps have been required to implement the concept of Smart Defense: prioritization, specialization and cooperation. The prioritization of the national capabilities has been made in accordance with the requirements of the alliance and its purpose was to establish the main objectives for NATO; by specialization, states have cut from the defense budgets the expenditure for the capabilities that were already allocated to other NATO member states and which all members


\(^5\) Frunzetti, Teodor, op.cit., p.9.
have access to. This method helps save some resources which could be invested in some underdeveloped or non-existent sectors within the alliance. The decisions concerning the army’s specialization must be made in a coordinated and transparent way. The Smart Defense initiative also focuses on pooling and sharing resources, engaging in joint procurement projects and on the cooperation regarding maintenance and logistics efforts.

As NATO former General Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen admitted, “maintaining a capable and effective NATO Alliance in this era of financial crisis presents a real and pressing challenge for NATO”\(^6\). At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO allies agreed to allocate 2% of the GDP of each state for defense spending, in order to ensure that each member is able to maintain the required level of interoperability. However, taking into consideration the recent developments in the financial environment, NATO has faced some challenges such as decreasing defense budgets in many countries, or the gap between European and American contributions within NATO. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, stated, “the fiscal, political, and demographic realities make [achieving the 2 percent of GDP target] unlikely to happen anytime soon”\(^7\).

“Smart Defense is about building security for less money by working together and being more flexible. That requires identifying those areas in which NATO allies need to keep investing. [...] Smart Defense also means encouraging multinational cooperation. Nations should work in small clusters to combine their resources and build capabilities that can benefit the alliance as a whole. Here NATO can act as a match-maker, bringing nations together to identify what they can do jointly at a lower cost, more efficiently, and with less risk”\(^8\).

NATO is the main structure for strengthening the cooperation in the transatlantic security field. This role is essential, especially given the fact that the European Union is facing a financial and political crisis that slows down the process of European integration and cooperation. There are many favorable arguments regarding the initiatives of Smart Defense and Pooling & Sharing, but they do not change the fact that NATO allies have been affected by the reduction of the military capabilities. The United States and European NATO members must recognize the fact that the nature and amplitude of reductions in the defense field are worrying. Pooling resources, investing in new types of capabilities and coordinating the relations between the alliance’s members, all these issues are very important and NATO should take them into consideration while addressing current and future challenges in the field of security.

2. Defense cooperation and the economic crisis

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, stated on 23 May 2011, that the EU wants to turn the financial crisis and its impact on national defense budgets into an opportunity to increase the cooperation in developing the defense capabilities\(^9\).

While the financial and economic crisis occurred in 2008, the attention has been focused for a long time on the

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\(^7\) Ibidem, p.86

\(^8\) Rasmussen, Andres Fogh, “NATO after Lybia”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, nr. 4, July/August 2011, pp.2-6.

financial sector, the job market and the stability of the common currency. Expenses and falling revenues have created massive debt and budget deficits. The decreasing confidence of the people in the capitalist system was another important consequence of the economic crisis. For example, in Germany and the UK, two countries that contribute the most to the EU budget, we could notice a diffusion of the suspicions regarding the EU principles, such as the economic solidarity.10

Germany, like many other European partners, realized that it is difficult to align their military capabilities with the missions’ requirements. The economic crisis came along with new dynamics and a higher degree of reliability in terms of reforming the armed forces. Germany made the most consistent reductions in the field of the defense: 8.3 billion euros between 2010 and 2015, having an annual defense budget of about 30 billion euros.11 On the other hand, France and Britain always claimed they would like to have the ability to act independently, if necessary. In these countries, the austerity measures consisted in the drastic reduction of armed forces and the increasing cooperation with the European partners (the Franco-British agreement in 2010). Despite the budget deficits, France continued to insist on a strong and independent military industry.12

The UK focused on reducing the troops, stopping the nuclear submarine modernization, but they also concentrated on the military cooperation with capable partners. In Poland, we could notice a surprising evolution in the military field, before and after the economic crisis. Poland has the most powerful military system of the central and eastern European NATO member states. Although its defense budget was reduced by 20% in 2009, it experienced an increase of 7% in 2011.13 Poland redirected the spending towards the military modernization and made plans to invest 35 billion euros in the military fields in the next 15 years.14

Based on the statistics presented in the table below, we can see that although France’s GDP is considerably lower than Germany’s GDP, France shows a higher interest on military affairs than Germany. Thus, although Germany is seen, generally, as the most powerful military force in Europe, along with Britain, if we summarize strictly the spending made in defense, France has an obvious interest to be on top, with a budget of around 2.3% of GDP for the defense spending.

We can also notice that, considering the presented states, the GDP has been on an upward trend until 2008, but it started to decrease in 2009. However, the percentage of GDP allocated to defense spending has remained constant. This demonstrates that, despite the economic variables, the interest in the military remains constant. We could also see that the U.S. continues to make considerable investments in defense. Moreover, we notice that during the crisis, the U.S. GDP has increased since 2008, while military spending was commensurate with this increase, recording a rise of 1% compared to 2002-2007. But in the last two years, the United States has also reduced defense spending. Regarding the case of Romania, despite the fact that GDP is considerably higher than it was in the pre-crisis period, the percentage allocated to military spending is lower. However, considering the big increase of the GDP between 2008 and 2014, compared to 2002-2007 period,

12 The Cooperation Agreement between France and Britain (November 2010) proposed reducing defense spending while maintaining efficacy. It promoted the sharing of aircraft carriers, satellite communication division, creating joint expeditionary forces.
13 Keller, Patrick, op.cit., p.119.
14 Ibidem.
the investments in the military field were higher.

Thus, we have to underline the fact that Smart Defense and Pooling &Sharing contribute to the improvement and stabilization of the defense budgets. Although the European leaders expressed their fears regarding the drastic cuts in the defense field, we must take into account the efforts required to make the armies more efficient and the cooperation mechanisms that seek to maintain the strongest EU and NATO member states as relevant actors on the international security scene. Noting the percentages in the table below, if we evaluate the defense budgets, we can refer rather to the lack of investment in the military field than to the drastic cut of the defense spending.

Cooperation has represented, for a very long time, a key element for the European Union and NATO cooperation in the defense area. Actions such as pooling and sharing resources are designed to bring significant long-term improvement in European military capabilities, to the extent that the powerful countries take part in this initiative. The results can be visible if the responsible institutions establish joint funding measures. Otherwise, the solutions of pooling and sharing resources will be used primarily to reduce costs without bringing improvements in operational efficiency and strategic forces. If states pool and share only the resources they already have, Pooling & Sharing is not a long term solution to reduce the capabilities deficits. The initiative should take into account future investment and provide a set of measures and strategies for the future.

![Figure 1. GDP evolution and military expenditure 2008-2014](image)

**Conclusions**

Because of the economic climate of recent years, the political leaders have been forced to find the best solutions to cut expenditures and ensure security both in the states and the alliances their states belong to. New forms of collaboration and cooperation were developed in order to ensure mutual support between partners and to face the current challenges to the security and, at the same time, to cope with the constraints caused by the economic crisis by prioritizing defense spending and ensuring the necessary military capabilities. Thus, the measures taken to reduce costs, imposed by the budget deficits, maintaining and improving global defense capability, represent new challenges for the governments.
The initiatives for cooperation: Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defense became representative elements within the defense and security sphere. The fragile budgets of the European Union and NATO member states, the lack of investment in defense capabilities and the need to enhance the level of cooperation between states, led to the reconfiguration of the security strategies. The economic and financial crisis has been a real test of stability, responsibility and solidarity of the European Union. Although the GDP started to grow, the economic recovery is still moderate. However, the effects of the crisis are still present in the global security environment, and this environment is becoming more diverse and unpredictable. The necessity of development, acquisition and maintenance of military equipment encouraged the cooperation among allies. With the cooperation initiatives, states have been forced to focus on mutual trust and on sectors where they may develop joint strategies and programs. Optimizing the defense capabilities of NATO member states and promoting their rationalization are also the aims of the defense structures.

Both the budget cuts in times of crisis as well as the austerity measures have implications in the military field. However, as shown above, although the budgets have significantly increased, the defense spending remained constant. Thus, we can say that these two initiatives Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defense have boosted the defense budgets and they have partially achieved their goals by improving the capabilities deficits. However, a long-term strategy should take into consideration new investment in defense capabilities and a clear positioning of the states with respect to the concept of cooperation among allies.

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INTELLIGENCE DRIVEN OPERATION INFLUENCE ON UN PEACE KEEPING

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Abstract: "Comprehensive intelligence support is vital in both contemporary peace and peace support operations. Understanding the adversaries and dealing with complex and rapid changing security challenges, international organizations should develop relevant intelligence structures and integrate intelligence from all possible sources.”

Keywords: intelligence, operations, security, knowledge.

Introduction

The past years peace support operations have shown the necessity of an integrated intelligence capability and require a dedicated intelligence support. It was only the beginning of a new paradigm and some start calling peace support operations as “intelligence driven operations” in spite of it has been proven to be at least difficult to really put the term into practice and implement it to the field.

Intelligence driven operations, a term that came from ancient times from the Great military thinker Sun Tzu was again brought into attention nowadays by the military and law enforcement planners.

Some operations are really intelligence driven for the fact that intelligence provides both the mean and the direction for these operations even though not all the military people cope with the idea. They are more into the fact that intelligence supports operations instead of leading it. In this instance a paradigm shift, if not a new paradigm is needed in order for the intelligence to keep up with the quick and ever changing threats and the vast operational environment. Every change is hard to be achieved for the system momentum and for the people’s reticence in front of new challenges. Anyway if the progress is wanted some changes are to be made for the simple reason that those two concepts are intrinsic and deeply related.

The line between Intelligence and operations

In order to be successful a peace support operations should achieve a high level of understanding, learning and dealing with the modern, rapidly shifting environment and possible threats and also develop a reciprocal relation between operations and intelligence.

In this operational environment the threat is easier to be conceived and hidden making it harder to discover than in other conventional operations. One reason is that the enemy is blended and mixed with the local actors and the role of regular forces is only a secondary one. According to Renaud Theunens in his thesis: "Paramilitaries, volunteers, self-declared police forces, freedom fighters, or even criminal networks and the gangs they control, dominate the situation on the ground. These groups are fully integrated in and assimilated with the local population and often maintain close relations with the local power centres. Due to the nature of the conflict, the local power centres amalgamate military, economical and political power”¹. For this and many other reasons the peace keeping mission is facing the strange situation to cooperate with those who pose the biggest threat to its mandate fulfilment. This

¹ Renaud Theunens: http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/file/_Peacekeeping_intelligence: Emerging_Concepts_for_the_future"
creates particular constraints on the very structure of intelligence system. Instead of focussing on information and intelligence to the traditional way they have to adapt and evolve along with the changing environment and also they have to look deeper and into a much broader information framework starting with geographic and ethnic, through political and economical, to end with but not only linguistic, social, sociological, and demographic intelligence. Doing so it increases the organizations area of responsibility followed as well by a broaden area of intelligence interest. Some can say that the intelligence system for a peace keeping operation have to deal with the global information environment rather than with the normal or regular military information environment. Comprehensive intelligence support is vital in both contemporary peace and peace support operations. Understanding the adversaries and dealing with complex and rapid changing security challenges, international organizations should develop relevant intelligence structures and integrate intelligence from all possible sources.

Learning and trying to understand the quick-shifting structure of the enemy takes in this case more interaction and active collection instead of using the classical “actionable intelligence” or passive collection combined with periodic sampling.

It is also important for this intelligence picture with multiple layers to be available for decision makers long before the political decision to be taken. Once the decision to send or not the troops is taken, intelligence qualified personnel should be sent to the field along with the first deployable units in order to complete the picture with the latest information and to compare and corroborate the intelligence already gathered.

Officially the mission of a peace support operation it is given by the statement of its mandate. In the real life they are too many factors to impose limits and unforeseen difficulties in the mandate implementation. Also the objectives of the peacekeeping operation are being affected and sometimes postponed by the real life and operational environment facts and figures. For this and not only, in peacekeeping operations it is harder to clearly identify, the layers of tactical, operational and strategic operations. They tend to influence and interconnect each other and for this the intelligence structure has to be flexible and allow the flow of information between those layers, integration and interconnection being a must.

The need for Intelligence

To get to know the real intention of the field actors could be more important than their real fire power. “The knowledge of the involved parties’ intentions will be crucial and actually be more important than their measurable military capabilities. What is their goal, and why? These intentions are often wider than just political or military objectives and sometimes, may seem irrational for a logical system.”

For a proper intelligence system it could be a critical mistake to exclusively rely on sensors and detectors and will always provide a partial and incorrect picture of the actors’ intentions. In order to get the full picture and to complete the bigger puzzle, besides the technical support the human factor should be a part in all the Intel cycle steps. Even though we all know that HUMINT is subject to a number of caveats they have to be a part of one good intelligence structure. Given the nature of the operation (peace keeping), all military personnel should be taken into consideration like potential collectors. Every kind of movement inside the mission area should and can provide very valuable information on the situation. The same goes for everybody that interacts, talk and have any kind of contact with the environment, actors, local populace, land lords and local authorities. For better

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result and a proper collection all these sensors need to be made aware of their role as collectors and also receive basic training to carry out this task.

Another key player in the field are the civilian organizations from various entities EU, OSCE, NGO’s which have the advantage of different corporate cultures, and their own approach to intelligence and security. Having access to each other information is of paramount importance for mission success and for the benefit of all. In this instance the representatives of the various organisations should have access to a common database where everybody can and should share and exchange information.

Intelligence in peace keeping operations should be directed towards creating conditions for learning and understanding the complexity of the operating environment, the adversary and how those can and may influence our own operations. In order not to be surprised by uncertainty and complexity, understanding the adversary and operating environment by intelligence driven actions is a must. Intelligence driven operations the eyes and years on the ground that create awareness, understanding, and meaning of action over adversary systems, should be developed and implemented in all field missions.

Intelligence driven operations should be implemented in all levels of operations from strategic to operational and down to the tactical level which was the beginning and the best example of how intelligence driven operations works.

There could be a risk, however, to lose the balance between operations and intelligence but with an experimented core of professionals from both operational and intelligence sides the equilibrium should not be affected.

Conclusion

In modern operational environment fighting with intelligence support is as important and as necessary as fighting for it. To be successful we have to interact and learn from that interaction with the threat and/or possible adversary. Intelligence driven operations can create the conditions and allow the learning from the threat and enemy.

Intelligence driven operations are crafted to increase the understanding of the adversary and its systems and for that all the operational lines can only benefits. Working together and complementary, operations and intelligence will enhance the potential of both and with better and faster results. The complexity of modern warfare and the varsity of the operational environment require a part of intelligence activities to move away from traditional doctrinal frame if wanted to be successful. That is not to say that not needed anymore as the classical intelligence support but only a swift shift of some assets beyond and further direct support.

Finding the balance in between and tracing the thin line of demarcation remains to the art of war artisans to fulfill. It also depends on their real understanding and influencing the operational environment to be a win – win situation and also to help achieving the mission objectives.

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Juvenile Delinquency, Risks, Vulnerabilities and Threats Against National Security

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Abstract: The structural transformations that took place in the Romanian society in the economic, social, spiritual and moral areas determined the amplification of the crime phenomenon among the underage too. At present, the risks of security in non-military organizations are manifesting mostly economically, financially, socially, politically and ecologically. The continuity of the existing vulnerabilities in this sector may affect the security of the country, generating interdependent, diffuse, multidirectional effects, which impose prevention forms and suitable and flexible action. Negligence, the amplification or uncontrolled accumulation of these vulnerabilities may create instability, in the future becoming national security risks. Today, juvenile delinquency reveals multiple forms, from theft to violence, drugs and hetero- or homosexual prostitution, from gang violence to vandalism and vagrancy.

Keywords: Juvenile delinquency risks, national security, vulnerabilities, threats.

Introduction

The unprecedented extension of contesting youth movements in the contemporary world, the proliferation of the non-conformist and protesting “subcultures” (tagged by the juvenilogists as forms of “radical deviance”), specific of this age category and, last but not least, the decisive contribution of the young generation to the profound changes that modified the social and political structure of the East European societies, represents an issue of special interest for the scientific research.

In our age the youth, as a powerful creative force, is more and more acknowledged the right to claim its own identity in the “adult society”, to participate with full rights in the political, economic and social process, to assert its ideals and aspirations according to its own options. In Romania, in the last years, delinquency has had a mainly ascending trend, and the insecurity feeling has amplified. The indicators of the criminal status prove that, in order to stop the wave of threats to the public order – highly violent crimes, organized crime - a much more complex approach is required, an integrated system, with the participation of the responsible factors.

The deviance and delinquency phenomena in our country appear to be in close correlation to the level and amplitude of the economic and social development processes, depending, at the same time, on their negative effects on the organization, structure and cohesion of the social groups, on the relations of their members and the life standard.

The plurality of economic, demographic, social, cultural interdependent dimensions, mediated by a series of conditions of an ecological, sociological, psychological, criminology and law conditions represent a multidimensional process and one of the “key” concepts used to characterize social change.

Unemployment, delinquency, suicides, alcoholism, mental alienation, organized crime and corruption are not new phenomena for our society, but today they have become impressive as expansion. On the other hand, the institutions meant to accomplish and impose the norm consensus and observe the laws are strongly affected by dysfunctions and lack of authority; the
law framework itself is extremely fluctuant and the norms prove to be imprecise.

The fragility, the lack of energy of the institutions and the law framework influence in turn the level of the deviance but do not become its final explanations. Moreover, even the scale of the deviant phenomena and the incapacity of the institutions to accomplish social cohesion prove to be effects of the society's disorganization.

The impact of delinquency evolution on the national security, risks, vulnerabilities and threats

We are living in a globalized, interconnected world and we begin to notice that not only the benefits are global, but also the vulnerabilities, risks, dangers and threats. Due to a certain consensus on the fact that the vulnerabilities of the contemporary world cannot be reduced solely on a national basis, the international organizations started to deal with this issue. The European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OEC) created work-groups to deal with identifying the social vulnerabilities and finding solutions to diminish or eliminate them. These groups estimate that in the 21st century the vulnerability of the social systems will increase due to the transition to an intensive and much more technological economy, to social, demographic, environment changes etc.

The specialists established the probable causes for the increased vulnerability:
- market privatization and liberalization put the key infrastructure in private hands; at the same time there is pressure to eliminate the supplementary expenses, including those for security;
- the fast development of the new infrastructures and global services overcomes the capacity of the national and international political authorities to control them;
- the local and national police and military have difficulties in classifying, initiating and developing risk management plans needed for the new security environment.

In this context, social, economic and political security become extremely important at a national level. It is also vital to accomplish Romania's national security interests as established in the Romanian National Security Strategy.

The concepts of risk, vulnerability, threat to national security

The concept of “risk”, although relatively new, had several meanings in the course of time. The semantic modifications are explained by the social-historical conditions. Originating in the usury “philosophy”, risk in the 17th century meant the possibility of an unfavorable result, a threatening danger, a destructive potential. Later it was integrated in the theory of probabilities and later the economy theory defined it as an uncertainty transformed into a probability. Thus, for the first time in the history of its semantics, risk shows up as associated to a rational decision which takes into consideration possible different alternatives, evaluating the consequences and calculating the probability of all possible events. For ideological considerations, in the Romanian society the concept is used only in this decade, with a significant frequency in the political-military domain.

The risk to national security denotes the existence of factors that may affect national security. In close connection with this, the phrase “threat to national security” means identifying or perceiving the existence of risk factors, coupled with the manifested intention or political will to trigger the mechanisms of damaging state security. Therefore, the two concepts are a continuum, the risk factors being a precondition of the threat, and an


2 cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_publicatii/is4-5.pdf, p. 102.
activated and acknowledged form, as such, for the risks\textsuperscript{3}.

Aggressive type risks can take many other nuances such as psychological, informational, imagological, ecological, cultural, ethnic, confessional etc.

The non-aggressive, non-military type risks in general stem from the inside, although the external source is not excluded. They can come from all subsystems of society and may belong either to the decision-making or action factor.

Non-military risk factors may cause instability on various levels of society (economic, social, political, cultural etc.) by removing or diminishing even the role of the military as a stabilizing factor of the national security system\textsuperscript{4}.

Military threat is the traditional core of national security concerns. Armed actions may threaten all parts of the state. The use of force, and the army by definition is a force (has qualified personnel, obedient, disciplined; combat equipment, arms and ammunition, transportation and management, etc.) can produce unwanted major changes in a very short time in any state or group of states. For this reason military threats are typically given priority for national security concerns.

Political threats are directed against the state organizational stability. They may take one of the following forms: pressure the government in favor of a certain policy; opposition parties; overthrow the government; foster secessionist movements (secession = break union); destruction of the state's political structures. Therefore, this kind of threat aims, in particular, at the idea of the state, i.e. its national identity, organizing ideology and main institutions. In turn, social threats can hardly be distinguished from the political ones. Often they are part of the broader package of military and political threats. Usually, however, the threats have their source within the State.

Economic threats are, due to the complexity and diversity of content of their forms of expression, the most deceptive and difficult to control. In a normal market economy the normal condition in which economic actors operate is one of risk, fierce competition and uncertainty. In addition, the globalization phenomena that manifest strongly in the global economy exert an overwhelming influence on each national economy. Therefore, economic threats have both external causes (malfunctions in the world economy) and internal (e.g. mismanagement by those responsible for the business management of the national economy).

**Crime risk as a factor of influence for the national security**

Anti-national ideologies build strategies to transcend the national borders in order to build a “world without borders”. By the pressures they carry, they affect the managing function of the nation, break the connections between organizations that maintain the state as manager of the nation. Through political diversion, it is the state that produces the nation's insecurity, generating delinquency. In these circumstances, organizations that maintain the state by invoking national interest generate and use social information detrimental to the nation and in favor of power centers that maintain anti-national ideologies\textsuperscript{5}.

In the organic procedural theory are considered aggressions the actions directed by purposes that affect other people, organizations, social organizations, arising from connections amoong organizations, including nations; the aggressions are particularly serious when they are designed to affect the reproductive capacity of the

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aggressed field. It results that any processing of information carried by political factors and affecting the reproduction of human or social organizations in which they are embedded constitutes delinquency, even if it is not a form of social aggression.

Incomes, inequalities, poverty, these are aspects that characterize Romania although it has been more than 20 years since the events of 1989. The social policies are still incoherent, ineffective and reactive, offer ad hoc solutions for specific crises, have conflicting goals, lack vision and strategic approach, are not based on evidence, on social indicators, do not monitor and evaluate the current and prior programs.

Human resources in the sphere of social policies have often been of poor quality and, anyway, in the local government structures they were unqualified, immovable, underpaid, politically oriented and controlled, and at the peak, at the level of ministries, agencies and departments, decision makers which supposedly provide some strategic vision have changed continuously on political criteria, not on competence, enhancing the provisional effect of continuous change, generating incoherence and inconsistency.

The nation, through its specific cultural creations, but also through cultural activities enshrined therein, takes selectively and evaluates all that its existential matrix is revealing. People's attitude to the homeland, social morality, social and national aspirations and ideologies, amplified by the national culture, are guidelines derived from the nation's symbolic matrix. Stripping a nation of its cultural treasure may affect national cohesion.

The consequences of delinquency generated by ineffective ideological management is manifested at all levels of the organization: family, social and human groups, nations, by affecting people's ability to integrate into society, by promoting relations of confrontation, not cooperation.

The human factor is probably the most unpredictable risk generator to national security. At the strategic level, the political crisis situations, the power vacuum, the bureaucracy of decision making are sources of risks to national security difficult to calculate. At lower levels, even stress is a source of risk to national security. It can generate fear of hardship and conflict (when it is triggered), generating deterrence and even abandonment of the tasks in the national security system, affecting the decision etc. The slightest malfunction in the national security system creates risks other than those that have been estimated and assumed. Because the system of national security incorporates a subsystem of awareness and pre-calculated risks, a failure in the system generates a (another) dysfunction. If the dysfunction occurs in a crisis situation, time pressured solutions are required in the subsystem, therefore in the system, widening crisis conditions and eroding the national security system.

The issues brought to attention until now enable a sufficiently comprehensive approach to the issue of delinquency so that we can identify forms of criminality which affect the nation's situation and the state's ability to publicly manage the state of the nation. We consider that a government that does not have a good understanding of the nation as a social organization is not able to correctly identify the management needs, the social processes that affect the nation, the state and the citizen. Consequently, negative social manifestations cannot be correctly noticed. There are possible situations where certain types of socially harmful acts can be interpreted as socially or ideologically normal or group interests can

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7 Mihail Dobrescu, *op.cit.*, p. 189.
prevent the criminalization of some harmful types of social facts.

If we accept that a “delinquent act” is the “harmful social fact” affecting the reproduction of a specialized social organization, by breaking the connections between the organizations that maintain it, it becomes possible that in the embedding social organization - the nation – there may be generated disruptive processes that affect continuity and reproduction. Delinquency within the social organizations affects the production, distribution and use of information, while material, financial and human resources can cause development crises. As a result of dysfunctional and disruptive assaults, social organizations can stumble into crises of legitimacy, there are possible crises of honesty and competence, if the state has no organization capable of explicitly managing crises. In the case of such setbacks, if there are no possible new social information processing capabilities able to design organizations’ reorganization and production of the human resources with better performing interrogative capacity, processes such as those mentioned above are out of control. In such situations may occur tensions, conflict situations, confrontations that bring organizations’ situations to limit situations. This generates social crises.\(^{11}\)

In conclusion, ignoring the fact that delinquency can be a source of insecurity is dangerous, non-incriminated delinquency can generate dysfunctional and disruptive processes to the continuity and reproduction of the nation. This conclusion results in the following openings for the identification and analysis of delinquency:

1) the sociological interpretation of delinquency, which distinguishes between a fact with harmful consequences and its legal incrimination, proves an opening for a fairer and more nuanced understanding of the sources of insecurity for states and nations;

2) the possibility that delinquent events affecting states and nations would not be identified and criminalized offers the opportunity of research in the field. Such studies should provide answers so as to act constructively, so that the socializing processes will not generate people and social organizations acting destructively, trying to meet their own needs and aspirations in ways that maintain negative consequences for the nation, state and citizens;

3) the organic procedural analysis makes it possible to have comprehensive studies of delinquency problems; the ontological explanation of human social existence enables historiographical investigation and foresight estimates that could lay the foundation for praxiological design that would make enlightening information available to public decision makers;

4) the ability for a comprehensive and unified settlement of the delinquency issues affecting the security of the nation and state depends on the cognitive horizon in which it lies, on society and policy makers, especially legislators;

5) Many ways of delinquency manifestation cannot be seized and timely legally criminalized; it is possible that some harmful social manifestations, that are delinquency, may not be incriminated on ideological considerations;

6) Delinquency was and is a measure of the errors of government; particularly relevant are the types of delinquency that are created and maintained by the power relationships themselves. They cannot be blocked unless the power relations are replaced by functional relations, oriented towards an efficient public management of the nation's needs, which include, of course, people's needs\(^ {12}\).
The concepts of risk, vulnerability, threat to national security, although relatively new, have had several meanings in the course of time. The semantic modifications are explained by social-historical determination. Having as origin the usury “philosophy”, risk in the 17th century meant the possibility of an unfavorable result, a threatening danger, a destructive potential. Later it is integrated in the theory of probabilities and later on the economy theory defines it as an uncertainty transformed into a probability. Thus, risk shows up for the first time in the history of its semantics as associated to a rational decision which meant taking into consideration the possible different alternatives, evaluating the consequences and calculating the probability of appearance of all possible events. For ideological considerations, in the Romanian society the concept is used only in this decade, with a significant frequency in the political-military domain.

The risk to national security denotes the existence of factors that may affect national security. In close connection with this, the phrase “threat to national security” means identifying or perceiving the existence of risk factors, coupled with the manifested intention or political will to trigger the mechanisms of damaging state security. Therefore, the two concepts are a continuum, the risk factors being a precondition of the threat, and the activated and acknowledged form, as such, for the risks. Risks, whatever their nature, have complex determinations. At present the countries which are part of NATO, and most European countries use the term “risks” on the grounds that it is more comprehensive and reflects better the current situation. Incidentally, in the sociology of risk, addressed in particular by the German school, the risks are categorized also as uncertainties of the modern era. Analyses on security in general use the words: “risks and threats”, “risks, threats and hazards” or “risks, threats, dangers, aggressions”. All of these only emphasize a certain potentiality of risks whose effects seriously damage, at one point, security at both the national and sub-regional, continental and global levels. The specialized literature emphasizes among other things, that non-military risks include phenomena of aggressive and non-aggressive type. The aggressive type are hostile, their gravity is actually measured by the extremely serious consequences to national security. Thus, in peace, they usually find it difficult to qualify and distinguish a zone that separates the cooperative behavior of states from the specific conflict situations. History records in this regard many examples that show that some states have been forced by political-diplomatic, economic and other actions - some having as a subtext threat or use of armed force, to yield, for example, even parts of the territory or to accept the breach of other prerogatives of national-state independence.

The aggressive type of non-military actions, foreign and domestic, can aim at a wide range of objectives such as: discrediting the Romanian state and isolating it internationally; harmful actions towards the government and political forces in power; exacerbation of territorial and patrimonial claims on account of Romania; exercise of direct or indirect pressure on political, diplomatic and legal bodies of the Romanian state to make them act in a certain way that may be contrary to the national interest; preparing the necessary conditions for triggering aggressive type of non-military actions (political, economic, environmental, psychological, informational, ethnic etc.), having in subtext a threat of force.

Risks of an aggressive type can take many other nuances such as psychological, informational, imagologic, ecological, cultural, ethnic, religious etc.

The non-military risks of non-aggressive type generally stem from internal sources although external ones are not excluded. They can come from all subsystems of society and can belong either to decision-making level or to the action level.

Non-military risk factors may cause instability in various levels of society (economic, social, political, cultural etc.) thus removing from play or diminishing even the role of the military as an element of national security system stability.14

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14Gheorghe Crețu, op.cit., pp. 135-139.
Juvenile delinquency etiology strategic imperative for national security

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Abstract: Juvenile delinquency has been and continues to be analyzed differently from one society to another. Numerous theses, guidelines, paradigms and explanatory theories have been developed, some excluding one another and others completing each other. All of these theories aimed at identifying one another and assessing causes and basic mechanisms that determine the occurrence of criminal facts and events with young people. Some of these theories have only limited capacity to generalize from the particular social framework of the criminal acts of delinquent youth, others have a larger degree of generalization, being available in different social contexts. Because the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency has a number of limitations and multiple causal determinations, the different approaches imply multiple definitions and explanations from many scientific disciplines, each of them with a particular theoretical perspective, which is why at the moment there are so many attempts and etiological models in this area.

Keywords: Juvenile delinquency, etiology, theories, psychological, sociological, legal.

Introduction

In agreement with theoretical premises, we can develop the general hypothesis that the phenomena of deviance and crime in our country are closely related to the level and scale of the processes of economic and social development, being dependent also on their negative effects on the organization, structure and cohesion of social groups, on relations of their members and their living conditions. Including a plurality of dimensions, economic, demographic, social, cultural in interdependence, mediated by a number of environmental, psychological conditions etc., development is a multidimensional process and one of the “key” concepts used to characterize social change. This work on the general theoretical analysis of juvenile delinquency issues viewed through the prism of science - sociology, psychology, criminology and legal previews elements that will give shape to the etiology of juvenile delinquency and shaping a personality profile of juvenile offenders.

Juvenile delinquency viewed through the prism of several sciences

“Juvenile delinquency” comprises two distinct concepts that entered common language with clearly defined and unambiguous meanings, often used with different meanings, not only in everyday speech, but also in scientific language. The lack of uniform definitions and unanimously accepted is a source of confusion which can distort the results of criminological investigations.


“As a social phenomenon, delinquency is managed by the social organization called “state” in ways dependent on the ideologies that built the

state”. "Ideologies in turn, are dependent on philosophies and their limits undoubtedly give ideologies limits”2.

"Juvenile, adj. Which belongs to youth; youthful. - FR. Juvenile, lat. Juvenilis”

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: that term describes all offenses against social norms, acts committed with discernment, legally sanctioned, committed by minors between 14 and 18 years.

Some definitions of “delinquency” in informal dictionaries, although not recommended because they are not edited and may contain errors without consulting other dictionaries in parallel, are presented because they are part of the everyday language of juvenile delinquents.

Juvenile delinquency is part of criminality3, part of it having its own identity, conferred by the category of individuals to which it relates. This own identity is reflected by the sinuous nature of this phenomenon, which does not overlap the evolution, increases and decreases in recorded crime in general. This is emphasized in crime among minors which has many different causes from adult crime. Juvenile delinquency is a phenomenon of deviance, manifested by the inability of some minors to adapt to the rules of conduct in society, incapacity due to reasons of biopsychosocial order.

“MINOR, is the person who has not reached the age of majority.”

Juvenile delinquency from a sociological point of view

Sociology considers delinquency as a particular case of social deviance, reason that most often does not differentiate between deviance in general and delinquency in particular. The approach in

sociology terms5 targets social unrest and disorder as a condition of network statuses and roles inadequacy creating a discrepancy for the purposes of collective and individual goals, as they manifest by powerfully extending the sphere of needs and aspirations of the individual (or group) who do not find full satisfaction. State of social disorganization or anomie, as Émile Durkheim called it, causes besides increased numbers of offenses (alcoholism, drug addiction, social deviance) also the gradual extension of the state of marginalization to a growing number of individuals and social groups. Marginalization causes deep feelings of marginality and social frustration, highlighting the social phenomenon of non-integration, with, as the defining note, lack of adherence to social norms and moral. Capturing the incipient phenomenon, delinquency sociology is contributing to deciphering the criminal act at the level of social phenomenon, with the analysis of actually committed antisocial acts, in relation to many aspects of maladjustment, disorganization, anomie and marginalization existing in society.

The phenomenon of teenage criminal deviance, known as juvenile delinquency, currently exist in our country with increased intensity. Criminal statistics, compiled by specialized institutions of social control, which started to be released for public scrutiny, are revealing in this regard, as they demonstrate an increased incidence of crimes committed by juvenile offenders, and especially an increased seriousness of these offenses specific to a growing category of teenagers. This phenomenon is a social issue of acute actuality, especially with how destructive the policy directed against families, educational institutions, courts of socializing role undertaken in the “Golden Age” years proves today its abundantly negative effects, some of them

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2 Mihail Dobrescu, Delicența sursă de insecuritate națională, Editura Licorna, București, 2003, p. 43.
3 Mihail, Dobrescu, op.cit., p. 43.
5 Maria Dorina Pașca, Infactorul minor și reintegrarea lui în comunitate, Editura Ardealul, 2005, pp. 11-17.
having repercussions at the level of delinquent acts committed by minors and young people from families characterized by poor material conditions and educational deficiencies.6

At the root of moral behavior of adolescents, as emphasized by sociologists, there are multiple norm conditionings and value determination influenced by the success or failure of the socialization process. Representing in its ensemble that process started at the earliest age, in which young people learn the norms, values, and standards of conduct compatible with the model ethical-normative society to which they belong, socialization refers actually to acquire young people’s capacity for exercise through: a) the ability to exercise, proper social roles, guided by rules and norms; b) their knowingly participation in the purposes and ideals of society; c) the acquisition of correct discernment capacities to distinguish between permissive and prohibited behavior, between legitimate and illicit means, between socially desirable and undesirable purposes. Due to this process’ acquisitions (acquisition of rules of behavior and human action, positively assessed by other members of society), each individual acquires a specific cultural identity and at the same time, respond to social situations under that identity. Socialization is the process “by which a biological being turns into a subject of a specific culture” under which it can exercise, correctly, positive action, in accordance with the standards of normality and rationality of the social group in which it is integrated. Teaching the young man how to “teach” himself the repertoire of roles to be met in social life, to decipher himself the meanings of processes and situations that involve social interaction and act to fulfill only those purposes desirable for collective and only by means permitted by moral and legal codes, socialization process involves progressive adaptation and compliance to the cultural patterns and norms of society.7

Juvenile delinquency from a psychological point of view

From a psychological perspective delinquency appears as a necessity of integrating the approach of legal norms and the social dimension of the offense, profoundly involving individuality and the delinquent and non-delinquent individual.

The theory of criminal conditioning is a better fit with reality. For the sake of brevity, H. J. Eysenck and Eysenck M. showed excessively dogmatic in defining this theory, therefore they guided readers to its presentation in the book “Crime and Personality”. Behavior morality is not the result of rational decisions, it can be said that all rational considerations are influencing it to a small extent. In fact, very few offenders are caught and punished, and this is well known. If someone would organize a purely rational life, might decide to choose an offender career, since such would likely have higher enrichment chances than those offered by an honest living. So the real question would be: why are there so few people to commit crimes, since they are so profitable that their reward is immediate and that the possibility of punishment remains so vague and remote8. The reason9 is the notion of “conscience”, conceived not as a mechanism implanted in man by his Creator, but rather in response to a conditional reaction gained from lengthy “Pavlovian” type training. Think of what happens when the child grows. Of course, he is naughty, has manifestations of selfishness, dishonesty and antisocial. Whenever he behaves in this way, parents punish him - as do teachers, those older than him and whoever happens to be around. Whatever the punishment - pulling ears, making corner, suppression of evening meal - it is painful and unpleasant.


7 Ibidem, p. 18.


And here is the chaining of facts: first, conditioned stimulus - the sound of the bell of the Pavlovian experiment in our case, the child's intent to commit antisocial and commission of the antisocial act in question; then, unconditional stimulus appearance - corresponding for feed in Pavlov's experiment, here, received punishment from parents, teachers or other persons; finally, unconditional reaction - corresponding to dog saliva, is for the child of our example, pain, anxiety, and fear inflicted by punishment. According to the principles of Pavlov stimulus conditioning is associated, after a number of repetitions of the situation-type, to the unconditional reaction, so that soon the intent to commit or the commission of an antisocial act will be related to anxiety characteristic to administering the punishment. This anxiety coupled with intent to commit an antisocial act is what we usually call "conscience", and its censorship is indeed effective, as it stops most people from indulging in antisocial activities even if they could prove very beneficial and the risk of being caught would be small.

Risk factors in committing crimes may be due to biological causes, such as a disorder of the limbic system, believed to be the source of feelings of pleasure and pain, and partly controlling vital functions like heart rate, respiration and sleep and possibly moderating the expressing violence and emotions such as anger and fear (Bohm, Voegel, 2010). Other possible biological explanations of this factor could come from correlation made in research between abnormal levels of certain neurotransmitters and antisocial behavior: the low level of serotonin has been linked to impulsive antisocial behavior, substance abuse, impulses and suicidal acts (Goldman, Fishbein, 2000), high level of dopamine was associated with violence, aggression and substance abuse, and a high level of norepinephrine was also correlated with aggressive behavior. We believe, however, that this factor can be influenced by family dysfunctions such as problem solving, communication, roles, emotional involvement, emotional responsiveness and auto-regulation, dysfunctions that cause greater than three times the physical aggressiveness in boys, but also the stress the child is subjected to as a result of negative life events related to family, school and peers, level which is increased especially those who do not benefit from parental support. S.G. Tibbetts in "The Development of Persistent Criminality" reports identifying the following significant interaction in the etiology of early-onset crime:

a) low birth weight and socially disadvantaged backgrounds;

b) adverse family environment and a low verbal intelligence;

c) the individual's sex and low birth weight;

d) socioeconomic status and low birth weight;

e) unstable family environment and minor physical anomalies;

f) obstetrical complications and adverse family environment;

g) hyperactivity and deviant companions.

Study of indirect effects could help detect those "supreme" factors leading to the occurrence of certain risk factors (psychopathy, impulsiveness, empathy deficits, etc.), strong predictors of persistent offending. J. Savage in "The Development of Persistent Criminality" states that the following factors could have a significant importance in determining persistent criminal behavior:

a. attachment issues can have powerful, indirect effects on antisocial behavior;

b. the effects of childhood abuse on delinquency are in part direct, by violent socialization, but it is likely to have some indirect effects such as delays in development processes associated with regulation of emotions, cognitive abilities, social information processing etc.

Several authors that have reported some indirect effects are:

Feldman and S. S. Weiberger in "Child Development" conclude that family functioning influences the ability of self-
control for boys, which then in turn affects delinquency.

G. R. Patterson in "Development and psychopathology" suggests that hyperactivity leads to disciplinary problems that may develop over time in antisocial behavior.

Blomberg in "Development of Persistent Criminality" identified that educational achievement in detention increases the likelihood of continuation school after release, a factor associated with increased probability of employment and cessation of delinquency. Risk factors for juvenile offenders are:

1. psychological problems in childhood;
2. hyperactivity, difficulty concentrating and restlessness;
3. deliberate self-aggression, suicidal ideation, suicide / parasuicide;
4. violent history;
5. disorganized family of origin;
6. Physical abuse in the family of origin;
7. high level of behavioral activation and poor behavioral inhibition;
8. observable intellectual disabilities / cognitive;
9. early initiation of delinquent or violent behavior (under 14 years);
10. engaging in other forms of antisocial behavior;
11. beliefs and attitudes favorable to deviant or violent behavior;
12. delinquent or antisocial behavior of parents / guardians;
13. divorce of parents during coexistence with them;
14. parent-child separation;
15. academic failure;
16. Low educational aspirations;
17. The low level of integration at school;
18. Dropout and absenteeism;
19. School with students with a high rate of delinquency;
20. Social rejection;
21. Participation in a criminal group;
22. Links with delinquent persons (neighbors or acquaintances);
23. Increased level of physical aggression;
24. The total period of custodial sentences executed / educational measures;
25. Belief that loved ones are absent when the person needs them, that they could not provide emotional support and protection required as in turn they are emotionally unstable, or that they will abandon the person to someone else, or through a imminent death;
26. High sense of lack of self worth, their own evil, of not being wanted and being inferior or incapable regarding important aspects of life, but also perception of lack of love from others;
27. Vulnerability to harm and disease - exaggerated fear to various diseases, serious emotional problems or external disasters and imminent negative situations that could occur anytime and can not be prevented;
28. Exaggerated relationship closeness and emotional involvement with one of the close persons, relationship that prevents development of their identity and social networking;
29. Insufficient self / self-discipline - the difficulty of control to be disciplined in achieving goals;
30. Excessive accepting control from others, generally to avoid their anger and abandonment or other reprisals from them, proved by the subjugation and enslavement of needs and emotions (especially anger);
31. Exaggerating the negative aspects of life and concomitantly minimizing the positive events;
32. Tendency to be angry, intolerant, punitive, and impatient with people who do not meet expectations or individual's standards, belief that others should be severely criticized for their mistakes, mistakes that are forgotten with difficulty;
33. The presence of irrational ideas, behavior guided by impulses and difficulties to cope with stressful situations at different times of life;
34. Maladaptive parenting overprotective father;
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY FROM THE CRIMINOLOGY POINT OF VIEW

The term criminology is composed of two words, one belonging from Latin: crimen (crime, offense, delinquency) and another belonging to the Greek language: logos (science, study), therefore we can define criminology as a science concerned with crime in general (studying causes of crime) and finding methods for their removal. This approach differs criminology from other sciences dealing with crime phenomenon analysis, as it is the only one that addresses all aspects. It is common ground that the crime in its various forms of expression always existed, but there was also social opinion unfavorable to it, who continually sought to counteract this scourge through various forms and methods, leading to the creation today of a system fighting criminality. Criminology examines crime historically in its dynamics, the offender as a social individual, the environment in which he lives and works, as morality, health, entourage and everything contemporary science has available to investigate, and not last the victim or predisposition to be or become a victim, prevention and combating of criminal phenomenon.

Considering the crime as an integral part of the killer's body itself, representatives of different schools have tackled different aspects crime, developing several theories.

Theory of delinquent predisposing constitution is due to psychiatrist Kretschner Ernst, who, in his work published in 1921, “The body structure and character”, claimed that there is a direct correlation between the structure of the human body and its physical features. Thus, people fall into four distinct constitutional types: picnomorph type, asthenic type, athletic type, and dysplastic type. Subsequently, the theory was taken up and developed in the US, by Ernest A. Hooton and by VH Scheldon who have added endomorphic, mesomorphic and ectomorphic type. Also in the US, Geneck spouses have determined that there is a link between mental peculiarities of minors and their inclination towards a certain type of criminal behavior, where the social living conditions determine the criminologic phenomenon.

Criminologist Benigno di Tullio (“Principles de criminologie Clinique”, Paris, 1967), in the theory of delinquent constitution deemed that the offense comes from a delinquency predisposition, including both elements of hereditary type and acquired, most often in childhood. This theory states that for criminals has to be recognized the existence of a certain delinquency constitution with a clear criminogenic specific that predispose individuals to crime.

Another important theory to explain the formation of the personality of the juvenile delinquent is the biological failure to adapt described by Swedish criminology expert Olof Kinberg in “Fundamental problems of criminology”, published in 1935. To Kinberg, biopsychic structure of each individual determines how he reacts to environmental stimuli. In other words, knowledge of personality structure is paramount (to him) to explain delinquent behavior. For Kinberg an individual's personality is made up of three components: constitutional core; possible pathological variants; moral function.

The constitutional core – designates all individual reactions to external stimuli, as Kinberg distinguished four fundamental factors of mental constitution (drawn from the work of Swedish psychologist H. Sobring Personality): capacity (the maximum intelligence that an individual can use).
can achieve); validity (the amount of energy available to the brain of the individual); robustness (degree of functional unity of the activity subject); the character of these radical or constitutional factors is designated by prefixes super- or sub-, as in excess or deficient amount. Thus a child who developed a personality characterized by the four factors: sub-capable, super-valid, super-stable and sub-solid will adapt less to external stimuli and become more easily a delinquent than another one whose constitutional core is structured differently. The pathological variants are accidental as opposed to constitutional radicals and consist of mental illness, any serious disturbances of intelligence or strong mental imbalances. These pathologic conditions can cause a deficiency of moral function which is naturally a factor of resistance of a minor to the delinquency. Moral function is the minor's ability to assess individual moral norms and his quickness to react to external stimuli. Biopsychological constitution concept envisioned Kinberg was often cited by the etiology of juvenile delinquency, because essentially it represents the normal hereditary provisions that are found in every individual, but also factors acting on the individual during fetal development and its afterword.

In one of his studies, Kinberg wanted to particularly underline\(^{15}\) that it would be a serious error to believe that individuals who sporadically or frequently commit social or criminal acts would necessarily be different from those who don't commit them, thus clearly separating from the criminal anthropology. Perhaps the largest and best known theory on the personality role in the etiology of delinquency (including juvenile delinquency) is the theory developed by Jean Pinatel\(^{16}\). Essentially, this theory assumes that the ability to take the act, that characterizes the offender in relation to the non-delinquent, expresses a personality structure which can not be equated with a certain type of personality.

**Theories and explanatory models in juvenile delinquency**

Juvenile delinquency has been and continues to be analyzed differently from one society to another, numerous theses, guidelines, paradigms and explanatory theories being developed, some excluding each other, others complementing each other, all aimed at identifying and assessing the main causes and mechanisms determining the development of criminal facts and events by the youth. Some of these theories not only have a capacity to generalize limited to a particular social framework of the delinquent youth acts, others have a larger radius of generalization being valid in different social contexts.

Because the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency has a number of conditionings and multiple cause determinations, in the different approaches involve and conjugate multiple definitions and applications from many scientific disciplines, each valuing some theoretical perspective, which is why at the moment there are so many attempts and etiological models in this area. From this set of paradigms and theories we briefly mention the most representative:

- a) theories that overbid the importance of individual cases, psychological, considering that delinquent youth events lies in individual behavior;
- b) theories that believe juvenile delinquency is a direct consequence of social disorganization involved in processes of change and development;
- c) theories according to which juvenile delinquency is a direct result of direct normative conflict between different categories of youth and organizational obstructions to access status, power and wealth.

The great diversity of these theories and views, as well as their degree of


Relativity and representativeness require the use of caution and operationalization of various “key” concepts it covers, such as social pathology, social anomie, social disorganization and dysfunction, cultural-regulatory conflict etc. Of these we will deal mainly with those which are more often handled and used in the etiology of juvenile delinquency, as they include a number of indicative benchmarks for interdisciplinary research of misconducts and antisocial behaviors committed by young people:
  a) theory of resistance to frustration;
  b) “differential association” theory;
  c) social disorganization theory;
  d) “delinquent subcultures” theory and “street-side groups” theory;
  e) social labeling theory.\(^{17}\)

**Bibliography**

**Lucrări de autori români**


**Lucrări de autori străini**


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\(^{17}\)Sorin M., Rădulescu, Dan Banciu, *op.cit.*, pp. 61-63.
IS THE WAR GAME A CONFLICT GENERATOR?

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Abstract: Encouraging the creative thinking of the members of the command participating in the war game is a definite prerequisite of their freedom of action. Accepting to find new methods of approach or techniques that might suggest new solutions represents a way of sustaining the command, adapting it to the changes of circumstances and ensuring the continuation of ongoing activities for future combat situations. At the same time, the desire to have an open mind, to synthesize a large variety of information, to be inquisitive so as to find answers to different questions is another quality that a person must possess in order to be ready for strategic thinking. The notion of conflict usually has a negative connotation, but, in certain organizations, it is appreciated as a progress generating factor. It stimulates creativity, encourages change and growth and the organizations lacking in contradiction spirit are considered prone to failure on the competitive market.

Keywords: conflict, strategic thinking, war game, negotiation.

At the beginning of the third millennium, mankind has undertaken a rapid, continuous, and profound process of change, a permanent search for strategic ideas, or ideas that truly matter. People discover, re-discover and develop strategic ideas due to a constant demand generated in the field of strategic behavior. This condition was put in words in 1970 by the French sociologist Raymond Aron who stated that „strategic thinking is inspired in every century or, better said, in each moment of history, by the issues raised by the ongoing events”1. As it was considered a turning point with respect to ideologies and international relationships, the end of the Cold War represented such an event. Even if this change did not manage to bring peace, tranquility, and prosperity to people, nor did it manage to clear inter-ethnic or intercultural relationships, it still produced profound mutations in all the social domains of life. It was he moment when, through the disappearance of one of the poles of power, the bipolar system began to be gradually replaced by a potentially multipolar system with inclinations towards a generalized globalization, generated by geographic discoveries and technical and scientific revolution, especially developed through the discoveries of information age, communication and transportation interconnection. Globalization, with everything good and everything bad it brought about, influenced in a significant manner, in all aspects, the military organization and its way of manifestation, that is, military actions.

Under public opinion pressure, the expenses specific to sustaining a massive military system have been constantly reduced. It was the moment when the number of military personnel was dramatically reduced, when the armed forces became less massive in all respects, and expenses were cut down on, which resulted implicitly in the need to rethink the way of using the armed forces and waging war. The events that took place after the end of the Cold War are in the trend of what happened during the last two centuries which generated a lot of particular issues requiring more or less innovative reactions from strategic thinking.2

A significant aspect of the period analyzed is that military interventions, in the second phase, had a „pacifist” character

1 Colin S. Gray, Războiul, pacea și relațiile interne interioare. O introducere în istoria strategică, POLIROM 2010 p.32.

2 Ibidem, p. 33.
and they were approved, undertaken, and probably continued in the future with the consent and on behalf of international security organizations. This aspect imposed the necessity of using modular military structures belonging to different states and being led by multinational joint commands. Even if the actions are as democratic as they can be, and they are appreciated by the international public opinion, these activities undertaken in common, within coalitions/alliances are not in the least simple and easy for everyone involved.

Differences in culture, education, training, linguistic abilities, different perceptions and expectations and so on generate within multinational commands sometimes different, even divergent, points of view and even tensions. These conflict-generating aspects, actually to be found in any type of organization, have existed and will still exist in military commands as well. By their very nature, these differences of opinions may influence in a positive / negative way the strength of that command, hence the need to acknowledge these aspects and the ways to be solved through negotiation and mediation performed by the commander.

Within the command, both among different compartments and among their members there are contacts and organizational relationships meant for ensuring a natural act of command. When analyzing any headquarters or command, it is easy to notice that it has a hierarchy and is led according to military rules and regulations; that is why under these circumstances, the entire responsibility and power belong to the commander. Still, if we search through history, we can quickly notice that, for many people, getting and holding on to power has been a crucial objective generating a permanent fight for power.

The relationships established within any organization mean establishing contacts with different people with different mentalities, biases and opinions which are often divergent and may even cause conflicts. Solving these conflicts which emerge in this manner can still be done through functional relationships, that is, through the capacity to communicate of the parts involved in conflict and through the leader’s capacity to negotiate.

Conflict, despite the negative connotation it has in everyday life, is appreciated in some organizations as a factor generating progress. It stimulates creativity, it encourages change and pushing one’s limits, and in places where there is a low drive towards contradiction, the organization is considered to be prone to failing in competitions. A concrete example in the military domain is the war game performed during operation planning, when, from the disputes among the members of the staff, a viable and achievable scenario must be produced as an outcome. This is a positive instance of conflict, and identifying the sources of conflict may be regarded as a means of multiplying the functionality of the system and increasing personnel motivation.

The military staff, like any other organization, is not exempted from the emergence of tense states with latent or open manifestations, for the simple reason that it is made of people with different positions, ranks, education, age and statutes, who are following their own impulses and interests and behave in their different particular manners. This aspect is amplified within ad hoc constituted multinational commands in which all the differences above are added cultural, ethic, and linguistic differences which makes conflicts very diverse in nature, necessitating careful negotiation.

In order to exploit conflict to the use of the staff (see the war game) it is necessary to study and understand notions such as power and conflict, their origins and typologies, negotiation techniques, and so on, for an adequate adjustment of the leadership to the specificity of each structure.
Power exists potentially or effectively in whatever implies social relationships and in all the moments of people’s interactions, ordering and separating all the relationships between individuals and groups. It is characterized by functional organizational relationships which are hierarchical (of authority), of control, and last but not least, of cooperation. To many individuals, power may mean something extraordinary, the wish to have access to and handle resources, the satisfaction to be listened to, to command, to reward or punish, the possibility to influence others. Influence, perceived both positively and negatively, is only possible when it is backed by power. In a positive sense, influence, exercised usually by those who have legitimate power, sanctions and limits the lack of efficiency and the ambiguity of norms due to the power and prestige held by leaders; in a negative sense, influence is especially meant to cheat others – perceived as to manipulate – and is based on the lack of qualms that informal leaders sometimes possess.

If power is a parameter of interpersonal relationships, an asymmetric relationship among the members of the staff with respect to a certain given situation, the attributes of power are ensured by:\(^3\): physical strength (in case of primitive power); personal qualities (integrity, moral profile, personality, stateliness, age); skillfulness in a certain domain; resources he/she has access to (human, financial, logistic, information); institutional authority. In order for a commander to be listened to, obeyed and respected, with the exception of physical strength, it is necessary for all these attributes to be found together in his/her character (if any of them is missing, the result may be a diminished power).

Generally speaking, interpersonal / inter-group conflicts represent a very sensitive issue that needs to be analyzed carefully and thoroughly. We did not set this as our aim in this paper, but I need to emphasize that it exists in any organization and the concepts related to it are perceived simultaneously as being positive and negative forces. Modern approach defines conflict as the state of tension generated by the interference between two or more important issues.\(^4\)

In order to eliminate tension as quickly as possible from an organization (staff or command) it is imperatively necessary for the parties to communicate among themselves. As a focused and interactive type of inter-human communication between disagreeing parties, *negotiation* seeks to reach an understanding that settles the dispute generated by divergent opinions in a mutually beneficial way. Negotiation, this unarmed confrontation, brings together arguments and evidence that are presented openly and honestly, concessions and compromises are made, claims and objections are stated in order to avoid both breaking relationships and armed conflict. Negotiation is a manner of solving conflicts or controversies, its assumed aim being to establish concrete finalities, operational for both parties.

Any military operation begins with the preparation phase, when the operations plan is made. That is the moment when specialists, depending on the commander’s intentions and the tasks received from the superior echelon, on the forces and means available, plan actions in order to accomplish the goal set. An important role, during the planning process, is played by elaborating courses of action starting from specialists’ estimations and ending with their simulation. The analysis of courses of action is performed in order to demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages given by each of them and to create a picture as close as possible to that of real fight so as

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\(^3\) Eugen Burduș, Gheorghi a Căprescu, *Fundamentele managementului organiza iei*, Editura Economică, 1999, p. 452.

to obtain maximum outcome using the forces and means available.

As a means of analyzing courses of action, the war game is used, as an activity with rules and stages by which the ones involved attempt to visualize the fight itself. The elements analyzed regard both own forces and enemy forces, their strong points and their weak points, function of the advantages and the drawbacks offered by the operational environment. The probable courses of action that the enemy is going to take, based on doctrines, analysis of past actions, and specialists’ experience are analyzed in search of vulnerabilities.

The analysis, which is based mainly on assumptions, generates new ideas and brings out to the front critical aspects in the development of the respective operation. It is the moment when, within the respective staff, conflicts emerge in a positive way. While they are taking part in the war game, the staff members should avoid making a comparison between courses of action until the moment set for comparing them formally. Also, new elements may be discovered during this process, either for or against, which may determine the staff to reject a certain course.

Coordinated and led by the chief of staff, the war game is going to include all the responsible factors and the specialists in the staff, who are going to analyze the courses of action in their domain of competence, indicating the way in which they can support best the accomplishment of the mission.

Without attempting to get into a technical analysis of the way in which the war game is performed, we will emphasize the moments of tension that may occur during this planning stage which may generate conflicts.

Starting from the simple idea that the two parties „facing each other“ are the members of J/G/S2 and J/G/S3 compartments, we can create the image of a possible conflict, the image of two sides that are about to confront each other. However, as we mentioned above, the participants should be objective and impartial. Reference is made in this respect especially to officers in J/G/S2 compartment who need to have detailed knowledge of the enemy’s doctrine and manner of action, the technical-tactical characteristics of weapons and technique, the strong points and weak points, as well as the characteristic features of the area of operations, so as to be able to create problematic situations for the own forces represented by J/G/S3 officers and make them find optimal solutions in the action - reaction - counteraction cycle. In other words, they are going to try to turn an imaginary conflict into a real one.

Taking into consideration that the process is coordinated and led and its results are recorded, it is clear that it does not go along by itself, subject to chance, risking to get stuck at a certain moment due to disagreements, but it is monitored and mediated in critical circumstances. In other words, the coordinator and the observers – referees have the task to negotiate critical situations.

The conflict may end only when people consider that the „opponents” have brought all their arguments and for each of them optimal solutions have been found.

As it can be noticed, the war game can be considered a conflict within the staff, a functional conflict generating progress. During this conflict, the aim is to find and eliminate weak points or difficult moments that may occur during actions and underline the positive or constructive side of conflict.

The negotiation capacity and techniques within the staff, but especially the negotiation abilities of the commander are decisive elements characterizing the decision making process regarding future activity. The importance of these abilities becomes obvious when the participants in the war game need to find a common solution and to harmonize their arguments and positions as we showed above.
All negotiation techniques have as a common element communication. The primordial goal of communication in the war game is to be clearly understood. When efficient dialogue is not present within the staff, the lines exchanged among the game participants are more exchanges of words rather than exchanges of ideas and meanings.

In order to communicate efficiently during the war game, each member of the staff should take into account that the principles and the ideas stated are of crucial significance for the staff. Last but not least, listening is also part of the communication process, so an attitude of active listening will encourage the speaker to voice new and interesting ideas.

Precision in communication is absolutely necessary, as each member of the staff wants to know his/her part and involvement in the solutions proposed by the speaker. In order to do that a concise and clear formulation of ideas has more chances of being understood and appreciated.

In order to reach a harmonization of points of view and in order to adopt a final solution, it is recommendable to use a few techniques meant to lead to solving problems.

**Analogy** presupposes discussing the subject resorting to comparisons to other similar ones and may lead to finding a solution to solve the case.

**Reversing roles** among members of the staff makes them adopt and understand new perspectives with respect to the issue that needs to be solved.

**Integrated elaboration** presupposes two distinct stages: defining objectives and consolidating the aspects achieved in the final solution. This is actually the essence of working as part of the staff, the advantage of this technique consisting in the fact that it involves all the members of the staff in solving problems, each of them for the part he / she is best qualified for.

In the process of reaching consensus within the staff, there are some issues generated, for instance, by the fact that one single variant has to be accepted, which means that some of the team’s members should give up the solutions they proposed and accept others, assuming at the same time the task of solving problems and getting involved in this. In order to reach consensus, one should take into consideration concept clarification and group cohesion. A clear presentation of the situation and offering clarifications for each of the solutions upon request generate the expected attitude of acceptance of the variant proposed. In this respect, it is necessary to develop Standing Operation Procedures that need to be known and followed by the entire personnel in the respective command.

An important factor in the war game is resistance to stress. In combating this, an essential role is played by the cohesion of the group.

Promoting and supporting new ideas represent an adjustment behavior to be embraced and a challenge for the members of the staff. Stereotypical thinking is the sign of a possible agreement between problem and solution.

Encouraging creative thinking of the staff members participating in the game is the essential prerequisite of their freedom of action. Accepting to resort to new methods of approach or techniques that might suggest solutions represent ways of keeping the team up to date, of adapting it to changes of circumstances, and of ensuring a continuation of activity for future combat situations.

Finally we may say that the example analyzed above showed that not all conflicts are dysfunctional. Some of them have a functional character and fulfill a stimulating, competitive role, enhancing the dynamics of people’s thinking and acting. The war game is much more than simply checking different hypotheses. Once the war game is performed, due to the conflicts of ideas among the members of various compartments, an efficient way of accomplishing the mission results,
supported by all branches and specialties and that will probably turn from course of action into concept of operation.

Functional conflicts are motivating and idea generating tools favorable to renewal and change and conflict management issues have therefore more than ever to be approached especially in this period when the possibility of conflict emergence is amplified by the measures imposed by restructuring, modernizing, and getting integrated in multinational structures. Once again, as a way of solving conflicts, negotiation technique with its two aspects – communication during the war game and mediation in multinational missions – plays a crucial role within the staff planning an operation.

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OPERATIONAL PLANNING FEATURES FOR HYBRID MILITARY OPERATIONS

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Abstract: Operational planning in hybrid military conflicts is not limited to planning military conventional and unconventional forces, but must integrate political, economic, legal, media, civil and humanitarian actions into a convergent direction in a coherent, effective and measurable system under the command and control of the battle space owner.

Keywords: operational planning, hybrid conflict, command, control.

The security situation at European Union and NATO borders was considered stable even in the circumstances of the unclear status of quite vast regions and frozen conflicts in former Soviet area. The reality of the last two years brought the military conflict into focus, however not the classic one, but one that had evolved, both hidden and open, involving advanced technologies and exploiting all opportunities and vulnerabilities such as the political, economic, social and informational ones.

Similarly to hybrid organisms that receive their parents’ genetic characteristics and develop their own, which may be evolved, even sometimes surprising, in hybrid military conflicts threats and dangers acquired a high level, having effects that go beyond the areas of operations and their own background environment. Military operations conducted under such threats and dangers must adapt and respond promptly, showing flexibility in planning and execution. The years of experience in which the Romanian military forces were involved in operations outside the national territory proved that flexibility of action plans does not lie in formulating vague tasks to subordinate units. Actually, the detailed definition of tasks allows flexibility in execution on the condition that the mission answers only the questions who?, what?, when?, where? and why ?, leaving the answer to the question how?, to the subordinate unit.

The planning process at tactical level in hybrid military operations has perhaps more special valences than in conventional operations, representing the only way a commander may determine the final state required, courses of action adapted to hybrid threats and dangers, and state its intention and decision so as to fulfill the received mission. The planning process itself begins by collecting, analyzing and evaluating data and information. In the area of military intelligence of the operational environment, the analysis tools must be tailored to relevant intelligence in order to fulfill the needs of the operative and tactical commanders. In analyzing the operating environment of hybrid military operations, even at the tactical level, it is mandatory to analyze the information in the cyber environment, the computer networks, mass-media and social media. The need to extend the area of sources provenance and the spheres of data collection is essential. This can be achieved by wide and constant use - to the tactical level - of the civilian / military specialists or cells with professional studies and intelligence background. Another important aspect in hybrid military operations is estimating the effects of enemy’s action in all confrontation
environments and countering them, especially in the social, informational and cybernetic environments. In terms of planning own forces operations, the challenge is the simultaneous planning of all types of land forces specific actions “offensive, defensive, stability and intermediates operations” 1. If in armed conflicts, the moments of maximum intensity are the offensive and defensive operations, in stability operations the need of support for the civilians by the armed forces arises. In hybrid military operations, in the same area of operations all specific types of land forces operations may be executed simultaneously. In terms of planning operations in the area of responsibility, the challenge is to plan joint civil military operations or actions in support of the civil authorities (CIMIC). These actions are not limited to distributing food, clothes and building shelters for population or refugees, but goes further to publicized action taken to recover, support and develop local agriculture and industrial economy, or in support of the health and education system restoration. Task forces for planning and mission execution or the procedures for applying the plans are also subject to adaptation in order to ensure the success of the operation.

Due to the nature of hybrid military operations, which manifests itself as armed conflict, conventional, unconventional and asymmetric at the same time, to the presence of civilians in the area of operations and to the actions carried out over a long period of time (similar to counterinsurgency operation), it is obvious that operational planning must be adapted to these specific conditions. Adaptation involves primarily the existence of viable structures in or under the operational control commands that could meet their requirements. Operations planning handbook provides the following main components for the tactical headquarters: “decision center, operations center, resource center, communications center” 2. Analyzing the headquarters task organization requirements for planning hybrid military operations, I assume that the characteristics lie mainly in regrouping the existing planning staff in specialized cells and less in the augmenting the organizational staff number.

The Decision Center “is a temporary structure where information from the area of responsibility is obtained, centralized and analyzed” 3. As hybrid military operations are conducted in populated areas or in their vicinity, the centers of decision must be constantly updated with information from the social environment of the area of operations, keeping close connection with local authorities, and with important economic agents. The hybrid military operations have two poles on which the actions of forces focuses. One is the enemy, against whom conventional actions are planned and the second is the society that must be kept working. A solution for commanders in such situations is the division of governance, reconstruction and development tasks planning to the deputy and coordination planning for the conventional actions to the chief of staff, keeping the attribute to de-conflict plans during decision process and public representation in his responsibility. The distribution of these tasks must take into account the personal qualities of deputy, due to the fact that the person in charge with coordinating actions in civil environment requires diplomatic skills and economics knowledge.

At the tactical level, division and brigade headquarters engaged in military operations require updated intelligence, interpreted information, summarized in the key moments of operations planning process. Regardless the quality of personnel from the G/S 2 information module, information requirement can be ensured only by increasing the specialized structures, under the operational command

1 FT 3 Land forces General Tactics, Bucharest, 2012, p. II-30


3 Ibidem, p.144
or operational control. Capabilities of such structures should include at minimum: daily updates from area of information interest, information processing to intelligence, electronic warfare, airborne reconnaissance and tactical teams.

Operations Centre organized in three groups: planning operations group, leading operation group and assessment operations group should focus its efforts on two coordinates, action against the enemy and civil society protection and support. Also due to the feature of extended operation, a distinction must be made between long-term planning and short term planning - similar to planning counterinsurgency. One approach to such challenges can be to organize the planning group into two subgroups: long-term planning and short term planning. Within the subgroup of long-term planning one may form a fusion cell of non-lethal actions. This fusion cell, focused on CIMIC actions psychological and information operations and public relations, aims to plan, analyze, evaluate and conduct actions support of civil environment and specific actions against the enemy. This cell consists of specialists from psychological operations, information operations, public relations and CIMIC under the direct direction of the deputy commander. The experience of tasks conducted in counterinsurgency operations, in Afghanistan Theater of Operations, planning model subgroups worked on a cycle of decision-making process for one or two weeks. As a way of working, the staff of non-lethal working group establishes connections with people from civil society, government representatives, may give them advice at times and take note of their plans or events. Part of the data will be brought to operational planning cycle of the armed forces. A hypothetical example can be the following situation: after harvesting an agricultural product, one producer from the area of operations has closed a contract for the sale of a large amount of it with an economic agent and no logistic company will perform the transport, considering the risk to be too high. By bringing the issue into the planning cycle, a solution for that issue may be to ensure transport security using military forces and the logistic company may reconsider its attitude and perform the shipment. The social gain is to keep the local economy working, bringing money into the area and increase stability, and from a military perspective, the gain may come from the exploitation of the event in terms of psychological and information operations and public relations. A second cell of planners who work on lethal action planning against the enemy and insurgent elements made up of the information, operations and planning operations personnel will operate under the direction of Chief of Operations.

Tactical operations planning on two planning horizons, appears as a necessity, due to the long lasting time of the hybrid military operations. The determination of what planning means on short or long term occurs at the moment of calculation of time, after receiving the mission from the higher headquarters. The operation order for employing a brigade or division value unit in hybrid military conflicts comes with at least several months before deployment in the area of operations, which automatically implies long-term planning. Long term plans have distinct moments; they start at the deployment and end at the replacement and redeployment outside the area of operations. Short-term planning aims at inserting specific objectives / targets for the following days into fragmentary orders and is performed by a short-term planning group under the direction of Chief Operations.

The Tactical Operations Center (TOC) "ensures continuous knowledge of the situation and achieves common tactical picture of the area of responsibility by monitoring all actions, events or incidents." The activity in the tactical operations center is usually carried out by personnel working shifts. Due to the fact that the IO, PSYOPS, PR and CIMIC personnel is limited, it is difficult to appoint someone from each one to be in each shift in TOC. Grouping them in a

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4 Ibidem, p.145
non-lethal matters working group allows that specific working group to designate a representative to the TOC for managing and evaluating specific operations.

According to the operations planning handbook, the operations assessment group also works in TOC. The evaluation staff is coming from G5 - operations planning, but actually all staff works on evaluating issues. Basically, operations evaluation in hybrid military operations are continuously performed, pursuing the task progress, as feedback on all actions performed. This continuous evaluation is not enough; it works as a control element and to avoid deviation from the established mission. In addition, it is mandatory to periodically perform self-evaluation sessions, followed by objective reassessment, depicting conclusions effort, performance, effectiveness and success, conclusions which, forwarded to the operational and strategic level, form the basis for reviewing plans and campaign operations. Effort indicators are statistical data that allow rating the number of missions, mission employed personnel, deceased, expenditures, etc, without providing action effect data. Performance indicators are also statistical data that point out action outcome under the form of square kilometers and released places, CA (CIMIC) projects objective results. Efficiency indicators are as far as possible objective data, but they are rather comparative analyses of operational variables, PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure – physical environment and time) analysis elements of ASCOPE (area, structures, people and events) civilian society and SWEAT-MSO (sewer, water, electricity, academic, trash, medical, security and other). The success attainment indicator allows a general survey that may be subjective, especially at the onset of operations. Such self-evaluations require Operation/Action Order established terms, most preferably received during the mid-period of operation engagement, in order to allow planning and execution adjustments. Throughout hybrid military operations it is easy to set out the effects related to seizing some operation areas, defeating some separatist and guerilla groupings, and also to spot out the military actions’ negative effects upon the civilian population and international public opinion, whereas it is difficult to identify the result of long term effects of such actions. In this circumstance, beside the resources invested by commanders at tactical level with the aim to collect, analyze and evaluate data, it is necessary that they provide information to military and political factors, in order to adjust campaign plans.

In hybrid military operations, the resource center must provide personnel, logistics and medical support expertise, and in addition to classical operations, it should provide financial support, legal assistance, psychological and recreational assistance and environment protection.

The financial support presents three additional aspects distinct from peacetime financial support. The first aspect represents the financial assistance to Host Nation Support (HNS), respectively acquiring services that are essential to deployed forces and contracting other service types locally. The second financial support area confers support to security or allied forces who take part in mission accomplishment and to this purpose, they require adequate equipment and training. The third financial support area, one that is vitally important to attaining operation success, is the support conferred to applying programs such as Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), Post Emergency Response Funds (POERF) and Money As A Weapon System, funds available to commanders, in order to counteract military actions’ effects upon civilian population and improving the perception of forces within operation areas. As to operations conducted in hybrid conflict worn-out areas, money spending is a delicate aspect because of the possibility that all or part of it be directed towards separatist, insurgent or guerilla movements, such conditions requiring certain check measures of contractors through whom projects are accomplished.

Legal advice within hybrid military operations is materialized through advising
upon financial spending issues and also through applying international human rights norms in operation planning.

The personnel’s psychological assistance, crossing the enemy’s psychological operations effects and personnel’s leisure activities are aspects that affect morale and that, on the background of wide access to technology, communications, information and social networks, should represent an essential element to operation planning.

Environment protection is a sensitive aspect for the international public opinion, and subsequently, varied organizations will have representatives in conflict areas, whereas hybrid enemy information operations compartments will take advantage of any opportunity to discredit friendly forces. Images depicting environment disasters are spreading rapidly via on-line media, creating currents of opinions and activist-organized movements thousands of kilometers away. On such background, environment protection management within military actions becomes a planning, leadership and performing element in hybrid military operations.

The Computer and Communication Centre in hybrid military operations plans organizes and leads communication and computer operations, provides safe and secure communication and computer technologies, ensures information exchange and accessibility especially through providing interoperability to different computer systems and by suggesting the most adequate exchange channel by mutual agreement with allies’ profile structures, coordinates the activity of subordinate communication centers, establishes and applies the information protection measures and organizes radio traffic. Using computer networks and data traffic on a large scale when planning and conducting modern military operations represents an advantage as to planning accuracy, applying control measures, but also a vulnerability due to the possibility of interrupting communication or networks and systems operation, which would lead to a serious syncope in operation development. The hybrid military operations development feature during a long period of time facilitates and leads at the same time to placing command points in special places and settings that allow the development of computer technology-related facilities.

Starting out from two definitions that looked simple and comprising to me, according to which: hybrid conflicts are “wide spectrum conflicts or crisis situations that include both physical and conceptual dimensions: the first represents combat against an armed enemy, while the second stands for the complex combat to win over the local population’s perception in conflict areas, the support of civilian population in operation participating states and international community support.”5 while “hybrid war supposes the simultaneous engagement of conventional and unconventional combat means, as well as the permanent adjustment of political, military, economic, social, informational or diplomatic means in order to attain set political-military goals”6, we may draw out the main features regarding the operational planning process at tactical and operational level in hybrid military conflicts.

The hybrid military operations planning process at tactical level is correlated to the planning process at operational level and comprises the six stages specific to operation planning (Situation Awareness, Appreciation and Assessment, Orientation, Concept of Operation Development Order / Plan Development, Execution, Assessment and Review of Plan and Transition) any additional planning stages being unnecessary, except for adjusting the content of analyses, estimations and output.

Even if the planning process cannot start before receiving the operation order, Situation Awareness is a stage which, through its continuous and uninterrupted

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5 Gabriel Anghel, Features of Future Conflicts, Hybrid Threats, Hybrid War / conflict, Info sphere No. 1 /2011, p57
6 Ibidem, p 58
character, is permanently in the intelligence structures’ attention. Data base update, enemy actions, terrorist organizations’ activity at international level, general information in intelligence interest area do not start out when the operation order is received, but only acquire intensity. The commander’s critical information requirements are being reevaluated, passing from general formulations to sound requirements and distributed to intelligence structures. Although the data base shaped at strategic level through a merger of data provided by organizations, structures and specialized agencies, is probably vast and hard to be brought into the decision-making process tactical level structures, they need to have access to and especially constantly benefit from informative analyses and syntheses. To this purpose, I have to assert once more the necessity to supplement the personnel and informational structures with specialized forces that the commander may direct as own forces in view to cover the requirement of own information. In hybrid military conflicts, the operations area situation is marked by risk and threat expansion. Alongside the risks and threats to be spotted in the physical, virtual and cybernetic environment, the informational environment requires that the risks and threats in the diplomatic, geo-strategic, economic, social, psychological, religious, scientific, cultural, artistic, historical, geophysical and cosmic environments must also be identified.

Appreciation and Assessment, as a planning process stage, actually begins with receiving the operations order and results in issuing a preliminary order, initial guidance and situation initial evaluation. The specific features of this operations planning phase in a hybrid military operation are: time estimate – which usually allows going through all planning and order issuance stages, intelligence element deployments in the operation area – who may carry out analysis and data base update activities with similar structures already in the operations area, reconnaissance actions with command and control system elements – in order to connect with operations area deployed units and acquire updated data.

Orientation, the third stage of the planning process, contains the following products: „intelligence preparation of the battlefield, including refining enemy most probable and most dangerous course of action, mission, operation design, and commander’s planning guidance.” These products are presented during the mission analysis briefing, activity which integrates the staff’s analysis, synthesis and design effort. Within hybrid military operations, time usually allows carrying out a response briefing to the received order, which consists in reporting the received mission to the upper echelon in view to its understanding, receiving latest planning specifications directly from the upper echelon commander and avoiding deviation from his intention. This briefing should not contain the answer to the question how? the mission will be accomplished. This stage ends with the issuance of an operation order to subordinate structures.

Operation Development Order / Plan Development are stages 4 and 4b of the operational planning process. Within the design elaboration stage, the staff will determine how the mission received from the upper echelon will be accomplished. Estimate review, intelligence preparation of the battlefield update, war game performing, course of action analysis and advantages and disadvantages quantification of each of these are being presented to the commander in view to making decisions. The concept approval by the upper echelon signifies that the answer to the question how? answers the commander’s intention and is synchronized with the other subordinate units’ actions. Operation plan elaboration starts with revising aspects mentioned by the upper echelon during concept approval, continues with detailing aspects regarding execution, respectively nomination of
tasks, forces, place, time and planned actions justification.

Execution, Assessment and Review of Plan is the attribute of operations conduct and the tool through which the commander ensures deviation from the operations plan and issued order is avoided and actions are synchronized. Also, plan reassessment and review are necessary to adapt to real situations and allow anticipation of decisive moments and taking necessary measures to ensure success. Assessment data represent the feedback essential to commanders, tactical and operational level upper echelons, and strategic planning elements for subsequent operations and post analysis, a set of lessons learned. Plan review within the hybrid military operation is permanently performed and materializes into fragmentary orders. Besides directing conventional forces specific tasks, it includes development or minimization measures in intelligence, psychological and media operations, applicable at tactical level.

According to the operations planning handbook, the transition stage purpose is to adapt the operation plan to the conditions in which responsibility is handed over to the civilian authorities. Pursuant to the same interpretation, unaltered by the passing of time, I sustain my assertion that „transition must be planned and it is not only a stage in the planning process”\(^8\). Transition specific operations in hybrid military operations are planned and operation area responsibility is handed over to other military structures preceding replacement, case in which all responsibilities are finally handed over. Another situation is handing over responsibilities to governmental authorities, case in which the hand over is gradually performed on the background of a favorable climate and only after having previously evaluated their specific management capability. There will always be a tendency to hasten the transition moment and its process, but also as a lesson learned from a counter-insurgency operation, this transition is speculated by insurgent / separatist elements in order to regain their authority position and enforce their system. On the other hand, during military operations, a certain part of the population, mainly formed of people who gained from them, will carry out actions designed to extend the conflicting situation and delay the transition plan application. To this purpose, I recommend a parallel reevaluation of security in the area and management system efficiency through independent sources.

The enemy’s strictly military organization, military training and equipment in hybrid military operations, as well as operational diversity, discloses the high degree of support they enjoy from certain state actors. Recruiting militants and fighters from the interest areas and instigating the population before any institution or organization be able to take measures, are advantages to the rebel forces as against any military force, regardless training, equipment or motivation. The action of counteracting these advantages cannot be performed by classical military actions. Success in such operations does not lie in battle victory and placing the flag on the management system buildings, but true victory is acquired in people’s hearts and minds. This operational environment is a sensible one, more difficult to influence by changing older generations’ opinions and easier but longer lasting by safe and prosperous upbringing of an educated generation – the latter being the success indicator in operational planning evaluation throughout hybrid military operations.

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PREPARING THE ECONOMY AND THE TERRITORY FOR DEFENSE – AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract: Any state must take thorough measures to manage its own national security, namely to be a security developer in the region and for certain organizations it has joined to this effect.
The system of preparing the Romanian economy and territory for defense, as an essential component of the country’s defense system, must be continuously adapted to the foreign policy and defense options, so as to successfully meet any extreme situation. The analysis of the country’s defense system in point of preparing the economy and the territory for defense, by using scientific research methodologies and methods, may finally become a theory that may successfully be put into practice.

Keywords: security, economy, territory, defense.

The political reconfiguration of the world required rethinking the concepts of defense and national security and the adoption of appropriate legal regulations, appropriate to the new political-military context. National security is inextricably linked to economy, because of the risks and threats that it may generate while being its support in all directions.

The last decade has outlined some of the concepts using the economy as an instrument of war, more precisely, has witnessed the development of "economic wars," such as blockade, embargo, boycott, economic and currency dumping, non-military actions which can fundamentally contribute to winning supremacy, respectively acquiring an important place on the political scene. From the point of view of economic strategy, the war can be considered an indirect means of combat, a strategy that can be used against the opponent with the purpose of substantially diminishing material and financial resources, as well as the military power of the states.

Thus, economy may represent both a fundamental support of the military potential of a state, as well as a goal to be attained in the armed combat.

It is obvious that in the conditions of the various elements of the economic interdependencies, states find it increasingly difficult to fulfill the tasks of their national economies in providing security and defence. The economic relations among states become very important, they can foster the development in all directions, or on the contrary, give rise to genuine economic collapses.

If more than a decade ago, preparing the economy for national defense took place within a legislative framework, starting with the implementation in our country of the concept of “collective defence”, new procedures have been adopted to meet the needs of defense and set out the responsibilities of the central public authorities, the public institutions subordinated to the government, the economic operators, as well as the population apt to perform these actions.

In keeping with the above-mentioned facts, we can say that there is a mutual conditioning among national economy, economy and national security and defense, therefore, any government is interested in creating viable defense systems, which in case of war, will allow a gradual mobilization of the financial human and material resources.

This scientific approach aims to bring to the attention of the reader some aspects related to the preparation of the
economy and territory for defence\(^1\) (PETA), a component of national security, which is based on the provisions of the Constitution, the laws of the country and other national defense planning documents and, last but not least, Romania’s obligations consequent upon joining certain international organisations.

An important role in the development of national security is played by Romania’s foreign policy, which is the interface between the internal efforts and the external environment, thus ensuring the correlation between the national interests and the actions taken across the borders.

Thus, in accordance with the national security objectives, the directions of diplomacy aim at finding political solutions: the diversity of conflict situations, in particular those in the vicinity of our country; the promotion of national interests within the framework of multilateral organizations of which Romania is a part; supporting alliances and strategic partnerships; capitalizing on the policies the North Atlantic Treaty Organization\(^2\) (NATO) and the European Union\(^3\) (EU) in order to develop bilateral relations with the countries of the Middle East and Asia; boosting the relations with Romanians from everywhere in order to preserve the national and cultural identity; strengthening the national legislation at all levels in relation to the new requirements of the domestic and international context.

Given the complexity of these objectives, in fulfilling them actions will be directed towards processing areas such as foreign policy, defence, intelligence, security and information protection.

The country's reformed defense system had envisaged the transformation of institutions, the improvement of the quality of leadership, a better national coordination of the three and functional integration into the security systems which Romania is part of.

Nationwide, the country’s defense policy is implemented on the basis of a detailed plan, a complex of activities and measures aimed at promoting the national interests, while defining and achieving the objectives of Romania’s national security in the field of defence.

To this end, according to the law, defence planning\(^4\) implies addressing the following spheres of activity: the planning of forces, arms, resources, logistics, command, control, communications and civil emergency.

Also within the defence planning process have been included programs, actions and measures initiated by Romania within the context of their contribution to the collective security and defence in the context of bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with other countries in organizations such as NATO, the EU, the organization of the United Nations (UNO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe.

The basis of defence planning political decisions of the president of the meeting, the Parliament and the Government of Romania, as well as measures and actions have been undertaken among other public institutions with responsibilities in the field of defence.

Under the legislation, "... (1) the main documents that underlie the defence planning at national level are: the national defense Strategy and the Program of government.

(2) the defence-planning documents at departmental level, are: the White Charter of Defense, the Military Strategy, the Defence planning directive, the Major Programs and the Operational Plans of the forces."\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Law No. 477/2003 regarding the preparation of both the economy and defence, art.1, al.(1);
\(^2\) Organization established in 1949 by the Treaty of Washington;
\(^3\) Organization established in 1993, by the Treaty of Washington;
\(^4\) Law No. 473 of 4 November 2004 on defence planning, art. 2.
\(^5\) Ibidem, art. 4.
The national defence strategy, defines the objectives and interests of national security, an assessment of the international security environment, potential risks, threats and vulnerabilities, main directions of action and ways of achieving the goal of building a strong country in Europe and in the world. It has a medium-term coverage of 5 years and includes long-term objectives of security and national defence and collective.

Another document to implement the guidelines of the defence policy set out by the Program of government and in line with the provisions of the NATO strategic concept, is the White Charter of Defense, which is issued by the Ministry of National Defense. It consists of objectives, measures and actions for performing the missions and requirements specific of the Romanian Armed Forces as well as human, financial, material, natural resources and otherwise, to be provided annually for this purpose.

The White Charter of Defence is drawn up for an average of 4 years and contains long-term objectives related to national and collective defence and security. It is adopted by the Government, approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence, then submitted for approval to the Parliament within a period of no more than six months of entrusting the Government.

In accordance with the objectives laid down in the national strategy for homeland defense, through its White Charter of Defence and through NATO’s ministerial guidance, the Ministry of National Defence will develop its military strategy. This includes an assessment of the international security environment in strategic-military terms, listing potential risks and threats, defining and setting goals and strategic and operational concepts necessary for attaining military missions. Military strategy is drawn up for a period of 4 years, endorsed by the Supreme Council of National Defence and is approved by the Government within a maximum of three months from the approval of the White Charter of Defence. On the basis of the White Charter of Defence and other important documents of NATO defence planning, the minister of national defence will issue a Directive on defence planning. It has a time horizon of 6 years, it will be reviewed annually and it is designed to plan the structure and military capabilities on whose basis it will lay down the major Programmes and allocate resources for defence.

The major programmes are drawn up for a period of six years, to be reviewed annually, and comprise all actions and practical measures that should be undertaken for establishing, equipping, modernizing, training, ensuring optimal conditions for the staff, the maintenance and preparation in time of peace for crisis and war of military structures, planning in order to participate in international cooperation actions with other countries, the achievement and maintenance of the infrastructure, with the aim of carrying out military actions within the framework of NATO common defence, providing logistic support and reserves for mobilization and war, as well as the annual resources required to meet them.

The competence to develop, coordinate and monitor the major Programmes belongs to the planning bodies of the Ministry of National Defense, while the execution will be performed by the program directors.

Within the framework of defence planning based on military strategy and procedures, NATO develops and approves regulations of the Ministry of National Defense, the operational Plans of the forces. They include the army's missions, the requirements intended for the categories of forces, certain predictable scenarios, the necessary forces, resources and mode of action established to achieve them.

The operational plans of the forces will be implemented on the basis of the

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6 National Defense Strategy of the country, 2015;
cooperation protocols which will be concluded in this regard by the Ministry of National Defense with other ministries, agencies and governmental bodies.

As a basic component of national security, the preparation of the national economy and territory for defence comprises all the measures and actions that will be undertaken in time of peace, by harnessing the economic and human potential of the country to meet the needs of defense and ensure the continuity of the economic and social activities in situations of war or mobilization.

The system of priorities and resource allocation for defense is based on regulations which lay down: the tasks for public authorities, public institutions and economic operators, criteria for choosing products and services contained in the contracts, establishing priority resources and planning the allocation stages and the rights and duties of the economic agents with the role of suppliers in order to achieve the objectives.

The transition of the economy from peace to war and its implementation in order to ensure the necessary resources to support the defense effort covers certain actions laid down in a plan called Plan of mobilization of the national economy for defence (henceforth defined Mobilization Plan).

The Mobilization Plan establishes tasks for the civil ministries, other public administration authorities, other institutions and economic agents. On the basis of their proposals, the Mobilization Plan will include products and services as determined by the Nomenclator developed by the national administration of state reserves and special problems (ANRSPS) for this purpose.

After approving the Mobilization Plan, on the basis of proposals of the ministries and other institutions involved in the event of mobilization or war, approved by the ANRSPS, the Ministry of Public Finances elaborates the state budget for war.

The Mobilization Plan and the drafts of state budget for war, are worked out for a period of one year, have validity for 4 years and are approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence.

The updating of the Mobilization Plan is the competence of ANRSPS and is carried out at the request of the public institutions involved, in case changes occur in the requirements of the national system of defense forces or the possibilities of fulfilling the tasks. The changes are submitted for approval to the Supreme Council of National Defence. The Plan for the preparation of national economy for defence (henceforth called Training Plan) is a document that defines the system of priorities and resource allocation for defense and includes: the goals, measures, priorities and resources to be established and carried out in time of peace for carrying out the tasks provided for in the Mobilization Plan. The aim of this Plan is to gradually meet the needs of the forces of the national defence system.

To implement the measures approved for the preparation of national economy for defense, ANRSPS concludes contracts with businesses and other specialized public institutions, according to the Plan and the funds allocated from the State budget. The mobilisation reserves necessary to carry out the tasks in case of mobilisation or state of war are constituted and maintained in time of peace by the economic agents and other specialized public institutions, their management costs being covered in accordance with the terms laid down in the contracts concluded with the ANRSPS.

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7 Ibidem, art.5.
8 Ibidem, art.10.
9 Government decision No. 1380 of 18 November 2009 on the establishment, organization, functioning and powers of the National Administration of State Reserves and Special Issues, art. 3, al. A), pct. 2.
10 Ibidem, art.13.
The implementation of the Mobilization Plan and the execution of the state budget for war will be approved on the basis of proposals from the Supreme Council of National Defence. Also, the president of Romania may decide on the implementation of the Mobilization Plan and the execution of the state budget for war only in exceptional circumstances, including situations of armed attack against the country, according to the constitutional provisions. To meet the strategic and operational needs of the forces of the national defence system, to ensure the protection of the population, material goods and national heritage against the crippling effects of the attacker, by using traditional and modern means, it is necessary to prepare the territory for defence. The Program with the objectives for preparing the territory for defence operations (henceforth called the Program for the preparation of the territory), represents the document showing the necessary strategic objectives and operative needs to be implemented in time of peace, covers a period of 4 years and is updated annually by the ANRSPS with the approval of the general staff, in line with the proposals of the public institutions involved.

The national regulations at PETA level and the literature of some leading authors in the field provide a theoretical framework for guidance but also some assumptions that once confirmed and interpreted in the context of a scientific endeavor, one might transpose the results to ensure the improvement of the country's defense system. From this perspective, we wish to highlight some of the assumptions which aim at improving the activities in this area, to which we subscribe ourselves, as follows:

- the hypothesis according to which, if the allocation and management of resources for national defense were achieved by a unitary government structure\(^\text{11}\), homogeneous as outlook and action (currently responsibilities being distributed to various ministries or institutions), it would produce a number of improvements which aim in particular at: flexibility and adaptability of the national system of ensuring defence resources; optimizing the resource allocation necessary for the national defence system actions in peacetime, crisis, war, disasters and calamities; interoperability with similar structures from organizations Romania is part of; harmonization of the national legislation with the international norms in this area;

- by carrying out and putting into operation the work of an "integrated management of defence resources"\(^\text{12}\) by specialized structures within the General Staff, major categories of states, joint logistics command and other units, the process of planning and allocating resources would benefit from better coordination through an effective exercise of supervision;

- the precautionary approach to the use of "conservation through innovation or conservation by limiting consumption and efficiency"\(^\text{13}\) would lead to the possibility of better turning to account the economic and human potential.

It is obvious that any of the above assumptions, once validated through dissemination, may eventually become an applicable theory through:

- developing a methodology for improving the work of PETA;

- issuing a Government decision according to which the work of PETA for the purpose of the flexibility and adaptability of the national insurance system of defence resources, is to be run by a unitary government structure, homogeneous and professional, not

\(^{11}\) M., Puşcaşu, „National defence and defence resources management”, the publishing house National defence University "CAROL I", Bucharest, 2009, p.102.
\(^{12}\) Ibidem, p.118;
\(^{13}\) Idem, p.130.
fragmented by several ministries of resort as it is at present;
- providing management for the activities of PETA, to ensure interoperability and the system integration of security structures to which Romania adhered.

At the same time, we believe that for the achievement of the goals set out in order to ensure PETA a viable support for the country's defense system, it is essential that, with the acceleration of the economic reform, some measures should be taken to ensure the independence of decision makers in using the human and material resources, as well as the development of branches of special importance, such as:
- adaptation of the current economic structures to the needs of national security;
- economic infrastructure development requirements of national defence;
- ensuring the functioning of the economic system, namely the national productive components and the area of decision-making information, fully in line with the fundamental interests of the country;
- stimulating scientific and technological research for the benefit of both the overall economy and progress in developing the potential of national defence;
- integration into the European and world economic system, according to the policy commitments, taking into account the progressive reduction of dependence on external financial resources in order to eliminate the risk of blocking economic branches vital to national security.

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SOCIAL MEDIA – A NATIONAL SECURITY OPPORTUNITY

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Abstract: The present paper starts from the premises that Social Media represents an extremely valuable instrument for all the security warrant organizations, being, at this moment, the main mass communication mechanism. However, talking about a general access resource, Social Media can transform itself in either a national security opportunity or a threat. Taking this into consideration, we aim at building a general framework that justifies integrating the Social Media debate on the security strategies agenda, by presenting the advantages brought by Social Media to the military organizations activity. We can no longer achieve the stake of communication by exclusively using the traditional media channels, hence, the military organizations need to adapt to the new changes and exploit at its best this new resource, by minimizing, at the same time, the effects generated by the use of this same resource by its direct opponents. Consequently, we will draw the characteristics of the current virtual space by defining the social media concept and by presenting and analyzing a series of statistics, which underlines the power gained by Social Media worldwide. The study of the Social Media phenomenon is a rather recent step; therefore the theoretical resources are quite limited, even at an international level. In these conditions, our communication intends to explore the theme and to create a possible analysis framework in this field. We do not aim at stating categorical responses regarding the role of Social Media on the security agendas, since we consider that we cannot generalize and typify its impact. The effects of these mechanisms’ use are influenced by the socio-economic and the political context. Nevertheless, we have a firm target, sketching a series of analysis directions that allows the identification of those specific situations when Social Media can be a national security opportunity, and, consequently the possible exploitation mechanisms of this resource.

Keywords: social media, national security strategy, USA, strategic communication, security opportunities, European Parliament.

Introduction

The start of the 21st century is marked by the quick propagation of a social phenomenon, omnipresent at the time. The social networks, also known as social media, rapidly enjoyed an extraordinary popularity, transforming itself, in less than ten years,1 in the main communication channel, regardless the users’ interest niche. Although these show the main characteristic of the traditional media channels – information flow and entertainment channel, social media developed a series of options, allowing the user to leave this sphere of passive receiver, isolated by the traditional media, and to transform himself in both receiver and broadcaster. From his broadcaster position the user enjoys several possibilities of spreading the information: he can either assume it as it is presented by other online broadcasters, or disseminate the information, transmitting his own point of view concerning a specific subject. He can even be a content creator. Hence, social media represents real time interactivity.

This continuous expansion of the online spectrum, seconded by the constant development of the technologies allowing access to the highest sophisticated applications and programs all over the world, clearly affects the global security’s dynamics as well. However, regardless of the debates on the information warfare and the problems related to the cyber-security matter, the subject of the social media impact over the security strategies is poorly analyzed. Assuming that social

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1 Facebook, the number one social network worldwide, was publicly launched in 2006.
media is, at the moment, the main mass communication channel, we came to the conclusion that social media use might be at the same time an opportunity and a threat to national security. Therefore, we aim to sketch a general framework which might justify the integration of social media issues on the security agenda. What we can strongly state at the moment is the fact that strategic communication can no longer be reached exclusively through traditional media’s channel. Consequently the military organizations are forced to adapt to these new changes and maximize the exploitation of this new resource, while minimizing the effects of its direct opponents using this same instrument.

1. A step forward – from traditional media to social media

Social media is an extension of the media field, representing a component communication channel, covering all the existing information transmission mechanisms. Social media platforms offer the possibility of transmitting the message through video, audio and written means. Although there is a series of technical specifications underlining the clear distinctions between these two means of communication, the biggest difference that we can found is the one regarding the impact that social media has over the user, in comparison with traditional media. We have identified these major differences starting from Lazarsfeld theory\(^2\), who is stating that mass media does not change mentalities. Thus, the simple transmission of information does not change the way people perceive a certain subject or react concerning a particularly problem. Mentality change is an extremely vast process, influenced by two variables. First of all we are talking about the process of transmitting the information, which, in a second stage, is disseminated by each person in their own environment, either with family or friends. Thus, only after this analysis and debate over a subject, people will define their opinion. Only in this point of the process of sketching opinions can we observe the major distinction between social media and traditional media. Social media offers the necessary debate framework.

In the online world, people have the opportunity to actively participate in shaping a subject. The users get to have direct contact even with content creators, regardless of the fact that they are public figures; consequently the easy access would not be possible by other means. For example, the only effect of the televised speech of a statesman is the simple transmission of information to the general public. The citizens do not have the opportunity to comment on the subject of the discourse, and this has a dual impact. While people have no communication channel, in turn, to be able to express their views with respect to the stated issue, initiators receive no feedback, reducing their opportunity to properly assess the impact of the message.

Social media extends the component of participation to public life: “Communication through Social Media instead of traditional Media generates a feeling of privilege and appreciation among loyal fans”\(^3\). In this context, people feel appreciated and they are reassessing their opinion role on topics of general interest. We can also distinguish social media from traditional media by the speed with which information is transmitted. More specifically, the online space allows an instant transmission of information, propagating it with astonishing speed worldwide. "The internet allows for a

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\(^3\) Kaplan, Andreas and Haenlein, Michael, The Britney Spears Case: Social Media and Viral Marketing at its Best, in Business Horizons, Kelley School of Business, Indiana, SUA, 2012, online version, p. 27.
quasi instantaneous transmission of information at low cost and free from the typical barriers that confine access to the traditional media”4. It is also true that traditional media can overcome geographical barriers, passing in turn through its own process of globalization, but although we have access to the news media, television and radio stations from around the world, we are just passive spectators, at the flow of all of this transmitted information.

2. Social Media – conceptual remarks

One of the simplest but at the same time clearest definitions of social media says that this concept gathers under its umbrella a variety of communication channels scattered in the cyberspace, allowing the transmission of information, facilitating the communication and the interaction between users. Users can be individuals or groups united under the umbrella of common interests (personal or professional), which, by creating personal profiles can send general information, photos, graphics or videos. All profiles, regardless of the network can be developed and completed in real time, from any computer or phone from the smart phone generation. Each social network has developed its own methods of interaction between users, as well as its methods of corroborating information from multiple networks if the user logs in with the same account (email address).

Kaplan and Haenlein define social media as a group of online applications, built on the basis of technical and ideological principles of Web 2.0 network, which allows users to create and promote their own online content: "Social Media is a group of internet-based applications that was build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and that allows the creation and the exchange of user-generated content.”5. The two experts in the field of communication provide the simplest and most comprehensive definition of social media. Social networks allow users to turn from consumers into content creators.

In terms of classifying the social media channels, we identified seven types of instruments, which are mainly differentiated by the type of the content generated, but also by the propagation mechanisms available to the users. Thereby, the social media platforms are divided into: blogs (Wordpress), micro-blogs (Twitter), project-based cooperation (Wikipedia), video generators communities (YouTube), social networks (Facebook), virtual worlds (Second Life) and instant messaging platforms (WhatsApp).

3. The Social Media „Population”

Since we considered statistics being the most relevant argument that social media is the most important channel of communication, we conducted a comparison between the world states’ and the Social Media population. If during the first half of 2015, Facebook recorded a total of 1.44 billion users, we observe, without too many calculations, that the socializing application has already exceeded the population of China (1.355 billion)6, China being the country with the largest population in the entire world. Facebook population is at the same time, almost 4 times larger than the United States and nearly 3 times higher than the European Union. The population of Russia and the United States’ together does not meet the number of users using Facebook’s

4 Michaelsen Marcus New Media vs Old Politics – The Internet, Social Media and Democratisation in Pakistan, 2011, online version.


messaging application. Facebook Messenger app has been downloaded and used by over 500 million people. Facebook Messenger is an application developed exclusively for smartphones. Those wishing to use the messaging service via a computer can do this through an accessible tab that can be found on the user’s profile. As for LinkedIn platform, this manages to incorporate, at the moment, both the Russian population and that of Brazil. Social networking giant Google launched Google+, which already reaches US population, exceeding the amount of the population in Russia and Brazil combined.

Despite these impressive numbers, Twitter only holds the 10th position in the Social Media applications’ top. According to statista.com, Twitter was already outrun by Google+, LinkedIn and Instagram as well.

We would like to draw attention to the fact that this upward trend will be maintained in the future because of the mobile devices development, an increasing number of users will use smartphones to connect to the virtual world, enabling continuous and constant accessibility to social media applications. Continuous online interaction is encouraged by the fact that mobile applications developers have implemented notification systems based on sets of criteria which, in some cases, can be set by the users themselves. For example, Facebook allows users to select friends from whom they receive activity notifications. According to the report published by the Internet Society in June 2014, 50% of all mobile phones used are smartphones. The same report estimated, at the middle of last year, that in 2015 the number of Internet users would reach the number of 3 billion. This happens in the context in which the global population is a little over 7 billion. Thus, 42.8% of the planet’s population is connected to the Internet. Of the total number of Internet users estimated for the current year, almost half of them have Facebook accounts. The 2014’ reported expectations were exceeded just one year away, a fact that is validated by the monitoring site www.internetlivestats.com an extremely valuable resource for those aiming either real time monitoring or long-term evolution of these figures. The site presents, in real time, changes on the number of users on various platforms, and also of sales of computers, smartphones or tablets in the current day, worldwide. According to Internet Live Stats, every second one Twitter and three Facebook accounts are created.

With Facebook being the market leader, the online spectrum sends us a clear message. The Social Media phenomenon is not even near its peak, and the communication and social sciences experts should not only consider this new field, but in order to keep pace with the phenomenon they are also compelled to consider some projections that they should do regarding the future of Social Media.

4. The American and the European perspective regarding introducing Social Media as a national security and defense resource

Social Media has represented, for almost ten years, the most valuable mass communication tool. US already granted a special interest in this area, despite the absence of the academic theories on the subject, either through an exclusive approach, or by mainstreaming a broader approach to information warfare and cyber security. Still, perhaps the most important signal that social networks represent a tool

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to be both operated and monitored is the express indication made by the US Department of Defense on the official website: “Social media is an integral part of Department of Defense operations. This site is designed to help the DoD community use social media and other Internet-based Capabilities (IbC) responsibly and effectively; both in official and unofficial capacities. Visit Social Media @ DoD for the latest on defense-related social media activity.” A similar message is also posted on the official website of the US military.  

The interest for Social Media and importance of the United States for the online environment has been clearly stated by Hillary Clinton in February 2010. Occupying the position of Secretary of State at that time, she stated all citizens’ freedom of accessing information, of producing their own content and of communicating with each other. “We need to work toward a world in which access to networks and information brings people closer together and expands the definition of the global community.” The US, through Clinton’s voice, proposed five objectives for the digital age: freedom of expression; freedom to assess situations, events, ideas, according to each person’s values; freedom to connect independent of geographical barriers; freedom from fear and freedom to overcome geographical barriers, not only in the context of communication, but also from economic opportunities point of view.
European Parliament published a report on the international security environment. The reports primarily aimed to list and analyze the changes that have taken place globally and their impact on the security environment, underlining the need to develop a new European security strategy, aligned with the threats that have escalated in recent years.

The current European security strategy has its origins in 2003 and was revised in 2008, just two years after the public release of the Facebook phenomenon. In these circumstances, it is clear that it makes no reference on the subject of Social Media. However, we have observed that, surprisingly, the report requested by the European Parliament does not have a comprehensive approach to the problem, making just a few entries regarding the threats raised from the online development. Specifically, they make seven mentions on Social Media. Three of them refer to the fact that the online environment in general and social media in particular is the main communication tools of the terrorist organization, the Islamic State. However the report only states a generally known fact without providing some potential directions to pursue in this regard, much less some possible solutions.

The other four entries refer to the fact that Russia has identified and used the online space into its implementation mechanisms of the "soft power" concept, aiming to gain a better image, to attract the support of the masses, and strengthen its influence, as well.

Conclusions

The emergence of social media caused a revolution in the way people communicate. This new method of communication is characterized by an accelerated speed by which information is transmitted, information exchanges are no longer made exclusively between individuals, but can be made between groups with common interests. Also, social media allows the highest degree of interactivity that a communication channel can make available to a user. The access to information is unlimited, this feature is ubiquitous in the virtual environment and the lack of a regulating forum, unlike the case of the traditional media, makes the online environment to be extremely permissive.

Given the fact that the subject does not enjoy, at the moment, a comprehensive analysis, being vaguely outlined even in the American academic world, we consider it necessary to make further assessments of the manner in which the social network may be included in the national security strategies, and this approach can start to explore three integrated perspectives. First of all, it is necessary to approach social media as a pillar of strategic communication. Military organizations can use social networks to legitimize their actions by informing people about the constant operational details of general interest, to react in a crisis context, or even to propagate democratic values. Secondly it is necessary to analyze the role that social networks can play in the fight against terrorism. Prevention can be achieved through continuous monitoring of networks, groups and individuals who have contact with the world of global terrorism.

Still, the framework for doing this information analysis, which can even lead to the development of profiles of organizations or individuals must be covered and integrated in a uniform manner in all state or international structures which aim to ensure global security, in order to facilitate the exchange of information. At the same time we consider useful an approach to social media as a tool of the concept of soft power, an analysis should be conducted on the campaigns and communication channels used by Russia, since this type of approach could offer a different perspective on the implications and effects that social media brings to international security. Although this is not comparable
with the propaganda waged by terrorist organizations, lacking the aggression characteristic of terrorists, the kind of propaganda waged by Russia may prove to be more difficult to combat. Alongside Russia, or even as a different research subject, we can make an analysis on China’s perspective on social media since China is the country with the highest number of people in the world. Social media censorship is itself a subject of analysis, the use of social networks being limited in the past in Iran and Turkey.

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SYRIA, TERRORISM VS. HYBRID WAR

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„The one who may seem a terrorist to some people may seem a freedom fighter to others...”

Abstract: Considered on a global scale, the security environment is continually changing, undergoing a rapid and dramatic process of evolution. All these changes may have effects upon democratic states and standing alliances such as UN, NATO, and EU. In this respect, each actor has to adopt common strategies of security and apply measures of prevention and management for possible crises and conflicts. Taking into consideration these facts, before analyzing nowadays players we would like to draw a roadmap, emphasizing the concepts of terrorism versus hybrid war.

Keywords: war, conflict, terrorism, hybrid war.

The features of nowadays conflicts, interconnected to their adjacent processes, generating risks in a certain area or even in the region, cumulated with the concerns they trigger or may raise, are all significant subjects of analysis and interpretation. The fact that a large variety of military capabilities are used in different types of combat actions, together with the threat of classical armed forces being extended to individual or group action turn into a primary source of danger.

In many situations nowadays, the battlefield and the enemy are not clearly identifiable; they have become unclear and ubiquitous. In this new setting, military engagement is replaced by the singular, on-the-spot action and counteraction. Together with economic, political, or historical factors, identity becomes a central argument in the multitude of implicit or explicit reasons that justify the legitimacy of resorting to violent measures. In current confrontations, the so-called legitimacy of conflicts is brought as an argument. Extremist circles bring as arguments supporting their actions fundamental values or undisputable rights such as independence, the fight against foreign dominance or against abusive and unjust power, social inequality or even the suppression of own cultures.

Taking into consideration these rather general basic arguments and elaborating particularly on the example of Syrian framework, the history of acts and socio-institutional facts which happened during the last four years leads us to state that the conflicting situation in the area is still dramatic particularly due to the extremely large number of victims cumulated with immediate and irreversible effects. Like any other phenomenon of manifestation of a confrontation, having as central core the asymmetric military action, called war, civil war, or fight between factions belonging to the same state, the Syrian armed conflict is a current phenomenon, having as actors on the one hand the Bashar al-Assad regime and its supporters and, on the other hand, its opponents, and keeping in the middle other states’ interests, both in the area and worldwide.

Analyzing the sequence of events in Syria in 2011, as part of Arab spring, we notice that they consisted mainly in

peaceful manifestations against the ruling regime. Protests received a harsh response from the regime, protesters being severely punished, which led to deeper and harder protests spread all around the country. This can be considered the initiating act of events that degenerated further on in a violent conflict bearing the first features of civil war. The subsequent evolution of facts integrated, at each moment, both the military capabilities and organic military structures of the regime, and, on the other hand, the free Syrian army organized for fighting against state leadership and including both civilians and former military personnel who had turned to become rebels. The situation became ever more complex, confrontations taking the appearance of local fights between the army and the opposition in order to occupy / defend certain neighborhoods, towns, and regions, and already seizing public opinion’s attention at the international level and especially triggering the game of interests of different actors in the area.

In these moments of clear cut conflicts, one could find reasonable explanations in doctrines, with possibilities of estimating the amount of probable effects, but as events unfolded on and on, without finding a democratic solution, especially a political one, with national and regional security implications, the civil war seemed to get into a stalemate. None of the factions seemed able to defeat the other and not even the fall of Assad regime seems able to end the conflict, so all the elements of opposing factions continue to fuel and develop in a rapid and degenerating manner the open conflict following their final goals. What started as a rebellion against the regime turned little by little and deliberately into an existential sectarian war with immediate and medium-term effects which may even lead to the disappearance of the Syrian state.

The methods, techniques, and approach of Syrian counter-insurgent operations is given by the correspondence with certain classical doctrine actions specific to defending certain areas, economic centers and sectarian enclaves, but also offensive operations in the key points that must be re-conquered by the government by using air strikes and artillery, resulting exactly in this destructive feature of the conflict. Classical military operations are supplemented intensively by specific information warfare programs through which the opponents of the regime and their actions are deemed as terrorists and terrorist methods. On the other side, rebels do not have the instruments and the power necessary for the transformation of military structures which are just being constituted into military capabilities able to respond to challenges on a classical battlefield. This is the reason why, the way it operates remains a tentative one,
depending on different local and occasional opportunities. Shortcomings in command, shortcomings in mobility, logistics, and combat support are all very significant, thus constituting vulnerabilities for them and opportunities for the organic governmental structures.

These general issues defining the conflict environment and the general framework in which the conflict develops give rise to the first set of debates regarding the actions pertaining to terrorism, according to which “terrorism is the amplest amoral type of organized violence”\(^2\). From a conceptual perspective, terrorist acts are different violent actions through which people or groups of people act against the life and physical integrity of a social category or perform such acts against political groups, social organizations, institutions, or groupings of people reunited in an organized manner or happening to be at a certain moment in public or private places.

In many instances, these acts are directed against institutional order, putting in danger constitutional relationships, directly threatening peace, producing instability in a certain region, having considerable potential for enlarging the respective area. “Terrorism is another type of warfare – new as intensity, old as origin – a guerrilla warfare performed by rebels and assassins; a warfare conducted through ambushes, not through fight, through infiltration, not through aggression, in which victory is won by eroding the enemy, not by engaging him.”\(^3\)

The rebels’ tactical actions, supported by anti-governmental groups, have the main role of inducing panic and terror, by using methods and techniques pertaining to the ideological pattern of terrorist acts. The fact that they use on a large scale specific procedures such as booby traps, suicide bombers, assassinations and ambushes in small spaces results only in conquering small objectives such as villages or neighborhoods in cities, the main purpose being that of demonstrating that government institutions cannot manage the situation. The real facts show that they can gain followers but with serious, even catastrophic costs, evaluated in losses of human lives, destruction of infrastructure and economy, leading to a mass migration phenomenon, phenomenon which is one of the main points on the current agenda of the European Union.

As the conflict evolved, certain peculiarities stemmed out regarding the structure of forces of the opposition and less the symmetrical manner in which they are used in conflict. A significant advantage is the fact that the number of followers grew constantly, an essential aspect in a long-lasting civil war, but it was exactly because of this qualitative lack that certain strategic successes could not be used strategically.

The “Free Syrian Army” is more of an aspiration, not a reality, exactly because of the fact that not all the basic conditions are met, that is, doctrine, command and control, centralized planning – decentralized action, training and instruction. The military entities company and battalion levels are led by tribal leaders without military training, one of their few common elements being the fact that they have the moral energy of having fought for ages against the regime that oppresses them, being animated however by the support of other state actors, as well as by a possible intervention from the West.

The general outline shows us that the opposing structure of forces comprises a few hundreds of independent units, self-entitled battalions and brigades, without accomplishing the required standards pertaining to these units in the history of military art. Independent units are only grouped together in larger units, the common features having as ideological denominator one’s loyalty to the other, although after a certain period this spirit

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\(^2\) Paul Wilkinson (1973) - interview

\(^3\) John F. Kennedy (6 iunie 1962) – press conference
of loyalty became rather fluid. The “Free Syrian Army” is more like a sort of back-up for these military structures enclosing a first generation of rebels, well augmented according to the evolution of the conflict, with a few tens of thousands of deserters from regular armies, mostly Sunni people opposing the regime, thinking that it will not be able to maintain its position.

Another important aspect of the structure of forces is given by the involvement of tertiary jihadist parties to the conflict, including al Qaeda, involvement which is openly stated as part of anti-Assad war, while their hidden goals being completely different ones. From the point of view of equipment and armament, they are quite reduced in standards and quantity, differing substantially from one unit to another.

On the other hand, the big advantage of the regime, viewed strictly from a military point of view, but obviously translated in a political advantage of strategic level, consists in using armed capabilities for managing the conflict situation. In the initial moments, when the wave of repressed protests changed in civil war, a significant part of the Syrian military changed sides, joining the rebels, still finding the necessary resources (even members of Hezbollah) to fill in the gaps, permanently maintaining an accessible force ratio.

It is a long way from a bunch of armed forces arranged in a hierarchical pyramid to a military capability and, subsequently, to a sum of capabilities. The Syrian army which is now fighting for the regime maintained the disciplinary statute in the chain of command, and perfected its training process and therefore its action techniques, having at the same time superior fire power available.

If at the beginning of internal conflicts the government held one of the most numerous armies in the Middle East, well founded in doctrine and structure (over 200,000 land forces, approximately 70,000 air force), well equipped (a few thousands tanks, over 35,000 APCs, approximately 250 fighter airplanes and 150 helicopters) and a reasonable level of troop training, due to the evolution of the situation and because of the eroding factors mentioned above, in current operations, Assad can only dislocate just a small part (approximately 25%) of the initial military capabilities. These comprise mainly elite units, including the 4th Armor Division, which played the most important role in annihilating the riot, the Republican Guard, and the Special Operations Regiments. The other standing units are composed mainly of Sunni conscripts, but led by officers close to the regime, being dislocated and stationed in their basic garrisons, receiving a large range of simple missions in point of content and variety. The chain of command loyal to the president interconnects the linking parts made up of tank, artillery, and aviation units, unlike the less credible Sunni who make up most of the infantry forces, obviously endowed only with light armament.

In fact, the regime has been using this advantage conferred by the high fire power of heavy armament and air force in order to annihilate the opposing parties. If we take into consideration the analysis detailed above, we notice a whole series of issues referring to logistic support, maintenance, and even morale which generate lack of efficiency on medium term. Another major issue which seems to be emerging is that of personnel as most militaries are conscripts who should normally stay in the army for 30 months and conflict has already turned into its fourth year, the probability of closing their accounts with the system being much reduced in this situation. Another similar factor is the fact that the duration and intensity of the conflict has drastically diminished the number of possible recruits from the areas controlled by the regime.

These dynamic transformations have pushed the regime to find new compromise solutions, by engaging local militias and other paramilitary groups in military operations, engagements which
have grown constantly. On the one hand, these groups and militias solve the morality issue and that of lack of personnel and, on the other hand, through the means used, it offers a whole series of asymmetric opportunities, as they act outside any rules of engagement, being prone to denigration by the standing power at any time. We should also mention the major risk that these groupings might degenerate instantaneously into criminal / terrorist groups thus creating another issue regarding the security of the areas controlled by the regime.

Offensive operations for regaining control in certain areas have not been limited solely to air strikes and artillery bombings, but have also included the action of infantry troops, the tanks, and making use of the chemical agents.

At the same time, the Syrian army did not stick only to neutralizing the objectives controlled by rebels, but deliberately sought to destroy elements pertaining to the economic infrastructure (bread factories – essential in ensuring food, hospitals, schools), the number of collateral damage being extremely high. These tactics had a double purpose: on the one hand to destroy rebel centers and spread terror among the opposition adepts and, on the other hand, to have as partners in these atrocities a part of military leaders at various levels, which no longer grants them a comfortable statute in case the regime falls and power is taken over by the opposition.

Yet, the center of gravity consists in the capacity of action deriving exactly from the fact that the operations which took place had as a common denominator the classical doctrine principles of offensive and defensive actions, but not in the manner they are viewed by military art, but in a asymmetric manner, element which entitles us to attach to it the supplementary hybrid character.

The term „hybrid warfare” describes armed actions undertaken by soldiers and military technique without insignia showing they belong to a certain country, also being supported through campaigns of disinformation and cyber attacks.

The state which is conducting hybrid warfare uses paramilitary groups made up of individual fighters, local population in the area, such as the province the conflict is directed against, but denies categorically that it might have closed a deal with these organizations or might coordinate them.

The effects produced by the conflict are catastrophic: over 200,000 victims, millions of refugees, shattered economy and infrastructure. Both the forces faithful to Bashar al-Assad regime and the rebel forces, through acts of kidnapping and killing civilians, slaughtering them on a large scale, are leading to a critical situation from a humanitarian point of view. The counter-insurgency campaigns have deliberately destroyed trade and essential public services in the areas hostile to the government which does not raise any hope for a possible end to violence and a beginning of reconciliation.

The effects are not only internal, but they inevitably reverberate in the neighboring areas. Approximately four million people had to take refuge in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and have recently started to think of building a new life in European countries, while an almost triple number of people are trying to survive inside borders.

While partially exploring the dynamics of the Syrian conflict, through the analysis of current situations and their implications, we have drawn a series of conclusions, without claiming to have covered the whole range of circumstances given by the reality in the field, but it is absolutely certain that this conflict is more than a warning for civilization.

Cumulating the aspects presented in a central conclusion, we may say that

4 http://adevarul.ro/international/europa/Tarile-baltice-pretate-razboi-hybrid-1_54da4496448e03c0fd79bd9f/index.html
the current acts and facts going on in Syria do not offer prospects for negotiating peace and stability terms either locally or regionally, this being the reason why we only made some assumptions referring to this conflict, trying to include them conceptually under terrorism or hybrid warfare.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE
CASE STUDY: UNITED STATES

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Abstract: Information sharing represents, for the Intelligence Community, the act of exchanging intelligence between collectors, analysts and users in order to improve national security. This is seen inside as essential aspect rather than a courtesy. Efforts are directed to act according to a mind-set in intelligence in order to assume the responsibility to provide intelligence products instead of the former practice of the mere need to know. The main idea is to foster a culture of sharing information among agencies, all levels of government, the private sector and foreign partners. In the Intelligence Community this process is “at the end of the beginning”- a beginning that has been made but much work still remains to be done.

Keywords: information exchange, intelligence sharing, community, security.

Exchange of information - formula based response to threats and intelligence reform

The recent developments in the security field, in which a significant share is represented by the activated or latent conflicts, require more difficult decisions to be made by state actors alone or in an alliance.

The security environment has been marked lately by deep changes in the main areas of social existence: NATO and the EU expanded eastwards towards the Black Sea, Caucasus and Near East (between the Baltic and Black Sea), the EU accedes to the status global player, the rivalry with the US and the Russian Federation has rekindled political and military influence, especially by the Ukrainian crisis.

Globalization security environment amid various actions and ambitions, manifested by worldwide or regional actors, highlights the genesis of asymmetric and unconventional threats, which in turn equally determines risks for world states.

In this context, the exchange of information becomes a powerful support to develop action in one direction or another, to support a decision within a system of alliances in order to prevent harmful interventions of external actors’ opponents.

Current security threats combined formulas of response calls. In the field of information exchange this cause-effect link can be summed up in the following manner: the new challenges and threats, whatever their nature (environmental, physical or virtual), require that security actions be performed by intelligence structures in a complex network of viable information, having available proactive and reactive sources of information, with an accelerated flow and a high degree of accuracy. In order to keep up with the pace of change and threats these types of actions must be accelerated within the intelligence community.

Nowadays, technology can influence the direct and rapidly changing future, so that unhindered access to information, massive sharing of personal information – either from individuals or business-corporate environment is realized today through the Internet. The Internet has the ability to facilitate the connection, communication and sharing of information; through the use of technology at different levels of development, without any computers, applications or identical security level, people can access information in a uniform manner.

Thus, in the intelligence community collaboration and cooperation is necessary to improve inter-departmental and inter-agency relations. Relying on the
information technology industry, policymakers must find and implement a workaround Internet, the only difference being that the network should be secured and the interconnection policies strictly controlled.

The exchange of information means more than technology and culture is based on the responsibility to provide information in Intelligence, in many cases the two concepts substituting one another. In the US Intelligence Community, information exchange can be defined as the act of exchanging information between intelligence collectors, analysts and policy makers in order to strengthen national security.

Efforts made in recent years are characterized by trying to adopt the exchange of information not only as a complex technology, but as a rule of conduct for the exchange of information and the objective of establishing a trusted partnership for the exchange of information among all available information agencies and ensuring that those who need the security of information will receive it in due time. Promoting the exchange of information was accelerated after 9/11 events.

The exchange of information was one of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, subsequently turning the cornerstone of American strategy for intelligence reform. The 9/11 Commission Report issued concluded that the necessary information about the attacks was there, but it was not available to those who needed it, largely due to the "wall" created in the exchange of information between law enforcement institutions (in this case CIA FBI). The report raised the question of necessity for new procedures concerning the exchange of information and a widening technological advancement and exchange framework.

The report clearly highlighted the state of the US Intelligence Community: it was created during the Cold War, when information was limited, there was a restrictive trade flow and enemies were moving at a pace which was slow and easy enough to predict. The situation is totally different nowadays, contrasting fast evolving threats demanding answers as fast, imaginative and agile. To develop such capabilities, the information must change into a much larger framework and be relieved from the standard need to know that proves not to be enough anymore to the current principle of the need to share information.


Overall, the Commission recommended the establishment of an information exchange unit and standardization of practices, procedures and rules for US citizens access to information and simplifying procedures for classification.

A new approach to information exchange

In 2008, the US drew the first strategy of information sharing among the intelligence community in order to improve the ability of intelligence professionals to exchange information to strengthen US national security; the document suggested broadly how to remove institutional and technical barriers, so the federal government could be in a position to take decisions of vital importance to national security.

The US intelligence community is involved in an extremely complex process associating two major issues: risk management and improvement of the exchange of information; also we must not lose sight of issues such as achieving a fair balance between benefits and costs - calculated in advance, ensuring the success of missions, civil liberties and the protection of sources and methods.

This offers a new vision of sharing information, exposing a model for implementing that vision through the Intelligence Community, interconnections
between exchanging information agencies, creating a thorough acknowledgement of facts and enhanced security.

The new model is totally opposed to sharing information the exchange of information from before 9/11 events and includes:

- adopting a dominant exchange of information pattern to characterize the entities involved and be based on the responsibility to provide the necessary information (need to share versus need to know);
- the position in which agencies must act is that of belonging to a complex institutional framework and information exchange must be carried out accordingly in this larger context: between agencies with different partners and across international borders;
- the type of collaboration needed is dynamic, based on a rapid adaptation to the needs which are constantly changing and the inclusion of new partners in the exchange of information;
- security is built into the database, and access to focus on attributes that go beyond classification levels - focusing on missions, environment and affiliation;
- giving up ownership of information, facilitating information exchange to remove "cultural" barriers and to further the analysis (intelligence) which use appropriate multidimensional security protocols to follow.

The strategy specifies the main key points, goals and objectives envisaged in the development process of information sharing between all partners involved in the community and among allies. The objectives identified in the Strategy explicitly described the actions to be implemented and are considered a bridge between the current state in which the exchange of information and the targets are set and its implementation in the future.

Moreover, the complexity of effective implementation of the especially high information exchange is reflected in the smooth functioning of the areas involved in this process: government, politics, technology, culture and economics.

Subsequently, this strategy was seen as a new form of organization for intelligence, a mix of policies, procedures and technology for the exchange of information among all the entitled entities, at the local, state and federal external partners and the private sector.

The current major objectives within the Intelligence Community in the United States we can see the following: creating a culture of information sharing, reducing barriers to facilitate the exchange of information, improving practices of internal exchanges and with external partners, institutionalized exchange information.

**Conclusion**

Assessments on the effectiveness of promoting the exchange of information throughout the American community do not have a unified position; US Department of Justice concluded that law enforcement agencies are fully pleased with the level of information exchange on terrorism. On the other hand, all those law enforcement agencies in the US which do not have operational units expressed their dissatisfaction in this respect.

Assessments on the operations centers fusion of information, however, are negative: many of their representatives complain that, although centers receive sufficient information from federal agencies, it seems that these centers "never" get the correct information necessary, or it is received but in an inefficient manner. Leaders of the fusion centers consider that most times the appropriate targeting intelligence threats should be called fusion centers more than being proactive federal agencies in providing this type of information. A difficulty found is that members of the fusion centers manifest an inability to request such information.

Other assessments point out flaws at the level of personnel training in the sense of lack of control over it. They insist
on the idea that changes should occur also with respect to the way people perform their activities and there is a need to establish a system of rewards and sanctions and awareness and accountability for information exchange to be built by programs after going through documentation.

Thus, it can be said that information exchange is crucial in the current security environment, eroded and subject to new challenges, risks and asymmetric threats as it is. On the other hand, the danger for such information fusion centers may come from sharing unreal information, based only on the interests of a single actor, usually the issuer.

This practice has shown that the information war has become permanent, multidisciplinary and dual. Permanence refers to the strategy of an actor collection, protection, management and limitation of access of others/opponents to information also out of conflict or crisis periods.

Multidisciplinarity refers to the interconnection of systems, organizations, objectives, views, ways and measures used to achieve them. Duality refers to the fact that some differences disappeared between the military and civilian environments, in the sense that the means of retaliatory violence are not a strict monopoly of armed forces, being caught up and sometimes overrun by violence information that statewide facilitated migration to banking, financial, energy, communication, distribution of resources and infrastructure.

Regarding the benefits of institutionalizing the exchange of information, estimates are generally characterized by formulations in the future; while the world is moving towards service-oriented system, everything is subject to change, generating new areas of action. This is expected to further increase the opportunities to develop services that will allow rapid exchange of information, so that all the parties might receive correct information in an optimal timeframe.

As for the need to enhance cooperation and exchange of information between national intelligence agencies in the context of escalating regional conflicts, progress is in an early stage. This requires states to produce intelligence - and this depends on their individual commitments – so as to be entitled to receive intelligence in their turn.

An example taken into account in NATO is the exchange of information developed by the US that have the most extensive system of intelligence in the world and the exchange of information with Britain, which facilitates in some cases the information transfer on terrorism coming from US to Europe.

The implementation exchange of information on different levels within the European Union can be a contributing factor blurring the differences between consumers and producers of security transition to status of holders / guarantors of global security.

The exchange of information will become the expression enhancing the products of intelligence, in terms of quality of activities in systems / organizations charged with the management of security in relation to the efforts of collection, storage, processing, analysis, information processing, so as to able to draw relevant conclusions and information products, to be made available to decision makers and responsible for implementing various policies in order to develop response options for countering the risks and threats identified.

The efficiency measures to ensure regional security awareness, prevention and counteraction of any kind of threat will be directly proportional to the value and performance of information submitted by beneficiaries. The efficient management of security issues will have to develop an effective operational management of intelligence activities and enhancing exchanges of information.

Cooperation by exchanging information is based primarily on common interests in clarifying a situation, but taking into consideration the way the laws of each
state allow this type of joint action. The lack of legislative harmonization at Community level is currently an obstacle to countering potential risks and threats. Therefore, legislative harmonization is important to be fulfilled, other measures arising as a direct and natural result of this situation.

Thus, it can be said that drawing conclusions for a work in full swing turns out to be extremely difficult; therefore I consider that the evaluation / quantification efficiency on the exchange of information at different levels of government, state and local level can compensate for the lack of explicitly formulated conclusions.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION, POPULAR REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AND THEIR INTEREST IN AFRICA

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Abstract: The African continent has infiltrated economically among world’s greatest powers due to its major opportunities offered at low prices. African wealth has been subjected since its disclosure to exploitation by colonialism, the story of the „black continent“ perishing in the economic spread of the greatest international powers. Throughout its history, natural resources and cheap labor force have aroused the interests of big investors who have seen the exploitation of the African continent as an economical solution for expanding their economies. Currently, the largest investor on the African continent is People’s Republic of China which is pursuing a consolidation of the African market for Chinese products and also an enhancement of Sino-African exchanges. This paper captures the main aspects of China’s involvement in Africa and the effects of economic integration on African economy. The main objective of this paper is to identify the consequences of China’s economic descent in African states and the impact of Sino-African relations on the international community and especially on the European Union, as well as their response to the “unfair marriage” between China and the African continent.

Keywords: Economic growth, resources, commercial exchanges, security, terrorism.

1. The European Union’s role in managing African issues

1.1. The European Union – promoter of peace and stability

The Lisbon Treaty which came into force on 1st December 2009 stipulates that European Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights\(^1\). EU foreign policy is also consolidated on democratic values and measures taken for respecting human rights.

The European Union made its name on the international scene as a genuine promoter of supporting human rights. The partnership between the EU and Africa is a classic fundamant of preservation of bilateral relations based on cooperation and dialogue. Its institutional source is the first EU-Africa summit held in Cairo in the 2000. The partnership between the European Union and Africa was built around promoting democracy and human rights and contributes to facilitating comprehensive dialogue in areas such as rule of law, natural resources, security, institutional development and human rights.

The partnership was strengthened as time passed by, decisive moments being the summit in Lisbon in 2007 in which representatives of the two unions adopted the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action Plan, and the third summit held in Tripoli, Libya, in 2010.

The fourth summit was held in Brussels in 2014. At the summit, leaders on both continents discussed possibilities for developing cooperation opportunities and expansion of relations in several fields: political, commercial, economical,

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investment and employment.\textsuperscript{2} The summit ended with the establishment within the joint action area of five priority items\textsuperscript{3}: peace and security, democracy and human rights, social development, sustainable development and continental integration, emerging global issues.

The European Union is a reliable partner for the African Union. Cooperation between the two unions intensified in the fields of security and peace. High-level visits and support by the European Union peacekeeping operations on the African continent have proved the willingness of European leaders to support the blurring of conflicts and ensuring stability in the area. The EU funding of peacekeeping actions led by African partners reached 750 million euros for the period between 2014 and 2016\textsuperscript{4}.

1.2. Natural resources – the main ingredient of Afro-European economic and commercial relations

The development of relations between the European Union and the African continent states is founded on trade in raw materials and natural resources. Cooperation between the European Union and African countries is based on economic and commercial relations. Trade in both raw materials and manufactured products is the main area for dialogue between Europeans and Africans.

The European Union has always been an important market for exports to African countries. Trade relations with the African continent have been established in the nineteenth century, when countries like Portugal, France, England developed trade ties set as a result of the colonization momentum.

African exports to the European Union Member States recorded an upward trajectory. In 1990, the quantity of goods exported by Africa to the European Union reached an amount exceeding $ 47 billion, representing 44 % of total exports\textsuperscript{5}. It increased in 2007 to reach a value of 129 billion USD\textsuperscript{6}.

The largest partner of the European Union on the African continent is South Africa. It exports to EU Member States a wide range of fuels and mining products, machines, transport equipment and other semi-finished goods\textsuperscript{7}. The European Union exports to South Africa products such as machines and transport equipment, chemicals, etc\textsuperscript{8}. Trade relations between South Africa and the European Union are governed by commercial negotiations, development and cooperation. Encompassed in this there is also a trade-free zone set by both parties covering 90 % of bilateral trade.

The West African region is a major point of interest for the European Union in the field of commercial development, whereas relations with states in this region amount to a 40% \textsuperscript{9} of the total trade value that the European Union has developed in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The European Union initiated an Economic Partnership Treaty with 16 countries in West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone.

\textsuperscript{6} Same.
\textsuperscript{8} Same.
\textsuperscript{9} Same.
Togo and Mauritania. EU exports to West African States predominantly industrial products, machines, transport equipment, and chemicals. European Union imports from West African States are dominated by natural resources and raw materials. Among the main countries providing oil is Nigeria, followed closely by Ghana.

In the same breath, EU is provided cocoa exports by the largest exporter of this product worldwide, Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The European Union imports from Cape Verde, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Ghana bananas, processed fishery products, basic agricultural products (mango, pineapple, peanuts, cotton, etc.), as well as copper, gold and diamonds. The European Union is the largest importer of non-petroleum products and goods originating in Nigeria.

Under the economic partnership treaty with South Africa, the European Union has reserved the application of bilateral development cooperation. The treaty stipulates the possibility to undertake negotiations on issues related to trade and services. The implementation of the Treaty has helped strengthen regional integration, having as a key priority the development of economies through increased competitiveness and supporting companies and exporters in consolidating their capacity. Additionally, this was achieved by promoting the agricultural sector throughout the West African region.

Gross domestic consumption of energy led to the amplification of the European Union’s dependence on exporting countries, the import of fuel in 2013 rising to a rate of 53.2% of the total energy demand.

1.3. The European Union’s involvement in consolidating African stability

The European Union has established itself as a good monitor of peace and democratic principles on the African continent. Although the crisis in Darfur, supported by disagreements between nomads and farmers based on obtaining and holding control over resources and land not yet affected by the desertification process, has increased considerably since 2003, the European Union got actively and directly involved in the conflict settlement. Crisis degeneration led to increased proliferation of arms and ammunition, as well as the liberalization of actions conducted by rebel groups. The European Union has played an important role in ensuring stability and rebuilding peace in Darfur region, providing financial, personnel, logistic and technical support within the African Union mission – the UN, UNAMID, since its inception in 2007. The EU political and technical support provided peace negotiations and development assistance to secured areas of Darfur in order to consolidate peace, cooperating with local, regional and international partners to implement peace, justice and human rights.

The European Union imposed an embargo on arms and related material in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, and Liberia. In Libya, the European Union decided on the implementation of an embargo on arms, ammunition and equipment that can be used in internal retaliation, as well as on banning certain services, restrictions on admission of persons within the borders of Libya, freezing of funds and economic resources.

10 Same.
11 Same.
12 Same.
13 Same.
of certain people and limitation of some rights. In Sudan, the EU measures included the implementation of an embargo on arms and related materials, a ban on the provision of certain services, restrictions on admission of individuals who impede on the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian law or human rights or other atrocities, violate the arms embargo and the freezing of funds and economic resources.

Since 2003, the European Union has completed nine missions and operations on the African continent, in Guinea-Bissau, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, South Sudan and the Darfur region. Currently, under the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union, nine missions and operations are being conducted in countries such as Somalia, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Mali, and Libya. The aim of EU involvement in conflict resolution on the African continent stems from the desire to ensure a stable and peaceful environment conducive to the development of economic and trade relations. The European Union contributes to the stabilization of differences through the instruments of issues management regarding human rights, protection of children in armed conflicts, the fight against impunity for sexual violence, etc.

2. The People's Republic of China and generating a new partnership model

2.1. China - Africa trade relations and the rush for resources

China is considered to be the largest trading partner of Africa. The total value of trade relations between China and Africa rose in 2010 at $126.9 billion. Sino-African trade relations contribute to strengthening states on the African continent and stabilizing their position in the Economic Partnership Treaty. The most important trade partners of China on the African continent are Angola, South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria and Egypt.

African exports to China consist, for the most part, in petroleum and other natural resources or raw materials such as iron ore, metals and smaller amounts of food and agricultural products. China exports to African countries a wide range of finished products, machines and transport equipment, electronics and communications systems.

To facilitate access to resources, China has adopted a strategy less common among Western states. It develops projects for funding resource-rich states, characterized by lower costs and cheap labor force. In 2014, China launched a new funding with a total project value of at least $12 billion with the aim of consolidating Sino-African cooperation and strengthening exchanges based on materials. Poor infrastructure in African countries and the urgent need for its development were seen by China as an opportunity of ensuring reserves for its own economy.

Chinese companies collaborate with African partners despite the unstable authorities that govern African countries. The Chinese goods that are imported by Africa are considered to be below quality standards. Africa is being used as a garbage dump for the Chinese industrial waste.

2.2. The role of China in generating instability in Africa

Since 2003, the western region of Sudan, Darfur, witnessed an expansion in

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18 Same.
19 Same.
22 Same.
23 Same.
political tensions that were upsetting the Sudanese community. The conflict quickly turned into a real genocide that killed over 300,000 people and 2.7 million others were forced to leave their homes and relocate. Despite the efforts, government forces failed in establishing a peaceful climate which brought the whole situation to the attention of the international community.

Among the main causes that led to violence we find environmental degradation and desertification due to extreme drought periods, competition for resources, ethnic marginalization, manipulative policies by imposing postcolonial government. Pursuing their own interests, state leaders have amassed economic development in their regions of origin, disregarding other areas whose inhabitants felt deprived of profits from the exploitation of oil resources.

China is Sudan’s main partner in the field of oil, the latter emerging as among the most important trade partners of China. Economic and trade relations between China and Sudan have influenced the course of action the government in Beijing is taking in addressing the Sudanese situation. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China has reserved its right to veto and in September of 2004, declared its intention of using this right if anyone will try imposing an oil embargo on Sudan. In 1996, China purchased the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company whose main activity is the exploitation of oil resources in Sudan. China also had an important role in building an oil pipeline worth a billion dollars, covering a distance of 1,506 km. Chinese investments in the oil sector continued to increase over time, causing serious consequences on the development of a favorable settlement of the Sudanese conflict. PRC has contracted numerous projects in other areas such as electricity and construction, providing a high contribution to the development of the labor market in Sudan.

China was blamed by the international community not only for the deep involvement in trade and economic relations with Sudan or fraternizing with a direct supporter of terrorism, but also for its arming race and participation in human rights abuses. The sales of weapons by China and Russia fuel human rights violations in Darfur. These transfers highlighted the need to strengthen the UN embargo. Exports include supplying significant quantities of ammunition, helicopters, attack aircrafts, air-ground rockets and armored vehicles. According to Amnesty International, in 2005, China sold to Sudan military equipment worth 24 million dollars.

In 2007 China and the Democratic Republic of Congo signed a commercial agreement for the financing by the Chinese government of mining and infrastructure projects, Sicomines. This agreement is the legal basis for granting credit lines that are to be refunded by the authorities of DRC from mining profits. Chinese companies Sinohydro and China Railway Group Limited undertook to subsidize the building of roads and hospitals, receiving in return 68% of copper and cobalt exploitation under the Sicomines project. These mines are listed to be the largest in Africa, with a reserve of 6.8 million tons.

China also financed 1800 miles of


28 Same.
highway, 2,000 miles of roads and the construction of two new universities.29

China indirectly contributed to worsening the conflict situation in Angola. Inefficient exploitation of the oil resources in Angola resulted in increased degree of poverty, causing discontent among citizens. In the period between 1997 and 2002, the Angolan treasury declined in value by 4.2 billion, revenue from petroleum30. To improve this precarious situation, in 2004, the International Monetary Fund urged the government to guarantee transparency measures when it comes to commercial activities based on financial loan for the purpose of regenerating the state after conflict. Following its interests, China jumped in to help the Angolan authorities, giving them a loan of $ 2 billion, not requiring other specific mitigation measures regarding the degree of corruption and improving transparency. The government of Luanda has accepted China’s support by offering in exchange 5,600 tons of oil per day31.

The policy promoted by China to respect state sovereignty and not to interfere in their internal affairs led to little interest compared to the external echo generated by its investment spending on the African continent. Its material and financial contributions have accelerated the process of human rights denigration and escalation of conflict situations. In Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Chinese companies have repeatedly ignored legal regulations on minimum wages, refusing to pay social insurance and allowances to workers32 and claiming superiority of economic, social and cultural rights in the face of civil and political ones33.

PRC has recognized potential threats on the African continent with the attack on the Chinese companies initiated by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). MEND is a Nigerian militant group fighting to stop the oppression of inhabitants of the Niger Delta and the devastation of the natural environment by suppressing partnerships between the Nigerian government and companies whose presence endangers petroleum resources. The attack was motivated by MEND, arguing that “the entry [of Chinese companies] in the oil industry in Nigeria will be a disaster for oil-rich communities”34. In view of the widening new risks for its own security, China has decided to contribute more to UN peacekeeping actions. Cooperation between China and the UN peacekeeping forces opened the way for a more effective dialogue and closer proximity in standards between Chinese and European companies on the African continent.35

3. Divergences and congruencies

The European Union action on the African continent is founded by its desire to impose the stability of African countries that are affected by internal conflicts. The implications of European states were sustained by the necessity to protect the civilians promoting human rights and to prevent armed attacks that affect the state system. The interventions of the European Union in Africa were made according to the responsibility to protect principle.

The responsibility to protect can be achieved both through non-coercive measures, involving political and diplomatic mediation, negotiation and cooperation, and through coercive measures involving the use of armed force. Military intervention motivated by the need to protect human beings is an exceptional and extraordinary measure, which is mandated under specific conditions such as massive loss of life resulting from deliberate actions of states, ethnic cleansing committed by homicide, forced explosions, terrorist acts and rape. European Union conducts military missions in Mali, in order to train and prepare the armed forces, in Republic of Central Africa, to support the authorities to impose the security reform, but also in Somalia, to consolidate security institutions.

In his report, UN Secretary-General reiterated building the responsibility to protect on three pillars. The first pillar lawfully states the responsibility of each State to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. The second pillar relates to the assistance of the international community and its commitment in assisting countries to fulfill their obligations concerning the protection of the population on national territory. The last pillar promulgates the responsibility of Member States to respond promptly and decisively where the state concerned fails to provide a reliable protection of the population.

The responsibility to protect the civilian population in the area is supported by the United Nations Security Council resolutions and cumulative action is manifested by international actors to provide viable solutions to protect their populations against atrocities and human rights violations.

The measures applied by the western governments contributed to the rise of African states addiction to Chinese investments. The suspension of the commercial relations, the embargoes, and the limitation of the aid measures hindered the development of indigenous industry, while foreign operators remained active in the quarrying industry. The embargoes imposed by the European Union were often built on unstable foundations.

A European unilateral embargo on arms hardly makes a difference in limiting the availability of arms to the regime in Zimbabwe, who makes use of various African networks and continuously develops ties with China, extending the arms trade. Most imports of weapons to Zimbabwe during 2002-2012 came from China, the influence the EU can exert being severely undermined by the lack of cooperation from non-western actors such as China.

China’s heedless behavior towards the situation in Africa has been repeatedly denounced by the European Union. China pursues its own interests rather than supporting basic human rights, adversely impacting Sino - European relations in this field. In turn, China denounces EU behavior, saying it imposes its own ideology in African countries.


36 Same.
The Kenyan Government’s spokesman, Alfred Mutua, declared, during a press conference, that “China is a country with which business can be done easily because the Chinese do not shape their business according to political conditions (…) you will never hear China saying it will not finish a project because the government has not done enough to fight corruption. If the construction of a road is planned, then it will be built”. 39

The negative effects of China’s actions are made by its way of acting in the African markets. The problem is that PRC practically sells Africa’s natural resources back in the form of manufactured products. This is a dangerous equation that reproduces the historical relationship with the colonial powers in Africa.

The relation between China and Africa presents a dual face. It is clear that it is rapidly evolving, offering huge opportunities to Africa, but also presenting new challenges. The aid offered by China in Africa is perceived as a leeway for African leaders to perpetuate human rights violations. For example, projects for the construction of a dam displaced thousands of people and had negative effects on the environment, while at the same time helped generate much needed electricity. 40

What is important in China-Africa cooperation is that instead of a top-down approach used by the European Union, China used a networking system based on friendship and mutual help with the African states leaders. The West actors criticized China’s position in Africa and claimed it is irresponsible and reckless because of its non-interference policy that contributes to the deterioration of the African problems.

It is in China’s interest to continue on its strategic path, but additional pressure must be put on China to reevaluate the way they do business in conflict zones. African governments must be accountable to their citizens and factions that take advantage of the relationship with the Chinese should be held accountable. The Chinese government should use all possible means to pressure, both publicly and privately, to end ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes not only in Darfur but worldwide also.

The best means to maximize the positive influence of China are represented by the use of investment and trade agreements with China to ensure a fair deal for the population. The natural resources competition in Africa benefits the African states’ economy because it provides a large plethora of options and ensures a fair deal, stimulating the respect of human rights. African leaders must ensure that all financial agreements on behalf of their states are in accordance with the law and are exercised in the exclusive interest of the people.

Conclusions

Africa represents an important source of raw materials and natural resources for European Union member states and China. The soil, rich in oil and minerals, has often been seen as a target by western countries and Asian states which affirmed themselves as large resource consumers. These developed cooperation strategies and trade relations with states from the African continent, each of them imposing their own vision and institutional personality.

The European Union developed a cooperation policy with Africa that is founded on democracy and state low principles. Trade liaisons with the African states have been built upon a partnership stated on stability and respect for human rights. The European Union contributed human resources, financial resources and logistics in order to ensure the settlement

of conflict situations, help local
governments in streamlining their actions
as a response to the possible crises and
conflicts, and also, to train the armed
forces to be able to intervene efficiently in
order to help civil population.

The Chinese approach regarding its
relation with Africa is different than the
type of approach that the European Union
desires to impose. Unlike western players,
China provides substantial aid to the
African states, unconditionally and more
openly. China’s vision is oriented to its
own profit and its action regarding African
countries targets the development of trade
relations and ensuring a viable source of
natural resources. China pursues its own
interests and acts in accordance to this,
de spite the substantial criticism received
from the international community.

Cooperation between the European
Union and China towards the African
states has encountered countless
oscillations. The European Union has often
criticized China’s lack of interest and
rather indifferent attitude towards
humanitarian crises on the African
continent. In its turn, China complained
about excessive involvement of European
states in the internal affairs of African
governments.

Although the European Union
assiduous behavior was legitimiz ed by the
principle of responsibility to protect, China
has often spoiled the measures imposed by
it and exacerbated the problems related to
human rights, causing discrepancies in
Sino-European relations.

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THE ROLE OF COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION DEVELOPMENT AS GLOBAL PLAYER

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Abstract: This paper reveals the main issues of common foreign and security policy, highlighting its role in the European Union’s rise as a prominent actor on the international stage. The central objective of the paper is to depict the interaction of the European Union with other actors in the international system and its contribution to strengthening global peace and security which are officially stated as common foreign and security policy objectives. The paper is structured in two parts. The first part defines the conceptual framework of the CFSP as the successor of European Political Cooperation and its transition due to inherent reforms introduced by Lisbon Treaty. The second part of the paper emphasizes the European Union’s international behavior, its conflict management, threat prevention and counteraction, as well as its impact on the international community.

Keywords: defense, European Union, foreign policy, global player, security

1. Common Security and Defense Policy

1.1. Short History

Common Security and Defense Policy was defined for the first time in the Maastricht Treaty which was presented as the second pillar of the European Union, alongside the European Communities and Justice and Home Affairs. Common Security and Defense Policy sums up the whole concept of the European Union on security issues, including the further establishment of a common defense policy.

The Foreign and Security Policy objectives were as follows1:

– safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
– strengthening the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
– maintaining peace and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter objectives;
– promoting international cooperation;
– ensuring the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Amsterdam Treaty, which entered into force on 1 May 1999, amended and strengthened the provisions of the EU Treaty on the European Union’s foreign policy. By Amsterdam Treaty, the WEU is assigned new responsibilities, becoming an integral part of the Union, supporting it in defining the defense aspects of the common foreign and security policy. Another new aspect brought by the Amsterdam Treaty is the introduction of the position of High Representative for the CFSP and the appointment to this position of Secretary General of the WEU, Javier Solana, on November 20. This way he was able to oversee the transfer of powers from the WEU to the European Union2. The High Representative was intended to assist the Council in relation to matters of common


foreign and security policy by contributing to the definition, preparation and implementation of policy decisions.

On February 1st, 2003 the Nice Treaty came into force, which also contains specific aspects of foreign policy and common security. By this Treaty, the role of the Political and Security Committee in crisis management operations was reinforced. It also proposed new methods for changing the composition of the European Commission and the voting system for the Council.

EU Constitutional Treaty brings major changes to the European Union and thus to CFSP reform. By the Constitutional Treaty, the European Union receives legal status, ceasing its operation mode based on three pillars. The Treaty of Lisbon was signed on December 13th by the heads of state and government and foreign ministers of the European Union countries. The Lisbon Treaty amends the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. The legal personality of the European Union promotes its role on the international stage, strengthening its global efficiency. The Lisbon Treaty brings a new element which consists of creating the post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The responsibilities of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy include participation in its work, along with Heads of State and Government and the European Commission President. He also chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, the Council operating in the EU Council structure. The High Representative is one of the Commission Vice-Presidents. This ensures consistency of the Union’s external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission procedures. The contribution of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy procedure involves formulating legislative proposals on foreign policy and security and responsibility to achieve, as mandated by the Council. The High Representative represents the European Union on the international scene, within the relationships with international organizations or third countries.

1.2. European Security and Defense Policy

By the European Security and Defense Policy, acting within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union had the possibility to develop civilian and military capabilities for crisis management and conflict prevention. The main missions of the European Security and Defense Policy include humanitarian missions, peace-keeping and crisis management, with the aim of strengthening international security. The European Security and Defense Policy are considered a European pillar of NATO.

In 1992, the “Petersberg Declaration” was drafted by the foreign ministers and defense ministers of WEU Member States that define the types of missions assigned to ESDP: humanitarian and rescue missions within peacekeeping missions for crisis management, peace enforcement missions. Achieving these kinds of missions is ESDP’s ultimate objective.

In 1999 the Helsinki European Council concluded the need to raise the capacity of Member States within 60 days to about 60,000 troops, backed by at least one year in theater, until 2003. Then, an agreement was also reached regarding the establishment of permanent bodies to facilitate decision-making: Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Staff. Before the Feira Summit the fourth body, i.e. the Committee for Civil Aspects of Crisis Management was created to submit information, advice and opinions to the Political and Security Committee.
Following several analyses by the Military Staff members it was concluded that the legally required amount of force was covered, but there were qualitative deficiencies. As a solution to the outlined qualitative problems, the establishment of European Action Plan in capabilities (ECAP) was suggested.

Following the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the Seville European Council decided in 2002 to widen “Petersberg” missions including a new mission: fighting terrorism. In December, the same year, NATO-EU agreements, known as the “Berlin Plus” were adopted in Copenhagen, the relationship between NATO and the European Union becoming institutionalized. By these agreements EU access to NATO assets and capabilities to conduct operations under the leadership of the Union are guaranteed. For example, in terms of the “Berlin Plus” agreement, PESA took over SFOR NATO operation in Bosnia. Any action runs the power of a mandate from the UN Security Council. Given the very name of the Security Strategy, we can outline two ways in which the EU refers to the concept of security. The first step in this area is made by creating a stable security environment within the Union’s borders that ensure strengthening the stability within Member States. A second orientation of the Union is to consolidate the security environment outside its borders which aim to promote the democratic principles and to respect the fundamental values of the rule of law.

A new approach to the development of the European capabilities in security and defense led to the adoption of a new global EU objective, namely Headline Goal 2010 which involves improving defense capabilities and adapting them to current requirements. Within the Headline Goal 2010 the concept of “battle group” was introduced, whose mission is to ensure effective military intervention.

In 2004 a decision was made on the establishment of the European Defense Agency (EDA) which provides the development of defense capabilities and strategies for EU policies aimed armaments and research activities by integrating national policies in the field.

Developing a security and defense measure involves a high capacity to adapt to changes occurring in the international expansion. It requires the completion of a process of assimilation of the lessons learned while enhancing adaptability and flexibility.

There is a particular potential for primarily domestic conflict, as well as interstate conflicts, in the non-integrated Europe. Also, EU Member States are not excluded from the path of terrorist attacks that could trigger large-scale conflicts. Terrorism is a major threat to NATO member states and the EU, which contributed military forces in theaters of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 in the US, those of 2004 in Madrid or London in 2005, for example, show that the developed states can be targeted by hybrid threats.3

2. The European Union on the International Stage

The European Union stood out as an active player in keeping peace, both domestically and internationally. Its involvement in crisis management in the Western Balkans, Israel and other remote parts of the world, and building an efficient European Neighborhood Policy which promote European values, contributed to the implementation of its status as an international actor. Its global involvement

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is supported by the development aid that amounted to more than half of the official aid granted for worldwide development\(^4\). It also campaigns for human rights, working closely with the United Nations under whose mandate it conducts military operations and civilian peace support operations. The European Union has provided about 50%\(^5\) of global funds for emergency aid, contributing significantly to saving victims of natural disasters and more. EU economic power gives it the opportunity to engage directly in conflict prevention and keeping peace and in assisting countries undergoing post-conflicts reconstruction while having limited possibilities.

Since its establishment, the European Community is involved in all phases of the crisis cycle, from prevention to rehabilitation strategies and post-crisis reconstruction. It manages substantial resources devoted to countries in political crisis through its programs and specific instruments such as the Instrument for Stability. The Commission places a great importance to crisis coherent approach, ensuring complementariness of Community instruments and CFSP actions.

The Common Security and Defense Policy, established after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, contributes to promoting global security. In this regard, the EU cooperates with other international organizations and third countries to combat terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration and ensure the settlement of global problems and a stable climate.

Through the European External Action Service, the European Union acts to promote European values on the global scene, peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security.

EU external action for conflict prevention is based on\(^6\):

- Identifying the early risk of violent conflict;
- Improving understanding of conflict situations (causes, actors and dynamics);
- Increasing the identification of the range of options for EU action;
- Scheduling external assistance on conflict grounds.

The early warning system is an instrument of the EU risk management for upstream conflict prevention. It is designed to bridge the gap between early warning and early action by EU staff engaging in a joint evaluation process that includes specific recommendations and follow up actions. The EU also promotes systematic use of conflict analysis, especially in fragile and conflict-prone countries.

Mediation is part of the EU preventive diplomacy field and is a component of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. Relying on the concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue adopted in November 2009, the EU has developed its own mediation support capacity. The EU is also active in the process of dialogue involving civil society organizations, in particular the Instrument for Stability (IS).

Following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty the diplomatic and political actions that the European Union can take to prevent conflict and crisis management were demarcated. “Petersberg” type missions offered a new dimension including activities related to “disarmament, humanitarian and rescue tasks, advice and assistance to the military missions in conflict prevention and peacekeeping, the missions of fighting forces for crisis management, including peacemaking missions and post-conflict stabilization operations. All these tasks may contribute to fighting against terrorism, as well as to supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.\(^7\)


The Common Security and Defense Policy, acting under the Common Foreign and Security Policy aims to strengthen the civilian and military capabilities of the EU in conflict prevention and crisis management. EU involvement in crisis management process is carried throughout the cycle and is directed to all areas of the world. European Union’s role in promoting regional stability is enhanced by launching the Eastern Partnership which aims to strengthen relations with those Eastern states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to promote European values, providing sustainable economic and security environment.

The missions of the Common Security and Defense Policy are spread to all areas where the situation requires it. The European Union has conducted missions in Georgia, Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guinea-Bissau, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan / Darfur, Central African Republic, Somalia, Afghanistan, Moldova, Ukraine, Iraq, Indonesia. These missions mainly support police, justice, customs reforms and strengthening capabilities. They facilitate the conclusion of ending hostilities agreements and ensure compliance of these agreements. European Union efforts are made to ensure the security of civilians, refugees, workers and UN humanitarian personnel. Furthermore, CFSP missions have also application in certain specific areas such as border monitoring or fight against piracy.

In Georgia, the EU deployed a monitoring mission to increase and strengthen security in the South Caucasus. 350 people participated in the mission and worked together to minimize the chances of an armed conflict burst, enabling people displaced by the 2008 conflict to return to their homes.

In Yugoslavia, the European Union deployed Operation Concordia which operated using NATO capabilities based on commitments between the two organizations. The aim of the operation was to provide support to ensure a stable security environment. Although the operation lasted for only a few months (31 March 2003 – 15 December, 2003), this resulted in the acquisition of a peaceful, democratic and stable environment and the establishment ascent to prosperity and economic development and welfare. Subsequent EU missions in Yugoslavia had an evident impact in the evolution of Yugoslavia as a state based on the European values. EUPOL PROXIMA mission, launched on December 15th, 2003 aimed to purge the Yugoslav police and facilitated their transition towards reaching European standards. With the completion of PROXIMA, on December 14th, 2005, the EU sent a police team (EUPAT) to provide advice and guidance for the development, streamlining and increasing the quality of police services in the areas of border police, public order and safety fight against terrorism and organized crime.8

The most significant European Union mission launched under the Common Security and Defense Policy was EULEX held in Kosovo to support state authorities in terms of the specific rule of law development. This mission is a pertinent illustration of EU involvement in promoting and strengthening security in the Western Balkans. The main aspects of the mission responsibilities of local authorities aimed at strengthening and improving the profitability of their actions in the framework of organized crime, corruption, and war crimes. The mission is being conducted under Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council and its mandate was extended as a result of decisions by Member States until on 14 June, 2016.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, since 1 January, 2003 the European Union held its first mission under the auspices of the Common Security and Defense Policy, EUPM. The mission focused on developing sustainable policies of the State under international and European practices and police metamorphosis in a competent and effective body and reinforcing the capacity of local structures to execute actions counterterrorism and to fight against organized crime and corruption.

A new mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, CSDP has been launched since 2004. EUFOR ALTHEA Operation aims primarily at providing a support system for building and strengthening the capacity of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as their complementing in ensuring a stable and secure environment. ALTHEA Operation is carried out under the Resolution Agreement “Berlin Plus”, the Commander of the Operation being the Deputy of the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe (DSACEUR).

The European Union has conducted a mission in support of security sector EU SSR local reform, under the authority of the security and defense policy, in Guinea-Bissau, since February 2008. The objective of the mission was to ensure a stable and peaceful environment by implementing security sector reform, in partnership with the security forces and local authorities.

EUPOL RD CONGO mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo belongs to the police forces of the European Union, conducted to implement security sector reform related to the police and their cooperation with the justice system and management issues related to human rights, children protection in armed conflicts, the fight against impunity for sexual violence.9 This is achieved by providing assistance, support and advice to local authorities. The mission’s mandate ended on 30 September 2013. EUPOL RD CONGO mission followed EUPOL-Kinshasa mission which was the first police mission of the EU in Africa, held from February 2005 to June 2007 in order to ensure security during the elections.

On 25 April 2006 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 167110 which authorized the deployment of a European Union reserve force, EUFOR RD CONGO, for a defined period to support the UN mission in DR Congo during the presidential and parliamentary elections. The mission was successfully completed on 30 November 2006.

Over the last decade the European Union has concentrated its efforts in fighting terrorism and ensuring a stable and peaceful environment, especially in Afghanistan. EUPOL Afghanistan mission began in 2007 and has significantly contributed to building an effective police force whose functionality was to fit within the rule of law with an emphasis on human rights. The mission is conducted in cooperation with government authorities and international partners. The EU mission focuses on the institutional reform of the Home Office and the increasing professionalism of the Afghan police (ANP).11 The mandate of EUPOL Afghanistan was extended to 31 December 2016. The main objectives of the mission during 2015 and 2016 are amplifying the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan, increasing the efficiency of police forces, and strengthening cooperation between police and prosecutors.12

Triton is a Frontex joint operation conducted at the request of the Italian

authorities that started on 1 November 2014 in support of Italy, which provides support in helping people who immigrate into the European Union through the Mediterranean and in strengthening supervision.

Following the Extraordinary Council meeting\(^\text{13}\) on 23 April 2015, the Member States decided to triple the resources available for Triton mission and enhance operational capability by increasing the number of vessels and personnel. The Member States decided to strengthen the presence of the great fight against traffickers in accordance with international law, preventing illegal migration flows, strengthening internal solidarity and responsibility.\(^\text{14}\)

By its missions undertaken under the CFSP, the European Union stood out as a competent provider of assistance and support in the affected areas of the world. Common Security and Defense Policy provides European Union instruments necessary for crisis management and the imposition and maintenance of international peace. EU external relations contribute to fulfilling the strategic interests and objectives. This is improved by enhancing the political and trade relations in the framework of strategic partnerships concluded with countries such as China, India, US, Japan, Canada. The European Union also promotes international cooperation and supports the development by institutionalizing its relations with countries bordering the Mediterranean, with the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Western Balkans.

Conclusions

The Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union incorporated the voice of the 28 member states campaigning for a more secure, stable and prosperous Europe. Through the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union contributes to a climate of understanding and cooperation at regional and global level. This policy is based on the Lisbon Treaty which created the position of the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” and the diplomatic corps of the European Union, the “European External Action Service”. The foreign and security policy aims to maintain peace and strengthen security internationally, to promote international cooperation, to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and to supervise the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

European Union participates in peacekeeping missions, conflict prevention, crisis management, aiming at sustainable development of the entire global system. The comprehensive role of the European Union regarding security is highlighted by the broad range of operations that the Union took part in. Since 2003, the EU has participated in both civilian and military operations, on three continents, providing an effective response to crisis and conflict.

EU involvement in the restoration, consolidation and maintenance of international security and cooperation with other international actors in order to enhance and strengthen democracy, rule of law and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms have demonstrated the EU’s ability to effectively act on the international stage and the enhancement of its position as a global player.

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THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCEPT
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON COOPERATION AMONG NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES

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Abstract: Although the subject of exchanging information is an important aspect of security policy, this area of cooperation is still characterized by reticence and lack of transparency between the Member States of European Union. When we analyze the dimension of cooperation relations in the area of information exchange among Member States of the European Union, we can observe a key element – the fear of decision-makers. This fear concerns the fact that despite the benefits of an integrated approach, based on the pooling of information, the national sovereignty will diminish. Keeping in mind common security concerns, and taking into account that the legally operative beneficiaries, in this case each EU Member State, have a strong interest in developing means of cooperation, it was expected that such a concern might be approached early, and up to the present moment significant progress to have been made. We will notice further on that this claim is actually invalidated. It is true that the information revolution has made the European approaches regarding the exchange of information to evolve from informal meetings and events, to the construction or remodeling under a new architecture of structures increasingly more formalized. One of the entities that falls and actively responds to these new trends is the European Union’s Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN). The multinational structure of analysis of information is part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and will be dealt with in a separate chapter of this paper.

Keywords: Exchange of information, intelligence, European Union’s Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN), cooperation, European security.

Approaches of security dimension of the European Union and their implications upon intelligence structures

As in 1950s the foundations for the creation of the European single market and the common currency were laid, in 1990s there were discussions about the possibility of creating a single European intelligence agency and different possible architectural structures were proposed in this respect. Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, which established the European Union (EU), to the EU summit in December 1999 in Helsinki, Finland, European leaders stressed more and more often the need for Europe to develop autonomous capabilities for the collection and analysis of information, as a necessary component of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The main problem was identified in what the new structure will have as architecture, not in its existence. Efforts remained at the stage of political debate as a result of certain country-specific obstacles. Some policy makers, for instance, fear that the sovereignty of each state will be reduced; other obstacles are based on collective concerns not to jeopardize the relations with NATO and other obstacles are related to the institutional limitations.

The existence, at least at statement level, of some powerful motivators regarding deepening cooperation in the sense of intelligence cooperation should have led, in time, to developing specific relationships, maintaining however the same principles: decentralization, rapid responsiveness and not overlapping with NATO.

In Europe, the 1990s were characterized by a strong political impetus to strongly develop security cooperation. The Treaty of Maastricht agenda had as main objective the implementation of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP) and the creation of a legal and operational application of an old idea: a
common defense policy. For the latter, however, concrete means of implementation were not specified. Another shortcoming, or as I mentioned above, maybe just because of the fact that it was not reached unanimously, was also the matter that the Treaty did not address within the CFSP the issue of cooperation in the distinct sphere of information exchange.

Several conflicts involving European countries into action along the United States, the Gulf War or the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina, constituted evidence that Europe was totally dependent on information provided by the United States. Communications, information and means of surveillance were key factors supplied by the US. This convinced the European community of the need for autonomous capabilities of collecting information and provided a strong impetus for the development of a common European policy on cooperation in the intelligence community. Although some European governments have stressed again the need for an independent collection of information to support the CFSP at European political level, there was not significant support for the development of a common intelligence agency. Changes to the CFSP in 1997 by the Treaty of Amsterdam, were aimed at increasing the effectiveness of this area and orientation towards pragmatism and results. First of all, the Treaty created the position of High Representative for the CFSP, which has the attribute to assist the Council in the CFSP issue, in particular through the design, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and alternatively through conducting political dialogue with third countries. Now, the well-known missions, Petersburg (humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, crisis management, including peacemaking) are explicitly mentioned in the Treaty as aspects of EU security policy. Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty made references in this respect, thus opening the door to include in the EU the Western European Union (WEU) together with the military and information exchange existing structures. Although the Treaty had many positive contributions to the CFSP, we still cannot speak of a separate provision on exploring new opportunities for cooperation on the information line.

The first important and visible developments were recorded in 1998 and 1999. The first one was after the reunion of the French and British leaders in December 1998, in St. Malo, where an agreement was reached that the EU should have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible forces and the ability to use them whenever it is considered necessary. The statement from St. Malo further specifies that the EU should have analysis capabilities, structures, and relevant strategic planning capacity.

The EU Summit in Portschach, Austria, in October 1998, represented the first time when British Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed the dissolution of the WEU structures and their incorporation into the EU, and the establishment of modern European and flexible forces. This inflection point of British politics preceded next stage for important changes in the European security. Also, EU leaders meeting in Cologne, Germany, in June 1999, agreed in the joint statement on several important provisions related to CFSP and the development of autonomous capabilities for intelligence. The Joint Statement from Cologne strengthened the declaration of St. Malo, and added that the EU military forces should be prepared to intervene when an international crisis requires their presence. However, they should do this without prejudice to NATO’s actions. The document states that the achievement of these objectives requires keeping up a sustained defense effort, and especially common adaptation, capacity of building structures, command and control, and strategic transport. To equip the EU with analysis capability, intelligence structures, and a capacity for relevant strategic planning, leaders participating in the Summit stressed the need for a permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC), an EU Military
Committee to make recommendations to CPS and other bodies such as a Satellite Centre and an Institute for Security Studies. Thus EU leaders agreed on and mentioned in an official document not only the need for increased cooperation regarding the exchange of information, but also the need for institutional development to transform words into action. In similar future events, Helsinki, Finland, in December 1999 and Sintra, Portugal in February 2000, the world witnessed this current ascent on multilateral cooperation in security. Thus, the new vision provided the creation of multinational brigade-sized structures, with adequate naval and air support, by the end of 2003.

The next important milestone in security approaches at EU level was the Lisbon Treaty. In order to improve the consistency of the EU externally, the Common Security and Defence Policy was resized. Structural and organizational innovations aim to achieve closer cooperation among EU states, promoting the visibility and synergy of their actions abroad. Político-military architecture was reformed so that a number of structures (European Union Intelligence Analysis Center, the EU Military Staff) were transferred under the European External Action Service (EEAS). All these changes might seem at first glance simply a bureaucratic reorganization. In reality, the hierarchy, the chain of command and organization were greatly simplified, thereby targeting a significant change of efficiency and effectiveness.

At a broad level, the Lisbon Treaty reflected the demands of a globalizing world, as it extended the areas of security and defense. The treaty abolished the system of pillars established under the Maastricht Treaty, which separates internal security (the third pillar), external security (the second pillar), and the Community decision-making area (first pillar). The previous system based on pillars became obsolete some time ago, given that most of the third pillar migrated to the first, especially after the incidents of September 11, 2001. The line between internal and external security was not well defined and, as a natural tendency over the years, also the areas of application of the three pillars began to be intertwined.

**Cooperation between intelligence structures – necessity or consequence?**

It is widely accepted that the contribution of intelligence services to the world policy has now reached levels that have not been seen so far. Conducting an anti-terrorist action against organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or against a series of asymmetric threats is unthinkable to have taken place without the essential involvement of the intelligence community.

One of the existential reasons in the field of interstate cooperation in information exchange is that there is such a large amount of information that one country alone could not collect it all. We can add here the impossibility caused by objective factors such as geographical, political, cultural diversity, etc. which prevents the access of a single entity to such a large variety of sources. Aiming to overcome the factors listed above, a successful path that European intelligence agencies could take in order to keep up with the evolving needs for information is combining human and technological resources. It should be mentioned that through a joint approach, the financial effort would also be greatly diminished. The intelligence services have adapted to modern threats. They have become larger, more interventionist; they were moved to private entities and, perhaps the most important attribute, was the fact that they accelerated cooperation. We can say that in most cases the circumstances were those that forced this cooperation because cooperation is by natural instinct contrary to what happens in intelligence services. More often than not, the level of cooperation among the national intelligence agencies is a bilateral one. A piece of information becomes useless when the secret of having it cannot be kept.
Since, after a piece of information is distributed to more beneficiaries, it cannot be controlled and the distribution is managed with difficulty, cooperation at multilateral level is rare. The amount of information that is shared depends on its safe management, and the agreements that are made tend to establish guidelines to protect the value of information products. The lack of an integrated approach from all Member States to create a common overview, together with the removal of artificial barriers within the Schengen area, may decrease the effectiveness of national intelligence structures. As Müller-Wille Björn says, “information exchange is a first step towards harmonization of opinions, policy formulation and implementation of security policy, and exploiting potential synergies in the fight against new threats”\(^1\)

The European Union has made visible efforts to develop common approach against illegal immigration, terrorism, cybercrime, organized crime and human trafficking. An integrated structure of information analysis provides the necessary background to carry out these policies in a homogenous manner. Consequently, at national level, many countries responded by creating fusion centers that integrate operational information from multiple sources. Connecting these centers to each other, but also to other structures beyond the traditional ones, could lead to a new relationship on the exchange of information, to be operational, enabling centralized and relatively easy two-way transmission. The evolution of the security environment at the EU borders, weather east or south, has created strong incentives for Member States to start sharing information. First of all, due to the free movement of a single market for capital, goods and services, and the unique currency have reduced the possibility of exercising national control. This measure, that decreased illegal border activity, had to be offset by an exchange of information at a higher level. Secondly, in terms of standardization of concepts, the development of the European common security has led the Member States to integrate aspects of defense planning policy, including those in the sphere of information capabilities. All these led to a visible change in the approaches in European information exchange in Europe; we have seen a gradually increasing cooperation among intelligence agencies, but this is not necessarily an increase in the exchange of information. This assertion is supported by the fact that in reality, cooperation can take many forms, from expert advice, joint activities, or assistance in implementing new procedures. A deeper cooperation, in the shape of a federal structure-like organization, has been repeatedly discussed at EU level, but as often rejected. The ideas were rejected most often by the European countries with more developed intelligence services, and this is not surprising at all, given that maintaining high standards involves significant financial, human or time resources. Müller-Wille presents five main reasons which could be the cause of reluctance\(^2\): (1) lack of trust on the use of information, (2) fear that an increase in European services interoperability information could jeopardize bilateral relations of each country with the US, (3) the unequal involvement of members could lead to parasite relations, (4) the redistribution of influence within the EU members and the loss of some of their privileged positions, (5) the fear that a new type of handling relationships will be adopted. These reasons are completed by the sixth one, mentioned above: the uneven development of the intelligence services of the Member States.

In approaching security developments in the European Union, significant progress has still been noticed. Starting from informal meetings and events, up to debates, it reached increasingly formalized structures. There

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are important multilateral mechanisms which, in time, have taken on increasing importance, such as the Club of Berne, the Club of Budapest, Eurosint Forum and this list is not exhaustive. This happened without becoming European Union formal bodies, but their activities and results were designed to be synchronized with the EU.

**European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN)**

European Union took important steps along its existence as an institution in order to improve security cooperation. Especially regarding the intelligence structures, there have been multiple initiatives to deepen cooperation, but most of them remained at the declarative stage. In the area covered by the subject, we can say that at the joint level, we are currently facing institutional vacuum, the majority being national structures. Regarding the dilemma national structures - European structure, until the year 2010 there were just few serious events that motivated decision makers to change the current existing situation (attacks in Madrid, March 11, 2004, in London, July 7 2005 etc). In the past five years, however, we can say that Europe was under constant security threats which accounted for unit tests and consistency in decision making. We can mention here only two of the most important: the first is the conflict in Ukraine that arose within the Eastern Partnership and the disagreement of the Russian Federation on its objectives, conflict that Europe did not appear at any time to control or even to influence it in any way; the second is the crisis of immigrants from the Middle East, amid a war in Syria and metamorphosis of terrorism through its new front, represented by the Islamic State, phenomena which also could be counteracted, or at least mitigated, still being in its early stages. In these cases, the European leaders also limited themselves to general statements. Both examples have in common the existence of global consequences. In this case we should ask:

are there enough independent national structures, be they with long experience in the field? Or should it, beyond cooperation, institutionalize structures in order to move towards a unitary type structure? This joint structure should not have intervention and resource forces for a real action, because so far everything has been based on national resources or in the best case on bilateral cooperation. As the terrorist phenomenon is global by definition, then the methods to fight it should be similar. As mentioned in the first paragraph, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a number of innovations on Security Policy of the European Union, one of which is the creation of European External Action Service (EEAS) which, under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Policy security also includes capabilities of information. One such structure is the European Union Intelligence Analysis Center (INTCEN EU). The Center can be found in its current form and subordination since January 2011. The mission of this organization is to provide to the High Representative and to the European External Action Service, intelligence analysis regarding international strategic situation awareness in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy. INTCEN also serves as early warning and prevention for the potential beneficiaries about the risks and threats of the areas analyzed. Speaking of beneficiaries, it should be noted that the High Representative and the EEAS are not the only beneficiaries, the Center’s information products can be made available also for EU member states or other political decision-making bodies (the European Commission for example). The means by which the Center obtains its information products and processes is monitoring international events, focusing on areas of responsibility circumscribed to terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other global threats of sensitive geographical areas. Formally, its activity is limited to analysis of information and does not include operations or policy making, due to the
fact that it has not its own information collection capabilities. The center is composed of two divisions: Analysis Division and General and External Relations Division. The Center staff consists of EU officials and national agents, on temporary duty. The Analysis Division is responsible for providing strategic analysis based on information from security and intelligence services of the Member States. It consists of different sections, dealing with geographical topics or thematic basis. General and External Relations Division is in charge of administrative and legal problems, as well as analysis, of open sources. In its turn, this is composed of three sections, dealing respectively with IT problems, internal and external communication as well as the “open source office” responsible for the analysis of open sources.

EU INTCEN history is closely linked to the creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the creation of the post of High Representative in 1999. Initially, it was called Joint Situation Centre and had the only field of open sources. The capacity of crisis management within ESDP missions conducted by both civilians and the military, made clear that there is a necessity for a joint structure for analysis of information. The events of 11 September 2001 and the growing threat of global terrorism also stressed the need for analysis of relevant information, providing accurate and timely operational support to EU policy making. Following the events in New York and Washington, Solana decided to use the existing Joint Situation Centre to begin production-based assessments and classified information. The following year the Centre was passed to the General Secretariat of the Council, directly subordinated to the High Representative. In the same year, personnel belonging to the intelligence services of Member States were brought there, and the Centre turned into an important forum for the exchange of sensitive information between the foreign intelligence services in several states. At that time, the central mission was to contribute to early warning (in collaboration with members of military personnel Council), to monitor and assess the situation of international security, to provide facilities for crisis task force and to work as an operational contact for the High Representative. The Centre had information from public sources, military intelligence, non military information and diplomatic reports. At the request of the High Representative Solana, the EU Council approved in June 2004 to establish a Counter Terrorist Cell within SITCEN. This cell was assigned to produce informative analysis and strategic assessments of terrorist threats in the field of counter-terrorism with the support of the security services of the Member States. This decision was implemented in 2005 when within the EU SITCEN a team of experts was constituted seconded from Member States’ security services. Also the year 2005 constitutes the start and the widespread use of the name of the EU SITCEN, until 2012 when it was officially renamed EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN). Most missions were maintained, but they were updated in accordance with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the European Security Strategy review. In 2007 the Center strengthened collaboration with the EU Military Staff (EUMS) through a functional agreement, the so-called Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC). All information ratings issued to the Member States are common products prepared under the SIAC. The Moving Center initially subordinated to the Secretariat Council under the European External Action Service in 2011 after the Treaty of Lisbon, had a major influence on its power to engage in intelligence gathering. Earlier, the Centre had no formal authority needed to request EU delegations around the world to collect specific information on its behalf. Now, through the EEAS, it has that power. Because the whole area of foreign policy merged into a single hierarchy under the High Representative, the EU INTCEN’s role has become more coherent.
Conclusion

There are numerous contextual developments that are important in the establishment of relations within the intelligence community at EU level that transcend the simplistic arguments about certain preferences of Member States. Most of them derive from globalization, which gained speed and superior quality in recent decades. The revolution of technology and the explosion of information have transformed the need for exchange of information in real time in a primary need. This approach is particularly conducive to timely detection and response to security threats, a concept that evolved from the national to the community level. European Union member states have used the operative exchange of information to support the decision making since the 70s, even if in a more ad hoc basis, not institutionalized, or bilaterally. In the late 1990s this started to be institutionalized. Since 1998 the EU Member States were in a position to approve the creation of common security and defense policy without having instead a structure through which to share information relating to future missions and operations. Subsequently, the crisis management capacity within ESDP and the deployment of civilian and military missions made it clear that a larger structure is needed for data analysis. The context of globalization was an argument for strengthening an intelligence community that could actively be intertwined, to shape a European information space. In recent years, changes in the security environment in the immediate vicinity of the European Union have created visible effects on Union security and plausible premises for member countries to engage actively in deepening cooperation in the exchange of information. Because states cope more often with the same internal and external threats, security policies should be developed in a common and coherent manner. After the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London there has been a gradual increase in the field of cooperation between intelligence agencies. Also, there were often discussions about the possibility of creating federal information structures. The latest proposal of this kind came late last year from some MEPs, after in 2013 the former Justice Commissioner Viviane Regling, promoted it in a statement to a Greek newspaper: „I would therefore wish to use this occasion to negotiate an agreement on stronger secret service cooperation among the EU member states - so that we can speak with a strong common voice to the US. The NSA needs a counterweight. My long-term proposal would therefore be to set up a European Intelligence Service by 2020."

This proposal was a mirror of the measure taken by the United States after the attacks of 11 September 2001, to create an early warning steering in connection with terrorist threats, dedicated exclusively to the President. Just like in previous cases, however, at European level this idea was rejected. The most reluctant countries were those with a long history of intelligence services, in part because of concerns that this could erode their bilateral relations with the United States and on the other hand due to concerns about the inability of such a structure to maintain the security of the information shared. Also, as a general feature, each service thinks their analytical results are superior to any other products derived from outside. This attitude creates consequential negative approaches on cooperation, because there is no identifiable added value. Another obstacle to cooperation is of institutional type, represented by structures and EU decision-making inertia. The field of intelligence is

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4 President Bush authorized the creation of a separate department for fighting terrorism, namely the National Intelligence Directorate serving as the President's principal informant security issues, according to http://www.revista22.ro/uniunea-europeana-nu-intentioneaza-sa-infintee-un-serviciu-secret-la-nivel-european-52147.html, consulted on 11.09.2015.
characterized by attributes such as the surprising, the unknown, the unexpected, the unforeseen, attributes that do not always blend perfectly with diplomatic relations which often are cumbersome and time consuming.

Following the Lisbon Treaty, the EU structures have been resized and the control architecture rethought, in order to create new opportunities to extend the performance and capabilities. Repositioning under the EEAS confers to EU INTCEN a simplified command structure in support of a single foreign policy hierarchy. The High Representative has the authority to send analysts immediately to the places where a crisis occurs, to collect information on the spot shortly after its commencement. In a general way, it is clear that an institution such as the European Union Intelligence Analysis Center is a link between internal and external security of the European Union and between military and non-military actions. The comprehensive approach of the EU security, which emphasizes the need for civilian and military instruments as well as a European security strategy, to give the exact delineation of security in the internal or external field, stresses the need at the level of EU of an institution that has the capacity to think with one single brain and to speak with one single voice. Contrary to this paradigm, in early 2015 through the voice of the European Commission the same idea previously promoted was reissued, that efforts will be limited just to improve cooperation among national services and between EU INTCEN and other structures in the field, not to create a single European Union intelligence service.

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THE EVOLUTION OF OPERATION APPROACHES ACCORDING TO SECURITY THREATS AGAINST NATO MEMBERS

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Abstract: In the current geopolitical and military climate, modern approaches to military operations have been confirmed by recent NATO summits in Britain and Portugal. We are talking about a “comprehensive approach”, the military phrase introduced in the Romanian glossary of terms as “abordare cuprinzătoare”, term that actually describes a modern approach to effects-based operations. This approach influences the mindset of military planners, based on a deep understanding of the operational environment in order to propose a concept of operation covering operational design elements, to produce the desired effects necessary for successful operations.

Keywords: operations, operational planning process, comprehensive approach, operational design.

The Cold War (1947-1991), a weird phenomenon of the 20th century, in which a conflict began without a statement of war ended without signing a peace treaty, which originate from the weirdness of the Second World War. It was an open conflict, nonmilitary and limited, causing the arms race, which took place after the Second World War between the USSR and their allies (The Oriental Block) and the U.S.A. and their allies (The Occidental Block). At a political-military level, there was a confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact parties.

The NATO alliance has known a different rhythm of evolution after the 1990s, a new horizon of complexity being born, in order to respond to the new dimensions of the international security environment, in which the security threats diversified and multiplied with an increase in the area spread and content.

The variety and the fast evolution of the international security environment have accelerated the rhythm of development of the North Atlantic Organization. In accordance, NATO has expanded its area of interest, diversifying its agenda with different types of threats and geographical locations. The North Atlantic Alliance has redefined its missions and objectives in order to adapt to the new security environment, through the expansion of the alliance’s borders and also through the creation of a stability environment between the alliance members.

Consequently, NATO has suffered a complex process of evolution, influenced by the new forms of security risks which led to the alteration of NATO’s structure, number of members and the types of response necessary to answer to the new security risks.

As the area of operations of the Alliance grew towards further away regions, from which the new types of security threats originated, the Alliance members involved themselves, gradually, in areas with different political-economic and social components. NATO has gone to a new and strict way to handle crisis management, anticipation of conflicts, peace support operations, disaster response, civil protection, humanitarian aid, institutional consulting, etc.

Through the diversification of risk and widening of the area of operations the actions changed from the traditional military procedures towards social and economic actions, working along international organizations with various domains of activity. The Alliance has evolved in this manner, reaching from a
military trademark to actions comprising non-military elements, like the security of civilian infrastructure, consultancy offered to international structures for their support offered in the areas of operation in which they act simultaneous.

The transformation of the security environment in the 1990s showed that Euro-Atlantic peace and stability cannot be kept only through the action of the alliance members; therefore the need of a dialogue between the alliance and the states in their nearby vicinity has emerged. In this notion, certain partnerships of NATO with countries in areas of interest for the Alliance (ex-soviet sphere or the Mediterranean zone) were born, so as, through common actions and dialogue in the defense and security domains, to build the premises for a peaceful and stable security environment.

The evolutions in the last decade of the 20th century demonstrated that the Alliance understood the complexity of the security environment. From this fact, we can conclude that there is a need to create, consolidate and expand the network of partnerships, this being a side of the NATO’s transformation process. The evolution of the Euro-Atlantic partnership proves that the transformations suffered by the security environment have been reflected in the changes made in the alliance.

The cooperation relationships of the Alliance with partners from the area of interest after the 1990s have known a dynamic increase. The cooperation has focused development on two main topics, one of political nature, materialized from the year 1997 with the founding of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council - EAPC1, and the other topic, sustained between NATO and other interested partner states, made possible by the Partnership for Peace – PfP2, created in 1994 in Bruxelles. The two main topics, with different functions but complementary, were certified through the decision made in the Prague Summit in 2002, when the two main topics were reunited under the concept of Euro-Atlantic Partnership.

Partnership for Peace’s goal is to support the development of modern democratic and efficient defense institutions and to improve the capacity of NATO members and partners to participate in joint operations in order to minimize the risks addressed to security, peace consolidation and international stability. PfP main idea consists in development of a practical cooperation establishment in harmonization with the needs of the alliance’s partners.

Security represents a basic condition for the founding of democracy, resulted from the social agreement which mandates the Alliance to protect and promote the member states’ interests. At the same time, security represents an essential goal, assuming the obligation to watch over the security climates of each NATO member.

The Alliance security concept is expanding continuously, including, besides the traditional military component, those of economic, diplomatic, ethnic, religious and ecological nature. Therefore, we can state that, in the international environment, with some exceptions, there is a minimal risk of military warfare, whereas there is an increased level of risk, threats and vulnerabilities towards the security environment of asymmetric nature.

The new threats addressed to NATO demand a proper approach to

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1 NATO Summit in 1997 (Sintra) consented to the setting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which precedes the older forms of the North-Atlantic Cooperation Council, created in 1991. In the 1997 Summit, the Base document EAPC was put together in which there are mentioned the principles, values, structure, substance and eligibility in order to become a member of EAPC.

2 At 1994 NATO Summit (Bruxelles) the Basic document of the Peace Partnership was adopted, reflecting the principles, values and objectives of the PfP.
planning operations though they cannot have a major impact upon the nation security. We have to take into account the evolution of weapons of mass-destruction, technologies, nuclear materials, expansion of international terrorism, development of munitions, lethal non-conventional weapons, cyber-attacks, expansion of organized crime, high number of immigrants, natural environment degradation, natural disasters and other non-conventional risks addressed towards the security environment.

The changes in the strategic security plan are defined by major events harder than ever to predict and escalation of tensions, provocations, and risks which lead to conflicts. These facts represent essential elements that political analysts and military personnel take into consideration when bearing in mind different strategies of defense and security, which have an important role in the future decision upon the forthcoming conflicts.

For Romania, all these procedures, to which we can add the geopolitical context, represent different strategic opportunities, empowered by NATO membership, involvement in the economic, political, cultural and security environment of the European Union, the strategic partnership with the USA, increased implication in the security and stability environment in the Black Sea region and the high level of interoperability between the Romanian defense structures and other similar structures from NATO European Union members.

The risks and threats to the national security of our country are taken into consideration from NATO and EU membership point of view. Although the danger level of a classic warfare or other conventional military threats is minimal, Romania cannot afford not to take into consideration these types of security risks. Not taking into consideration these types of threats would be a vulnerable point to our own security environment and the quick-response capacity we assumed in international agreements.

Within ”Romanian National Defense Strategy” we can identify some fundamental aspects that our state consider a priority for national security but also for global security. In this paper, we can find the new strategy of security “focused, as an ultimate goal towards guaranteeing individual security, good life and family.”

The national security strategy embodies an important number of “… decisions, plans, measures and actions meant to prevent and oppose effectively risks and threats that jeopardize the values and national interest, also the values that identify and unite the European construction idea.”

In the last decade, the military structures undertook a long process of reforms, development and restructuring with the final purpose of having credible and effective military capabilities, which could respond to the major alterations of the international security environment and to assure the completion of the request imposed by NATO and the EU.

One of the highest security risks that threaten world peace, stability and order is considered to be terrorism, in any of its many shapes.

The beginning of contemporary terrorism coincided with the Second World War, with the Nazi propaganda through the support offered towards different nationalist organizations throughout the Western European continent, the idea of the colonial empires resurfacing, constant clashes throughout South-East Asia and the constant Americano-Soviet conflict. From that moment on, the struggle intensified continuously and expanded throughout the world, however keeping the same traits.

Terrorist groups acted in the 1970s with different forms of harassment actions, without any visible result, but with the

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3 Romanian National Defense Strategy, Bucharest 2007
4 Ibidem, p.3
purpose to capture international attention, which had not been fully informed in this respect by the mass-media until then.

Terrorism acted, from the beginning, with four types of endeavors, such as: high value targets kidnappings in order to claim rewards and often they requested the liberation of known terrorists; airplanes hijackings usually followed by the same requests; bank robbing in order to support armed groups; attacking and destroying buildings or other symbols of terrorists’ choice at the time.

To all these terrorist attacks, we can add the actions meant to influence the international public opinion, such as publicly demanding their requests through radio and television stations with the intention to spread fear, not only to scare the victim, but also to frighten the international community. Terrorism can be defined as a psychological act, being put in practice in order to obtain, through mass-media, a powerful reaction of panic from its audience. The concept of audience automatically means public exposure. Public audience depends on the means of communication in order to be informed. Their relationship with terrorism is a special one, as often it was stated that: “Without the media, terrorism would not exist”.

The impact caused by the terrorist attacks in 11 September 2001 dramatically reminded the whole world the threat posed by terrorism, which had slowly become neglected and minimized. The states which pretend to be the guarantee of human rights have undertaken new approaches towards this threat which were soon assimilated by all the international community. The NATO strategy initiated in the year 2002 asserted the necessity of international cooperation in the anti-terrorist domain, having a good understanding upon the way it manifests and how we can counter it.

In May 2000, in Manchester, Great Britain, a book was found in an apartment rented by an Al-Qaeda member which proved to be essential evidence in the trial against the terrorist accused of terrorist attacks which took place at the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book was addressed to those who unconditionally fought in the name of justice and wrote messages with their blood and suffering. “Confrontation with the non-believers regimes, which we consider natural, has nothing to do with philosophic debates. They know only to use bullets in order to accomplish their ideals through terrorist attacks, bombardments, and destruction through diplomacy with cannons and machine guns”.

The security environment was influenced by the following factors: a fast pace in the globalization process and regional integration, founding of new organisms of security, safe, predictable climate accompanied by anarchic episodes in some regions, states trying to achieve further influence in international relations, simultaneously with the growing influence of the non-state participants in the international relations dynamics.

The proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction also represents a major risk in the evolution of the way operational planning is carried out. Banning weapons of mass-destruction, mainly nuclear weapons, is necessary because there is the threat that these weapons may fall into the hands of totalitarian regimes or terrorist groups; if this happened, it would be a major and difficult threat to deal with.

As non-official data show, the situation now is significantly more dangerous than it was at the time of the Cold War. Consequently, the Non-proliferation Treaty allows only the five states which tested a nuclear weapon before 1967 to be recognized as nuclear powers. For the others it is forbidden to build military weapons, but they are permitted to have nuclear technology, which is an uncontestable right. Basically,
India, Pakistan and Israel, are three states which did not sign the treaty, but achieved the status of nuclear powers. The same context can appear in the case of other states which could withdraw from the treaty, such as North Korea.

Violent or even not so violent conflicts which are at present at the border jeopardize national security. Conflicts, no matter their type, always result in the loss of human lives, ruined buildings, threats to minorities, violation of the rights and basic liberties of a person. The conflict may escalate to extremism, terrorism or government failure. This leads to diverse opportunities for criminal organizations. Regional insecurity may cause an increase in the demand of weapons of mass-destruction. The most practical way of dealing with the new threats is similar with the ways used to deal with older regional conflicts.

Cross-border criminal activities, guns trafficking, drugs and persons smuggling are posing new security risks which persist and will negatively influence the international security environment in spite of all the measures taken by the state members and the whole international security environment. Alongside other illegal activities, such as: money laundering, smuggling, hacking banks and companies databases with the purpose of stealing money, they are often associated with terrorism.

These types of threats and hazards cannot be analyzed individually and the boundary between them is very confusing, creating high risks for interconnectivity and interdependency. So, a preventive action of effective results leads towards an enlarged and integrated approach in the internal and external space. As the boundary between the two dimensions has become less clear, these events became a source of risks and vulnerabilities.

A risk with a huge potential, developed simultaneously with the evolution of cyber technology, is considered to be the cyber-attacks. These attacks have proven to be hard to control and avoid, because of the complex dimension in which they are carried out.

At an international level, cyber-attacks directed towards cyber systems represent a phenomenon which has been on a rise in the last few years. The attacks have often been associated with certain events which had an impact upon nations, communities and society groups, becoming sometimes the mirror of the current conflicts in a virtual environment.

In this general context, the beginning of the year 2015 was marked by the increasing terrorist phenomena in Europe, which generated at an international level a raise in the number of cyber-attacks, being motivated by extremist ideologies, through which the authors manifest they adherence to Islamism.

All the threats posed by these security risks meant to jeopardize the safety and security of the NATO members, led in the last two decades towards a new approach of handling and planning military operations, with effective objectives meant to minimize the effects. So, in a strategic plan, NATO understood that ideas regarding the nature, causes, triggers, developments and finality of wars have evolved and, with them, so did human society. Thus, nowadays, warfare has turned into an asymmetric and hybrid type of warfare, which can be defined as “a conflict being conducted by one party with military conventional means, and also with non-conventional military means or non-military means at all, simultaneously.”

Even if one of the three peace support operation of the Alliance was undertaken in Europe, the tendency towards a more stable environment at a global level is well-known. NATO governments have admitted this problematic issue at the 2002 reunion in Reykjavik in Island, when they stated that

“For fulfilling its entire specter of missions, NATO has to be capable to send in the field of battle units which have a high-readiness status and can be deployed wherever they are needed, and sustain their effort over great distances to fulfill their objectives.” This decision has opened the way to deploying NATO troops outside its boundaries, ending up in Afghanistan.

Beside the peace support missions, the Alliance is getting more and more involved in humanitarian aid missions, after the founding of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Center in 1998. This structure plays an important role in the elimination of the hazards provoked by natural disasters or industrial incidents caused on the territory of one or more NATO members.

In order to have effective deployment, outside NATO borders, the Alliance has adopted some measure making sure that NATO is adequately equipped to carry out a different spectrum of operations which included modern military missions. This initiative is tied to capabilities which determined allies to undertake improvements necessary in strategic aerial and sea transportation, imposing the creation of NRF (NATO Response Force), which allows the Alliance to respond in due time in case of crisis. At the same time, it offers flexibility to military NATO command structures, through the creation of the Allied Operations Headquarters, in order to make it more dynamic and easier to support in the context of the 21st century and also with the founding of the General Headquarters Department for Operations of NATO.

In time, NATO has become more and more operational, as on the Alliance’s agenda new aspects are included. Therefore, NATO has to become a more political organization and needs to build tight relationships with the allied countries and relevant international organization which agree to the same way of thinking. The Alliance has improved directives and planning processes and troop regeneration, in order to be able to uphold their agreements which they will undertake. Regarding the theatres of operations, NATO approaches the problem referring to the restrictions imposed in using the allied forces equipment and also the problem of ensuring information quality. The allies have to decide if, in what way, and when, to get involved, taking into consideration that the request in these types of operations in which NATO specializes has intensified demands.

Starting with the first peace-support operation initiated by NATO, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the participating allied armies joined the forces of other partner states. Also, the Alliance built collaboration relationships with some international organizations such as the European Union, Security and Cooperation Organization in Europe and United States Organizations. To this date, partner states which participate with forces to allied operations are from Europe. The geographical area of NATO operations is expanding and it will be more and more important to tie up partnerships with other countries which subscribe to similar type of aspirations, such as Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand. This complex political-military process is part of the improvement plan of operational planning.

The evolution of operational planning and force generations is vital for the minimization and prevention of risks which threaten the Alliance. To this purpose, the governments of the allied states reached an agreement in December 2005 inside the General Political Directive, considering the standardization of the numerous disciplines included in the development and implementation of the force’s capabilities.

As NATO is developing operational experience, member stats started diminishing their reserve or restrictions towards the way of their contributions to operations. This approach
consists in denying the engagement of troops and equipment, such as group control. The effect of these prohibitions is to complicate the operational commander’s tasks who needs to substitute with other forces and capabilities. This way, the situation is improving, and the states are minimizing the imposed limitations as they realized the operational complexity.

A problem identified in the Alliance was the one connected to the use of troops and the importance of quality information, after the resurfacing of violence in Kosovo in March 2004. This event took the Alliance by surprise, and the imposed limitations delayed an instant reaction. Alongside the need for quality information, the rapid reaction in a case of events was even bigger in Afghanistan, when the NATO forces were dislocated in isolated areas.

Soon, the pressure upon NATO to assume more responsibilities for more operations will probably increase, the Alliance being a victim of its own success. Nonetheless, there are limits to what NATO can do, which leads towards a risk for the Alliance that may translate in NATO spreading its forces and capabilities too much. NATO has the capacity to transform what is limited regarding the political willpower and continuously diminished resources in a real international action, when allies decide over the need to get involved, even if the role of NATO is not to be an international sentinel or a humanitarian aid and it is not an alternative to UN.

After the start of the political-military evaluation, the military operational planning is initiated at all decisional levels. This fact imposed the implementation of standard procedures for each specific level, creating different connections between actions, effects, objectives and the end state, as well as correlation with planning at political, civil and economic levels. The planning process has to include, in all domains, all the opportunities of interaction and collaboration.

A clear image of the effects leads towards action concentration, towards the completion of objectives, so as to achieve the final desired goal. The actions have the role to create effects which determines changes at the capability level, behavior status and the attitude of the actors in a strategic environment.

Operational planning has the purpose to increase the coordination capacity and synchronization of actions, through the use of various assets in the engagement space. This process determines movements at a political level and keeps developing, simultaneously and cyclically at all levels, in order to obtain the final goal. For the accomplishment of a coherent and optimal planning process there appears a need to early identify the organization which the alliance can relate with. The creation of a database and the evaluation in the operational planning process need to be undertaken in a continuous and active manner.

Another important function implied in the planning process is known as Knowledge Development – “Data integration into a mix of information and connections” which use the system studies and the recognition of different forms of the strategic environment with the intent of accomplishing the behavior pattern and the capabilities status of the main actors, the connections between them in the area of engagement, in order to make fundamental

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7 Political-military, strategic, operational and tactical level
8 It is necessary that national/international organization and non-governmental organization which desire and are capable to interact, and reach formal agreements established between the military and these organizations
9 The evaluation covers a wide area. Evaluation at a theatre level of action and effects its integrated in the general evaluation at a strategic level in an engagement are which includes the progress obtained in the fulfillment of the non-military conditions which comes in the completion of the strategical military plan.
decision in the planning process. The process of creating a database is endless, flexible, and included in a network, depending on system analysis. This relies on human resources and the proper use of information, for a better understanding and acknowledgement of the situation, at all levels, during planning, execution and evaluation. This means making use of a common database for all levels, which can be accessed for informative and documentation purposes.

This process differs from the classic one, which is anchored in military issues, through the fact that the approach of the area of engagement is seen as a system of systems and the systems components (political, cultural, economic, religious, etc).

From a military point of view, the concepts are based upon a continuous evaluation, which needs good reasons for applying adjustments. The evaluation function of the engagement approach needs permanent supervision and analysis of the actions carried out in the area of engagement and their effects upon it. The progress of operations, effects elaboration, and goal fulfillment lead towards reaching the desired end state which is continuously evaluated through cyclical action. The evaluation has an estimative role upon the current situation and tendencies and provides feedback for the planning process. The process is executed at all levels and the interrogation of these data can be a non-military capability, to underline the need for interaction and cooperation between the assets and the most important actors.

The most recent military operations of the Alliance have proven that there is an increasing need of a close cooperation and a proper approach between the international actors, more in the present than in the past, in order to maintain the global climate of peace and security. This approach implies cooperation between main actors and common actions of the international organizations, non-governmental organizations and agencies in joint operations. The implementation of any plan of approach requires from the main actors a concentrated effort, based on common-sense, of responsibility, transparency and determination. In order to maximize the ability to act in this context, the Alliance desires to improve its response capacity and crisis management with which they are confronting, and to improve cooperation at all levels with foreign actors including the support for stability and reconstruction.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM

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Abstract: Human resources are one of the main pillars of health care. Their correct management is essential in assuring a high quality health system. A better management of human resources in the health domain and the development of new health policies are absolutely necessary in the future. Also, efficient strategies of managing human resources are extremely necessary for obtaining effective results and facilitating access to medical assistance, which is known to be a universal human right and is vital for saving lives. In this paper we will try to analyze the present situation of the human resources needed for the military health system and the problems they confront in order to show their importance in the military health system.

Keywords: efficient, effective, military health system, health policies, medical assistance, management.

Introduction

The human resource is the most important resource that belongs to an organization. For this reason it is considered essential to a successful organization and especially to a medical one, knowing its importance in providing medical care.

A motivated and highly qualified human resource is a basic element necessary for the provision of quality health services for all the needs and expectations of patients.

Without a good team of professionals working in the Human Resources Department, no organization can build performance. The key functions of the Human Resources team include recruitment of staff, their training, performance evaluations, employee motivation and communication in the workplace, workplace security, and much more.

Any organization without a proper setup of human resources will suffer serious problems in the management of its usual activities. For this reason, nowadays, companies must make efforts and consume energy to create a management of strong and effective human resources.

The concept of human resources

The human resources concept first appeared in the ‘80s and developed in the UK and USA, providing a new image on staff. This new approach was centered on people and emphasized that staff is the most important resource or at least as important as the financial and material resources. Experts in the field believe that of all health resources, the human resources play the most important role.

In the health sector, the role that stuff has is more important than in other sectors. Human resources management aims to ensure a sufficient stuff with certain qualities and appropriate professional training for effective and efficient use of resources. As stated above, in the health field it is undeniable that human resources are strategic components of the health system.

The most important aspect for obtaining performances in the health field is the quality of human resource management and the exercise of certain functions: human resource planning, job analysis, staff training and development, staff management, staff performance evaluation, motivating staff. In Romania, it has been admitted that human resource management was not a priority, its
functions are not exercised correctly and consistently, and some of them are missing.

This has led to a crisis of human resources in the health system. Romania is ranked last in the EU in terms of the number of medical staff per number of population: doctors, dentists, nurses or pharmacists. The lack of interest and appropriate human resources policies in health, and the health system in Romania lead to a precarious situation and the results have an impact on population health. Health is a system that works long on long term. Knowing the chronic deficiencies of the health system and the difficulty to provide adequately for these needs, several aspects must be considered. In order to discuss a possible health system performance in Romania measures and reforms are required in the management of human resources and problems arising from its analysis.¹

**Management of human resources in the health field**

In several health care systems worldwide, there is increased attention on human resource management (HRM). Specifically, human resources is one of the three main entrances to the health system, the other two main entrances being the financial and material capital.

Many general human resources issues are seen in healthcare assistance systems examination in a global context. Some of the issues of greatest importance include the size, composition and distribution of the health workforce, workforce training, migration of health workers, and the country’s level of economic development, demographic development, geographical and cultural factors.


The overall objective is to promote a modern human resource management in the health system which ensures a high quality of healthcare, a high degree of satisfaction of beneficiaries and health service providers, fair conditions of professional growth.

The specific objectives are the following:

a) modernizing human resource service from healthcare professionals institutions

b) professional performance of medics

c) satisfaction of the beneficiaries and health service providers is equitable condition of professional growth

To further promote the attractiveness of the medical profession, it is necessary to design and implement a concept to promote sustainable prestige of the medical profession and professional orientation of young people to the medical professions, to operate continuously and to include all forms information transmission to potential candidates for training in the medical domain.

For planning justified human resources in the health system, approval is required at the state level of principles and criteria for strategic planning on scientific principles, based on a balanced correlation between the supply of general education, the ability of educational institutions, evolution in demographic indicators and the needs of perspective of the health system which ensures appropriate conditions for the full integration of young professionals and offers it their necessary conditions for activity and professional growth.

Appropriate and diversified training by performing staff for the healthcare system will be achieved through continuous modernization of the training process, implementation of contemporary educational technologies, its adjustment to current needs and the perspective of the health system, wider integration of the curative-prophylactic training processes
and updating the regulatory framework to provide more framing opportunities in doctors’ work.

In order to adapt the continuous medical education and postgraduate training in specialties that correspond to the needs of the health system and to the recommendations of European and international bodies in this field, it is necessary to adopt regulatory frameworks based on the provisions of EU directives in this respect, including the adoption of a new Nomenclature of specializations for life-long training of doctors, which provide for the recognition in time of qualifications in the European region as well as academic and workforce mobility in the health system.

For the rational use of available human resources in the currently limited economic, financial and organizational conditions, it is necessary to direct them in particular towards the optimization and efficiency of their use as a single cost-effective solution to improve the situation in the respective area, because currently, the major problem of the health system regarding human resources is not so much a lack of staff, as it is particularly the inefficient way of using them. The attraction and return in the health system of doctors who are currently working in other fields of national economy is a further cost-efficient and secure source to increase the density of health workers able to contribute to covering the needs of the health system.

The importance of human resources in public health organizations

Health systems play a central role in modern societies, helping people to maintain and improve their health. In the last decade, all European health systems faced various difficulties:

- rising costs of medical care;
- aging population and consequent rise in chronic diseases generating increased demand for health care;
- unequal distribution of health services and the lack of medics;
- inequalities in the access to specialized medical assistance.

The future of EU Member States’ ability to provide high quality healthcare to the entire population will depend on their health systems which must be robust and able to cope with future challenges while remaining efficient and fiscally sustainable.

Human resources are the ones leading the health domain reform initiatives, are a key element of these initiatives, and the main competitive advantage of the possessors of health services.

So far, there have been various initiatives in the reform of human resources field in an attempt to increase its efficiency. Outsourcing was one of the initiatives used to convert fixed labor costs by the variable costs as a means of improving efficiency.

In order to attempt improving service quality and patient satisfaction a reform of human resources is necessary in the healthcare domain. Healthcare quality is generally defined in two ways: technical quality and socio-cultural quality. Technical quality refers to the impact that available health services have on the health conditions of the population. Socio-cultural quality is the one that measures the level of acceptability of service and the capacity to satisfy patients’ expectations.
The human resource is a current and urgent subject of high importance, because Romania is in the process of European integration and health is a priority worldwide. Experts in the field believe that the health sector is one of the most complex and dynamic sectors of the economy. This area has suffered many changes and is still in a process of development and innovation in response to a whole category of forces: changing social patterns, public policy, new technology and consumer demand.

An important aspect relates to the fact that now the quality of life and life expectancy have increased worldwide due to the doubling in the last 30 years of the volume of health spending in most developed countries. In the developed countries of the European Union health spending reached an important level as a percentage of GDP, the tendencies to maintain the high funds allocated to this sector. The European Union has invested and continues to invest in the health system, and is involved in supporting and developing health policy at the highest levels through a comprehensive analysis of health systems in Europe. The factors underlying the analysis of health care systems are tied to countries’ legislative framework, political decisions and trends in health system reforms.

In the field of public health management it is necessary to develop and train effective partnerships to provide new experience for professional development in public health. They are required to plan, organize and implement health policies in time. Because of these implications public health policies are needed, emphasizing human resource funding mechanisms, models of care, facilitating and regulating procurement systems.

The current crisis of human resources for health revealed the presence of differences in skills of public-private distribution, professional migration, poor working environments and lack of experience in planning, policy development and programming that affect the workforce in health systems world. In this context, reform processes in the health sector need to focus mainly on increasing productivity, performance evaluation, implementation of stimulating systems and hiring new staff resources. However, issues such as unequal distribution of human resources, the concentration of specialists and high complexity services, professional migration remain areas that require national regulations.

Human resources policies to ensure sustainable health system in Romania

A well-trained and motivated staff is an essential condition to ensure quality health services. Unfortunately, in the last decade, the trend of migration of health personnel increased. Better working conditions, better payment and professional recognition were the main temptations that favored this workforce migration.

According to the National Health Strategy 2014-2020, "the health domain human resource sustainability can be ensured by retaining policies aimed at providing financial incentives and improving prospects for professional development of medical staff". Moreover, incentives are proposed for staff working in disadvantaged areas or lacking in certain specialties.

The Military Health System in Romania

The Medical Directorate is a central body of the Ministry of Defense which develops a unitary concept of organizing, equipping and operating for the healthcare system in the army in peacetime, in crisis situations or war, and for the improvement and further modernization of health care

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activities in order to prevent diseases, preserve and improve the health status required to permanently maintain a high combat capabilities of military personnel.

This ensures the achievement of the partnership and develops operational and administrative military standards based on standardization agreements and Allied Publications in medico-military interoperability connecting the Romanian Armed Forces with NATO military structures.

The specific activity of the Medical Directorate is to cooperate with the structures of military leadership, the Ministry of Public Health, the Health Insurance House of Defense, Public Order, National Safety and Legal Authority, Ministry of Administration and Interior but also with civil authorities with responsibilities in healthcare and pharmaceutical sanitary work.

The Medical Directorate’s area of responsibility includes the following components:

1. Operational health insurance, part of the logistics forces, meaning all activities of healthcare, medical evacuation and logistical support of the medical staff, according to operational requirements while carrying out missions in the theaters of operations.
2. Preventive and curative health care which is achieved by:
   - ambulatory care facilities;
   - primary health care facilities;
   - hospital medical assistance;
   - dental care.
3. Insurance of pharmaceutical and medical logistical support to medical structures operational with: drugs, medical and pharmaceutical supplies, medical devices, falling under the competence of specialized structures of the Medical Directorate, according to current legal regulations being fully funded by the state budget.

4. Recovery healthcare, seeking to restore the health of military and civilian personnel of the army and provided by specialized medical units of the Ministry of National Defense.
5. Military medical expertise, an integrated and multidisciplinary medical activity comprising:
   - medical-military expertise in the selection of people opting for a military career;
   - medical-military personnel Ministry of Defense, part of the health assessment;
6. State sanitary inspection, a specific prophylactic activity, specialized and fully financed from the state budget;
7. Military medical scientific research with the following objectives:
   - specific and nonspecific medical protection of militaries and the civilian population against the effects of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN);
   - Protection of soldiers against the effects of prolonged physical and psychological stress.
8. Development of pharmaceutical products for the treatment and prophylaxis of diseases caused by CBRN agents through specialized production units, subordinated of the Medical Directorate and/or in cooperation with other specialized units.
9. Military medical education and human resource management are essential elements in training the medical and military staff qualified and able to perform specific tasks.

On the battlefield, the military health system elements come together to make the difference between life and death. Professionals belonging to the land forces, air force and naval forces are ready to deploy anywhere in the world and medical professionals are also ready to accompany them. For this there should be a military force with expertise in health care to cope with any challenge.

However, the military health system is a complex system that sums up:

- health care;
- medical education;
- public health;
- private sector partnerships;
- medical research and development.

**Conclusion**

Good health is an asset and a true source of economic and social stability. This is a key factor for reducing poverty, an element that contributes to sustainable development, every citizen having to benefit. Most important is the fact that indicators of good health are no longer the result of a single sector: sustainable improvement of population health respecting the principle of social equity is actually a product of effective policies promoted at all levels of government and some collaborative efforts submitted by all segments of society.

Unfortunately, approaches concerning the efficiency and effectiveness of health domain have often been detrimental. Unlike the medical work in the private sector, in the public sector the focus is more on the coverage of demands and less on the use of resources.

The current crises in Ukraine and in the Middle East remind us that it is necessary to keep an increased interest maintaining investment in military equipment and health and also in personnel training. Our main idea must be that, despite the limited economic resources available for defense, they are not irreconcilable requirements. To satisfy them, we must rethink how fundamentally important healthcare is, given its impact on the defense budget. Medical assistance should be seen as an important component of national security.

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4. Strategia Naţională de Sănătate 2014-2020

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND THE URBAN SETTLEMENTS

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Abstract: The tendency for military operations to develop within cities has grown, as a result of the pressure coming from urbanization and the consequences on environmental degradation. Within the urban area conditions, it is difficult to establish the difference between a civil belonging and the military objectives. In this respect, the concern for the smart cities, as innovative human establishments, became more and more interesting during the last years, passing from the academic concerns to the integration in the governments’ planning or to the worldwide IT corporations’ projects. Spatial planning of the aims meant for the Defense System is vital and to be in agreement with ecological, technological and social principles specific to the smart city. Understanding the impact of the presence of the military objectives upon the cities’ development, along with providing the premises for optimizing the common using of the urban area, by all categories of users, military or civil ones, is going to be the foundation for a theoretical framework of analysis for the possibility of a further layout of the objectives designated to the defense within the smart cities.

Keywords: military objectives, smart city, spatial planning, urban security, localizing.

Introduction

The historical evolution of the human presence in the territory has been manifested by generating a specific habitat and by creating human settlements related to the technological possibilities of every age. Talking about the development of the human settlements, there are several theories that try to explain how they emerged over time. Whether they refer to the geo-climatic conditions, to the defense needs, the religious and economic elements and the legislative decisions, the settlements were established based on the need of dwelling under various conditions. Increasingly present throughout time, the main form of living in the spatial organization frame has become the city. Along with the specialization of the dwelling environment the military, monastic or industrial cities have emerged. The desire of the leaders and planners to create ideal cities was manifested in the Renaissance by expressing perfect geometric shapes in diagrams of iconographic significance. The peculiarities of a certain function of the city have also led to spatial segregation, manifested through a visible territorial limit. Today, the physical limits of space have become diffuse, allowing the expansion of cities, in an environment that keeps on expanding. In this context, the presence of military objectives within the urban areas should be linked to the existing conditions in an environment of uncertainties, where contradictions, complexity and chaos dwell altogether.

1. Transforming military objectives within urban settlements

The relationship between the military and urban settlements was marked

1“Military objectives are: a) armed forces except the medical service, the religious personnel and goods; b) establishments, buildings and positions where the armed forces and the military equipment are located (e.g. positions, barracks, warehouses) c) other goods: which by nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action, and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”, Frédéric de Mulien, trad. Dumitru Codă, Manual de drept al războaiului pentru fortele armate, Comitetul Internaţional al Crucii Roşii, Geneva, Elveţia, 2013, Cap.C, Art.55
by each step in the history of human presence in the territory, by the sedentary lifestyle or by the movement of the population. People’s commitment to certain environments is conditioned primarily by the demand of the need for subsistence, by the way to ensure the safety and stability of the settlements in time. The existing initial conditionings, as well as those related to the natural environment or the historical, political, economic, social and cultural conditioning etc. have led both to the spatial modeling of the territory as well as of the human behavior in relation to the new habitats created. Whether spontaneously made or based on predetermined plans, cities reflect a certain mindset coupled with the technological possibilities of achievement, specific to the existence period of the inhabitants.

A predominant way of delimitation of the urban settlements has been liaising with the defense works that were speculating the landforms in order to obtain the security of the urban settlement. In this respect, the most visible elements made for the defense of the cities gains a planned form during the Renaissance. In this period, there is a predominance of rectangular geometric shapes, physically evidenced by fortified defensive walls according to the requirements imposed by the progress of firearms. This is how they wanted to achieve perfection, a harmony that would comply with the ideal proportions in relation to the human scale. The concerns of the leadership of the cities were largely absorbed by the construction of fortifications, while ensuring the urban comfort was falling on the second place. The evolution the artillery has radically changed the defense system of the city, transforming the physical form in a stellar one, widely extended in the territory, a phenomenon that has significantly altered the spatial structure of the cities. The increase of the population density, alongside the movement of the physical limits of the fortification walls, the emergence of new building techniques and the implementation simulation of the major industrial projects have changed the relationship between the military objectives and urban settlements. From presence concentrated on the physical limit of the cities we are switching to a cluster of defense nuclei in the territory. Based on the desire for knowledge and understanding of the surrounding reality, together with the achievement of the conditions for the composition and decomposition of the natural phenomena and/or artificial, we reached today to create specific technological tools, information systems acting as vital elements in making decisions in order to ensure the security of a territory. The relationship between subject and object has changed in terms of knowledge, but also due to the possible confusion of the two entities. Creating a virtual space as an extension of the real classical space brings the expression through a cluster of inter-dependencies. Therefore, the relationship between the military objectives and the urban settlements has changed both in terms of presence and location in the territory and also in terms of spatial resource use and mutual influences of the civilian and military activities.

The transition from a linear approach of the relation between the military objectives and the city, to an approach where contradictions, complexity and chaos prevail have generated novelties in the planning method of the defense in the urban settlements. Linking the city defense and development principles with the idea of the intelligenta growth, today, is a goal difficult to achieve. However, principles such as accessibility, initiative, flexibility/adaptability and concentration/density remain constant and available to use, in order to enhance the survivability capacity of the cities, given the current challenges.

Starting from the ideal of the fortified city from the Renaissance and having the security element as a
connecting idea, the concept that is emphasized today is the intelligent city. The word city is always the same, but the reality is in a continuous process of change. "Given that there are many types of intelligence, we believe that in order to make sense, the concept of intelligent city must be based on the capability of detection, understanding and settlement of problems for the three levels of organization: material, the living structures (non-verbalized) and the social and human one (verbalized). Thus, the reliance on the real physical space - virtual space creates the ability to sense the connection between the elements of certain situations (inter-legere) and to find and communicate the solution related to such relations, through IT technologies."  

Beyond economic considerations, the power of the concept of the intelligent city comes from the desire of the political leaders to harmonize the relationship between the current issues of the contemporary world: the living environment, technology and society. This way, it is desired for the intelligent city to be an entity capable of developing in a sustainable way and to find solutions to complex issues the human settlements are facing. However, the lack of clarity and of a position unanimously accepted towards this concept has fuelled much of the political discourse at international level. For example, the European Economic and Social Committee proposes that the urban settlements should represent the driving force of a new European policy development, while for the implementation of an intelligent city concept there have been accelerated the works for the development of tools necessary for the implementation of the projects.  

Nowadays, the quantitative and qualitative problems of the cities are multiplied in terms of enhancing human mobility in the territory. Beyond the physical structural transformation due to the need to ensure the necessary elements for the cohabitation in environments which are increasingly dense, we are witnessing a transformation in terms of challenges regarding the minority-nation interaction. The "Invasion" of the refugees from Syria is challenging the EU countries in a way that it calls into question the whole European institutional construction. The dynamics of the influx of migrants adds pressure to the shared common spaces of the European cities, this way fuelling the tension between the states. The sedentary statute and stability of the settlements in Europe are threatened in such circumstances by the movement of those coming from the areas of conflict, the refugees, immigrants, asylum seekers or other categories of migration.  


2. Relation from an ecological perspective

The recent European and Euro-Atlantic concerns in the field of the environment security and military security, address, in particular, the climate change issues and their effects on the population movement worldwide.  

Founded in 1969 under the NATO, the Committee for Challenges of the Modern Society seeks to respond to the  

3 "Increased mobility has contributed to a higher number of migrants in recent decades (inter-regional migration, intra-EU migration and migration from non-member countries into the EU). Some migrants move in order to improve their living standards (for example, for improved employment opportunities), while others may be driven from their homes, for example to escape conflict and/or oppression.”, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Population_statistics_at_regional_level#Population_density, accessed on 09.09.2015
challenges of the environment and those related to the quality of life. Therefore, addressing the relationships between organisms and the environment in which they live, under the influence of the existing conditions and the military activities carried out in certain areas, it seeks a better understanding of the processes and existing resources, with the purpose of effective planning and management aimed at protecting the environment and improving performance. In this regard, there projects have been carried out that have targeted the cessation or reduction of pollution, urban problems, energy and health and, in particular, environmental issues with defense implications.

Also regarding the concerns about the environmental issues, the first policy of the European Community dealing with this subject was launched in 1972 and, starting this year, the topics covered are focused on the problems of acid rain, ozone depletion, air quality, noise pollution, waste, and water pollution.

In this context, the relationship between organisms and the environment in which they live is influenced by the existing living conditions. From this perspective, the relation between the military objectives- urban environment requires a smart environment management, given the natural and anthropic risks that go beyond state borders, and which can generate global issues. In this regard, the location of the armed forces, of the establishments and of the military goods in the urban areas, must be settled according to the principles of sustainable environmental development. “Therefore, creating a coherent framework for integrating multiple components, both military and civilian, throughout the urban landscape, based on the effectiveness of the site, environmental conservation, the development of connected neighborhoods and the sustainable use of resources, will enable the transition from solutions planning to the real transformation of the defense structures in relation to the development of the cities.”

3. Relation from a technological perspective

The city leaders for a long time have benefited from various systems that enabled them to receive information and monitor the events, in order to make decisions about the existing threats and risks. In this regard, supervision has played an important role for the spatial knowledge in order to exercise power. With the modifications brought by the revolutions in the military field and by globalization, we are witnessing significant changes in the relations systems, in the streams,
connections, interdependencies between communities and between the individual and the community by increasing their capacity of interaction.

The access to an increasingly efficient technology in the sense of allowing human interaction as well as raising the awareness of reality, allowed the reorganization of armies and the commencement of a process of interconnecting the command and control systems worldwide. Although it is well known that it is recommendable to avoid conducting armed conflicts in the cities, we believe that in the future, this recommendation will be difficult to meet.

From a military perspective, “information systems consist of infrastructure, organizational structures, the staff and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, distribute and act according to the information obtained. They form the structure that supports the processes of the general staff, the decision making staff, it provides a common relevant picture that contributes to sync the use of force, the connection of the sensors and the combat means of the commanders, it supports and protects the capacity of attack and protects the command and control.”

The process of conversion of the military goods in military objectives or the opposite involves a temporary or permanent militarization of resources with the aim of carrying out the specific activities of training and modification of the space according to the complex requirements of the contemporary security environment. Alongside the existing information systems, in the future, the intelligent materials and the nanotechnologies will change the cities’ defense methods, the location of the military objectives, their relationship with

the neighborhoods and the ways to camouflage the military presence in the territory.

We believe that future challenges will be related to finding the legal solutions for placing the military objectives in the urban context, related to the possibilities offered by the intelligent buildings but complying with the international humanitarian rights under the pressure of urbanization and climate change.

4. Relation from a social perspective

The different needs that the location of the military objectives within the urban settlements involve have determined the adaptation of the space to functional, utilitarian requirements and less to the aesthetic and psychosocial ones. “When the population lives below or just slightly above the subsistence level, its value system is comparatively uniform.”

The correlation and interdependence of natural risks – anthropic risks to which we are exposed nowadays – through the issue of resource decrease on one hand and the increasing need of pecuniary emulation on the other hand, indicates the need to strengthen the environmental security - military security relationship in the urban context. Anticipating a need before it actually occurs involves understanding the psychological mechanisms that underlie the human interactions and the security in the urban context, by creating spaces with the possibility to be used both for civil purposes and for military purposes. Thorough advanced estimating of the need and demand in the city we can achieve the integration of the civil and military needs in the urban settings.

Locating the military objectives within the urban settings can positively complement the architectural urban ensemble, without the negative influence

7 Cf. Col. (r.) Gheorghe Boaru, PhD – during the course of Information Systems, optional EDSM, 1st year, 2014-2015, Doctoral School, “Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest

8 Toffler, Alvin, Corpora ia adaptabilă, trad. Robert Adam, Editura Antet, Bucureşti, 2001, p. 61
on the development of life in the city. Carrying out common technical-urban works, along with the common use of digital infrastructure of the cities and the creation of a legal framework of continuous civil-military cooperation, in the administration of the cities, can provide the development of the defense activities in terms of security challenges.

Therefore, in order to ensure the best conditions of coexistence between urban settings and military objectives, we must take into account the principles of location and relationship of these in the territory, which refer to:

_ The possibility of future development of both military objectives and localities;
_ The location of the military objectives in relation with the locality to be resolved so as to shield the locality from possible harmful activities;
_ To avoid locating military objectives on top of natural deposits, or elements that need preservation.

Referring to the residential and social mobility, we can conclude that “[...] the space is thus understood as a place of competition between different social groups who are trying to dominate or maintain themselves in a certain position. These operations which lead to a convergence of numerous individual initiatives involve a relative fluidity of the land and property mechanisms and their logic leads to the replacement, more or less complete, of a population with another, inducing chain effects that will affect the whole urban territory.”

Conclusions and proposals

Based on the analysis of the relations in terms of components: ecological, technological and social, we believe that in the future the relation of the military objectives to the urban settings will undergo significant changes, both in terms of physical structure and in terms of methods of spatial use of the existing resources. “No matter the adversary, historical period and level of military strategy development, or the weapon systems or bullets, missiles or other means for striking targets, the future military confrontations will have a common point: the target, which is man’s mind. Man is the one that initiates conflicts, fights against them, negotiates peace or sets relations among international actors. Future wars will focus on man’s mind rather than on destroying him physically because somebody has to work to produce goods and services.”

In order to meet the current and future security challenges, cities must implement the intelligent components at the physical, spatial and functional structure level, in all three levels of the reality organization (material, of living structures (non-urbanized) and social-human (verbalized)). Such a goal is difficult to achieve, given the lack of an integrating, monitoring and management platform for the existing elements. Even with the advanced technological tools available and various databases, the natural systems’ instability makes it almost impossible to solve the complex problems we face now or that we will face in the future. However, we can hope that the knowledge method and the relationship with the environment has transformed from the perspective of the awareness of the security issues and military security, and from the perspective of understanding the shaping social processes that underlie our future decisions.

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THE ROMANIAN MILITARY ART DURING THE SECOND BALKAN WAR (1913)

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Abstract: Favorable to a foreign policy of peace and good neighborhood in the region, in the particularly complex international context surrounding the events of the years 1912-1913, Romania is urged to intervene militarily during the Second Balkan War. Threatened by the very aggressive territorial policy of the Bulgarian state, which looked avidly towards Dobrogea, and also by the trend to modify the Balkan status quo, Romania decides to mobilize the whole Romanian Army on June 22 / July 5 to June 23 / 8 July 1913.

Keywords: Romanian military act, strategy, tactics, operational art, Second Balkan War, Romania, Bulgaria.

After proclaiming the independence of the state in 1877, the Romanian state under the leadership of Carol I of Hohenzollern open a new page of the history of Romanian society, politically, economically and militarily.

The framework provided by Romania’s new international status makes possible the onset of a long process of reconstruction and development of the economy and of the national military system in accordance with the state policy, whose objective was to defend the territorial independence and sovereignty.

To this end, the main directions pursued by the policymakers in the military area were: improving the legislative framework of the military power organization; fixing the place and role of the army within the society and the legal and administrative instruments designed to ensure the mobilization of the human capacity and of the material defense; establishing alliances and the directions of the foreign military relations.

The new direction of the Romanian military policy created the opportunity of opening up of military historiography and hence of Romanian military thinking. Under the influence of Clausewitz’s work, military theoreticians made known the ideas of the great German doctrine-writer, trying to adapt them to the particularities of Romania, which determined a qualitative increase of the solutions needed to solve possible military confrontations that Romania may be involved in.

In this context, the Romanian military art on the eve of the Balkan wars redefines its components by respecting the fundamental principles of military science. Thus, one of the doctrine writers of Romanian military thinking who considered alongside other authors of the time, that military art consisted of strategy and tactics, referring to the former, wrote: "Whatever its definition, the strategy will be forever the art to maintain, combine and direct the movements and the disposition of troops in the theaters of operations preparing their decisive engagement with the opponent in the best conditions, both in terms of number and of the situation leading towards it, and to use in the most rational way the results of these engagements in order to achieve the purpose of the war".2

In the opinion of General Alexandru Averescu, tactics is "the military science in which we can find all the rules and regulations to be followed when preparing the troops to fight and their use on the battlefield" [...], tactics is

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1 Vasile Alexandrescu (group), Istoria militară a poporului român, Editura Militară, București, 1988, p.41
the operative instrument of strategy; all strategic combinations are based on and consider tactics, meaning the battle [...] if it happens that tactics is incapable to produce our victory, the most genius strategic concepts remain ineffective [...] tactics aims at twofold purposes – troops’ preparation and their use [...] tactics is divided into theoretical tactics, applied tactics, tactical exercises, large tactics and elementary tactics”.

In terms of offensive struggle, General Al. Averescu wrote: “whenever someone wants to gain something by means of force, he is fighting offensively. [...] Offensively the soldier has more confidence in himself, either by the only reason that he goes forward, which exalts him, or because the attacker always believes himself stronger than the one that stays in place, even if in reality things would be different. [...] we are on the offensive tactics, when the battlefield aspire one positive purpose, that is, when by our efforts we want to win something, we intend to overturn all the obstacles that might stand in the way to our goal. [...] offensive is characterized by our efforts to move forward toward a goal which is positive, well-established, and known to all, and also by freedom of action.”

Carl von Clausewitz, almost 18 decades ago, attributed to offensive a positive value or feature, even if from its definition results its essential destructive role identified with the very aim of the war. Besides that, in Romanian thinking it was considered since the beginning of the twentieth century that “offensive follows a positive purpose: the material and moral destruction or disruption of the opponent, which is precisely the aim of the war; only by offensive can we impose our will to the opponent.”

As a result of this doctrinal confrontation of the Romanian military thinking, with all its limitations, some ideas emerged that the High Army Headquarters has implemented during the Balkan wars.

In this respect, as General Gr. Crainiceanu stated in 1913, the Romanian High Army Headquarter, depending on the political and military situation in Europe, on the foreign policy orientation and sometimes on the alliances of Romania, there were always strategic plans including clearly defined concepts regarding the use of armed forces, elaborated by choice of action and kept a great secret.

The outbreak in 1913 of the Second Balkan War, the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict near the border of Romania and Bulgaria’s position towards our country put a possible military action on the South of Danube to the attention of the Romanian High Army Headquarter.

In these conditions, on 17/30 June 1913, the Memorandum regarding the guidance of the Romanian military operations was drafted and finalized, to establish where it would intervene in the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict. Also known as the Assumption 1 bis, the Memorandum of 1913 developed under the direction of General Alexandru Averescu-Chief of High Army Headquarter, and stated: the main operations that were being carried out, the way to choose the base and the line of operations, the way to conduct the actions and the defense measures on the north bank of the Danube.

Thus, according to this plan: "In the event that the course of events in the Balkan Peninsula would necessitate military action of Romania against Bulgaria, it seems appropriate that the operations be carried out in two

3 Corneliu Soare (colectiv), Pagini din gândirea militară românească, Editura Militară, București, 1969, pp.96-99

8 Ibidem, p.36.
directions: the main one, directed towards the strategic gravity center of Bulgaria’s forces as played today; the second one facing Ruscuc-Varna line. The first direction is indicated only from purely military reasons, while the second especially from political reasons.\(^9\)

In order to achieve the strategic goal, all combat actions within the Romanian battle action plan were guided by the central idea of the plan: the offensive in two directions. The main direction was oriented towards the opponent’s center and capital, contributing to fixing Bulgarian troops in both the Eastern and the Western sectors. Also, the external two-pronged maneuver, developed by the High Army Headquarter ensured the possibility of collaboration with the Serbian troops, neighbor on the right flank of the Romanian main group. The distribution of forces respected the principle of concentration of forces and means, the main group receiving the necessary resources to carry out its tasks.\(^10\)

According to the campaign plan, "against a strategic deployment on a front of over 300 km in a straight line, a vigorous breakthrough of the center is the process that can lead more safely and in short time to crucial results. Bulgarian front center, considered geometrically, is Küstendil. Given the land forms and communication network, advancing from Romania to Küstendil would be only through Sofia. That fact makes that the operations directed from Romania against the Bulgarian Centre have as motion axis the extension of Küstendil -Sofia line towards the Danube... As soon as the arrangement of Romanian army would be put in place to advance in a direction shown above, the Bulgarian army would see itself threatened in its center from two opposite directions: on one side the main Serbian army, in Usküb-Küstendil direction; on the other side the main Romanian army in Vra a- Sofia direction. The judgments one might make in this situation would be the following: 1) The vigorous offensive with the central group against the main Serbian army, while the left wing would hold back the Greek army and the right wing, overturning the front Eastwards would seek to strengthen the Romanian army's advance, by threat of flank. Once the victory against the main Serb army is obtained, the bulk of the center would be back in the opposite direction, so as together with the right wing to face the Romanian army. The success of this plan will depend on the resistance strength of the main Serb forces and the advance speed of the Romanian army. This advance would be on its turn, depending on the committed attitude of the Serbian troops from Timok region, facing the Bulgarian right wing (1st Army) that would seek to threaten the Romanian right flank. 2) A second judgment that the Bulgarian army could make would be to leave part of the central group in front of the main Serbian army, and with the main and the right wing, inverting the front, to meet the Romanian army. The success of this plan would depend on: the attitude of the Serbian army regarding the center and Timok region as well as on the swiftness of Romanian action.\(^11\)

The plan drawn up on 17 June 1913 noted that although the secondary direction has political overtones, it does not show the political purpose of the Romanian military action. It is found in hypothesis "C" of 1910, where, in the paragraph entitled General Considerations it was shown that: "With us Bulgaria wants to have Dobrogea issue just as that of Alsace-Lorraine, that is to claim it as its owner from the distant past, just as the French provinces were claimed by Prussia on the basis of history. So, regardless of the reason, Romania should not be surprised as France was, politically in 1866 and militarily in 1870."\(^12\)

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\(^9\) Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (se va cita A.N.I.C.), Fond Casa Regală, Dosar 2/1913, fila 2.


\(^11\) A.N.I.C, op.cit. filele 3-4.

\(^12\) Gl.bg.dr. Vasile Apostol, op.cit. p. 36.
It should be noted that prior to the campaign in 1913, the law on the organization of the army was promulgated, thus ensuring the necessary legal framework for the Romanian military organization. Thus, the formation of an active army was regulated, which with its reserve formed up the operational army, the militias and the territorial army.

The national defense system was organized and the top leadership of the Army Headquarter consisted in three sections, under which they placed five army corps together with other components.

The General Headquarters, the top leadership organization, assembled only in case of war and have the following organization: the commander in chief (the king), the Crown Prince, the High General Staff and the General Inspectorate of weapons.13

Under these circumstances, on 3 July 1913, at 09.00hrs, the Romanian Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu was communicating to King Carol I that since the war in the Balkans started it is appropriate to order mobilization that very day. The Journal of Ministers was prepared for mobilization and at 17.00hrs, the Mobilization Decree no. 4751 was signed. The Mobilization Decree included the following provisions: “1. The active Army with its reserves is mobilizing and forms the army of operations; 2. Mobilization will run after the requirements of the Regulation on military mobilization; 3. To complete the troops of war the backup quotas and the necessary militias shall be called. The abundance will be used gradually according to the necessities; 4. The order of battle will be decided by the mobilization plan in place.”14

The work of mobilization and the mobilization transport began on the night of June 22/23, at 24.00hrs, on June 23 the passenger trains were suspended, only one train in one direction running until mobilization was set. The railways were busy at this time only with military transports. Troops and equipment were transported with the help of over 500 military trains, on the roads, or with the vessels on the Danube. Requisitions started immediately after the mobilization decree and were conducted across the country quickly and in good order by the administrative authorities. The population has benevolently made vehicles and animal traction means available to the army. People from the backup groups and the reserve quotas from 1900-1911 were called under the flag, including quotas 1901-1897 were called with individual orders and quotas 1896-1895 (militia), only those with special orders.15

Romania mobilized on 22/23 June 1913 an army composed of 5 army corps with 15 divisions (including 5 reserves), 3 reserve brigades, 2 cavalry divisions and one horsemen brigade. The mobilized armed force was 247 battalions, 33 squadrons, 180 batteries. Troops mobilized accounted for 6 percent of the population. Mobilization took 8 days, starting at 24.00hrs in the night of 22/23 June 1913, and ended on 30 June 1913. The Bulgarians had foreseen that the mobilization of the Romanian army would last 14 days and thus that the Romanian troops will enter the Bulgarian territory on July 7, 1913.16

However, the mobilization of services had some shortcomings, particularly in the columns of artillery ammunition, subsistence and sanitary formations due mainly to their excessive centralization.17

The Romanian military concentration was set in different areas. Thus, the main army made up of Division I and II cavalry, army corps I, II, III and IV, 1st and IIInd reserve divisions and reserve brigade 33. Generalissim, A.S.R. Prince Ferdinand, heir to the throne; Chief of

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14 Participarea Armatei Române la cel de al Doilea Război Balcanic. Modul cum s-a desfășurat mobilizarea (22-30 iunie 1913), p.3.
15 Ibidem, pp.5-7
16 Ibidem, p.8
17 Arhiva Ministerului Apărării Naționale, fond Marele Cartier General, dosar nr.61, f. 2.
High Army Headquarter General Al. Averescu; Second Chief of High Army Headquarter Colonel Constantin Christescu came together and the area of concentration of Bechet-Turnu Magurele was chosen.\textsuperscript{18}

The concentration area was not randomly chosen. On the one hand this area was near a national railway hub; on the other hand, according to the plan established by the high General Staff, the main target was the city of Sofia close to which the bulk of the Bulgarian army was found. Another criterion was the difference in height of the left river of the Danube, which favored Corabia location versus the Bulgarian rive, which withdrew some 30 km from the river.

For the secondary army, made up of the Vth Army, the IIIrd reserve Division and the reserve infantry brigade 31, whose commander was Major General John Culcer, Chief of General staff lt. col. Găuseanu Traian, the area of concentration included the area between Cernavoda and Constanta.

According to "the Military Operations Plan" known as the "Hypothesis no. 1 Bis", its main elements predicted the offensive as a form of warfare in order to defeat the Bulgarian army for Quadrilater joining the old home, motherland Romania, requirement made known to the Bulgarian authorities within the negotiations previous to mobilization. The political and military purpose consisted in the existence of a strategic border in the South of Dobrogea, and with the cessation of hostilities peace to be terminated reinstated between the warring parties. To achieve this goal, Romanian military forces concentration was performed according to the declared objective of each group of forces. The main group of forces consisted of 4/5 of the ground forces and the group of secondary forces consisted of 1/5 of the ground forces.

The main group of forces concentrated in that area was to go on the offensive in Ferdinandovo Vratsa - Roman direction, opening in Sofia region - Küstendil to destroy or capture the right wing forces of the Bulgarian Army. The second group of forces was to go on the offensive with a limited objective to conquer the Rusciuk - Sumea - Varna alignment and to eliminate existing Bulgarian forces in the area. The general strategic reserve, composed of Divisions 4 and 5 Reserve, was to be centrally located in the district of Bucharest, in order to intervene upon order in South of the Danube.

The moment of the entry into war was well chosen by the Romanian High Army Headquarter, in the context in which the Bulgarian army was engaged with all forces in the West, having prepared strategic reserves to use against the Romanian army. However, without claiming strong armed confrontations, the Romanian military offensive has seen a series of short military clashes. I would like to recall here the battle of Liuta, the Pravets fight, the Löjanefight and the seizure of the Bulgarian brigade from Ferdinandovo.

The Romanian army offensive launched in South of Danube led Bulgarian command to stop carrying out attacks against Serbia and Greece and to readjust it to political, diplomatic and military attitude towards Romania.

In terms of tactical movement, the stationing of the armed forces was carried out as planned. Tactical marches inline were executed, at medium level, observing the marching steps, the units ensuring the research, security and assurance elements of marching. The survey plan, thoroughly conducted by the Romanian High Army Headquarter, and well implemented by the armed forces in the offensive, led the Bulgarian government to react.

By not accepting to sign a separate peace between Romania and Bulgaria, Romania imposes its views during

negotiations, prompting peace to be reached among all states participating in the conflict.

In those circumstances, and in order to save Bulgaria from a possible disaster, Tsar Ferdinand I Coburg asked King Carol I of Romania, on 5/18 July 1913, to stop the advance of the Romanian troops, concluding a peace treaty aside from the signing of a bilateral agreement with the government of Bucharest.21


Under the Treaty, Serbia received the north of Macedonia (Article III), Greece took the biggest part of historical Macedonia and Bulgaria pledged to waive any claim on the island of Crete (art. V.), and as far as the regulation of relations between Bulgaria and Romania was concerned, article II stipulated: "The new border will start from the Danube, from top of Turtucaia to reach the Black Sea in South of Ekrene... A joint commission composed of representatives of both Contracting Parties, in equal numbers, will be appointed for that in 15 days following the signing of the treaty to trace onsite the border line, according to the previous stipulations. This committee will preside over the division of real estate property and of capitals hitherto belonging jointly to the counties, municipalities or communities of inhabitants now separated by the new border line.21

After concluding the peace, the General Headquarters placed with its command in the town of Pleven, decided to start evacuation of the armed forces from the Bulgarian territory in accordance with the deadline set during Bucharest Conference.

Thus, Colonel Arghirescu Nicolae conducting the Operations Division, established the documents necessary to evacuate the operational army on the North of the Danube, according to Operations Order no. 115 dated 2/15 August 1913.22

Since the cholera epidemic made casualties within the Romanian militaries, routes were set for a better execution of the evacuation, ordering forces and means in question to be divided into three groups, which following the order given, had to cross the Danube by Sistov-Zimmicea, Nikopol-Turnu Magurele and Rahova-Bechet sectors, managing to avoid the areas affected by cholera.

Complying with the terms agreed, the High Army Headquarter carefully supervised the evacuation and disposition of the Romanian army within the garrisons of residence, so that to order demobilization afterwards.

In conclusion we can say that in the campaign of 1913 in Bulgaria, the Romanian army, observing the plan devised by the High Army Headquarters, succeeded in fulfilling the military purpose of the war. Beside the fact that Bulgarian resistance was virtually non-existent, the military action was a success of the Romanian military art.

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The relevance of the world economic and financial crisis for European security

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Motto:
“The year 2010 should mark a new beginning. I wish that Europe would emerge stronger from the economic and financial crisis”.
Jose Manuel BARROSO
Communication from “the Commission-Europe 2020”

Abstract: The impact of the global financial and economic crisis on security was an extensive and a complex one, favored by the multidimensional characteristics of security and by the interdependence of those dimensions. The European Union, an intergovernmental political, economic and international entity, has its own policy on security and defense and is seeking for viable solutions to overcome the economic and financial crisis in Europe. Using a constructivist approach, this article briefly presents the relevance of global financial and economic crisis for European security at the beginning of 21st century.

Keywords: world crisis; economic crisis; financial crisis; the euro; Security; The European Union.

The international strategic security environment is constantly changing as a result of the complexity of the interaction and interdependence of social, economic, political, environmental, demographic and military phenomena and processes in the world, which makes the member states be concerned with their own security and defense.

The security and defense dimension is in a continuous process of definition and redefinition, evolution and adapting to the characteristics of the international security environment; this is due mainly to the fact that the becoming process has a reactive nature.

The causes are multiple and can be identified in the intergovernmental nature of the Foreign and Security Policy CFSP of the EU, in the westphalian concept of European States over international relations, in their attachment to the idea of nation and sovereignty. Within the EU, security and defense are sensitive issues because they are tangent to all these characteristics of European States.

Therefore, the EU aspiration itself to evolve towards a common defense system\(^1\) becomes a challenge; states must

\(^1\) Moștofle, Constantin; Du u, Petre, Apărarea colectivă și apărarea națională în contextul integrării României în NATO și a derării la Uniunea Europeană, Editura Universității Științelor Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2005, pp.14-18. The authors state that collective defense means constituting adequate structures (both civilian and military) by several states or by a union of states, staffing them with personnel who is qualified for the type of tasks they might receive, proper instruments for the goal targeted (from computers to armament), normative documents regulating the respective activity, all of them through the human, material, and financial efforts of the members of the respective organization. Also, providing leadership for this structure is the responsibility of the interstate organization that constituted it. In other words, common defense means constituting (through the contribution and with the will of all participating states) of instruments – institutions, human, material, financial, and information resources, juridical normative acts – meant to protect their fundamental interests, defend their territory, independence and sovereignty.
overcome not just the historical legacy, but also aspects of mutual confidence, willingness to contribute to the development of appropriate structures, to find a balance between pursuing their own national interests and participating in achieving the ambitions of the European policy as a whole.

Also, the idea of challenge does not necessarily have a negative connotation, but a double one (both positive and negative). The challenge is really a problem to solve, one aspect that must be managed in such a way as to achieve a state of balance. But, at the same time, the challenge is to send out the idea of evolution, of overstepping the limits in order to achieve the development of a better functioning organization which is more efficient and more adapted to reality. Therefore, after overcoming them, the EU could evolve towards becoming more viable, more efficient and more stable on the international arena.

The impact of the world financial crisis showed us that economic realities are evolving faster than political ones. We have to accept that economic interdependence, more and more pronounced, requires a response which is more determined and more coherent at the political level.

Millions of people have lost their jobs in recent years, and the EU will still have to deal, for many years ahead, with debt burdens arising from the crisis, which has exerted new pressure on our social cohesion. The crisis also revealed some fundamental truths about the challenges that the European economy is facing. Meantime, the global economy is evolving, and the future of the EU will depend on the response of Europe. The crisis is a wake-up call, which makes us acknowledge the fact that if we continue on the same road, we will gradually decline into tier two of the new world order.

For a sustainable future, Europe will have to “pull itself together” and then hold on to its position. This is in fact the objective of the EU strategy Europe 2020, which aims to create more jobs and to ensure better living conditions. The strategy will address both short-term problems linked to the crisis and the need to implement structural reforms through measures to stimulate economic growth meant to prepare Europe’s economy for the challenges that lie ahead. EU strategy Europe 2020 represents the growth for the next decade. In a constantly changing world, the EU wants to become a smart, sustainable economy, favorable to inclusion. These three priorities shall complement each other and are able to help the EU and Member States to achieve a high level of employment, labor productivity and social cohesion.

The European Commission proposes EU 2020, five measurable objectives that will guide the process and will be transposed into national objectives: employment, research and innovation, energy and climate change, education and combating poverty. These objectives are ambitious, but they can be met. They are based on concrete proposals, designed to guarantee their achievement using a number of powerful tools: new economic governance, supported by domestic market, budget, economic policy and external trade, as well as the rules and the support of economic and Monetary Union.

The success of the EU depends on the actual involvement of leaders and institutions within Europe. The new EU agenda requires a coordinated response at European level to engage the social partners and civil society. Only EU partners will be able to jointly counter the effects of the crisis and will come out of this stronger and stronger.

1. General aspects

The overall picture of the security and defense challenges is extremely complex at European Union level. At present, one can identify a long series of challenges of various natures, extremely
dynamic, complex and beyond continued efforts of developing defense dimension in the form of security and defense policy, common (PSAC), to increase the cohesion and coherence of EU action on the international arena, which is maintained by the forces of globalization that continues to characterize the international security environment.

So, on the one hand, the challenges may relate to matters that have become classics in the entire system of international (international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, inter-ethnic conflicts, risks and threats related to cyber and energy security), and on the other, the new issues with a strong, determined, usually a relatively recent global phenomenon, that has influenced and continues to influence the perception of security and international relations in 2007 – economic and financial crisis world.

The impact of global financial and economic crisis on security was a large and complex one favored by the multidimensional nature of security and the interdependence of these dimensions. Starting from the assumption that security has many dimensions (economic, political, military, social, environmental, energy, cyber, etc.) and the fact that any disruption arisen at one of these dimensions will have repercussions on the other, the economic and financial crisis can be considered as the main generators of international and European challenges. The “earthquake” of economic and financial plan has been followed by a series of aftershocks in the social, political and military dimensions. The EU has become the scene of crises of various natures:

- **Social** – constantly moving street protests often accompanied by acts of violence, vandalism, clashes between protesters and security forces as a result of the increasing dissatisfaction of the population with adopting austerity measures and declining sensitive living standards. Such movements have occurred in Greece, Italy, Romania, France, Spain;
- **Political** - usually consisting in eroding the legitimacy of the governing authorities. In this case, we can identify two dimensions of political crisis: national (non-recognition of certain state governments where citizens consider that the government no longer meets their expectations and has not managed optimally the economic and financial crisis) and European (non-recognition of European institutions being capable to optimally pursue the interests of citizens);
- **Military** – under the impact of global financial and economic crisis, the budgets for defense in Member States have significantly decreased. Since the military instrument remains central in promoting and protecting national interests, there has emerged the need to streamline defense spending, and the solution for this was identified in the implementation of the “pooling and sharing” concept in NATO’s approach, called “smart defense”.

2. The global financial and economic crisis for European security

The international financial and economic crisis appeared for the first time in 2007 in the US, then gradually expanded around the world and the most developed countries of the world. It won the real sector of industrialized economies in difficulty placing certain activities (eg. automotive and real estate transactions) that supported growth in these countries over the years. The indirect effects of the crisis occurred in less developed countries immediately and then direct ones were quite severe for those countries.

It is known that there is always a close connection between economics and security interdependence, the two of the reinforcing each other. Currently, a functional and competitive economy is one of the essential conditions for the actors to enjoy security and, reversely, the security level is a significant contributor to the
optimal functioning of the economy. If we refer to the implications of the global financial and economic crisis, we can say that it happened and even affected the area which led to the EU’s success in securing peace, stability and prosperity on the European continent.

Therefore, the financial and economic crisis has a significant impact on European security. In fact, it generates a series of security threats. In the short run, it is the instability of Europe’s most fragile states, a phenomenon that would lead to internal unrest and international conflicts. Even if the economic sphere has taken shape as an area where Member States coordinate their best actions, the crisis highlighted the extremely large distances between the levels of development of European economies.

Due to the reduction of international trade flows and tightening the access to credits, the higher unemployment rate, there is a huge social anxiety. Today, there is a real degradation of living conditions of disadvantaged people. This increases frustrations and grievances that could cause disturbances in poor countries, major internal and border around the EU are also countries (eg. Moldova). The difficulties created in these countries have negative repercussions on European security both in order to increase vigilance and means of strengthening the European security and the adoption of measures to support and aid these countries. Moreover, the EU has developed the European Neighborhood Partnership (March 2003) and in the period immediately launched the Eastern Partnership (20 June 2008) in order to eliminate potential security risks and threats that might come from outside the EU.

The financial and economic crises adversely affect European security at the EU level as an economic, political, social and administrative entity, as well as within each Member State. The factor generating insecurity is the economic instability that induces negative effects in the social, political, economic work of all EU Member States. Accordingly, the EU economic and financial activity was in turn seriously affected by the financial and economic crisis. Real estate decreased significantly compared to the year before the onset of the financial crisis, unemployment increased in 2009 and 2010, the banking system faced serious problems and the production of goods and services decreased significantly.

Also, the internal security of the EU member countries is directly affected by the crisis: it is estimated that approximately half of hedge funds consist of financial funds originating from criminal and narcotics trafficking and is in a continuous process of growth, representing about $200 billion. Also, the crisis emphasizes legal and illegal migration flows which are accompanied by negative effects for those involved, but also for the receiving countries. At the same time, the financial crisis has a major influence on growth and jobs through

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2 Polițica Europeană de Vecinătate, http://www.undp.md/border/Pol_vecin_ue.html, accessed on 01.06.2015, 17.00
4 Europe: le dégonflement de la bulle immobilière ne fait que commencer, http://www.le-buzz-immobilier.com/2009/05/europe-le-degonflement-de-la-bulle-immobiliere-ne-fait-que-commencer-0014974, accessed on 01.06.2015, 17.50
multiple channels. This influence is exercised by: crisis and fragile banks more sensitive to risk than before 2007 which have become more selective in the distribution of credit; the impact of the crisis on consumption, the pillar of the demand and growth in all countries. However, the real estate crisis acted on the real economy. The families and investors had net losses due to the financial crisis and the reduction in value of real estate assets. This poverty has a direct effect on consumption and investment, called “wealth effect”\textsuperscript{8}.

Also, changes on the real estate market have negatively affected the construction sector, faced with slowing down demand. Moreover, losses of financial institutions and the lack of trust that followed the financial crisis have made lenders more selective and have pushed up market interest rates. This has resulted in a contraction of credit, which reduced consumption and investment.

\textit{In my opinion, the EU is facing, in economic terms, two major challenges:} 

- supporting Member States to overcome the state of economic and financial crisis, with appropriate measures problems each of them;
- coordinate such measures at European level.

In addition, the Union must identify solutions to manage also another issue raised by the crisis. These measures are necessary for the 16 Euro-zone countries (Austria, Cyprus, Belgium, Finland, Malta, France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia and Spain) as well as the ones needed by the other member states. The recent period has shown that there are discrepancies within the “euro-zone”, although in general the states that compose it are considered to be more stable and better developed economically. So, on the one hand, there are countries like Germany, France and Britain playing the role of “heavy pillars” in the European economy and on the other, a number of countries to which the crisis had a greater impact and worse - Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, the so-called “PIGS”\textsuperscript{9}, who need to be supported by “heavy pillars”.

States that are not part of the eurozone showed a high degree of vulnerability to the financial crisis, as it is stated in one of the reports by Stratfor\textsuperscript{10}. They were affected by the global crisis, just like the other member states, but subsequently were under pressure from the stronger economies. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe experienced growth based on a highly permissive system for obtaining loans, which were financed by foreign banks. The Report also states that these banks came mainly from Italy, France, Austria, Greece and Scandinavia. So, when creditor countries have faced liquidity crises they exercised/put pressure on debtor states, which was perceived as a second blow for the latter.

Therefore, the interdependence of national economies determines the need to identify measures across the Union. Identifying and setting them proves to be difficult because of the large distance in terms of levels of economic development of Member States, but also because of the tendency of each state to save, first, its own economy. The economic and financial crises have led to a gap, with warnings being issued regarding the emergence of an “iron curtain” that will lead to new divisions, divisions on the European continent\textsuperscript{11}.

\textsuperscript{8} Jamet, Jean-François, \textit{Europe in the face of the financial crisis}, http://www.robertschuman.org/question_europe.php?num=qe-89, p.12, accessed on 02.06.2015, 18.10


\textsuperscript{10} The Financial Crisis in Europe, 13 octombrie 2008, accessed on-line, on http://www.stratfor.com/analyses/20081012_financial_crisis_europe web page, on 02.06.2015, 19.15.

\textsuperscript{11} The remark was made by the Hungarian Prime minister, after his demand refering to a special EU fund, which might sustain the economies of less developed countries, was rejected by Germany.
The European Commission reacted immediately to extend EU-wide recession and adopted the European Economic Recovery Plan, built on two main directions. So, a first direction contains short-term actions — a major injection of purchasing power into the economy, which will increase demand and stimulate confidence. The second direction contains a program of measures to support “smart” investment, whose ultimate goal is to strengthen the EU’s competitiveness in the long run. The plan provides an overview, panoramic measures needed to emerge from recession, but also to avoid its other period. The problem consists in the different reaction of member states to the financial and economic crises, as well as the large differences in the degree to which they were affected.

Beyond these two major challenges, the economic downturn has highlighted shortcomings in the organizational structure of the Union. For example, tensions and competition between the tax systems of the EU Member States have weakened the viability of the Union. At EU level, the crisis was amplified and its repercussions have extended significantly over time due to structural deficiencies that would not have been so obvious under normal economic conditions. The economic system of the EU has allowed, subject to a period of prosperity and strong economic growth, some states to sit in the background resolving structural economic problems and accumulating substantial debts. This explains why the crisis has had serious repercussions on some countries, like Greece, whose deficit reached 13.6% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) at the end of 2009 or Portugal, where the deficit amounted to 9.4%. Moreover, even if recent events have confirmed that countries that have adopted the euro are more stable, Greece, although part of this group was strongly affected by the crisis because of structural weaknesses, which supports the hypothesis that “Greeks are not victims of the crisis”.

In other words, the economic crisis was felt more strongly in its vulnerabilities and poorly organized areas in the European economic system, in those areas whose weaknesses and deficiencies were tolerated when the EU was in a period of economic growth.

3. The implications of the financial crisis (euro) on foreign policy of the European Union (EU)

Although it has been more than 7 years since the outbreak of the financial crisis in the industrialized world, a state of concern still persists in Europe. It seems that our conventional policies the Fed (US central bank) and other measures implemented have begun to take effect and an economic recovery is under way in the US, what is seen and an unemployment fell below 6.5% at the end of 2014, from over 9% in the early years of crisis.

But with a deep crisis of the eurozone and having to face the specter of very slow economic growth (although with an uneven distribution within the Union), even a quasi-stagnation (stagnation secular), Europe is in a major

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13 By these, we mean investments in finding the necessary future competences for jobs which in the future might increase the efficiency of using energy in “clean” technologies, which might contribute to increasing sectors such as car producing industry on the future market of low carbon dioxide emissions, infrastructure investments, and creating connections in order to promote efficiency and innovation;
14 Bernoth, Kerstin, interview in Adevărul, Ce re ete a avut Germania ca să scape de criză?, http://ww.adevarul.ro/international/ce_rete те_a_avut_Germania_ca_sa_sc ape_de_criz a_0_2309773 77.html, accessed on 03.06.2015, 17:30.
problematic situation, it is even suggested that this is the opportunity to build an European economy on the Japanese model by comparison with the “lost” decades that Japan had experienced under the burden of high public and private debt. Unemployment in the EU is on average much higher than in the US and distributional conflicts lead to new wealthy societies. These conflicts between countries are felt between net donor countries and net receiving countries of European funds; they are felt intensely in the euro-zone between creditor countries and debtor countries. In the EU, public debt increased on average by more than 40% of GDP in the effort to rescue banks, combined with large private debts that were accumulated during a large “bubble” of the so called, though ironically, “The Great Moderates”.

The geopolitical crisis caused by the annexation of Crimea to Russia and Ukraine hybrid war adds to the already complicated economic situation of the EU. Also, for the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall, EU citizens are resuming contact with the “importance of security arrangements” on the continent which, among others, are designed to protect national borders. Cyber-attacks, new invoice terrorism, the spread chaos in the Arab neighborhood of large, are other tests that have to be passed by Europeans. Setting aside ideological confrontation of the past century, economic and social systems resilience appears to be tested like never before since World War II.

Since its foundation in 1992, the European Union has sought to develop both economically and politically and less militarily. Known especially for specific “soft” security operations, the EU has tended in recent years to assume the status of “smart power”, which would have guaranteed a certain independence from NATO’s capabilities and would be allowed to manage more effective security issues in its interior and its spatial proximity. Having a well-defined role on the stage of international relations, the EU has become gradually a global actor. The increasing euro crisis seems to leave in “shadowed” specific Common Foreign And Security Policy (CFSP) operations.

The European Union has made significant efforts towards developing its foreign policy and common security as well as the security component and Defense Policy (ESDP), with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. When it managed to shape policy and security institutions to ensure a balance in the European area, the EU evolved in the security and defense domains especially after the crisis in Yugoslavia. The establishment of a coherent security and defense was a rather difficult task, given that member states were not willing to extend cooperation beyond the economic and diplomatic fields. Until the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia, European security could not be called either common, or external. EU could not ensure security nor was it cohesive in policy itself. In 1992, European political leaders decided to turn the European Political Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy, which is one of the first steps taken by the EU in the process of assuming an international role. However, EU missions were limited to soft operations meant for post-conflict stabilization.

EU targets were achieved with the implementation of Berlin Plus Agreements, allowing them to intervene successfully in operations in Bosnia and Macedonia. The EU has evolved as a reliable partner with NATO, trying to harmonize the “soft” to that of “hard” components. Clausewitz considered that in order to be able to ensure security, an international player needs to combine the two components, while Joseph Nye notes that the power of a “smart” player lies in the ability to effectively manage resources in a changing world that must face an increasing number of challenges, threats and risks.

At the end of 2011, the European leaders’ efforts were focused in particular on solving the euro crisis. As this crisis had an impact on all other European policies

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*a review of the issues*, in Baldwin and Teulings, 2014.
and programs, including the common foreign and security policy, the economic and monetary policy were at the forefront of their concerns.

The European Union’s problems are furthermore complicated by European Union Euro-area crisis, but President Mario Draghi and the European Central Bank (ECB) managed so far – by non-conventional declarations and measures – to prevent a disaster, suggesting that there is the will and capacity of intervention when needed. The monetary injection program announced for March 2015-September 2016, amounting to 1,100 billion euro, falls into this category. But we have to deal next with a dramatic reality, caused by a faulty institutional design and policies that emerged with the outbreak of the financial crisis. Political leaders understand that a monetary union without “strong fiscal arrangements” (not just a Stability Pact) is vulnerable. But political considerations prevailed in launching the euro-zone. A number of internal and external imbalances arose with the “Great Moderation”, which allowed governments, private companies, households to borrow excessively. It was a period of great consumption and credit-based living, in the belief that, whatever the mode of funding, it is essential to have economic growth, to operate as a perpetual motion engine (Modigliani-Miller theorem). In fact, the overall cause was the design of the euro area crisis combined with the financial crisis.

Now, large imbalances require major corrections, but in the euro-zone the instruments of monetary correction and exchange have disappeared. The correction meant “internal devaluation”, cutting off wages and other income in/for the countries with large imbalances. Hence, the gap between Germany and the southern stronger EU in the Euro-zone. Paul Krugman was a visionary who foresaw that the introduction of a single currency will increase the industrial core force the Union to the economies of northern South. The euro acted as the former German mark (DM) undervalued for Germany and as a currency overvalued/overrated for Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy.

A study by a group of specialists in economic and financial crisis management in Europe at the end of December 2011 shows that EU citizens’ confidence in the economy and euro strength has decreased considerably, especially in Poland, Italy and Spain, while in the Netherlands and Germany it increased a lot.

Currently, the EU’s intentions to establish itself as a global player with a say in the arena of international relations, also into a “smart” power that can ensure their safety in times so troubled and decisive for its future, are not well defined. A “smart” power must have the ability to export worldwide its principles and values. The instrument through which the EU can achieve its aim is CFSP and to omit this aspect is to downgrade the expected outcome.

EU policies are determined and mutually reinforcing. The Union must continue to act with all means, both externally and internally, to overcome the crisis. The impact on euro crisis is felt within the EU CFSP and has consequences for evolution and the role it assumed internationally. Therefore, the EU needs

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16 In London, 26th July 2012, Mario Draghi stated that “The euro must be saved whatever it takes.”, speech at the Global Investment Conference;
17 The MacDougall Report in 1977 talked about the necessary budget for monetary union being 6-7% of the total GDP of member states;
18 Miller-Modigliani theorem states that the source of financing does not matter, that is, debt vs. equity. The financial crisis shows that it is better for development to rely more on equity, which is an economic common sensical fact;
20 Economies recently added to the EU – starting 2004 (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland) seem more compatible with the industrial network in the North rather than economies in the south of Euro-zone.
now to find a balance that enables it to resolve their internal problems, without renouncing the involvement in foreign policy that ensures visibility and recognition worldwide.

Conclusions

From an economic perspective, the challenge for Europe is to find a solution to overcome the faults which are outlined in the Member States because of the economic and financial crises.

The Union is faced with the need to prove that the economic and financial system, that has been the foundation of the development of supranational political integration organization, is a viable one and that overall, the EU is not a project that works only when there are favorable economic conditions and fails when the global economic environment changes.

The economic and financial crisis has not only meant for Europe “shaking” the foundations of economic and financial system, but has created a new security context, in which challenges are extremely diverse, broad, deep, making rehabilitation as well as redefining reorganizing the functioning of the EU not only necessary but also extremely difficult.

Brussels does not only have to identify the best ways of economic and financial recovery of the EU, but it also has to assume increased levels of responsibility in ensuring security in all its dimensions.

The economic and financial crisis had a strong impact on the ability of European businesses and governments in financing investment and innovation projects.

Since the EU already faces major difficulties in the economic, social and political fields, it is also in the middle of major strategic moves (movement of the strategic interests of the US towards Asia-Pacific region in terms of financial implications for European security).

The stage of fundamental movements coincided, at international level, with the period in which the EU was crossing its first years of implementing changes that were introduced by Treaty of Lisbon (2009).

This made many changes be foreshadowed by it and aimed at increasing cohesion and EU consistency on the international arena to prove extremely difficult to implement.

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THE RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE DANUBE AND BLACK SEA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Motto:
“Finally, Russia has returned to the world arena as a strong state, a country that others must take into account and whose will has to be obeyed”.

quote from Vladimir Putin

Abstract: The Black Sea geopolitical position makes it identify with the Heartland, also known as “Heart of the Earth”. According to the theory of international relations, who rules the Heartland World Island dominates the World Island and who dominates the World Island rules the whole world. Also, this may attract the Western interest for this area. From the geostrategic point of view, the Black Sea region has the characteristics of NATO and EU proximity space. Black Sea Basin is the buffer zone between Europe and Asia and the eastern border of the Western community. The discovery of huge reserves of oil and natural gas in the Caucasus and Central Asia have also led to the emergence of economic interests in the Black Sea, turning it into current geostrategic stakes. Since ancient times, Tsarist Russia was concerned with controlling the Black Sea and the Danube, and after the annexation of Crimea, their importance has amplified. The Black Sea had to be turned into a “Russian lake”, thus providing access to hot seas... Using a constructivist approach, the article succinctly presents Russian interests in Danube and Black Sea in the context of contemporary security environment.

Keywords: interest; Danube; the mouths of the Danube; Black Sea; Russia.

At the beginning of XXI century, the current security environment is marked by profound changes in the main areas of social existence. The Cold War ended in the years 1990-1991, the USSR and Yugoslavia were dismembered, NATO and the EU expanded eastwards towards the Black Sea Basin, the Caucasus and the Middle East (the Baltic and the Black Sea), the EU acceded to the status of a global player, becoming a competitor with the US, the Russian Federation reduced its political and military influence, and China and India started to aspire to the rank of “political and economic superpower”.

In the context of current security environment we should “give a glance” to the Black Sea. For 200 years, the Black Sea and the surrounding area is a very important bridge between East and West, a region of the world that, thanks to this specific area, has favored economic exchange relations. Positioned at the confluence of two religions, Christianity and Islam, but between two great families of Slavic and Turkic languages, it holds an important geopolitical space, characterized by political isolation, with the enclave region predisposing factors and strict control of ships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.

The Black Sea passed since the last decade of the last century, through a spectacular transformation. Whereas not long ago it was embedded in the communist world, now it has become a high point of interest with considerable geopolitical significance. Being situated at the crossroads of three security spaces – European, Euro-Asian and Islamic - “the Black Sea region is a complicated intersection of societies, cultures and

1 Due to the Montreux Treaty from November 9th 1936.
political systems”\(^2\). Being the interference space of three geopolitical and geostrategic areas – Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and the Middle East – the Black Sea area, after 1990, transformed not only into a zone of instability, marked by politico-military and economic disputes of the riverside states, but also into an area of concern of other states to reconsider their interests in the area.

In the Black Sea there are a few “key positions” which give it its peculiar character and special value, especially with respect to the geostrategic significance of this area\(^3\). These “key positions” are the following:

* **The Straits** (the Bosphorus, Dardanelles – linked by Marmara Sea) enables navigation and provides a large “closed” Planetary Ocean. Turkey controls the straits, which are, at present, the only strong external transport sea artery, quite handy for all the residents, economical and with a permanent perspective. Also, Turkey control over the straits gives it a privileged status among riverside states.

* **Crimea** – advanced maritime bastion, a real aircraft carrier, “well anchored”, with multiple facilities, surrounded by sufficient naval forces ready for action;

* **Mouths of the Danube (Danube estuary)** – entry and exit of ships navigating through the complex of Sulina performed entirely on Romanian territory, this being an element of strength for Romania;

* **Continental tableland** in front of the Romanian seaside, with attractive elements that have made a hot issue, for many years, the problem of delimitation of the exclusive economic zone of the continental shelf between Romania and Ukraine;

* **Snakes Island** – “rediscovered” in recent years which created turmoil and placed it again in the issue of international diplomacy.

The events in recent years have imposed a new approach to the Black Sea region and the adjacent area, turning them into so-called “Wider Black Sea Area”. The new zone includes, in addition to the six countries with access to the coast (Bulgaria, Russian Federation, Georgia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine), the Republic of Moldova, Greece and other countries in the Caucasus region (Armenia and Azerbaijan)\(^4\).

NATO and the EU enlargement process has brought NATO and European Union on the West Coast, changing the perception that “the Black Sea is a Russian lake at the periphery of Europe”\(^5\) and increasing its geopolitical role of interface with Central Asia and the Middle East.

The economic interests generated by the discovery of huge reserves of oil and natural gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia turned the Black Sea into a geostrategic stake today.

The political map of the Black Sea region in the 21st century is influenced by a former superpower, Russia, and two regional powers, Ukraine and Turkey. After a very long time, when Moscow was the most important actor in the Black Sea, it seeks to maintain its central role that it once played in the construction and maintenance of Cold War architecture shores”. The new concept of extending the Russian Black Sea originated in Tsarist and Soviet eras, especially the need to counter NATO/US and EU expansion in the region. In this respect, Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed increased interest in a permanent Russian Black Sea fleet, which despite the obsolescence of the past 15 years is a significant force that must be taken into account. Russian President’s statements

\(^2\) The article “Regiunea Mării Negre are un nou rol de securitate” of Paul Ciocoiu, for Southeast European Times, 8th November 2006.

\(^3\) SMFN, Marea Neagră - Spaialul de confluență a intereselor geostrategice, (București, Editura CTEA, 2005).

\(^4\) The article “Regiunea extinsă a Mării Negre în căutarea unui concept de securitate strategică” by professor Iulian Chifu, PhD, presented at the Summit for launching Forumul Mării Negre pentru Dialog și Parteneriat, 5 iunie 2006.

\(^5\) Alocu iunea președintelui Traian Băsescu at the Council on Foreign Affairs, 10 martie 2005.
like “the Black Sea and Sea of Azov are located in the Russian strategic interest” or “Russian Black Sea offers direct access to the most important global transport routes” can only emphasize that Russia does not want to abandon the positions held in the Black Sea.

1. Russia - the main actor in the Black Sea and the Wider Black Sea

The Black Sea – mainly Wider Black Sea Area (ZEMN) - is one of the major challenges of global competition for energy resources. The countries that have direct access to the Black Sea are Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia. There is also Moldova, connected to the spam of water through a system of rivers and associated states - Azerbaijan, Greece and others. All these countries have port-loading terminals receiving oil and gas. In terms of energy resources, there is the obvious following classification: exporting countries: Russia, Romania and Azerbaijan; countries that are not directly dependent (or least dependent) of Russian energy supplies: Turkey, Bulgaria; importing countries – all others; transit countries – are state land corridors through which oil and gas (exp. Georgia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Poland, Germany etc.) are transported. Together with local stakeholders and major players, they are part of global US and EU.

In the past twenty-five years the Black Sea region was highlighted as an important commercial hub also because it is close to the Caspian Basin, very rich in fuel. Therefore, Russia, US, EU and regional states have started competing particularly in commercial and diplomatic terms to establish routes of hydrocarbons. Russia, acting as the main producer of oil and gas in the region (and the world), and the main gas supplier of the EU countries, is directly concerned with the “energy game” in the Basin. The “Energy weapon” is for Russia the only way to keep Europe under pressure and cannot afford to lose it. So, Russia is the main actor in ZEMN and exporter of oil and natural gas, while transit countries differ in their stance against the country’s energy flows.

Russia is an important strategic player in the REMN and a predictable actor with a distinct positioning in relation to states, but also with the problems of the region. According to tradition, Russia preserves its right to diplomatic influence in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Black Sea. Russia considers these important areas to provide security and fights to maintain the status-quo. In the energy competition, Russia relies on energy resources, especially oil and gas. Taking advantage of these resources, Moscow forces itself on the international political scene, using them as weapons, whose effect is becoming more visible, and any initiative of an area that is foreign to Russia is badly perceived and the reaction is to pull the plug on delivering gas, by proposing some alternative projects, maintaining a complicated geopolitical situation (in the case of Georgia and Moldova) or preventing NATO and the EU from closing their borders (in case of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine).

Given the orientation and concentration of Russian forces in the Black Sea, both in the energy space, but also in the military, especially after the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, we can estimate Russia’s intention to broaden its area of influence. The Russian revenge, after the attempt to eject them from the Balkans, is to be held by gaining control on the energy space in the Southeast European region, and after that the occupation of the European Union, where Russia has stuck really well its “energy boot”.

But the stakes are not only of geopolitical nature. According to one of the main geopolitical laws, Halford Mackinder said that “who controls Eastern Europe rules the heartland (and Pamir territory of Ural, Volga and Iantzi); Who rules the heartland controls the World Island

2. The importance of the Black Sea to Russia

Russia promotes a favorable foreign policy and development in order to regain its sphere of influence over neighboring states with or without the Black Sea: Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, in general the CIS Member States. By having a huge territory, Russia remains inoculated with “imperial” reflexes. It varies between old Slavic messianic claims and the aspiration to be integrated into Europe and to respect the rules of liberal democracy.

Russia viewed with hostility, in a first phase, the integration of the Balkans and the Baltic-Black Sea region into Euro-Atlantic structures. In the period around 2000-2001, the regime led by Vladimir Putin understood that ongoing processes are irreversible and have adopted a strategy of adaptation to pragmatism. Statements made by Russian President like “Black Sea and Azov Sea is located in the Russian strategic interests” or “Russian Black Sea offers direct access to the most important global transport routes” can only emphasize that Russian does not want to abandon the positions held in the Black Sea.

Russia attaches great importance to the area, especially on strategic military level, being concerned with removing any threat that may come from the south (aware of the risk of blocking their naval communication routes towards the south). At present, the Russian military ground forces have two military bases in Georgia (Batumi and Ahalkalaki), one in Armenia, and one in Tajikistan. The same publication also stated that Russia still has “some subdivisions of peacekeepers in Abkhazia (1.500 troops), South Ossetia (900 troops) and Transnistria (about 1.000 soldiers, and employees guarding ammunition depots)”.

Nowadays, Russia’s new policy appears conciliatory towards the West in general and to the US in particular. The current leader of the Kremlin seeks to maintain an open dialogue and cooperation with the US and Western Europe.

2.1. The importance of the Black Sea Energy

The Wider Black Sea Region is under a double influence: on the one hand, NATO, through its member states, bordering this sea and, on the other hand, Russia, which is trying to promote its own policy by requiring countries to adopt its operating model in the region.

NATO expansion to the Black Sea, which began after a meeting in Istanbul, is a political-military process, the first of its kind. It was preceded by a dialogue of “Mediterranean” type. Most countries in the region have expressed their desire to join NATO, whose doors remained open after the last wave that included Romania and Bulgaria, countries bordering the Black Sea. Russia opposed and still opposes enlargement to the East, but recognizes the right of states to choose security models.

EU enlargement is the second integration process. The accession of

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7 Ionescu, Costin, Marea Neagră - un pivot geopolitic în dispută?, in Geopolitică, Nr.1 (5)2005, an IV, http://www.geopolitica.ro, accessed on 05.07.2015, 17.00
8 Ivestea, 3rd March 2005.
9 Dungaciu, Dan, Transnistria - miza post-electorală și miza geopolitică a Republicii Moldova și miza geopolitică a Mării Negre, http://www.studiiadesecuritate.ro, accessed on 05.07.2015, 18.15
Romania and Bulgaria into the EU on January 1st 2007 and the beginning of negotiations with Turkey will make the European organization a decisional reality in the area. No one opposes this process that hinges critically on the ability of states to reform society so as to join the European community.

The problem of oil added further elements to the decisive American policy. The need for diversification of energy sources as an alternative to alleviate dependency on oil from the Middle East, turns slowly in a US security interest. The oil fields in the Caspian Sea and Central Asia represent a promising alternative which requires strategies for strengthening economic, political and military aspects. For the US, the Black Sea offers the opportunity to establish long-term mechanisms, ensuring free transit of oil. In this context, the increasing quantities of commercialized oil are becoming an issue. The oil from Azerbaijan, where companies are well represented in the US and Britain, and Russian companies will be insufficient. The more so as the area began to sense the competition of China, the second oil consumer in the world, and the looming of India, another large economy whose development depends on securing energy supplies. In this situation the importance of hydrocarbons will increase in Russia, Central Asia and, why not, Iran. In order to ensure themselves and their allies the access to oil resources in the long run, the US will need Russia's cooperation, not its opposition. In its turn, Russia is interested in the advantages of the western market, especially that of the US.

Russia’s importance in securing energy, at least in the Eurasian space and the North American space, has increased hugely. It is one of the realities that must necessarily be taken into account in the configuration of the future strategic environment. For now, this area of major energy resources is in itself confusing and conflicting at the same time.

The existence of significant oil deposits in the region is the main factor which encourages cooperation with major international corporations, as well as with other states. No doubt, the main actors are the Russian Federation and the USA, and two regional powers, Ukraine and Turkey, which have the greatest, although often divergent, interest in this region. A third important actor is the EU but it does not have a well-defined policy in this area.

“Speaking of NATO, the Black Sea region now has three members of the Alliance - Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria - three countries that want to join NATO - Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan - two countries with highly developed PIAP - Ukraine and Moldova - Armenia, member of the PfP, but which has a strategic partnership with Russia, and Russia, which has a special relationship with the Alliance in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). One must not forget the Ukraine-NATO Commission (CUN).”

2.2. The importance of the Crimean Peninsula for Russia

The recent events in Ukraine and the problems caused by these events have brought Crimea into the spotlight of international relations specialists. Crimean Peninsula has a strategic importance to Russia, which secured its influence on the Caucasus and Western Europe and the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol military base.

Formerly an autonomous republic within Ukraine, Crimea is located in southern Ukraine, between the Black Sea and Azov Sea and up to its annexation by Russia (March 2014), it was separated from Russia through the Kerch Strait. We

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must remember that here, Russian tsars, and Soviet elite used to spend their holidays on the southern coast of the peninsula, which remains to this day a special attraction for tourists, and in recent times has aroused more and more interest from foreign investors.

In Crimea, the Black Sea Balaklava Bay, a Russian naval base secretly functioned for many years. Beneath a mountain there were ammunition warehouses, repair shops and a channel through which submarines proceeded to the Black Sea. Between 1957 and 1961, a secret Soviet naval base was built and operated for several years after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since 1995 it has been abandoned, and in 2003 it was opened as a museum in some areas of the base. It was said that this base is indestructible and can withstand a nuclear attack. Most people from the Balaklava city worked on the base during the Cold War and there were very strict security rules. Obviously, this was only natural since the base housed fully equipped nuclear submarines.

Sevastopol is the main port of Crimea Peninsula, being an important naval base in the Black Sea. It houses the Russian Black Sea Fleet from the USSR period. Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, the fleet was divided between Russia and Ukraine. The presence of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol was a permanent cause of tension between Russia and Ukraine.

The agreement on the fleet stationing in Sevastopol was also another tense episode between the two countries emerging from the former USSR. Russia and Ukraine, Kiev and Moscow have signed an agreement that the Russian fleet will remain in Sevastopol in Ukraine until 2017, but after the election of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2010, Ukraine agreed to extend the agreement for another 25 years over the initial deadline in exchange for receiving cheaper gas. With Kiev’s desire to join NATO, new disputes arose between the two countries, Russia and Ukraine. In late 2003, the Kerch Strait was another moment of tension. As soon as Russia began to build the dam, which connects Russian peninsula Taman to the Ukrainian island of Tuzla nearby, the Kerch Strait tensions between the two countries rose again. Tuzla Island is an important strategic point, since it allows the control of navigation in the Kerch Strait that connects the Black Sea with the Sea of Azov.

Crimea has major strategic importance for Russia. The Russian military presence in Sevastopol, amounted to 10,000 soldiers in 2008. After the annexation of Crimea to Russia (March 2014), the Russian military presence in the peninsula has increased. The Russians’ massive military presence in the Black Sea peninsula allows Russia to maintain its influence on Ukraine, and the Caucasus.

Crimea is a traditional example of Russian expansion. Since the military occupation and annexation of Crimea, the war began between Russia and Ukraine. Immediately after “little green men” invaded the peninsula in early March 2014 and the population of Crimea Peninsula was preparing the referendum, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a historic statement: “Crimea had always been and now has become Russian again”.

By occupying the Crimean peninsula, which has a great strategic position, Russia has regained its true importance in the Black Sea and beyond it. Crimea is a “pivot” in the Black Sea, from where it can threaten the entire coastline and from where it can project its power to the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East. By annexing the Crimean peninsula, it has changed the balance of power in the


Black Sea region. Given that Russia cannot claim that the illegal annexation of Crimea was due to a genocide, in which case the UN resolution 1970, which concerns the right of peoples to self-determination could have been applied, Moscow will still have to give explanations for the “illegal abduction” of this territory. Russia used as arguments that “this province (Crimea) has always been Russian; Crimea is a territory where Russian blood was shed in wars; Crimea was unlawfully transferred to Ukraine by Khrushchev”\textsuperscript{18}.

Given the heightened tensions in southeastern Ukraine, Russia sent dozens of Mig-29 fighters and Su-27 and Tu-22 bombers in military bases in the Crimea region\textsuperscript{19}.

The US and NATO allies’ geostrategic priority must be to protect Central and Eastern Europe in the face of Russian threats, including the economic one. However, in order to be able to fulfill this objective, Europe must solve its energy problem and not depend on Russia.

2.3. The importance of the Danube Mouths

In the 21st century, Russia seeks to regain the Danube, although some experts in geopolitics consider that Russia has given up and has lost interest in the Danube.

Who controls the Danube mouths, such a strategic entry into the Danube corridor, whose economic importance increases significantly from year to year (especially in terms of European river transport network), is significant and extremely important, since it leads to becoming a key country or pivotal country in southeastern New European regional construction. It involves very big responsibilities, and prospects for development and substantial development.

Russia, unlike Ukraine, in all the years of Soviet domination, was able to give importance to the Danube and its presence not only militarily, but especially on the military level. From the mouth of the Danube and Prut to enter the Danube to the Black Sea, its shores were full of soldiers. Russia has strengthened here economically also. The port of Reni with 6 jetties, most important by the volume of cargo and rail hub, all of Reni (the only point of passage between the left and right shore of the Danube being Reni) became the most important channel trade route with CAER (socialist Europe). Given its experience as a great empire, Russia has always known how to take advantage of Danube while Ukraine either did not know or did not have time to do it. Thus, nowadays, things got to the current state of affairs... Russia is today with its armies at the borders of Ukraine, while Ukraine is plagued by a guerrilla war, which threatens its peace, territorial integrity, constitutional order and the right to preserve its access to the Danube river.

\textit{But why are the mouths of Danube still so important for Russia?} Russia believes that they are important to it because it is a completely different position to hold one’s armies on the Danube than to have them on the Dniester. There is one thing is to keep under control the navigational flow on Volga River and another one to do so on the Danube. And, we have to face it: Danube is not Dnieper, Don, Volga, or Baikal... Danube is both water, but also the bridge between two worlds and two civilizations, this being the reason for which Russia has not found such an alternative, of controlling Danube Mouths after 1991. But who knows? Perhaps in the near future this will happen too...

\textbf{Conclusion}

The Black Sea and the adjacent area have been for over 200 years an important bridge between East and West. The economic interests in discovering oil and natural gas reserves in the Caucasus and Central Asia have transformed the Black Sea in the current geostrategic stakes.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibidem}

\textsuperscript{19} \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/opinion/the-new-col-war-that-isnt.htm}, accessed on 20.07.2015, 18.00.
The 21st century political map of the Black Sea region is influenced by a former superpower, Russia. Russia, the main actor of the Black Sea, seeks to maintain the role of “pivot” which it once played in building and maintaining the “cold war architecture shores”.

The Black Sea Basin is in a strategic interest area; the Black Sea offering direct access to the most important global transport routes.

Russia’s geopolitical target is closing Ponto-Baltic isthmus and gaining control of Danube Mouths.

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Abstract: This article aims at describing the main challenges for NATO Intelligence capabilities in the existing context of hybrid threats and hybrid warfare, in order for them to address these threats pre-emptively and flexibly and to provide the decision makers with timely effective intelligence designed to allow gaining superiority in this hyper-competition with the hybrid warfare actors. The intelligence structures within NATO are evaluating the best options for a better understanding, adapting and responding to hybrid threats with new hybrid procedures and methods and the ways in which these adjustments are to be de-conflicted and implemented inside the alliance, inter-agencies and inter-governments. Full commitment and trust building, defining the new enemy, maintaining the achievements of latest NATO campaigns, more training in common and inputs of new capabilities will help NATO intelligence to deter the hybrid threats.

Keywords: hyper-competition, hybrid threats, transformation, integration, adaptation, hybrid answers.

1. Introduction

Military intelligence activity is defined in its core as a dynamic process that should consider and timely and effectively adapt to the continuous changes posed by the security situation of the owned operational environment. Military intelligence should also know and face the newly identified threats against the security situation. Due to its preemptive character, military intelligence activity continuously generates multiple changes in procedures, doctrines, and organizational management for a better understanding and countering of all threats. Also, military intelligence activity deals with time delay between the action of the enemy or opponent and the answer of the intelligence structure. The hybrid warfare characteristics showed by the conflict in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq, highlighted this necessity to continuously adapt to all kind of threats, and particularly to know and prevent the insurgent activities and the complex tactics and procedures used by state and non-state actors involved in the conflict.

During Wales NATO Summit¹, SACEUR, gl. Philip BREEDLOVE, said that the Russia’s activities in Ukraine offered the opportunity to witness “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare”. Therefore, NATO decided to develop its capabilities in order to identify and properly confront all kinds of challenges generated by the hybrid warfare threats. Consequently, the newly formed NATO response force – SPEARHEAD, that is to be fully operational starting with 2016 – offers the NATO members to reconsider the importance of the strategic communication and approach.

Generally speaking, fighting hybrid threats requires new answers and adjusted plans, inter-governmentally and inside the alliance. However, the amount of desired transformation and the right timing represents the real challenges. The intelligence domain, as a decisive and successful factor for countering hybrid threats is facing multiple changes, struggling for new capable intelligence

¹ Wales Summit Declaration, www.nato.int
structures, adapted postures, and the right level of reaction.

2. The use and transformation of NATO Intelligence in the hybrid warfare

After the NATO campaign in Afghanistan, the intelligence community contribution has been questioned in terms of the level of information advantage gained. Despite the overall performance, it is still unclear whether or not there was any intelligence or other type of superiority during NATO intervention in Afghanistan, since there were no comparable actionable answers from the insurgency side, strong enough to build a comparative analysis.

The NATO intelligence community truly realized the importance and the dimension of transformation projects and intentions up to the full operational capability state of NATO Response Force, only when Russia switched the NATO relationship paradigm from partnership to conflict. Therefore, in light of the new security context, NATO is compelled to raise the level of intelligence structures, and get them ready for a future possible confrontation with a comparable adversary, Russia, that holds the operational environment better, and is a little ahead in terms of time and initiative. Moreover, at this time, it is being said that NATO and Russia intelligence systems find themselves in a hyper-competition.

NATO intelligence community should also pay attention to other areas of intelligence interest, like Africa and former theaters of operations (Iraq, Afghanistan, Balkans), that could influence the NATO security environment. There are still other latent global actors (China, Iran) that could take advantage of hybrid warfare solution while attempting to control their areas of influence.

Therefore, NATO intelligence community should pass important steps for a comprehensive approach of hybrid threats.

2.1. NATO Intelligence level of ambition and lines of effort

NATO campaign in Afghanistan has been the most important indicator that showed NATO capacity to conduct complex mission abroad, out of its territories. Even at the end of Afghanistan campaign, there were enough arguments and queries because of logistical, operational, and manning limitations, as well as the repeated attempts of state members’ governments to impose restrictions regarding the use of their own troops. After noticing this, ISAF commander, gl. Stanley McChrystal firmly asked for a profound change inside ISAF, a deep change in its operational culture and strategy, and the cancelling of separate campaigns.

Finally, the persistent hybrid threats could enforce the re-thinking of the entire NATO intelligence system (and national level, too) on three vectors: integration – adaptation – transformation.

The intelligence partnership inside NATO has been repeatedly questioned and discussed due to the lack or inconsistency of the unity of effort. The sensitive intelligence activity domain faced multiple challenges, starting from politics, resources, culture, and competing national interests. The new NATO Strategic Concept highlights the importance of security cooperation among the three most important pillars. Thus, traditional challenges against cooperation inside the alliance, like national caveats, interoperability, resources, national interests and intelligence sharing, ought to be managed timely and efficiently.

Finally, it is crucially important for NATO intelligence community to reaffirm the common engagement to re-establishing

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3 NATO strategic concept is a visionary document that establishes the main directions of NATO actions on medium and long terms and a document that informs the public opinion from the allied countries on NATO priorities.
the level of trust strong enough for a good cooperation, to identifying the reliable partners from an organization that witnesses the undermining of the collective effort, even by countries that previously affirmed NATO adherence as a national interest. The strategic alignment and NATO intelligence community integration will mainly consist of passing from the state of conducting operations (Afghanistan campaign) to the stand-by contingency state, along with providing the integration conditions for capabilities.

2.2. Defining the new enemy

There is a great deal of dualism when referring to the new enemy and/or opponent. On the one hand, there is a direct approach that points out the states and organizations involved in hybrid warfare. On the other hand there is a denial of hybrid threats evidence from political, defense and military sides. Above all, some incapacity of intelligence community to completely and timely predict the rapid evolution of the security situation resulted in the incomplete knowledge of the adversary and its intentions. Most of the situations found NATO intelligence structures acting reactively. Therefore, NATO intelligence community should identify the opponents’ strategic steps and alert and get ready the response force in order to face the new threats. The most important criteria is represented by the flexibility of intelligence force deployment and the preemptive engagement of hybrid threats, similar to the flexibility showed by the regional and global actors using hybrid threats.

2.3. Exercise and training common planning

Modern operational environments determined by the new challenges against regional and global security highlight the minimization of the armed forces’ role compared with political and economic intervention. In the near future, NATO forces will follow the transformation process to an end state that requires joint actions, rapid deployment and sustainability for long periods of time and that designs an expeditionary force, in accordance with the global dimension affirmed by NATO.

Once the NATO campaign in Afghanistan was finished, the intelligence human resource found itself out of the last twelve-year-situation. Therefore, it is crucially important to prepare the human resource up to the required level in order to step forward to the new NATO Response Force concept. The new NFIU strategic command units will be expected to harmonize the level of training, between the veterans from former NATO campaigns and the new generation of military intelligence personnel.

The new challenges of hybrid warfare require new training methods, also. Thus, collective training and exercise directive could be reviewed and adapted to the new scenarios that match the characteristics of hybrid warfare operational environment actors. Following this, the role of intelligence centers will play a crucial role in the preparation of the future intelligence units and specialists. The new scenarios will start from reviewing the operational environment characteristics from permissive to non-permissive and hostile ones. Then, the operational procedures might be reviewed and modified. Together with them, the development of alternative intelligence disciplines, like special operation forces, cyber intelligence, and “human terrain system” suit the needs for a comprehensive training. Other options

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4 NATO Force Integration Unit
5 BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 075-003, 02 October 2013
6 Human Terrain System (HTS) is a support program employing personnel from the social science disciplines – such as anthropology, sociology, political science, regional studies and linguistics – to provide military commanders and staff with an understanding of the local population (i.e. the “human terrain”) in the regions in which they are deployed.
result from the specific model of „smart defense” concept. Close cooperation in the intelligence field, transatlantic solidarity, and innovation approach are valuable solutions to the new training program.

2.4. Using new capabilities in order to optimize the intelligence process

In order to provide the intelligence support, NATO might consider using new capabilities to optimize the intelligence collection process. Using biometrics, data mining, GEOINT joint capabilities, emphasis of cyber intelligence contribution, and JISR integration of OSINT, SOCMINT, and cyber intelligence are multiple alternatives to optimize the intelligence process. There is also need for balance between security and civil rights, in the place where possible constrictions might appear. These limitations will deter the rhythm of changing and adapting to new requirements. For instance, the process of acceleration, maturation, and uniformity of access to the technical aspects of intelligence represents a possible unpleasant situation.

It is also necessary that political and military decision makers might consider a preemptive approach of a global actor using hybrid threats, before those actors become stronger. In this context, it has to be stated that intelligence remains the main contributor to help decision makers to deter potential developments of hybrid threats. NATO agrees with a global approach from the intelligence support perspective, when confronted with the volatile character and mutation showed by this type of threat. Even though the new hybrid threats are not new for NATO, they are hard to be anticipated, both as events and with respect to their destructive potential. For instance, even during the ongoing hybrid warfare in Ukraine, the seeds of future conflict are grounded, by creation of psychological enclaves in different targeted countries, by sustaining corrupt governments, or by controlling critical infrastructures through elaborated cyber actions. As first response, once the cyber security concept has been operationalized, NATO frontally and timely attacked one of the most favorite hybrid threat used by Russia in Ukraine.

In the near future, another major challenge will consists in the identification of the form, of legal frame, and the extent of using operational information preventively, before the beginning of hostilities, providing the continuity of diplomatic efforts, too.

Inside NATO, the intelligence community should quickly adapt to new threats, to measure and identify the needs for adaptation, to use the legacy of those collection systems developed during the cold war, and the experience of counterinsurgency campaigns, all these to gain an intelligence advantage against a state-level political and military structure. For instance, NATO might question the amount of HUMINT used, due to the increased risks the agents are exposed to, taking into consideration that the adversary is dominating this space far beyond.

NATO should identify hybrid answers to hybrid threats. Moreover, NATO should carefully identify, from the intelligence perspective, the societal challenges that the aggressor exploits, like inter-ethnic tensions, institutional corruption, economic and energetic dependency, and migration from insecure areas.
Conclusion

The new NATO strategic concept considers the global emergent threats and draws new missions and tasks in the domain of intelligence collection.

Based on the afore mentioned concept – „NATO is an alliance that ensures security and consists of military forces capable of cooperation and deployment in any environment” - intelligence structures are committed to integration, adaptation and transformation, inside the newly created NATO structure – SPEARHEAD.

Reaching full operational capability for multinational divisions in order to answer timely and effectively to any threats represents a challenge as important as the role played by the intelligence structure in the decision making process. Providing the critical intelligence requirements during pre-positioning of military equipment, and the intelligence preparation of an operational environment that presents hybrid threat characteristics, before rapidly deploying tens of thousands of land-forces troops with the support of naval, aerial, and special operation forces, represent challenges that intelligence structure might approach during integration – adaptation – transformation process, only.

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MILITARY ART CONFLICTS IN THE NEW GLOBAL CONTEXT

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Abstract: In „War and Civilization”, Arnold Toynbee proves that the evolution of military art does not depend on the evolution of society, on its proper functioning. A civilization in development prevents wars, it does not create them. Military Art in general is an art of confrontation of aspects related to political and social crisis, the theory of critical circumstances involving the use of the force in order to manage out of them, the use of deterrence, threat or violence. Also, military art is rendered by the art of dialogue, a certain type of communication. „The one who does not understand in depth the evil that war can do does not understand its advantages either.”(Sun Tzu).

Keywords: art, military, conflict, war, strategy.

Military art - essential in managing armed conflicts

Military art known in the past as the art of war, before becoming part of military science – coincided with talent, skills, mastery, personal example and initiatives in fighting of the commander, master craftsmanship and sense of orientation in critical situations. Military art is the art of organizing and leading a battle.

Military art - specialized field of organization and management of combat - includes two main components:

• military art theory, studying the experience of the armed fight for development principles, methods, procedures and rules of preparing combat;

• military art practice, which relates to the preparation and execution of the battle itself.

More than 2500 years have passed since “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu started to be perceived as a reference piece of work when it comes to military art or strategy. The work led to the development of numerous papers, articles and theses, which summed up would certainly create the greatest military art treaty in the world. The work was and is still read since wars were won with weapons to the newest firearms and sophisticated technologies. US infantry soldiers still carry a copy of this treaty, together with their advanced equipment.

The Chinese philosophy on war is that war it is just a way of doing things in a different manner. “Wu” – the Chinese sign designating the phrase “military issues” is composed of two characters: “Zhi” – to prevent and “Ge” – an old type of weapon (billhook); these characters reveal that ancient Chinese people were guided by the idea of preventing war and maintaining peace with the help of war. In the past, Chinese people used to divide state problems into two categories: military and cultural. The military category included issues related to war and the army, and cultural side was related to administration, economics and politics.

War - the last option for settling disputes

Chinese people have followed for thousands of years the dictum: “To love war will lead you to ruin, to forget about war certainly puts you in danger.” This philosophy is essential to the country’s politics. Defense is an essential feature, from antiquity, of Chinese military strategy; of course that defense must be strategic and effective. The third chapter of the “Art of War” is entitled “About the offensive”. This strategic thinking has had a great influence on commanders of
armies, because it highlights the idea that “defeating the enemy without fighting is the best option that military troops must first adopt.”

Based on Sun Tzu’s opinion, winning or losing a fight is due to the rule whose solutions can be predictable. Most important for a commander is to know his opponent and himself - that will enable him to safely wage a hundred battles. However, the treaty is not a recipe for easy victories. It is proved that in the ancient Chinese culture, the opponents who used at the same time “The Art of War” in conflicts did not have the same results, which is perfectly natural. There are many factors influencing the outcome of a war: from the geographic, weather, climate, political state in which the commander has to make decisions, soldiers’ skills and their combat power they have or even people support. It is impossible for a commander, after performing this analysis not to not know what action to take.

After the world passed in this new century and although the interest shown for peace is increasing – the technology has advanced so much that a potential war would lead Earth to the edge of transformation into an apocalyptic space.

From strategy and tactics to a vast and complex domain

Military art was not always perceived as it is today. When it first started to function as a field of study, the military art only included strategy and tactics. Since the twentieth century, especially during World War I, to some army forces a new field was developed – the operative art.

It is necessary to study not just military art as a macro field, but also to analyze its components involved in the preparation, conduct, results and conclusions of wars, battles or campaigns or military operations.

In the wars of the slavery era documents mentioned strategy as an area of military art, which encompasses the preparation and support of the war to which we might add: training, equipment, organization and use of the armed forces of the state in war, setting goals that determine war and the types of strategic actions to reach them; using different types of forces (land, sea, air), building cooperation, making alliances, preparing the territory for defense and not least ensuring cooperation with the allies in the coalition wars.

During the following historical period – modern age, contemporary types – the strategy issues became more diversified; even if for a significant period of time that lasted until the onset of the twentieth century, strategy had been considered almost the exclusive attribute of the commander-in-chief.

The First and Second World War dismantled the principle that strategy is the art of the commander-in-chief and emphasized the idea that strategy is a system that was set up after a laborious activity of important commanders and military experts who theorized war experience into a system of knowledge and principles relating to leading campaigns, operations, wars.

Together with the growth of the war phenomenon, the functions of the military strategy have evolved; currently being formulated as follows: determining the war character; preparing the country’s armed forces and the population for war; leading the campaigns and operations; ensuring the overall management of the war; training commanders. Additional to both forms of strategic actions, strategic offensive and defense, there are also other strategic military actions: mobilizing the army, coverage, strategic deployment, grouping joint strategic echelons from one theater of operations to another.

Analyzing strategic maneuvers in wars over the centuries we observe the evolution of military art from the simplest forms to complex forms of modern and contemporary, although the basic
maneuvers are the same: reverse, flanking, interior / exterior direction maneuver, front strike. From the Second World War the vertical maneuver is also used, through the use of air force or navy troops.

Operational art is the connecting domain, which includes theory and practice of military actions, less important than the strategic part but more important than the tactical ones.

Tactics, as a field of military art, appeared together with military institutions and war as a phenomenon and had as interest the armed fight on land and sea, and later also in the air. Its area of concern includes the development of principles, processes, rules and methods of preparation and execution of the armed fight, and at the same time the use of all resources in the preparation and support of all warfare.

Main concepts of military art

Military art includes a wide range of concepts whose understanding is mandatory for understanding the phenomenon in all aspects; therefore the most frequently used terms are the following:

- **Truce** – the agreement for suspending military operations of the belligerents, while the war continues.
- **Siege** – encirclement of a fortified district or a reinforced place (village / town) for as long as possible – cutting off the enemy’s connections with the outside world in order to force him to surrender or to weaken him before the final assault.
- **Battle** – all combat actions undertaken by forces of the operative groups in a set geographic-military space.
- **Campaign** – part of the war that includes all military actions on one or several theaters of military action in a certain period of time, in order to achieve a strategic goal.
- **Bridgehead** – the piece of land on the watercourse conquered or held, opposite to the own military force, beyond the crest of a mountain range or on the coast, in order to develop offensive over the respective obstacle.

  - **Surrender** – ending the hostilities or resistance of a belligerent or other part of the forces, as a result of defeat.
  - **Military coalition** – temporary agreement between two or more states in order to wage a common war.
  - **Group of armies** – high strategic and operational units in the armed forces of some countries – composed of several armies in order to act in a military theater of operations.
  - **Belligerent groups** – groups of countries that are in conflict.
  - **Fight** – action or actions organized by subunits, tactical units and important units that use weapons and combat equipment, having as focus the suppression or seizure of enemy forces.
  - **Military operation** – all major combat operations conducted by the important operational and strategic units following a unique plan with the purpose of achieving a single strategic and operative interest.
  - **War** – a socio-political phenomenon; a manifestation of conflicting political relations at a certain time; in order for certain economic or political objectives to be achieved, violent means are used, which makes the situation extremely destructive.
  - **Offensive response** – a defensive action which is performed at all levels and, depending on the report with the echelon that performs it, it can be a counter-attack, executed by a tactical echelon, a counterstrike executed by operative echelons, or a counter-offensive performed by strategic echelons.
  - **Stratagem** – organizing a combat action in such a way as to give the enemy the impression that will be conducted otherwise than in reality.
  - **Theater of military actions** – a part of the territory of belligerent forces, defined by specific geographic features,
where warfare is conducted on one or more strategic directions.

- **Theater of war** – all the territories of the member states engaged in a war – it includes land, sea and air space; it may comprise one or more military actions.
- **Ultimatum** – a political act of a state which has a dispute with another state, imposing firm conditions.

**“Strategic Management” substitute of “Military art”**

Of the specific characteristics of today’s society, the one that does not change is the change – manifested in all areas of activity. It directly determines the activity of organizations (political, cultural, economic, and military) forced to constantly adapt in order to meet the changes produced inside their sphere of activity. The need for change is driven by scientific and technical progress, fierce competition manifested worldwide and the increasing amount new needs from people.

A modern form of leadership is strategic management. Strategic management focuses on amendments and changes to be undertaken within the organization and in its interactions with the environment in which it operates, for avoiding situations where the entire activity is exceeded or in a total mismatch with the changes.

Changes also occur in the military field, so, in future military conflicts, the presence of strategic leadership is needed, as it has been proved from a conflict to another; a previous conflict served as a case study for the conflict that followed.

The context in which future armed conflicts will be conducted requires a wide range of requirements in a system open to strategic military leadership. Worldwide alliances reduce the possibility of occurrence of armed conflicts – before conflicts occur, peaceful ways of settling disputes shall be used primarily, such as those with diplomatic or jurisdiction-related character, or those based on coercion without the use of force: retaliations, reprisals, embargo, boycott etc.

These peaceful ways of solving conflicts between states must be developed, enhanced and maintained; otherwise in the event of opening an armed conflict situation worldwide in the context of today’s development of technology, even if it is believed that the conflict could be kept under control, the situation will degenerate and this would certainly be fatal to the entire planet.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY EDUCATION – AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM

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Abstract: Modernizing public order and safety/national security military structures depends primarily on the modernization and improvement of selection criteria, including greater rigor; upgrading their training both in academic institutions and in the institutions for basic and advanced training. Romania as part of NATO does not represent only safety and security; its participation with NATO to world-wide missions in order to ensure world peace requires the development and evolution of the whole defense system, from increasing the human resource performance to ensuring a modern logistics adapted to new challenges.

Keywords: school, training, military performance, defense.

Military School – the basis of training for the officers

Military education institutions are the main, if not the only responsible institutions for officers’ training. The Romanian general context of partnership with international organizations such as NATO commits to performance – the educational component having an essential role in this regard. The role of military schools, training and development centers and so on is to respond primarily to the needs of vocational education, training and future specializations of the officers in order for them to be able to face situations occurring in practice.

Maintaining the high level of training results from the interest turned to performance of professional activities, by continuously improving the educational offer (so the selection source will increase); from an efficient management and a comfortable budget; from its rational use and attracting new income sources.

Performance arises out of competition; therefore for the purpose of education and training future officers, but also for their development, the military schools can address competition similar to the competitive market of services, so as their abilities to be always driven by the continuously changing requirements arising from developments in the technical and technological environment and also in the social, political and economic environments.

In the new social context we can also discuss about competition between the military and civilian educational institutions; under these circumstances a selection system and appropriate training must be applied, it also requires a management system that is appropriate to the driven structure.

New opportunities in military education

After 1990, due to the opening of international borders, the Romanian education, including the military education, has had significant prospect of exchanging information. Educational institutions through partnerships made over the years have favored the harmonization of curricular area and the contribution to the modernization of military education through cooperation in research – all these led to the modernization of military education in the broad range of educational offerings, institutional culture, management techniques and improving materiel.

Cooperation between the Romanian and the international military in the field of education requires from Romania a...
constant effort for adapting and developing the educational offer and the professionalism of training teachers and instructors, on the one hand, and of student or trainees, on the other.

The extent to which teachers and commanders of military educational institutions bear responsibility and get involved in achieving the objectives is as important as the management strategy adopted. Motivating personnel cannot be achieved only through material means, but also through factors such as patriotism, open communication, organizational culture, dignity, comradeship, honor, desire to progress and many more.

**The need for a reliable management system**

The gap between the change of the human factor and the institutional and material factors can be understood. The system of ensuring quality claims in the development of the responsibility and motivation factors, the following aspects:

- completing a continuous process of improvement of the instructors
- ensuring a more transparent and coherent management act
- establishing responsibilities, tasks and performance criteria
- establishing the periodic evaluation of individuals and adopting a strategy directed towards improving results.

The military specific structure of the educational process includes the following:

- the development of the detailed knowledge base – expressed by transferring knowledge from teachers / instructors to students or trainees; the knowledge transfer being achieved during the courses and practical sessions;
- the development of the tactical knowledge base – performed in weapon training centers – an important factor in the complexity of training the future professionals;
- the development of the ability to process knowledge – Romanian military education was focused over time on the accumulation of knowledge; to counterbalance the American system of military education the emphasis is on the ability to process the knowledge gained.

The most efficient solution is the development of both options:
- generating new knowledge – is performed during post graduate Masters and PhD courses by research in the military education
- assessing knowledge and the knowledge processing ability – depending on the specialization, it has as an objective ensuring the fulfillment of minimum requirements of promotion and evaluation for the purpose of hierarchy.

The components listed above are included in the educational process organized in military training centers. For greater efficiency of this process it is necessary to also develop process support consisting of hard and virtual libraries, the possibility of connecting to the Internet from a variety of databases available worldwide, providing reliable technological databases, assuring appropriate social conditions for students and trainees.

**Aiming for performance**

We synthesized the most relevant aspects of quality assurance systems of training and education in schools. They are the following:

- an increased confidence in its capacity to be efficient;
- an alignment with international military education standards;
- an evaluation of professional performance in the educational and scientific domains;
- an efficient use of results and ensuring efficient training;
- the development of a military-specific institutional culture.
Considering all these aspects, it is essential to create an institutional framework that would underpin a national quality assurance system of specialized education – Romanian military.

We believe that the main action areas that would lead to the development of military education system are the following:

• creating a more appropriate selection on profile specialization
• creating the possibility to study and perform on the selected specialization
• ensuring a systematic program and appropriate logistics
• enforcing institution regulations more rigorously in order to develop discipline and military exigency
• rewarding trainees / students depending on their activities
• creating the possibility of carrying out more often internships abroad at similar institutions
• providing guidance and counseling towards further learning and development.

The Romanian military higher education is currently going through a process of reform in order to create mechanisms to perform in a similar manner to those of the international organizations our country has adhered to. To that purpose, mixed specialized boards were set up, formed by joining specialists in the field, recognized nationally and internationally.

Academies training Romanian officers

The Academy of Higher Military Studies, today “Carol I” National Defense University, was founded as the Superior War School. On March 15th, 1937 by the unanimous vote of the Chamber of Deputies and on March 16th, that of the Senate, this War School was founded on November 1st, 1937. Actually, that was the solemn moment when the act of foundation took place in the presence of Romania’s sovereign - Carol II. The parchment built within the actual foundation stated: “May the new sanctuary whose foundation is set today (...) give the Romanian wise army leaders and industrious staff officers who at times of peril may lead the army of our nation, in defense of our ancestral land and to the prosperity of our imperishable full glory”.

“Nicolae Balcescu” Land Forces Academy in Sibiu was founded on the royal order of Prince George Bibescu no. 36 of June 13, 1847, which certified the establishment of the first military schools for officers. This marked a memorable moment in the history of "Nicolae Balcescu" Land Forces Academy, successor and follower of military tradition and institutionalized education during the process of becoming of Romanian military education in different social and historical contexts. Its current name was given in 2000 by the General Staff Order no. G-2/008. Over time this institution occupied an important place in the fight for the defense of the Romanian Countries. This is also the context in which we must understand the preoccupation with training officers who, in turn, will be able to train troops and prepare the population from a military point of view.

“Henri Coandă” Air Force Academy in Brașov is an accredited military institution of higher education, part of the national education system, located in Brasov, a city in the geographic center of Romania with a rich tradition for nearly a century in the construction of aircraft and of military education.

“Mircea cel Bătrân” Navy Academy in Constanța has the roots in the Fleet School established by Decision of War Ministry No. 15 of November 17, 1872 with its headquarters in Galați.

1 www.unap.ro
2 www.armyacademy.ro
3 www.afahc.ro
Government Decisions no. 551 206 of 23 April and 17 May 1990, “Mircea cel Bătrân” Naval Academy was established as a higher education institution specialized in training navy officers.  

The Technical Military Academy of Bucharest was founded on 15.09.1949 by Ordinance no. 371 of 09.14.1949, aiming “to form officers-engineers trained for dealing with the technical features corresponding to different arms, required for staffing headquarters, units, formations and specialized military institutions.”

“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy in Bucharest. In 1991, within "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Police Academy of Bucharest, by Government Decision no. 137/1991, the Faculty of Psycho-sociology was established as a structure specialized in intelligence and subordinated to the Romanian Intelligence Service. Awareness of the social utility of this initiative led to the creation in 1992 of an independent higher military education entity, specialized in training intelligence officers.

“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Police Academy of Bucharest was established in 1949 as the School of Police Officers. “The purpose of the school is to prepare police officers, in order to fill the existing vacancies in the police organizations with well-qualified staff. Candidates for the preliminary examination were recruited from young people in different working environments, soldiers within the police or army and the police NCOs proposed by superiors.” The Superior School of officers was transferred within Police Officers’ School, as special subunit, whose classes began on August 23rd, 1949.  

As a conclusion, I should mention Anghel Andreescu quoting from a speech delivered at “Carol I” National Defense University: "... together we must defend this country!

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EDUCATIONAL STRATEGY OF INITIAL TRAINING
(PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION) OF HUMAN RESOURCES
FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE MINISTRY – PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract: As a member state of the European Union, Romania must actively contribute to the achievement of the strategic framework for the European cooperation in the field of education and professional training – ET 2020. Considering the changes that Romanian Army has been through in the last few years, as well as the legislative development of the professional training process (ET 2020), it is necessary to design a new strategy for the professional training of human resources within the Ministry of National Defense. The present paper aims to emphasize the main structural marks of the strategy in question, having as a main objective to identify priority areas of action in the initial training of human resources, all these in support of the institutional development effort and the strengthening of our role as NATO partner.

Keywords: strategy, professional training, areas of action, military personnel.

The current state of facts shows that Romania has evolved with respect to the adult vocational training system by developing national policies in the field. As a result, a well put together legal framework and a strengthened institutional framework was founded, aimed primarily to develop and improve human resources by participating in a modern, effective and quality training.

As a member state of the European Union, Romania must actively participate in achieving the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in the Field of Education and Professional Training – ET 2020.¹ In order to achieve the objectives projected by the strategy “Education and Training 2020 (ET 2020)”, Romania drafted, in 2011, the national targets for all objectives of the strategy in question, initiating significant changes in terms of legislation and structure. In this regard we can mention:

- Education Law no. 1 of 2011;
- Government Decision no. 556/2011 on the organization, structure and functioning of the National Authority for Qualifications;
- Law no. 57/2012, amending and supplementing Government Ordinance no. 129/2000 concerning the professional training of adults;
- Government Decision no. 918/2013 on the approval of the National Qualifications Framework;
- The Order of the Minister of Education and Scientific Research no. 5204/2014 approving the Methodology for entry and registration of qualifications concerning higher education in the National Register of Qualifications in Higher Education (RNCIS).

Starting from the Lisbon Strategy, which has set a sustainable framework for the first time, a European cooperation in professional education, the ET 2020 strategy aims mainly at human capital development through education and training systems. In this regard, ET 2020 again brings to attention that “lifelong learning should be regarded as a fundamental principle for the entire framework, which is designed to cover

¹ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/?uri=celex:52009XG0528 (01), accessed on 03.08.2015
learning in all contexts – formal, non-formal or informal, and at all levels\(^2\). For this, four strategic objectives are set as follows:

1. Practicing lifelong learning and mobility. In this regard, the purpose is considered the development of the national qualification frameworks and the setting of more flexible learning paths, including through greater openness towards non-formal and informal learning. At the same time it aims to ensure full transparency of the process of recognition of learning outcomes (competences, knowledge, and skills).

2. Improving the quality and efficiency of education and training. It mainly aims at increasing the quality of teaching, which facilitates the learning process by professionalizing the teaching career and also by increasing the attractiveness of teaching positions. In the same context, another thing brought to attention is the importance of the processes of administration and management of educational institutions in developing and implementing effective quality assurance systems.

3. Promoting equality, social cohesion and active citizenship.

4. Stimulating creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship at all levels of education and training. It envisages, among other things, promoting the acquisition of transversal key competences such as: entrepreneurial spirit, cultural knowledge etc.

The new challenges of national security, generated by the superposition of different military processes, and the obligations arising from its quality as member of NATO, as well as its commitments to the European Union, the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has thought a long process (2007-2025) for the transformation of Romanian Army. As a result, they drafted in 2007 the Transformation Strategy of Romanian Army. This allows “broadening the range of objectives and processes to include structuring and preparing forces to participate in collective defense, strengthening the capacity for the full range of crisis management operations and those for multinational operations.”\(^3\) The transformations designed and planned to work are estimated to cover, synchronize and correlate all the fields specific to the military environment, ensuring coherence and sustainability. Regarding the transformation of human resources, there is the fundamental purpose “constituted by achieving an efficient management of professional human resources of defense”\(^4\) by modernizing human resources management and by reshaping military education.

As it can be seen, the concept of professional human resource is brought to the attention, a concept that has changed with the evolution of training and development processes. Therefore, in 2003, at the Centre for Defense and Security Strategic Studies Petre Dutu, Constantin Mostofle and Alexandra Sarcinschi published the study “Romanian Army Professionalization in the context of integration into NATO”. The authors believed at that time that the military profession implies the existence of employees who voluntarily join the military institution and, in order to perform their functional duties, they have a specific training. However, experts in science education and training (such as Professor Emil Păun) believe that professionalizing for a career, including the military one, is the result of the acquisition of certain competences of a given domain, a process developed based on a model of the respective profession. Moreover, besides

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\(^2\) Council’s conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (“ET 2020”), the EU’s Official Journal – C119 from 28.05.2009 p.3

\(^3\) The Transformation Strategy of Romanian Army, Bucharest, 2007, p.3

\(^4\) Idem 3, p.16
the educational process of formation of professional competences it is also required to go through the procedures to legitimize the occupation in question in the sphere of social activities and professions based on the model designed. As a result, we believe that in order to speak of a professionalized human resource, in a first phase, it is necessary to develop those minimum models of occupations specific to the military environment (similar to occupational standards or standards of training), constituting reference documents to designed training programs.

Also, the remodeling process of military education, objectified through the strategy of military transformation, pursues its compatibility with national education and that of the Euro-Atlantic area for training and professionalization of Army staff.

In this sense, in our view, an educational strategy for the initial training of human resources for the Ministry of Defense should be developed in line with national and European policies in the field, materialized in the particularities specific to military environment. Therefore, we propose to analyze these perspectives for action:

A. The structuring of educational systems in accordance with the National Qualifications Framework by making a connection between education, professional training and employment. This requires:
- defining the qualifications specific to military environment, according to skill levels, for which we may organize training programs finalized with professional qualification certificates;
- completing the Classification of Occupations in Romania (COR), major group 0 – Armed Forces with specific MND occupations, for which we can later organize training programs;
- developing occupational standards for occupations introduced in COR by transforming the existing models of graduates. The documents shall be drafted according to those professional models necessary for training programs and evaluating the professional performances of servicemen that are hired for those specific functions.

Due to the fact that, at this moment, these elements are missing, military educational institutions are determined to authorize professional qualification programs for qualifications/occupations specific to areas of civil activity. For example, the Military School for Land Forces Military Technicians and NCOs organizes the training programs for Military Technicians and NCOs for professional qualifications with mechanical profile/specialization mechanical technologist technician, electronic automation profile/specialization electronic technician in telecommunication, etc. The negative elements caused by these phenomena are the following: the assessment of institution for accreditation/licensing is performed by specialists external to the military environment, who seek primarily the degree of admission to civil standards and the curricula specific to military training is limited by the obligation going through the full curricula for approval. Moreover, the professional training of soldier volunteers is done for an occupation found in the COR with a high degree of generality: staff of the armed forces, other degrees\(^5\) and the training program is exceptional, a stage of basic individual training followed by a stage of specialized individual training. Of course, the program itself provides training for successfully occupying the assigned functions, but the desire imposed by the transformation strategy of the Army, according to which training programs must be compatible with those existent at national level is far from being fulfilled.

\(^5\) Government Decision no. 1352 of 2010, regarding the approval of the Classification of Occupations in Romania – level basic group, published in the Official Gazette no. 894 of December 30th 2010
Also by defining qualification, occupations and occupational standards specific to military environment and by integrating them into the national registers, we can underpin the recognition and certification of military expertise acquired in other ways than formal (non-formal and informal, namely by executing mission in operations’ theaters or by participating in integrating exercises and applications, etc.). This objective is in correlation with the ET 2020 objectives and strategy.

B. Ensuring the educational quality and effectiveness of initial training systems (professional qualification) of the human resource for the Ministry of Defense. This requires:
- defining a quality management system in education specific to military training institutions with the mission of initial training of human resources for the military career;
- defining the armed inspector institution;
- professionalizing the teaching career and increasing the attractiveness of teaching positions.

Quality Assurance in Education involves the design and operationalization of a series of actions, having as main objectives the development of beneficiaries’ trust (graduates and employers-operational units) that a teaching institutions offers as educational services in accordance with recognized standards of performance. By “standard” we mean the “description requirements formulated in terms of rules or outcomes, which define the compulsory minimum level of achievement in educational activities”.

At this point in the MND there are no quality standards specific to the educational field. All military educational institutions that are evaluated in terms of quality assurance in education report educational processes to the national standards managed by ARACIS (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education) or ARACIP (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Undergraduate Education). Moreover, for non-university ongoing professional training in MND, there are no specific laws to deliver industry-specific national legislation in terms of quality education (Emergency Ordinance no. 75 of 2005 on Quality Assurance in Education) in specific military education. As a result, in application schools, centers and training bases, the functioning of the management systems of quality in education is inconsistent, different for each institution, depending on the experience and specific training of instructors in the field.

Also, ensuring quality in education requires a direct relationship with employers, namely operational units especially that, according to Emergency Ordinance no. 75 of 2005, the commission for evaluation and quality assurance in education includes, in relatively equal number, military corps representatives and employer representatives. This relationship would allow both the evaluation and analysis of instructional processes and especially the definition, jointly between the educational institution – employer, of corrective actions that can be applied to reduce or even eliminate identified nonconformities. At this point, the relationship between non-university professional training institutions (application schools, training centers/bases) and operational units is an indirect one, mediated by the categories of forces’ staff. By defining and organizing the institution of armed force inspector this relationship will be a direct one, in the sense of coordinating and harmonizing armed military training with the evolution of the specific military phenomenon, with the process of developing doctrines and manuals for armed fighting, capitalizing the experience accumulated. The armed inspector institution has had traditions in the army since 1865, when it was decreed

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6 Emergency Ordinance no.75 of 2005 on the quality assurance in education, art 9, point b)
to establish Advisory Committees for various weapons, which examined the issues concerning the organization and training of troops and discussed draft regulation for each weapon, but, for unknown reasons, this institution was abolished in 2008.

Regarding the professionalization of the teaching career related to military instructors, the concept is not a new one, but specific to knowledge society, it has suffered changes so that now there is not only the problem of initial training for the teaching profession, but the definition of precise professional standards for ongoing learning and evaluation of teaching. Currently, the instructions on military instructors – M58/2013 stipulate that “appointed military instructors are required that within two school years subsequent to graduation to prove following a type of pedagogical training”.

As a result, there is the possibility of getting hired in the highest military instructor positions (senior instructor or advanced instructor) without requiring the initial training in the field. As for the professional training and development of servicemen occupying instructional leadership positions, specific to application schools and training centers/ bases, until now the acquisition of skills specific to educational management has never been discussed. Therefore, we believe that, in correlation with national and European systems of education for these positions, it is necessary to define the relevant professional standards, in order to improve the quality of the servicemen who occupy them.

Conclusions

A future strategic document substantiating the courses of action of initial training (professional qualification) for MND human resources will be developed in the context of the existing institutional framework. Therefore, in our opinion, the main effort should be focused primarily on training needs. Based on Euro-Atlantic educational policies for what educational systems are expected to become, but also on what professional qualifications are meant to be, the specific strategic objectives identified in MND, in our view, should also include the marks mentioned above. As the initial training of human resources is a multidimensional field of human resources management, the transformations and changes proposed will require a major commitment from the governing bodies of the ministry. This means both the development of specific laws and also organizational transformations (setting up a central structure with tasks specific to the National Authority for Qualifications and reopening the armed inspector institution) and especially the allocation of financial resources to promote quality in education (development of teaching logistics, increasing the attractiveness of teaching positions). Of course, all strategic objectives must be supported by specific objectives and annual operational plans, all of which must be reviewed annually, based on an ongoing evaluation.

We expect that the entire anticipated effort, including overcoming the inertia to change, will result both in founding systems for initial training of human resources according to modern fundamentals, in line with equivalent European systems, and also with the professional qualifications of servicemen pertinent with the specific tasks and missions of the modern battlefield.

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THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-COLD WAR REVOLUTION OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

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Abstract: The spectacular developments of the last twenty-five years in technology area which in turn required changes of organizational and even doctrinal levels, fulfilled to a new revolution in military affairs, highlighted a new form, a new physiognomy of military conflicts.

If the present time belongs to informational war confrontation, cyber warfare, network-based warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare and media war, the future will belong probably, to a new form that integrates all those forms, already talking concepts “hybrid war” or “cosmic war”.

In those circumstances, command and control systems are subject to special challenges and require and compel to a high degree of flexibility and adaptability to respond effectively and appropriate to the new conditions of the battlefield.

Keywords: command and control, system, organization, doctrine, technology, revolution.

Existing concerns and efforts of military researchers communities, to systemically identify and approach the military organizations command and control system to streamline the decision making process, in the context of increasingly diversified risks and threats, were often proved to be a relatively difficult scientific steps, requiring also the emergence of vast human, technological, economic resources beside deeply theoretical knowledge’s and vast experience.

Therefore, an analysis of command and control systems in the context of the post-Cold War revolution in military affairs, poses a real and particular challenge due to the complexity, timeliness and perspective expression of the studied concepts.

In this context, the identifying prevailing trends issue in the operating environment requires an interdisciplinary approach which must underpin and design the basis of that integrated command and control system to ensure efficient decision making process.

Thus, I consider that particular attention should be paid to command and control system analysis, from the perspective of the defining elements of the revolution in military affairs, namely organizational, doctrinal and technological.

This approach allows us to focus effort, in order to, identify those elements that can provide the necessary theoretical and methodological framework and assure the effective command and control system components to streamline the decision making process. Also, versatility approach of modern operational environment from post-Cold War military affairs revolution perspective materialized identified and specific assessed processes of the command and control elements.

Linking contemporary operations physiognomy with actually command and control domain trends, allows therefore identifying those factors that influence the decision making process and actions groups of forces, especially in the field of management/command actions area.

A brief scan of the concept revolution in military affairs reveals that it is based on three distinct areas, namely: organizational, technological and conceptual. Most authors place the technology as a core element of vision evolution. I appreciate, however, that the effects would be void without substantial changes in the doctrinal and organizational areas.

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Therefore, the concept requires innovations on all levels of materialization it is show this time under a conceptual form of a triad technology - doctrine - organization, each with different contribution but the same importance, and the synergy of their defining a new manner in conducting a war.

If we agree that a visit card, a picture of a military affairs revolution is show up as a above-mentioned triad form, understanding of contemporary operations physiognomy is a priority and allows us to have a real and objective radiography of phenomenon, for which the most times we cannot confine only to the actions carried out post-cold War era.

From post-Cold War military affairs revolution perspective we have seen how dynamic technological developments resulted in major changes in all spheres of socio-human, but the most spectacular or maybe just the most visible were in military area, with major effects on military action.

Moreover, research shows that changes in the dynamics of military operations by introducing smart weapons systems and platforms, advanced sensors, control systems and modern control of the battlefield digitization, are elements that profoundly changes the physiognomy of military conflict. However, recent geopolitical developments worldwide, some even close to the borders of Romania not allow us to undervalue the possibility of a classic conflict.

A new original element, introduced indirectly in equation by current military affairs revolution is the question mark raised over by the human role in this system. The Post-Cold War transformations of the command structures, the leading process, military organization and implemented command-control procedures, mainly due to the availability of new technologies, bring to the attention of increasingly role of the human factor in management act. Not less times the military literature, points to the fact that at least two of the elements introduced by the current revolution in military affairs are factors in operations management with major implications: the command networking structures and artificial intelligence. Computer limitations and its indispensability in modern military actions leading process, highlights the need to integrate those two types of intelligence capabilities, in certain sequences of decision process, rather than each other of those eliminating. So it seems that, at least for now, people need to maintain central attributes of leadership, to keep the ideas, directions and general intentions, formulation of goals and desired end states.

On the other hand, research in the field of military art, have shown that "a battle space intensive informational, will work to our advantage only if people can be largely excluded from control loop," therefore the amount fantastic information produced by modern military operations can be managed only in artificially manner.

Going forward, it is easy to see that in most cases the command and control systems are central to the action environment, so requires that research to be focused on identifying those fundamental elements and to streamline the decision in contemporary military actions.

The command and control system shall support the commander by accomplishing three important functions: creating and updating common operational picture, accelerate decision making by increasing its speed and accuracy and performance of preparation and transmission of act orders.

In this context I believe that the essence of this research is to identify and correlate connections between the system of command and control – grounding the

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2 Valentin Dragomirescu, Comanda şi controlul acţiunilor militare ale mărții unităţi operative din forţele terestre utilizând sisteme tehnice de sprijin specific, Teză de doctorat, Universitatea Naţională de Apărare „Carol I”, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 38
making decision - command and staff procedures, all of those made from the perspective of post-Cold War military affairs revolution.

Using modern command and control systems, substantially changing methods, procedures and techniques work of commanders and staffs, exponentially accelerating processes undertaken in the chain of command and substantially shortening timeframes for decision. The command and control system, as a central environmental action, receives data and information from sensor networks, is influenced by environment, and based on the physical, informational and not least cognitive processes carried, provides the battle space knowledge for decision makers.

At the same time, based on data and information received from sensor networks, confirms to combat forces the discovered targets, so that the weapons systems used will convert them into targets hit.

Success is ensured through the use of combat power in functional and synergistic interaction of information technologies way, materialized in various modern weapons systems, surveillance and warning systems, decision systems, communication and information and not least military structures.\(^3\)

After this review of site control system, in the following, we will focus on identifying the innovations brought by post -Cold War military affairs revolution in on the one hand and highlighting the prospects for control systems and control structured and analyzed in terms of the defining elements of the concept RAM or doctrine, organizational and technological.

Theories and doctrine - strategic concepts of command and control domain expressed in a greater or lesser extent, the evolution of contemporary military phenomenon, development trends of combat equipment and weapon, as well as the most advanced knowledge in the field of military art.

More and more military experts consider that victory on the modern battlefield depends not only on by preparedness of staff, the quantity and quality of weapons systems and munitions but also the existence of command and control systems based on the doctrine - strategic concepts which will add value to the process. Thus, I believe that doctrinal aspect can be considered “the engine” which initiate and monitor completing the follow steps because it depended on the analyzed period most factors that influenced the evolution of the system. Doctrine field has succeeded in transforming conceptual information and network infrastructure.

Today we are the beneficiaries of communication and information systems that are able to ensure permanent contact with the site of the troops, ensuring continuity of leadership through the elements of staff and deployable systems controls, providing early warnings, situational awareness and make the data operational picture.

For example, we notice how conflicts during the after Cold War period, due to the unstable environment in which the rules of armed conflict often were not followed, was applied and is still applying the principle of mission command, which emphasizes „centralized initiative and dispersed execution driven by disciplined execution”.

Another aspect that must to be highlighted and is a feature of war doctrine developments is the concept of command and control war that requires the ability to detect, identify and control opponent systems, while protecting and defending our own systems. We also see, how the post-Cold War conflicts developed between two countries almost did not exist. In most cases, it was either a coalition intervention against a State or against hostile entities and it seems that the

registry will be the same in the future. Classical dichotomy friend - enemy, specific to the earlier majority military confrontations, it will be increasingly difficult to sustain throughout the military actions. 4 This translates into a special challenge to the organizations and entities that operate or have interests in an area of operations. Topics like joint, integrated or multinational are common in both specialized military literature and military specialists debates.

Transformation of military conflicts and identification of their development trends to the next steps, is materialized in the development of military affairs revolution concept5, multidimensional and revolutionary concept, which integrated the deeply transformation processes at doctrine, organization and equipping structures conceptual level and that can be used to streamline the decisional and action plan.

For example, I would stop to the operational chain of command level, at national level. Thus, we see how in some cases groups of land forces, air forces and naval forces may act independently, in a separate area of operations, respectively, can perform the operational level missions, if targets are operational level also.

The need for a firm option, on the hierarchical management levels of operational and tactical levels by inclusion or exclusion of intermediate type links of categories of forces headquarters, between the Joint Force Command headquarters and major tactical unit of land forces, air forces and navies staff remains an open topic.

Perhaps the most correct conclusion, on the analysis of command and control field is made in American dictionary of military terms (JCS Pub . 02), which states that „essential in command relationships is the maintaining of chain of command as short and simply possible, so be clear who is responsible for and what is area of responsibility”.6 Most opinions converge to flexibility and directed flow of information to decision makers and beneficiaries, and decisions directly focus to the performers, without intermediates and intermediate levels.

In those terms, from organizational perspective the actions will be directed to leadership effectiveness, that can be achieved by optimizing the relationships established between subject and object, and between operational structures and led forces, with an emphasis on simplifying the chain of command.

Through this approach we are approaching the NATO model of establishing ad hoc headquarters and force structures depending on the mission, aim and scale of operation.

Therefore we see as the main challenges come from the command relationships area, given the new technological facilities, and from reorganizations have occurred in the world order in the 1990s by the disappearance of bipolarity west-east and western block extension, the North Atlantic Alliance. Once with technological developments, the recovery of the economic gap of some European countries and amid the acceptance of new members, began to appear problems to find the common denominator in what was meant to be the chain of command, particularly in those Member States which participated in multinational operations. All these converge to the idea that a continuous command structure must be first adaptable, mean to identify and react to circumstances changed and secondly must be modular, so capable of being displaced, moved or act independent. Summarizing, I appreciate that after the Cold War, on the background

5 Teodor Frunzeti, Vladimir Zodian, Lumea 2011, Enciclopedia politică și militară (Studii strategice de securitate), Editura CTEA, București, 2011, p.393
6 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Chief of Staff Publication (JCS Pub . 02), Department of Defense, 2007
of technology bum but also under the reorganization and reorientation of political and military status, we are witnessing to a doctrinal change regarding command and control systems, meaning that the main feature of the system becomes modularity.

Regarding technological component see how that has influenced radical interoperability solutions, in the context of same operations are increasingly the multinational force involving.

Existing general tendency today, to the extensive use of information technology and communications systems for defense envisage are focusing on develop operational capabilities with minimal cost, in most cases, the main intention is moving towards networking working shop.

Configuring network communications of networks by using different communication technologies, respectively, combination of units and systems tailored to the situation was possible due to technological developments and why not military environment for technology "appetite".

Concepts such as network-centric warfare (NCW) and NATO capabilities networking feature (NNEC), have emerged in the post-Cold War period, were adopted and designed to develop and expand important functions such as: collection, processing and dissemination of information. Technological factors, included in particular by digitization of the battlefield, an extremely and complex issue topic, may allow connection of all systems on the battlefield in a single system, so-called "system of systems", including sensors and platforms battle.

In this way, the process of data corroborating and decision-making facilitates the availability for commander, in a manner as close to its needs of information, including changes that occur during the course of actions.

Another aspect of technological nature, extremely important, noted during documentation was the identification of artificial intelligence as a major factor influencing the decision making process. By transferring part of decision responsibilities to artificial intelligence, respectively automated command and controls processes can obtain more high speed, even there is still a widespread concern in yielding some of the command authority to a machine, smart clearly but lacks emotionally.

In conclusion, broadly in the post-Cold War there were three stages of technological and social transformations that have determined new revolution in military affairs and had major influences on command and control systems.

The first stage, called "information revolution", has been among the most important features: collection, storage, processing, transmission and presentation of information, increasing computed capacity.

The second step is determined by organizational level and is representative to the massive armies (oversized) decline and changing of them with other smaller, more flexible and professional.

The third stage that caused the current military affairs revolution is the new design forces for use by states, organizations and coalitions of states on the threats faced (ad hoc constituted structures, cooperation, interoperability, etc.).

It is well known that the world of tomorrow is and will be a projection of the contemporary. Certainly in the future, the trends that were detailed and presented here, if will allowed them to work freely to chance, will became more evident. Moreover, the existence of a hypothetical ideal command and control system seems to be an illusion as long as the human factor is the most important role in this equation.

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However, contemporary technological revolution and its influence on the military domain, in concurrence with the mutations produced in the society, are likely to cause fundamental changes in military thinking as a result of the reflection of the economic and technological metamorphosed functions.

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REMARKS REGARDING THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS POST-COLD WAR

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Abstract: Command and control theory is based on activities speed, flexibility and dynamism in the context of an environment of uncertainty, fluidity and rapid change, in which the human factor remains the central element and modern technology means to support his actions. The trend of today is that a contemporary scientific-technical revolution, very spectacular, to be passed towards a stronger position both on civil society evolution and the development of military domain under all its aspects, including the one regarding the doctrine.

Keywords: system, doctrine, command, control, cold war.

In order to make a valid and true analysis of the command and control systems and its doctrinal evolution framework for the last 25 years that passed from the of the Cold War, the starting point should be sometime before 1989, if not even the beginnings of alliances who held the headlines over the 50 years of the Cold War and by this we mean NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Nord Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created as a political-military alliance in 1949, based on North Atlantic Treaty signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington and was consisting of independent states interested in maintaining peace and defend their own independence. So, the basic idea and actually the foundation of the alliance is that of a common, credible and effective defense and it can be understand that at the base of the alliance under the famous Article 5 is a political solidarity and it presumes the existence of a military defensive force, capable to deter and if necessary, to respond to all forms of aggression against its probable, or its Member States.

It is interesting how the HQs and the forces available of NATO have been and are made, which is based on a democratic framework, in which the negotiations and the stake of the partners capabilities is a state of normality and at the national level, a country member has control over its own provided structures. Moreover, in the command structures each member state has its own positions, both in peacetime and in conflict situation.

In contrast with NATO way of working, the Warsaw Pact was a military alliance created in 1955 at the initiative of Nikita Khrushchev, as a response to the North Atlantic Alliance and hasten by the needs of integration and remilitarization of West Germany in NATO.

The countries that signed the “Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance” were: USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Hungary and have committed to defend each other if one or more states were attacked. The Political committe consultant, Joint Secretariat of the treaty, HQ and Staff of Joint Armed Forces were the main structure to ensure the functioning of the alliance.

Regarding the command system, we see an aspect that can be classified as an impermissible interference in national sovereignty of any state party, not including the URSS, and the aspect was that at war the OPERATIONAL COMMAND of the Joint Armed Force should be given to the BIG HQ of the Soviet Union and the Joint Armed Force
HQ should only have the role of supporting it.¹

So here's a first difference between the two structures. While in the North Atlantic area was going and still goes through negotiations and consensus, in the eastern area things were based most often on force and unfortunately this aspect can be observed even today. In support of this statement can be brought into attention examples such as: intervention during the 1956 Hungarian revolution meant to replace János Kádár to the head of the country, the intervention of August 1968 in Czechoslovakia on the background of internal events of this State or earlier actions undertaken in various areas of former USSR space. Even Romania was targeted at some point because of its refusal to intervene in Czechoslovakia.

Another difference between the two organizations was regarding the approach of security and their leaders' positions on this matter, namely the US on one hand and the USSR on the other. While the USA acts as a security provider probably in exchange for resources, the USSR acts as a supplier of energy resources in exchange for security, and today we see how Russia is trying to restore the same political standing.

We should mention, however, that despite the "friction" of the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact have never been involved in a direct armed conflict. Furthermore, these interactions, potential conflicts began in December 1988, when Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the USSR at that time, proposed a new doctrine, the so-called Sinatra Doctrine, according to which countries in Eastern Europe could and were entitled to choose their own political line to follow. Following this situation, the year of 1989 brings significant and rapid change in Eastern Europe.

Consequently, the profound changes produced in the last 25 years in the military-political world landscape, caused meaningful changes of substance, on the doctrines and strategies of countries that had direct implications regarding doctrinal aspects of command and control structures of forces.

It became very clear to most military analysts that the new phase, the beginning of the new millennium will start with new formulas and methods of design regarding the systems of command and control. At the same time it began to be brought in to attention an operational concept called "system of systems".

In the same spirit, the year of 1996 marks the appearance of General David Malki John Shalikashvili work, that was written based on his experience and by the key ideas that he was promoting, a new horizon both military practice and theory was beginning. Therefore, almost immediately, the general ideas were taken up, continued and transformed into capabilities and capacities of action and reaction for Combined forces. These concepts have been debated extensively in the United States and accepted as such. Furthermore, each concept, was translating in theory a reality governed by technological impact, revolutionary weapons, information and communication systems and was opening new directions of conversing belligerence into practice, with direct implications for command and control systems.

For example, the Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO) will develop at that time the concepts of JV 2010 and also will give them a practical purpose. In this way, the concept for future joint operations requires major changes in critical areas, such as: organization, doctrine, personnel, leadership, education and training.

The doctrine - strategic theories and concepts of command and control express in the majority of the situations, the evolution of the contemporary military

¹*** http://www.historia.ro/exclusiv_web/general/articol/10-lucruri-tiut-pactul-var-ovia, accesat la 31.03.2015, ora 1045
phenomenon, the trends of combat equipment and weapons development, as well as the most advanced knowledge in the field of military art. More and more military experts consider that victory on the modern battlefield depends not only on the personnel level of training, the quantity and quality of weapons systems and munitions, but also depends on the existence of systems of command and control based on the doctrinal - strategic concept that puts out their value.

It is well known that one of the armed battle laws is the one in which command and organizational structures depend and it is in close relation with weapon and technique level of development. Consequently, the post-Cold War years and the great progress made in military equipment domain produced major changes on the command and control doctrine and even among the force organization involved in military conflicts of the early millennium. Moreover, the implementation of avangardiste doctrinal concepts wouldn’t be possible without an adequate organizational structures and appropriate forms and procedures they promote.

Therefore, when we speak of a command and control doctrine it is needed to associate it with another element of the revolution in military affairs or organizational domain.

So, through the extensive process of restructuring that we have witnessed in the immediate period after the Cold War and we are witnessing in the present in the context of new geopolitical developments, we can observe that among evolved armies there is a tendency of „building“ echelons with less forces, easy to be command, but particularly flexible and mobile, with great fire power and striking capability, who are able to carry out military actions in any area, regardless of the physical landscape and weather conditions.

This matter translates into a special challenge for command and control system, both in terms of its structure and the doctrinal framework.

The idea that military structures must be able to conduct military action with a high degree of actionable autonomy, forces this structures to have both command and combat elements and combat support(CS) or combat service support(CSS) elements, that can make the difference in the economy of a armed conflict, in other words, new approaches of structuring military entities who should answer the following requirements: flexibility, mobility and firepower, high capacity of deployment and self-sustaining during theater of operation, reduced reaction time and ability to perform all the tasks designated for the armed forces.

For example, taking in consideration the lessons learned from conflicts attended during the Cold War and because of an unstable environment in which the rules of armed conflict often were not respected, the US army operates and applies the principle of Mission Command, which emphasizes an, centralized intention and dispersed execution through an disciplined initiative in order to successfully carrying out missions.

This principle is applied at every level and has the commander as a central figure, being taken often even in actions where the context was or is multinational.

In terms of doctrine, the implementing of new capabilities for existing command and controls systems, in the context of military affairs post -Cold War revolution, assumed completion of some stages and courses of action in the areas of systems development.

Areas such as operational, managerial, technical, training and education or of the resources represented in the last 25 years those particular areas of focus and concerted efforts to establish doctrinal objectives, resources and schedule for subsequent programs and projects.
Generally, the objectives of modernization and optimization aimed for establishing the main steps to be taken in order to achieve optimal use of the system requirements.

Speaking of revolutions in military affairs, teachers Williamson Murray and Macgregor Knox stated that "there are periods of innovation that armed forces develop their concepts involving changes in doctrine, tactics, procedures and technology."  

In this context, the doctrinal aspect can be considered the "engine" which initiate and monitor completing the other steps because on it depended in this period the most factors that influenced the evolution of the system.

A doctrinal aspect highlighted in the analyzed period, respective the integration of new command and control capabilities, comes from the signatory countries of the former Warsaw Pact, along with the change of policy guidelines and strategic reorientation towards North Atlantic Alliance.

The development in these countries of policies and plans for use of the command and control capabilities being in service lifecycle, often coherent and more than that of the new capabilities development programs in order to ensure nationwide cooperation and interoperability within NATO and EU structures has led to a relative places uniformity of the Alliance potential in this area.

The regular updating of normative, conceptual and doctrinal documents, by specialized structures at national level has facilitated the acquisition of new capabilities needed both communications and command and control processes and for serving as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance functions.

I also appreciate that the doctrinal domain has succeeded in conceptual transforming regarding the informational and network infrastructure.

Today we are the beneficiaries of communication and informatics systems that are able to ensure permanent contact with the troops location, ensuring continuity of leadership through the elements of staff and deployable command and control systems, providing warnings, situational awareness and achieving the operational image, including information operations(IO).

Moreover, as required by highlighted concepts of NEC and „Force Goals", gradually toward the horizon of 2018-2020 , it discusses more and more about the cyber defense and computer network operations, operations and capabilities based on the existing subsystems or under implementation.

Relating to the doctrine from theoretically point of view, as a body of adopted ideas, principles, theses and models in our attempt to highlight the main developments of doctrine spectrum from the period after the Cold War, my opinion is that one of the synthetic modes of expression is found in the work of William A. Cohen, "The wisdom of the generals „, published in November 2001. On this issue, paraphrasing General Henry H. Arnold, former chief of the US Air Force, he said that "the principles valid yesterday no longer applies .... ... we need to think in terms of the future". How can this statement be translated in term of the article title? In this case, the conclusion that emerges is that conceptual change or transformation (in thinking, concepts, ideas, planning, etc.) is as necessary and has to keep up with new transformations in both technological and organizational domain. Furthermore, I believe that sometimes the ideas and strategic thinking need to be one step ahead, to identify the potential developments and come up with solutions accordingly.

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Even though, theoretically the doctrine most often involves specifically dogmatic aspects and focuses on tradition or history of past decisions, in the reviewed period, the post-Cold War, it can be noticed a flexibility on this regard, especially from military organizations of countries that choose to go to Western military political organizations.

So, in the manner of doctrinal orientation changes, reorganizations and access to high technology, we could see that command and control systems were directly influenced in a positive way, managing to ensure in very good conditions and even to enhance the effect of the following activities:

- management and coordination of subordinate forces by establishing a action management system in real-time, under large distances conditions to subordinate forces and a hostile electromagnetic environment;
- conducting command and control specific actions that requires the ability to detect, identify command and control systems of the opponent, while protecting and defending own systems, through knowing and understanding of their vulnerabilities, identifying and taking necessary countermeasures;
- identifying the best course of action through dynamic and flexible planning, permanent knowledge of the situation and achieve necessary capacity to fulfill the commanders decisions;
- obtaining and delivering relevant data and information in real time and in volume, form and necessary place for courses of action, satisfying the commanders needs of information about the mission given, opponent forces, friendly forces, terrain and weather;
- warning about the situation by purchasing fast, good manner processing of necessary data and information and dissemination of these in a suitable shape and quantity for each level of command;
- management of public information, using a proactive presentation of the information and in order to get the public support and coordinate efficient, in a timely manner the dissemination of images regarding the situation, to both the media and own forces.

Another aspect that needs to be brought into attention is the one regarding multinational operations carried out mainly after 1990. On the matter of emergence and intensification of operations developed within a multinational context, we are witnessing doctrinal changes regarding the command and control area at armies involved, in the meaning that the level of national command is reducing in favor of mission command. Also, some authors have identified several real options for multinational forces command and control, within multinational military operations.

So, we can speak of a parallel command when nations retain control over their deployed forces. If a nation within a coalition wishes to exercise independent control over its force, there will be a parallel structure with a national command. At the same time we can speak of the existence command of a leading nation in this arrangement, having the nation that provides most of the forces and resources normally to provide also the commander for the coalition forces. Leading nation can retain its command and control structure using other national forces as subordinate formations. And last but not least, we can talk about the option of a regional alliance, which depends on the willingness and ability of nations within an area to achieve a coalition effort. In this case, the arrangements relating command and control may depend on regional leadership of a country and the influence it exerts.

Experience shows, however, that the act of national command should be exercised only for regular information reports and various administrative situations. The term of multinational force, from operational point of view goes beyond and it’s more important than national authority. However, despite complains and remarks, tensions between
multinational and national decisions remain to this day and a solution for both parties to agree in the near future was not found yet.

A point of view that helps us to fully understand the domain is given by specialists of the National Defense University "Carol I". They place command and control as a central process, so significantly, that all essential actions in battle come of it, except the action of nature. This process should facilitate freedom of action, by giving the authority and command in every critical point of the battlefield. The statement comes to strengthen and to underline the need for a unique act of command.

In conclusion, under the new geopolitical and strategic context existing worldwide, in the last twenty-five years we noticed profound changes in all areas of social life, and the doctrinal aspect of command and control cannot make a suitable note, in most cases based on technological differences it is actually the changing "engine".

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THE EUROPEAN UNION BUDGETARY PROCESS

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Abstract: The European Union Budget is that act by which it is annually authorized the financing of the ensemble of activities and community activities, the necessary resources, the priorities and the established objectives. Its evolution along time, reflects the successive transformation of the European construction.

Starting with 1970 years, the powers of the European Parliament regarding the budget, have progressively increased. The procedure made the object of a profound reform in 1988 and at present, is based on three principles.

Keywords: The principle of subsidiarity, The principle of the unity of account, The principle of the budgetary incomes’ non-affecting.

The European Union Budget is that act by which it is annually authorized the financing of the ensemble of activities and community activities, the necessary resources, the priorities and the established objectives. Its evolution along time, reflects the successive transformation of the European construction.

Starting with 1970 years, the powers of the European Parliament regarding the budget, have progressively increased. The procedure made the object of a profound reform in 1988 and at present, is based on three principles:

- providing the European Union with resources which enable it to function with a total plan of own resources, expressed each year as a percentage of the gross national community income (VNB);
- the guarantee of the budgetary discipline (payments’ controlled increment) and the improvement of the procedure, initiating an inter-institutional equilibrium between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission;
- providing a mechanism of efficient structural Funds.

The components of the European Union budget

By the budget, there are authorized the incomes and the expenses of the European Union, depending on the political priorities and orientations adopted by the officials of the member states within the community institutions with competences regarding the budgetary process.

The incomes of the European Union budget are set by a decision of the European Union Council, which then are ratified by the national parliaments of each of the member states.

At present, the EU budget includes the following categories of own incomes: the own traditional incomes (customs’ taxes, agricultural taxes and taxes on sugar), quote of V.A.T., applied in each member state (0.5%), quote of the PNB of each member state.

At their turn, the expenses of the European Union budget, are approved by the Parliament and Council, based on the suggestions that are made by the Commission, after several examination and debate stages of several variants of annual budgetary projects. The budgetary expenses are of two kinds:

- compulsory expenses: are those which come from treaties or acts, issued according to the treaties;
- non-compulsory expenses: include the structural support (structural actions) toward the disadvantaged regions of the EU and expenses for
the support of the effort to UE adhesion, for aspiring countries.

The approved incomes and expenses under the above-mentioned conditions, represent the indicators of the Union’s budget, related to a budgetary exercise, corresponding to a calendar year.

The contribution of each member state is calculated in euro, but is paid monthly, in national currency, being transferred in an account, opened on the name of the European Commission at the national central bank.

The evolution the European Union budget

➢ The unification of instruments and own resources (1952-1975)

At the beginning of the European integration process, the different communities had their own budget. With the coming into force of the “fusion treaty” in 1967, only two budgetary instruments remain in force: the general budget and the operational budget CECA (The European Community of Coal and Steel). Until 1970, The European budget a supplied by the member states’ contributions. The regime of own resources was pointed out by a decision in April 1970.

➢ The search for an institutional equilibrium (1975-1988)

The juridical and institutional equilibrium between the European Parliament and Council, forming today the two branches of the budgetary authority, was confronted in the middle of the ’70 years with a situation of crisis. The current legitimacy and power of influence of the European Parliament, as a result of its election by an universal suffrage in June 1979, have introduced a permanent political tension element between Council and Parliament in the budgetary field. It resulted sometimes a difficult running of the budgetary decision process, marked by numerous incidents.

➢ ”Delors I” Package (1988-1993)

The commission suggested a profound reform of the financial system of the Community in 1987, which introduces financial perspectives, as a pluriannual financial frame. The new category of own resources, based on PNB of the member states, is complementary to other three own resources. For the 1988-1993 period, the total plan of own resources was set at 1,20% from PNB.


It led to a tidy evolution of payments, as well as, to an improvement of the procedure and of the budgetary inventory. The plan of own resources was set at 1,27% from PNB of the member states. It also led to a renewal of the interinstitutional agreement upon the budgetary discipline and upon the improvement of the budgetary procedure.

➢ Berlin Reunion – ”2000 Agenda”

The main objectives of the 2000 Agenda are the strengthening of the community politics and the facility of EU with a financial frame. The equalization of payments, formed the main preoccupation during negotiations. The plan of the resources was maintained at 1,27% from PNB, respectively 1,24% from VNB of EU.¹

Financial perspective

Starting from 1988, the annual UE budget is set within a financial plan (financial programming) on a medium term, named financial perspective, assigning the annual sum which could be maximum possibly spent, for a period of 7 years and conferring a legal base for annual budgets, the scope being the facilitation of the annual budget’s adoption, offering the guarantee of the financing’s continuation for the multiannual projects [Delors I package(1988-1992), Delors II package

The decision of resorting to such a multiannual programming, was taken as a result of the 
deterioration of the financial community system’s annual budget, 
and of the increased difficulties, met in the attempt of the incomes-
expenses balance’s equilibration.
The success of budgetary crises determined the community institutions to agree 
with a new method, meant to improve the budgetary procedure and to enable 
the Parliament, The European Union Council and the Commission to 
reach an agreement in advance, regarding the budgetary priorities of the next 
period and to set a financial frame which would enable the achievement of these objectives.

**Budgetary principles**

The European Union Budget is formed according to the recognized budgetary principles, met in the national state.

1) *The principle of the budget’s universality* presumes the registration into the European Union budget in integral sums of all the community incomes and expenses, without compensations. In other words, the ensemble of the expenses must be financed from the incomes’ total.

2) *The principle of unity* according to which the ensemble of the cashings and expenses must be found in only one budgetary document, in order to provide an efficient control of the community resources’ modality of usage.

3) *The budgetary incomes’ non-affecting principle* has in view the depersonalization of these ones, once they get in the EU budget, being used for the covering of all the budgetary expenses. The particular signification of this principle for the community budget, is connected to the member states’ tendency to compare the expenses it benefits by, with the paid contributions, being seen in this context, as a form of financial solidarity between states.

4) *The principle of the budget’s annuality* means the dependence of the operations, by an annual exercise, able to facilitate the control upon the activity of the community executive. The particularity of the European Union’s projects, especially those of infrastructure, most often unfold on a multiannual basis, made necessary the finding of a solution for the highlighting of these expenses and for the provisioning of the financing continuity, known by the name of "financial perspective”.

5) *The principle of the budget’s equilibrium* presumes incomes (at least) equal to expenses. In comparison with the case of the national states’ budget, the community budget can not be drafted with expenses that are bigger than incomes (meaning these ones to be covered by loans), the budgetary deficit being forbidden, from reasons than are connected to its financing.

6) *The principle of the budgetary specialization* entails that each credit must have a determined destination and must be assigned to a precise scope, so that, any kind of confusions between the different credits would be avoided, at the moment of authorization and execution. The same rule is also valid for the cashings, which must be precisely identified.

The registration of incomes and expenses into the EU budget is done in accordance with the budgetary classification, including sections, subsections, titles, chapters, articles and paragraphs. The budgetary classification distinctly includes the expenses of each institution or body, created by treaties:

- The European Parliament (section 1);
- The European Union Council (section 2);
- The European Commission (section 3);
- The European Communities Court of Justice (section 4);
The European Union Court of Auditors (section 5);
The Economics and Social Committee (section 6);
The Committee of Regions (section 7);
The Ombudsman and the European Controller for data protection (section 8).

7) The principle of the budget’s publicity (the transparency principle) is provided by the publishing of the EU budget in the Official Journal of the European Communities and by the publishing of the information regarding the budgetary execution.

8) The principle of the account unity. The use of euro is an absolute principle, namely for the setting of the budget, the reissue of accounts, as well as, for the budget’s execution.

9) The principle of subsidiarity, according to which the financed actions and decisions must be performed as closest as possible to the national, regional, or local level. In other words, the community actions are justified only to the extent in which there aren’t any possibilities of accomplishment, at the level of the member states, at the regional or local level.

10) The additionality principle starts from the necessity of recognition of the fact that the community funds must not be substituted to national funds, but must be completed, being additional to them.

The stages of the budgetary process at the European Union level

The drafting, the approval, the execution and the termination of the European Union’s budget, presume the crossing through a budgetary process, which is characterized by an increased degree of complexity in comparison with that of the member states.

The unfolding of the budgetary process, in its turn, implies the holding of some specific information, the performance of some analysis and assessments, the adoption of some complex decisions, as well as the performance of some activities and actions with the implication of the community competent institutions, in accordance with the budgetary principles, statuated by the treaties and the regulations of the European Union.

The annual budget is regulated by the Treaty of the European Community’s institutionalization, changed by the Amsterdam treaty, by which, there were also set the procedures of the budget’s setting.

In practice, the procedure of the budget’s signing, is based on different interinstitutional arrangements, between Parliament, Council and European Commission which, by cooperation, are setting the annual budget and previously agree upon the way of exertion of the competences which they have upon this act.

As any budgetary process, the process of the European Union, includes the crossing through some stages, including procedures, terms and specific formalities, determined by the actions and decisions orientated toward the objectives’ achievement on stages of the Union.

The budgetary project’s drafting

The budgetary process starts with the preparation by the European Commission of a budgetary project. Each community institution is drafting a budgetary project in which there are estimations regarding own expenses, following that, by their centralization, the Commission, by the specialized service, under the supervision of the commissaire responsible for the

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2 Ovidiu Stoica. “European Union’s mechanisms and institutions”, course support, 2008-2009 university year
financial and budgetary programming, will draft until the 1-st. of July, a preliminary project of the EU budget.

Until the 1-st. of September, The European Commission sends the project and the position of the Council, on whose basis the budgetary project will be drafted, and will be submitted to the Parliament until the 5-th. of October.

The budget’s approval

The first reading of the budget in the European Union Council

The internal procedure for the budgetary project’s adoption within the Council, starts with the budgetary project’s examination by the budgetary Committee, then by the COREPER (The Permanent Officials Committee of the member states’ governs, attached to the European Union).

The budgetary project must be adopted with a qualified majority (regularly in July). The qualified majority is reached when there are at least 232 votes (72.27%) from 321, expressed by at least two thirds of the members, are favourable.

The first reading of the budget in the Parliament

After the budget’s finishing off, the EU Council submits it to the Parliament. After the receipt of the budgetary project, in 45 days term, the Parliament states upon it, either by the project’s approval, or by the initiation of some modifications or amendments.

In case of the Parliament interaction in the above-mentioned term, the budget is considered as being adopted, fact ascertained by the Parliament’s president, by a juridical act, drafted in this respect.

If the suggested amendments are approved by the majority of the Parliament’s members, the law project is returned to the Council, which will discuss upon it with the Commission and with the interested institutions.

The second reading of the budget in the European Union Council

The Council, after the receipt of the budgetary project in 15 days term, may accept, change or reject the amendmends suggested by the Parliament. In case of compulsory expenses, if the Parliament’s suggestions lead to the increment of the total budget, they must be adopted by the EU Council with a qualified majority, otherwise they are considered rejected.

If the Parliament’s suggestions do not lead to the increment of the total budget, they might be rejected by the EU Council, only with a qualified majority.

The decisions of the Council in the second reading which vise the compulsory expenses, normally lead to the setting of the final values. The Council exercises indeed, excepting the ulterior rejection by the Parliament, the last word upon this category of expenses.

The second reading in the European Parliament

Taking into consideration the reducement of the terms granted to the Parliament in order to proceed to its second reading (15 days), the essential of the works is performed by the Budgets’ Commission. The Council, already having the last word upon the compulsory expenses, the Parliament will establish for the plenum session of December, mainly, the reexamination of the non-compulsory expenses, for whom it may accept or reject the Council’s suggestions.

The European Parliament is the one which has the last word upon the assigned expenses.

Finally, upon the budgetary project, irrespectively of the rejection or the modification by the Council of the amendments formulated by the Parliament, the entire Legislative Body which adopts the budget in the set form, will state, on the basis of third fifths of the expressed votes. The President of the European Parliament formally declares the final adopted budget, and from this moment, the budget acquires a compulsory force.

Thus, the budget is voted until the end of December, in the year which is previous to the budgetary year. If exceptionally there won’t be reached an agreement until the end of the year, which is previous to the budgetary year, the budget of the previous year will be taken
as a benchmark, under the condition that the 12-th part of the normal expenses can be spent, until the reaching of an agreement.

The competences registered in the budgetary project are of an expenses nature, as follows:
- for the compulsory expenses (which compulsorily come from the European treaties or specific acts), The European Parliament can only but suggest some modifications which enter in the competence of the European Union Council, which holds the power of setting the level of these expenses (40% from the compulsory expenses are meant for the support of the agricultural products’ markets);
- for the non-compulsory expenses, the Parliament can change the budgetary project (60% from expenses).  

**The budgetary execution**

According to the article 274 of the European Community Treaty, the budgetary execution enters in the competence of the European Commission, which has the responsibility to perform the budgetary expenses in the limit of the budgetary approved credits, observing the Council’s adopted regulations in this respect, as well as, according to the principle of a good financial administration.

In other words, this means that all the rules in force, must be strictly observed and that observing the Union’s objectives, the persons who administer the funds must do everything to provide an optimal usage of each spent euro. In order to verify this thing, there are performed regular assessments.  

Because the implementation of the EU politics is made by the member states, over 80% of the community budget’s expenses are performed by the member states, together with the European Commission.

**The control of the budget’s execution**

Annually, the Commission presents to the EU Council and to the European Parliament (the main role belongs in his case to COCOBU – The Budgetary Control Commission) an account, until the date of May the 1-st., next year, along with the monthly reports sent to the Parliament and to the Court of Auditors, regarding the execution of the European Union budget’s incomes and expenses.

At the same time, the Commission publishes each month, the details of the budget’s state of execution, on the Union’s site.

**The termination of the budgetary execution**

The termination of the budgetary execution at the level of the European Union, presumes the granting of the Commission’s budgetary execution discharge, by the Parliament, according to the recommendation of the European Union Council.

The discharge is the procedure by which the European Parliament gives its political verdict upon the way in which the Commission has administered the resources of the European Union.

After the expiry of the budgetary year (31-st. of December), the Commission submits to the Council the documents regarding the budgetary execution’s

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termination. The compulsory documents regarding the budgetary exercise’s termination, are the execution accounts, regarding the execution of incomes and the execution of expenses, as well as, the financial balance.

As a result of the examination of the execution accounts and of the financial balance, the Council makes recommendations to the Parliament for the granting of the budget execution’s discharge to the Commission.

After the receipt of the recommendations, accompanied by the execution accounts and the financial balance of the Annual Report of the Court of Auditors and of its special Reports on branches, the Parliament discharges the Commission from the budget’s execution.

Granting the discharge, the Parliament issues observations, often recommending measures to be taken, which must be made by the Commission. The Commission presents the taken measures in a follow-up report and in a plan of action which is sent to the Parliament and to the Council.

It is usually for the Parliament and for the Council to invite the Commission for auditing, regarding the execution of the budgetary expenses, the internal-financial auditing systems’ way of running, or other problems regarding the budgetary execution.

The non-granting of the inventory discharge by the European Parliament, could lead to the necessity of resignation of the entire European Commission, the way it happened with the commission led by Jacques Santer.

The internal and external control

The internal controls which are performed in order to see the way in which the community money were spent, as well as, their effective payment, are performed by the so-called ”financial cells” of the different ”credits’ administration services”, as well as, by the ”financial control central service”. This previous control is done according to the supporting documents for the expenses performed in cooperation with the control services of the member states.

The Coordinator of each service of the Commission (generally, the general manager) is entirely and finally responsible for the operations which reveal his competence, as well as, all the members of the European Union’s staff, which certainly undertake the disciplinary and pecuniary responsibility of their acts.

Since 2002, all the general directions and all the services of the Commission are invited to publish an annual activity report by which they are presenting their achievements during the year in question and are suggesting coercive measures which vise the remediation of the identified gaps. A recapitulation material or a synthesis report is then sent to the Parliament and to the Council, before the 15-th of June of the next year. These reports form one of the basic branches on whose base, the external control, the European Court of Accounts, is supporting their declarations of annual insurance, regarding the accounts’ fiability, the regularity and the legality of the associated transactions.

The annual accounts of EU and the resources’ administration are supervised by their external controller, the European Accounts Court, which sets an annual report for the Parliament and UE Council. The main task of the Court is to lead an external and independent verification of the annual accounts of the European Community. Paralell to the annual report, it issues a notification, based on its controls, under the form of an insurance declaration regarding the accounts’ fiability, legality and regularity of the associated transactions (meaning the performed cashings and the effectuated payments).

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7 Ovidiu Stoica, "European Union mechanisms and institutions", course support, 2008-2009 university year
The European Institutions created in 1999 and the Anti-Fraud Battle Office (OLAF), can launch inquiries from own initiative for the illegal activities, capable of reaching the community interests. These are the internal administrative inquiries of the community institutions or of controls and verifications of the member stares, according to the cooperation agreements in force.

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THE BUDGETARY PROCESS IN ROMANIA

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Abstract: The European Union Budget is that act by which it is annually authorized the financing of the ensemble of activities and community activities, the necessary resources, the priorities and the established objectives. Its evolution along time, reflects the successive transformation of the European construction. Starting with 1970 years, the powers of the European Parliament regarding the budget, have progressively increased. The procedure made the object of a profound reform in 1988 and at present, is based on three principles.

Keywords: decisional process, democratic process, cyclic process, public impact.

The application of the budgetary principles confers the budgetary document a certain configuration. However, it does not represent a simple list of incomes and expenses, but an extremely voluminous and complex document, in which decisions of a great importance find their reflexion. That is why, it is continuously prepared, discussed and then it is submitted for approval. The synthesis is found in the Budget’s Annual Law, which must be put into practise by the government in the budgetary execution stage. At the end of the budgetary exercise it is drafted the general account of the budget’s termination, being also submitted to the parliament’s approval. The specialized organs of the state are supervising and checking the budgetary operations, submitting them to the preventive and ulterior control.

All these activities are performed in successive stages, excepting the control, which is present in all the stages. These stages or phases in which it is performed the drafting of the budget’s project, its discussion and approval, the execution and the termination of the budgetary exercise, as well as the control upon all these operations, form together the budgetary process.

This is an especially complex process, achieved by the implication of a very large number of participants, some of them having the right of decision regarding the budget, others, performing the budget’s execution or the control upon it.

The budgetary process presents a series of characteristics, which confer to it the specific features:
- it is a decisional process, because its content consists in the allocation of some limited budgetary resources, reported to the society’s need for assets and public services;
- it is a democratic process, because during the running of its stages, there are manifested both the attributes of the state of law and the possibility of the constraint of the social-economical interests of different groups of citizens, which own the political decision majority;
- it is a preponderantly political process, because the options reflected into the budget represents an act of political decision of the majority forces of the parliament;
- it is a cyclic process, with a rigorous phasing;
- it has a large public impact, with implications at a macro and micro-economical implications, both in the economics’ plan and in the social plan.

The stages of the budgetary process in Romania

According to the usances, the initiative regarding the budget, usually belongs, to the Government. It has to
At the same time with the acquirement of these laws projects by the Government and their delivery to the Parliament, the first stage of the budgetary process is closed, the one regarding the budget’s projects’ drafting.

**The budget’s debate and approval to the Parliament**

The budget’s debate and approval procedure in the Parliament is different from one country to another, depending on its way of organization (one-chamber or bicameral system) and depending on tradition. In countries with a bicameral system, the competences of the two chambers can be the same or can be different. Usually yet, the inferior chamber has priority regarding the budget, meaning that it is the first which analyses the budget project and it is the one which decides in the long run.

In some countries, the head of the executive of the minister of finances, presents, first of all, as usual, in the reunited chambers, the report upon the budget project, with references to the budget’s execution of the current year and the projection of the budgetary numbers for the next year. Sometimes, this report is more ample, refering to the economics’ budget in its ensemble and not only to its financial component. Then, the documents will be analysed in the commissions of the chambers which have the right to formulate amendments.

Yet, in many countries, inclusively in Romania, the permanent budget commissions, which function next to the two chambers, are those which receive first the governmental projects for analysis and amendments, then the project, with the suggested amendments, being submitted for the debate to the chambers.

In the first stage, there is performed a general debate upon the budget project, to which, the officials of the different parliamentary groups, present their point of view, the opposition criticising usually the
presented project, and the officials of the power supporting the executive’s suggestions.

At the end of this general debate, the minister of finances presents, on the Government’s behalf, its position regarding the problems raised by the officials of the different parliamentary groups.

If by their common report, the two permanent chambers have suggested the rejection of the governmental project, after the termination of the general debates, the president of the common meeting may ask the Parliament to pass by voting this suggestion.

If the common report of the commissions was favourable to the budget project, with or without its modification, then, we pass to the second stage of the common meeting’s debates, assigned for the analysis and the voting of the budgetary laws.

The budgets are approved by the parliament on the whole, on parts, on chapters, subchapters, titles, articles, as well as, paragraphs, if necessary, and on the main credits’ coordinators, for the budgetary year, as well as the commitment credits for the multiannual actions.

According to the Romanian law, if the budgetary annual laws, submitted in a legal term, were not adopted by the Parliament, until the 15-th. of December at the latest of the previous year to which the budgetary project refers, the Government will ask the Parliament to apply the emergency procedure. If, the budgetary laws were still not adopted with at least 3 days before the expiry of the budgetary exercise, the Government is fulfilling its tasks on the basis of certain monthly advances in the limit of 1/12 of the provisions of the previous year’s budgets’ provisions or of the sums suggested in the budget project, in the situation in which these ones are smaller than those of the previous year. The public institutions and the new actions, approved in the current year, but which start with the date of January the 1-st., of the next budgetary year, will be financed, up to the approval of the budgetary law, in the limit of 1/12 of their provisions, included in the budget project.

The budgetary annual laws adopted by the Parliament, must be then promulgated by the President and published in the Official Journal in order to be brought into force.

The budget, in its whole, is an extremely voluminous document, often including over 15,000 pages. What is published in the Official Journal is only the state budget Law and respectively, the Law of the social state insurances, which include around 20 pages of text and their annexes.

The budget’s execution

When the budgetary law is approved and promulgated, we pass to the third stage of the budgetary process and namely to the budget’s execution. This means the cashing of incomes and the effectuation of the expenses authorized by the Parliament by the approval of the budgetary laws. The task is assigned to the Government, which performs it by its specialized body, and namely the Ministry of the Public Finances. In the execution of the budget are yet implied thousands of participants, their competences, of disposition or execution, being rigorously delimited, according to the principle of the functions’ separation. Their main concern is to provide the cashing of incomes at least at the approved level, and the effectuation of expenses in the limits and in the approved destinations.

It means that the incomes registered in the budget represent minimum tasks. Their overtaking (excepting the extra-budgetary ones) does not represent an act of budgetary indiscipline if there weren’t violated the fiscal laws. The attention is paid to the identification of all sources of incomes and the integral cashing of the sums due to the
state, without the completions of fiscal abuses.

Instead, in the case of expenses, the sums registered in the budget represent maximum limits. The effectuation of expenses beyond the approved plan or for other purposes than those for whom the approval was obtained, represent a violation of the fiscal discipline, and the guilty persons will be sanctioned. Here, the preoccupation is that of effectuating the expenses in the limits, conditions and for legal destinations, avoiding the funds’ embezzlement, the loss and the abuses.

The termination of the budgetary execution

The Ministry of the Public Finances has the responsibility to permanently observe and supervise the functioning of the budget’s execution, and to present the periodical reports for the Government’s information regarding the budget equilibrium’s state.

It uses in this respect, the trimestrial accounts of the credits’ coordinators, and follows the accounts regarding the house execution of the budget by the state’s treasury.

At the termination of the budgetary exercises, the Ministry of the Public Finances must draft the general annual account of the state budget’s execution and, respectively, the account of execution of the social state budget insurances, which have as annexes, the annual execution accounts of the special funds budgets and the budgets of the main credits’ coordinators, inclusively the annexes to them.

The annual execution accounts include:

a) for incomes: initial budgetary provisions, final budgetary provisions and achieved cashings;

b) for expenses: initial budgetary provisions, final budgetary provisions and effectuated payments.

By the comparison of the achieved cashings with the effectuated payments it can be ascertained the state of equilibrium of the terminated budget, the favourable difference, occurring as a final surplus, and the unfavourable one as a budget’s deficit.

The general accounts drafted by the Ministry of the Public Finances are presented to the Government for analysis and acquirement. When they are acquired by the Government, they are submitted until the date of July the 1-st. of the next year to the Parliament for approval.

The Ministry of the Public Finances is obliged to draft and to attach to the general account of the budget’s execution, the general account of the public debts, too. It includes the states’ direct internal debts’ account and external debts’ account and the situations of the governmental guarantees for internal credits and for external credits, received by other juridical persons.

The budgetary execution’s control

After receiving the account regarding the budgetary execution, the Parliament, delivers the document to the financial external supreme control institution, which in most of the countries, inclusively in Romania, bears the denomination of the Court of Auditors.

Regarding the budgetary execution account, the Court of Auditors, performs to each public institutions, the ulterior control, vising the legality and the truth fullness of the data included in this document. It verifies the efficiency, the effectiveness, and the economy of the budget’s execution, also stating upon the quality of the public money administration, at the level of each institution and upon the budget’s entirety. At the end of the verifications effectuated by its functional structures, if there aren’t ascertained any illegalities or damages brought to the public funds, the Court of Auditors issues the act of administration download of the leader (credits’ coordinator) to each public institution. If there are ascertained any
illegal operations, which might generate material damage, these are recovered by the jurisdiction bodies of the Court of Auditors.

Finally, the Court of Auditors drafts the public report, which stays at the base of the Parliament’s debates, with a view to approving the annual laws of the public budgets’ execution.

**The approval of the budgetary execution**

According to the report regarding the budgetary execution account, drafted by the specialized control institution of the public finances, the Parliament initiates the procedure of its debate and approval. First of all, the analysis of the report in the permanent reunited budget commissions, finance and banks of the legislative forum, takes place, and then there is debated in the Parliament’s plenum, the Law project regarding the approval of the budgetary execution account.

With this occasion, there is presented by the executive, the synthesis of the economical-financial evolutions of the year in which the budgetary execution refers to, and the elements which influenced its evolution. Then, it comes the turn for the political formations points’ of view expressing, represented in the legislative forum, occasion by which, there are done assessments regarding the quality of the budgetary administration, in comparison with the approved budget.

The final favourable vote, upon the project of the law, regarding the approval of the budgetary execution account, marks the end of the stages that are the components of the budgetary process.

**Particularities regarding the budgetary process in the Ministry of National Defense**

In the Ministry of National Defense, the stages of the budgetary process, consist in the drafting of the budget project, its approval, the execution and the termination of the budgetary exercise and the control upon all these operations.

The credits coordinators budgets from the Ministry of National Defense are drafted and are approved according to the provisions of the annual legislation of the state budget, of the annual laws of the social state insurances budget, as well as, the Law 500/2002, regarding the public finances, republished, with its ulterior completions and modifications.

The budgetary execution starts on the 01-st. of January and ends on the 31-st. of December. The budgetary credits which are unused until the end of the year, are annuled of right, by the effect of the law.

At the same time, according to the provisions of the article 21 parag. (1) of the Law no. 500/2002, with its ulterior completions and modifications, the main credits’ coordinator, by the financial-accountancy Direction, assigns the budgetary credits approved for the own budget and for the budget of the structures that are found in financing, whose leaders have the quality of secondary or third credits’ coordinators, depending on the case.

In 3 days term from the budget’s receiptment, the secondary credits’ coordinators assign the distribution of the credits for the own budget and for the budgets of the subordinated structures, whose leaders have the quality of the third credits’ coordinators, related to their needs.

The third credits’ coordinators use the assigned credits only for the achievement of the tasks, undertaken by the entity they lead, according to the provisions of the approved budgets and within the conditions specified by the legal dispositions. The credits’ coordinators have also the responsibility to deliver the approved budget, in a copy, to the territorial unity of the state’s treasury.

In budgets, the expenses are detailed on financing sources, and within them, on chapters, subchapters, paragraphs, titles, articles and paragraphs of expenses.

According to the provisions of the Law 500/2002, regarding public finances, republished, with its ulterior completions and modifications, the sums approved by the budget, within which there are
committed, coordinated and effectuated payments, represent the maximum limits which should not be exceeded. The commitment and the usage of funds beyond the approved limits and in other purposes than those for which they were opened, attracts the responsibility of the guilty persons, within the conditions of the law.

The budgetary execution is based on the principle of the competences’ separation of the persons who have the quality of credits coordinator from the competences of persons who have the quality of accountant.

To the credits coordinator, there are submitted only the operations projects, which integrally observe the legislation requirements, the regularity and framing in the limits of the commitments credits or of approved budgetary credits and which bear the vise of own financial preventive control.

In the process of the budget’s execution, the expenses cross the stages of commitment, liquidations, coordination and payment, according to the provisions of the art. 52 parag. (1) of the Law 500/2002, with its ulterior modifications and completions.

The operations specific for the commitment, liquidation and coordination of expenses, are in the competence of the credits’ coordinators, and are performed only pursuant to the notifications of the specialized departments. The commitment and the coordination of the expenses are effectuated only with the previous vise of the own financial preventive control. Finally, the payment of expenses is performed by the head of the financial-accountancy department, only in the limits of the available funds.

At the level of the ministry, the planning, the financial, the budgetary execution and the patrimony’s administration documents, must be compulsory signed, by the credits’ coordinator and by the head accountant.

The drafting process of the budget project starts from the level of the third credits’ coordinators, pursuant to the specifications received by the superior echelons, following a hierarchical succession whose finishing is found at the level of the main credits’ coordinators, namely, D.F.C., which provides the centralization of all budget projects of the secondary coordinators, who, are also performing the centralization of projects received from the credits’ third coordinators.

The projects of the incomes and expenses budgets of all the categories of credits’ coordinators, must be accompanied by the annexes which stood at the base of their drafting, respectively, different undertaken programs, situations regarding the economical-financial indicators, situations regarding the fundamentation calculations, etc.

The monitoring of the budgetary execution is performed monthly, trimestrially and annually, by the drafting at the level of the credits’ coordinators of the financial situations provided by the normative acts in force and their submission to the credits’ superior coordinators.

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THE AIR DIMENSION OF THE UKRAINIAN HYBRID WAR

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Abstract: The Ukrainian conflict threatens to change in a drastic way the paradigm of security not only in the Eastern Europe, due to the strained relations between the two major actors, the USA and Russia, but also in the entire world because it questions the validity of the post Cold War security system. The actions undertaken by the participants in the hybrid war within the aerial medium contributes to increasing the Ukrainian conflict’s complexity and scope, thus transforming the pacification of the area in a distant objective.

Keywords: Ukraine, Syria, Russia, the USA, international security, hybrid war, air dimension, aviation, anti-aircraft missiles, state actor, interests.

The Russian position in support of the Syrian president Bashar al Assad at the recent UNO Summit, followed less than 48 hours later by the direct military intervention against his enemies (especially the Islamic State, but not only this) complicates the security situation in Syria because of the different attitudes the other major powers, especially the USA, Great Britain, and France, have towards the regime in power.

Taking the opportunity to address the majority of world’s great leaders from the United Nations’ rostrum, president Vladimir Putin, in his attempt to protect his security interests in the area and improve the image of Russia in the world, exploited perfectly the lack of engagement and results of Western Powers, doubled by the worldwide sensibility towards the refugee problem from the Middle East so that he would pose as a responsible global leader, thus managing to push away the conflict from Ukraine and especially Russian role in this crisis, which had been harshly criticized by the Euro-Atlantic powers.

Despite the successful image turnover made by the Russian president at international level and of his appeal to the past between the two great powers responsible for managing global problems (Yalta Conference), it seems that the USA are not ready to reset the strained relationship with the Kremlin not even for the sake of the fight against the Islamic State, while the major causes of this reside in Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and its crucial role in continuing the war in the Eastern part of Ukraine (Donbass). As a result, regardless of the urgent character of the fight against the Islamic State, an acceptable result for all the participants in the Ukrainian crisis is still in the offing.

While in 1654, after the bloody revolt against the Polish-Lithuanian Union, the hetman Bogdan Hmelniţki, trying to find legitimacy and protection, handed in Ukraine to Russia (which was interested in promoting orthodoxy and reshaping the Kievan Rus’) by signing the Treaty from Pereiaslav with the representatives of the tsar, nobody expected that after 360 years in which they have shared common history and called themselves “sister states”, today’s Ukraine should be now in a state of “demi-war” against Russia.

In national security, Ukraine pays today the price of neutrality, of lack of alignment after the declaration of independence as well as the lack of experience in dealing with sensible files such as the handing-over of nuclear weapons to Russia (Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances¹, Through this treaty, Russia and the USA provided security assurances to Ukraine in exchange of its whole inventory of nuclear weapons – the third in the world - - that had to be handed over to Russia.

¹ Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances
1994) or the keeping in Sevastopol of the Russian military fleet from the Black Sea (for 25 more years beginning with 2017)².

On the other hand, Ukraine pays the price after the failure of reforms made to pass from centralized economy and social system to the democratic and market economy, but mainly because of the widespread corruption that has fundamentally compromised the state³.

As a result of this conflict, blamed on Russia by the Ukrainian officials who claimed that it offered direct and indirect support to the separatists, the consequences at the level of the state are similar to the ones of an unfavorable course of events in the war – the loss of Crimea and of an important part of the regions from the East /Donbass -- Donețk and Luhansk.

In addition, the loss of control over Crimea and the Kerch Strait by the Ukrainians brings negative consequences to the young Ukrainian state -- the loss of political, economic, and military relevance of the Sea of Azov, the diminished control not only in the Odessa harbor, but also in the adjacent area, and last, but not least, the loss of Ukrainian maritime relevance in the whole Black Sea area.

From a military point of view, starting with the Ukrainian conflict, a relatively new concept of war become known, the hybrid warfare, which consists of a combination of conventional and irregular warfare, not recognized by the state that undertakes it.

Some features belonging to this type of warfare could be highlighted in the Ukrainian conflict such as: the presence of military equipment and personnel without insignia (the famous „silent” „green men” with covered faces from Crimea), the logistic support provided by the Russians for the benefit of the Donbass separatists through humanitarian aid convoys that were less inspected by the Ukrainian and international officials, and finally, conventional military actions of the separatist militia (in close proximity to Russia) and Ukrainian Armed Forces, which are different in scale, being successive or concomitant, performed in all the media – terrestrial, aerial, and naval.

We cannot help observing that judging by the results and the field casualties, hybrid warfare was extremely efficient in Crimea as it allowed the seizure of all military installations from the Peninsula with minimum loss (almost any) and less efficient in Donbass, where the territorial gains of the pro-Russian separatists were less significant, being accompanied by casualties and destruction to both sides.

As we know, war⁴ is a complex social and historical phenomenon that defines the geopolitical situation of an area, re tracing borders and having an impact on the destinies of people and nations involved, sometimes expending to the generations to come.

As a result, their economic, political, and military elements highlight and make operational the economic, politic, and military power of the enemy, of the state and non-state actors. Furthermore, the military component of war integrates the air, land, sea and information ones, which influence and make operation at their turn the same traditional types of military power.

Therefore, the air dimension of war, including the hybrid one, engulfs in

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³ Oliver Bulloch, *Welcome to Ukraine, the most corrupt nation in Europe*, www.theguardian.com/ne/feb/04/welcome-to-the-most-corrupt-nation-in-europe-ukraine, accessed at 29.09.2015

⁴ Social and historical phenomenon which is regarded as the most violent form of conflictual relationships at a certain point between large groups of individuals (peoples, nations, coalitions of states, social, ethnical, and religious communities), organized from a military point of view, which use military force to meet their purpose, fact that gives it a very destructive character. Gl.mr. (r) dr. Corneliu Soare & Gl.mr. (r) dr. Valentin Arsenie & Col.ing.(r) Traian Barbu & Lt.col. C-tin Onişor, *Lexicon Militar*, Ed. SAKA, 1994, pag.271
my opinion, the military actions and their results (with incurred casualties), maneuvers and repositioning in TAM\(^5\) and in its vicinity as well as the degree of belligerent’s air power\(^6\), being all affected by the war.

Beyond the hybrid war on its territory, this state of affairs between Ukraine and Russia (neither peace nor war) supported from external sources, involved from the beginning a mixture of surprising and complex relationships; on the one hand, Ukrainian officials openly accused Russia of supporting the rebel cause with ammunition and troops, and on the other, were reluctant to declare war state with Russia and continued economic exchange including the military cooperation that went on after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991).

This military cooperation, which was deeply rooted in Soviet industrial military history, referred to all the dimensions of contemporary warfare, but subsequent developments of this war equally damaged military power of both states, but especially the sea and air ones.

Regarding the most evident military component affected by this conflict, the naval power, with its surprisingly rapid deployment, it influenced in a profound way the naval side of the hybrid war on the whole, thus Russia winning from Ukraine the Crimean Peninsula with Sevastopol and the other elements of naval infrastructure as well as an important part of the captured Ukrainian fleet. The consequences of this transfer of power from Ukraine to Russia at the level of security and operations in the region are extremely visible since not only the Crimean Peninsula, but also the Sea of Azov are under Russian control, which has thus become the major naval power in the Black Sea area.

Regarding the air dimension of this war, we could argue that it has suffered important and quick mutations. The fact that the traditional and close military cooperation between the two countries ceased to exist has had a negative impact on Russian air power, on the capacity to manufacture aircraft since it left it without some Ukrainian equipment, which was necessary to produce Antonov airplanes (An -124, An -70, An -140) as well as helicopter engines at the Motor Sich Public Joint Stock Company\(^7\).

At the same time, the disrupted cooperation with Russia had a direct impact on the economic performance of Ukrainian military factories controlled by the government, which lost the main, if not the only, commercial partner (beneficiary) which is Russia.

Moreover, within the same air component of war as a result of Russia taking over Crimea and the loss of control over an important part of Donbass, Ukrainian air power lost an important part of its production and maintenance in the aeronautical field because Russia took away the airplane production factory from Sevastopol and the airplane maintenance factories from Eupatoria (Crimea) and Lugansk (Donbass)\(^8\).

At operational level, the air component of war has been affected by the actions taken by the air forces involved, by associated infrastructure, human casualties and loss of equipment as well as by the maneuvers undertaken by the air and anti-missile forces and installations.

Thus, in the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine lost to Russia 146 military

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\(^5\) Theatre of Military Actions - Teatru de acţiuni militare

\(^6\) Air power is a complex of at least fifteen different elements, each of which must be considered indispensable. The relative importance of each must be variable, yet the absence of any one must endanger control of the air or prevent its exploitation ... The fifteen elements are: raw materials and fuel, industrial potential, tool reserves, and high rate of technological progress, bases and protective forces, communication and electronics, logistics and supplies, auxiliary services, airborne forces, guided missiles and atomic weapons, aircraft, manpower, training, morale, intelligence, research and innovation, tactics - - strategy - - planning. / Charles Westenhoff, *Military Air Power*, Air University Press, Alabama, October 1990, p.24


\(^8\) Ibidem
facilities\(^9\) among which the air bases from Kirovsky, Dzankay, Gvardeskoye together with the deployed air means.

The last Ukrainian air base captured in Crimea by the armed representatives of the local population with the help of the „green men” was the one near Sevastopol, at Balbek, together with planes there consisting of 45 MiG-29 fighter planes and 4 L-39 training planes\(^10\).

Beside the above-mentioned air bases, Ukraine lost and Russia gained the military airstrip from Bagerovo and the airports from Simferopol and Kerci. In addition, Ukraine also lost the airports from Luhansk and Donetsk to the pro-Russian separatists from Donbass.

Through all these transgressions („transfers”) of industrial and operational installations from Ukraine to Russia together with the Russian air maneuvers in Crimea and in the vicinity, Russia became both the most dominant air power (naval power) in the area and in the whole Black Sea basin.

Talking about the International Fighter Conference from November, 2014, the Ukrainian representative provided a relevant point of view regarding the high rate of losses suffered by the Ukrainian air force from the beginning of the conflict until that moment. Thus, the representative stressed under Chatham House, that the extensive air losses – 10 helicopters (5 Mi-8 "Hip"; 5 Mi-24 "Hind"), 9 fighter planes (6 Su-25 "Frogfoot", 1 Su-24 "Fencer", 2 MiG-29 "Fulcrum"), and 3 cargo planes (1 An-26 "Curl", 1 An-30 "Clank", 1 Il-76 "Candid") had multiple causes such as: lack of combat experience, lack of money for training pilots, inadequate tactics and procedures of attack as well as the lack of information about the man-portable air-defense-systems (MANPADS)\(^11\).

Related to the source of MANPAD systems, the Ukrainian official stated that some of them fell in the hands of the separatists as a result of losing the bases at Crimea and Donbass, and others came directly from Russia. In the estimation of the same official, „the last Russian military convoy had about 5% food and water supplies and the rest of 95% consisted of military equipment, projectiles, mines and MANPADS estimating that the rebels possess about 20 air defense installations”\(^12\).

Regarding the shut-down of the civilian airplane belonging to Malaysian Airlines, the same official mentioned that the MH17 airplane, in which 298 people died, was shut down by a Buk (SA-11 „Gadfly”) missile - - a group of missiles sent by Russia and operated by Russian military\(^13\).

However, beyond the guilt of those who launched the missiles, this horrible act makes me stress the fact that equally guilty are those who unconsciously took the risk of flying over a war zone in which other planes had been previously shut down, respectively the traffic air controllers or International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) which had announced, according to the representatives of Malaysian Airlines, that „the usual air route over the Sea of Azov is safe”\(^14\).

The deployment of troops and equipment related to the terrestrial, naval, and information dimensions of the Ukrainian war, together with troops and air maneuvers performed by Russia, which had freed itself from the constraints of the CFE\(^15\) Treaty in March 2015, performed under the cover of military exercises at its

\(^9\) Ukraine’s Military Bases Targeted In Crimea, http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-crimea-bases-targetted/25306141.html

\(^12\) Ibidem
\(^13\) Ibidem
\(^15\) The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
West and South-West border, come to shape the image of air conflict undertaken in Ukraine: air maneuver in the Crimean Peninsula and in its vicinity with Tu-22M3 supersonic bombardment airplanes or the establishment of a new air base in Belarus, close to Polish border, which was provided with Su-27 SM3 fighter planes.

At the same time, in the event of escalation, not only Ukraine, but also the whole North-Atlantic Alliances took measures to fully reconfigure the air and missile defense forces and elevate their level of training.

The new geopolitical situation in the Eastern Europe after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis – the annexation of Crimea to Russia and the war of secession in Donbass, have made the relationship Russia – the USA drop to a minimum which has not been attained since the Cold War, the situation further deteriorating. The mutual accusations between the officials of NATO and those of Russia stem from a difference in vision regarding the idea of security in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, respectively, the Ukrainian and Syrian problems, starting from the bleak premises of NATO/SUA and Russia identifying themselves as potential enemies.

In conclusion, the air component of war makes the other elements of both hybrid and conventional warfare more dynamic by the possession and operation of unique decisive capabilities meant to meet political and military objectives, and in the end, the ones of war itself.

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SPECIFIC CONCEPTS FOR THE MARITIME DOMAIN
AND THEIR DOCTRINAL APPROACHES

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Abstract: The purpose of this research paper is to explain the meaning and importance of maritime power, naval power and their projection, and the link between power projection and the force projection operation in relation to the Romanian Navy Doctrine. This is, at the same time, a way of highlighting an answer to the necessity of knowing the difference between these concepts. This paper also aims at promoting the force projection operations, and assessing the existing doctrine. The alternative is to create a new doctrine for force projection that may serve as a doctrinal basis for planning and participating in multinational amphibious operations.

Keywords: Maritime power, naval power, maritime power projection, naval power projection, power projection, force projection, multinational amphibious operations.

In this research paper, I want to highlight the meaning of the maritime environment specific concepts and the importance of their expression. Terms such as maritime strategy and naval strategy, military doctrine and naval doctrine, maritime power and naval power or the power projection action, will be found further along with related conceptual arguments.

Incidentally, I will emphasize the link between the power projection and the force projection, by correlating the conceptual meaning of the terms mentioned. My approach supports the argument that acquires importance on the use of these concepts within the provisions of the Romanian Navy doctrine. This is at the same time, a way to respond to the need to know the difference between meanings and the way to use these concepts.

In essence, this research paper addresses the analysis of the existing provisions in order to promote the doctrine of force projection operations, considering the importance of maritime concepts. The analysis of these concepts contributes to the rationale of recognition awareness of Romanian maritime power position. The solution to my approach is to promote the creation of a doctrine for force projection, which can serve as a doctrinal basis for planning and participating in multinational amphibious operations.

My scientific approach assumes that the maritime domain specific laws and principles that underlie the preparation and development of a maritime strategy, of a naval strategy implicitly, find their applicability and usefulness in maritime operations.

Thus, through a heuristic approach of the maritime domain specific concepts, I will try to take a picture of the possibilities of developing a fleet capable of meeting the main purpose for which it was created, i.e., the projection of power.

Therefore, I consider it necessary to address only some of the conceptual issues that lead to identifying those research opportunities for participation of the Romanian Navy in the force projection by taking part in multinational maritime operations.

Today, the sea is the place of major military action due to the legislation and influence of international organizations, alliances, coalitions, which find a favorable environment for its expression.

Due to the ratio of the land territory and the maritime environment, the most
common example of the power expression is the manifestation of the maritime power. The maritime power projection is a peaceful expression of the intent of states to impose their will over others.

The principle of freedom has generally valid connotations for all states, creating the appearance of international maritime law rules to solve the complex problems related to the legal regime of the sea [1]. The free use of the seas and oceans is the fundamental objective of sea traffic, ensuring global circuit of goods safely and timely, and economic efficiency.

Battling for the conquest of the naval supremacy on sea or for the control of the sea in order to perform maritime power projection is the core of the concept "maritime power". This is based on deterministic foundations of an interest for the marine environment for the development of the fleet and imposing manifestation of the will, and which also are the content elements of the concept "maritime power".

The form of expression of the maritime power, represented by the ability of states to build, maintain and staff prepare for serving the naval fleet, is attributed to the states that realize the importance of the marine environment for economic development and other.

Concepts related to the maritime domain are applicable by establishing, deploying and conducting maritime operations. The fundamentals in connection with the maritime domain are underlying to maritime strategies and naval doctrines.

What is strategy? and What does strategy represent? Here are two questions that will clarify the meaning of the term strategy, closely linked to the sea.

Epistemologically, "strategy" is "the military art which deals with the preparation, planning and execution of war; a coordinated action plan to achieve a goal"[2]. Thus we can find the answer to the question: What does strategy represent?

In his book "On War", Carl von Clausewitz addresses the military aspect of strategy, analyzed in terms of a career officer: "Strategy means to use combat in order to fight the war"[3], which stresses that the planning and strategic issues rely on politics, whereas the army has the task of exercising the political will.

In the author's view, strategy is a "big war theory" [4], as he defined it, the assembly of all decisive military actions that were employed by the opponents and thereby obtaining the final decision on war. It also completes the conceptual meaning of the term strategy in the sentence: "Strategy must follow the army on the battlefield" [5] in which he, in a personal manner, defines strategy as a science and an art, a theory and an action, which contains principles that can be applied according to the situation occurring during military actions.

The author differentiates between theoretical elements which are derived from the study of military history and military art, the defining elements of strategy that are extracted from experience and the products of those elements to which military history refers. "Strategy takes only from experience the means and the investigational purposes". [6] By this statement, he states that the success of military actions strategy provides for a special purpose, success and victories are the means of the strategy that provides peace. Through the intercession of peace, strategy gives the goal of the military action and the goal becomes the true meaning of strategy.

In a similar manner, the author refers to doctrine and addresses the problem of making a comparison between this and theory, emphasizing the difference between them by the sentence: "Theory must be a study and not a doctrine" [7].

Thus, in the author’s view, doctrine is only a guideline for action, not a theory; if the theory includes analysis of the goals, ways and means, so is an analytical object of military art/the military action in fact (the theory of military art - theoretical
component), in response, the doctrine is the support offered to commanders for the application of military art (military actions-component practical approach).

The reputed analyst Milan N. Vego, in his book "Joint Warfare Operational Theory and Practice" offers military meaning of the term ‘strategy’, by taking the prestigious German military statement of the 19th century, "The first task of strategy is the final assembly of the fighting forces, the first deployment of the army. Here, multifarious political, geographic, and national considerations come into question. A mistake in the original assembly of the army can scarcely be corrected in the entire course of the campaign"[8].

Milan Vego caught very well the practical applications of strategy, acknowledging the merit of strategic planning by which commanders can solve most of their missions and the purpose for which they constituted the forces.

According to the same analyst, doctrine means "that which is taught"[9] or "set forth for acceptance or belief"[10].

He emphasizes that doctrine is shared experience, and, in its modern sense, doctrine is understood as an attitude or position, principle or political orientation, represented as a guide on how to act and that the organization must follow it and trust it.

According to the Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine, the document containing the guidelines for the national strategy of homeland defense, strategy "incorporates active measures to be used by the diplomatic, economic and military powers, applicable in peacetime, in crisis or at war, in accordance with the rules of conduct of the Euro-Atlantic community"[11].

The conceptual national approach also emphasizes the military sense of strategy, as "the component of the national or multinational strategy, showing the way for development and use of the military power to meet national targets or for a group of nations"[12] (definition taken from the NATO concept).

What is strategy? To answer this question, it should be noted that strategy is the document that includes the principal elements, related to the political goals and intentions to pursue and recommends the ways and means to achieve them.

Two aspects of the approach to strategy should be noted, one that expresses the theoretical side, that builds on the experience materialized in issuing laws, principles or fundamentals, and one that is applied by the exercise of imagination, creativity, intuition or experience which sets the military actions. So strategy essentially is a science and an art at the same time.

For the conceptual approach to the theoretical foundations on the specific aspects of the maritime domain, I consider it relevant to emphasize the practical applications of "strategy". This will be the one which will help me clarify during the research the most relevant content items listed below: the Maritime Strategy; the Naval Strategy; the Naval Power; the Force and Naval Power Projection.

The Maritime Strategy is a means of expressing the political intentions of a state and that have a link with the sea. The Maritime Strategy is the science and art of preparation and coordination of diplomatic, political, economic, technological, military, social, educational and other elements in the maritime domain.

The Maritime Strategy is a tool for developing the Maritime Power. In my opinion, the development of the Maritime Strategy is conditioned by the existence and development of the Maritime Power. The Naval Strategy as an integral part of the Maritime Strategy, expressing the requirements of the Military Strategy, evidenced by actions taken by the Navy and the Merchant Navy.

"The Naval Strategy relates to the use of all the forces and means, including military ones, for the achievement of the purposes in the sea area of..."
responsibility”[13].

The Naval Strategy is the concrete use of naval power independently or in joint context with the Land Forces, the Air Force and the Special Forces. So it can be said that the Naval Strategy refers to the science and art of using the Naval Power.

The Naval Strategy represents the way of using naval operations in time of crisis, peace or war. From this point of view we may conclude that The Naval Strategy is an instrument which develops the Naval Power of a state.

Doctrine reflects the will and philosophy of an organization specifying the prerequisites and actions to support its efforts. It is also described as a set of principles that guide the application of the intentions of this organization.

In the military use of the term, Doctrine is understood as a set of information, beliefs, fundamental principles, principles of organization and methods of use of military forces, concisely expressed and designed to plan, prepare and execute military actions to fulfill the goals.

The main purpose of the doctrine is to provide the military organization with a philosophy, language, common purpose as well as unity of effort. It is a bridge between theory and practice and military law enforcement. These theoretical ideas become doctrinal principles. These principles are further used to develop tactics, methods and procedures.

It is worth mentioning that The Military Doctrine is a complex and interrelated system of politico-military knowledge, options, ways, means and forces related to the overall problems of preparing and developing to achieve the goals and objectives of the war.

The Military Doctrine passes overall issues in the strategy towards particular respecting the characteristics of war, nominates the strategic concept and the rules that detailed specifying means, structure of the forces participating in military action, the process of warfare, other provisions. It outlines the principles governing the use of force, from which are extracted the major objectives of the branches that become their essential tasks.

The Naval Doctrine is a reference, authoritarian document. It should be the core of the naval thinking and philosophy, able to unify the thinking process, without having the preconceptions or predictions. It should be also uniformly known and understood. The doctrinal provisions should cover a broader contextual framework within which the forces participating in military action could adapt and work. The Naval Doctrine is the expression of the military component of a country's naval power.

Next, keeping in mind the basic documents and conceptual elements of the maritime concepts to which I will further refer in this paper, I will analyze mainly the specific concepts for the maritime domain in order to achieve an overview of their application, namely their projection. So I will refer to the concepts of maritime power, naval power, force projection and power projection.

Some references about the concept of "maritime power". If the sailors are the image of the sea, so the maritime power is the image of state's power, the expression of political and economic power. But the sailors are not the sea holders like the states that hold the maritime power.

The concept of "power" is complex and difficult to define. From the sociological viewpoint, power means "one's ability to impose its will in a social relationship, despite any resistance encountered and regardless of the factors that determine this capacity”[14].

If we approach of international relations and diplomacy context, the concept of power defines the ability of a state to control or influence other states and the countries that have such ability are called 'powers’ that are classified as zonal power, regional powers, great powers, super powers or, according to some classifications, hyper-power.
From this point of view, I will consider the hypothesis that power is relative and not absolute. Power is a relationship between individuals, groups, organizations, countries, etc., and its exercise is closely related to intentions, needs, values and interests, as well as unequal distribution of resources and economic power that determines them. To determine and compare the power of states, a hierarchy is frequently used based on the potential power derived from several sources: geographic, demographic, economic or military.

The power can be based on the following sources derived from those mentioned before, like natural sources as the surface/area, the littoral, the type of boundaries, the socio-psychological and population self-image, the social policy or political organization and some synthetic, like the ability of the state to use industrial, financial, technical or military resources.

The real power is the effective exercise of coercion and together with the above sources depends on the will of the people and the quality of leadership, internal organization and infrastructure of the state and the strategies created for this purpose.

These elements of power are expressed concretely through national documents, strategies and doctrines, that reflecting directions and the main areas where a nation turns its interests.

One form of the power is the maritime power, represented by the ability of states to build, maintain and staff prepare to serve fleets. This is attributed to countries that realize the importance of the maritime environment and economic development not only correlated with their maritime interests for the purpose.

In peacetime, non-military means of the maritime power conferred on the political and economic advantages, requiring the existence of commercial fleets that provides trade volume.

Leaving aside the periods of hostility, the Navy has been the symbol and the ongoing support of the maritime power, especially being a power manifestation.

In situations of war, the maritime power is expressed primarily by military force in the maritime area, which may procure one who possesses dominance at sea, meaning the property to use the sea for its own use and to ban its use by the adversary.

The Romanian Navy is the full security guarantee of its transport routes and its flag platforms; it guarantees the inviolability of the territorial waters, participates in the defense of the national territory, in various military actions in areas of national and ally interest.

The items of maritime power are changing and are complemented by new ones which are related to socio-economic development, thus the leagues and associations in the field, the specialized components of the media, the specialized shipping companies, the installations and ships specialized in the research and exploitation of maritime, river and subsoil, the companies and associations that promote tourism by sea and inland waterway, and means of their equipment, the research institutes actively in research aquatic environments and their logistics, and other elements.

The concept of "maritime power" underlying geopolitics, a domain that appeared in the 19th century, but its origin is as old as there were power relations between states.

With the advent of geopolitics as a science, from Friedrich Ratzel, (1844-1904), which can be considered its founder, the Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922), who is considered the father of geopolitics, Sir Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947) pioneer of this discipline, the concept is often addressed in analyzing the evolution of continental powers, but detailed by the most important name of universal geopolitics, Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914), the Admiral of the US Navy.

The Admiral Alfred Mahan [15] is
one of the greatest personalities of American geopolitics and the author of the maritime power theory. He had changed the mentality of military political figures of the late nineteenth century, the role and importance of the sea for any nation. Alfred Mahan had advocated replacing of maritime doctrine, typical for a continental nation, defense of the borders with the coastal artillery or ships in return for specific doctrine maritime states. Manifests preemptive attitude and advocates for the development of a fleet capable of carrying out naval blockade to prevent any attack on the continent, maintain freedom of navigation of their vessels in any maritime zone.

It recognizes the need to develop expeditionary capabilities, for force projection. Mahan's idea was characterized as to promote of the naval power potential for building a strong fleet to the US, indispensable new status of its great maritime power.

Mahan can be considered an author with copyright of the concept because it was the first who predicted the strategic importance of maritime power.

Originally, the term was used in 1849 by the historian George Grote (1794-1871), in his "History of Greece"[16]. But the Admiral Mahan used in strategic terms the maritime power of the US states that had had such great need at that time.

In the American author's vision, to become a great maritime power, a country must meet three conditions or criteria. First, they must be contiguous a substantial length with the planetary ocean or have access to it through a wide open sea. Secondly, to have not the powerful neighbors in the immediate vicinity. Finally, have a naval capacity and high military potential of fleet.

To underline the merit of Mahan, he brought in clear terms the strategic dimension of maritime force for new power which foreshadowed. A strong commercial fleet was necessary not only for carrying out an intense commercial activity, but also because it represented a size and a symbol of power. National prosperity and fulfillment of destiny US national depended on the vision of Mahan, of the merchant fleet, merchant ships would be allowed in protected ports, and their protection is assured throughout the entire process, which is equivalent to building a maritime empire.

The American author had notified the transition from the colonial to modern expansion, which was not based on conquest, but in control. There was no significant the annexation or possession of a country, the territory or a province. More important became the control of trade routes over the territory. The center of gravity of naval power, as part of maritime power, moves by conquering it in the control areas, which meant rethinking the means and the tools to impose the will.

A conclusion that I will emphasize by the analysis of the conceptual meaning of the term "maritime power" or any manifestation of it, is that the use of tools with which a country designs its maritime power are and should be different from epoch to another. I note that in the expression of maritime power, the ability to design the necessary means for any period is a constant.

Mahan's contribution as to the need to build a fleet is that he noticed sooner than others the potential power which it represented for the US, its vessels and their force projection function. From this point of view, I will subscribe that power to be effective, it must be accompanied by the ability to manifest, to interlink, to project.

Another conceptual landmark is offered by the historian and professor Geoffrey Till[17], which stresses the role of the components of the maritime power, a concept that respects previous theories, thus creating an image of the system of relations between its elements, which he describes as dependent by the existence of naval forces, the population, the technology, the economics, the resources, the geography maritime means and the
Thus, according to the author, “Maritime power is the amalgam of interconnected constituents that are difficult to tease apart. These constituents are attributes of countries that make it easier or harder for them to be strong at sea”[18].

The author analyzes the maritime power in two ways. The first concerns the maritime power as a component of state power and is represented by the Navy, coast guard, merchant ships or civil maritime industry. From another point of view, it emphasizes the meaning of the term "maritime power" as a manifestation of power that is not just what it takes to use the sea. This remarks "maritime power is also the capacity to influence the behaviors of others people or things by what one do at or from the sea. This approach defines sea power in terms at its consequences: its outputs, not the inputs, the end, not the means"[19]. The author emphasizes the diplomatic component of the term in involving the public, the government and the society.

Moreover, he defines the constituent elements of maritime power in the book "Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age" as: the Navy; the population; the technology; the maritime geography; the resources and the economy [20].

The appearance is well represented in Figure 1, which includes an overview of the components of maritime power in the author's conception, which represents British philosophy.

Most theorists neglect the contribution of other armed forces to the maritime power, knowing that the land forces has been reconfigured to be transported on water, being less clear what contribution the army has, as a representative of military power, can complement a maritime power.

In 1979, The Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of US Naval Operations from 1978 to 1982, launches the “Power Projection” concept offensive that meant hitting the Soviet naval power sources. However, the concept was a counterparty of Admiral Gorškov work, which created an impressive fleet completely offensively “Voenno-Morskoi Flot”[21], while US politicians were minimizing the role of the Navy and promoting diplomacy shipping hoping that this solves the problem arms reductions.

So Mahan's concepts relaunch the issue of rethinking of US Naval doctrine. Hayward's plan was the continuation of the work of Admiral Holloway, former chief of naval operations in 1977 with a document “Sea Plan 2000” launched the idea of force planning, initiating the concept of “versatility” of naval capabilities.

According to the national doctrine, the instruments of national power are likely diplomatic, economic, military and information, all contributing to its manifestation in peacetime, in crisis or at war, in accordance with the rules of conduct of European and Euro-Atlantic community.

I consider it necessary to underline the sense that it confers the national strategies and doctrines content for items to which they refer, namely, strategic concepts and doctrinal guidelines in order to properly use the concepts of maritime power, naval power and force projection. Furthermore, these conceptual elements derived from reference documents of a state mentioned above, its strategies and doctrines.

The components of maritime power in thinking and national consciousness of a state are forces and naval means represented by the Navy and merchant fleet, including the border police, aviation and navies, infrastructure and logistics resources, including bases, ports, supply points and warehouses, shipyards, workshops rapara ii, airports, etc., complemented by navy conscious, thought thinking and nautical mastery and maritime education system.

The concept of maritime power
comprises a number of components, but the manifestation of the presence and action are made by the most visible elements, the Navy, nationally represented by Romanian Naval Forces (FNR) and the merchant navy, generically named commercial fleet.

“The maritime power projection” is a concept closely linked to the concept of “maritime power” and represents the attribute of exercising it and whose analysis is the subject of this paper, and is represented by the use or threat of use direct military force at sea in order to influence events on land.

The maritime power projection on land, requiring implementation of specific actions, anti aircraft warfare, submarine warfare, surface warfare, mine countermeasures, informative actions, enforcement action blows against targets ashore using aviation-based aircraft carriers, launching cruise ship-to-ground missiles, naval artillery using or actions of special forces, naval control of maritime traffic, maritime interdiction actions, amphibious warfare and support actions at sea and on land.

The last two actions are materialized directly through maritime power projection over land. Amphibious action combat consist in using timely and safe of force at sea on a target to land and disembark in order, in the place and at the right time of the forces capable of performing shares in coastal involving defense transport and movement control amphibious forces from ship to coast. Support actions at sea and land are done to support joint actions of its forces that were designed ashore.

Also, the Navy can perform the full range of joint operations, presence and surveillance operations, humanitarian operations, display of force operations, non-combatant evacuation operation, protection of sea lines of communication, strikes against the forces of sea, air and land of an opponent, amphibious operations, other operations.

According to the concept, all components of the manifestation of maritime power are used in order to gain access to coastal areas and to ensure the force projection on land, in various forms, such as amphibious forces, the aviation of its composition, the heavy weapons or Special Forces. The maritime power

Figure 1. The components of the maritime power, according to Geoffrey Till (Adapted)
projection is a concept that can be applied in both crisis management and armed conflicts.

Typically, the countries that are declared the maritime powers have all maritime power components. The representative component, the Navy, represents the most of intense presence through the constitutiv units: the naval fleet; the amphibious forces units (amphibious force / the specialized ships, amphibious landing force / the Marines); the maritime aviation and Special Forces.

The criteria for classification of maritime powers depend on their importance and size, which is difficult to quantify, given the complexity of their components and the causing factors.

The main criteria have into consideration the naval forces possession, regional or global interests, abilities and credibility of forces.

The last criterion, the abilities and credibility of forces, is aimed at defending the interests of the state, the protection of territorial sea, the communication routes defense, exercising the maritime police power and the projection capabilities.

According to these criteria, the maritime powers are ranked [22] from 1 to 6, the first being the countries with aspirations and global interests of Navy states holding with capabilities for a global force projection from all types of missions being able to independently perform major operations, the latter being states with naval forces only with maritime policy missions.

In the previous classification we observed an enhancement of the role of force projection capabilities, which defines the quality of a state’s maritime power.

The hierarchy of maritime powers can be achieved by comparison with other actors, conform of the power projection potential, in which case I propose their ranking as: maritime super powers; great maritime powers; regional maritime powers and non-maritime powers.

After other sources the maritime powers are classified based on the criterion level of development of power components, as follows: global maritime powers; regional maritime powers; maritime powers of the states with lower fleet [23].

According to these criteria and according to the hierarchy mentioned, Romania is classified in the maritime power on the regional level, with a continental defense conception, the economic support limited, reduced power projection capabilities, the tradition and development potential in the maritime domain, criteria so important for the classification and ranking of maritime powers.

Due to contemporary challenges requiring joint participation of the international community, through military and political instruments of power, the Romanian Army contributes for power projection in to allied or coalition context.

According to the national doctrine, the power projection role complements the demonstration of military capabilities and discourage of any aggression directed against the interests of Alliance members, even before the outbreak of conflict. “Deterrence may be supplemented or replaced by other activities with a high level of taxation and coercion or conflict prevention, involving military intervention”.[24]

Some references about the concept of “Naval Power”. The Navy, as a form of representation of maritime power, led to the edification of first global powers or empires. These were the representative forces to express the military power of a state, constituting instrument through which political power has submitted other populations and civilizations through power or force projection by sea.

Before Mahan, the term “naval power” was not defined, and subsequent definitions have not been completed, this has led to the definition in different ways. The most of them defines the naval power as the ability, potential, performance,
interest, the state’s capability to sea control, to use it for their own goals, commercial and military in the advantageous position to deploy them, to conduct them, to force projection, to impose its will to ban the use of the sea by the enemy or prevent the enemy impose. Some of the criteria used to define the naval power tend not to be current due to the technological revolution, due to identification of exceptions that they replace or the emergence of new criteria.

The relevant examples include: failure of international law of the sea legislative regulations by extending by some states of the limits of territorial waters up to 200 MM; the existence of commercial fleets sailing under a convenience flag; unavailability of states on naval activities; other criteria.

Considering the factors that determine the naval power expression of the state (geographic, economic and political) presented by Mahan in “The influence of the Sea Power Upon History” the concept “naval power” takes on new meanings, which are differentiated between the maritime power components, or other concepts of power in general.

The Naval Romanian Thinking offers some nuances concerning the classification of naval power in the criteria listed in the previous paragraph so that during the research I identified the following terms: “the great naval power”, “the zonal naval power” and “the naval power”[25].

If we follow the national literature [26] a ranking of countries in terms of naval power, we identify a similar classification on maritime power at levels from 1 to 6; Romania is located at level 5, the naval fleet with limited support of high-intensity conflict.

These criteria were at the basis of the maritime power classification and still are because the naval power is part of the maritime power. There is a relationship of subordination between the two concepts; by default the components and attributes of the naval power belong to the maritime power, and some of the maritime power attributes and features are transmitted to the naval power.

It should be borne in mind that although some states have the coastline these have not the capabilities to support their naval power position, or are not interested in expressing this position. Here I refer to both the military and civilian components of a naval power that directly influence the maritime power. In this case I consider that the expression of the empirical German thinking [27] defining maritime power is relevant: if one of the components of the sea power fleet, commercial or military, naval bases or ports, naval traditions and conscience tend to zero, thus the naval power and the maritime power will also tend to zero.


![Figure 2](image-url)

*Figure 2. The four attributes of the sea, according to Geoffrey Till (Adapted)*
the Twenty First Century”, Geoffrey Till says: “Mahan was a realist” [28], meaning that he recognizes the merits of Mahan, takes his idea about the state power components, highlights the importance of the maritime power components, and defines the concept in his personal way. He also exemplifies the role that offers the four attributes of the sea (Figure 2) to express the role of the naval component of maritime power.

Under the guidelines of the national doctrine, the naval power is "ability of the Navy to defend its maritime interests in peace time, crisis and war"[29]. Thus is revealed that, for the representation of power at maritime level, contributes the naval power, which also represents one component of a country's military power.

According to the national doctrine, “The Navy is mobile, flexible, with high resilience and through autonomy and transport capacity can participates in a joint campaign. These are powerful tools of diplomacy and maneuverability, especially in the context of expeditionary operations; it provides a feature of particular importance”[30].

During the armed conflict, the forces of maritime power projection are capable to use the sea to provide access to a territory that is less accessible for land forces or to create forward operating base for the air force.

The Navy can use and exercises the naval power by using the attributes of military actions, deployment, concentration and maneuver.

The maritime operations are usually deployed simultaneously with the land forces actions, so that if a component of a maritime power dominates, it can influence the success of actions on the coastal.

The maritime power exercises by using the influence of naval power, thus the military power, involving the execution of maritime joint operations, which required the use of the naval and air forces during amphibious operations and land support of the ground forces to execute operations on the coastal area.

In essence, by emphasizing those aspects that define the concept “naval power” I tried to build its meaning. In my opinion, the naval power represents all the capabilities of a state to express the attitude and its will under its interests at sea by political interference, economic, diplomatic or military in peacetime, crisis or war to achieve the final strategic state in the maritime area.

In other words, the naval power is the ability military action of a state, by sea and from the sea, provided by its naval potential, determined by the political will and of society, economy, resources, infrastructure, technology and weapons, maritime industry, tradition, shipping and the existence of maritime institutions and associations in the field, in order to ensure its own security and its allies’.

I also state that the naval power alongside other elements of maritime power and a naval strategy existence creates and maintains the conditions necessary for achieving the objectives and end state. Strategy is the one that integrates elements of the naval military strategy for linking strategic objectives with the proposed final state.

I emphasize that the process of reconfiguration of the Romanian Navy contributes to strengthening its naval power by creating a balance between tradition, experience, modernization, professionalization and operational in configuring how to make and use the naval power.

In conclusion, I can say that naval power is determined by the capabilities of the naval, military and civilian, which are a force tool of power state like Romania.

Nationally, the Romanian Navy is the main instrument for imposing the will and the manifestation of naval power. The main indicators are given by the personnel, the types of ships, combat and support units, the number and quality of platforms, the ship types (surface ships and submarines), organic maritime aviation,
the Marines, the number and quality of communications and information system of observation, the diversity and quality of infrastructure elements, the resources and other elements. Do not neglect the land and air component of the Romanian Army, which complements the naval power in expeditionary operations, power or force projection, and multinational maritime and amphibious operations.

I can conclude by noting that the naval power largely depends on other elements of maritime power of a littoral state, being closely interrelated with them. I believe that we can compare with the British concept (Figure 2), the expression of naval power, if we bring specific additions: overcoming the level “lower fleet in action”; the expression of sea and river interests; achieve the obligations towards international commitments (NATO, EU); shipbuilding program development; all complemented by developing a naval strategy the component of a maritime strategy.

I noticed that the two concepts, “maritime power” and “naval power”, are sometimes confused, so I felt the need to redefine them, after an analysis of meaning and their conceptual meaning in different naval strategies, as well as the results of the schools of thinking; thus, in my opinion, the naval power is part of the maritime power, this being the difference between them, performed by their components.

Some references about the concept of power and force projection. The evolution of regional and global security environment, closely linked to extending the manifestation of maritime interests,

![Diagram showing the national components of the maritime power and the naval power](image-url)

**Figure 3.** The national components of the maritime power and the naval power

prompted the function of the power or the force projection by participating in independent action or multinational maritime operations. The power and force projection as actions to support of national interests is achieved in principle through participation in the multinational stability operations in allied or coalition context.

The concept of “power projection”
as a way of imposing the will was mistaken for centuries by the “force projection”. Diversifying methods of the state asserting by components political, economic, financial, etc., made of power or force projection, an attitude of last resort used when others have failed. As a result of these realities, it can be considered “power projection” strategic concept, and “force projection” operational and even tactical type concept.

As Milan N. Vego well emphasizes, taking Mahan's statement, “Force does not exist for mobility but mobility for force. It is of no use to get there first unless, when the enemy arrives, you have also the most men-the greater force”[31], it allows to understand the relationship between force and mobility or its performance, namely its projection.

The power projection is in the American school conception “The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power-political, economic, informational, or military – to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability”[32].

The force power projection is in the American school conception “The ability to project the military element of national power from the continental United States (CONUS) or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. Force projection operations extend from mobilization and deployment of forces to redeployment to CONUS or home theater”[33].

According to the national concept, the combat power is defined as “the ability of the armed forces to fight and achieve success in operations and consists of the following components: physical, moral, cognitive and doctrinal. The doctrinal component represents the projecting foundation of other three doctrinal components and ensure their interrelation”[34].

The quotation is a doctrinal reference; the meaning of the power projection term is presented as the effect it offers triptych components of combat power, where the doctrine role is evidenced even its existence.

In another international interpretation, I identified the following expression which is a reflection on the concept “is an expression projection of military power projection. It consists in using fighter, one of the pillars royal state officials, that means concretely assert their interests and stake regular troops today, often together with allies form of coalition or under the aegis of international organizations recognized international community”[35]. The authors underline the ultimate goal of projection by imposing the will regarding stopping conflict, defusing crisis, stability and security.

I emphasize that the potential power projection allows a State to exercise influence in an area of interest, according to the needs and means they own. In the modern era, force projection is realized mostly with a special force designed, initially small, which can rapidly project combat power anywhere in the world.

According to the US doctrine, the force projection stages are usually considered the following: mobilization; predeployment activity; deployment; entry operations; operations; war termination and postconflict operations; redeployment and reconstitution; demobilization. There is a similarity to addressing international conceptual stages of multinational operations [36], which are similar stages of military action whatever of initiator goal, its ways and means.

The projection refers to planning, preparation, deployment, command and control intervention with trained Special Forces, conducted outside their borders, able to carry out self-supporting actions away from permanent places of deployment onboard special ships.

According to the Navy doctrine, under criterion the objectives, the power
projection and force projection is the main function of the Romanian Navy, along with the prevention and the safeguard (monitoring, control of risks, protect and defend the maritime and fluvial).

Following the aforementioned doctrinal analysis, I completed the view that the project function refers to two distinct concepts: power projection and force projection.

As indicated in the Romanian Navy doctrine, the power projection is “a system of political actions, diplomatic, financial, economic and military, whose essence is the exercise of power relations. This means the use or threat of use of the sea power to influence the course of events on the coast. The power projection is a strategic concept that integrates ships, aircraft and other military equipment, including amphibious operations, using the firepower of weapons and / or actions of Special Forces”[37].

According to the same doctrine, force projection is "part, an expression of power projection and theater means effective redeployment of military forces able to impose, by violent means or by discouraging the will of the beholder. This requires deployment on the ground, means leadership, and an appropriate supportive combat force to be employed". [38]

Incidentally, the force projection by sea is one of the military interests of Romania, the Romanian Navy (FNR) have an important role to defend the security of the Black Sea and beyond, the rejection of any aggression towards the sea and the river, strengthening the maritime security through proactive participation in regional initiatives, etc.

The force projection entails a system of military action, the essence of which is the exercise of military power in relations with other actors. If maritime operations, this means the use or threat of use of naval power to influence the course of events on the coast.

In another national approach [39], the force projection is a component of power projection that involves a system of policy, financial, economic and military actions.

The projection can be achieved through indirect action, political, financial or economic or by force projection able to impose the will by violent means or through discouragement.

The problems of power and force projection are becoming more complex, since these bring up numerous actors: the states, especially international bodies and organizations where the decision is collective, the non-governmental organizations, the networks of influence in a world in which the information is paramount, hence in the power projection, and therefore the force, the psychology and media are extremely important.

The complexity of factors explains why, today, no actor can achieve power projection without international support, without participating in an alliance or coalition. International relations that generate interdependence commit the states involved in multinational cooperation.

The force projection is realized, depending on the aims and objectives. It outlines at least two distinct power projections: the projection of force in case of war in the event of armed conflict and force projection in operations other than war.

The proportionality principle is generally valid in both cases. The force projected on the theater of operations must be able to resolve the received mission in time. Its calculation and planning begin by the detailed knowledge of the situation and continue with a clear definition of the type of employment, with all the implications and consequences that result.

The maritime power projection begins ashore, is developed on sea and finishes on land. In other words, the idea to underline that the most frequent military action of force projection from the sea to shore, as a form of continuation of maritime operations is reflected by different types of amphibious operations.
If we seek solutions to increasing the value of the maritime power we observe the increasing strategic importance of the sea. The rapid projection of forces and placing them on the theater are the key elements in winning the initiative in the shortest possible time and with minimum human and material losses: ultimately, it is the sea that provides the necessary opportunities.

The future organizational structure of the Romanian Navy should be extremely flexible to allow as appropriate the proper organization for their missions in force projection operations. At the same time, the land forces will find support not only from maritime forces operating for potentiation of their actions, but also the appropriate support necessary to the platforms located on sea.

We are the witnesses to the rapid changes in the physiognomy of military action that change the pace of the emergence of modern technologies and conceptual paradigms. These issues contribute to changing the traditional concepts related to military actions. Often we do not observe these but we are silent partners to the adaptations to everyday challenges. Sometimes we are surprised by the new developments in military actions, other times we predict these, but do not let them unanalyzed, helping to strengthen the theoretical foundations. Even if these are analyzed post conflict, some details escape the theory, but we cannot afford to ignore the prospects and contribution to the military science.

After analyzing the conceptual meaning of the terms "maritime power", I can conclude that any manifestation of it is based on the use of instruments with that any country projects their maritime power, and they are different from one stage to another. I also noted that the expression of maritime power, the ability to project it with the means to any stage is a constant. The concept of maritime power comprises several components, but the manifestation of her presence and action are the most visible elements, the Navy, nationally represented by Romanian Naval Forces (FNR) and the merchant navy, generically, commercial fleet.

I propose the maritime power ranking, achieved by comparison with other actors, as the potential of power projection, such as: maritime super powers, great maritime powers, regional maritime powers and non-maritime powers.

The naval power also retains its comparative value in relations between states with a rich naval tradition. The naval power is influenced by technological and economic development as conditions without which it can not exists and cannot manifests.

The power projection must be supported through the sustained presence and the flexibility, diversified capacity for action in combat, the participation in a wide range of military actions, to simple actions isolated from the major operations. By means of force projection that is necessary to ensure their capability protection and deterrence through which the participating forces have the ability to prevent or delay the production of an unwanted incident against them and to resume activities after its occurrence.

The military action of force projection, especially for amphibious operations can not be separated from the maritime operations. During the force projection the result actions from coastal are influenced by the contribution of Naval Air Component and during its exercise on the coast, the success action of land forces influence the evolution of the joint actions at sea. In this case, military operations of power and force projection, integrates ships, aircraft and other military equipment that lends itself to operations in low-intensity military threat reduced to operations in times of crisis or fighting operations.

The force projection is a military action taking place both in peacetime and
in time of crisis or war. The force projection in time of crisis or war depends on actions taken since peacetime. In such cases operation force projection success is based on collection and availability of information peacetime and continues during operation.

I conclude that the two concepts differ in terms of operational art by its application so that the power projection is a strategic concept that involves political-diplomatic elements and the force projection concept is a tactical-operational because it requires deployment of forces in the field.

The importance of promoting conceptual aspects of maritime power and force projection by national doctrinal approach is relevant. For example in the US political leadership is constituted Military Service Commission. The role of the committee is divided by specialized subcommittees: tactical air and ground forces; military personnel; surveillance and investigations; operational forces; maritime power and force projection, strategic forces; capabilities and threats.

Subcommittee on maritime power and force projection has primary responsibility for control of the Navy and the Marines. Through its powers, authorize the programs of research, development and procurement of Navy and Marines. The aim is to prevent a decrease in the fighting power of US Navy. This subcommittee is committed to develop combat power, strengthening component Naval Air fleet and providing equipment needed for combat operations for fighters from the Marines.

I thereby emphasize the importance of developing capabilities for force projection of Romanian Navy, by monitoring of the doctrine to the practical aspect to highlight the potential of Romania’s maritime power.

The Black Sea region is a priority for NATO and the EU. I believe that each international actor has a different views and perspectives related to this issue. The picture region influences the challenges facing our country on the eastern border that is shared with NATO and the EU. On the other hand there is nothing new or spectacular considering that the Black Sea has a strategic relevance. Therefore I consider that one can not talk about differentiated measures to ensure NATO member countries and the EU.

I support a uniform approach to security throughout the alliance without taking into account the geographical layout. For each country, depending on the arrangement, it has a different perception of its role in collective security equation, seen from different perspectives the regional threats.

Therefore, I believe that every member (NATO, EU) must assess and improve the national power projection capabilities for participation in multinational operations, those for amphibious operations being a priority.

For this we need a naval doctrine that reflects our intentions with national foundations and community interests projection.

In this respect, I support the idea of standardization to ensure the optimal deployment of forces and capabilities for their projection.

We need to achieve the deployable force packages with rapid response capacity to potential threats, taking into account the hybrid type.

Also, I support the creation and development of amphibious capabilities that contribute to increasing the operational capacity of the force by increasing employment potential and force projection.

In order to develop an easily and fast deployable command and control structure for the multinationally compatible forces, the set up of the Joint Forces Command is an important step in this direction, as a result of experience.

The exploitation of the economic potential of Romania’s maritime power by building platforms for the naval power and force projection is meant to fulfill the
conceptual expression of the will and interest in the maritime domain.

Multinational cooperation is the expression of the international use of the power projection potential.

The existence of a doctrine is a key condition for achieving operational or tactical common perspectives, so important for success during military actions. In addition, it provides a common vocabulary for the forces involved, and also ensures communication in an integrated manner within the services and their forces.

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THE USE OF MARINE MAMMALS IN THE UNDERWATER WARFARE

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Abstract: This research is aimed at stressing out the necessity and importance of developing a program to use marine mammals in the underwater warfare for the discovery, identification, location and neutralization of underwater hazards. The real threats are underwater mines, combat divers, submarines or underwater vehicles, surveillance systems and other devices, but this paper draws attention to the existence of other underwater dangers and the potential threats they may pose. On this occasion may I remind the readers the resumption of the Romanian program on marine mammals used to defend against the submarine danger and other underwater activities like the underwater defense system in the Romanian Navy, in order to identify the necessary steps to be taken on board against mammals systems used in underwater warfare by a potential adversary.

Keywords: marine mammals, Romanian program on marine mammals, underwater warfare, the Romanian Navy.

Using the marine mammals in various activities in the marine environment or in environments that have contact with that initially started by the human desire to dominate and control animal life underwater in the simplest case for entertainment and then to exploit their potential to be used in an environment that was difficult for humans to control.

It is no secret that war generates competitions that are progress generating, so that to achieve superiority in the military; scientists identify any means to achieve objectives, including animals.

The emergence of human tendencies to approach the underwater field was initially due to the need of humanity’s boldest manifestations, then to manifest the desire to control the underwater environment.

Prior to using UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles) or underwater drones, several attempts appeared to use marine mammals in the conduct of various underwater activities. Due to the complexity or field, difficulty of work with the animals, or other challenges, it took time to create collective mammals programs, named Mammals to solve the need to monitor work with the marine mammals.

Thus aroused various control manifestations of marine mammals by initiating specific programs of simple activities in working with mammals, which were later enhanced in order to meet the initiator's needs.

Not infrequently growing cases of dolphin groups in the Black Sea have been spotted or reported with the presence of research or battle ships near the boundary of the free zone.

Today Mammals is much more than using marine mammals in the underwater environment. Mammals means a complex system of programs developed for specific activities underwater, from simple ones of research, discovery, location and identification of underwater objects, to underwater combat activities, both defensive and offensive.

The use and development of these programs occurred because mammals can perform naturally in this environment that for humanity has always been a challenge.

The purpose of this article is therefore to highlight the importance of exploiting the potential submarine combat
against any threats by the Romanian Navy (FNR) by knowing their existence and the way of working, the field in which they operate, in order to identify measures to combat them.

We know some of the main underwater threats, which are mines, combat divers, submarines or underwater vehicles, surveillance systems and other devices. Through this paper, I bring into attention the existence of other underwater hazards and their potential threats in order to identify appropriate measures to be taken by the Romanian Navy ships against the Marine Mammals Systems used in the underwater battle by a potential adversary.

To do this, I bring into attention the importance and role of the Mammals program, in the combat structures of a modern army, and I exemplify the place that it holds in the US Navy, which, along with China, Australia or the Russian Federation, is internationally known as a landmark in the field.

The US Naval Institute is developing the program Marine Mammal System [1] (MMS- marine mammals system) which aims mainly to use marine mammals in underwater warfare, including the fight against mines, fighting divers, other hazards, for current defensive actions like the safety control of the hull, recovering objects from the bottom, etc.

The US Navy's marine mammal program began in 1960 and developed afterwards. First, the US Navy began studying the animals’ deep diving and echo-location capabilities, and determined that the dolphins and sea lions could work in the open seas. In its progress, the program became part of the Naval Undersea Center (NUC), headquartered in San Diego. After that, the US Navy moved some of the animals there for further training, and later established a NUC laboratory at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, Hawaii.

After the US Navy had developed the Mammals systems by using them in various operations [2] (Cam Ranh Bay, 1970) [3], by developing the skills of search, recovery of rockets and ammunition exercise, the Navy subordinated the Mammals systems to the Naval Special Warfare / SEAL Force, thus functioning after 1980. Subsequently, the US Navy, focused on the use of expeditionary missions so that they now operate by ships in missions in the enemy littoral in the service of the US Navy EOD (US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal) [4].

The Mammals program is subordinated to the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service (EOD) of the US Navy (US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal) [5].

The Navy's Explosive Ordnance Disposal (Navy’s EOD) force maintains that it is this small element (i.e., the Marine Mammal Systems - MMS) that provides a unique capability by using mammals’ abilities. That system offers an important support for mine countermeasures in the underwater warfare, or for detecting and marking an adversary's combat swimmers. The mammals program is often checked in Navy exercises, and the results are amazing [6].

The Marine Mammal Systems (MMS) is made up of specially trained bottlenose dolphins and sea lions that use their natural abilities to detect and locate underwater objects. The sea lions or dolphins have the advantages of evolution that offer mammals the perfect abilities for this operational environment. They offer the effective and efficient way to solve important and complex missions of the Navy.

Generally, the EOD mission is to eliminate the hazards from Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), which paralyzes operations in support of the national security strategy. The EOD functions are to detect, locate, access, identify, render safe, recover/exploit and dispose the UXO.

The EOD threats are on the surface, in the air and in the underwater area. The EOD threats are conventional ordnance
like chemical, biological or nuclear type and the unconventional devices like improved explosive devices (IED), weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and chemical/biological/nuclear disposals.

According to the Department of the Navy, “the primary mission of U.S. Navy EOD is to provide direct combat support to joint forces, to enable access to areas denied by explosive ordnance and to facilitate the operational mobility and battle space maneuver”. [7]

The Operational Capabilities of the US Navy EOD shall maintain a maximum state of readiness. The Operational Capabilities are required (ROC - required operational capabilities) to project in the operational environments (POE - projected operational environments).

General categories of EOD support include the EOD combat service operations in support of joint force operational mobility and battlefield maneuver, the EOD operations ashore or underwater in support of fleet and shore establishments, assistance in the clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO) remaining in former combat zones, the EOD support during nuclear weapons incidents, the EOD defense support of civil authorities, the assistance in the development of allied nation EOD programs, diving, underwater object location, recovery, and demolition services required to support salvage, limited ships husbandry, oceanographic, and other Navy requirements, the support to ships and stations in planning and conducting training in areas of firefighting and damage control involving explosives, explosives safety, disaster control, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) monitoring, emergency personnel decontamination and emergency destruction procedures.

The EOD support includes, among general missions, the diving, underwater object location, recovery, and demolition services required to support salvaging. Here comes the role of marine mammals; these missions are executed by the EOD MMS.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Units (EOD MUs) report administratively to Explosive Ordnance Disposal, under their Type Commander, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC).

The EOD MU is designated to execute mine searching, reconnaissance and clearance missions.

All Navy EOD MU forces are dive-qualified to provide combat-ready forces capable of rapid worldwide deployment in support of national interests.

For that, the EOD MU is composed of the Combatant Craft Units to insert and extract forces from over the horizon to proximity of the VSW zone, conducts diversionary operations, and provides force protection Unmanned systems company to conduct IPOE (intelligence preparation of the environment), mine hunting, and battle-space situational awareness enhancement using the UUV (Swordfish unmanned under-water vehicle) and various unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

The EOD MUs originated from the Special Forces and have MCM capabilities (Mine Counter Measures), operated in the VSW.

Like other EOD MU, these are also organized for deeper water MCM and other EOD missions as well.

A key mission for these units EOD MCM is the conduct of underwater mine and obstacle reconnaissance and clearance operations from over the horizon to the seaward edge of the surf zone (SZ) and in confined areas including ports and harbors.

EOD MCM detachments operate from the MCM-1 class ships, other platforms, and ashore to reacquire, identify, and neutralize mines in deep waters into about the 12 meters depth. They also support combatant commanders’ anti-terrorism force protection requirements performing pre-arrival dives to conduct pier inspections.
On the other hand, the EOD MU is composed of the Marine Mammal Company. That has the role to locate and neutralize deep and shallow water, moored and bottom mines employing different species of marine mammals, like sea lions or dolphins. These are organized in the aforementioned systems (MK4, MK5, MK6, MK7 and MK8) [8] specially trained for specific different missions of each marine mammal systems.

The use of marine mammals is not a new activity, but with the need for implementing emerging measures against the use of mines, these agile animals are becoming again a way of identifying and marking the potential underwater threats, used worldwide.

For mission, the mammals are transported by aircraft specially equipped with tanks that provide a suitable environment for their transportation in different areas of operations. The US owns over 100 dolphins and sea lions, different species, white whales, porpoises and killer whales, ready at any time for missions. In the program are included 300 mammals in various stages of preparation [9].

In the EOD MU composition take part the divers’ group; this aims at reacquiring and neutralizing mines marked by UUV systems or mammals in areas for which they were discovered.

The PMS-EOD is a program management (Service) Office Explosive Ordnance Disposal which provides life cycle management of the Joint Service EOD Programs, Underwater EOD Programs for divers, form Marine Mammal Programs and UUV.

The EOD Underwater UXO “Tool bag” are a tactical Integration of small UUV, with Divers & MMM Forces [10].

For example, the Multi-capability Enhancement Program (MCEP) [11], is part of the PMS-EOD-management software (Service) Explosive Ordnance Disposal Office and operating systems with the following categories MK4, MK7 and MK8 order to realize their interoperability.

The program provides support for the full range of MCM missions. The program also supports the entire MCM missions in DW (Deep Water), SW (Shallow Water) and VSW zones (Very Shallow Water), operates in pre-assault and permissive environments, in exploratory or clearance mode, reports bottom and moored mines, performs searches station-to-station for buried targets. The MCEP Detachment provides full capability to perform the full MMS MCM mission.

As operative structures, the EOD MMS consists of special dedicated systems (generically named MK4, MK5, MK6,
MK7 and MK8), which are interoperable and have the main task of fighting underwater, being specialized in detecting objects underwater and in defense against divers.

EOD MMS systems provide an enhanced capability to detect, identify, mark, render safe, recover and neutralize objects within the water column.

The Navy Operational Detachments MMS include mammals located at EOD Mobile Unit deployed from San Diego (dolphins and sea lions) and EOD Mobile Unit in Charleston (sea lions).

Another group of mammals are owned by the Command Navy Ocean Surveillance Center in San Diego. This group is trained for MCM tasks or to serve other support missions. This group also includes mammals that have "retired" after many years of service.

Each fleet MMS detachment includes four to eight dolphins or sea lions, which can be quickly deployed by strategic airlift to any part of the world and can be operated from ships in forward areas.

They can act in the deep water (more than 100 m), shallow water (12 to 100 m), and Very Shallow Water (VSW) (3 to 12 m) zones of the littoral battle space.

The MK4 MMS conducts moored mine hunting and neutralization operations in the deep and shallow water zone.

The MK4 system has dolphins able to detect mines and attach neutralization charges on the mooring cables of close-tethered mines buoyant mines that are moored to anchors with the mine case close to the bottom to make them more difficult to detect, locate and neutralize.

The MK5 system has Sea lions which are able to attach recovery pendants to exercise mines, torpedoes and other test objects, equipped with acoustic pulse system.

The teams of four sea lions in Charleston and San Diego have recovered more than 95% of the test and exercise mines, torpedoes, and other ordnance configured for sea lion recovery [12]. The sea lions' operational envelope recently has been expanded to depths of 300 m.

The MK6 MMS conducts swimmer detection and defense within ports and anchorages, alerting maritime security forces of the presence of combat swimmers and underwater vehicle delivery systems in proximity to high value assets.

The MK6 has dolphins able to provide defense missions for ports, moorings and individual vessels or divers against other mammals.

It was first used at Cam Ranh Bay during 1970-1971, and an MK6 system deployed to Bahrain in 1987-1988 during Operation Earnest Will [13].

The MK6 is easily deployable on very short notice - as are all of the Navy's Marine Mammal Systems - requiring one C-5 (a large military transport aircraft, with a heavy intercontinental-range strategic airlift capability) to transport support vans, small boats, and equipment.

The MK7 MMS conducts mine hunting and neutralization operations against bottom, moored and buried mines in shallow waters and VSW zones.

The MK7 system operates with dolphins able to detect, locate, and mark or neutralize "proud" bottom mines - those that are on the surface of the seafloor - and buried mines. These animals are today the only operational buried-mine detection and neutralization capability worldwide.

The MK8 MMS conducts low-observable mine hunting operations in the VSW zone.

The MK4 and MK7 MCM MMS are integrated operational systems of the US Navy, especially against mines. They have demonstrated their ability to operate for long periods for ships deployed in forward areas.

For example, during the exercise Bell Thunder '93 and Bell Thunder '95 squads MMS aboard of USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43) [14] and Cleveland
anti-amphibious mines were detected in shallow water.

In Rim Pac '94 [16], the Navy operated three dolphins MK4 and four MK7 MMS on the USS Juneau (LPD-10) to assess integration in various surface missions and EOD MCM, and to evaluate the ability of marine mammals to conduct MCM operations on a surface ship on sea.

The capabilities of these platoons can be supported from a well-deck equipped amphibious ship or from expeditionary shore facilities within small boat range of the area of operations. In these cases the role of the EOD MMS PLT are specific for amphibious operations.

MK4, MK6, and MK7 MMS are led by an active-duty command and control cell of two to four personnel and operated by civilian contractors. MK8 MMS is manned, led, and operated by 16 active-duty personnel.

An important aspect of the Mammals program is that the program owner, i.e., the US Navy, must operate their program of marine mammals under international regulations promulgated under the Act on the Protection of Marine Mammals, Animal Protection Law and various other statutes and regulations governing their ownership and care.

The costs can vary by program component systems, starting from a few million dollars, but pays off in a short time.

The animals that can be used in such missions vary in species of whales, sea lions, dolphins or seals. The characteristics of different species of marine mammals that can be exploited in MCM missions are presented in the table below [17]:

In conclusion, I want to highlight the advantages of using marine mammals in the Romanian Navy as compared to the disadvantages of implementing such a program:

- covering an area which apparently appears untouchable and dealing with an environment full of unpredictability. The purposes, even if they seem intangible, easily ensure full execution of missions in an environment that is native for mammals.
  - carrying out missions in addition to high operating costs and providing the ease of their execution.

For example, the hull control will be executed in safety with maximum effectiveness and efficiency. The recovery of ammunition and exercise projectiles will be done easily. Aquatory control of ports, place of residence of ships or districts for the deployment of missions, the divers’ existence, underwater research means or explosives, will be more effective.

The identification or discovery of mammals involved with missions in the ports is an advantage of the program along with the implementation of measures to counteract the action of opponent marine mammals.

Hull control for the existence of foreign objects on the hull will be easily performed.

Mine hunting will be covered by mammals systems, more efficient and more revolutionary, because marine mammals perform in their natural environment.

It provides coverage and countering to a new range of missions in a combat area that offers many opportunities.

This can emphasize the importance of the role, place and Mammals existing benefits program in the Romanian Navy, along with the UUV, along with divers, whom we already own, the American model being an example of organization.

Using the experience gained in the use of US Navy programs can lead to reduced costs for implementing the national program.

One must not forget the importance of trainers in carrying out such a program, the qualities required from coordinators, as well as the affective instructors’ connection with marine mammals.
**Table 1. Table showing different species of marine mammals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family and Scientific Name</th>
<th>Common Name</th>
<th>Federal Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Order Cetacea</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suborder Mysticeti (baleen whales)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Balaenidae (right whales)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Eubalaena glacialis</em></td>
<td>North Atlantic right whale</td>
<td>Endangered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Balaenopteridae (rorquals)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Megaptera novaeangliae</em></td>
<td>Humpback whale</td>
<td>Endangered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Balaenoptera acutorostrata</em></td>
<td>Minke whale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Balaenoptera brydei</em></td>
<td>Bryde’s whale</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Balaenoptera borealis</em></td>
<td>Sei whale</td>
<td>Endangered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Balaenoptera physalus</em></td>
<td>Fin whale</td>
<td>Endangered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Balaenoptera musculus</em></td>
<td>Blue whale</td>
<td>Endangered</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Suborder Odontoceti (toothed whales)** |             |                |
| **Family Physeteridae (sperm whale)** |             |                |
| *Physeter macrocephalus* | Sperm whale | Endangered |
| **Family Kogiidae (pygmy sperm whales)** |             |                |
| *Kogia breviceps* | Pygmy sperm whale |         |
| *Kogia sima* | Dwarf sperm whale |         |
| **Family Ziphiidae (beaked whales)** |             |                |
| *Ziphius cavirostris* | Cuvier's beaked whale |         |
| *Mesoplodon mirus* | True's beaked whale |         |
| *Mesoplodon europaeus* | Gervais' beaked whale |         |
| *Mesoplodon densirostris* | Blainville's beaked whale |         |
| **Family Delphinidae (dolphins)** |             |                |
| *Steno bredanensis* | Rough-toothed dolphin |         |
| *Turusps truncatus* | Bottlenose dolphin |         |
| *Stenella attenuata* | Pantropical spotted dolphin |         |
| *Stenella frontalis* | Atlantic spotted dolphin |         |
| *Stenella longirostris* | Spinner dolphin |         |
| *Stenella clymene* | Clymene dolphin |         |
| *Stenella coeruleoalba* | Striped dolphin |         |
| *Lagenodelphis hosei* | Fraser's dolphin |         |
| *Grampus griseus* | Risso's dolphin |         |
| *Pepinocephala electra* | Melon-headed whale |         |
| *Feresa attenuata* | Pygmy killer whale |         |
| *Pseudorca crassidens* | False killer whale |         |
| *Orcinus orca* | Killer whale |         |
| *Globicephala macrorhynchus* | Short-finned pilot whale |         |

**Order Pinipede / family Otaridae / subfamily / Otariinae / Sea Lion Species**

| *Zalophus californianus* | California Sea Lion |
| *Eumetopias jubatus* | Steller Sea Lion |
| *Neophoca cinerea* | Australian Sea Lion |
| *Zalophus wollebaeki* | Galapagos Sea Lion |
| *Arctocephalus forsteri* | New Zealand Sea Lion |
| *Arctocephalus australis* | South American Sea Lion |

**Order Pinipede / family Phocidae / subfamily Arctocephalinae / Fur Seals**

| *Callorhinus ursinus* | Northern Fur Seal |
| *Arctocephalus galapagoensis* | Galapagos Fur Seal |
| *Arctocephalus gazella* | Antarctic Fur Seal |

For this I propose that instructors teams of 2 to 4 be trained in the centers in the USA. For selection purposes, they must be endowed with: teamwork capacity; love for animals; diving skills; some experience in working with marine mammals.
It is equally important to initiate a program to start from similar schemes that include MK5 and MK6 in order to subsequently develop other systems MK4 and MK7, especially because MK8 needs to be implemented after having acquired some experience.

Among the disadvantages of program I can mention that working with animals involves attention, respecting the legislation, permanent counseling, specialized medical care, etc.

The program costs cannot be calculated precisely because of the central objective of the program, i.e., the marine animals, creatures that require special attention - both emotional and financial. In the USA the initial costs amounted to millions of dollars and decreased after four years close to the operating costs, the salary costs of instructors and personnel, food for the mammals, training costs, health care, living expenses and other expenses.

In my opinion, it should not be large, but when compared with the operating costs of the Dolphinarium in Constanta, which mammals manage are in a profitable activities. But for the purposes for which they are intended, the Mammals program justifies its costs, relative to the benefits of the program.

Since the promotion of the initiative the question What do we need it for? or What is it useful for? will permanently rise because the program does not have directly visible results, but they result from the indirect effects that they will produce.

Apparently it is resource-intensive and the finalities are not tangible, but if we look at its historical evolution, the program has provided various successful outcomes, for example at Palm Beach - where the divers were rejected due to the presence of specially trained dolphins to Vietnam and Irak actions [18].

Based on the experience of the US Navy in the Mammals program management (MMS), and in virtue of the bilateral relations, the Romanian Navy can develop such a program.

FNR may initiate such a program to perform tasks using sophisticated and complex underwater marine mammals under the guidance of Naval Research and Development Center from San Diego, which is the spearhead in the training capabilities of these highly intelligent marine animals.

Mammals can be purchased on the US or Chinese markets and may be involved initially in the US Navy centers as a partnership program.

Because of the instruction techniques based on behavioral mammalian sciences, the FNR can run a training program conducted by instructors identical to the Dolphinarium in Constanta, possessing the knowledge necessary to prepare new instructors in the field. But to conduct such a program basic training and special equipment are required; so, in my opinion it may value the potential of Mangalia naval base.

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